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Foreign Relations of the United States 1948

Volume V

The Near East,
South Asia,
and Africa

(in two parts)
Part 2



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PREFACE

Part 2 of this volume was prepared under the direct supervision of the late S. Everett Gleason, former Editor of *Foreign Relations*, and of William M. Franklin, former Director of the Historical Office.

Herbert A. Fine and (at a later stage) Paul Claussen compiled part 2. Ruth M. Worthing provided editorial and research assistance.

The editors acknowledge with appreciation the assistance provided them by the historians of the Department of Defense, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and by the Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri. They are also grateful for the cooperation of the National Security Council, the Department of Defense, and the Central Intelligence Agency, which concurred in the declassification of various papers for release herein.

The technical editing was done by Helen V. Gilbert of the Publishing and Reproduction Division, headed by Willard M. McLaughlin. The index for part 2 was prepared by Francis C. Prescott.

Part 1, released in August 1975 as Department of State publication 8802, includes documentation on South Asia and Africa as well as on multilateral relations in the Near East and on Egypt, Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia.

FREDRICK AANDAHL
Acting Director, Historical Office
Bureau of Public Affairs

PRINCIPLES FOR THE COMPILATION AND EDITING OF "FOREIGN RELATIONS"

The principles which guide the compilation and editing of *Foreign Relations* are stated in Department of State Regulation 2 FAM 1350 of June 15, 1961, a revision of the order approved on March 26, 1925, by Mr. Frank B. Kellogg, then Secretary of State. The text of the regulation, as further amended, is printed below :

1350 DOCUMENTARY RECORD OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY

1351 *Scope of Documentation*

The publication *Foreign Relations of the United States* constitutes the official record of the foreign policy of the United States. These volumes include, subject to necessary security considerations, all docu-

ments needed to give a comprehensive record of the major foreign policy decisions within the range of the Department of State's responsibilities, together with appropriate materials concerning the facts which contributed to the formulation of policies. When further material is needed to supplement the documentation in the Department's files for a proper understanding of the relevant policies of the United States, such papers should be obtained from other Government agencies.

1352 *Editorial Preparation*

The basic documentary diplomatic record to be printed in *Foreign Relations of the United States* is edited by the Historical Office, Bureau of Public Affairs of the Department of State. The editing of the record is guided by the principles of historical objectivity. There may be no alteration of the text, no deletions without indicating where in the text the deletion is made, and no omission of facts which were of major importance in reaching a decision. Nothing may be omitted for the purpose of concealing or glossing over what might be regarded by some as a defect of policy. However, certain omissions of documents are permissible for the following reasons:

- a. To avoid publication of matters which would tend to impede current diplomatic negotiations or other business.
- b. To condense the record and avoid repetition of needless details.
- c. To preserve the confidence reposed in the Department by individuals and by foreign governments.
- d. To avoid giving needless offense to other nationalities or individuals.
- e. To eliminate personal opinions presented in despatches and not acted upon by the Department. To this consideration there is one qualification—in connection with major decisions it is desirable, where possible, to show the alternative presented to the Department before the decision was made.

1353 *Clearance*

To obtain appropriate clearances of material to be published in *Foreign Relations of the United States*, the Historical Office:

- a. Refers to the appropriate policy offices of the Department and of other agencies of the Government such papers as appear to require policy clearance.
- b. Refers to the appropriate foreign governments requests for permission to print as part of the diplomatic correspondence of the United States those previously unpublished documents which were originated by the foreign governments.

CONTENTS

	Page
PREFACE.	III
INTRODUCTION.	VII
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND SYMBOLS.	XIII
ISRAEL:	
Interest of the United States in the Arab-Israeli controversy over the future status of Palestine; the issue at the United Nations; creation of the state of Israel; entry of Arab forces into Palestine.	533
APPENDIX—Resolution 181 (II) Concerning the Future Government of Palestine, Adopted by the General Assembly on November 29, 1947.	1709
INDEX.	iii

MAPS

Military Situation—11 June 1948 (<i>in color</i>).	<i>facing</i> 1200
Military Situation—18 July 1948 (<i>in color</i>).	<i>facing</i> 1240
Palestine—Plan of Partition with Economic Union proposed by the <i>Ad Hoc</i> Committee on the Palestinian Question (<i>in color</i>).	<i>facing</i> 1730
City of Jerusalem—Boundaries Proposed; Proposed by the <i>Ad Hoc</i> Com- mittee on the Palestinian Question.	<i>facing</i> 1730



Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, Volume V, Part 2

ERRATA

On page 935, Clifford memorandum, second paragraph, replace line one with the following:

1. Considerable doubt as to the advantage of the British "Neutral

On page 982, telegram 327, first paragraph, first sentence, replace the word "Spanish" with:

Special

INTRODUCTION

SCOPE OF COVERAGE

Part 2 of this volume presents documentation on the interest and policies of the United States with respect to the Palestine question and the creation of the state of Israel during the year 1948. It begins in the aftermath of the resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on November 29, 1947, on the future government of Palestine, which provided for the partition of the area into separate Arab and Jewish states bound together by a system of economic union, with an international area for Jerusalem. Major subjects in the early months of 1948 which are documented in part 2 are United States exchanges with Arab and Jewish leaders and other interested powers at the United Nations and at world capitals, consideration of the problem of enforcing the partition resolution, the reports of the United Nations Palestine Commission, the United States proposal in the Security Council in March for the establishment of a temporary trusteeship for Palestine, and the convening of the Second Special Session of the General Assembly in April. Also presented in the early portion of this part are documents regarding the attitude of the United States toward the continuation of fighting in Palestine, the interest of the United States in the achievement of a cessation of hostilities, and support for the Security Council Truce Commission and for the appointment of a United Nations Mediator in Palestine.

Part 2 continues with papers concerning the events of May 14 and after: The expiration of the British mandate for Palestine, the proclamation of the independence of the state of Israel, the extension by the United States of *de facto* recognition to the Provisional Government of Israel, and the entry of Arab forces into Palestine. Documentation is included on United States bilateral relations with Israel, including the exchange of special representatives and Israel's request for military and financial aid. Documentation is also included on the United States position with respect to the various truce resolutions adopted by the Security Council; the recommendations of the United Nations Mediator and, following his assassination, the work of the Acting Mediator; and the question of arrangements for the city of Jerusalem. Papers are also presented on the consideration of the Palestine question at the Third Regular Session of the General Assembly which opened at Paris on September 21, 1948, and lasted until December 12.

These considerations included the Mediator's report, assistance to Palestine refugees, and the establishment of the Palestine Conciliation Commission. The volume and the year 1948 conclude with the entry of Israeli forces into Egyptian territory and the Security Council's resolution of December 29 calling for a permanent armistice in all sectors of Palestine.

The editors have attempted to account for all major United States policy decisions with respect to Palestine and Israel in the year 1948, and to include as many examples as possible within the limits of space of political reporting by United States missions on which these decisions were based. The texts of various categories of papers dealing with overlapping aspects of the Palestine situation are printed in one chronological sequence, and include telegrams, airgrams, instructions, and despatches to and from United States missions; notes exchanged with foreign heads of government and diplomatic representatives; correspondence of the President, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense; memoranda, position papers, and analytical papers prepared by the President's immediate advisers and by the National Security Council, Department of State, and Central Intelligence Agency; and memoranda of conversations with Arab and Jewish leaders and representatives of interested states. Where documents concerning significant situations, events, meetings, or exchanges of correspondence were not available, editorial notes have been provided to set forth what is known from available official or unofficial sources. The texts of a number of documents which are relevant but of secondary importance have been summarized in footnotes and editorial notes.

SOURCES

In view of the strong interest in the Palestine question and the creation of the state of Israel on the part of President Truman and his advisers, as well as the involvement of executive agencies other than the Department of State, the editors have made extensive use of appropriate files outside the Department of State in order to make the record herein presented as complete as possible. The papers printed in part 2 of this volume, except for a few items reprinted from published sources, were drawn from the following files and collections of official and private papers:

A. INSIDE THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1. *Indexed Central Files*. Papers in the indexed Central Files of the Department for the year 1948, now located in the National Archives Building in the custody of the National Archives and Records Service, are indicated by a decimal file number in the headnote. A few docu-

ments or copies of documents originally in the unindexed files of offices of the Department or in retired "lot files" (numbers 2 through 7, *infra*) have been indexed and deposited in the Central Files.

2. *S/S—NSC Files, Lot 63 D 351*. Serial master file of National Security Council documents and correspondence and related Department of State memoranda, as maintained by the Executive Secretariat of the Department of State.

3. *PPS Files, Lot 64 D 563*. Master file of documents, drafts, records of meetings, memoranda, and related correspondence for the years 1947–1953 of the Policy Planning Staff.

4. *IO Files*. Master files of the Reference and Documents Section of the Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State.

5. *USUN Files*. Files of the United States Mission to the United Nations.

6. *L Files*. Files of the Office of the Legal Adviser.

7. *News Division Files*. Files of the former News Division, including memoranda of the press conferences of the Secretary of State, 1935–1955.

8. *London Embassy Files*. The files for the year 1948 of the American Embassy at London, now located at the Federal Records Center, Suitland, Maryland.

9. *Paris Embassy Files*. The files for the year 1948 of the American Embassy at Paris, now located at the Federal Records Center, Suitland, Maryland.

B. OUTSIDE THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1. *Truman Papers*. The papers of President Harry S. Truman in the Harry S. Truman Library at Independence, Missouri. Although the Truman Papers were not entirely processed and open for research at the time this volume was prepared, the editors have included the most important and relevant papers concerning Palestine and Israel in 1948 from those that were available.

2. *Clifford Papers*. The papers of Clark M. Clifford, Special Counsel to President Truman, in the Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

3. *Elsey Papers*. The papers of George M. Elsey, Assistant to Clark M. Clifford, in the Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

4. *Forrestal Papers*. The papers of Secretary of Defense James Forrestal, in the Princeton University Library, Princeton, New Jersey.

5. *Murphy Files*. The files of Charles S. Murphy, Administrative Assistant to President Truman, in the Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri.

6. *CIA Files*. Files of the Central Intelligence Agency.

7. *Department of Defense Files*. Files of the Office of the Secretary of Defense for the year 1948, now in the National Archives.

In addition the editors consulted but did not include material from the papers of Philip C. Jessup and Francis B. Sayre in the Library of Congress, and the papers of Warren R. Austin in the Library of the University of Vermont.

The editors also interviewed or corresponded with Clark M. Clifford, George M. Elsey, Loy W. Henderson, Robert M. McClintock, and Dean Rusk.

PUBLISHED WORKS

Much authoritative information is to be found in unofficial accounts by those who participated in the events covered by part 2 of this volume, or by authors who later interviewed those participants. In view of the occasional incompleteness of the official record on some aspects of the events of 1948 in the Near East, the editors have made use of such unofficial publications and have cited them for factual information which was noted as being specifically supplementary to, or at variance with, the official record. The Department of State assumes no responsibility for the accuracy of fact or interpretation in these unofficial publications.

In addition to the *Foreign Relations of the United States* volumes, the Department of State *Bulletin*, and published documents of the United Nations, the official and unofficial publications listed below were found to be of particular value in the preparation of part 2. Other publications consulted by the editors are identified in editorial notes and footnotes.

Ian J. Bickerton, "President Truman's Recognition of Israel", *American Jewish Historical Quarterly*, December 1968

Jonathan Daniels, *The Man of Independence* (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1950)

John Foster Dulles, *War or Peace* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1950)

Dan Kurzman, *Genesis 1948: The First Arab-Israeli War* (New York: World Publishing Company, 1970)

Trygve Lie, *In the Cause of Peace* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1954)

James G. McDonald, *My Mission to Israel, 1948-1951* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1951)

Walter Millis (ed.), *The Forrestal Diaries* (New York: The Viking Press, 1951)

Bernard Postal and Henry W. Levy, *And the Hills Shouted for Joy: The Day Israel Was Born* (New York: David McKay Company, 1973)

Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1948 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964)

Moshe Sharett, *Be-Sha'ar ha Umot* [At the Threshold of Statehood] (Tel Aviv: Am Ovid, 1958)

John Snetsinger, *Truman, the Jewish Vote, and the Creation of Israel* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1974)

Harry S. Truman. *Memoirs*, vol. 2: *Years of Trial and Hope* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1956)

Margaret Truman, *Harry S. Truman* (New York : William Morrow and Company, 1973)

United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, *A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941-49*, Senate Doc. 123, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington : U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950)

Chaim Weizmann, *Trial and Error: The Autobiography of Chaim Weizmann* (New York : Harper & Brothers, 1949)

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND SYMBOLS

EDITOR'S NOTE.—This list does not include standard abbreviations in common usage; unusual abbreviations of rare occurrence which are clarified at appropriate points; and those abbreviations and contractions which, although uncommon, are understandable from the context.

- A-A**, Assistant Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Armour)
AA, anti-aircraft
AAUN, American Association for the United Nations
AGP, Arab Government of Palestine (at Gaza)
AHC, Arab Higher Committee
AHE, Arab Higher (Committee) Executive
AIOC, Anglo-Iranian Oil Company
AIT, Anglo-Iraqi Treaty (1948)
AL, Arab League
AL, Arab Legion (Transjordan)
Amcross, American Red Cross
AmExp, American Export Lines
Aminco, American Independent Oil Company
AMMIA, American Military Mission with the Iranian Army
AMVat, series indicator for telegrams from the American Mission at the Vatican
AP, Associated Press
Aramco, Arabian American Oil Company
ARMISH, American Military Mission with the Iranian Army
ATC, Air Transport Command
BC, Division of British Commonwealth Affairs, Department of State
Black, series indicator for certain telegrams sent by the White House to the Department of State
Blue, series indicator for certain telegrams sent by the White House to the Department of State
BMEO, British Middle East Office
CAA, Civil Aeronautics Administration
CAB, Civil Aeronautics Board
CC, Conciliation Commission (for Palestine)
CEEC, Committee for European Economic Cooperation
CFP, *Compagnie Française des Pétroles*
CG, Consulate General
CIA, Central Intelligence Agency
CICR, International Committee of the Red Cross
CINC, Commander in Chief
cirtel, circular telegram
CNO, Chief of Naval Operations
CO, Commanding Officer
Comkas, series indicator for telegrams from the United States Representative on the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan
COMMUN, Indian Delegation to the United Nations Commission on India and Pakistan
Contel, Consulate telegram
CP, Division of Commercial Policy, Department of State
CPS, Communist parties
CRL, Consolidated Refineries, Ltd.
CRO, Commonwealth Relations Office (British)
CRYPTO, military message indicator
CSGID, Ground Intelligence Division, General Staff, Office of the Chief of Staff, United States Army
DA, Division of Dependent Area Affairs, Department of State
Del, Delegation, Delegate
Delga, series indicator for telegrams from the United States Delegation at the United Nations General Assembly
Depcirtel, Department of State circular telegram

- Depintel**, Department of State circular information telegram
Deptel, Department of State telegram
Deptreftel, Department of State reference telegram
dipcorps, diplomatic corps
DP, displaced person
DRN, Division of Research for Near East and Africa, Department of State
E, Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
EAD, External Affairs Department (India)
ECA, Economic Cooperation Administration
ECME, Economic Commission for the Middle East (United Nations)
ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council of the United Nations
ED, Division of Investment and Economic Development, Department of State
Emdesp, Embassy despatch
Embtel, Embassy telegram
ERP, European Recovery Program
EUCOM, European Command, United States Army
EUR, Office of European Affairs, Department of State
FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization
FBI, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice
FLC, Foreign Liquidation Commissioner, Department of State
FN, Division of Financial Affairs, Department of State
FO, Foreign Office
FonOff, Foreign Office
FoSec, Foreign Secretary
FSO, Foreign Service Officer
GA, General Assembly of the United Nations
GADel, General Assembly Delegation (United States), also Gadel, series indicator for telegrams to the United States Delegation at the United Nations General Assembly
GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GAUN, General Assembly of the United Nations
GMT, Greenwich Mean Time
GOC, General Officer Commanding
GOI, Government of India
GOP, Government of Pakistan
GTI, Division of Greek, Turkish, and Iranian Affairs, Department of State
HE, His Excellency
HMG, His Majesty's Government
HQ, Headquarters
HRH, His Royal Highness
HSO, Highest staff officer
Hydel, Hyderabad delegation
IC, Interim Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations
ICEF, International Children's Emergency Fund
ICJ, International Court of Justice
ICRC, International Committee of the Red Cross
INA, Indian Army
INDel, Indian Delegation
infotel, information telegram
IO, Reference and Documents Section, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
IPC, Iraq Petroleum Company, Ltd.
IR, International Resources Division, Department of State
IRC, International Red Cross
IRO, International Refugee Organization
IS, Division of International Security Affairs, Department of State
ITO, International Trade Organization
IZL, Irgun Zvai Leumi
JA, Jewish Agency for Palestine
JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff
JTA, Jewish Telegraphic Agency
Kascom, series indicator for telegrams to the United States Representative on the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan
L (Le), Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State
L/P (Le/P), Assistant Legal Adviser for Political Affairs (Snow), Department of State
MA, Military Attaché; also series indicator for telegrams from Military Attachés to the War Department
Martel, series indicator for telegrams from Secretary of State Marshall while away from Washington

MD, Munitions Division, Department of State
ME, Middle East
Mistel, Mission telegram
mytel, my telegram
NE, Division of Near Eastern Affairs, Department of State; also Near Eastern or Near East
NEA, Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, Department of State
NEDC, Near East Development Corporation
niact, night action, communications indicator requiring attention by the recipient at any hour of the day or night
NME, National Military Establishment
NSC, National Security Council
NWFP, North-West Frontier Province
OFD, Office of Financial and Development Policy, Department of State
OIE, Office of Information and Educational Exchange, Department of State
OIR/GE, Special Adviser on Geography in the Office of Intelligence Research, Department of State
PA, Plebiscite Administrator (Kashmir boundary question)
PAK, Pakistan
PCG, Provisional Councils of Government (Palestine)
PCIRO, Preparatory Commission for the International Refugee Organization
PD, Passport Division, Department of State
PED, Petroleum Division, Department of State
PG, Persian Gulf
PGI, Provisional Government of Israel
PM, Prime Minister
PPS, designation for documents by the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
PriMin, Prime Minister
RAF, Royal Air Force (British)
RC, Red Cross
reDeptel, regarding Department of State telegram
reEmbtel, regarding Embassy telegram

reftel, reference telegram
remytel, regarding my telegram
reurtel, regarding your telegram
RIAF, Royal Indian Air Force
RSFSR, Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic
S/, designation for documents issued by the Security Council
S/P, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
S/P.V., Plenary verbatim records of the Security Council
S/S, Executive Secretariat, Department of State
SAG, Saudi Arabian Government
SC, Security Council of the United Nations
SCTC, United Nations Security Council Truce Commission
SD, Shipping Division, Department of State
Sec. Gen., Secretary-General
SGUN, Secretary-General of the United Nations
SOA, Division of South Asian Affairs, Department of State
Socony, Standard Oil Company of New York
SPA, Office of Special Political Affairs, Department of State
SWNCC, State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee
SYG, Secretary-General
Tapline, Trans-Arabian Pipeline Company
TC, United Nations Security Council Truce Commission
TC, Trusteeship Council of the United Nations
Telmar, series indicator for telegrams to Secretary of State Marshall while away from Washington
TJ, Transjordan
TS, Top Secret
TVA, Tennessee Valley Authority
U, Under Secretary of State (Lovett)
UKDel, United Kingdom Delegation
UKUN, United Kingdom Delegation at the United Nations
UNA, Office of United Nations Affairs, Department of State
UNCIP, United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan

- UNESCO**, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
- UNGA**, United Nations General Assembly
- UNICEF**, United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund
- UNMis**, United States Mission at the United Nations
- UNO**, United Nations Organization
- UNS**, Division of International Security Affairs, Department of State
- UNSC**, United Nations Security Council
- UNSCOB**, United Nations Special Committee on the Balkans
- UNSCOP**, United Nations Special Committee on Palestine
- UNTC**, United Nations Security Truce Commission
- UP**, United Press
- urdes**, your despatch
- urtel**, your telegram
- USAF**, United States Air Force
- USDel**, United States Delegation
- USG**, United States Government
- USGADel**, United States Delegation at the United Nations General Assembly
- USIE**, United States Information and Educational Exchange Program
- USMC**, United States Marine Corps
- USUN**, United States Mission at the United Nations
- WARX**, series indicator for telegrams sent overseas by the Department of the Army or by Army Headquarters, Washington
- Weeka**, weekly, inter-agency, summary analysis from United States diplomatic missions
- White**, series indicator for certain telegrams sent by the Department of State to the White House
- WHO**, World Health Organization

ISRAEL

INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONTROVERSY OVER THE FUTURE STATUS OF PALESTINE; THE ISSUE AT THE UNITED NATIONS;¹ CREATION OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL; ENTRY OF ARAB FORCES INTO PALESTINE

867N.01/1-548

The British Embassy to the Department of State

TOP SECRET

G2/-/47

MEMORANDUM

During a conversation between Mr. Bevin² and Mr. Marshall in London on the 17th December,³ Mr. Bevin said that the reactions of the Arab Governments to the recommendations of the United Nations on Palestine⁴ had been worse than he had expected, in spite of the efforts which were being made by British representatives in the Arab states to bring the Governments concerned to a more reasonable frame of mind. Mr. Bevin added that he was proposing to see Arab representatives in London, one by one, in order to steady them. The British Government feared that the situation in the Middle East might get out of control and seriously endanger the U.S. and British position there, which could only benefit the Soviet Union.

2. In amplification of Mr. Bevin's remarks, and in the spirit of the recent conversations on the Middle East between United States and United Kingdom representatives,⁵ the following summary is provided, for the strictly confidential information of the State Department, of

¹ Continued from *Foreign Relations*, 1947, vol. v, pp. 999-1328.

² Ernest Bevin, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

³ For British memorandum of this conversation, see *Foreign Relations*, 1947, vol. v, p. 1312.

⁴ On November 29, 1947 the General Assembly had adopted Resolution 181 (II) recommending the partition of Palestine into Arab and Jewish states; for the text of the Resolution, see the appendix, p. 1709.

Two maps illustrating the boundaries proposed in Resolution 181 (II) are reproduced facing p. 1730. They are respectively entitled "Palestine—Plan of Partition with Economic Union" (United Nations Map No. 103 (b), November 1947); and "City of Jerusalem—Boundaries Proposed" (United Nations Map No. 104, November 1947).

⁵ For documentation on Anglo-American talks in October 1947 concerning the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean, see *Foreign Relations*, 1947, vol. v, pp. 485 ff.

the views on Palestine which have in the last few weeks been expressed to British officials by Arab representatives in the countries concerned. These views were mostly elicited in conversations at which British representatives informed the Arab Governments in general terms of British plans for withdrawal from Palestine and urged that Arab leaders should take no action which might render the British task more difficult. The following were the main points which emerged.

(a) All the Arab representatives were willing to give an assurance that they would avoid action of any kind likely to bring them into conflict with the British Government during the period of withdrawal; but it is clear that it would be dangerous to make any assumption that Arab opposition to partition is mainly wild talk.

(b) The Arab Governments do not believe that they can restrain their nationals from volunteering for service in Palestine. This was mentioned, for example, by the Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs, by the Acting Prime Minister of Iraq, by Riad Sulh (Lebanon), by Jamil Mardam (Syria), and by Samir Pasha (Transjordan).⁶

(c) There is much concern whether restraint is also being urged upon the Jews. This was mentioned, for example, by the Egyptian Minister of Foreign Affairs and by Yusef Yasin⁷ (Saudi Arabia). This concern is likely to be increased as a result of the recent disturbances in Palestine in which Arab casualties have been somewhat larger than Jewish casualties.

(d) Considerable bitterness was expressed against the British Government for having adopted a neutral attitude in New York,⁸ and more especially against the United States Government for their more positive stand in favour of partition. Such criticism of the American attitude, which was sometimes stated in terms of general references to "dollar diplomacy" and of the consequent need for friendship specifically with Britain, may in part have been actuated by a desire to play off Britain against the United States.

(e) It is clear that any attempt to provide for mutual defence arrangements in the Middle East is likely to meet with great difficulties. Riad Sulh, for example, urged that the whole Middle East was changing and that the time had surely come for the British Government to consolidate their friendship with the Arabs. The British Government's treaties with Iraq and Egypt⁹ were under consideration for revision, and what use could that with Transjordan be, if Palestine were lost? He considered that the British Government should come to some agreement with the Arabs as a whole and, as it were, capitalise their good will. He deplored any idea that Anglo-Arab relations should be exposed to too great a strain, through what would seem to the Arabs to be British support for partition, and he asserted that his sentiments were shared by all other Arabs.

⁶ The three persons mentioned were Prime Ministers of their respective countries.

⁷ Acting Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia.

⁸ At the United Nations.

⁹ See Part 1 of this volume, pp. 202 ff. and editorial note, p. 85.

3. There are other indications, such as that mentioned in the following paragraph, that there is a general desire for some kind of formal understanding with Great Britain, without which Arab leaders fear that the situation may get out of hand. No Arab representative has yet stated in concrete terms what kind of a lead was required; their plea was in the form of: "Cannot you do something to help us?"

4. That this situation may have a bearing on one concrete and very important interest of the British Government (and of the United States Government)—namely a revised Anglo-Iraqi treaty—is indicated by the remarks of Tahsin Qadri, Master of Ceremonies at the Palace in Baghdad, which reflected the deep feeling shown in earlier conversations by Saleh Jabr¹⁰ and Nuri.¹¹ He said that for the past thirty years the British had been able to give a line which the Iraqi Government had been able to follow with advantage to both countries, and he could not understand why they should now give the Iraqis no guidance at all except to keep calm. If the British would only give a line, moderate men would support the Regent and the Government in guiding the policy of Iraq. But without any word from the British the situation would go from bad to worse. The enemies of the Regent and of Great Britain would be able to say that the only result of a thirty years' alliance was that, if only passively, the British were foisting Jews on the Arab world. The pressure on any Iraqi Government would be so great that the most desperate and dangerous steps would be taken, with disastrous effects on Anglo-Iraqi relations. The situation could not be held, Qadri concluded, unless the British came forward with concrete suggestions which showed that they really were prepared to help the Arabs. The danger to our treaty negotiations, which this situation represents, needs no emphasis and it is evident that this depth of feeling is shared by other Arab leaders.

5. There are a few other items of information which have a bearing on this question. The Transjordan Government is still interested in securing for itself the Arab portion of Palestine and appears to have some hope of doing a deal with the Jews. It does not want troops from other Arab States to pass through its territory, but it may cooperate to some extent with the other members of the Arab League as a result of their recent meeting. At this meeting, according to confidential information received by the British Government, it appears that quotas were agreed upon for the proportion of arms to be supplied by each member. But no decision was reached on the quota of volunteers, the actual number of which it was not felt possible to determine. The activities of the volunteers are to be controlled by Ismail Sawfat, who would be released from the Iraqi Army for this purpose, and there

¹⁰ Iraqi Prime Minister.

¹¹ Nuri as-Said, Iraqi political leader and many times Prime Minister.

are to be local commanders in Palestine. But it was generally agreed that the open use of Arab armies against the Jews, even after the termination of the Mandate, was not practicable at present.

6. The remarks of Riad Sulh, as well as those of Tahsin Qadri, clearly indicate the effect which the Palestine problem may have upon future plans in the Middle East, even though the British Government continue to follow the course already marked out in the statements made by British representatives at Lake Success. They also clearly reveal the great obstacles which will for some time be set in the way of concerted Anglo-American action in the Middle East. It was agreed in the recent talks that Palestine presented special problems. But these Arab reactions again demonstrate that this issue will not only cause a further deterioration in the British position, but may well frustrate all plans for Anglo-American support throughout the area.

7. In the view of the British Government, the situation which is now developing over Palestine thus represents a grave threat to the position of both countries in the Middle East. While the British Government will in no way obstruct the execution of the decisions taken by the United Nations, they intend to do their utmost to preserve their position and influence in that area. In so doing they are working for ends which both Governments have decided, at the highest level, to be in their respective interests. They have already asked the Arab Governments to avoid precipitate action and to restrain their nationals. But counsels of patience should be offered, not to one side, but to both.

8. The British Government are sure that the United States Government realise the dangers to which attention has been drawn. They are sure, too, that the United States Government realise the need for the most careful handling of this most difficult problem and the need for viewing it against the wider international background, if all the efforts which have just been made are not to be in vain. They would therefore be grateful to learn whether the United States Government would be prepared to speak to the Jewish Agency in terms parallel to those of the British representations to the Arabs.¹²

9. It is the hope of the British Government that, as a result of this information, given frankly and in the spirit of the recent talks, the United States Government will share their view that it would be dangerous to underrate Arab resentment. The British Government believe it to be most urgent that, in the common interest of both countries, all possible steps should be taken by the United States Government, not only to reassure the Arabs, but also to persuade the Jews, even though it means the exercise by the latter of considerable restraint, to make good in deeds their words of friendship to the Arabs.

WASHINGTON, 5th January, 1948.

¹² Marginal notation by Loy W. Henderson, Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs: "We are doing so on every appropriate occasion."

501.BB Palestine/1-648

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Fraser Wilkins of the Division
of Near Eastern Affairs*

RESTRICTED

[WASHINGTON,] January 6, 1948.

Participants: Mr. Epstein, Jewish Agency ¹
Mr. Eban, Jewish Agency
Mr. Henderson, NEA
Mr. Rusk, SPA ²
Mr. Merriam, NE ³
Mr. Wilkins, NE

Mr. Epstein and Mr. Eban called on Mr. Henderson, Mr. Rusk and Mr. Merriam separately today for the purpose of reporting current developments with regard to Palestine and eliciting the further support of the United States Government in implementation of the recent UN recommendation to partition Palestine.

Mr. Eban said that he had accompanied UNSCOP during its investigation last summer and that more recently had been acting as a liaison officer for the Jewish Agency with the UN in New York. Mr. Eban pointed out that the Jewish Agency was particularly concerned with two aspects of the UN recommendation at the present time: (1) immigration; (2) security. Mr. Eban said that the Jewish Agency hoped that the British authorities would be able to provide a seaport by February 1 ⁴ in order that immigration might commence at once but that unless the UN Commission was able successfully to negotiate with British authorities, it did not appear that immigration would take place as soon as hoped.

With regard to security, Mr. Eban expressed the view that two matters might be considered under this heading: (1) action by the Security Council; (2) action by the militia authorized in the UN recommendation. With regard to the first, Mr. Eban recalled that the American representatives at the UN had remarked during recent UN consideration of the Palestine problem that the U.S. would play its part. For this reason, Major Eban hoped that the United States would support such action relating to security as the Security Council might deem it appropriate to take. Mr. Eban said that he understood the

¹ Eliahu Epstein, Director of the Washington Office of the Jewish Agency for Palestine.

² Dean Rusk, Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs.

³ Gordon P. Merriam, Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs.

⁴ The partition resolution of the General Assembly had provided that "The mandatory Power shall use its best endeavours to ensure that an area situated in the territory of the Jewish State, including a seaport and hinterland adequate to provide facilities for a substantial immigration, shall be evacuated at the earliest possible date and in any event not later than 1 February 1948." (Appendix, p. 1711.)

Syrian representative and the Polish representative on the Security Council might raise the Palestine question as a threat to international peace and security and observed that this might be appropriate time for the U.S. Government to make known its views. With regard to militia forces in each of the proposed states in Palestine, Mr. Eban said that he hoped that the members of the UN including the United States would be in a position to arm and equip these forces. Major Eban said that at the present time, the Haganah, which would be the armed militia in the proposed Jewish State, was adequately manned but poorly equipped and that it was essential that supplies be obtained.

Mr. Eban expressed the view that current newspaper reports and information being received from Palestine indicated that the Arabs hoped the UN recommendation to partition Palestine would not be implemented and that the Jews feared no action would be taken to put it into effect. Mr. Eban thought that this basic approach to the problem on the part of the Arabs and Jews was one of the major factors in the present situation and expressed the belief that strong support by the U.S. for partition in the Security Council and the provision of equipment for the Jewish militia would indicate American determination and would thus have a stabilizing effect on the situation in Palestine.

Mr. Henderson said that he had been following recent developments in Palestine closely and was very much concerned with the type of incidents which were now taking place in Palestine. Mr. Henderson recalled the recent attack at the Consolidated Refinery in Haifa in which Jews bombed Arabs and Arabs in reprisal killed some 30 to 40 Jews in spite of the fact that both Jews and Arabs had worked in harmony previously. Mr. Henderson pointed out that a continuation of terroristic activities which resulted in the killing of innocent people would have a brutalizing effect and would cause many to have serious doubts as to whether either the Arabs or the Jews were sufficiently mature to govern themselves. Mr. Henderson asked Mr. Epstein and Mr. Eban whether they thought the issuance of a statement by the UN or possibly by the US deploring such activities and pointing out the inevitable consequences would have a salutary effect. Both Mr. Epstein and Mr. Eban were of the opinion that the issuance of a statement of this type would be helpful and said that, as far as the Jews were concerned, they were making every effort to conduct themselves with restraint. Mr. Epstein stressed the fact that the Jews were desirous of acting in accordance with the UN recommendation and hoped that the UN would support their activities.

Mr. Rusk remarked in reply to Mr. Eban's statements regarding immigration and security that he believed the establishment of a *modus vivendi* between the Jews and the Arabs was the most important question for consideration at this time since all other matters

were of necessity corollary to it. Mr. Eban said that he agreed but that it was essential that actual steps be taken regarding the commencement of immigration and the establishment of security forces in advance of the departure of the British from Palestine. Mr. Rusk said he understood the members of the UN Commission had now been appointed and that it would meet on January 9 or 10, and that he hoped that the Jews would shortly initiate conversation with the Commission, the British authorities and the Arabs. Mr. Rusk said the successful implementation of the UN recommendation hinged on the working out of details with these three groups. Mr. Rusk said that he stressed this aspect of the situation because he believed that Mr. Epstein and Mr. Eban were well aware of the many legal difficulties attendant on further consideration of the Palestine problem in the Security Council. Mr. Rusk said that, for this reason, it was extremely important that both the Jews and the Arabs should attempt to settle the problems with regard to Palestine as well as they could by themselves and should only fall back on UN action as a last resort.

Mr. Epstein and Mr. Eban expressed their appreciation for the various views expressed and said that Mr. Shertok⁵ was returning to the US from Palestine via London toward the end of this week and that he would undoubtedly call at the Department for the purpose of presenting further information with regard to current developments in Palestine.

⁵ Moshe Shertok, Head of the Political Department of the Jewish Agency.

867N.01/1-748 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Tuck) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

CAIRO, January 7, 1948—1 p. m.

21. Was received in audience by King¹ yesterday afternoon and with help of carefully prepared notes conveyed to him informally and orally purport your confidential verbatim telegram 1695 of December 26, 5 p. m.²

Farouk listened attentively to points as I developed them and then, with reference to expressed hope that Egypt would set example in restraint, stated there was nothing that he could do, even if he wanted to, to prevail upon other Arab states to curb their proposed action or to influence their attitude. Arab countries, he said, had made firm decision and they intended to carry it out. He added that tenor of my remarks reminded him strangely [*strongly?*] of what late President Roosevelt had said to him on same subject at time of their meeting on

¹ King Farouk of Egypt.

² *Foreign Relations*, 1947, vol. v, p. 1319.

canal in 1945.³ He qualified my remarks as "very optimistic" as to the future particularly in connection with the expressed belief that acquiescence on part of Arab states in UNGA decision on Palestine would remove that area as disturbing influence in international affairs.

He showed interest in the reasons given for US Government support of partition and in assurance that no undue pressure was brought upon other countries by US governmental officials responsible to executive. This latter assurance, he added, was contrary to reliable information which he had previously obtained.

I am forced to the conclusion that our arguments failed to convince him and have in no way changed his views.⁴

TUCK

³ For documentation on the conversations between President Roosevelt and the monarchs of Egypt, Ethiopia, and Saudi Arabia at Great Bitter Lake, Egypt, in February 1945, see *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. viii, pp. 1 ff.

⁴ On January 12, Prince Faisal, the Saudi Arabian Minister for Foreign Affairs, handed to Minister Childs a message to the United States Government from King Abdul Aziz ibn Saud. He then stated that "His Majesty believes US policy prejudicial both Arabs and US and against their mutual interests. His Majesty sincerely desires maintain existing friendly relations between Saudi Arabian Government and US Government and this motive had inspired His Majesty to communicate once again with his friends and endeavor further to persuade the US Government to reconsider its position in this question, in hope US Government would attentively listen to its sincere friend." (Telegram 14, January 13, noon, from Jidda, 501.BB Palestine/1-1348)

The King's message, in the form of an undated memorandum, was transmitted by Jidda in telegram 15, January 13, 3 p. m., not printed.

Editorial Note

The United Nations Palestine Commission, established under the General Assembly resolution of November 29, 1947, consisted of representatives of Bolivia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Panama, and the Philippines, with Karel Lisicky of Czechoslovakia serving as Chairman and Ralph J. Bunche of the United States as Secretary. The Commission held its first meeting on January 9, 1948, and unanimously adopted a resolution calling on the Secretary-General of the United Nations to invite the Mandatory Power, the Arab Higher Committee, and the Jewish Agency to designate representatives who would provide the Commission with authoritative information and other assistance.

The Secretary-General, the same day, transmitted such invitations. They were promptly accepted by the United Kingdom and the Jewish Agency, which designated Sir Alexander Cadogan, British Representative at the United Nations, and Moshe Shertok, respectively, as their representatives. The Arab Higher Committee, on January 19, telegraphically rejected the invitation, stating that it was "determined persist in rejection partition and in refusal recognize UNO resolution this respect and anything deriving therefrom." (United Nations,

Official Records of the Security Council, Third Year, Special Supplement No. 2, hereinafter cited as SC, 3rd yr., Special Suppl. No. 2, pages 1, 2)

501.BB Palestine/1-1448

Memorandum by Mr. Robert M. McClintock¹ to the Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs (Rusk)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] January 14, 1948.

Subject: The Problem of Enforcing Partition in Palestine.

The United States will presently be faced with a choice between two courses of policy consequent upon its decision to favor the partition of Palestine. One course is to support enforcement measures by the Security Council of the United Nations; the other is to support exclusive reliance on the Jewish and Arab militia which are to be established under the terms of the Assembly's resolution on Palestine adopted November 29, 1947.

The adoption of either of these alternative policies will involve injury to the interests of the United States in greater or lesser degree and to the United Nations in greater or lesser degree. It is a question then of sober judgment on balance which policy will most greatly injure the interests of the United States. In an endeavor to analyze this problem I have worked out the following rough outline and have come forth with a suggested line of policy which falls far short of being satisfactory by any other standard than the fact that no line of policy applied to the present Palestine problem can prove satisfactory.

TWO COURSES

[Here follows outline of two courses.]

III—Possible US policy.

1. Refusal to agree to SC enforcement measures.
2. Stress GA recommendation that Jewish and Arab militia provide security forces in Palestine.
3. Inform Arabs that unless they cease hostilities we shall end arms embargo and permit recruitment, by Jewish militia only.
4. Inform Arabs that if they keep the peace we shall not, as a Government, provide Jewish State with more than strictly limited financial assistance.
5. Inform Jews that unless they keep the peace we shall deny them all hope of relaxing arms embargo and of economic or financial aid.
6. Seek creation by foregoing measures of an uneasy but actual local balance of power which will give the Palestine partition experiment a fair chance of being tried.

¹ Special Assistant to Mr. Rusk.

Editorial Note

According to Dan Kurzman's *Genesis 1948: The First Arab-Israeli War* (New York, World Publishing Company, 1970), page 84, a "legal conference" was held early in January 1948 in Mr. Dean Rusk's office to consider whether the United Nations was empowered to enforce the partition resolution of November 29, 1947. The conference was said to have been attended by Department of State officers and a panel comprising Messrs. Alger Hiss, Joseph Johnson, and Leo Pasvolsky, all of whom had previously filled positions of responsibility in the Department. Mr. Kurzman asserts that the unanimous opinion of the panel was that the United Nations could not legally enforce the partition resolution as such but that it could use force against the Arabs should they sabotage partition by committing a breach of the peace.

Mr. Kurzman states that, as an aftermath of the meeting, Mr. McClintock sent a telegram to Ambassador Warren R. Austin, United States Representative at the United Nations, instructing him to call for a special session of the General Assembly to deal with the Palestine problem on the grounds that partition could not be legally enforced. The Editors have been unable to find in the files of the Department of State any documentary record to substantiate this account of events.

*News Conference of President Truman on January 15, 1948*¹

[Extracts]

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 Q. Mr. President, do you think, in view of the Palestine situation, that American troops might be sent to Palestine?

The President. I do not. I have no further comment to make on that. Probably in the long run we will have an international police force with the United Nations plan, to which all of us are working.

.
 Q. Mr. President, could we go back to the question of Palestine? Do you mean in the long run there would be an international police force in Palestine?

The President. Not necessarily. Wherever it is necessary for the United Nations to use it and enforce its mandates.

¹ Reprinted from *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1948* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 101.

Editorial Note

The Legal Adviser (Gross), in a memorandum of January 15, to Mr. Rusk, commented on a recommendation drafted by Mr. Rusk for the Under Secretary. The editors are unable to find Mr. Rusk's recommendation in the Department of State files. Mr. Gross' memorandum, however, summarized the recommendation as follows: "In your draft memorandum the problem was considered of what position the United States should take in the Security Council of the United Nations in the event that a member of the Council should move 'to request an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice on the legality of the action recently recommended by the General Assembly with respect to Palestine. The memorandum recommended that the United States should support such a motion.'"

After analyzing the advantages and disadvantages of the recommendation, the Legal Adviser concluded:

"(a) The United States should not *support* a motion in Security Council to refer any question on Palestine to the International Court;

"(b) The United States should oppose reference to the Court of *any* question on Palestine as a pre-condition to action by the Security Council in carrying out its responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and security; the United States should be prepared to vote against a reference under such circumstances, after consultation with other Security Council members to ascertain that such negative vote would not constitute a unilateral United States veto;

"(c) The United States should oppose reference to the Court, by the Security Council, of any question not pertinent to a matter before the Council (e.g., the general question whether the General Assembly had power to recommend a Palestine solution that did not have the consent of the inhabitants of Palestine); again, the United States should be prepared to vote against such a reference provided the negative vote did not result in a unilateral United States veto;

"(d) In other cases of a motion in the Security Council to refer questions on Palestine to the Court the United States should not support a reference and should abstain from voting." (501.BB Palestine/1-1548)

867N.01/1-1648: Telegram

The Consul General at Jerusalem (Macatee) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

JERUSALEM, January 16, 1948—6 p. m.

62. Emile Ghory of AHE, just returned from Cairo meeting with Mufti, informed official ConGen following:

1. General national administration for whole Palestine will be established by Arabs on day British terminate mandate. Administration now being organized on basis Cairo press communique 5 January.

2. Believes Abdullah¹ regardless private thoughts must accept Palestine Arab administration although admits possibility various parts Palestine may be annexed to bordering states. The line is that unimportant who takes over Palestine provided Palestine remains Arab. Preference is for unified Palestine state.

[Here follow Mr. Ghory's further thoughts, including the observations that Arab attacks on Jewish settlements were "for demonstration, training and probing purposes" and that "Arms arriving increasing rate and young Arabs undergoing rigid training."]

MACATEE

¹ King of Transjordan.

501.BB Palestine/1-1948 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

NEW YORK, January 19, 1948—1 p. m.

67. Palestine Commission report to SC on February 1 will probably charge UK with failure to observe provisions of GA resolution for progressive withdrawal, and assert that under the conditions laid down by the British the Commission cannot proceed to Palestine, Bunche, Secretary of Commission, said in conversation with member of USUN.

Cadogan's recent statement to the Commission set forth an exact time table for British withdrawal. Informed Commission it could arrive in Palestine only two weeks before the British departure with all British Civil Service personnel. No British subjects would be seconded to the Arab or Jewish Governments and any British member of the Palestine Administrative Service accepting employment with new states would forfeit all pension rights. UK held that to allow British nationals to serve with new states would violate neutrality. Commission was bluntly warned that it must plan to recruit a civil administration ready to take over when British left. Asked how that could be done in two weeks. Cadogan said he did not know. (mytel 59, January 17¹). Bunche observed that "sheepishness" of Cadogan was greatest in answering that question.

Bunche believes that it will be impossible to govern Palestine unless some experienced top-level British administrators can continue with both new states. Utilities, railroads and other essential services have mixed Arab and Jewish staffs, and few executives and supervisory personnel are available to replace top British civil servants.

The Secretariat is preparing questions for Cadogan to answer at a later session. Bunche says questions will be very sharp and designed to smoke out British implication that they will not cooperate with the

² Not printed.

Commission in any way. Answers to questions will determine tone and content of February 1 report to SC.

[Here follow six paragraphs dealing with such matters as the relations among the Commission, top Secretariat officers and British specialists on Palestine, and compensation to be paid to Commission members.]

Bunche is a close friend of long standing of USUN officer to whom foregoing told. He has never appeared more upset or more concerned about a problem. He will draft the Commission's February 1 report to SC. He considers the British position indefensible, that Commission cannot operate under present British plans and would be better advised to refuse to leave New York now than to attempt to implement GA decision under impossible conditions. He has every intention of urging Commission to expose British position in SC and demand that showdown take place in New York before departure. He believes that Commission shares his view. He wryly remarked that he hoped that Department was actively formulating position for first week in February discussion in SC although he had gained impression US had false sense of security as regards its responsibilities in Palestine.²

AUSTIN

² Ambassador Austin, on January 27, reported information from Mr. Bunche that the Palestine Commission report would not draw conclusions or make charges. The Ambassador advised that "Despite previous indications that the report would severely criticize the British attitude, the commission feels that the British should have an opportunity to answer the questions recently put to Cadogan before any judgment is passed. Cadogan has said that some of the answers had to be cleared at Cabinet level, and certain material gathered in Palestine. Following receipt of these answers, the commission will send a special, confidential report to the SC on the Palestine security problem.

"However, the February 1 report will point out that it is impossible to meet the April 1 deadline for the establishment of provisional governments because the UK will not allow the commission to arrive in Palestine until two weeks before the British leave." (Telegram 97 from New York, 501.BB Palestine/1-2748)

PPS Files, Lot 64 D 563, Near and Middle East, 1947-1948

*Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennan)
to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] January 20, 1948.

PPS/19

On November 25, 1947 the National Security Council received a report from the Secretary of the Army on the problem of Palestine with the request that it be considered by the National Security Council.²

At the meeting of the Consultants of the National Security Council on December 12, 1947,² it was agreed that the State Department should

¹ Addressed also to Under Secretary of State Lovett.

² See editorial note, *Foreign Relations*, 1947, vol. v, p. 1283.

prepare, on a priority basis, the initial draft of a National Security Council report on the position of the United States with respect to Palestine, taking into consideration U.S. security interests in the Mediterranean and Near East areas and the recommendation of the UN General Assembly on the partition of Palestine.

I attach a paper³ prepared in the Policy Planning Staff in response to the above request.

This paper has been prepared in close collaboration with Mr. Henderson, and has his general approval. The tenor of the recommendations has also been discussed at length with Mr. Rusk, who has voiced no objection to their presentation by the Staff but has not seen the final draft or committed himself to it.

We have not thought it wise to attempt to draw outside consultants into the preparation of this paper; but it has been seen by Ambassador Grady⁴ and has his general approval. You may recall that Ambassador Grady was alternate to Secretary of State Byrnes on the President's Cabinet Committee on Palestine.

I recommend that the paper be approved as the Department's initial position for further discussion in the National Security Council.

GEORGE F. KENNAN

[Annex]

*Report by the Policy Planning Staff on Position of the United States
With Respect to Palestine*⁵

TOP SECRET
PPS/19

[WASHINGTON,] January 19, 1948.

The Problem: 1. To assess and appraise the position of the U.S. with respect to Palestine, taking into consideration the security interests of the U.S. in the Mediterranean and Near East areas, and in the light of the recommendation of the General Assembly of the United Nations regarding the partition of Palestine.

Analysis

2. Palestine occupies a geographic position of great strategic significance to the U.S. It is important for the control of the eastern end of the Mediterranean and the Suez Canal. It is an outlet for the

³ *Infra.*

⁴ Henry F. Grady, Ambassador to India. In June 1946, he had been appointed alternate for the Secretary of State on the Cabinet Committee on Palestine and Related Problems; see footnote 78, *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. VII, p. 631.

⁵ A marginal notation of February 19, 1948, indicates that this paper was returned to the Policy Planning Staff with a note from Secretary Marshall that he had "personally outlined my position on this Palestine matter to Mr. Lovett. He can therefore act for me." The editors have found no record of the Secretary's position as outlined to Mr. Lovett.

oil of the Middle East; which, in turn, is important to U.S. security. Finally, it is the center of a number of major political cross-currents; and events in Palestine cannot help being reflected in a number of directions. For these reasons, and particularly in view of the Soviet pressure against the periphery of that area, and Soviet infiltration into the area, it is important that political, economic, and social stability be maintained there.

Because of the present irreconcilable differences between Arabs and Jews in Palestine, great danger exists that the area may become the source of serious unrest and instability which could be readily exploited by the USSR unless a workable solution can be developed.

3. The UN General Assembly on November 29, 1947, recommended the partition of Palestine into separate Arab and Jewish sovereign states, substantially as proposed by the majority report of the UN Special Committee on Palestine. The partition plan provides for an economic union of the two states, administered by a Joint Economic Board, and for the city of Jerusalem to be placed under international trusteeship. The mandate for Palestine would be terminated by August 1, 1948 and the newly created states and special regime for Jerusalem would come into existence by October 1, 1948. Provision was made for a five-member UN Commission to take over progressively the administration of Palestine and to establish Provisional Councils in each new state.

4. The boundaries of the proposed new Arab and Jewish states do not satisfy Zionist aspirations from either the political or the economic viewpoint, and the whole plan of partition with economic union is totally unacceptable to the Arabs. Although frequent reference has been made to "sacrifices" accepted in the interest of compromise, the partition plan was strongly supported by the Jewish Agency for Palestine and by various Zionist organizations favoring the establishment of a sovereign Jewish political state in Palestine. It did not, however, have the support of the Irgun, the Revisionists or the Stern gang (the so-called leftist groups), whose influence among the Jews of Palestine appears to be increasing.

5. The Arabs of Palestine and the Arab states have uniformly and consistently maintained their unequivocal opposition to any form of partition. The Arabs of Palestine have indicated their determination not to establish a separate government in the Arab area of Palestine designated by the UN, and to boycott all activities of the UN Commission charged with the transfer of authority from the British to the new Arab and Jewish states. Even if partition were economically feasible, the Arab attitude alone renders it improbable that any economic union could be effected between the two new states.

The General Assembly, in adopting the recommendation for partition, left unanswered certain questions regarding the legality of the plan as well as the means for its implementation. Nor did the General Assembly, in the circumstances prevailing at the time, have an opportunity to explore the last minute announcement by the Arab States on November 29 of their willingness to accept the principle of a Federal State in Palestine⁶ which they had previously opposed. There was no indication of any real effort by the UN toward conciliation between the Jews and the Arabs.

6. The U.S. and USSR played leading roles in bringing about a vote favorable to partition. Without U.S. leadership and the pressures which developed during UN consideration of the question, the necessary two-thirds majority in the General Assembly could not have been obtained. From this there has grown a belief that the United States has a heavy responsibility for seeing that partition works. It has been shown that various unauthorized U.S. nationals and organizations, including members of Congress, notably in the closing days of the Assembly, brought pressure to bear on various foreign delegates and their respective home governments to induce them to support the U.S. attitude on the Palestine question. Evidence to this effect is attached under Tab A.⁷

7. The decision of the U.S. Government to support the UN Special Committee's majority plan was based primarily on the view, expressed to the GA by Secretary Marshall on September 18 [17], 1947, that "great weight" should be accorded the majority opinion of a UN Committee.⁸

8. Strong nationalistic and religious feelings were aroused throughout the Arab world as a result of the UN recommendation on Palestine. Widespread rioting has followed. In Palestine, the outbreaks have consisted of armed clashes between Arabs and Jews; in certain of the Arab states, there have been attacks on Jewish quarters and demonstrations directed primarily against the U.S. These manifestations of popular feeling have not so far represented organized Arab resistance to partition, although a "jihad" (holy war) against the Jews of Palestine has been proclaimed by Moslem leaders in most of the Arab states and has been joined by Christian leaders in Syria.

9. As British forces are progressively withdrawn from Palestine and as steps are taken with a view to implementing the UN decision, organized large scale opposition by the Arabs is to be expected. Irregular military units are now being organized in Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Transjordan and Saudi Arabia to fight in Palestine. There are strong

⁶ See telegram 1274, December 1, 1947, from New York, *Foreign Relations*, 1947, vol. v, p. 1293.

⁷ Not printed; for documentation on the subject of these pressures, see *ibid.*, pp. 999 ff.

⁸ See statement by the Secretary of State, *ibid.*, p. 1151.

indications that at an appropriate moment at least some of these units will move into the Arab portion of Palestine as defined by the UN. That these forces will come into violent conflict with the Haganah or other Jewish military bodies operating from the Jewish state is probable.

10. In order to protect themselves and to secure the establishment of a Jewish state, Zionist representatives will seek armed support from the U.S., for without substantial external assistance the proposed Jewish state cannot be established or exist. This may take the form of an attempt (a) to obtain money, arms and volunteers in the U.S. and/or (b) to induce the U.S. Government to assist in organizing an international armed force under the UN to enforce partition.

11. The UN decision did not provide for outside armed forces to impose the partition scheme, either in maintaining law and order in the two new states or in affording protection to the five-member UN Commission which is to implement the decision. The UN Commission is almost certain to meet with armed Arab opposition in seeking to discharge its functions. Palestine police authorities have declined to assume responsibility for its safety outside of Tel-Aviv. There can be no assurance that in the present and foreseeable circumstances, local security forces will be able to maintain law and order; rather may their failure to do so be confidently predicted.

12. The U.S. has suspended authorization for the export of arms, ammunition and other war material intended for use in Palestine or in neighboring countries.⁹ If we resist pressure by the Zionists to alter this position, the question then arises whether we should send troops to Palestine as part of an international force under the UN. It may be assumed that the Soviet Union would, in certain circumstances, be prepared to contribute troops to such an international force. If the USSR should do so, it would be awkward for the U.S. to decline to take similar action. If Soviet troops are sent to Palestine, further opportunities would be provided for the exercise of Russian influence in the whole Near Eastern area.

13. U.S. support of partition has already brought about loss of U.S. prestige and disillusionment among the Arabs and other neighboring peoples as to U.S. objectives and ideals. U.S. support of the principles of self-determination was a basic factor in the creation of the Arab states out of the Ottoman Empire after World War I. U.S. officials, missionaries, and educational institutions in the Near East have built successfully on this foundation, and U.S. businessmen have reaped the benefit of the widespread belief that the U.S. had no political motives in the area inimical to Arab welfare.

⁹ See telegram Telmar 42, December 6, 1947, to London, *Foreign Relations*, 1947, vol. v, p. 1300.

14. The position of Saudi Arabia in the Palestine question is of particular importance. King Ibn Saud values the friendship between his country and the U.S. and recognizes the significant financial aid to Saudi Arabia derived from oil royalties. He is reluctant to sever political and economic ties with the U.S. Nevertheless, he is under strong pressure from other Arab states to break with the U.S. Prince Faisal, his son and Foreign Minister, departed for Saudi Arabia from the UN General Assembly in a bitterly anti-American mood and may give strength to a faction of less moderate elements which will force the King's hand. Important U.S. oil concessions and air base rights will be at stake in the event that an actively hostile Government should come into power in Saudi Arabia.

15. In view of the evident determination of the Arabs to resist partition with all the means at their disposal, it may be anticipated that, if an attempt is made to carry out the UN decision (with or without U.S. assistance), the more moderate and intellectual leaders of the Arab states, most of whom have ties with the west, will be swept out of power by irresponsible elements. Leaders such as Azzam Pasha, Secretary General of the Arab League, would be displaced by extremists such as the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem. Hatred of the Zionists or of those identified with Zionism might be extended to include all westerners in direct proportion to the latter's support of Zionist armies in general and of partition in particular.

16. Any assistance the U.S. might give to the enforcement of partition would result in deep-seated antagonism for the U.S. in many sections of the Moslem world over a period of many years and would lay us open to one or more of the following consequences:

(a) Suspension or cancellation of valuable U.S. air base rights and commercial concessions, cessation of U.S. oil pipeline construction, and drastic curtailment of U.S. trade with that area.

(b) Loss of our present access to the air, military and naval facilities enjoyed by the British in the area, with attendant repercussions on our overall strategic position in the Middle East and Mediterranean.

(c) Closing or boycotting of U.S. educational, religious and philanthropic institutions in the Near East, such as the American University at Beirut established in 1866 and the American University at Cairo.

(d) Possible deaths, injuries and damages arising from acts of violence against individual U.S. citizens and interests established in the area. Official assurances of the Arab Governments to afford protection to U.S. interests could not be relied on because of the intensity of popular feeling.

(e) A serious threat to the success of the Marshall Plan. The present oil production of the Middle East fields is approximately 800,000 barrels a day. To meet Marshall Plan requirements, production must be raised to about 2,000,000 barrels a day, since no oil for Europe for this purpose could be provided from the U.S., from Venezuela, or

from the Far East. Before the current disturbances, U.S. oil companies had made plans for the required development in the Middle East, with which it will be impossible to proceed if the present situation continues.

17. The USSR stands to gain by the partition plan if it should be implemented by force because of the opportunity thus afforded to the Russians to assist in "maintaining order" in Palestine. If Soviet forces should be introduced into Palestine for the purpose of implementing partition, Communist agents would have an excellent base from which to extend their subversive activities, to disseminate propaganda, and to attempt to replace the present Arab governments by "democratic peoples' governments". The presence of Soviet forces in Palestine would constitute an outflanking of our positions in Greece, Turkey and Iran, and a potential threat to the stability of the entire Eastern Mediterranean area.

18. It is not certain, however, that the USSR would choose to send its forces into Palestine. To do so would be to place those forces in an exposed position, far from a base of supply, and without suitable lines of communication. Rather than risk the enmity of the Arab world by such action, the Soviet Union might prefer to have U.S. forces bear the brunt of enforcement and incur the odium of the local population and Moslems everywhere as a result.

19. Other choices are open to the USSR besides the furnishing of troops. Evidence is accumulating that the USSR may be covertly or indirectly supplying arms not only to the Jews but to the Arabs, thus aggravating the friction in the Near East. From the Soviet viewpoint, it might be preferable to exploit in this manner the explosive character of the situation created by partition rather than to enter the area in a military sense.

Whether or not Soviet forces should assist in implementing partition, the UN decision is favorable to Soviet objectives of sowing dissention and discord in non-communist countries. The partition of Palestine might afford the USSR a pretext on the basis of "self-determination of minorities" to encourage the partition of areas in Iraq, Iran, Turkey and Greece, with a view to setting up separate [Kurdish?] Azerbaijani, Armenian and Macedonian states enjoying the support of the USSR.

All in all, there is no way of telling in exactly what manner the USSR will attempt to turn partition to its advantage. It must be assumed, however, that Moscow will actively endeavor to find some means of exploiting the opportunity.

20. Various other factors would enter into the situation if an attempt is made to enforce the UN recommendation. The foregoing is intended merely to suggest the principal elements in the problem. So numerous would be the ramifications of mounting Arab ill will, of

opening the door to Soviet political or military penetration, and of generally chaotic conditions in Palestine and neighboring countries that the whole structure of peace and security in the Near East and Mediterranean would be directly or indirectly affected with results impossible to predict at this stage in detail but certainly injurious to U.S. interests.

Conclusions

21. As a result of U.S. sponsorship of UN action leading to the recommendation to partition Palestine, U.S. prestige in the Moslem world has suffered a severe blow and U.S. strategic interests in the Mediterranean and Near East have been seriously prejudiced. Our vital interests in those areas will continue to be adversely affected to the extent that we continue to support partition.

22. The original U.S. premise in supporting the partition of Palestine was founded on the belief that, with certain modifications in the majority proposals of the UN Special Committee on Palestine, a just and workable plan could be devised immediately which would receive broad international support, provided always that there was cooperation between the parties concerned. A study of the present plan raises serious doubts as to its workability because of the artificial and arbitrary political subdivision of a complicated economic area. Events have demonstrated that the Arab inhabitants of Palestine will not cooperate even to endeavor to make the partition plan work. Therefore, one of the major premises on which we originally supported partition has proved invalid.

23. The United States should not send armed forces to Palestine, either on a volunteer or contingent basis, for the following reasons: (a) This would represent a political or military commitment of which the dimensions, both in time and space, cannot be calculated or foreseen and which might carry us into actions of a major character, out of all proportion to the foreign policy objectives involved; and (b) to do so would invite the possibility of the movement of Soviet armed forces to the strategic Near Eastern and Mediterranean area. For similar reasons, the U.S. should oppose the sending of armed forces of any nationality to Palestine.

24. While the governments in Arab countries have partially succeeded in restraining demonstrations against the Jews within their borders, in the case of open conflict major massacres of Jews in Moslem countries would seem to be inevitable, despite efforts of the governments of those countries to control popular feeling. Moreover, a basis would be provided for anti-Jewish agitation in other parts of the world. The process of assimilation or integration of the individual Jew in the life of the country of which he is a citizen, which has been strongly advocated by World Jewry in the past, would be made more

difficult and he would be singled out for attack as an alien political factor. In the U.S., the position of Jews would be gravely undermined as it becomes evident to the public that in supporting a Jewish state in Palestine we were in fact supporting the extreme objectives of political Zionism, to the detriment of overall U.S. security interests.

25. Unless an effort is made to retrieve the situation, the prestige of the UN itself will be at stake because of the notoriety and resentment attendant upon the activities of U.S. pressure groups, including members of Congress, who sought to impose U.S. views as to partition on foreign delegations. Furthermore, the probable abstention by the Arab states from active participation in many UN activities may further weaken the effectiveness of the UN and the U.S. position within the UN, as has Soviet abstention in certain other activities.

26. The U.S. Government should face the fact that the partition of Palestine cannot be implemented without the use of force, and that the U.S. would inevitably be called upon to supply a substantial portion of the money, troops and arms for this purpose. The British have made it clear that they would not accept any role in the enforcement of partition. No other nation except Russia could be expected to participate in such implementation to any appreciable extent.

26a. It must be concluded that the partition of Palestine will not be possible of attainment without outside assistance on a substantial scale. If the U.S. is determined to see the successful establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine (either as proposed or as may be geographically modified because of Arab noncooperation in the proposed economic union), the U.S. must be prepared to grant economic assistance, together with aid to the Jewish authorities through the supply of arms, ammunition and implements of war. Ultimately the U.S. might have to support the Jewish authorities by the use of naval units and military forces. It should be clearly recognized that such assistance given to the Jewish state, but withheld from the Arabs and the Arab States, would in Arab eyes be a virtual declaration of war by the U.S. against the Arab world. It is improbable that the Jewish state could survive over any considerable period of time in the face of the combined assistance which would be forthcoming for the Arabs in Palestine from the Arab States, and in lesser measure from their Moslem neighbors. The preparations now being made for intensive guerrilla warfare by the approximately 400,000 Arabs resident in the proposed new Jewish state are alone giving rise to serious doubt as to whether the Jewish people in Palestine could themselves control the situation.

Recommendations

27. We should take no further initiative in implementing or aiding partition.

28. We should oppose sending armed forces into Palestine by the UN or any member thereof for the purpose of implementing partition. We should also oppose the recruitment of volunteers for this purpose.

29. We should maintain and enforce our embargo on arms to Palestine and neighboring countries.

30. We should endeavor as far as possible to spread responsibility for the future handling of this question, and to divest ourselves of the imputation of international leadership in the search for a solution to this problem.

31. When and if the march of events has conclusively demonstrated that the effort to carry out the partition plan as prescribed by the UN General Assembly offers no reasonable prospect for success without the use of outside armed force, we should then take the position that we have been obliged to conclude that it is impracticable and undesirable for the international community to attempt to enforce any form of partition in the absence of agreement between the parties, and that the matter should go back to the UN General Assembly.

32. Thereafter, our position in the UN should be that we would cooperate loyally in working out and implementing any proposals designed (a) to encourage pacific settlement between the Palestine Arabs and Palestine Jews or (b) to investigate the possibilities of any other suggested solution such as a federal state or trusteeship, which would not require outside armed force for implementation.

33. We should oppose referring to the International Court the question of the UN recommendation on Palestine on the grounds that the fundamental issue, i.e. whether the two communities involved will cooperate to make the partition plan effective, is not a proper question for the Court.¹⁰

¹⁰ According to *The Forrestal Diaries*, edited by Walter Millis (New York, The Viking Press, 1951), p. 360, Mr. Lovett showed PPS/19 to Secretary of Defense Forrestal on January 21. The latter was said to have expressed the view that the United States was not committed to support the partition plan which was unworkable without the use of force; that it was against American interest to supply arms to the Jews while embargoing arms to the Arabs or to accept unilateral responsibility for carrying out the partition plan; and that the United States should attempt to have the plan withdrawn as soon as possible.

501.BB Palestine/1-1948: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative
at the United Nations (Austin)*

TOP SECRET
US URGENT

WASHINGTON, January 23, 1948—7 p. m.

27. For Austin from Lovett. We are concerned at probable attitude of SC toward UK when Palestine Commission reports on Feb. 1, in light of your 67 Jan. 19.

On Dec. 3 Ambassador Johnson¹ paraphrased text of Dept.'s 586, Dec. 3, 1 p. m.,² in a telephone conversation with Cadogan and stressed final paragraph this telegram. Please call immediately upon Cadogan recalling this telephone conversation and say that we would feel reassured in the attitude expressed in that telegram if more complete information were available indicating how UK has "furnished utmost facilities by way of advice and continuing cooperation to the Commission from the moment of its creation."

You should frankly ask Cadogan what he has told the Commission and what plans in detail UK has suggested to the Commission. You should recall to Cadogan that in his telephone conversation with Johnson he said that the idea of the Commission going to London was excellent. You may conclude the interview by saying that we are sincerely desirous that the Commission have every opportunity of successfully fulfilling its most arduous task.

LOVETT

¹ Herschel V. Johnson, Acting United States Representative at the United Nations.

² *Foreign Relations*, 1947, vol. v. p. 1297.

S90D.00/1-1548

Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State

SECRET

[WASHINGTON, undated.¹]

Summary: Reports from the U.S. Mission at Damascus indicate that Syria is the center of recruitment and training of the so-called "irregulars", which are intended for infiltration over the Palestine border and subsequent guerilla work in Palestine. There is evidence that such forces have already proceeded across the border to a considerable extent. National forces do not appear to be directly involved.

(1) *Recruitment.* Active recruiting of "irregulars" under Fawzi Qawuqji has been carried on in Syria. The total recruited by January 1, 1948 was estimated at approximately 16,000, although only a small number actually were receiving instructions and uniforms. (Damascus 436 of Dec. 20, 1947; Damascus 438 of Dec. 21, 1947; Damascus 2 of Jan. 1, 1948.²)

(2) *Training.* Syria appears to be the training center for recruits from Palestine, Egypt and Iraq. The Liberation Army Chief of Staff is reported to be Taha Hashimi and the Field Commander to be Qawuqji. (Damascus 415 of Dec. 11, 1947.³) Two contingents of Iraqi volunteers arrived in Syria for training, totalling 800, and indications

¹ Prepared, presumably, between January 24 and January 26, 1948.

² None printed.

³ Not printed.

are that more will follow. Syria presumably arms them. Supply arrangements were embarrassed by the unexpectedly large number of such volunteers. (Damascus 24 of Jan. 12, 1948; Damascus 39 of Jan. 19, 1948.⁴)

(3) *Infiltration into Palestine*. Sizeable bands of the volunteer "irregulars" have crossed the border from Syria into Palestine. (Damascus 436 of Dec. 20, 1947; Damascus 439 of Dec. 22, 1947; Damascus 453 of Dec. 28, 1947.⁵) It was reported that a prominent Hama deputy, Akram Haurani, led a force into north Palestine in the last week of December. (Damascus 7 of Jan. 3, 1948.⁶) Arabs reportedly dressed in Syrian Army uniforms fell back into Syria following night action about January 9, 1948. (Jerusalem 43 of January 12, 1948—Eight[h] report for Army.) Emir Faour is reported to have stated that an attack of Fadl tribesmen across the Palestine frontier in the second week of January was made "under orders", and [Syrian] Defense Minister Sharabati in a flat statement to American newsmen described the attack as a "screen", under cover of which there is good reason to believe that approximately 600 Syrian-trained, equipped and transported "regular irregulars" moved across the border into Palestine. (Damascus 31 of January 15, 1948.⁶)

(4) Memminger⁷ has suggested that the Department "might consider cautioning the Syrian Government that its participation in recruiting, arming, training, financing and transporting the 'irregulars' to the frontier in Syrian army trucks is contrary to the word and spirit of the U.N. charter and the G.A. U.N. resolution on partition." (Damascus 31 of January 15, 1948.⁶)

⁴ Neither printed.

⁵ None printed.

⁶ Not printed.

⁷ Robert B. Memminger, the Chargé in Syria.

867N.01/2-648

Memorandum by Mr. Dean Rusk¹ to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] January 26, 1948.

1. The attached Policy Planning Staff Paper² recommends a reversal of the Palestine policy supported by the United States in the recent General Assembly. A few minor suggestions of detail are contained in Annex A³ which might round out the paper on points of

¹ The name of the Office of Special Political Affairs was changed to the Office of United Nations Affairs on January 21, 1948 (Departmental Announcement 943). Mr. Rusk, however, was not formally designated Director of the new office until January 28.

² PPS/19, January 19, p. 545.

³ Printed on p. 561.

fact, although in general the paper appears to be accurate from the factual point of view.

2. Obviously a major change in our Palestine policy would require the approval of the President as well as of leading Members of Congress. The Planning Staff Paper does not appear to be complete enough to serve as the basis for such reconsideration. Specifically, it would need to deal with the following questions which would inevitably arise at an early stage of any reconsideration :

(a) What events have occurred which create a "new situation" with respect to the action taken by the General Assembly on Palestine? Were not the considerations discussed in the attached paper known at the time of the decision to support the plan of the UNSCOP majority? At what point or points can it be reasonably concluded that the situation in Palestine will render impossible the implementation of the General Assembly resolution?

(b) What has been done thus far by the Department of State, either within or outside the United Nations, to increase the chances of success for the solution approved by us and by the General Assembly?

(c) What steps could now be taken by the Department of State, either within or outside the United Nations, to ensure maximum opportunity for the successful execution of the General Assembly recommendation on Palestine? Are such steps of such a serious character as to require us to reconsider our Palestine policy as being prohibitively costly?

(d) If it is concluded that the recommendations of the General Assembly resolution are unworkable, what alternative solution or solutions should the United States support and what procedures must be followed to bring about a change in our present commitments on Palestine?

3. A "New Situation"? Neither the United States nor the United Nations should consider political recommendations as sacrosanct, to be pursued at all costs despite new or unforeseen conditions or the disappointment of hopes and expectations upon which the initial recommendations were based. On the other hand, the mere revival of earlier objections does not state a "new situation". It is suggested that a reconsideration of the Palestine problem would be justified by a turn of events which either (a) clearly demonstrated the impossibility of continuing further with the present solution, or (b) clearly demonstrated that the costs of proceeding further with present policy are prohibitive and cut across more fundamental policies.

The following are samples of what might be considered a "new situation" with respect to the General Assembly resolution on Palestine :

(a) A refusal by the Mandatory Power to offer the degree of co-operation essential to the success of the plan ;

(b) A refusal by the Security Council to accept the responsibilities toward Palestine envisaged for it by the General Assembly resolution

(it is very doubtful that there is a working majority of seven votes in the Council favoring partition);

(c) An advisory opinion by the International Court of Justice that an important part of the Assembly resolution is illegal under the Charter;

(d) A refusal of Member Governments to provide the necessary support for the international regime planned for the City of Jerusalem;

(e) A scale of civil war inside the proposed Jewish state of Palestine which would be clearly beyond the capabilities of the new Jewish Government to handle (there is serious doubt that there is legal authority for the United Nations to impose a recommendation of the General Assembly by force upon the Arab inhabitants of the proposed Jewish state);

(f) A refusal by Member Governments to meet their obligations to prevent aggressive acts by neighboring Arab States designed to frustrate the recommendations of the General Assembly (armed intervention by the Arab States would clearly be aggression).

It is doubtful that events have indicated as yet any "new situation" of the character which would itself justify a basic reconsideration of the Assembly resolution. The most significant approaching date in this regard is April 1, 1948. If by that date there shall not have been established in the proposed Jewish and Arab states the Provisional Councils of Government which, under the resolution, would take over authority from the United Nations Commission, the Security Council is called upon to consider the situation thus created. The importance of this date has been underlined by the British plan to terminate the mandate shortly thereafter, on May 15. It is entirely likely, therefore, that by mid-April the possibilities of proceeding with the execution of the Assembly resolution will be greatly clarified.

4. *Armed Interference with the General Assembly Resolution.* The question of "enforcing" the General Assembly resolution on Palestine must be broken into component parts if the situation is to be accurately assessed. Armed interference in Palestine by the Arab States to prevent the implementation of the Assembly's resolution would clearly be aggression contrary to the obligations of those states under the Charter. If such interference takes the form of furnishing arms and assistance for guerrilla action in Palestine, the character of the aggression is similar to that now going on in Greece. The United States cannot avoid its responsibility as a permanent member of the Security Council to act within the limits of the Charter to prevent this type of aggression from outside Palestine. There is already considerable evidence that the Arab States are as directly involved in Palestine as are Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria in Greece. The question may shortly be raised in the Security Council whether there does not now exist a threat to the peace or breach of the peace with respect to Palestine.

The "enforcement" of the General Assembly resolution within Palestine itself presents a different problem. Specifically, there is a serious question as to whether the United Nations (or its Members) are entitled to use armed force to carry out a *recommendation* of the General Assembly against the resistance of the people directly concerned (where aggression is not involved). If the resistance of the Arabs of the proposed Jewish state is greater than can be handled by the Jewish state, the Security Council might have to intervene to maintain the peace of the Middle East, but in doing so it would not be bound to carry out the resolution of the General Assembly. It might arrange a truce, pending reconsideration of the matter by the General Assembly.

5. *The Role of the Mandatory Power (United Kingdom)*. The Policy Planning Staff Paper does not go into the present irresponsible attitude of the United Kingdom toward the Palestine question, nor the extent to which United States embarrassment is directly due to the British desire to shift the Palestine problem to the United States and to replace [herself with?] the United States as the leading influence in the Middle East. The United Kingdom placed the question of Palestine before the General Assembly for recommendations but during the course of United Nations consideration it offered no suggestions whatever about the character of an appropriate solution. Nevertheless, the United Kingdom Delegation discouraged the adoption and the implementation of the UNSCOP majority plan by every means not involving acceptance of public responsibility therefor. Although it can be understood that this course of action may have stemmed from the great personal irritation of Mr. Bevin, the result has been to multiply the difficulties for the United States and the United Nations. British noncooperation amounts to a rejection of the Assembly resolution and there should be no hesitation on our part in stating that this is the case. If a reconsideration of the Palestine question is taken up by the United Nations, one of our objectives might well be to turn back to the United Kingdom the responsibility which they have sought to saddle upon the United States.

6. *Measures Designed to Increase the Chances for Success of the Partition Plan*. In assessing our present Palestine policy, it would appear to be obligatory upon the Department of State to determine what steps could be taken to support the General Assembly resolution, if for no other reason than to understand its cost and the procedural problems involved. These comments do not purport to deal adequately with measures of support, since intensive study by all interested elements of the Department would be required. However, it is believed

that some or all of the following measures would be normal action to support an important United States policy :

(a) *Bilateral Talks with the United Kingdom.* Such talks should attempt to uncover the elements of the Assembly resolution to which the British object, their purpose in placing the matter before the United Nations, their idea of a solution with which they would be willing to cooperate, and their attitude toward joint diplomatic action to obtain the cooperation of the Arab States.

(b) *Multilateral Diplomatic Talks.* As the threat of violence in Palestine persists, consideration might be given to consultations with the permanent members of the Security Council, with other Members who voted for the Assembly resolution, and with more moderate Moslem governments such as Turkey and Pakistan directed toward diplomatic pressures upon the Arab States to persuade the Arabs not to use their influence to frustrate the Assembly resolution.

(c) *Action by the Security Council.* If evidence continues to build up and Arab officials are assisting in armed resistance to the Assembly resolution, the Security Council may be required to use such powers as it has under the Charter to bring such aggression to a close.

(d) *Active United States Participation in the Establishment of the International Territory of Jerusalem.* It will be difficult for the United States to avoid a substantial share of responsibility for the international territory of Jerusalem. The idea that the "United Nations" might undertake such a responsibility, separate and apart from its Members, is quite unrealistic. Under the Assembly resolution, it will be necessary for the United States to assist in providing necessary security in Jerusalem, whether by United States units within an international force or by United States volunteers in the constabulary employed by the Government of Jerusalem.

(e) *Exploitation of Differences of View Among the Arabs.* There is considerable evidence that the Arabs are not of a single mind about the right line of action on Palestine. Important differences are known to exist among the several Arab Governments. Greater attention might be given to the possibilities of turning Arab differences into a "hands-off" attitude on their part toward Palestine.

7. *Alternative Lines of Action.* In considering lines of action alternative to the present partition scheme, it must be realized that partition will be strongly opposed by the Arabs, that the conversion of Palestine into an Arab-dominated state would be violently opposed by the Jews, and that if no solution is reached the British would withdraw and large-scale fighting would likely occur in Palestine. In light of the above, consideration should be given to the following alternative lines of action if the matter is opened again in the United Nations:

(a) General Assembly to call upon the United Kingdom to consult with the Arabs and the Jews in the light of the unanimous recommendations of UNSCOP and to seek a solution agreeable to both parties.

(b) Establishment of a United Nations trusteeship for the whole of Palestine, with the United States taking its fair share of the fiscal and security responsibility for the trust territory.

8. *United States Responsibility.* The United States will not be able to avoid responsibility for a Palestine solution. A completely hands-off policy (even if politically possible from the domestic point of view), coupled with British determination to withdraw from Palestine, would leave Palestine in a state of violence which would inevitably come before the Security Council. If we shirk our responsibility as a member of the Council, having declined to take an active part in the settlement of the Palestine question, we would be subject to a loss of prestige from which we could not readily recover. Unless the present partition plan is reconsidered, the United States already has substantial obligations under it. If an alternative plan is considered, it would be frivolous not to suppose that the United States must play a leading role in the execution of such alternative.

Annex A

NOTES ON PPS/19

*Page 3, paragraph 1.*⁴ A reference to the last-minute move by the Arab States to propose a federal state should take into account the boycott of UNSCOP by the Arab Higher Committee, the boycott of the partition subcommittee of the General Assembly by the Arabs, and the fact that the proposal on November 29 was considered by most Delegations as more favorable to the Arab point of view than even the minority report of UNSCOP. The proposal of November 29 was made by the Representative of Lebanon but was not based upon consultations with the Arab Higher Committee and the Jewish Agency, which would have been prerequisite to a genuine conciliatory move.

Page 3, last half of paragraph 5; page 4, paragraph 9. The problem of aggression by the Arab States needs further consideration at this point.

Page 10, paragraph 22. It is doubtful that the basis for American support of the majority plan can be reduced to the point developed in this paragraph. Many other factors were also involved. Further, American support for the majority report was not made contingent upon the cooperation of the parties concerned.

Page 13, paragraph 30. The only practicable way by which we can "divest ourselves" of leadership in the Palestine problem is to place responsibility fully and squarely upon the British. This does not arise out of our membership in the United Nations but from the policies pursued by the United States toward Palestine since World War I.

⁴ The latter half of paragraph 5 of PPS/19, p. 548.

Page 14, paragraph 32(b). The reconsideration of the Palestine question in the United Nations will require an alternative plan which is workable and which will be supported by the Members. Although it would be desirable to reach a plan which would not require outside armed force for implementation, it may not be possible to find such a solution. The alternative to armed force might be large-scale civil war in Palestine in which the United States would inevitably become seriously involved.

Page 14, paragraph 33. It is too early to say how the question of a possible reference to the International Court will arise, but it may come up in such a form as to be difficult to oppose or prevent it. It is suggested that a decision on this point be held in abeyance.

867N.01/1-2648 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, January 26, 1948—7 p. m.

US URGENT

256. For your info UndSecy sent for Brit Amb this morning to discuss US arms embargo for Middle East. He informed Inverchapel informally and confidentially of conversations he had had yesterday with two key Senators asking whether it were true that Brit continue supply arms to Arab states. They indicated that unless some statement could be made to effect such arms were not in fact being supplied Arabs by Brit it would be difficult withstand great pressure campaign being brought on Congress by organized groups in US to force lifting of embargo.

UndSecy read Amb portions urtel 271 Jan 23¹ and of Brit Emb memo of about Nov 15 1947² setting forth Brit policy on matter of supplying military equipment to Arab states and referred last two sentences urtel 6523 Dec. 17. He also showed Amb samples of full-page ads being published in various newspapers throughout US advocating among other things repeal of arms embargo.

Lovett also referred to President's statement of June 5 last³ appealing to Americans to do nothing to make more difficult UN handling of Palestine problem. Mentioning emotional aspects of case in US

¹ Not printed; it reported information from Harold Beeley, the official in the Eastern Department of the British Foreign Office immediately responsible for Palestine affairs, that "British arms embargo regarding Palestine is still operating under principles Foreign Office memo transmitted Embtel 6523, December 17. HMG is 'stalling' regarding all new arms orders for area. Regarding old contracts with Arab states . . . HMG is bound to assume these deliveries will not be used contrary UN charter. Evidence misuse will result reconsideration entire question." (501.BB Palestine/1-2348) For telegram 6523, see *Foreign Relations*, 1947, vol. v, p. 1315.

² The editors were unable to identify this paper.

³ See bracketed note, *Foreign Relations*, 1947, vol. v, p. 1101.

he said it would be almost impossible to withstand pressure to retain arms embargo if groups advocating supplying of arms to Jews had any vestige of justice in their demands. This he felt they would have as long as Brit continued to supply any arms to Arab states.

UndSecy requested Amb to present in most urgent terms seriousness with which Dept views this situation and to suggest to his Govt how helpful it would be if it could take following two steps:

1. Make flat statement that Brit as mandatory power will continue embargo shipment of arms to Palestine except for maintenance of internal security.

2. Suspend all shipments of arms to Arab states pending clarification in UN of present confused situation.

UndSecy also requested him inform his Govt that unless some way could be found of taking this latter measure there was at least fifty-fifty chance Congress would move in and force us to remove arms embargo.

Amb said he understood importance and urgency of matter and would immediately transmit this request to his Govt. It would be helpful if you would also inform FonOff of great importance we attach to this request.⁴

MARSHALL

⁴Chargé Gallman discussed the contents of telegram 256 on January 27 with Sir Orme G. Sargent, British Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. The latter stated that while consideration had to be given to existing arms contracts with Arab states, the "policy of stalling on deliveries would for present be continued but at same time Foreign Office would thoroughly review situation in hope of finding some formula to meet our suggestions." (Telegram 315, January 27, 6 p. m., from London, 867N.01/1-2748)

501.BB Palestine/1-2748

Memorandum by Mr. Samuel K. C. Kopper of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] January 27, 1948.

THE PARTITION OF PALESTINE AND UNITED STATES SECURITY

[Here follows Section I on the aftermath of the General Assembly's resolution of November 29, 1947. Mr. Kopper outlined five "significant matters not taken into consideration by the General Assembly in adopting the resolution," namely the inadequacy of provisions for implementing the plan; various questions regarding the legality of the plan; the shift in the basic position of the Arab States on November 29, 1947, from one opposing the establishment of a Federal State in Palestine to an expressed willingness to accept that principle; "the failure of the United Nations to make any real effort to conciliate the two

opposing groups." (In this connection Mr. Kopper gave his view that "The abortive and utterly weak efforts of Dr. Evatt to bring conciliation to bear during the General Assembly session can hardly be classed as United Nations conciliation."); and the growing realization that features of the plan relating to the Palestine Commission were partially or totally unworkable.

Mr. Kopper then noted ominous signs in the present situation which portended the total unworkability of the plan unless it were implemented by force, namely the Arab League decision at Cairo on December 17, 1947, to "support the Palestine Arabs in the form of arms, ammunition, funds and volunteers, i.e., everything short of actual participation by the states themselves"; the discontinuation of work on the western half of the Trans-Arabian pipeline; the attempts by the Arabs to obtain arms from any source; and the start of a tremendous Zionist drive for funds, arms and ammunition, and other assistance.

Mr. Kopper, in Section II, analyzed possible courses of action by the United States, namely to support fully the partition plan without regard for the ultimate cost; to assume a passive role; and to alter the policy of the United States away from support of partition. He rejected the first two courses and made it "an essential prerequisite that a determination be made as to the best method by which the United States could obtain renewed consideration of the Palestine matter by the U.N."]

III—CONCLUSIONS

It is evident from the foregoing that there is no clear cut solution to the Palestine problem which would be completely acceptable to all parties. This has been pointed out in the UNSCOP report and is the unanimous view of all observers of the situation. However, it is also evident that certain solutions may be less costly than others. The growing tendency to refer to the recommendation of the General Assembly as a decision which must be carried out must not be allowed to divert our attention from the fact that the action of the General Assembly was only a recommendation. The United Nations has above all an obligation to preserve peace by peaceful methods so long as this is possible. The United Nations should retain a degree of flexibility and be able to alter its suggested solution of a matter when such is necessary in the light of changing conditions. There are serious doubts as to whether the Arabs of Palestine are under any obligations whatsoever, legal or moral, to be bound by the General Assembly recommendation. The situation is an anomalous one. The method of improving it is not to be found in forcing something on the peoples which is based on dubious grounds. Instead the United Nations should consider other possibilities which might be more acceptable. Accordingly, it is recom-

mended that the United States should follow the following line of action.

(a) When the Palestine case comes up in the Security Council we should seek to have the Council explore other avenues of a peaceful settlement of the problem.¹ Specifically we should endeavor to bring about conciliation or arbitration of the matter.

(b) Because of the vital interests of the United States in the Near East we should not permit ourselves to be drawn into any attack against British position on this matter.

(c) We should now consider abandoning support of partition as being unworkable.

(d) As a longer range objective we should seek a new solution in the form of (1) a transitional trusteeship or (2) a Federal State with liberal immigration provisions.²

(e) We should not lift the arms embargo.

(f) We should not participate in or advocate the sending of armed forces to Palestine (it would be impossible for the United States to advocate sending armed forces to Palestine without being itself willing to participate in such a venture).

(g) Responsible leaders in Congress and in the Government should be thoroughly apprised of the whole situation well in advance of the announcement of such a fundamental change in United States position.

(h) The United States Government should also make quite clear to leaders of the Jewish Agency, the Arab Higher Committee and to the Arab States themselves the reasons for the change in our basic position. Those American nationals associated with the Jewish Agency's activities must be given complete and frank information on how our vital interests are being and will be adversely affected by support of partition. They should be informed that the administration will make renewed efforts to have the displaced persons problem handled more realistically but that the United States cannot afford at this juncture in history to let chaos develop in the Near East or to have a hostile Moslem World confronting us. Accordingly, major concessions must be made by the Jewish Agency.

If a determination is made that it is impossible to alter our policy now, then the next most preferable general line of action to follow would be to assume a passive role until our policy can be altered or until the situation makes or breaks partition as a solution. Active support of partition is the least preferable course of action and should be rejected outright at any time that it appears that :

(a) The United States is unwilling to pursue it to its logical and ultimate extent.

¹ As an alternate suggestion, Mr. Kopper, on p. 22 of his memorandum, suggested that the United States "request the Secretary General to call a special session of the General Assembly to review the Palestine situation in the light of developments since November 29, 1947."

² Mr. Kopper, on p. 29, suggested that up to 125,000 additional Jewish persons be accepted in the proposed federal state in Palestine over the next two or three years.

(b) The USSR, for one reason or another, appears to be willing to send forces (volunteer or otherwise) into the Palestine area, or [if ³]

(c) Communism appears to be gaining eve[n the ³] slightest foothold in the proposed new Jewish State.

(d) Hostilities on a major scale are imminent.⁴

³ Bracketed portions supplied by the editors because the pertinent piece of the record copy has been torn away.

⁴ Secretary of Defense Forrestal described in his diary a discussion of the Palestine problem by Defense Department officials and Messrs. Rusk and Henderson on the evening of January 29, 1948. According to Forrestal,

"Henderson brought out the fact that:

"1. The partition vote in the General Assembly took the form merely of a recommendation to the Security Council. In other words, that it is not a decision of the United Nations.

"2. That the American support of this recommendation was predicated upon the assumption that it would be 'just and workable'.

"I asked whether there was sufficient evidence in the record to support a statement that unworkability of the proposed solution would justify a reexamination. Henderson replied in the affirmative." (Diary entry for January 29, 1948, Forrestal Papers)

IO Files, US/A/AC.21/13

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. John C. Ross*¹

CONFIDENTIAL

[NEW YORK,] January 28, 1948.

Participants: Mr. Moshe Shertok, Jewish Agency for Palestine
 Mr. Lourie, Jewish Agency for Palestine
 Mr. David Horowitz, Jewish Agency for Palestine
 Major Aubrey Eban, Jewish Agency for Palestine
 Mr. John Ross, United States Mission

Mr. Shertok had wanted to see Ambassador Austin whose schedule did not permit and I therefore saw him for the Ambassador. We had a quarter of an hour conversation this morning at which time Mr. Lourie accompanied Mr. Shertok, and continued for three-quarters of an hour this afternoon at Lake Success when Mr. Shertok was accompanied by Mr. Horowitz and Major Eban.

Mr. Shertok outlined as follows his presentation of the Jewish Agency's views to the Palestine Commission over the past few days.

1. The most urgent need was to find a means of supplying the Jews in Palestine with arms so that they could defend themselves and prepare for the defense of the Jewish State.

2. Mr. Shertok realized the problems for national governments which this objective raises. It would be desirable, therefore, for the Security Council representing the United Nations to take action in this matter. Such action might be along the lines of the Security Council approving the export of arms to those who were supporting

¹ Deputy to Ambassador Austin.

the decision of the Assembly and disapproving the export of arms to those who were defying the decision of the United Nations.

3. The Jews wanted to organize a militia. This would consist of a headquarters organization and five "brigade groups". Each brigade group would be a self-contained unit possessing the various arms and services and would amount to five or six thousand men. (The total force envisaged was about thirty thousand.) Four of these brigade groups would be established in the four principal Jewish areas; a fifth would be held in reserve. The British apparently opposed the formation of such a militia and the Jewish Agency was willing to compromise on a minimum of the headquarters organization and one brigade group which, I gathered, would form a cadre for future expansion. The Haganah would eventually be absorbed into this militia.

4. In his presentation to the Palestine Commission Mr. Shertok had exposed "aggression" by the Arab States. I asked him about the probative value of his evidence. He felt that it would stand up without question. This factor of Arab aggression involving defiance of the United Nations was, of course, fundamental in the whole situation.

5. Mr. Shertok had then dealt extensively with the question of providing international forces for Palestine. He made the following points:

(a) an international force was needed as a deterrent to further aggression and disorder. The Jewish Agency did not intend that this force would be a cloak for the Jewish militia. The Jews were more than willing to fight for themselves.

(b) Such an international force would not have to be large (he mentioned the figure ten thousand men) but it would have to be a self-contained, effective force including air squadrons, artillery, and the rest.

(c) Such a force was necessary to fulfill the international responsibility of the United Nations to repel aggression should this transpire. The Jewish forces would deal for the most part with local attacks. It might be necessary to call upon the international force for assistance in any large scale local attacks. Finally, the Jews would assist but would expect the international force to deal primarily with any incursions from outside Palestine. Mr. Shertok and his associates seemed to feel very confident that the political and psychological effect of a force of this size and character would be effective against any threat of major incursion from outside Palestine.

After reviewing as outlined above the position of the Jewish Agency Mr. Shertok moved on to his main purpose in our conversation. He expressed the hope that the United States would support the Jewish Agency position with regard to a finding of Arab aggression, with regard to an arms policy which would make it possible to provide arms to the Jews but not to the Arabs, and with regard to the establishment of international forces, when these various matters are brought before the Security Council.

He went on to say that when the Commission report comes to the Security Council there will be an initial issue of procedure on which the Jewish Agency hoped it would have United States support, namely, whether the Jewish Agency would be admitted to the Security Council table as an interested party. The interests of the Arab States are represented by Syria's membership on the Council. Egypt and the Lebanon had filed formal requests to participate in the Council deliberations and possibly other Arab States would make similar requests. The Jewish Agency, of course, feels that it is as much an interested party² as any of these. It feels further that its position has been established in view of the fact that the Special Session last spring admitted the Agency as an interested party and that this has been continued through UNSCOP, the *ad hoc* committee during the last Assembly and the Palestine Commission.²

In conclusion Mr. Shertok said that the element of time was all important. The situation in Palestine was deteriorating every day. It had taken more time than anticipated to organize the Palestine Commission. The Commission had been working thus far for three weeks without any very tangible results. If he were to say that the British were not being helpful it would be the grossest understatement. On the 19th of January the Commission had asked the British a series of thirty odd questions. They had received answers, and negative answers at that, to only four or five of these questions. When this matter reached the Security Council it would be subject unquestionably to various filibusters. In addition there would, of course, be the necessity of the various representatives consulting their governments.

The most important consideration was to avoid a vacuum. If through lack of leadership and decisiveness the United Nations failed to meet its responsibilities this would mean a vacuum in Palestine when the British withdraw. This would have a catastrophic effect on the peace of the entire Middle East.

At the beginning of our conversation I made clear to Mr. Shertok that the United States Government was of course following this matter with close attention but that I was not in a position at this time to express any views to him. I would be very glad, on the other hand, to have him tell me as much as he cared to about the views of the Jewish Agency. In concluding our conversation I thanked Mr. Shertok for his very clear and complete account of the views of the Agency and invited him to communicate to me at any time any further views

² The Department, on January 30, suggested to Ambassador Austin that "US should support request of Jewish Agency to be admitted and heard pursuant to Rule 39 of SC Rules of Procedure in SC discussions Palestine question. Arab Higher Committee should likewise be heard on same basis if request made to SC." (Telegram 37 to New York, 501.BC/1-3048)

he might have. He said that he would do so and that meanwhile he would send me copies of the various memoranda on the subjects referred to above which he had presented to the Palestine Commission.

JOHN ROSS

501.BB Palestine/12-947: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Pakistan

SECRET

WASHINGTON, January 28, 1948—5 p. m.

31. In response to Mr. Jinnah's¹ message to President Truman of Dec. 8 (re Embtel no. 198 of Dec. 9)² you may deliver the following written reply to Mr. Jinnah.

"I appreciated greatly your message of Dec. 8, 1947, and welcome the spirit in which it was sent. Such exchanges of views are always helpful in the development of mutual understanding. I am sure that we have a common purpose in the maintenance of world peace on the basis of the principles incorporated in the Charter of the United Nations.

"Even with these common objectives it is only natural that differences in views will from time to time arise and it is only by frank and open discussion that these differences may be resolved. I have therefore instructed our Chargé to discuss with you at some length the bases of United States policy on Palestine. I hope that this discussion will help to make the United States position clear and will serve to promote better understanding between our two countries."

During your oral discussion with Mr. Jinnah you should adopt following lines:

1. US Govt decided after anxious and sober consideration to support partition in the UNGA despite realization of how strongly opposed Arab States were to establishment of Jewish state in Palestine. In its support of partition the US Govt was motivated by the following considerations:

(a) After reviewing statements and expressions of policy by responsible American officials, resolutions of Congress, and Party platforms of last thirty years it came to conclusion that unless there was some unanticipated factor in situation the trend of public opinion and policy based thereon practically forced it to support partition.

(b) Majority Report of UNSCOP recommending partition did represent new factor but one supporting Jewish state.

(c) Public opinion in US stirred by mistreatment of Jews in Europe and by intense desire of surviving Jews to go to Palestine strongly supported establishment of Jewish state.

¹ Mohammad Ali Jinnah, Governor General of Pakistan.

² *Foreign Relations*, 1947, vol. v, p. 1305 and footnote 1 to Mr. Jinnah's message.

(d) Troubled situation in Palestine accompanied by British decision to withdraw made it evident that solution of this difficult problem could not be postponed.

2. US Govt concerned re Palestine problem and sincerely desired fair solution. It therefore welcomed presentation to UN and earnestly and sincerely worked for impartial UNGA Committee with broad terms of reference to examine problem. At no time did Amer Govt directly or indirectly endeavor to influence recommendations of UN SCOP. It desired UNSCOP to approach matter in impartial way and work out solution of Palestine problem which would have overwhelming support of world opinion as one which was fair and workable.

3. US Govt in deciding to support Majority Report of UNSCOP at UNGA took position that it should not use United States power and influence in prevailing upon other countries against their will to support Majority Report. US delegation was instructed that it should explain US reasons for supporting Majority Report but should not exert pressure on other delegations. So far as US Govt can determine no undue pressure was brought upon other countries by US governmental officials responsible to Executive. Statements have been made that pressure was brought by Amer private citizens and by Americans holding official positions over whom Exec Branch of Govt had no control. It is impossible to determine definitely whether such pressure if it was applied changed any appreciable number of votes. In any event it is considered that the vote of the UNGA reflected the belief that partition was best of the solutions of the Palestine problem which were advanced.

4. It is understood that one of the reasons for Arab resentment at the UNGA decision is concern lest the Zionist intend eventually to use their state as a base for territorial expansion in the Middle East at the expense of the Arabs. It is the conviction of the United States Government, based on conversations with responsible Zionist leaders, that they have no expansionist designs and that they are most anxious to live with the Arabs in the future on cordial terms and to establish with them relations of a mutually advantageous character. If at a later time persons or groups should obtain control of the Jewish State who have aggressive designs against their neighbors, the United States would be prepared firmly to oppose such aggressiveness in the United Nations and before world opinion.

5. The United States Government, prompted by the friendliest feelings for the Moslem peoples, expresses the most sincere hope that in their disappointment and resentment at the decision of UNGA, the Governments of the Arab countries will not attempt by armed force. or

will not encourage the use of armed force, to prevent the carrying out of that decision. It is hoped that Pakistan, as a newly admitted member of the United Nations, will use its great influence with the Arab States to assist in persuading them not to resort to actions of a character which may undermine the present order of the whole Middle East and eventually lead to a world conflict in which the peoples of the Middle East may be the most tragic sufferers.

6. It seems hardly necessary to point out that there are in the world today powerful aggressive forces which create hatreds, promote violence, and result in chaos. It would be tragic if the forces striving for an orderly, peaceful and prosperous world should at this juncture allow themselves to be disrupted over the question of Palestine.

7. There is a mutual need for friendly political and economic co-operation between the United States and the countries of the Middle East. If there is to be a real sense of security as well as a developing prosperity in that area, the countries of the Middle East and those non-Middle Eastern powers who sincerely desire the principles of the Charter of the United Nations to be applied to that area in the interest both of the Middle Eastern people and of world security must work with cordiality and mutual trust. It is the conviction of the United States Government that if the problem of Palestine, which has long been a source of suspicion and uneasiness, could once and for all be eliminated by acquiescence on the part of the Arab States in the UNGA decision on Palestine, difficult though such acquiescence might be, a disturbing influence in international affairs would be removed, and the security of the Middle East measurably strengthened.

In view of the circumstances and method of delivery of this reply, please inform Mr. Jinnah that it is our belief that the common purposes of our governments would best be served if these messages were not made public.³

LOVETT

³ In telegram 29, February 3, 4 p. m., to Jidda, the Department referred to Jidda's telegram 14, January 13 (see footnote 4, p. 540), and directed Minister Childs to seek immediate audience with the King or other official of the Saudi Arabian Government. The Minister was to make known President Truman's instruction to discuss the Palestine question informally. Telegram 29 then repeated verbatim the seven numbered paragraphs in telegram 31 to Karachi, except that the first 14 words in the second sentence of paragraph numbered five were replaced by "It is my own hope that Saudi Arabia" (501. BB Palestine/1-1348) Telegram 29 bears the President's "OK" in a marginal notation.

President Truman, on February 3, made a reply of general character to the telegram sent to him by the Iman of Yeman on December 2, 1947, regarding the partition of Palestine. The reply is not printed (890J.001/2-348); regarding the telegram of December 2, see footnote 1, *Foreign Relations*, 1947, vol. v, p. 1291.

*First Monthly Progress Report of the United Nations Palestine
Commission to the Security Council*¹

[Extract]

14. CONCLUSION

(a) This first monthly report to the Security Council covers what is in effect the preliminary and exploratory stage of the Commission's work. In this stage the Commission has gained a working knowledge of the problem and a clear conception of the nature of the difficult tasks confronting it. The second stage of the Commission's work will be devoted to negotiations with the Mandatory Power, and with representatives of the Jewish, and if at all possible, the Arab communities in Palestine over the detailed matters involved in the implementation of the Assembly's recommendations.

(b) In view of the time-limits fixed in the resolution, and the nature of the tasks to be performed, the time available to the Commission, even under the most favourable circumstances, is extremely short. There is much preparatory work which the Commission may undertake at the headquarters, but the full implementation of the Assembly's recommendations requires the presence of the Commission in Palestine considerably in advance of the transfer of authority from the Mandatory Power to the Commission. The delimitation of boundaries, to undertake which the Commission envisages the establishment of an expert boundaries commission; preparations to ensure continuity in the maintenance of essential public services; the selection of Provisional Councils of Government and their activation; the creation of armed militia; and negotiations with regard to Economic Union, can be effectively undertaken only when the Commission is present in Palestine. In view of the complicated and often highly technical nature of the problems incident to the implementation of the resolution, and the limited time at the disposal of the Commission before the termination of the mandate, the Commission attaches the greatest importance to the progress of its negotiations with the Mandatory Power.²

¹ Reprinted from SC, 3rd yr., *Special Suppl. No. 2*, pp. 1, 9. The report, dated January 29, 1948, was transmitted by Chairman Lisicky to Secretary-General Lie on January 31.

² Gen. Andrew G. L. McNaughton of Canada, President of the Security Council, noted receipt of the first report of the Palestine Commission at the Council's meeting of February 10. He announced his assumption that the Council would wish to await receipt of the Commission's special report before entering into discussion of the Palestine question. The Representative of Syria, Faris el-Khourri, however, questioned the legality of the procedure used in creating the Commission. He stated also that the resolution of November 29, 1947, had been a recommendation and he now questioned whether the Member Nations had adopted the partition plan. For these reasons, he concluded, the proceedings were premature (United Nations, *Official Records of the Security Council, Third Year, Nos. 16-35*, pp. 56-58).

PPS Files, Lot 64 D 563

*Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennan)
to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] January 29, 1948.

PPS 19/1

MR. LOVETT: I have studied carefully Rusk's memorandum of January 26 (attached as Annex A) concerning the Policy Planning Staff paper on Palestine. I enclose a memorandum answering in detail the points he has raised. I hope this may be considered as a supplement to the earlier Staff paper.

As far as any technical inadequacy of the Planning Staff paper is concerned, I will of course bear in mind the suggestions you made, and see that they are taken into account in any future Staff papers. In the present instance we did not make the paper longer and more detailed because it was presented for approval as an initial Department position in the National Security Council, and we thought it would be most useful to stick to the main considerations of national interest involved.

But there is another aspect of this matter which causes me concern, and that is the question of basic policy. Everything in Rusk's memorandum seems to me to point toward a line of policy designed to gain for us some relief from the difficulties of our present position, but to do this at the expense of our relations with the British and Arabs and at the cost of further involvement in commitments leading toward international enforcement of the Palestine decision.

I have deep misgivings about such a policy. Even if our relations with the British and the Arabs were expendable for such a purpose (which I would not concede), the respite we would gain would be of brief duration. The pressure we are under in this matter is such that, if we continued to temporize with it, it would not stop short of a point where we would finally hold major military and economic responsibility for the indefinite maintenance by armed force of a *status quo* in Palestine fiercely resented by the bulk of the Arab world. I do not believe that the U.S. public would ever tolerate such a situation. If I am correct in this analysis, that means that we will be obliged to draw the line, sooner or later, somewhere short of that point, against further commitments in this direction. I believe that the sooner and the more sharply that line is drawn, the less trouble it will mean for this Government, for the United Nations, and probably for the people of Palestine.

I think, therefore, that we have here a clear-cut issue of policy, which will have to be resolved promptly.

GEORGE F. KENNAN

[Annex]

*Personal Comments by Mr. Kennan on Mr. Rusk's Memorandum of
January 26, 1948*

TOP SECRET
PPS 19/1

[WASHINGTON,] January 29, 1948.

My comments on Mr. Rusk's memorandum of January 26, following the order of his numbered paragraphs, are as follows:

1. No comment.

2. This paper¹ was intended, as stated in the covering memorandum, to constitute the Department's initial position for further discussion in the National Security Council. The Staff endeavored, accordingly, to set forth in its paper only those basic principles, the minimum dictates of national interest, which it felt should be observed in our policy on Palestine from here on out. It was assumed that the detailed implementation of these principles should remain an operational matter within this Department, on which the National Security Council would not wish to pass.

The following may be said on the specific questions which Mr. Rusk feels would have to be met before the Staff paper could form the basis of a reconsideration of our policy:

(a) Question: What events have occurred which create a "new situation" with respect to the action taken by the General Assembly on Palestine?

Answer: The two months which have elapsed since the Assembly made its recommendation have been marked by violent resistance of the Arab elements in Palestine to the proposed partition. It is becoming increasingly evident that the partition scheme cannot even be initially implemented, much less permanently maintained, without the use of outside armed force. Thus, what was once prediction has now become demonstrable fact.

Q: Were not the considerations discussed in the attached paper known at the time the decision to support the plan of the UNSCOP majority?

A: The Planning Staff was not concerned with the decision to support the plan of the UNSCOP majority, and did not attempt to assess the background of fact or the considerations which underlay that decision. I do not find this question pertinent to the subject of the Planning Staff paper.

Q: At what point or points can it be reasonably concluded that the situation in Palestine will render impossible the implementation of the General Assembly resolution?

A: The Staff paper did not speak of the situation in Palestine "rendering impossible" the implementation of the General Assembly resolution. It did speak of a point at which it will have been "conclusively demonstrated that the effort to carry out the partition plan as

¹ PPS/19, p. 545.

prescribed by the UN General Assembly offers no reasonable prospect of success without the use of outside armed forces." The determination of the stage at which this point may be considered as reached was regarded by the Staff as necessarily a matter for current operational consideration.

(b) Question: What has been done thus far by the Department of State, either within or outside the United Nations, to increase the chances of success for the solution approved by us and by the General Assembly?

Answer: I know of nothing in the Assembly resolution which placed any individual responsibility on this Government for increasing the chances of success of the solution recommended. This responsibility is clearly apportioned, by the terms of the resolution, among the mandatory power, the Commission, and the inhabitants of Palestine. This Government is appealed to, in the Preamble, to refrain from taking any action which might hamper or delay the carrying out of the recommendations; but that is not the same as being called upon to increase the chances for their success.

It is true that this Government has further responsibilities, under the UN recommendation, as a member of the Security Council. These it will of course have to face up to when the proper moment comes; and it has recognized this fact in its actions to date in the Security Council.

In this connection, the Planning Staff was perhaps remiss in not including in its paper a reference to one of the requests along these lines made by the General Assembly to the Security Council. This request, contained in paragraph (c) of the Preamble, is that the Security Council should "determine as a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, in accordance with Article 39 of the Charter, any attempt to alter by force the settlement envisaged by this resolution". To me, this request, which undertakes to prejudge a question obviously reserved by the UN Charter to the final competence of the Security Council, looks like an improper and unsound action of the Assembly, to which this Government should probably not have assented and to which the Security Council should not be held. I assume, however, that it is considered to apply only to the period when the settlement in question has become an accomplished fact. If so, we would presumably still have time to recommend in the next Assembly meeting the deletion of this passage. This is a question which I think should be given serious study in Mr. Rusk's office and by Le.

(c) Question: What steps could now be taken by the Department of State, either within or outside the United Nations, to ensure maximum opportunity for the successful execution of the General Assembly recommendation on Palestine?

Answer: Mr. Rusk has himself outlined on pages 4 and 5 of his memorandum² the steps which he would suggest in answering this question. These will be dealt with in detail below.

The Staff paper was based on the belief that partition would not be possible of attainment without outside assistance on a substantial scale and that no execution of the General Assembly recommendation which involved the use of force from outside could be considered as

² This refers to paragraph numbered 6 of Mr. Rusk's memorandum, p. 559.

"successful". The Staff considered that any steps taken by this Government, acting individually, to promote the successful execution of the Assembly recommendation at this stage could only commit us still more deeply to a final implementation and enforcement of that recommendation by the international community. Therefore, it had no such steps to suggest.

Q: Are such steps of such a serious character as to reconsider our Palestine policy as being prohibitively costly?

A: I take this question to mean: "Are such steps of so serious a character as to warrant reconsideration of our Palestine policy on the grounds of its being prohibitively costly?" As stated, the Staff had no suggestions for such steps. With respect to the steps suggested by Mr. Rusk, the answer is: "Yes, prohibitively costly or dangerous to national security—or both."

(d) Question: If it is concluded that the recommendations of the General Assembly are unworkable, what alternative solution or solutions should the United States support and what procedures must be followed to bring about a change in our present commitments on Palestine?

Answer: The only alternatives which the Staff felt we should support were set forth in paragraph 32 of the Planning Staff paper.

I have seen no evidence that there is any possible "solution" of this problem involving the use of outside force which could be considered a "satisfactory" solution and which it would be in the interests of this country to support. Admittedly, we must do what we can not to put ourselves in the position of blocking efforts of others to find a solution to this problem. This is why it was recommended in paragraph 32 of the Staff paper that we should "cooperate loyally in working out and implementing any proposals designed (a) to encourage pacific settlement between the Palestine Arabs and Palestine Jews or (b) to investigate the possibilities of any other suggested solution such as a federal state or trusteeship, which would not require outside armed force for implementation."

3. *A "New Situation"?* I agree with Mr. Rusk's definition of the turn of events which might justify a reconsideration of the Palestine problem. I have no objection to the samples he cites of what might be considered a "new situation", although it seems to me that point (e), which refers to civil war within Palestine, considerably overshadows the others in importance and probability. The Staff paper did not state that the contingency calling for reconsideration of the Assembly resolution had yet arisen. But it took account of the fact that this contingency is rapidly arising in the form of the trend of events within Palestine itself. I personally consider it likely that the contingency will be definitely established, in the sense of Mr. Rusk's point (e), before the April 1 deadline which he mentions.

4. *Armed Interference with the General Assembly Resolution.* I am concerned at Mr. Rusk's suggestion that armed interference in Palestine by the Arab States to prevent the implementation of the Assembly resolution, even in the form of furnishing arms and assist-

ance for guerilla action, would constitute aggression, and that the United States has a responsibility as a permanent member of the Security Council to act within the limits of the Charter to prevent this. (The Preamble to the Assembly resolution spoke not of "preventing the implementation" but of attempting "to alter by force the settlement envisaged.") If it were true that we had the responsibility Mr. Rusk imputes to us, it would constitute an existing commitment which would cut at right angles across our entire policy with regard to the Middle East, and our world-wide military-political strategy as well. Fortunately, I do not think that this commitment can be said to exist at this time, or that there would be any question of its existing until the Jewish and Arab states have been duly established, the new governments organized, their authority clearly recognized by the mass of the Palestine inhabitants of both camps, and the admission of the new states to UN membership made an accomplished fact.

As to enforcement within Palestine, I have nothing to add to the recommendations of the Staff paper, which stated that we should oppose sending armed forces into Palestine by the UN or any member thereof for the purpose of implementing partition and that we should also oppose the recruitment of volunteers for this purpose.

5. *The Role of the Mandatory Power (United Kingdom)*. I am also deeply concerned over Mr. Rusk's attitude toward the position of the United Kingdom in the Palestine question.

The Planning Staff, in drafting its paper, saw no need for making moral judgments on the policies of other nations in the Palestine question or for dealing with the British position otherwise than as a given fact.

The effort to shift responsibility back to the United Kingdom, as Mr. Rusk suggests, would not promote a solution of the real difficulties in Palestine. It would be firmly and promptly rejected by the British. It would increase anti-British feeling in this country and exacerbate Anglo-American relations. It might serve to relieve the immediate pressure on this Government and to divert some of it to the British Government. But it would do this, inevitably, at the expense of Anglo-American collaboration in the Middle Eastern area in general and therefore at the expense of the strategic interests of this country.

This Government is not prepared to replace the British Government in the military positions it has occupied, and is occupying, in the Middle Eastern area. In the opinion of the working levels in this Department and in the Armed Services Departments, it is undesirable that we should attempt to do this. On the other hand, Britain plainly has neither the resources nor the will to shoulder once more the political burden of enforcing a Palestine solution which fails to satisfy both Jews and Arabs. The necessity for the observance of parallel

policies in that area was specifically embodied in the results of the working level discussions with the British last fall, which were approved by the National Security Council.³

In my opinion, there is no positive consideration involved in the Palestine question which could justify the disturbance of the understanding and cooperation between ourselves and the British, at which we have only recently succeeded in arriving, in Middle Eastern matters. I cannot state too emphatically my belief that any attempt on our part to ease for ourselves the ugly realities of the Palestine problem by creating further embarrassment for the British there would be gravely prejudicial to our national interest.

For these reasons, I do not feel that we should put further pressure on the British, with respect to arms shipments to Arab countries. The importation of arms into Palestine is still clearly a question for the mandatory power, which bears responsibility for internal law and order there. As for British relations with the Arabs, the remaining British strategic positions in the Middle East are among the few real assets which we still have in that area. The British position there is in large part our position, and must be protected as such. It is in the interests of this country that *both* the U.S. and U.K. should not find themselves simultaneously in that position of extreme unpopularity with the Arab world which we occupy today.

6. *Measures Designed to Increase the Chances for Success of the Partition Plan.* I reiterate: I do not know of any specific obligation resting on the Department of State or on this Government individually to take measures to increase the chances for successful implementation of the General Assembly resolution at this juncture. I further feel that any active efforts on our part in this direction would only involve us more deeply in the moral obligation to see this solution through, even to the bitter end of international enforcement.

Such possibilities were therefore not specifically explored in the Planning Staff paper.

I think the force of this position can be seen from an examination of Mr. Rusk's suggestions:

(a) *Bilateral Talks with the United Kingdom.* Mr. Rusk suggests that such talks "attempt to uncover the elements of the Assembly resolution to which the British object, their purpose in placing the matter before the United Nations, their idea of a solution with which they would be willing to cooperate, and their attitude toward joint diplomatic action to obtain the cooperation of the Arab States."

There is no unclarity as to the reasons why the British placed this matter before the UN, as to the elements in the Assembly resolution to which they object, or as to their idea of a solution with which they

³ On November 21, 1947; see letter of November 24, 1947, from Acting Secretary of State Lovett to President Truman, *Foreign Relations*, 1947, vol. v, p. 623, and footnote 3.

would be willing to cooperate. British policy in these matters has been set forth with enviable clarity and emphasis on a number of occasions; and I would refer Mr. Rusk particularly to Mr. Bevin's statement in the House of Commons on February 25, 1947. We need have no doubt that their attitude toward joint diplomatic action to attain the co-operation of the Arab States would be inflexibly negative.

(b) *Multilateral Diplomatic Talks.* The events of the past months in the Palestine question have already been little short of disastrous for our relations with the Arab world. We cannot strain those relations any further without envisaging the complete disruption of many of our existing ties with the Middle East area and serious injury to our economic and strategic interests. The Turks, furthermore, have already expressed their dismay at what they regard as the inconsistency of our Palestine policy with our other policies in that area, and they would hardly be amenable to such an approach.

(c) *Action by the Security Council.* Any action by the Security Council to enforce the Palestine resolution will bring us closer to the point at which we will be asked to put up armed forces or to permit the recruitment of international volunteers for operations in Palestine. The Policy Planning Staff is firmly opposed to both of these solutions, considering them seriously detrimental to national security.

(d) *Active United States Participation in the Establishment of the International Territory of Jerusalem.* Any United States initiative to hasten the implementation of Part III of the Assembly resolution, concerning the city of Jerusalem, would be vulnerable to the same objections as were outlined above with respect to the Security Council action. I would raise the question whether the responsibilities devolving upon the United Nations from these provisions can properly be expected to become operative in the absence of the implementation of the remainder of the partition scheme.

(e) *Exploitation of Differences of View Among the Arabs.* This is again a course which would sacrifice our over-all relations with the Arab world to the requirements of the Palestine situation. It might achieve a cheap and momentary success. For the long run, I doubt that the mass of the Arabs would ever forgive us for resorting to it. It seems to me that such a course is neither in keeping with the general character of our diplomatic practice nor consistent with the integrity of our policy in the Middle East.

7. *Alternative Lines of Action.*

(a) The first suggestion is that the General Assembly call upon the United Kingdom to consult with the Arabs and the Jews in the light of the unanimous recommendations of UNSCOP and to seek a solution agreeable to both parties. This would appear to me to place the British in the precise position they were in in the middle of 1946 when they called the Palestine Conference in London. You will recall that the Jews refused to participate in that Conference, despite the expressed hope of President Truman that they might do so, and that the Conference came to no positive result. I am not aware of any possible agreed solution which the British failed to explore during the period when they were endeavoring to find some satisfactory way of relieving them-

selves of this responsibility. I am sure that the United Kingdom will not again accept any responsibility of this nature.

(b) It is suggested here that a United Nations trusteeship be established for the whole of Palestine, in which the U.S. would take "its fair share" of the physical and security responsibility.

We may have to come to this, and the Staff paper recommended that we cooperate loyally in the working out and implementing of any proposals in the United Nations for exploring the possibility of such a solution, provided it would not require outside armed forces for implementation. The Staff did not recommend, however, that this Government take any responsibility for the initiation of such a proposal, since it failed to see how even a United Nations trusteeship could fail to become a constant headache to the trustee power, a source of further controversy in the United Nations, and a cause of reproach to the authors of the suggestion.

S. United States Responsibility. Mr. Rusk is correct that a hands-off policy will leave Palestine in a state of violence. For that, all of us will share some measure of blame who have been concerned with the Palestine question in these past 30 years; but the main responsibility will have to continue to rest with the Jewish leaders and organizations who have pushed so persistently for the pursuit of objectives which could scarcely fail to lead to violent results.

It is my opinion that the commitments we have already undertaken in this matter are of such a nature that if an attempt were made to carry them out in the literal sense it would soon prove intolerable to national opinion, would lead to violent dissatisfaction with the leadership of our foreign policy, and would have other internal repercussions of an extremely undesirable nature.

In these circumstances, I think we have no choice but to try to extricate ourselves from the existing commitments as rapidly as possible and to see to it that we do nothing which would add any new ones to the present list. I believe that we, and the international community in general, will have to recognize that we have in Palestine a situation with which neither the United Nations nor any outside power is really able to deal successfully at this juncture. We may hope that the absence of international interference will eventually lead the parties themselves to a greater appreciation of their own interest and responsibility. We should scrupulously refrain from adding by anything we may do or say to the prospects for violence between them. At the same time, we should not attempt to be our brother's keeper or to offer moral advice to other powers when we are unable to bear our own full share of the responsibility for the consequences.

This may indeed involve a loss of prestige both for us and the United Nations. But I think it will be worth it if we can thereby

regain the full independence and dignity of our position in this confused and tragic question.

S67N.01/1-2648

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Satterthwaite)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] January 29, 1948.

Participants: Lord Inverchapel, British Ambassador
Mr. Lovett, Under Secretary
Mr. Satterthwaite, NEA

Lord Inverchapel called at 3:00 p. m. today with the reply which he had received from his Government to Mr. Lovett's suggestion, made to the Ambassador on January 26, that the British should if possible, in view of the pressure being brought in Congress to have the U.S. embargo on arms to the Middle East raised, issue a statement to the effect that they have suspended all shipments of arms to the Arab states. (Reported in full in Deptel 256, January 26, 7 p. m. to London.) As he was instructed to deliver the reply orally, the Ambassador did so by reading aloud his original telegraphic instruction, of which the following is a full summary:

HMG are responsible for Palestine until the mandate terminates on May 15 next. British troops may not be out until August 1. If the U.S. Government were to modify its position with reference to its embargo on arms to the Middle East two results would follow: (1) These arms would be used against the British, and (2) the British Navy would have to consider whether to allow ships carrying such arms to land in Palestinian ports.

HMG are bound by treaties of alliance with Iraq, Transjordan and Egypt. In respect of Egypt and Iraq they have entered into agreements for the supply of arms. They consider the fulfillment of these agreements necessary to prevent internal disorder and Communist penetration. To desist without the agreement of these two countries would be a violation of treaty obligations, the observance of which it should be to the advantage of our two countries to encourage, and would strike at the root of the friendly relations which the British maintain with them.

HMG have adopted the following attitude with reference to the supply of arms:

- (a) No arms destined for Palestine should be authorized, and
- (b) The only supplies being sent at present are in respect of long-standing orders on certain items to bring the local requirements up to the scale necessary for internal purposes and which arise out of treaty and contractual obligations.

The Ambassador is therefore to urge on the Under Secretary the dangers of our altering our position. If the U.S. have any doubts on

this subject these issues should be considered by the British and U.S. Services, the Embassy and the State Department in order to arrive at a joint assessment of the strategic and political stakes involved.

In any case HMG could not depart from existing treaty and contractual obligations without the consent of the other states concerned. Without violating any of Mr. Lovett's confidences, HMG are therefore informing these other Governments of the U.S. position, saying that it looks as if the pressure being brought on the U.S. Government to lift the arms embargo could be avoided only if HMG were to suspend delivery of materials for say six months with a view to reviewing the situation at the end of that period. They are being informed that only with the consent of those countries with which HMG have contractual obligations would such action be taken. They are being asked what their decision would be if the matter came to the point where a decision was inevitable.

You are to say to Mr. Lovett that these Middle Eastern countries will inevitably ask whether, if they are to agree to the abandonment of the supply of arms by the British, the U.S. will continue to enforce its embargo. It is clear that only the U.S. Government can answer this question. If in spite of the considerations hitherto advanced the U.S. decides it cannot maintain the embargo unless HMG withhold all deliveries, it is suggested that U.S. Government at once explore with the Middle Eastern countries concerned their willingness to forego the receipt of arms provided the present U.S. ban is maintained. You should leave Mr. Lovett under no illusion as to the gravity of the issue he has raised, both in respect of the relations of our two countries with the Middle Eastern countries and as between ourselves. It is therefore urged that all concerned will reflect most earnestly on the wide considerations of strategic and political policy involved.

After the Ambassador had read the foregoing message, the Under Secretary summarized his understanding of it and commented that he had then been given nothing to tell Congress except that the British felt that they must continue to deliver arms for internal security purposes if assured such arms would not be used in Palestine. The Under Secretary felt it would be of no avail to make any such statement to Congress. This was a matter for the British Government to decide but in his view a statement in such limited terms might do more harm than good, since it would serve only to emphasize the fact that the British are in fact furnishing arms to certain Arab states. About the only thing we can do therefore is to let the matter ride as it is and hope that the U.S. can nevertheless succeed in maintaining the arms embargo.

If these are the facts we must face them. Mr. Lovett had hoped that the British Government would be able to take prompt action along the lines he had suggested. Perhaps at some future date the British will be able to say that they did endeavor to persuade those countries with which they have treaty and contractual obligations to release them from these obligations.

The Under Secretary asked the Ambassador to thank the Foreign Office for the kind and prompt consideration it had given his request and to say that we will consider the information they have given us and hope that we may nevertheless be successful in holding the line as at present.

Lord Inverchapel enquired whether the British suggestion that the U.S. and British Services, the State Department and the British Embassy should assess the strategic stakes involved was not worthy of adoption. Mr. Lovett replied that he thought it would be impossible to hold such meetings without someone in the Foreign Office giving it out to the press. He therefore doubted the wisdom of holding such meetings. The Ambassador remarked that his Government had often felt in the past that more leaks had come out of Washington than out of London but that at the moment he had to confess that the British were several points up on us. Mr. Lovett retorted that he couldn't guarantee that we wouldn't catch up with them later.

In reply to the Ambassador's question as to whether we might wish to follow the British suggestion that we explore the arms embargo problem with the Middle Eastern countries, the Under Secretary indicated that we would only reach a decision on this matter after careful consideration, but that he very much doubted whether any good result could be obtained by our taking the matter up with those countries.¹

Lord Inverchapel asked Mr. Lovett to let him know when a decision had been reached on this phase of the matter and Mr. Lovett said he would be glad to do so.²

The Ambassador enquired whether the American public were generally aware of the fact that the British are at present refusing to ship any arms to Palestine and wondered whether it might be of some help if the British Government were to make a statement along these lines. Mr. Lovett thought that perhaps there wasn't a full understanding of this point in the U.S. and that a statement along these lines might be of some help, although the Zionists would of course at once point

¹ Mr. Henderson, in a memorandum of February 11 to Mr. Lovett and Assistant Secretary of State for Political Affairs Norman Armour, opposed making such an approach to the Arab Governments because "It would not be likely to lead to helpful results for the United States Government at this time to intervene in a matter which pertains primarily to relations between Great Britain and the Arab states" and because "The United States should not restrict its freedom of action by promising the Arab Governments to continue the present embargo. It is possible that recommendations of appropriate organs of the United Nations may cause the United States to alter its policies in this respect." (867N.01/2-1148)

² Mr. Henderson's memorandum recommended that the British Ambassador be informed orally of the Department's decision, but the editors were unable to find any record that this was actually done.

out that their real concern was with the shipment of arms to neighboring states. The Ambassador remarked that he might suggest to his Government the desirability of making the British position on this point clear through the device of raising a question in Parliament.

867N.01/1-3048

The Chief of the Division of Dependent Area Affairs (Gerig) to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

WASHINGTON, January 30, 1948.

DEAR MR. AUSTIN: I received your letter of January 27, 1948¹ concerning the draft Statute for the City of Jerusalem² prepared by the Working Committee set up by the Trusteeship Council. I greatly appreciate the careful manner in which you have read this document and the specific comments which you have made regarding it.

With respect to the question raised by you concerning the legal nature of the Statute, I should like to say generally that the provisions of Chapters XII and XIII of the Charter are not regarded by the Committee to be specifically applicable since the City of Jerusalem, on the decision of the General Assembly, is not to be a trust territory, but is to be administered as a special international regime by the Trusteeship Council. Thus, the Trusteeship Council, in drawing up the Statute and in carrying out its administrative responsibilities, considers that it is discharging a mandate conferred upon it by the

¹ Not printed.

² Not printed; this undated 28-page paper was prepared as the Joint Report of the two drafting groups of the Working Committee on Jerusalem (867N.01/1-1348).

The resolution adopted by the General Assembly on November 29, 1947, provided for the establishment of the City of Jerusalem as a *corpus separatum* from the proposed Jewish and Arab States, to be administered by the United Nations, and designated the Trusteeship Council to discharge the responsibilities of the administering authority.

The Trusteeship Council, on December 1, 1947, established a working group to draft a Statute for the City of Jerusalem and the following day designated Australia, China, France, Mexico, the United Kingdom, and the United States as members. Mr. Gerig was elected Chairman of the working group on December 3 (United Nations press releases TR/107, 108, and 109, dated December 1, 2, and 3, respectively).

The Working Committee, on January 8, 1948, began consideration of the Joint Report and on February 16, unanimously approved an amended draft statute TR/132 and 146, dated January 8 and February 16, respectively. The text of the amended draft statute, dated January 26, is printed in United Nations, *Official Records of the Trusteeship Council, Second Session, Second Part, Annex*, p. 1; the accompanying report of the Working Committee, dated February 16, is printed *ibid.*, p. 19.

General Assembly. The Trusteeship Council has not considered it to be its duty to question the authority of the General Assembly in referring this matter to it. It assumes that the plan envisaged by the General Assembly affords a proper basis on which to proceed. United States representatives on the Trusteeship Council have not questioned this position since they assumed that the United States Delegation in the General Assembly regarded the plan for the future government of Palestine as falling within the framework of the Charter and the powers of the organs and agencies thereunder.

The proviso of paragraph 4, Article VI, to which you call attention, derives directly from a stipulation in Part III, paragraph 3(c) of the General Assembly's resolution, which states that the members of the special police force "shall be recruited outside of Palestine". Since Palestine, as a geographical unit, will no longer exist after partition the Working Committee felt it advisable to avoid use of the term "Palestine" and to refer instead to the Arab State, the Jewish State, and the City of Jerusalem.

Your view with respect to the condition in Article XIII of the draft Statute that the Governor should never be eligible for citizenship of the City was shared by the Working Committee. That paragraph follows very closely the General Assembly's Plan and provides that the Governor shall not be a citizen of the City, the Arab State, or the Jewish State. Such limitations, of course, are designed to ensure impartiality and do not now bar the Governor from citizenship for his entire lifetime.

The word "substantively" in Article XIX of the draft was used in the sense of "in his own right". Its necessity was questioned in the discussions of the Working Committee. It was not, however, eliminated, because several members felt it to be useful. Personally, I agree with you that it could well be omitted.

Your suggestion with respect to paragraph 8 on page 24 was not discussed by the Working Committee. It is a point, however, which might well be taken up during the Trusteeship Council discussion.

It is certainly true that the Statute does contain novelties. They are for the most part, I think, a reflection on the uniqueness of the entire Plan. The Working Committee found in its discussions that on many points there were no precedents upon which it could draw for judgments. Similarly, there were many points passed on to the Working Committee by the General Assembly and the Committee felt that it was not in a position to digress from the substance of such points.

Sincerely yours,

[O.] B[ENJAMIN] G[ERIG]

501.BB Palestine/2-248

*Memorandum by Mr. M. Gordon Knox¹ to the United States
Representative at the United Nations (Austin)²*

[NEW YORK,] February 2, 1948.

Examination of the statements concerning Palestine made by United States representatives in the General Assembly (*Ad-Hoc* and plenary sessions) indicate that:

1. The United States is in no way committed to the use of force to implement the General Assembly recommendation regarding Palestine aside from the United States obligations assumed under the Charter.
2. On the contrary, the United States Delegation was careful not to take a position regarding this matter.

The following official and public statements concerning the use of force regarding Palestine were made by United States representatives: (see attached papers³).

No complete record has been kept of private or secret conversations but in the opinion of members of the United States Delegation, who were closely connected with the Palestine question such talks corresponded exactly with the official statements on this subject.

Aside from its duty as a member of the United Nations and as a

¹ Adviser on Security Council and General Affairs to the United States Mission at the United Nations.

² Addressed also to Mr. Rusk and to Mr. Ross and other members of the United States Mission.

³ The attached papers include excerpts from the following documents:

Statement by Ambassador Herschel V. Johnson delivered in the *Ad Hoc* Committee on the Palestinian Question, October 11, 1947 (Press Release 260 of the U.S. Mission to the United Nations, October 10. The text is also in Department of State *Bulletin*, October 19, 1947, pp. 761 ff. The summary record of the statement is printed in United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Second Session, Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question*, hereinafter cited as GA (II), *Ad Hoc Committee*, pp. 62 ff.);

Statement by Ambassador Johnson as U.S. Representative in Sub-Committee 1 of the *Ad Hoc* Committee, November 4, 1947 (U.S. Mission document US/A/AC.14/SC.1/8, printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1947, vol. v, p. 1237);

Statements by Ambassador Johnson to the afternoon and evening sessions of the *Ad Hoc* Committee, November 22, 1947 (U.S. Mission Press Releases 339 and 340; see also *Foreign Relations*, 1947, vol. v, pp. 1278 ff.);

Revised Amendment to the Draft Resolution proposed by Sub-Committee 1 (A/AC.14/34) submitted by the Delegation of Denmark (U.N. document A/AC.14/43/Rev. 1, November 25, 1947; see text in GA (II), *Ad Hoc Committee*, pp. 266 ff.);

Statement by Ambassador Johnson in the *Ad Hoc* Committee on November 25, 1947 (U.S. Mission Press Release 346, December 9, 1947);

Statement by Ambassador Johnson at the 124th Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly, November 26, 1947 (U.N. document A/PV. 124; see United Nations, *Official Records of the Second Session of the General Assembly, Plenary Meetings*, vol. II, pp. 1325-1326).

permanent member of the Security Council, the United States is not bound in fact or by implication to use or contribute to the use of force.⁴

⁴ Ambassador Austin, on February 3, reported the following: "Explaining he had heard rumors the US was not prepared to maintain its support of the GA partition decision, Muniz (Brazil) was alarmed at the possible effect of such a shift on the strength and validity of the UN, particularly the GA. He was advised that the US maintained its support, but did not contemplate the use of US troops to implement the decision". (Telegram 137 from New York, 501.A Summaries/2-348)

501.BB Palestine/2-348

*Memorandum by the Director of the Office of United Nations Affairs (Rusk) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)*¹

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] February 3, 1948.

The resolution of the General Assembly recommending the partition of Palestine, which was adopted on November 29, 1947, has placed the problem of implementation on the doorstep of the Security Council. The Council yesterday was given the first monthly report of the Palestine Commission, the accumulative effect of which is to highlight the almost insurmountable difficulties of carry[ing] out partition without the use of force and the very pointed lack of cooperation shown the Commission by the Mandatory Power in Palestine, the United Kingdom. In particular, the refusal of the British Government to permit the Commission to proceed to Palestine before May 1 and the intention of the British authorities to pull out of Palestine two weeks after the arrival of the Commission served to make the task of fulfilling the Assembly's resolution almost insuperable. The United States is directly involved in this problem since on November 30 it agreed to the proposal of Foreign Secretary Bevin to support the British timetable of withdrawal whereby the Commission would not arrive in Palestine before May 1.²

While the problems of the Palestine Commission are but one facet of the broader issue of Palestine partition, the Commission's report will certainly bring to a head and promptly the main issue before the Security Council: whether force should be employed by the United Nations or condoned by the United Nations to carry out the partition of Palestine against the will of a majority of its inhabitants and the pronounced policy of six members of the United Nations, comprising the members of the Arab League.

¹ Mr. Rusk did not initial this memorandum and there is no evidence that it was actually sent to Mr. Lovett.

² For the British timetable of withdrawal, see telegram Martel 12, November 28, 1947, from London, *Foreign Relations*, 1947, vol. v, p. 1289. Mr. Lovett, on November 29, authorized New York to inform the British of Departmental agreement concerning the timetable; see first footnote 1, *ibid.*, p. 1290.

[The Office of] United Nations Affairs *recommends*:

1. That the United States do everything possible to see that the resolution of November 29, 1947 be placed into effect by any measures falling short of the use of armed force.

2. That the United States make immediate representations to the United Kingdom pointing out that the indifference of the United Kingdom to its responsibility as Mandatory Power and as a member of the United Nations morally bound by the resolution of November 29 will cause us to revise our position regarding support of the timetable of withdrawal unless the United Kingdom manifests a more conciliatory attitude. Since our position is stated in (1) above the United Kingdom should have no illusions as to the determination of this Government to make the partition plan succeed if it is possible to do so without the use of force.

3. Should the constitutionality of the resolution of November 29, 1947, be challenged and an attempt be made to refer Charter interpretation of the resolution to the International Court of Justice, this Government should not oppose such reference, provided that meanwhile the carrying out of the provisions of the resolution were not placed in abeyance while the Court was deliberating on its advisory opinion.

4. Should, as seems almost inevitable, it prove impossible to carry out the resolution of November 29 by peaceful measures, the Security Council will be faced with decisions regarding the use of force

(a) Within Palestine itself,

(b) A force external to Palestine directed against the Jewish State,

the United States should take the position that it is not incumbent on the Security Council to apply force within Palestine to carry out partition by armed strength. As for the threat of external aggression against Palestine which would come from the Arab States contiguous to that territory, the United States should support any measures falling short of the use of armed force by the Security Council to restrain such aggression. It should not, however, support the sending by the Council of an international armed force to give battle to the Arab States in an attempt to quash such aggression.

5. When all measures falling short of the use of force to carry out the partition of Palestine have proved fruitless the United States should support the calling of a Special Session of the General Assembly to reconsider the entire problem, with the probable outcome that a special United Nations trusteeship for Palestine would be proposed and terminable at such future date when the Jewish and Arab inhabitants of Palestine were able to agree on a *modus vivendi* either for a unitary federated state or for partition.

Technical papers have been prepared in UNA on the possible measures which might be taken by the United States to implement the Palestine partition plan by measures falling short of the use of force

and also by forceful measures adopted by the Security Council. Studies have been made of the possibility of arming the militias of the Jewish and Arab States; of the recruiting of the international police for the trusteeship of Jerusalem; of the problem of Arab aggression; of conciliatory measures which might be adopted seeking to bring the Arab and Jewish parties to an agreement; and of the question of submitting the legality of the Palestine decision to the International Court of Justice. It is proposed to retain these studies for reference at your call, depending of course upon developments in the Security Council and elsewhere.

501.BB Palestine/2-348

The Director of the Office of United Nations Affairs (Rusk) to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, February 3, 1948.

MY DEAR SENATOR AUSTIN: The attached memorandum contains a draft telegram on the question of the acceptance by the Security Council of its responsibilities under the General Assembly Resolution on Palestine. In order to avoid sending broadly phrased instructions without direct reference to the problem presented to the Security Council, it was decided that I should furnish you the attached draft for your information. The Department may convert this draft into an instruction or it may separate out certain points raised therein for more precise instructions in the light of the questions presented to the Security Council.

I appreciate that this is a somewhat unusual procedure but I am confident that you will understand the difficulty in general instructions at this point.

Sincerely yours,

DEAN RUSK

[Enclosure]

Draft Telegram to USUN

In light of probability that Palestine Commission will submit report to SC early in Feb, following are Dept views on question of SC acceptance of its responsibilities under GA resolution Nov 29, 1947 on "Future Government of Palestine":

CONCLUSIONS

1. Resolution of GA is request to SC which the SC can accept in whole or in part.

2. GA request to SC has two principal aspects:

(a) Request that SC take measures provided for in plan necessary for its implementation. These include:

- (1) Guidance to commission in administration of plan (IB2);
- (2) Action if Provisional Council of government cannot be selected by April 1, 1948 by either state (IB4);
- (3) Instructions to Commission (IB14);
- (4) Receipt of reports from Commission (IB14-15). SC under its general powers set forth in Art 24 of Charter has full present authority to assume responsibilities devolving upon it under plan without specific determination of threat to peace or other jurisdictional prerequisite to SC action.

(b) Second aspect of GA request relates to SC action in event Council finds situation in Palestine constitutes threat to peace and request that SC should regard any attempt to alter by force settlement envisaged in plan as threat to peace, breach of peace or act of aggression. As to these requests, SC should take no action until occasion arises, nor should it determine in advance that a given act constitutes a threat to peace without examination of all surrounding circumstances at the time.

3. Accordingly SC should by appropriate resolution accept para (a) of GA request and assume responsibilities devolving upon it under plan and take note of paras (b) and (c) of GA request with understanding that these requests should be given due consideration in any determination by SC of whether situation in Palestine constitutes a threat to peace or whether a breach of peace or act of aggression has occurred, and in action to be taken by SC on basis of such determination.

DISCUSSION

I. IMPLEMENTATION OF PLAN OF PARTITION

1. Resolution of GA has established a GA commission to assume transitional responsibility for implementation of plan of partition. Measures of commission to implement plan are to "become immediately effective unless commission has previously received contrary instructions from SC."

2. GA recognized that implementation of plan might involve problem affecting international peace and security. To give effect to SC's primary responsibility in field of international peace and security GA addressed a series of requests to SC envisaging its cooperation in implementation of plan by commission.

II. PRESENT STATUS OF GA RESOLUTION IN SC

In its 22nd meeting on Dec 9, 1947 SC approved following position enunciated by President: "The SC having received the letter from the Secretary General enclosing the resolution of the GA concerning Palestine, and being seized of the question, decided to postpone discussion." Accordingly Palestine question is now on list of matters of which SC is seized in accordance with Rule 11 of its Rules of Procedure.

III. BASIS OF SC JURISDICTION IN RESPECT OF GA RESOLUTION

Basis of activities envisaged by GA resolution for SC in taking measures necessary for implementation of plan is Art 24 of Charter under which Members of UN confer on SC primary responsibility for maintenance of international peace and security. Same article of Charter was invoked and accepted by SC (with Australia abstaining) in connection with assumption of responsibilities under annexes to Italian Peace Treaty relating to creation and government of Free Territory of Trieste. In that case SC adopted resolution recording its approval of instruments relating to Trieste and "its acceptance of responsibilities devolving upon it under the same." See SC meeting Jan 10, 1947.

In respect of paras (b) and (c) of GA request, SC should, of course, take note of Assembly's resolution; but its responsibilities under those parts of resolution stem from its responsibilities under Chapters VI and VII of Charter rather than from GA.

SC has under Charter a duty to consider whether any situation involving maintenance of international peace and security constitutes threat to peace or breach of peace and if such a determination is made has duty to take such action or make such recommendations as are necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. Request of GA contained in para (b) of resolution does not enlarge or restrict responsibilities or authority of Council in this regard. If SC does determine that situation in Palestine constitutes a threat to peace, it may take such further action under any of Articles in Chapter VII as it deems necessary. Para (b) of GA resolution expressly mentions only Arts 39 and 41 of Charter under these circumstances. This cannot be regarded as limitation on SC's power to take measures under any Articles in Chapter VII.

Moreover, it would be inappropriate for SC to decide in advance that any attempt to alter by force settlement envisaged by plan should be regarded as threat to peace, breach of peace or act of aggression.

Such determination by Council should be made after examination of acts themselves and in light of surrounding circumstances prevailing at the time.

711.90G/2-448

Memorandum by the Ambassador to Iraq (Wadsworth) to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] February 4, 1948.

Subject: Conversation with the President

As you know, I had prepared a paper outlining remarks I proposed to make to the President when received by him today. A copy of that paper is attached.¹ It is in essence a report on American-Iraqi relations written within the framework of a brief exposition of the situation in the Near East as shaped primarily by Soviet pressures and by United Nations action in the Palestine problem.

I had, too, arranged with Admiral Souers² that my paper be put by him in the President's hands yesterday. This was done primarily in the thought that, in any discussion we might have, both the President and I might dispense with preliminaries and get down to what I hoped might be the nature of any representations he might wish me to make on my return to Baghdad.

Admiral Souers telephoned me this morning that he had discussed my paper briefly with the President who had said that it would be helpful and that he would be glad to discuss it with me. The Admiral commented that the President was under much pressure to support the United Nations in carrying out the partition plan but was not disposed to use American troops to that end.

The Admiral then asked that either you or I keep him informed of developments. He is in touch with George Kennan on the subject of the paper now under preparation in the Department for consideration by the National Security Council.³ Consequently, his request to you is primarily in respect to what might be the upshot of my talk with the President. He was, too, interested in any current information you might be able to give him on British attitudes and actions.

I was received promptly at noon by the President and stayed with him the better part of 15 minutes.

¹ Printed on p. 596. Ambassador Wadsworth had also conversed with President Truman on January 16, 1947, when he was the Appointed Ambassador to Iraq. His memorandum to Mr. Henderson and the "Outline of Proposed Remarks to the President", both dated January 16, 1947, have not been printed. They may be found in the files of the Department of State under 123 Wadsworth, George.

² Sidney W. Souers, Executive Secretary of the National Security Council.

³ Presumably the report of February 11 by the Policy Planning Staff, p. 619.

After salutation, I said I was particularly grateful to Admiral Souers for bringing my paper to his attention. I had wanted to do more than report perfunctorily regarding American-Iraqi relations.

The President answered that he had read my paper and was glad to have it. The situation was certainly one for concern. He had kept in close touch. Lovett knew the situation well; so did General Marshall. He himself saw alike with the State Department.

I said I knew that the National Security Council was to consider the whole matter, from all its various angles. In my paper I had wanted to present one of them, i.e. that of his representatives in the field. We were up against a pretty tough proposition. Consequently, I hoped that, after the National Security Council had thought the question through, it would go a step further and suggest something positive which we in the field might say, something constructive which we could use to build better and mutually beneficial relations.

The President replied that the whole problem was being worked on actively and constructively. The basic trouble was and had been that bullheadedness and fanaticism constantly interfered. Two years ago he had found a sound approach. The British had gone along with his proposals for an Anglo-American commission.⁴ Attlee⁵ and Bevin had agreed that, if its report was unanimous, its recommendations would be applied. There had been a unanimous report. Grady had gone to London to get it implemented but had failed because of British bullheadedness and the fanaticism of our New York Jews. The British were still being bullheaded and American Jews were still being fanatic about it. One thing he could tell me though was that we would not send arms to the Near East and that we would only act through the United Nations.

I said that that assurance would be a great help to our representatives in the Near East; and I hoped that, after the National Security Council's consideration, we could be authorized to go further and say that no American troops would be sent to Palestine to impose partition.

The President interrupted with a categorical ejaculation of concurrence and let me continue.

I continued: "Because, to us who are working on the problem in the field, partition seems, in the present situation, unworkable. It seems to us that a way must be found for United Nations reconsideration of the General Assembly's recommendations of last November, primarily on the ground that they presumed Jewish-Arab cooperation which is now seen to be nonexistent.

⁴ For documentation on the activities of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, see *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. VII, pp. 576 ff.

⁵ Clement R. Attlee, British Prime Minister.

The President answered in substance that that was for the United Nations to decide, in the light of experience. The situation was bad; and there was, as he had said, too much fanaticism. [Here follow personal observations by President Truman and Ambassador Wadsworth.] And I added that, until we could get both sides to rid themselves of extremist groups and thinking, I could not see the possibility of getting far with any sensible workable compromise. Without that, I could not see how we could turn successfully to constructive projects. As he knew, there were many such projects, from oil development to the Tigris-Euphrates Valley scheme,⁶ which were of mutual benefit and which we just could not get on with effectively in the present situation.

The President picked up my reference to Iraq. Development of the Tigris-Euphrates plan, he commented, would support 15,000,000 people. There was one point in that connection he wanted to make. Tamerlane had destroyed that great ancient civilization. In the past, destruction had always been the aftermath of war. Today, for the first time in history, the conqueror was putting everything he had into reconstruction of the conquered. We were trying to get the world back on its feet. We would work, as he had said, through the United Nations; but reconstruction was the active policy of the United States. He wanted other countries to know this and to understand that we wanted to work with them in realizing that policy. As for the Near East, he could not say more than he had said to Amir Faisal⁷ and the Prince of Yemen⁸ who had come to see him last fall; and he had said much the same to the Prince Regent of Iraq who had stayed with him two years before.⁹

I answered that I could testify to his having made of the latter a very good friend and admirer. I was much struck, I said, by his comment that "For the first time in history, the conqueror's policy was to reconstruct the conquered." Might I not, I asked, repeat that phrase to the Prince Regent on my return to Baghdad? It made exactly the sort of point Near Eastern leaders would appreciate, for the record of their past was an almost continuous passage of conquerors and destructive conquests.

The President replied in the affirmative.

⁶ Regarding the economic development of Iraq, see instruction 17, March 29, to Baghdad, Part 1 of this volume, p. 77.

⁷ For the memorandum of conversation between President Truman and Amir Faisal on December 13, 1946, see *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. VII, p. 729.

⁸ For information on the visit of Prince Abdullah to the United States in July 1947, see editorial note, *ibid.*, 1947, vol. V, p. 1344.

⁹ For information on the visit of Abdul Ilah, Regent of Iraq, to the United States in May 1945, see *ibid.*, 1945, vol. VIII, p. 586.

I added: "And might I also, when next I see the Regent, tell him you again expressed to me, as you did last year, keen interest in facilitating realization of the Tigris-Euphrates Valley scheme?" The President answered "By all means" but added that Iraqi, like other Arab leaders, should realize that they have to play their parts to make this possible. There was nothing much constructive anyone could do if they (the Arab leaders) started sending their armies into Palestine. There was only one force which should go there if any should be needed and that was an international police force under the United Nations.

I answered that that too was along the lines of the reassurance I hoped I would be authorized to take back with me after the matter had been gone into by the National Security Council. The Arabs' keenest fear today was that we, under Zionist pressures, would act unilaterally and send troops independently of the United Nations.

The President answered in substance: "We won't, but they (the Arabs) must first assure me, before I can give them any categorical promises, that they won't either."

I answered that I could well understand that and that it was in just that field that I believed I and our other Chiefs of Missions in the Near East could be helpful.

There was, I continued, one other field of discussion in which I felt we could be helpful, if so authorized. The Arabs enjoy nothing more than a legal argument. They had questioned at Lake Success the constitutional authority of the General Assembly, basically limited as it is to discussion and recommendation, to divide a country against the wishes of the majority of its population. They had asked that this legal issue be submitted to the World Court for advisory opinion. They would probably raise this point again when the matter comes this month before the United Nations Security Council.

The President interrupted, as I was about to add that I hoped I might be authorized to say that we would not oppose any such proposal if made to the Security Council. He said in substance that, while this might be helpful, there was little he could say on the subject at this time. It would all have to be worked out here and at Lake Success; and he repeated that, having kept in close touch with Mr. Lovett and General Marshall and seeing the picture as they do, he felt he could go along with what the Department might recommend.

Then, taking my leave, I thanked the President again for seeing me and for talking so frankly. Whatever the Department might authorize me to say on my return to Baghdad, our talk would have been immensely helpful to me. The situation gave us all much concern but there was nothing more reassuring than to know it was in good hands.

G[EOURGE] W[ADSWORTH]

[Annex]

*The Ambassador to Iraq (Wadsworth) to President Truman*¹⁰

[WASHINGTON, undated.]

MR. PRESIDENT: I have sought this opportunity to see and pay my respects to you before returning to my post at Baghdad. I should welcome particularly any general directives you may feel it desirable to give me.

The Regent, Prince Abdul Illah, has charged me with presenting his compliments and kindest regards to you personally. He recalls with warmest appreciation that when visiting this country in 1945, he was your first official foreign guest in the White House. He and his ministers have anxiously sought American understanding and friendship.

The situation in Iraq, as throughout the Arab World, is gravely troubled. Strong new social and political ferments are at work. When I left Baghdad last September for temporary detail here the Prime Minister charged me with an important message.

Its essence was that, in a world of increasing political tension between the Western Powers and Russia, Iraq believed the time had come for it to take positive action to identify itself forthrightly with the major policies and regional strategic program of Great Britain and the United States.

Iraq, he said, in such a relationship, envisaged for itself a position closely resembling that of its neighbor and friend, Turkey. It could, too, helpfully play a role as "pivot" between the Saadabad group of countries* and those of the Arab League in the evolution of a common policy of defense against Soviet aggression and communist infiltration.

Further, he said, Iraq would need British-American assistance (and support when applying to the World Bank for credits) to realize its great Tigris-Euphrates Valley development project. He had particularly appreciated the expression of keen interest in this project which you authorized me last year to convey to the Regent.

However, the Prime Minister concluded, none of this could be brought within the field of practical politics unless a mutually acceptable settlement of the Palestine problem be found, with our help, by the United Nations.

Such a settlement, Mr. President, has not been found. Rather are we, today, in Arab eyes, chiefly and almost solely responsible for the United Nations recommendation for Palestine "Partition with Economic Union." Arab leaders are convinced that in spearheading that

¹⁰ The source text is a carbon copy undated and unsigned.

*These are the Moslem countries—Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan—which signed in 1937 at Saadabad (near Teheran) a pact of mutual assistance. Pakistan is a possible applicant to membership. [Footnote in the source text.]

action the United States was, under Zionist pressures, unfaithful to its own principles, notably those of self-determination and majority rule.

The United States is, and can hardly be otherwise, the main driving force in the United Nations. The Arab World does not object to this so long as it is convinced that our objectives are those of peace, security and fair dealing.

We are now, to put it bluntly, highly suspect in their eyes—to such a degree even that they fear these same Zionist pressures will impel you to order American troops to Palestine to implement by force that single portion of the General Assembly's recommendations which envisaged a sovereign Jewish state.

More than forty percent of the population of such a state would be Arabs whose ancestors had owned the land for many centuries; a hostile state, they say, lying athwart the world's most strategically important landbridge, which, running from the Mediterranean to the Red Sea, separates some 20,000,000 Arabs in southwest Asia from a like number in northeast Africa.

Mr. President, until this Arab fear is removed, there will be little if any constructive work in the field of Arab-American relations which can be accomplished. Four points are outstanding :

1) The great Tigris-Euphrates Valley development project, which might in five years meet half the world's wheat shortage, cannot progress;

2) Our Middle East oil development schemes, on which success of your great European Recovery Plan may well depend, will be curtailed;

3) British-American strategic interest must continue to suffer, as in the case of the recently-signed Anglo-Iraqi Treaty ¹¹ which led last week to fall of the Iraqi government amid popular repudiation of an alliance which would have assured us as well as Britain the use, in an emergency, of the greatest military air base in the Middle East;

4) Our moral influence, built in large measure by private American institutions and enterprise, through a century of Arab renaissance, must increasingly suffer from the stultifying effect of a new and growing Arab scepticism as to our political *bona fides*.

May I not, therefore, take back with me your personal assurance that the American Government will not support or participate in any project to impose partition by force? May I not say that no American troops will be so employed, either directly as an American force or disguised under the banner of the United Nations?

With such an assurance, I believe your representatives to the Arab countries, can effectively prevent direct action seriously harmful to vital American interests pending appropriate action by the United

¹¹ For documentation on this subject, see Part 1 of this volume, pp. 202 ff.

Nations to reconsider the Palestine Problem in the light of current developments.

It would, too, I believe, be immediately helpful were you to authorize your representatives at the Arab capitals to add that the American Government would not oppose, in any proper organ of the United Nations, any proposal to the effect that, before decision be taken to implement any of the present recommendations, except it be in general agreement with the wishes of the population, the competency of such organ so to decide be submitted to the World Court for advisory opinion.

I make this latter suggestion because an Arab resolution to seek such opinion on basic legal issues of the problem was defeated at Lake Success by but a single vote; and there is ground to believe that in a less emotional atmosphere it would have received a substantial majority.

A gesture of this nature now, if supplementing the suggested assurance as to the non-use of force, might well temporarily ease our strained relations with the Arab governments and enable your representatives near those Governments to exercise a beneficial moderating effect against the adoption of extremist policies (including direct armed aggression against Palestine) now under consideration in Arab capitals.

The essential objectives and major purpose of our regional policies in the Near East have long been effectively summarized by the phrase: "Peace, progress and stability." Today, I feel, time is of the essence. By now supporting Partition and the establishment of a Jewish state, we are supporting a policy most calculated to defeat our major purpose and which has already begun to produce the opposite, namely war, stagnation and chaos.

And, if we fail to achieve our major purpose, the probable end-results will be irreparable damage to our vital national interest. I conceive it probable even that such end results may well include eventual subjection of much if not all of the Arab World, and of Iran as well, to Soviet domination.

It is these conclusions which, as your Ambassador, I have felt it my duty to report.

In so reporting, I have not endeavored to suggest a solution of the Palestine problem. On that immensely troubling subject my own views, which I submit with all deference, may be outlined as follows:

- 1) No solution can be found unless the present recommendations of the General Assembly be changed;
- 2) Until they are changed, conditions in Palestine and the Arab World will become increasingly chaotic;
- 3) A workable solution can best be found within the framework of eventual compromise agreement between Arabs and Jews;

4) Such agreement can best be found after a period of direct United Nations trusteeship over the whole of Palestine, similar to that now envisaged for the Jerusalem area;

5) Earliest possible establishment of such a trusteeship seems vital to prevent the present situation from further, perhaps irreparably, degenerating towards chaos.

501.BB Palestine/2-448 : Telegram

*The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to
the Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET

NEW YORK, February 4, 1948—1:17 p. m.

138. Following meeting in my office this morning on Kashmir case, Sir Alexander Cadogan stayed behind and we discussed Palestine in light your 27, January 23. I asked Sir Alexander to inform me just what situation is in his relationships with Palestine Commission, informing him that Department is concerned at possible attitude of SC towards UK when commission's report is discussed.

In response to my specific question whether UK is furnishing utmost facilities by way of advice and continuing SC cooperation to commission from outset, Cadogan replied that to best of his ability he has been giving commission just that. He has been meeting with commission or having discussions with members of commission virtually every day. His experts have been in close touch with commission experts. He said two principal points concerning commission were, first, brief overlap from May 1, when according to present schedule commission would arrive, to May 15 when British would withdraw. On this point he said Lisicky had told him privately it was humanly impossible for commission to organize its job in this two-weeks interval but there was chance it could do so in month. Second point worrying commission was provision of some neutral force which would guarantee law and order and thereby permit commission to perform its function. He thought commission was critical of UK with regard to first point but not critical with regard to second.¹

Cadogan said information and advice which he had tried to give commission with full candor and frankness was not always palatable

¹ New York informed the Department, on February 2, that at a closed meeting of the Palestine Commission on January 30, Sir Alexander advised the Commission that the United Kingdom would defend the whole of Palestine until May 15 and thereafter only those areas occupied by British troops. He underscored British insistence that the Commission not arrive in Palestine more than two weeks prior to May 15, but conceded that one or two members of the Commission's Secretariat would be allowed to enter Palestine in April to make preliminary arrangements (telegram 126, from New York, 501.BB Palestine/2-248). The Palestine Commission advised Sir Alexander on February 3 that the British position concerning the time of the Commission's arrival in Palestine was not satisfactory (telegram 135, February 3, 10:15 p. m., from New York, footnote 1, p. 572).

to them because it is very difficult situation and facts speak for themselves.

Commission is considering possibility of sending members of its staff to Palestine before May 1, including one or two military men who could work on problem of a police organization. Cadogan has referred these questions to London for advice.

I asked him about possibility of commission going to London. He replied he thought this might be feasible and commission would, of course, in London get much wider range of technical advice.

[Here follows one paragraph giving Ambassador Cadogan's evaluation of the members of the Palestine Commission.]

In concluding our conversation Cadogan offered to put his experts and any information he has at our disposal.

AUSTIN

867N.01/2-648

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) to the Director of the Office of United Nations Affairs (Rusk)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] February 6, 1948.

Subject: UNA Comments of January 26th on the Policy Planning Staff Paper on Palestine.

I have read with interest your comments of January 26th on the Policy Planning Staff paper on Palestine. While I believe that certain of the suggestions which you have made to Mr. Lovett are most valuable and should add materially to the value of the paper if the Policy Planning Staff decides to incorporate them, nevertheless, there are certain points concerning which I should like to make several informal observations to you.

Paragraph 2 of your memorandum poses certain questions which you believe should be answered in the Policy Planning Staff paper. In general I believe that it would be helpful to have these questions considered in the paper although I think certain factors should be taken into consideration which do not seem to be covered in the succeeding paragraphs of your paper. To begin with I think it is self evident that a "new situation" has existed since the 29th of November when it became no longer a matter of hypothetical speculation but actuality that the Arabs of Palestine would not cooperate in the establishment of the plan recommended by the General Assembly. While there were many who predicted that the Arabs would not cooperate in such a venture, nevertheless, the efforts of the United States were directed toward securing the adoption of a plan which would not require implementation by force and would, therefore, necessitate the

cooperation of the parties most immediately concerned i.e. the Arabs and Jews of Palestine. The considerations discussed in the Policy Planning Staff paper were known by many at the time the decision to support the UNSCOP majority plan was taken but that decision rested on the hope that by some chance it would be possible to obtain the cooperation of the Arabs in the plan. In addition it was premised on what was generally considered to be the policy of the United States vis-à-vis the Jewish aspirations in Palestine.

With respect to paragraph 2 (b) of your memorandum it might be said that this raises the whole question of whether the plan for Palestine is to be a United States or a United Nations plan. The extent to which the United States should go in ensuring the success of the Partition Plan is one which must be related to our consistent view that the plan should be a United Nations plan and not a United States plan and one which in the final analysis would be acceptable to the peoples of Palestine themselves. This observation might be made with respect to paragraph 2 (c) also.

I think it would be helpful if the Policy Planning paper could incorporate a consideration of the question raised in paragraph 2 (d) of your memorandum. I do not know how detailed Mr. Kennan wishes to be on this subject. It might be possible to indicate in general terms the alternative courses available.

In paragraph 3 of your memorandum I wonder upon what basis you reached the conclusion "that armed intervention by the Arab States would clearly be aggression". Would this be aggression against the mandatory power and if so, would not we be in an anomalous position if the mandatory power denied that there was aggression? Supposing after the termination of the mandate of May 15th the Arab population of Palestine invited the Arab States into Palestine, would this be aggression?

I cannot agree that it is doubtful whether events have as yet indicated any new situation. It seems to me that the report received by the Security Council from the five nation Commission on February 1st¹ and the situation in Palestine itself clearly demonstrates that a new situation exists which did not exist on November 29th. The Palestine Partition Plan is manifestly unworkable. I think that with each passing day our task will be rendered more difficult and that by mid April general chaos will reign in Palestine. The new situation exists today and the only difference between now and April 1st is that at that time it will be far more acute.

Paragraph 4 of your memorandum draws an analogy between the action of the Arab States vis-à-vis Palestine and those of Albania,

¹ See the First Monthly Progress Report of the Palestine Commission and footnote 1, p. 572.

Bulgaria and Yugoslavia toward Greece. I think it is quite clear that there is a fundamental difference in the actions and attitude of the Arab States with regard to Palestine from the actions of Greece's three northern neighbors toward Greece. The Arab States believe that there is a definite inconsistency in the United Nations action on these two questions. They believe, with some justification that the United Nations is endeavoring to protect Greece from being partitioned and the legitimate government from being overthrown whereas in Palestine the United Nations is seeking to invoke partition against the wishes of the great majority of the inhabitants, contrary to the purposes and principles of the Charter as set forth in Article 1 (2) providing for the self determination of peoples. In addition the efforts of the three northern neighbors of Greece, of course, have the political objective of establishing a Communist form of Government in Greece under the domination of the U.S.S.R. whereas the objective of the Arab States is the establishment of an independent Palestine. Were the situation in Palestine stabilized, Arab objections would cease.

I do not entirely agree with your conclusions set forth in paragraph 5 with respect to the role of the mandatory power. I think the fundamental objective of the United Kingdom with regard to the Palestine question is to be rid of the responsibility. I have not seen any evidence of a British desire to shift the Palestine problem to the United States. As you know there is general accord between the two governments with regard to the Middle East. There is the most frequent consultation and interchange of information on the courses of action which the two governments are pursuing. The difficulties presently inherent in the Palestine problem do not stem from the British position but rather from the questionable plan recommended by the United Nations, the adoption of which the United States was most instrumental in obtaining. Whether the British have been noncooperative since November 29th is a matter of considerable speculation. There is considerable evidence to the contrary. In any event it is not in the interest of the United States to commence arguing with the United Kingdom about who should bear the responsibility. It is in the interest of both countries that a plan acceptable to the Arabs and Jews in Palestine be worked out. I believe this is possible of obtaining.

With regard to paragraph 6 (a) I think we are aware of the elements of the General Assembly resolution to which the British object. I believe we should maintain the closest contact with the United Kingdom on this subject with the objective of finding a solution which would be acceptable. I doubt whether at this time the British would join us in diplomatic action to obtain the cooperation of the Arab States, or, if by any chance the British would join us, such action would have any good effect.

Whether the course of action suggested in paragraph 6 (b) of your memorandum is feasible is questionable. The more unilateral activity the United States engages in, the more the Palestine Partition Plan becomes identified as the United States plan for which we assume more and more responsibility.

The course of action alluded to in paragraph 6 (c) would be against the interest of the United States and the United Nations at this time.

With regard to paragraph 6 (e) I believe that such a course of action is politically most undesirable. If the United States is concerned about establishing a solution based on principle, nothing could be more far removed. To exploit the differences of one segment of the Arab world against the other is not a course of action which would serve the best interests of the United States, or the cause of peace and progress in the Near East. Likewise, I think it would vitiate a solution of the Palestine problem. A stable political situation in the Near East depends on cooperation among the Arab States. Palestine at this point is the most critical problem confronting those states. Should the United States undertake to exploit differences among the Arab States with regard to this question we would be doing incalculable harm to our policy in that area and to the general stability of the Near Eastern situation and finally to the prestige of the United Nations.

I agree with your comments on paragraph 8, however, I think that the course of action which we should follow is now clearly apparent i.e. there should be a reconsideration of the entire question.

Editorial Note

On February 7 the Legation at Jidda reported that Minister Childs on the previous day had presented an *aide-mémoire* to Amir Faisal along the lines of telegram 29 (telegram 50, 501.BB Palestine/2-748; regarding telegram 29 to Jidda, see footnote 3, page 571). Jidda stated on February 11 that the Acting Head of the Saudi Arabian Foreign Office had left a reply in the form of an *aide-mémoire* dated February 9. The reply stated that King Ibn Saud had seen the American communication and that he understood the circumstances that had compelled the friendly American Government to heed the opinion of its citizens. The King indicated his fears, however, that unless the American Government would guide public opinion to a safety zone, its interests in the Middle East might be threatened. He stated that the American communication had wrongly interpreted Arab opposition to partition as motivated largely by apprehension over Jewish strength. Rather the Arab position was based on adherence to Arab rights and defense of their countries. The very establishment of a Jewish State, he said, was a very aggressive and despotic idea, and

the partition of Palestine contradicted all constitutional principles and international practice. The King pointed out that the Governments of the Arab States, like that of the United States, must follow a policy in consonance with prevailing public opinion in their countries. He expressed his regret that it was impossible for him to comply with the American desire that he accept the partition resolution; indeed, he said, he must censure, in a friendly way, the United States for its suggestion that he use his influence to persuade the Arab States to accept partition. He concluded his views with a reiteration of his hope that American leaders would find a way of coming out of the dangerous position of insisting on the aggressive and erroneous policy of supporting partition (telegram 58, 501.BB Palestine/2-1148).

Minister Childs discussed the problem of Palestine with the Saudi Arabian monarch on February 21. The latter proposed that the "Question of Palestine partition be set aside as entirely incompatible with rights, interests Arabs" and that "Palestine should be closed to immigration and mandate continued until Palestine question could be re-examined more objectively by UN." (Telegram 78, February 21, from Jidda, 890F.001 Abdul Aziz/2-2148)

501.BB Palestine/2-248 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, February 9, 1948—8 p. m.

50. Your tel 121, Feb. 2¹. Careful study of first report submitted by Palestine Commission does not indicate that action by SC is necessary or desirable at this time. In fact Commission's report points to need for continuing negotiations with the Mandatory Power and to Commission's second special report on security and enforcement aspects of Palestine partition problem. This study by the Commission will be forthcoming by Feb. 15.

Accordingly in SC session Feb. 10 we feel that you should not participate in debate except, if discussion should wax acrimonious and emotional, to counsel patience and make a plea for objective thinking on the problem. You should state that you are much impressed by diligence and objectivity evidenced in Commission's first report and thank Commissioners for their effective contribution. You should then add that your Govt. believes Council should not undertake a full-dress debate or seek to reach definite decisions at this stage in light of Commission's first report which lays emphasis on need for further negoti-

¹ Not printed.

ations with the Mandatory Power, for negotiations with the Representatives of the Jewish and, if at all possible, the Arab communities in Palestine, and the fact that the Commission will next week introduce its special report on security and enforcement. These reasons impel your Govt. to feel that the Council's decisions can only be taken after thorough study of the Commission's next report, particularly since it is due within so brief a space of time.

For similar reasons should JA seek admission before Council to present its views you may make it clear that while we shall support right of JA and AHC to be heard (as authorized in Deptel 37, Jan. 30²), we question whether Council should now hear JA Representatives before having had opportunity to study Security Report of Palestine Commission.

Should question of Council's authority to assume jurisdiction in Palestine matter arise please be guided by terms of memorandum sent you under cover of Rusk's letter of Feb. 3 but in no circumstances indicate at this time whether this Govt. favors action being taken by SC. Jurisdictional question should be dealt with as technical matter only. Should question of submitting any aspect of Palestine problem to ICJ be broached please state that you must consult your Govt. We agree with your recommendation that communication of AHC set forth in your tel. 46 [146], Feb. 6,³ should best be met by dignified silence.

LOVETT

² Not printed.

³ Not printed; it gave the text of a statement of February 6 communicated to the Secretary-General of the United Nations by Isa Nakhleh, Representative of the Arab Higher Committee. The statement maintained that the partition resolution did not represent the sentiments of the United Nations and denounced the pressure allegedly put by the United States Delegation and Government on certain nations as "nothing short of political blackmail." (501.BB Palestine/2-648) The text of the statement is printed in United Nations document A/AC.21/10.

867N.01/2-948: Airgram

The Consul General at Jerusalem (Macatee) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

JERUSALEM, February 9, 1948.

A-34. In continuation of our A-274 of December 31, 1947,¹ which summarized developments in Palestine since the United Nations voted to recommend the partitioning of this country into Jewish and Arab states, we believe it appropriate to present in this and four following airgrams (Nos. A-35, A-36, A-37 and A-38²) further facts and estimates concerning the situation in this country.

¹ *Foreign Relations*, 1947, vol. v. p. 1322.

² No. A-38, February 9, not printed; for the remainder, see *infra* and pp. 609 and 611.

I. General.

Any hopes we may have held that the disturbances immediately following the UN decision represented a passing phase, and that more tranquil times would soon return, have now been dispelled. Violence waxes and wanes from one day to another, but an analysis of the frequency of incidents, and of other factors, will show it to be definitely on the increase.

The salient fact of life here is that in two brief months since the decision, more than one thousand persons are reported to have lost their lives, and more than two thousand have been wounded. This is a large number, but in considering it one should remember that these casualties have occurred with the British still doing a considerable amount of interfering in Arab-Jewish melees. Whatever the Jews and Arabs may believe or say regarding British favoritism toward each other, practically all independent observers in the country will agree that if the British had not been here the casualty roll would have been much longer.

The Government of Palestine is admittedly in a state of disintegration. Vital government services have been interrupted for long periods of time due to disturbances in the neighborhoods of government offices, and due to the unwillingness of local Jews and Arabs to work together. A day without shooting or an incident or two in Jerusalem, for example, is now unknown. Rifle and machine gun fire and heavy explosions in the center of Jerusalem are commonplace, even in the daytime.

Yet, neither the Jewish nor Arab community shows any desire whatever to compromise. The Jews say they are upholding a United Nations decision. The Arabs scorn that decision, which their press insists was arrived at by the use of shady methods, principally by the United States.

The Arabs have publicly threatened that UN Commission members who venture out of Jewish areas will be shot. The Jews, on the other hand, are reported to be urging the Commission to come to Palestine as quickly as possible in the hope that it will prove their contention that the mandatory is showing partiality to the Arabs; the Jews also say the presence of the Commission would have a good effect on the Arabs by showing them the UN means business. We do not agree that it would have that kind of effect.

Talks with the authorities indicate a possible switch of opinion as regards the advisability of the Commission coming to Jerusalem. Formerly, Palestine Government officials insisted that it must come to Jerusalem, even if it had to remain locked up in a building here. Now, the same officials doubt whether it should come at all, though they believe it might possibly set up in the Jewish area, near an army camp, and not far from the proposed Jewish-Arab frontier.

In private talks, Jewish officials say they have no doubts about their ability to set up their state and to give adequate defense to the Haifa-Tel Aviv coastal strip; they also say that defense arrangements in Eastern Galilee and the Negeb will be difficult; and they claim to be extremely anxious about the future of the 100,000 Jews in Jerusalem whose fate they see as dependent upon the efficacy of the International Police Force envisaged for the Jerusalem Zone by the United Nations.

(Section II, "The Jewish Situation", contained in A-35.³)

MACATEE

³ *Infra.*

867NO.1/2-948 : Airgram

The Consul General at Jerusalem (Macatee) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

JERUSALEM, February 9, 1948.

A-35. Continuation of A-34.

II. *The Jewish Situation.*

Jewish efforts at the moment are primarily concentrated on maintaining their communications. Buses and trucks are being armored as rapidly as possible, convoys are organized regularly between important points, and armed men travel with each group of vehicles for the purpose of warding off attacks. The Jews are also concerned with the protection of their suburbs in the large, mixed cities of Haifa and Jerusalem. These sections are now largely behind barbed wire and roads leading into them are barricaded. A barbed wire barricade has also been erected by Haganah in the no-man's-land between Jaffa and Tel Aviv.

Thus far, the Jews have been successful in maintaining communications. It may not be a pleasure to ride in the semi-dark interior of an armored bus, with daylight seeping in only through rifle slits, but the fact remains that those Jews who must travel can generally do so.

Another of the Jewish defensive arrangements which has apparently caused the Arabs considerable trouble is the construction of the kibbutzim, or settlements. The Arabs have launched attacks on several of these, that on the Kfar Etzion group near Hebron reportedly involving two to three thousand men. Yet none of the settlement defenses have been pierced. It should be said in this connection that only once have the Arabs apparently attempted to storm a kibbutz, which was in the Kfar Etzion affray. The report on that action indicates that the Jews allowed the Arabs to press the attack and then drove them into minefields with automatic fire, causing them heavy losses. A member of the Arab Higher Committee later told an officer of the Consulate General that the Kfar Etzion attack had to be called off as it was "badly organized."

In the field of offense, which the Jewish Agency prefers to term "preventive defense", we have seen all three Jewish armed groups in action, Haganah, Irgun and the Stern Gang. Their offensives generally consist of demolitions of Arab strong points, and forays into Arab villages which they believe to have been used as bases for Arab guerrillas. The blowing-up of the Old Serail in Jaffa (by the Stern Gang), the same type of action against the Semiramis Hotel in Jerusalem (by the Haganah), and the shooting of Arabs in Tireh Village (by the Irgun) are all examples of Jewish offensives. Such activities are designed, according to the Jews, to force the Arabs into a passive state.

In the field of propaganda, only the Haganah has attempted to influence the Arabs. In posters at first, and more recently in Arabic-language broadcasts, Haganah has taken the line that the Jews desire no quarrel with Arabs, but will give blow for blow.

Irgun's propaganda has been directed only toward warning the Yishuv¹ of worse times to come, because of British intrigue. They point to British disarming of Jews, to the refusal to grant a port and hinterland by February 1 in line with the U.N. recommendations, as indications of the British desire to weaken the Jews as much as possible by evacuation date, May 15. To these indications, Irgun propagandists will undoubtedly add the refusal of the British, as expressed by their U.N. Representative on January 30, to permit the organization of a Jewish militia prior to May 15. The point of Irgun's propaganda is that the Yishuv must prepare for a death struggle with "vast swarms of Arabs" from neighboring countries after May 15.

With respect to the above-mentioned militia, a certain amount of surprise was caused locally by the announcement that the Jewish Agency was asking for only 25,000 men. This surprise arose from previous claims that Haganah could muster 80,000, a figure which had been accepted in many quarters as a real indication of Haganah strength. It is pointed out in connection with the latter figure that some observers, while admitting it as overall Haganah strength, had said that mobilization of that number of men and women would probably cause Jewish economy to founder.

Finally, with respect to the Jews, a certain amount of uneasiness is apparent, not only among ordinary people, but among the leadership of the Jewish Agency. This uneasiness must be directly connected to press reports that the United Nations' Commission is by no means eager to come to this country and is, in fact, insisting on a force for its own protection and to aid it in implementing the recommendations of the Assembly. Well over half of the top-ranking Agency personnel are in the United States, including Shertok and Myerson, as are practically all of their technical experts. Some talk was caused locally

¹ The Jewish Community in Palestine.

by the sudden termination of Rabbi Silver's ² visit to Palestine, which he had intended should last for two or three months, and his hasty return to the United States.

The Yishuv and others are inclined to couple all these absences with the consistent attacks on the Near Eastern Division of the State Department now appearing in the news and editorial columns of the *Palestine Post* and other Jewish newspapers here. In addition, publicity given by Arabic newspapers to alleged anti-partition feeling among members of the American Cabinet has not gone unnoticed by the Jews.

These factors have not affected Jewish determination to establish their State. Hesitancy in UN circles, alleged second thoughts on the subject in Washington, local economic difficulties, Arab attacks, and what they believe to be the anti-Jewish bias of the Mandatory, have left the Jews unshaken. They have few illusions as to the immediate future, but they feel that if their cause should go under, the U.N.O. will go under with it, and they believe that is one thing the world will not permit.

(Section III, "The Arab Situation", contained in A-36.³)

MACATEE

² Abba Hillel Silver, prominent American Zionist leader.

³ *Infra.*

867N.01/2-948: Airgram

The Consul General at Jerusalem (Macatee) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

JERUSALEM, February 9, 1948.

A-36. Continuation of A-35.

III. *The Arab Situation.*

Since the report under reference, the principal development has been the influx of uniformed and trained Arabs, principally from Iraq and Syria. These men are said to head for the Tubas area, where they are immediately assigned to various groups already operating in the country. These groups have been identified in the Western Galilee, Ramleh-Lyddah-Tulkarm, Jerusalem and Hebron districts. They have carried out several fairly large attacks on Jewish settlements, and have made persistent raids on trains in the Tulkarm area.

It is generally believed that the Arabs have gone so far as to set up areas of command, with Fawzi Kawukji in charge of operations north of a line from the Jordan to Nablus to the sea, and Abdul Kader Husseini in control of Arab units to the south of that line. These men are both experienced guerilla fighters. Coordination of the two is said to be in the hands of Ismal Safwat of Iraq.

With respect to the train raids, official figures indicate that the following amounts of foodstuffs were captured in this manner by Arabs between December 1 and 28:

120 tons wheat and barley
30 tons rice
190 tons flour
15 tons sugar
20 tons oranges
43 cows

In addition to the foregoing, the official list also adds the following items acquired by Arabs in the same manner:

100 tons of wood
190 tons cement
220 bags of mail
100 tons miscellaneous goods.

Official figures for January have not been published, but it is expected that they will at least equal those above. In fact, on January 30 the Food Controller of the Palestine Government found it necessary to issue a warning of serious suffering from food shortage if these raids continue.

Arab markets are glutted with food supplies. Ordinarily, a large part of Arab produce found its way to Jewish markets. Poultry, fresh vegetables and fruit are particularly abundant, though it is generally difficult to approach Arab markets in Jerusalem. The Consulate General has commenced obtaining food supplies from the Bethlehem market, which the French Consulate General has been doing for some time.

Manufactured products generally, and pharmaceuticals in particular, are not in plentiful supply in the Arab areas.

In Jerusalem, the Arab grip on the Old City remains firm. They hold all gates leading in, and only armored British convoys get through with food for the 1500 Jews who have been cut off practically since the U.N. decision. The Arabs must also be considered in control of all roads leading from Jerusalem. The Nablus and Hebron roads are not, of course, used by Jews, though the British occasionally take a convoy along the latter route. The offensive nature of the Arab position on the vital Jerusalem-Tel Aviv highway can easily be seen by the conditions besetting the Jews who wish to travel on it: they must be in armored buses, which must travel in groups escorted either by British or Jewish armored cars.

A good deal of information is received on the alleged Arab intention to stay clear of the British, and to date it must be said that the Arabs have avoided giving battle to British units when the latter have intervened in settlement raids or highway ambushes. With armed bands

coming into the country at a steady pace, however, it remains to be seen whether Arab leaders can direct and control the energies of their followers to the extent they might desire. Even as it is, British troops are frequently held up by Arabs and their arms removed, and with the increase of Arab manpower, large-scale clashes with the British may become unavoidable.

While rumors of internal Arab dissension are, as usual, to be heard, we agree with the view Messrs. Clayton ¹ and Beeley recently expressed to an officer of the Embassy at London, that no Arab approaches the Mufti's stature in the eyes of Palestinian Arabs. He is the central figure on the Arab stage, and, as in other days, his organization shows itself to be ruthless in the pursuit of its aims. However, it is obvious that a great deal of Arab internal dissension exists, which may possibly weaken Arab action.

Insistent demands for more men and money often appear in the Palestine Arabic press, these demands frequently being coupled with the rhetorical question as to whether the Arabs of surrounding countries wish to see their Palestinian brethren go under in the face of the combined assault of Jewish men and money—aided by alleged British favoritism.

But whatever their dissatisfaction, Arab attention is mainly riveted on the activities of their guerrillas. They see and hear of the arrival of units from the surrounding states. They have food in their markets and their young men, if unemployed, may join the "National Guard". The clamor in the Jewish press concerning alleged "sabotage" of the U.N. decision by influential American and British officials encourages them. The prospect of U.N. intervention seems remote. They know of, and count on, U.S.-U.S.S.R. dissensions to block such intervention and thereby enable them to come to grips with the Jews.

(Section IV, "The British Situation", contained in A-37.²)

MACATEE

¹ Possibly Brig. I. N. Clayton, of the British Embassy in Egypt.

² *Infra*.

867N.01/2-948 : Airgram

The Consul General at Jerusalem (Macatee) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

JERUSALEM, February 9, 1948.

A-37. Continuation of A-36.

IV. *The British Situation.*

The British continue to be adamant in their refusal to assist in any shape or fashion the implementation of the partition recommendation.

Their officials, generally speaking, cannot get out of Palestine too soon. The Police have no sympathy for the Jews, and state freely their opinion that the latter will "collect a packet" from the Arabs once the British relinquish the mandate. Many Police add that in their opinion the Jews have "asked for it." However, high ranking British officials have expressed the belief that Jews and Arabs will eventually fight to a standstill and then come to an agreement which will not be based on partition. The British Army generally seems occupied with minimizing any casualties it might receive from strong intervention between Jews and Arabs. Aside from patrolling certain key areas, it employs decisive force only when disturbances seem likely to become widespread.

The British have refused to grant the Jews the port and hinterland which the U.N. recommended be handed over by February 1, 1948 for the purpose of enabling increased Jewish immigration to take place; they have, according to other reports, refused to permit the Jews to establish their capital at Haifa until after the British military have completely evacuated; and they have refused to countenance the establishment of a Jewish militia while Britain holds the mandate.

With respect to the ability of the U.N. Commission to control matters, the attitude of the local British may best be summed up in the words of one of their highest ranking officials: when the Commission arrives, Palestine "will go up in smoke". They want as little as possible to do with it, and feel that providing security for it, even for a short period of two weeks, will be a terrible task.

British women and children are expected to leave in the course of the next month or six weeks. A few British Police have signified their intention of remaining in a U.N. Police Force for Jerusalem, if one is established. But for the most part, Britishers look at Palestine and say they've "had it". Though they say little, one occasionally hears the brief comment from them that after the U.N. has guided Palestinian affairs for a while, it might come to the conclusion that the British haven't done so badly.

(Section V, "The Position of the Consulate General", contained in A-38.¹)

MACATEE

¹ Dated February 9, not printed.

501.BB Palestine/2-1048

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] February 10, 1948.

Participants: Mr. Isa Nakhleh, Representative of the Arab Higher Committee for Palestine
Mr. Henderson—NEA
Mr. Wilkins—NE

Mr. Nakhleh called on me this afternoon for the purpose of presenting a copy of the Arab Higher Committee's letter of February 6² to the Secretary General of the United Nations and for the purpose of ascertaining the attitude of the United States Government with regard to United Nations handling of the Palestine question.

Mr. Nakhleh said that he had two principal questions:

1) Did the United States Government intend to bring pressure on the members of the Security Council to cause them to vote for the sending of forces to Palestine to implement the General Assembly resolution of November 29, 1947?

2) Will the United States Government oppose a resolution of the Security Council calling for some form of reconsideration of the Palestine question?

In reply I told Mr. Nakhleh that:

1) The United States Government had no intention of bringing undue pressure on the members of the Security Council with regard to the dispatch of international forces to Palestine in order to implement the General Assembly resolution of November 29, 1947, and in fact I did not consider that the United States Government had brought undue pressure in the past on members of the United Nations. I said that, so far as I was aware, no decision had been reached by the United States Government with regard to the question of the necessity for any type of force to carry out the General Assembly's resolution of November 29, 1947.

2) I could not answer this question since I did not know precisely what the United States Government would do. So far as I knew this question had not been considered and, therefore, it was probable that no decision had been made with regard to it.

I told Mr. Nakhleh I had read the Arab Higher Committee's letter of February 6 to the Secretary General of the United Nations and

¹ Drafted by Fraser Wilkins of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs.

² See footnote 3, p. 605.

that I considered it most unfortunate for the Arab Higher Committee to make such statements as the following:

"It is an established fact that strong pressure was put on the Philippine Government by the United States Government ..."

I said that the Arab Higher Committee in making loose and unsupported charges was weakening its position in the eyes of world opinion. I pointed out that, so far as I was aware, no member of the executive branch of the United States Government had brought improper pressure to bear on the Philippine Government. Mr. Nakhleh pointed out in reply, that the Philippine delegation had switched its position, as had several other delegations, but conceded that he had no evidence of pressure by the United States Government itself.

L[OY] W. H[ENDERSON]

501.BB Palestine/2-1048: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET URGENT

NEW YORK, February 10, 1948—1:27 p. m.

155. The Palestine Commission's special report to the SC will not be ready until the end of the week because of a disagreement in the Commission as to whether it should state that there already exists in Palestine a threat to, or breach of the peace within the meaning of paragraph (c) of the GA Palestine resolution, or whether it should merely record the facts. Led by Medina, Lorgan and Francisco wish to pass judgment on the situation in the report, while Federspiel and Lisicky contend only the SC should make such a determination, Bunche informed USUN on February 9. He personally feels very strongly that the Commission should not officially make such a judgment, and believes that the views of Lisicky and Federspiel, with the aid of the secretariat, will prevail.

The special report draft states that some sort of international force (the exact terminology not having been agreed upon) will be necessary in Palestine as soon as the British leave in order to preserve law and order and defend Jewish state.

The Commission will make no recommendations as to the type or size of force, its method of recruitment or similar questions. The Commission has a further reason for insisting on some type of international force, Bunche pointed out, because, if it must entirely depend on Haganah for its strength, the Commission would lose its freedom of action.

In discussing the size of the international force, Bunche was of the personal opinion that not more than one highly mechanized division,

with the aid of Haganah, would be necessary to protect the Jewish state from Arab guerrillas. He pointed out that the British needed 80,000 troops in Palestine because they had to guard every post office and other civil installation as well as communications and the military installations. He pointed out that a large part of the British force was engaged in fighting Irgun and the Stern Gang, which would no longer be necessary. He believed there would be small need for force in the Arab state because either the Transjordan army will have occupied it or the Arab leaders will be keeping order.

The Commission, on February 9 received a letter from Cadogan stating that it would be welcome to visit London at any time, and informing them confidentially that in London they might discuss the question of arrival in Palestine earlier than May 1. The letter added that various political questions might be discussed with Creech Jones¹ who is arriving in New York February 15 to head the UK delegation for the SC Palestine discussion.

In discussing [*Discussions?*] with the UK are going forward actively regarding the advance secretariat party which will go to Palestine. The British, who originally suggested one or two staff members should go, now suggest four officers and two secretaries. Bunche said that the British are now pressing him daily to send some staff to Palestine at the earliest possible date. Bunche terms this a British maneuver to enable them to say to the SC that, although the Commission itself has not gone to Palestine, as a substitute there is a secretariat advance party. Bunche is derisive as to how much four men could do in the present situation. He is drafting a letter from the Commission which will specify the tasks which the secretariat party would undertake and demand from the British prior guarantees that the party could operate effectively, have access to officials, files, and to Jewish and Arab leaders. He also is going to demand that a substantial secretariat staff be allowed to enter. Lisicky has flatly refused to permit Bunche to head this advance party. Probably Renborg, a Swedish national, will head it.

Bunche states that SYG Lie feels strongly that the Palestine issue is a basic one for UN. On Lie's first day back from Europe, he sent for Bunche to give him a status report at Lie's home. He indicated that he probably would make a strong statement on the need for effectively carrying out the GA Palestine resolution when the SC takes up the matter. Lie reported that he had been unsuccessful in his attempts to secure UK promises of greater cooperation with the Commission while in London. However, he found Eden and other Conservative leaders critical of the Bevin policy of leaving Palestine precipitously.

¹ Arthur Creech Jones, British Colonial Secretary.

Bunche expressed grave fears that if a special GA session were called regarding the Korean or Greek situation, that the Palestine question might be reopened. He believes this would inevitably result in revoking the partition plan because it is his opinion, generally shared by the top secretariat officers, that the US has substantially weakened in its stand in favor of partition. Without US support, Bunche believes that partition would be abandoned. Thus UN would have surrendered to the Arab threats of force. Bunche points out that the Arab threats go far beyond the lack of cooperation with UN displayed by the USSR and its satellites in Korea and Greece. He believes that abandonment of the Palestine plan under these conditions would be a death blow to UN prestige. Bunche says that he and Sobolev² have discussed the situation in these terms and Sobolev stated that if partition were reconsidered and abandoned, he would feel that the UN was such a failure that he would quit. Sobolev has not given Bunche any indication of what the USSR position on Palestine might be when it comes to the SC.

The Commission headquarters must be in Jerusalem, in Bunche's opinion, both for psychological and practical reasons. He does not believe that the Commission should locate in a Jewish State city because that would make cooperation with the Arabs impossible from the beginning.

Aqir airport should not be Commission headquarters although the UK has been informed that the Commission might like to have the use of the installations there. Bunche thinks that the Commission should fly to Lydda airport and move into Jerusalem, ignoring the Arab threats.

A second special report to the SC on the problems of Palestine civil administration will be submitted in about two weeks.

AUSTIN

² Arkady Alexandrovitch Sobolev, Assistant Secretary-General of the United Nations.

867N.01/2-1048: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Legation in Syria

SECRET

WASHINGTON, February 10, 1948—6 p. m.

20. During conversation in Dept today with Syrian Minister and Lebanese and Iraqi Chargés Henderson asked that they convey to their Govts immediately the serious concern aroused over reports that they were actively encouraging recruitment and training of armed bands on their territory for purpose of fighting in Palestine, and that such armed bands had actually entered Palestine and were participating in the disorders.

Henderson urged in interests of Arab States and peoples themselves and of security in Middle East and of world peace that their Govts not permit further contingents to enter Palestine from their territories and that contingents which might possibly be in Palestine be withdrawn. He pointed out that the three countries were laying themselves open to most serious charges of aggression before United Nations and that if they persisted in this course processes might well be set in motion which would render it extremely difficult to find peaceable and constructive way out of difficult situation now existing in Middle East.

He asked that they urge upon their Govts desirability taking measures to insure that neither arms nor armed men be permitted to cross their frontiers into or en route to Palestine, and that they permit no other acts which might be considered as constituting armed attacks, aggression or threats of aggression.

Above is for your own background and not to be divulged to anyone. You may however, your discretion, take similar line in discussions relating Palestine which may take place between you and responsible local officials.

Sent Damascus, repeated Baghdad, Beirut, Jerusalem, Cairo, Jidda.
MARSHALL

501BB. Palestine/2-1148

*Draft Memorandum by the Director of the Office of United Nations Affairs (Rusk) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)*¹

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] February 11, 1948.

Subject: Shift to New Position on Palestine

The following represents an attempt in the confines of two pages to suggest the logic by which this Government or other Governments might contrive a "New Look" at the Palestine problem:

1. The reports of the Palestine Commission indicate that the Assembly's resolution of November 29, 1947, recommending the partition of Palestine, is unworkable without resort to war.

a. War by the Arab States against the Jewish State (and United Nations Representatives in Palestine).

b. War by the United Nations against:

(1) Arabs in Palestine.

(2) The Arab States.

2. The United Nations Charter clearly empowers the Security Council to use force to resist aggression and keep international peace.

¹ Drafted by Mr. McClintock.

The Charter does not authorize force to be applied within a State to compel a political settlement. The purpose of the United Nations is to keep peace, not to make war.

3. To relax arms embargoes in order to arm the Jewish and Arab State militias will merely give official UN approval and aid to inter-racial and inter-religious war in Palestine. Such wars in the light of history have always been the most fanatic and destructive of human and moral values.

4. The United States Representative in the Security Council or the representative of some other government (the Chinese have already offered their services in this respect) could point to the absence of Security Council forces under Article 43, ask the members if the Security Council is prepared to go to war in Palestine or to approve war in Palestine, and suggest that before so perilous a step is taken the whole problem be reviewed by a special session of the General Assembly to be held, pursuant to the spirit of the resolution of November 15, 1947, in Europe. Meanwhile the Security Council would call on the Jewish Agency, the Arab Higher Committee, the Mandatory Power, and the Arab Governments, to give immediate pledges to keep the peace in Palestine. The Security Council would further call on the Mandatory Power to continue its administration in Palestine and its responsibility for the maintenance of law and order pending further recommendations to the Mandatory Power from the special session of the General Assembly.

The foregoing analysis is couched in terms of United Nations interest and does not take into account such obvious items of United States interest as:

- (1) the inevitability of Soviet participation in any United Nations international force sent to Palestine,
- (2) the strategic loss to the United States of Arabian oil supplies,
- (3) the loss to the United States of Arab friendship, which is an essential prerequisite to utilizing the Middle East as a strategic lodgement for eventual United States security forces.

4 [5]. At the special session of the Assembly the United States would be prepared to support a trusteeship for Palestine to replace the present mandate until such time as the Jews and Arabs could work out a *modus vivendi*. Such a trusteeship could either be administered by the United Nations as is contemplated for the proposed trusteeship of Jerusalem or it could be administered by the remaining three of the Allied and associated Powers of World War I—the United States, the United Kingdom, and France.

PPS Files, Lot 64 D 563

*Memorandum by Mr. George H. Butler of the Policy Planning Staff
to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)*

SECRET
PPS/21

[WASHINGTON,] February 11, 1948.

MR. LOVETT: Attached herewith is a paper prepared at your request by the Policy Planning Staff on "The Problem of Palestine." In accordance with your suggestion, it consists of two parts:

1. A statement of the present position of this government with respect to the problem, and
2. A summary of the alternative courses of action now open to us, including an estimate of the consequences in each case.

The Staff realizes that the Palestine case may shortly be brought up for consideration in the U.N. Security Council and that this document may not be in time to affect the decisions which must be made as to the position which our representative should take on the subject. Consequently, the contents of the paper should not in any way relieve the operational officers in the Department of their responsibility in this connection.

If you approve, it is suggested that the document be made available to the Staff of the National Security Council¹ for its study of the Palestine problem. No conclusions or recommendations are included in the paper. That phase of the matter could be worked out by the NSC Staff.

GEORGE H. BUTLER

[Annex]

Memorandum by the Policy Planning Staff

TOP SECRET
PPS/21

[WASHINGTON,] February 11, 1948.

THE PROBLEM OF PALESTINE

A. PRESENT POSITION OF THE U.S. WITH RESPECT TO PALESTINE

1. The UN General Assembly on November 29, 1947, by a vote of 33 to 13 with 10 abstentions and one member absent, adopted a resolution recommending the partition of Palestine into separate Arab and Jewish sovereign states, substantially as proposed by the majority report of the UN Special Committee on Palestine. The U.S. Govern-

¹The Department, by memorandum of February 12, submitted the document as a working paper to the National Security Council, with the understanding that it did not necessarily represent its final views (501.BB Palestine/2-1248).

ment after very careful consideration voted in support of the resolution despite the realization that the Arabs of Palestine and the Arab States were strongly opposed to the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine. In its support of partition the U.S. Government was motivated by the following considerations:

(a) A review of the statements and expressions of policy by responsible American officials, resolutions of Congress, and political party platforms of the last 30 years indicated that unless there were some unanticipated factor in the situation the trend of U.S. public opinion and U.S. policy based thereon practically forced official U.S. support of partition.

(b) The majority report of the UN Special Committee on Palestine recommending partition actually did represent a new factor in the situation but one which supported the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine.

(c) Public opinion in the United States was stirred by mistreatment of Jews in Europe and by the intense desire of surviving Jews to go to Palestine.

(d) The troubled situation in Palestine accompanied by the decision of Great Britain to withdraw as the mandatory power made it evident that a solution of the Palestine problem could no longer be postponed.

2. Owing to its long concern with the Palestine problem and in a desire to achieve a fair solution, the U.S. Government welcomed presentation of the problem to the United Nations and made every effort to see that an impartial committee of the UN General Assembly was set up with broad terms of reference to examine the problem. We consistently adhered to the position that nothing should be done to hinder the Special Committee while it conducted its investigations, and at no time did we directly or indirectly endeavor to influence the committee's recommendations. The decision of the U.S. Government to support the committee's majority plan was based primarily on the view, expressed to the General Assembly by Secretary Marshall on September 18, 1947, that "great weight" should be accorded the majority opinion of a UN Committee.

3. During the UN discussions on the question of partition the U.S. took into account the statements of Jewish leaders that they would be able to handle the situation in Palestine if partition took place. Thus, Dr. Abba Hillel Silver, Chairman of the American Section of the Executive of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, declared before the UN *Ad Hoc* Committee on Palestine on October 2, 1947:

"The Jewish people in Palestine, I repeat, will be prepared to defend itself. It will welcome, of course, whatever support can properly be given to it by the UN or its members, pursuant to the decisions of the UN";

and, after noting the UK announcement that British forces might be subject to early withdrawal from Palestine,

"In that event, in order to avoid the creation of a dangerous vacuum which might affect public security, the Jewish people of Palestine will provide without delay the necessary effectives to maintain public security within their country."

4. In deciding to support the majority report, the U.S. Delegation to the General Assembly took the position that this Government should not use U.S. power and influence in prevailing upon other countries against their will to support partition. The U.S. Delegation was instructed that it should explain our reasons for supporting partition but should not exert pressure on other delegations. While it has been shown that unauthorized U.S. pressure groups, including members of Congress, sought to impose U.S. views on foreign delegations, so far as can be determined no undue pressure was brought to bear upon other countries by U.S. Government officials responsible to the Executive. In any event, this Government considered the vote of the General Assembly as reflecting a belief that partition was the best of the solutions of the Palestine problem which had been advanced.

5. The U.S. Government has adopted the point of view that if the problem of Palestine, long a source of suspicion and uneasiness, could once and for all be eliminated by acquiescence on the part of the Arab States in the UN General Assembly decision on Palestine, difficult as such acquiescence might be, a disturbing influence in international affairs would be removed and the security of the Middle East measurably strengthened. We have expressed the conviction that if there is to be a sense of security as well as a developing prosperity in that area, the countries of the Middle East and those non-Middle Eastern powers who sincerely desire the principles of the UN Charter to be applied to the area in the interest both of the Middle Eastern people and of world security must work with cordiality and mutual trust. This viewpoint has been urged orally and confidentially in the name of President Truman upon King Farouk of Egypt,² King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia,³ and Governor General Jinnah of Pakistan.⁴

6. Likewise King Farouk, King Ibn Saud and Governor General Jinnah have been informed of the President's hope (a) that in their disappointment and resentment at the recommendation of the General Assembly, the Governments of the Arab States will not attempt by armed force, or will not encourage the use of armed force, to prevent the carrying out of that recommendation; and (b) that Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan will use their influence with the Arab States to persuade them not to resort to actions which might undermine the present order in the Middle East and eventually lead to a world con-

² See telegram 1695, December 26, 1947, *Foreign Relations*, 1947, vol. v, p. 1319.

³ Telegram 29, February 3, to Jidda, not printed; but see footnote 3, p. 571.

⁴ See telegram 31, January 28, to Karachi, p. 569.

flict in which the peoples of the Middle East might be the most tragic sufferers.

7. This matter being in the hands of the UN, we have not felt it incumbent upon us to take any additional action in regard to the Palestine situation except to suspend authorization for the export of arms, ammunition and other war material intended for use in Palestine or neighboring countries.

B. ALTERNATIVE COURSES OF ACTION

Generally speaking, there are three possible courses which the U.S. might now pursue with respect to the problem of Palestine:

(a) Fully support the partition plan with all the means at our disposal, including the use of armed forces under the UN.

(b) Adopt a passive or "neutral" role, taking no further steps to aid or implement partition.

(c) Alter our previous policy of support for partition and, through a special session of the General Assembly, seek another solution to the problem.

1. *Full Support of the UN recommendation for partition, based on a determination to see the successful establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine*

Under this course of action, we would take steps to grant substantial economic assistance to the Jewish authorities and to afford them support through the supply of arms, ammunition and implements of war. In order to enable the Jewish state to survive in the face of wide scale resistance from the Arabs in Palestine, from the neighboring Arab States, and possibly from other Moslem countries, we would be prepared ultimately to utilize our naval units and military forces for this purpose.

In the Security Council, we would seek to give effect to the UN recommendation that "any attempt to alter by force the settlement envisaged" by the resolution should be regarded as a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression in accordance with Article 39 of the Charter. Thereafter we would assist in implementing the recommendation by sending armed forces to Palestine either as part of an international force under Article 43 or on a volunteer contingent basis to enforce partition. Since it is clear that no other nation except Russia could be expected to participate in such implementation to any appreciable extent, we would supply a substantial portion of the money, troops and arms for this purpose. If Russia participated, we would at least have to match the Russian effort in this respect.

Any aid to the establishment of a Jewish state such as described above, and withheld from the Arabs, would be construed by the Arabs as a virtual declaration of war against the Arab world. U.S. assistance in any form to the enforcement of partition, particularly by the use

of armed forces, would result in further deterioration of our position in the Middle East and in deep-seated antagonism for the U.S. in many sections of the Moslem world over a period of many years. We would be threatened with

(a) Suspension or cancellation of air base rights, commercial concessions, and oil pipeline construction, and drastic curtailment of U.S. trade in the area;

(b) Loss of access to British air, military and naval facilities in the area, affecting our strategic position in the Middle East and Mediterranean;

(c) Closing of our Near East educational, religious and philanthropic institutions;

(d) Possible deaths, injuries and damages arising from acts of violence against individual U.S. citizens and interests in the area; and

(e) A serious impediment to the success of the European Recovery Program, which is dependent on increased production of Middle Eastern oil.

2. Adoption of a passive or "neutral" role, taking no further steps to aid or implement partition

The adoption of this course of action would involve the maintenance and enforcement of our embargo on arms to Palestine and the neighboring countries. We would give no unilateral assistance to either the Jewish or Arab Palestine States financially, militarily or otherwise. In so far as possible, we would require an attitude of neutrality to be observed by all persons or organizations under U.S. jurisdiction. We would oppose sending armed forces into Palestine by the UN or any member thereof for the purpose of implementing partition, and we would oppose the recruitment of volunteers for this purpose.

Such a course of action would rest on the assumption that implementation of the General Assembly resolution was a collective responsibility of the UN and that no leadership in the matter devolved upon the United States. We would take the position that the UN machinery created by the partition plan should handle the question of implementation, and that the five-man Palestine Commission should proceed with the task entrusted to it of taking over control from the British. We would leave it to the peoples in Palestine to give effect to the General Assembly resolution.

This course would have the advantage that it would not be necessary for us to become embroiled in the Middle East through active support of the partition plan. At the same time we would not have to alter our original basic policy of support for partition.

The consequences of such a policy, while not further embittering our relations with the Arab world, would not however prevent the situation in Palestine from deteriorating even further. It would not be possible

to prevent the arming of Jews and Arabs by ardent sympathizers on the one hand and profit-seeking arms smugglers on the other, or Communist assistance to both sides. Disorder and bloodshed on a large scale would take place when the British withdrew from Palestine. The strongest kind of pressure would be brought on the U.S. to act in the chaotic situation which would ensue. Even if we should oppose any move in the Security Council to send armed forces there would remain the possibility that the USSR might intervene actively in behalf of the Zionists.

Politically, this passive attitude would be extremely difficult to maintain in the United States. It would, moreover, make impossible any possible future intervention on legal or moral grounds in Greece or Italy for example. The confusion and chaos which would result in the Middle East in the light of a passive attitude by the United States would be exploited by the Communists and might develop into a serious threat to our national security.

3. Altering our previous Policy of Support for Partition and seeking another Solution to the Problem

The special report of the UN Palestine Commission on security phases of the problem will emphasize the need for an international armed force if the partition plan is to be carried out or even if a complete state of chaos in Palestine is to be avoided at the termination of the British Mandate on May 15. If we should determine that it would be inadvisable to join in the carrying out of the UN resolution on this basis, our course of action would call for a special session of the General Assembly to consider the situation anew. Abandoning our support of partition as impracticable and unworkable in view of the demonstrated inability of the people of Palestine to assume the responsibilities of self-government, we would under this course of action attempt to seek a constructive solution of the problem.

As a first step in this direction we would seek to have the Security Council explore other avenues of a peaceful settlement when the Palestine case comes up for its consideration. Specifically we would endeavor to bring about conciliation or arbitration of the problem. We would propose that while working for such conciliation or arbitration, a special session of the General Assembly be called to consider a new solution in the form of

- 1) An international trusteeship or
- 2) A federal state,

with provision for Jewish immigration provisions in either case.

A trusteeship could take one of several forms: a three-power trusteeship of the U.S., UK and France, a joint U.S.-UK trusteeship either

with or without some of the smaller states, or a general UN trusteeship with the Trusteeship Council as administering authority. Alternatively, a federal state with cantonization, a plan which the British originally favored as having the greatest chance of success, could be discussed. We would make it clear that we did not favor the introduction of an international armed force for the implementation of any such solution.

This course of action would encounter strong opposition from the Zionists. It would, however, probably have the support of the Arab States and of world opinion in general. Our prestige in the Middle East would immediately rise and we would regain in large measure our strategically important position in the area. Our national interests would thus be served and our national security strengthened, notwithstanding the disfavor with which such a procedure would be viewed by Zionists elements.⁵

⁵ The Minutes of the Policy Planning Staff meeting of February 12 state: "Mr. Butler reported his discussion with the Secretary and Mr. Rusk on the Palestine problem. The Secretary plans to present yesterday's Planning Staff paper on Palestine to the [National] Security Council meeting today with the understanding that it will be considered by the NSC Staff as a working paper but not as representing State's position." (PPS Files, Lot 64-D563)

The editors have been unable to find in the files of the Department of State an account of the meeting of the National Security Council on February 12. Forrestal described the meeting in his diary, noting that Secretary Marshall outlined to the Council the three alternative courses of action concerning the Palestine problem as set forth in PPS/21 and observed that none of them carried his approval as yet. (Diary entry for February 12, 1948, Forrestal Papers; also *The Forrestal Diaries*, edited by Walter Millis, pp. 371-372.)

News Division Files

Memorandum of the Press and Radio News Conference of the Secretary of State, Wednesday, February 11, 1948, at Washington

[Extract]

No. 6

A correspondent, referring to the fact that Mr. Marshall had presented the American position on the Palestine issue at United Nations and had suggested the possibility of a volunteer police force, asked if this was still our position. Secretary Marshall replied that the American Government had not changed its position at all in regard to Palestine. He said we had indorsed the procedure which led up to the position of the United Nations and we were supporting the procedure consequent to that procedure [*position?*]. Secretary Marshall, when asked if the United States representative at the United Nations

had been or would be given instructions to reiterate the American position in Palestine, answered in the negative.¹

M[ICHAEL] J. McDERMOTT²

¹ President Truman, queried at his press conference of February 12 concerning the Palestine partition plan, replied that he had no comment. Asked whether there was any disposition to soften the plan, he stated that "The United States Government is supporting the United Nations. That is as far as I can go." (*Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1948*, pp. 137-138.)

² Special Assistant for Press Relations to the Secretary of State.

Editorial Note

The Secretary of State, on February 12, 1948, sent a letter to Congressman Jacob K. Javits, with copies to twenty-nine Members of the House of Representatives, in reply to their jointly-signed letter of February 10. The reply dealt with questions raised by the Congressmen concerning British arms shipments to Arab nations, the activities of Arab nations as possibly endangering the maintenance of international peace and security, the means for making effective the General Assembly's decision to partition Palestine, and the measures the United States was prepared to undertake to assist in implementing that decision; for text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, February 29, 1948, page 281.

USUN Files

*Memorandum by Mr. John C. Ross to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)*¹

SECRET

[NEW YORK,] February 12, 1948.

In the light of the rapidly developing situation with regard to Palestine and in particular in the light of the attitude of the press (referred to more fully below), I telephoned Mr. Rusk this afternoon and had a talk with him about the status of our preparation for handling the Palestine case when it comes up in the Security Council.

I told him that I realized he is in a very difficult position. We here in the Mission wanted to be just as helpful as we possibly could be to him and to the State Department; on the other hand, we also were in a somewhat difficult position.

I said that there was an obvious desire on the part of other delegations to discuss the Palestine case with us. Porter McKeever,² I under-

¹ This memorandum was "For Ambassador Austin—no other distribution".

² Chief of the Office of Public Information, United States Mission at the United Nations.

stood, had reported to him when he was in New York the day before something about the attitude of the press, namely, that the press was taking a very critical view of the State Department and of the Mission and was very much concerned about the relationship of the Mission and the State Department in the development of our policy in this matter.

[Here follow details of press criticism.]

I told Dean further that if I followed my natural inclination I would be talking to a great many people on the other delegations, not necessarily at this time to tell them our views if we were not ready to do this, but at least to give them an opportunity to talk and find out their views. [Here follow examples.]

Dean said he thought he appreciated our difficulties. He said he had been in a most difficult position himself. This matter was being dealt with at the highest levels in Washington. They had strict orders to "clamp down". He wanted to help us, of course, as much as he could and he wanted our help so far as we could give it.

He hoped that it would be possible for him to come to New York on this matter no later than next Tuesday night. Meanwhile, he thought all we could say in response to inquiries was that we had not yet had any instructions from the Department. He realized that this was not altogether satisfactory but he was afraid it was the best that could be done in the circumstances.

He thought we should be responsive to those who sought us out and wanted to express their views; in other words, we should not avoid them. On the other hand, we should not ourselves for the time being seek others out for the purpose of discussing Palestine with them.

[Here follows the remainder of conversation, dealing primarily with the timing of future discussion in the Security Council on the Palestine problem.]

501.BB Palestine/2-1348

*Handwritten Notes by Mr. Robert M. McClintock*¹

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON, undated.]

Drastic Step

1. At this juncture it would be a drastic step to admit that our advocacy on Palestine for years past and our recent championing of partition, was a mistake.

¹Prepared for "Meeting with National Security Council Friday, February 13, 1948".

Need for New Situation

2. Therefore, any change in policy should be based on a new situation: clear evidence that refusal of Arab population, or of Arab Govts, or U.K., to cooperate makes plan unworkable. Or, failure of UN members to join in carrying out resolution. For example, SC may not have 7 votes in favor. Basically, we must be convinced that state of affairs in *Palestine* creates a new situation which forces us for a review of the position.

No Change in Present Policy

3. Meanwhile U.S. Palestine policy is as set forth in terms of GA resolution. We should try to carry out terms as well as possible.

Arab Aggression

4. Arab Aggression—let there be no mistake that we shall back down under it. If Arab States aggress we shall treat them as we have aggressors against Greece.

Arms Embargo

5. Arms embargo—have obligation under Charter to do nothing which would threaten peace, and under international law not to get into gun-running business. However, will cooperate if Commission and Mandatory agree to arm militias.

Alternate Plan

6. Alternate plan imperative if new situation arises, *including readiness use U.S. forces*. Trusteeship ²

² Mr. McClintock prepared additional handwritten notes, also undated, but presumably after those printed here, which read as follows: "*National Security Council*

"1 Difficult to change course

"2 Can't send troops

"3 Politically difficult

"4 Don't want Russians to send troop[s]."

The two sets of handwritten notes have been filed together.

Editorial Note

The Minutes of the Policy Planning Staff meeting on Saturday, February 14, state in part that "There was a discussion of the position to be taken by Mr. Villard at the National Security Council Staff meeting to be held later this morning on the subject of Palestine. The attached paper was agreed as the position Mr. Villard should take on the point mentioned."

The attached paper, dated the same day, reads in full as follows: "The State Department member proposed that, when the United

Nations Security Council considers the report of the UN Palestine Commission, the policy of the U.S. should be to adhere to its position of support of the General Assembly resolution on Palestine. The State Department believes that in the absence of pressure from the U.S. Government, there would not be sufficient affirmative votes in the Security Council for its implementation. The U.S. Delegation would be instructed not to exert any such pressure." (PPS Files, Lot 64 D 543) Henry S. Villard was a Member of the Policy Planning Staff.

867N.01/1-2848

The Secretary of State to Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt, at Hyde Park

WASHINGTON, February 16, 1948.

DEAR MRS. ROOSEVELT: I have your two letters¹ giving me a frank expression of your views on Palestine.

We are trying hard to formulate and follow policies with regard to Palestine which would seem most likely to promote peace and maintain the prestige and effectiveness of the United Nations. At the same time we must not ignore the humanitarian aspects of the problem.

It is very unfortunate that the delicate situation in Palestine should be made so explosive by the acts of terror and violence committed by both Jewish and Arab elements. Their lack of restraint is not only increasing human misery and suffering but also makes the implementation of the General Assembly's recommendations all the more difficult. The political situation in this country does not help matters.

Since the appropriate organs of the United Nations are now dealing with the Palestine question, we feel that so far as possible we should approach the problem through the United Nations rather than unilaterally.

A decision by the United States, for instance, to permit American arms to go to Palestine and neighboring states would facilitate acts of violence and the further shedding of blood and thus render still more difficult the task of maintaining law and order. We are continuing, therefore, to refuse to license the shipment of arms to that area.

I am told that the United Nations Commission provided for in the November 29 resolution of the General Assembly will shortly make

¹ Dated January 28, neither printed. One cited Mrs. Roosevelt's concern about an article by James Reston in the *New York Times* of the day before, calling attention to the development in the State Department and the Cabinet of sentiment to extend bipartisan or non-partisan foreign policy to all questions relating to Palestine. She gave her opinion that the United States decision to support the majority report on Palestine and United States leadership in the United Nations placed a responsibility on the U.S. to see the UN through in implementing its policies. She suggested that "the quicker we remove the embargo and see that the Jews and any UN police force are equipped with modern armaments . . . the better it will be for the whole situation." (867N.01/1-2848)

a supplementary report on the question of security in Palestine. It is to be hoped that the report will be of genuine aid to the members of the United Nations in deciding upon a practical course of action which gives some hope for a tranquil solution.

Faithfully yours,

G. C. MARSHALL

*First Special Report of the United Nations Palestine Commission to the Security Council: The Problem of Security in Palestine*¹

[Extracts]

[II] 9. The main facts controlling the security situation in Palestine today are the following:

(a) Organized efforts are being made by strong Arab elements inside and outside Palestine to prevent the implementation of the Assembly's plan of partition and to thwart its objectives by threats and acts of violence, including armed incursions into Palestinian territory.

(b) Certain elements of the Jewish community in Palestine continue to commit irresponsible acts of violence which worsen the security situation, although that community is generally in support of the recommendations of the Assembly.

(c) An added complication is created by the fact that the Mandatory Power, which remains responsible for law and order in Palestine until the termination of the Mandate, is engaged in the liquidation of its administration and is preparing for the evacuation of its troops.

VIII. CONCLUSION

1. The pertinent facts in support of the Commission's unavoidable decision to call upon the Security Council for assistance in the discharge of its duty to the General Assembly are evident. The United Nations has taken a firm decision regarding the future government of Palestine. Following that decision the General Assembly created this Commission as its agent in the matter and charged it with responsibility, under the guidance of the Security Council, for implementing the Assembly's recommendations. This Commission now finds itself confronted with an attempt to defeat its purposes, and to nullify the resolution of the General Assembly.

2. For the above reasons the Commission has decided to refer to the Security Council the problem of providing that armed assistance which alone would enable the Commission to discharge its responsibilities on the termination of the Mandate, because it is convinced that there is no step which it can take under the resolution of the Assembly to improve the security situation in Palestine between now and the termination of the Mandate.

¹ Reprinted from SC, 3rd yr., *Special Suppl. No. 2*, pp. 10, 14, 18. The report dated February 16, was transmitted to Secretary-General Lie the same day.

3. The Commission realizes that time is a factor of utmost importance in its endeavor to fulfil the mandate given to it by the General Assembly. The Commission, therefore must emphasize the compelling need for prompt action, in order to avert great bloodshed and human suffering in Palestine, and to assist the implementation of the resolution which the Commission, notwithstanding all difficulties, is exerting every effort to carry out.

4. In the view of the Commission, a basic issue of international order is involved. A dangerous and tragic precedent will have been established if force, or the threat of the use of force, is to prove an effective deterrent to the will of the United Nations.

5. It is the considered view of the Commission that the security forces of the Mandatory Power, which at the present time prevent the situation from deteriorating completely into open warfare on an organized basis, must be replaced by an adequate non-Palestinian force which will assist law-abiding elements in both the Arab and Jewish communities, organized under the general direction of the Commission, in maintaining order and security in Palestine, thereby enabling the Commission to carry out the recommendations of the General Assembly. Otherwise, the period immediately following the termination of the Mandate will be a period of uncontrolled, widespread strife and bloodshed in Palestine, including the City of Jerusalem. This would be a catastrophic conclusion to an era of international concern for that territory.

PPS Files, Lot 64F563, Near and Middle East, 1947-1948

*Draft Report Prepared by the Staff of the National Security Council*¹

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] February 17, 1948.

THE POSITION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT TO PALESTINE

[Here follow thirteen numbered paragraphs presenting the problem and an analysis.]

¹ Circulated to the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and Air Force for comment on the consultant ("Kennan-Sherman-Wedemeyer-Weyland") level (attached memorandum of February 18 by Mr. Kennan to Under Secretary Lovett).

In a second attached memorandum, this one sent on February 19 by George H. Butler of the Policy Planning Staff to Carlton Savage, Executive Secretary of the Staff, appears the following: "As I told you and Mr. Kennan, Mr. Humelsine handed this [the draft paper] to me this morning. He told me that Mr. Lovett had said that S/P should keep the NSC paper for the present, that he did not want it circulated in the Department, and that the Palestine problem is being worked on by high Department officers.

"At his staff meeting this morning, Mr. Lovett cautioned all not to express any views to anyone about Palestine. He said that the problem was not one for unilateral decision by State; and that he does not know what the Department's policy is." Carlisle H. Humelsine was Director of the Executive Secretariat.

CONCLUSIONS

14. Any solution of the Palestine problem which invites direct Soviet participation in administration, policing, or military operations in Palestine is a danger to the security of the United States.

15. Any solution of the Palestine problem which results in the continued hostility of the Arab world toward the United States will bring about conditions which endanger the security of the United States.

16. The US should continue support for the Partition Plan in the UN by all measures short of the use of outside armed force to impose the Plan upon the people of Palestine.

(The military members of the Staff do not concur in the above conclusion and offer the following as a substitute)

The United States should alter its previous policy of support for partition and seek another solution to the problem. In so doing, United States should propose that, in view of the changed conditions as set forth in the Analysis, the UN Security Council request that a special session of the General Assembly be convoked to reconsider the Palestine problem.

17. The United States should urge the Government of the United Kingdom to continue to exercise its mandate over Palestine in the event of reconsideration of the Palestine problem by the General Assembly. The United States should also support a resolution by the UN Security Council requesting the UK to take this action.

18. In the event of reconsideration of the Palestine problem by the General Assembly, the United States should propose the creation of a trusteeship in Palestine with the UN Trusteeship Council as the administering authority. If necessary, this proposal should include provision for an international force to maintain internal order during a transitional period.

19. The United States should oppose dispatch of armed forces to Palestine for the purpose of enforcing the Partition Plan of November 29, 1947, against the objections of the inhabitants of Palestine.

20. The United States should immediately urge all Arab states to refrain from any act of aggression against Palestine.

Editorial Note

Secretary Forrestal noted in a dairy entry for February 18 that Major General Alfred M. Gruenther of the Joint Chiefs of Staff reported to a meeting of State and Defense officials with President

Truman at the White House that day on the serious limitations of American military manpower. He estimated that forcible application of the partition resolution would entail a minimum of 80,000 and a maximum of 160,000 troops.

Secretary Forrestal had discussed the Palestine problem with General Gruenther on January 24. The entry in Forrestal's diary reads as follows:

"General Gruenther said that the strategic planning of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had been substantially altered by the Palestine decision. That it had pretty well 'spiked' any consideration of any military operations in the Middle East and had pretty well disposed of the idea that the United States would continue to have access to the Middle East Oil." (Forrestal Papers)

501.BB Palestine/2-1948

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] February 19, 1948.

In my conversation with the President today I followed the understanding you and I had this morning.¹

The President assured me whatever course we considered the right one we could disregard all political factors. I told him that Sunday night,² but more probably sometime Monday morning, we would send to his ship the proposed statement for Austin. He said he would be in St. Croix³ getting there about 5 in the morning, but not going ashore until 9 or 10; that he would give instructions that whenever a message came in it be delivered to him immediately wherever he was; that the arrangement I suggested was most satisfactory. I gave him no idea of what our solution might be but I did tell him of the careful approach you were making toward the reaching of a conclusion, particularly as to the San Francisco and Senate discussions and also the consultations with men of some international legal understanding.⁴

G. C. MARSHALL

¹ The editors have found no record of the nature of this understanding in the Department of State files.

² February 22.

³ President Truman departed from Washington on February 20 for a trip to the Caribbean and vacation in Florida. The Presidential yacht *Williamsburg* was waiting for the President in San Juan, Puerto Rico when he arrived there by air on February 21. He visited St. Thomas on February 22 and St. Croix on February 23.

⁴ These allusions were not identifiable by the editors.

867N.01/2-1948 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Iraq

WASHINGTON, February 19, 1948.

56. Text statement issued Feb 16 by White House Press Secretary Charles Ross follows:

"In an effort to prevent the spread of disorder in the Middle East this Government has, during recent months, addressed appeals to certain interested governments stressing the importance, in the interest of Middle East security and world peace, of the exercise of restraint in dealing with the Palestine situation. Some of these appeals were made directly by the President."¹

MARSHALL

¹ This message was repeated to Cairo, Damascus, Beirut, and Jerusalem; a separate telegram, No. 46, was sent to Jidda the same day (867N.01/2-1848).

For the message sent on behalf of President Truman to the King of Egypt, on December 26, 1947, see *Foreign Relations*, 1947, vol. v, p. 1319; the message to the Governor General of Pakistan on January 28, 1948, is printed in telegram 31 to Karachi, p. 569; and the nature of the message to the King of Saudi Arabia is indicated in footnote 3 to telegram 31 to Karachi.

President Truman, in his *Memoirs*, vol. II, p. 159, writes that "On February 13 it was reported to me from our diplomatic missions in the area that the Arabs were expected to start full-scale military operations in late March.

"I published an appeal to the Arab leaders to preserve the peace and practice moderation. They rejected it flatly, charging that the United States had contributed to the unrest by supporting the Zionist cause. That was on February 17, 1948."

The editors have not been able to find a report to the President on February 13 or a reply from the Arab leaders dated February 17.

867N.51/2-2048

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy (Ness) to the Director of the Executive Secretariat (Humelsine)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] February 20, 1948.

Subject: British note on the Palestine Sterling Balances¹

Our comments on the above subject follow, for transmission to the Secretary for such other use as may be necessary prior to his weekly press conference.

I. BACKGROUND

On the 20th of February Ambassador handed the Secretary a note regarding the sterling balances of Palestine and Palestine's position in the sterling area. This note stated that on Sunday, February 22, the UK Government would block Palestine's sterling balances, amounting to about £100 million, except for £7 million which would be available

¹ Note No. G4/-/48 from the British Ambassador to the Secretary of State, dated February 20, not printed (867N.5151/2-2048).

for working balances and for current needs until the middle of May. The disposition of sterling balances after the middle of May will be the subject of consultation between Sir Alexander Cadogan and the UN Commission for Palestine and later will be the subject of negotiations with the joint economic board which is to be established under the terms of the U.N. resolution.

The note further stated that as of February 22 Palestine will no longer be a member of the sterling area. However, should the successor governments desire it, the British will be ready to discuss with them the question of readmission to the sterling area.

II. PROBLEMS RAISED BY THIS ACTION

(a) *Effect on U.S. interests.*

There appears to be no immediate or serious effect on U.S. economic interests. In the long run, the possible decreased availability of sterling for current purposes might increase both Palestine's need for financial assistance and pressure on the U.S. to provide it.

(b) *Relation to the Anglo-American Financial Agreement.*

Section 10 of the Anglo-American Financial Agreement calls for free convertibility of all sterling balances released after July 15, 1947. Since the balances to be released to Palestine will not be convertible, there is a technical violation of the agreement. However, this same problem has existed generally since the suspension of convertibility on August 20, 1947 and no new problem is raised in connection with the financial agreement.

(c) *Effect on Palestine of blocking balances.*

1. The superficial effect of this action is to limit the availability of sterling to Palestine. However, in the past there has been an effective limitation in the use of sterling balances through the British operation of the import control mechanism of Palestine.

2. The provision of £7 million between now and May 15 should be (according to oral statements of British Treasury representatives) more than adequate to take care of Palestine's needs of sterling during this period when export earnings are seasonally high because of heavy citrus exports. We are not prepared at present to endorse or to criticize this figure.

3. The availability of sterling after May 15 will be the subject for future negotiation. If there are to be any adverse effects on Palestine, they are likely to follow from the later negotiations rather than from this action. Although the note does not say so, the negotiations will probably cover the question of scaling down balances as well as the question of periodic releases.

4. There is a strong possibility that the results will be beneficial after May 15 when the present important mechanism is replaced by an administration of unknown competence. The blocking of balances will prevent the frittering away of reserves.

5. This action was not altogether unexpected. In a letter to the Export-Import Bank on January 23,² the Economic Advisor to the Jewish Agency stated that he would normally expect that drawings against sterling balances in 1948 would be limited to a rate lower than his estimate of £12.5 million for the present fiscal year.

(d) Effect on Palestine of removal from sterling area.

1. While all the technical details are not clear to us, we believe that there would be more difficulty in effectively preventing capital movements, even of blocked sterling, if Palestine remained in the sterling area. Logically, it should be possible to block sterling accounts in sterling area countries for either current or capital transactions, but the British evidently feel that this would not be consistent with the conception of the sterling area. Consequently, in order to have effective blocking for capital transactions Palestine may not remain in the sterling area. We have been informed by the British that capital movement from Palestine to South Africa have recently been on a fairly large scale.

2. By leaving the sterling area, Palestine will no longer be able to draw on Britain for her dollar needs against sterling, nor will she have the obligation of turning her dollars over to the UK for sterling area use. In the past, Palestine has been a heavy net earner of dollars for the sterling area, but we are informed that in the last two or three months dollar remittances from the U.S. for the use of the Jewish Agency have been held in New York and, therefore, have not been turned into the dollar pool.

III. RECOMMENDED ACTION

(a) That no reply be made to the British note at this time.

(b) If you are questioned regarding the British action on the Palestine sterling balances it is recommended that you say that this Government was informed by the British Government of its intention to make this announcement, that we recognize the desirability of taking any necessary steps at the present time to insure the maintenance of Palestine's reserves, and that we will follow developments with interest. Specific comments cannot be made until the results of future negotiations are known.

² Not printed.

501.BB Palestine/2-2148

*The Department of State to President Truman*¹

TOP SECRET

MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT

We give below working draft of basic position paper for Security Council discussion Tuesday. This has not yet been approved by Secretary Marshall or discussed with Forrestal. Its general line has been discussed with Austin who will come to Washington Monday for final discussions and briefing.

This draft is sent in order give opportunity for consideration fundamentals. We expect transmit draft Austin's remarks Sunday night or Monday morning after clearance Marshall and Austin and talks with military. Would greatly appreciate general indication president's views on following position paper very soonest possible. Note particularly last part of paragraph eight.

Working draft follows:

1. The problem of Palestine has been before the United Nations as a matter of special concern since the United Kingdom placed it before the General Assembly on April 2, 1947. The United States as a Member of the United Nations, has supported since that date those United Nations procedures which we considered best adapted to obtaining a broad and impartial expression of world opinion on the problem which would result in a just and workable solution and which would therefore commend itself to the Mandatory Power and to the people of Palestine.

¹ The source text is dated February 23; yet the message was actually transmitted to President Truman two days earlier, at 9:30 p. m., Greenwich Mean Time. The latter point is definitely established by the copy of the message, identified as White 4 and marked "urgent and top secret" in the George M. Elsey Papers in the Harry S. Truman Library at Independence, Missouri. Mr. Elsey was Assistant to Clark M. Clifford; Mr. Clifford was Special Counsel to President Truman.

Mr. Rusk transmitted a copy of the message to Brig. Gen. Marshall S. Carter, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, with a memorandum dated February 22, which read: "Attached is a top secret message to the President which was received on board ship at 7:00 p. m. on Saturday [February 21]."

"The Secretary will wish to read the attached message tonight. Senator Austin is coming to Washington on a midnight train for conferences in the Department early Monday morning. The principal task now remaining (assuming Presidential approval of the policy line) is the completion and clearance of Senator Austin's speech in the Security Council for transmission to the President by not later than noon on Monday."

The editors speculate that an undated copy of the message of February 21 was retyped two days later, and dated February 23, for possible use at the conference on Palestine held at 9:30 a. m. that morning. A marginal notation on Mr. Rusk's memorandum of February 22 states that Messrs. Lovett, Austin, Armour, Rusk, Henderson, Ernest A. Gross, the Legal Adviser, and George H. Butler, a member of the Policy Planning Staff, attended the meeting.

The source text of the message to the President has filed with it various earlier drafts.

2. As a result of the recommendations of the General Assembly of November 29, 1947 on Palestine, that problem is now before several of the principal bodies of the United Nations for various types of action under the Charter. The United States, as a Member of the United Nations and of these bodies, will continue to deal with the question of Palestine as a Member of the United Nations and in conjunction with other Members. United States policy will not be unilateral. It will conform to and be in support of United Nations action on Palestine.

3. In view of the complexity and importance of the Palestine problem, every possible effort must be directed toward calmness and the avoidance of bitterness. The task will require the attention of the United Nations for some time. In dealing with the various aspects of this problem the United States Government will decide what is right for it to advocate as a Member of the United Nations and will pursue this course regardless of improper pressures or threats of any kind from any source, whether from within the United States, within Palestine, or from Arab groups outside Palestine.

4. During the consideration of this question in the United Nations, the delegations of the other Members should understand that United States Delegation alone is authorized to present the attitude of the United States Government.

5. The recommendations of the General Assembly have great moral force which applies to all Members regardless of the way in which they might have voted on any given recommendation.

6. Similarly, the Security Council, although not bound under the Charter to accept and carry out General Assembly recommendations, is nevertheless expected to give great weight to them.

7. The Security Council now has before it the recommendation of the General Assembly on Palestine of November 29, 1947 which was received by the Security Council on December 9, 1947 but which has not yet been acted upon by the Council. In addition, the Council has before it two reports of the Palestine Commission, the first Monthly Report of February 2, 1948² and a Special Report on the Problem of Security in Palestine of February 16, 1948.³ In determining what action it should take with respect to these three documents, the Security Council must consider the moral responsibilities which derive from the recommendation of the General Assembly as well as the obligations and the powers of the Security Council under the Charter.

8. The Security Council is required by the Charter to take the necessary action to maintain international peace if it finds that a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression exists with respect to Palestine. This might arise either in connection with incursions into Palestine from the outside or from such internal disorder as would

² The report was actually dated January 29; see the extract printed on p. 572.

³ See the extracts printed on p. 630.

itself constitute a threat to international peace. Although the Security Council is empowered to use, and would normally attempt to use, measures short of armed force to maintain the peace, it is authorized under the Charter to use armed forces if necessary for that purpose. A finding by the Security Council that a danger to peace exists places all Members of the United Nations, regardless of their attitudes on specific political questions, under obligation to assist the Council in maintaining peace. If the Security Council should decide that it is necessary to use armed forces to maintain international peace in connection with Palestine, the United States will be ready to consult under Article 106 of the Charter with a view to such joint action on behalf of the Organization as may be necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security. Such consultation would be required in view of the fact that armed forces have not as yet been made available to the Security Council under Article 43.

9. The Security Council, under the Charter, is empowered to take action to prevent aggression against Palestine from outside. The Council is also empowered to take action to prevent a threat to international peace and security from inside Palestine. This enforcement action must be directed solely to the maintenance or restoration of international peace. The Council is not authorized by the Charter, however, to employ enforcement measures to give effect to recommendations either of the General Assembly or of the Security Council itself. This applies to the General Assembly's resolution on Palestine. The Council's enforcement action, in other words, would be directed to keeping the peace and not to enforcing partition.

10. The Security Council can and should, however, endeavor to reach a settlement of the Palestine question along the lines of the General Assembly recommendation. It should accept the tasks which the General Assembly requested it to accept in the resolution of November 29, 1947 and should use its broad powers to find a peaceful settlement of the problem through agreement between the Jews and Arabs of Palestine.

11. In summary, the Security Council takes action on the one hand to maintain international peace, calling upon its full authority under the Charter if necessary to use enforcement measures to that end; on the other hand, it should attempt to carry out the requests of the General Assembly with respect to the partition plan, short of the use of its enforcement powers to impose the plan upon the Mandatory Power and the people of Palestine. In any event, it should make every effort to use its authority and experience in the field of peaceful settlement to obtain a result which is acceptable to the Jews and Arabs of Palestine.

The substance of the following three numbered paragraphs will not be discussed in Ambassador Austin's proposed speech but is submitted

for the President's consideration and approval in relation to the further development of the problem.

12. If the Security Council and the other organs of the United Nations are unable to give effect to the General Assembly resolution on Palestine for lack of sufficient acquiescence on the part of the people of Palestine to permit its implementation without enforcement measures, and if the Security Council is unable to develop an alternative solution acceptable to the Jews and Arabs of Palestine, the matter should be referred back to a special session of the General Assembly. The Department of State considers that it would then be clear that Palestine is not yet ready for self-government and that some form of United Nations trusteeship for an additional period of time will be necessary.

13. Since the proposed effort to reach a peaceful solution under Security Council auspices may take additional time, it may be necessary for the Security Council to consult with the United Kingdom and to ask it as Mandatory Power to retain the mandate pending further United Nations consideration and action on the matter.

14. In connection with above, the Department of State plans to take vigorous diplomatic action with the Mandatory Power, the Arab Governments and the representatives of the Jews and Arabs of Palestine to bring about an immediate cessation of violence and illegal acts of all kinds which are contributing to the present disorders in that country. End of working draft.

In view extraordinary efforts pressure groups and press learn our position in advance we request every precaution against possibility leaks.

501.BB Palestine/2-2148

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Lovett)¹*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON.] February 21, 1948.

Participants: Moshe Shertok, Jewish Agency for Palestine
Eliahu Epstein, Jewish Agency for Palestine
Mr. Lovett—U
Mr. Wilkins—NE

Mr. Shertok and Mr. Epstein called this morning for the purpose of expressing the views of the Jewish Agency with regard to British activities in Palestine since the adoption of the GA Resolution of November 29 and for the purpose of ascertaining what action the UN might take during the forthcoming SC discussions.

¹ Drafted by Mr. Wilkins.

Mr. Shertok said that in the opinion of the Jewish Agency the Palestine Government had adopted a negative attitude toward the implementation of the GA Resolution on Palestine since November 29, 1947. Mr. Shertok cited the refusal of the British Government to make a seaport and hinterland adequate for Jewish immigration available by February 1,² and British reluctance to permit the UN Palestine Commission to arrive in Palestine more than two weeks prior to the termination of the British Mandate on May 15.

Mr. Shertok said that the Palestine Government had not impartially maintained law and order in Palestine, and that the Jewish Agency had, on February 20, submitted to the members of the SC a long memorandum outlining instances of the manner in which the British authorities in Palestine had acquiesced in, if not encouraged, Arab opposition.

For example, when armed bands had invaded Palestine from Syria recently, the British forces had only arrived after the Jewish settlers had repulsed the attack. The Palestine Government had subsequently communicated with the Syrian Government but instead of protesting in strong terms, its approach had been one of inquiry only. In another instance, the Jewish Agency gave the Palestine Government 48 hours advance notice that a band of 700 or 800 Arabs would attempt to leave Irbid in Transjordan to attack Palestine via one of two bridges over the Jordan River. The Palestine Government had not, however, taken any precautions and the attack had taken place as the Jewish Agency had predicted.

Mr. Shertok cited additional evidence of British partiality in the following: 1) The Mayor of the Arab town of Jaffa had recently undertaken truce negotiations through British channels with the Mayor of the nearby Jewish town of Tel Aviv. These negotiations were making progress until the arrival of an Iraqi Army Officer to take command of the situation in Jaffa. This Iraqi Army Officer immediately suspended the negotiations; 2) In certain areas of Palestine, the local British commanding officers were on friendly terms with the Arab leaders of the local Arab irregular military groups; 3) The British had recently turned over a number of rifles to the Arabs in Hebron; 4) The British authorities had not armed any of the Jewish metropolitan and civilian groups in self-defense as they had the Arabs.

Mr. Shertok said that he did not think British policy in Palestine flowed from a policy decision of the British Cabinet. Mr. Shertok

² London had advised the Department of this development on January 23, giving the British Foreign Office view that "until mandate is entirely surrendered HMG considers it is not legally entitled to withdraw its authority from part Palestine only. Such action would constitute change Palestine Government immigration policy with disastrous effect on security." (Telegram 274, 867N.01/1-2348)

added that he wished to be most cautious in this respect as he did not wish to impugn the British Government. Mr. Shertok believed, however, that if the activities of British representatives in the Near East were successful no questions would be raised; if they were not successful, the activities could be disavowed. The British Government was now miscalculating the situation in the Near East as it had miscalculated it before. The British Government, for example, had not expected that the American and British members of the Anglo-American Committee would reach a unanimous conclusion with regard to Palestine in 1946, nor had it expected UNSCOP to recommend partition. The British had never realized that the Jews were determined on establishing a state and would defend themselves to the last.

Mr. Shertok stated that last fall he had informed the working group of Sub-Committee 1 at the UN that if a Jewish State were established, the Jews would defend themselves but that if the Arab States attacked, the Jews would have to have funds and arms, and that if the situation deteriorated, the Jews might need an international force to back them up.

Mr. Shertok said that, in his opinion, the establishment of a Jewish State was the best means of maintaining political and social peace in the Middle East.

Mr. Shertok wanted to know whether the UN would permit the Jews to arm themselves with funds and military equipment from abroad, and whether the UN would send an international force to Palestine to back up the GA recommendation of November 29.

I asked Mr. Shertok if he could enlighten me on the following points:

1. Whom did the Jewish Agency represent and under what authority?
2. Whom did the Arab Higher Committee represent and under what authority?

Mr. Shertok replied that the Jewish Agency was the quasi-official body, established under the League of Nations Mandate, representing the peoples of Jewish faith in Palestine and throughout the World, organized under a system of democratic election; the Arab Higher Committee was the representative of the Arabs of Palestine, under the presidency of the Mufti in Jerusalem.

I ask Mr. Shertok whether the Jewish Agency had approached the Arab Higher Committee since the adoption of the GA Resolution on November 29, 1947 in an endeavor to achieve a peaceful settlement of the Palestine question on the basis of the resolution itself. Mr. Shertok said that no move of this character had been made, and that, it was impossible under existing circumstances.

I asked Mr. Shertok whether the authority of the Jewish Agency was sufficiently wide for it to prevent the illegal shipment of arms and

ammunition and the departure of ships from the U.S. Mr. Shertok replied that the authority of the Jewish Agency was very great but that it was not equivalent to that of a sovereign state at the present time.

I also asked whether the Jewish Agency had discussed the various questions arising under the GA Resolution with the British Government in London. Mr. Shertok said that the British Government was aware of the various problems; that the Jewish Agency had not specifically raised these questions with it but that the Jewish Agency had been discussing the GA Resolution with the Palestine Government in Jerusalem, and with the UK Delegation in New York.

Mr. Shertok pressed me for a reply with regard to funds and arms for the Jews in Palestine, and the question of a UN international force. I told Mr. Shertok that I could not answer these questions at the present time; that the US considered the Palestine problem as a matter which was being handled by the UN, and that the SC of the UN, which planned to discuss the matter on February 24, was the proper arena for a statement by the U.S. Government. I stressed the fact that the U.S. was one of the members of the UN and would not take unilateral action with regard to Palestine.

L[OVETT]

501.BB Palestine/2-2148

Memorandum by Mr. Samuel K. C. Kopper¹ to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)²

SECRET

[NEW YORK,] February 21, 1948.

Since I arrived in New York on Monday, I have had conversations with several of the principal Arab delegates to the UN. These delegates include Faris Bey el Khouri (Syria), Camille Chamoun (Lebanon), Charles Malik (Lebanon), Fawzi Bey (Egypt), and Jamal el-Kourdagy (Syria). The following points are of interest particularly since they seem to appear in the observations expressed by most of these delegates on the Palestine question.

1. The Arab States believe that the United Nations has by no means exhausted the processes of conciliation. Indeed they feel strongly that conciliation has hardly been touched. Concurrently with this view they believe that reconsideration of the Palestine question is necessary in order to bring to bear methods of conciliation.

2. There are definite indications that the Arab States still believe that proposals (such as the plan placed before the General Assembly

¹ On detail to the United States Mission at the United Nations.

² Copies forwarded to Messrs. Henderson, Rusk, and McClintock and other officers of the Department.

by Camille Chamoun on November 29)³ offer real hope and constitute substantial suggestions as to the manner in which the Palestine question might be equitably solved. Suggestions of this character are classified by Fawzi Bey as "middle courses" looking toward a settlement of the Palestine question.

3. While the Arab States could not publicly espouse such a course, I am convinced that they would be willing to accept the establishment of a trusteeship over all Palestine provided that the terms of such a trusteeship could be most explicit and clear, and also that substantial authority could remain in the hands of the peoples of Palestine themselves in order that they might become experienced in the art of self-government. They would probably accept the trusteeship only if it appeared that conciliation and middle courses would not be successful.

4. In so far as the question of immigration is concerned, I think there has been a substantial revision of the attitude of the Arab delegates on this question. During the General Assembly this was a stumbling block of a most serious nature. While the Arab States could not at this juncture come out for liberal provisions on immigration in an independent state or a trusteeship, it seems quite clear to me from statements made by representatives of Syria, Lebanon and Egypt that the Arab States would be willing in the process of the UN's seeking a revised solution to accept important compromises on this problem. In other words, the Arab States secretly seem willing to go much further on the question of immigration if the terms regarding future immigration could be explicit and if it appeared that there was no possibility of the establishment of an independent Jewish state.

5. The Arab States will regard the shipment of arms to the Jewish militia alone as an attack against the Arabs in Palestine and not as a constructive step toward the solution of the Palestine question.

6. The Arab States staunchly maintain that the United Nations does not possess the power to enforce simple recommendations of the General Assembly. In this connection they repeatedly refer to the position of the USSR vis-à-vis Korea, Northern Greece, the Interim Committee and other matters. The Arabs inquire why the UN has not sought to enforce its recommendations on these cases. More recently they have pointed out that the Security Council has ignored the recommendations of the General Assembly with regard to membership.

7. The Arab States more than ever feel that the United States was primarily responsible for the adoption by the General Assembly of the partition plan. As a corollary to this, they feel that any further United Nations action will depend entirely upon the US position. The role of the Soviet Union is discounted since they think it is quite clear

³ See telegram 1274, December 1, 1947, from New York, *Foreign Relations*, 1947, vol. v, p. 1293.

that in general the Soviet Union is not able to muster any support outside of its satellite states.

There are a number of other points of less importance which have been brought up during my discussions with the representatives of the Arab States. However, in the interest of brevity I have omitted them.

SAMUEL K. C. KOPPER

Elsey Papers

President Truman to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
URGENT

[ST. THOMAS,] February 22, 1948—4:55 p. m. EST.

Blue 4. Your working draft of recommended basic position¹ for Security Council discussion Tuesday received. I approve in principle this basic position. I want to make it clear, however, that nothing should be presented to Security Council that could be interpreted as a recession on our part from the position we took in the General Assembly.² Send final draft of Austin's remarks for my consideration.

¹ See p. 637.

² On November 29, 1947, i.e., in support of the partition of Palestine into Jewish and Arab states.

867N.01/2-2248

Mr. Moshe Shertok to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)

WASHINGTON, February 22, 1948.

MY DEAR MR. LOVETT: In connection with our conversation yesterday, I think it important to offer a few additional explanations on two points raised by you at the end of our talk and clear up their possible implications.

1. You asked me whether there have been peace moves on our part vis-à-vis the Arab Higher Committee since November 29, 1947. I replied in the negative. I explained that there had been innumerable attempts made by us in the past to explore possibilities of a peaceful settlement, including an approach to the Secretary General of the Arab League immediately after the publication of the UNSCOP Report, which had revealed an unbridgeable gulf; but that after the General Assembly had adopted its Resolution on Palestine, we felt convinced that any further such overture from us towards those pledged to oppose it by force would be not merely futile, but definitely harmful, in that it would signify that we, ourselves, did not regard the Assembly's Resolution as final, but as a basis for further compromise.

As I indicated, to the Jews of Palestine, and to the Zionist movement throughout the world, the Partition scheme adopted by the Assembly represents the limit of the concessions which they were prepared to make. After the cutting away of Transjordan from the area of the Jewish National Home in 1922, the present scheme has reduced the remainder of that area by nearly one-half. Moreover, in the land which the Jewish people through the ages has regarded as its historical heritage and as the country of its future, a second independent Arab state is now to be set up. The Jews have accepted these painful and far-reaching sacrifices on condition that in the reduced area, their political independence would be recognized, and that they would be able in that territory to work out their salvation as a free nation. It is to them the last and final compromise beyond which they will not go.

Actually, we have made efforts even after November 29th, 1947, to explore prospects of Jewish-Arab understanding and collaboration *on the basis of full implementation of the United Nations plan*. We have made and will continue to make these approaches to those Arab personalities and circles whom there is any hope of inducing to accept the internationally decreed settlement. Self-evidently, the Arab Higher Committee does not come into that category. It is not merely that the hands of its President are drenched in the blood of millions of Jews. We are convinced that nothing will ever satisfy that Committee short of the complete acceptance of its program, namely, the conversion of the whole of Palestine into an independent Arab state, with the Jews as a crystalized minority at its mercy; and that any impression of readiness to offer concessions to the Committee is bound to strengthen its belief that it can achieve this object.

Incidentally, a letter addressed by one of our representatives to the Secretary General of the Arab League *after* the session of the General Assembly, has remained unanswered.

It is for these reasons that we view with the greatest alarm the rumors now afloat that a move is about to be made calling for the "freezing" of the Palestinian situation so that a new effort of conciliation might be undertaken. Such a move would mean, in the first instance, that the United Nations Resolution does not necessarily stand. It would, moreover, come as a reward for the campaign of violence now being conducted against that Resolution and encourage the forces of defiance to redouble their efforts once the peace move had failed, as it must fail. It would completely shatter Jewish confidence in the United Nations authority and fortify extreme councils among Jews. It would discredit the United Nations in the eyes of the Arabs and deal a serious blow to its prestige generally. In short, far from serving the interests of peace, it would only prolong and intensify the present strife.

It was the spokesman of the United States delegation who pointed out to the Assembly at its last session, just before the vote was taken, that the compromise based on Partition was the only way out after all past efforts at conciliation had failed; that it was therefore useless to re-open the question of conciliation and that the time for action had now arrived.

2. Another question which you put to me was whether we had tried by direct contact with the British Government to clear up those aspects of their policy which were so distressing to us. I replied that we had, but to no avail. I should explain that soon after the decision at Lake Success my friends in London approached the Colonial Secretary and expressed their readiness to discuss with him questions of policy relating to the interim period, with a view to a possible agreement. His reply was that the British Government would negotiate on these points with the UN Commission and preferred our desiderata also to be communicated to the Commission and not to them direct. A similar approach on my part to Sir Alexander Cadogan in New York elicited a similar reply.

In the course of time, we repeatedly discussed with the representatives of the British Government in London questions arising from the course of events in Palestine. We called their attention to current reports about the designs they had in mind, aiming at or liable to lead to the frustration of the solution adopted by the United Nations. They have categorically denied the allegations and rejected the charges, but facts have continued to tell a different story—a story which I presented to you in the first part of our interview.

So long as the British Government are in control of Palestine, we shall, quite naturally, continue to address ourselves to them in an attempt to remove, or at least mitigate the evils arising from their present policy, however futile the attempt may be. Be we cannot hope to change that policy, which appears to be inveterate.

I should like to add, again in connection with rumors that are current, that we would view with the greatest anxiety any attempt to prevail upon the British Government to prolong their Mandate over Palestine beyond the date of May fifteenth, which they, themselves, have fixed for its termination. We would, in fact, most strenuously oppose any such prolongation. The progressive disintegration of the British governmental machine in Palestine, its failure to maintain law and order, the distrust and suspicion which its every action and inaction evokes, make the continuation of the present regime daily more intolerable. The new ghastly outrage in Jerusalem, which has given rise to the worst possible fears as to its authorship, renders the position unprecedentedly critical. In these circumstances, any deliberate attempt to give a further lease of life to British rule in Palestine is tantamount to courting disaster. If any change is indi-

cated it is to shorten, rather than lengthen, this critical period. We can only hope that either the report to which I have referred is completely untrue, or, if it is true, the attempt will not be countenanced by the United States Government.

In our submission, concern for a just solution of the problem and for eventual peace in Palestine, should lead to the concentration of all efforts on the speediest possible establishment of a Provisional Council of Government for the Jewish State, the immediate preparation of a properly armed Jewish State-militia, and if at all possible, the setting up of an international force adequate in composition and size.

We fully accept the position that the United States can act in this matter only as a member and within the framework of the United Nations. But it seems to us axiomatic that action by the United Nations depends on the initiative and readiness to assume responsibilities of its leading members.

I must apologize for the length of this letter, particularly since you were kind enough to give me so much of your time. But I hope you will agree that the seriousness of the subject warrants making every effort to clarify it fully.

With renewed thanks for your courtesy and attention, I remain ¹

Yours sincerely,

MOSHE SHERTOK

¹ Acknowledged by Mr. Henderson on February 27.

501.BB Palestine/2-2348

Paper Prepared in the Department of State for the White House ¹

TOP SECRET

MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT

There follows draft statement which Ambassador Austin proposes to make before Security Council Tuesday morning about 10:30 a. m.

¹ This top secret message is undated. In an attached memorandum, also undated, Secretary Marshall stated: "This is final on Palestine—The President has approved Austin's statement. Original is in New York." The latest available draft prior to the final message is dated February 23.

In a memorandum to Mr. Lovett on February 19, Mr. McClintock noted that he had prepared, at Mr. Rusk's request, the first draft of Ambassador Austin's proposed statement, also dated the 19th, and that it had "been gone over by representatives of NEA and Le." The memorandum stated that "The watershed of the speech is reached on Page 8. If the sentence in brackets in the second paragraph on that page is omitted the speech in effect knocks the plan for the partition of Palestine in the head. If that sentence is retained, however, the speech comes out in favor of UN enforcement measures to partition Palestine." The paragraph containing the bracketed sentence, as originally drafted, stated: "What this means is this: The Council under the Charter powers I have just mentioned can take action to prevent aggression against Palestine from outside. The Council by these same powers can take action to prevent a threat to

This statement accurately reflects the policy which you have approved in principle in working paper submitted earlier.² Austin's speech does not represent recession in any way from position taken by us in General Assembly. In fact, it is stronger with regard to threats to the peace which have developed since Assembly discussion. Those who may construe this as recession hold the incorrect view that Charter authorizes Security Council to impose recommendations by force.

If you wish to comment publicly on Ambassador Austin's statement, it would be helpful if your comments could be along the following line:

"I entirely approve the position taken by Ambassador Austin in the Security Council regarding Palestine; it is the position of the United States Government and follows the attitude we took in the General Assembly."

[Here follows the proposed statement, which, except for inconsequential changes in wording, was the same as that delivered by Ambassador Austin before the Security Council on February 24. Extracts from his statement of that date are printed on page 651.]

international peace and security from inside Palestine. This action is directed solely to the maintenance of peace. It has no concern with implementing per se the Assembly's resolution on Palestine. The Council's action, in other words, is directed to keeping the peace and not to enforcing partition. [It is undeniable, however, that the establishment of internal order in Palestine by the Security Council in pursuance of its duty to maintain international peace might establish conditions under which the Palestine Commission could succeed in carrying out its mandate according to the terms of the resolution of November 29, 1947.]"

In a memorandum of February 24 to Mr. McDermott, Mr. McClintock observed that Secretary Marshall had participated in the final drafting of the speech. He also expressed his belief that "it is of the utmost importance that an off-the-record background briefing of American correspondents be given promptly, either by Mr. Lovett or Mr. Bohlen. Mr. Lovett would seem to be the logical candidate since he has been handling the Palestine question at the top level. There is wide public misconception as to the enforcement powers of the United Nations and the kernel of our constitutional position requires considerable educative effort if it is to be got across to the people in plain English."

The memorandum of February 24, as well as various drafts of Ambassador Austin's statement, are filed with the record copy of the paper sent to the President.

The Elsey Papers contain an abbreviated version of the Secretary's top secret message, as transmitted to President Truman in telegram White 7 at 12:50 p. m. EST, February 23.

² See p. 637.

501.BB Palestine/2-2348: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Legation in Syria

SECRET
NIACT

US URGENT

WASHINGTON, February 23, 1948—6 p. m.

34. 1. It is planned that Sen Austin will make important statement tomorrow morning before SC with respect to Palestine. Full text will

be telegraphed Jerusalem and all Arab capitals¹ in clear as soon as he starts to speak. There will probably be many sensational and distorted rumors in Middle East re substance his statement. It is suggested in your discretion that you endeavor to prevail upon local govt officials and other leaders to refrain from making public statements re Austin's speech until they have had opportunity to examine carefully complete text. Public statements made by Arab leaders re speech before they have full understanding its significance may not only work against a peaceful and satisfactory solution of problems facing UN re Palestine but also against Arab interests.

2. In discussing text of statement with officials of govt to which you are accredited please emphasize how important it is in interests of Arab countries themselves as well as in interests of UN and world peace that Arab govts take at once all possible steps to prevent infiltration of fighting men and arms into Palestine and that they also desist immediately from training and equipping armed forces for Palestine and making statements which can be construed as threats to interfere in Palestinian affairs. Arab countries should understand that if SC finds that Arab countries through force or threats of force are creating in Palestine threat to international peace it has no choice other than to take steps in strict accord with Charter. Otherwise UN may be bankrupt.²

3. In talking with local govt officials please make clear that govt of US is adopting present position in interests of justice, of world peace, and of UN; that it cannot be swayed from course which it is following by US internal political pressures or by external threats of any kind. US Govt is convinced that maintenance of close friendly relations and understanding between Arab countries and US is in their common interests. It believes that position which it has assumed is consistent with maintenance of such relations.

4. Please do not discuss contents of para 2 and 3 above with anyone until you have received and studied Austin's statement.

Sent Damascus as Depts 34 rptd Cairo as Depts 211 Beirut as Depts 83 Baghdad as Depts 60 and Jidda as Depts 55 for action; to Jerusalem³ as Depts 130 for info. Repeated USUN as Depts 81.

MARSHALL

¹ In telegram 35 to Damascus, February 24, repeated to Arab capitals and Jerusalem, not printed.

² The Department, in an unnumbered service telegram to Damascus, February 23, 12 midnight, directed deletion of the last sentence of this paragraph. This message is attached to the record copy of telegram 34.

³ The Department, on February 25, directed Jerusalem to take similar action with the Government of Transjordan on an informal basis (telegram 136, 501.BB Palestine/2-2548).

501.BB Palestine/2-2348 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)*¹

TOP SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, February 23, 1948—11 p. m.
NIACT

80. Inform Austin and Rusk immediately. Latter at Hotel Vanderbilt. Following message received from President Truman :

“Your draft statement which it is proposed Senator Austin make before Security Council Tuesday 24 February is approved. In regard to public statement by me I intend to release the following :

‘The Palestine problem has been, and is the deep concern of this Government. It has been given the most careful consideration by me, the Cabinet, and other responsible Government officials. The US position has been developed through long and exhaustive study and many consultations.

This position has been accurately presented by Ambassador Austin in his speech before the Security Council of the United Nations today.’

Please notify me as soon as Senator Austin has made his presentation to the Security Council.”²

MARSHALL

¹ The President's top secret and urgent message was transmitted to Secretary Marshall in telegram Blue 8, at 7:29 p. m. EST February 23 (copy in Elsey Papers).

² President Truman released his public statement later on February 24, while still aboard the *Williamsburg*. See *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1948*, p. 39.

*Statement Made by the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) Before the Security Council on February 24, 1948*¹

[Extracts]

The Security Council is now confronted with the complex problem of Palestine as presented to us in General Assembly resolution 181 (II) of 29 November 1947 and the two reports from the Palestine Commission. The Security Council now has before it a number of important questions concerning Palestine for which it must endeavour to find an answer. The situation does not permit any further delay.

¹ Reprinted from SC, *3rd yr.*, Nos. 16-35, pp. 264-269. The Security Council began consideration of the two reports of the Palestine Commission on February 24, inviting Chairman Lisicky and representatives of Egypt, Lebanon, and the Jewish Agency to participate. The President of the Council suggested that if an application to participate were received from the Arab Higher Committee, it should be given the same consideration (*ibid.*, pp. 257, 258).

The problem has been before the United Nations as a matter of special concern since 2 April 1947. The United States, as a Member of the United Nations, has supported since that date those United Nations procedures which we considered best adapted to obtaining a broad and impartial expression of world opinion on the problem, which would result in a just and workable solution commending itself to the Mandatory Power and to the people of Palestine.

As a result of the recommendations of the General Assembly of 29 November 1947, Palestine is now before several of the principal bodies of the United Nations for various types of action under the Charter. The United States, as a Member of the United Nations and of those bodies, will continue to deal with the question of Palestine as a Member of the United Nations in conjunction with other Members. The United States policy will not be unilateral. It will conform to, and be in support of, United Nations action on Palestine.

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The resolution of the General Assembly makes three separate requests of the Security Council. The first is that the Security Council "take the necessary measures as provided for in the plan for its implementation". To determine what these measures are, it is necessary to turn to the plan itself. It will be seen that these are: To give guidance to the Palestine Commission; to take such action as the Security Council may deem proper with respect to either the Jewish or the Arab State if by 1 April 1948 a provisional council of government cannot be selected for that State, or, if selected, cannot carry out its functions; to issue such instructions to the Commission as the Security Council may consider necessary; to receive and consider periodic progress reports, special reports and the final report of the Palestine Commission; to give sympathetic consideration to the application for membership in the United Nations made by either the Arab or the Jewish State when a certain stage in the plan has been achieved.

We believe it is clear that the Security Council can undertake the above-mentioned measures. It is further clear from the terms of the resolution of 29 November 1947 that the Palestine Commission is bound by whatever instructions the Security Council gives to it pursuant to the General Assembly's requests.

We come now to the two following requests of the General Assembly as set forth in the resolution of 29 November. These invoke the wide peace-keeping powers of the Security Council under the Charter. The second request in the resolution asks the Security Council to consider whether ". . . during the transitional period . . . the situation in Palestine constitutes a threat to the peace".

The third request of the General Assembly asks that the Security Council "determine as a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act

of aggression, in accordance with Article 39 of the Charter, any attempt to alter by force the settlement envisaged by this resolution".

Although the Security Council is empowered to use, and would normally attempt to use measures short of armed force to maintain the peace, it is authorized under the Charter to use armed force if it considers other measures inadequate. A finding by the Security Council that a danger to peace exists places all Members of the United Nations, regardless of their views, under obligation to assist the Security Council in maintaining peace. If the Security Council should decide that it is necessary to use armed force to maintain international peace in connexion with Palestine, the United States would be ready to consult under the Charter with a view to such action as may be necessary to maintain international peace. Such consultation would be required in view of the fact that agreement has not yet been reached making armed forces available to the Security Council under the terms of Article 43 of the Charter.

The Security Council is authorized to take forceful measures with respect to Palestine to remove a threat to international peace. The Charter of the United Nations does not empower the Security Council to enforce a political settlement whether it is pursuant to a recommendation of the General Assembly or of the Security Council itself.

What this means is this: The Security Council, under the Charter, can take action to prevent aggression against Palestine from outside. The Security Council, by these same powers, can take action to prevent a threat to international peace and security from inside Palestine. But this action must be directed solely to the maintenance of international peace. The Security Council's action, in other words, is directed to keeping the peace and not to enforcing partition.

The United States Government believes that the first of the three requests made by the General Assembly to the Security Council under its resolution of 29 November 1947 can properly be complied with by the Security Council. With respect to the second and third requests of the General Assembly's resolution, the Security Council must act, if necessary, to preserve international peace and security or to curb and repel aggression as provided in the Charter.

Although we do not wish to place specific resolutions before the Security Council at this early stage of the discussion, my Government believes we should have in mind the desirability of the following specific steps which the Security Council might take at once: (1) to accept the tasks which the General Assembly asked the Security Council to accept in its resolution of 29 November 1947 on Palestine, subject to the authority of the Security Council under the Charter; (2) to

establish a committee of the Security Council, comprising the five permanent Members, to look at once into the question of the possible threats to international peace arising in connexion with the Palestine situation and to consult with the Palestine Commission, the Mandatory Power and representatives of the principal communities of Palestine concerning the implementation of the General Assembly resolution; (3) to call upon all Governments and peoples, particularly in and around Palestine, to take all possible action to prevent or reduce the disorders now occurring in Palestine.

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Editorial Note

Arthur Creech Jones then presented the British point of view in the Security Council of the United Nations. He noted that the general security situation in Palestine had degenerated very seriously since the resolution of November 29, 1947. He said further that "It is essentially because of the difficulties of security and the dangers of divided responsibility in Palestine in present conditions that the Mandatory Power, faced with specific threats by the Arabs, could not agree to open a port to Jewish immigration, to the progressive transfer of areas to the Commission's administration, or to the formation of a militia under the control of the Provisional Government of the future Jewish State. Nor could my Government safely extend the period of overlap during which the United Nations Commission would be present in Palestine while the responsibility for security and administration still rested with the Mandatory Power."

Mr. Creech Jones reiterated British policy of not opposing the United Nations decision but of not undertaking, alone or in association with others, to impose that decision by force. (SC, *3rd yr.*, Nos. 16-35, pages 269, 270)

Alfonso López, the Colombian Representative at the United Nations, introduced a resolution into the Security Council on February 24, which invited the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, China, and France "to consult with one another with a view to such joint action on behalf of this Organization as may be necessary to prevent or remove any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression arising from the implementation of the General Assembly's resolution of 29 November 1947". The measure also resolved "pending the result of such consultations, to appoint a committee composed of the representatives of two permanent members and three non-permanent members of the Security Council whose task will be:

"(a) To ascertain if it is not possible to bring about an agreement between the Jewish Agency and the Arab Higher Committee which

will enable the United Nations Palestine Commission to discharge its functions and responsibilities in due course, without the use of force;

“(b) To examine the advisability of requesting the Secretary-General to call an extraordinary session of the General Assembly for the purpose of reconsidering its resolution of 29 November 1947, as a whole or in part, and discussing such other matters relating thereto as the committee may find necessary for the pacific settlement of the situation in Palestine.”

Finally, the resolution requested the United Kingdom “to postpone the date fixed for the termination of its Mandate until 15 July 1948, and, accordingly, its arrangements for the evacuation of its troops from Palestine.” (SC, *3rd yr., Nos. 16-35*, pages 292, 293.)

The proposal was withdrawn by the Colombian Representative at the Security Council meeting of February 27 (*ibid.*, page 365).

PPS Files, Lot 64D563

*Report by the Policy Planning Staff*¹

TOP SECRET
PPS/23

[WASHINGTON,] February 24, 1948.

[Extracts]

REVIEW OF CURRENT TRENDS
U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

V. PALESTINE AND THE MIDDLE EAST

The Staff views on Palestine have been made known in a separate paper. I do not intend to recapitulate them here. But there are two background considerations of determining importance, both for the Palestine question and for our whole position in the Middle East, which I should like to emphasize at this time.

1. *The British Strategic Position in the Middle East*

We have decided in this Government that the security of the Middle East is vital to our own security. We have also decided that it would not be desirable or advantageous for us to attempt to duplicate or to take over the strategic facilities now held by the British in that area. We have recognized that these facilities would be at our effective disposal anyway, in the event of war, and that to attempt to get them transferred, in the formal sense, from the British to ourselves would

¹ This report was an annex to a memorandum of February 24 by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennan), addressed to the Secretary and Under Secretary of State. For the full text of both documents, see vol. I, Part 2, pp. 509 and 510.

only raise a host of new and unnecessary problems, and would probably be generally unsuccessful.

This means that we must do what we can to support the maintenance of the British of their strategic position in that area. This does *not mean* that we must support them in every individual instance. It does *not mean* that we must back them up in cases where they have got themselves into a false position or where we would thereby be undertaking extravagant political commitments. It *does mean* that any policy on our part which tends to strain British relations with the Arab world and to whittle down the British position in the Arab countries is only a policy directed against ourselves and against the immediate strategic interests of our country.

2. *The Direction of Our Own Policy*

The pressures to which this Government is now subjected are ones which impel us toward a position where we would shoulder major responsibility for the maintenance, and even the expansion, of a Jewish state in Palestine. To the extent that we move in this direction, we will be operating directly counter to our major security interests in that area. For this reason, our policy in the Palestine issue should be dominated by the determination to avoid being impelled along this path.

We are now heavily and unfortunately involved in this Palestine question. We will apparently have to make certain further concessions to our past commitments and to domestic pressures.

These concessions will be dangerous ones; but they will not necessarily be catastrophic if we are thoroughly conscious of what we are doing, and if we lay our general course toward the avoidance of the possibility of the responsibility I have referred to. If we do not lay our course in that direction but drift along the lines of least resistance in the existing vortex of cross currents, our entire policy in the Middle Eastern area will unquestionably be carried in the direction of confusion, ineffectiveness, and grievous involvement in a situation to which there cannot be—from our standpoint—any happy ending.

I think it should be stated that if this Government is carried to a point in the Palestine controversy where it is required to send U.S. forces to Palestine in any manner whatsoever, or to agree either to the international recruitment of volunteers or the sending of small nation forces which would include those of Soviet satellites, then in my opinion, the whole structure of strategic and political planning which we have been building up for the Mediterranean and Middle Eastern areas would have to be reexamined and probably modified or replaced by something else. For this would then mean that we had consented to be guided, in a highly important question affecting those areas, not by national interest but by other considerations. If we tried, in the

face of this fact, to continue with policy in adjacent areas motivated solely by national interest, we would be faced with a duality of purpose which would surely lead in the end to a dissipation and confusion of effort. We cannot operate with one objective in one area, and with a conflicting one next door.

If, therefore, we decide that we are obliged by past commitments or U.N. decision or any other consideration to take a leading part in the enforcement in Palestine of any arrangement opposed by the great majority of the inhabitants of the Middle Eastern area, we must be prepared to face the implications of this act by revising our general policy in that part of the world. And since the Middle East is vital to the present security concepts on which this Government is basing itself in its worldwide military and political planning, this would further mean a review of our entire military and political policy.

X. CONCLUSIONS

In the Mediterranean and Middle East, we have a situation where a vigorous and collective national effort, utilizing both our political and military resources, could probably prevent the area from falling under Soviet influence and preserve it as a highly important factor in our world strategic position. But we are deeply involved, in that same area, in a situation which has no direct relation to our national security, and where the motives of our involvement lie solely in past commitments of dubious wisdom and in our attachment to the U.N. itself. If we do not effect a fairly radical reversal of the trend of our policy to date, we will end up either in the position of being ourselves militarily responsible for the protection of the Jewish population in Palestine against the declared hostility of the Arab world, or of sharing that responsibility with the Russians and thus assisting at their installation as one of the military powers of the area. In either case, the clarity and efficiency of a sound national policy for that area will be shattered.

*Statement Made by the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) Before the Security Council on February 25, 1948*¹

I propose a draft resolution on the Palestine question which reads as follows:

"The Security Council,

"Having received General Assembly resolution 181 (II) of 29 November 1947, on Palestine, and having received from the United

¹ Reprinted from SC, 3rd yr., Nos. 16-35, pp. 294, 295.

Nations Palestine Commission its first monthly report and its first special report on the problem of security in Palestine;

"Resolves:

"1. To accept, subject to the authority of the Security Council under the Charter, the requests addressed by the General Assembly to it in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of section A of the General Assembly resolution of 29 November 1947;

"2. To establish a committee of the Security Council, comprising the five permanent members of the Security Council, the functions [of] which will be :

"(a) To inform the Security Council regarding the situation with respect to Palestine and to make recommendations to it regarding the guidance and instructions which the Security Council might usefully give to the Palestine Commission;

"(b) To consider whether the situation with respect to Palestine constitutes a threat to international peace and security, and to report its conclusions as a matter of urgency to the Security Council, together with any recommendations for action by the Security Council which it considers appropriate;

"(c) To consult with the Palestine Commission, the Mandatory Power, and representatives of the principal communities of Palestine concerning the implementation of the General Assembly recommendation of 29 November 1947.

"Appeals to all Governments and peoples, particularly in and around Palestine, to take all possible action to prevent or reduce such disorders as are now occurring in Palestine."

I think it would be premature for me to undertake to debate this draft resolution, because it follows a draft resolution which is already before the Security Council, but this draft resolution clearly shows that the attitude of the United States is such that it cannot support the proposal made yesterday by the representative of Colombia, and that its opposition is not without reason, because the position as stated yesterday is exactly the position that is represented in this draft resolution.

I wanted to submit this draft resolution to the Security Council early enough—indeed I think this is the earliest possible moment I could submit it—so that in considering the draft resolution presented by Colombia and any other situation that may arise here, the Security Council may know that the position of the United States, represented in the address which I made before the Security Council yesterday, is carried into a definite, concrete proposal, and so that the members of the Security Council may have the earliest possible notice of the United States position.

IO Files : US/A/AC.21/45

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Samuel K. C. Kopper

SECRET

[NEW YORK,] February 25, 1948.

I. PALESTINE

Mr. Chamoun told me this afternoon that he was somewhat concerned about the possibility of the Security Council finding a threat to the peace existing in Palestine and while taking action with respect to such a threat implementing the partition plan as a by-product. I replied that in so far as the United States position was concerned, Ambassador Austin's statement yesterday clearly indicated that the United States did not believe the Security Council had the power to enforce a recommendation. On the other hand, however, we did feel that the Charter very definitely granted power to the Security Council to deal with threats to the peace. In so far as the Palestine situation was concerned, the Council could take action with respect to any threat which it determined existed there. The maintenance of peace, however, was not the same as the enforcement of partition. Mr. Chamoun did not seem to be convinced. I tried to point out that it was rather difficult to make it clear to him, since the Council action would depend on existing facts but would be limited within the powers granted to the Council by the Charter.

Mr. Chamoun said he did not like the resolution introduced by the United States this afternoon. I said it followed the speech made by Ambassador Austin yesterday. He again reiterated his concern about whether the Council would implement partition while seeking to maintain peace. I said the question of maintenance of international peace was very important. I said that it was of deep concern to the United States Government that there be no aggression from without Palestine because it was incumbent upon the Council to take action with respect to breaches of the peace and acts of aggression.

[Here follows Section II dealing with another subject.]

501.BB Palestine/2-2648*Memorandum to the Files by Mr. Robert M. McClintock*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] February 26, 1948.

Pursuant to Mr. Rusk's request by telephone this morning I spoke to Mr. Lovett at 12:25 p.m. and said that Mr. Rusk had some doubts as to the treatment which the US resolution on Palestine, introduced yesterday before the Security Council, would receive at the hands of

the Council. Particularly, Mr. Rusk wondered what course of action should be taken if the Council decided to consider this resolution paragraph by paragraph and in so doing to delete paragraph 2(a), which charges the Big Five Committee to "inform the Security Council regarding the situation with respect to Palestine and to make recommendations to it regarding the guidance and instructions which the Council might usefully give to the Palestine Commission."

Mr. Lovett said it was difficult to answer a tactical question of that sort in absence of knowledge of the parliamentary situation attending the debate. He was clear in his mind, however, that the basic question confronting the Council was whether or not to accept the responsibilities which the Assembly sought to impose on it by the resolution of November 29, 1947. Now that we had introduced the resolution we should, of course, stick to it but should not be unduly concerned if our language was not adopted. Should the Council not accept our draft it was not incumbent, in Mr. Lovett's opinion, on the US Delegation to continue to "carry the ball."

The essential thing was for the Council to decide what it would do under the Assembly's resolution. If it decided not to accept the responsibilities imposed upon it by the Assembly, then clearly there was justification to call a special session to consider what to do next. If the Council did accept all or part of the Assembly's requests it could then examine to what degree it could carry them out and, after the results of this inquiry, would be in a position to decide whether the plan were workable or whether a special session should be convened.

Editorial Note

Messrs. Henderson and McClintock, on February 26, drafted a telegram on the Palestine question to be sent to Damascus and repeated to other Arab capitals and Jerusalem. In an attached note, dated the following day, Mr. McClintock stated: "Mr. Lovett decided not to send this telegram at present. He said, 'This is a good time for everyone to sit tight.' " The proposed telegram, as originally drafted, reads as follows:

"In furtherance of your representations to Govt to which you are accredited under instructions in Deptel 34, Feb. 23 (211 to Cairo, 83 to Beirut, 60 to Bagdad, 55 to Jidda and 130 to Jerusalem) the following salient points of Ambassador Austin's speech sent you in Deptel 35 should be stressed:

"(1) While we are discussing problem of Palestine it is of first importance to future of UN that precedent to be established by

action taken in this case be in full accord with terms of Charter. (2) The recommendations of General Assembly have great moral force and every Member should make a serious effort to comply with them. (3) Security Council should attempt to get agreement on basis of GA recommendation with respect to Palestine. (4) UN Charter does not empower SC to enforce a political settlement, whether pursuant to a recommendation of GA or of Council itself. (5) If SC finds that international peace is threatened from any source, it is required by Charter to act. All Members of UN are under an obligation to assist Council in maintaining peace.

"You should point out to responsible officials that in line with Austin's statement to SC US feels that SC must do what it can within framework of Charter to effect peaceably settlement of Palestine problem along lines of recommendations of GA resolution of Nov 29, 1947. In endeavoring to effect such settlement SC can use its wide powers of recommendation and conciliation. US earnestly hopes that while honest endeavors are being made to effect such settlement situation will not develop in Palestine which will compel SC to find there is threat to international peace and to consider dispatch of armed forces to that country to remove such threat. Much depends upon policies pursued by Arab countries at this juncture. If they persist in sending troops and arms, in making threats to intervene by force in Palestine or engaging in other activities which can be construed only as aggression or threats of aggression re Palestine SC will have no choice other than to decide that situation referred to above exists.

"As indicated in Austin's statement, US policy on Palestine will not be unilateral but will conform to and be in support of UN decisions. It is because this Govt is a sincere friend of the Arab world and is with equal sincerity determined to maintain international peace and security as a steadfast supporter of UN that this present counsel is given.

"Repeated to Cairo as ———, Beirut as ———, Bagdad as ———, Jidda as ———, Jerusalem as ——— with request that CG informally communicate contents to Govt of Transjordan. Repeated London and USUN." (501.BB Palestine/2-2648)

Regarding telegram 35, see footnote 1, page 650.

501.BB Palestine/2-2648 : Telegram

*The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)
to the Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET

NEW YORK, February 26, 1948—6:30 p. m.

214. For Lovett from Rusk. In private meeting this afternoon among Austin, Parodi [France], McNaughton [Canada], Pearson [Canada], Nisot (Belgium), Ignatieff (Canada) and Rusk, Parodi and Nisot raised a number of objections to the proposed US resolution on Palestine. The substance of their objections was (a) that SC should

not accept the partition plan of the GA resolution prior to the investigations to be carried out by the committee of the permanent members, since without such investigations SC could not know the effect of the recommendation upon the maintenance of international peace and security; (b) that the SC should not accept in advance the standard as to what constitutes a threat to the peace set forth in request (c) of the GA resolution. It was clear from Nisot's remarks that Belgium does not wish to approve partition again at this point in the light of the changed conditions which have arisen since November 29. Both Parodi and Nisot hinted that they might not be able to support the US resolution unless their amendments were accepted.

Austin informed them that we considered it important for the SC to establish a frame of reference for the work of the proposed committee, based on the GA recommendation; that we were confident that our phrase "subject to the authority of the SC under the charter" took care of any inference that the SC would be exceeding its powers by accepting the request of the GA.

Austin stated that he felt certain that we were after the same objectives and that he hoped agreeable language could be found to meet their views. He added however, that he could not say whether the US could agree to any such amendments since the matter was one which would have to be referred to the Department for further instructions. [Rusk.]

AUSTIN

501.BB Palestine/2-2648: Telegram

*The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)
to the Secretary of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

NEW YORK, February 26, 1948—6:40 p. m.

215. According to present information, following amendments to US resolution ¹ on Palestine will be offered by Belgian and French delegations:

1. Delete paragraph 1.
2. Insert after the word "establish" in paragraph 2 of US resolution the following "in the light of the said resolution of the GA."
3. Add to subparagraph 2 (a) the following: "Should circumstances permit."
4. Add a new subparagraph 2 (d) as follows: "to give advice to the SC as to the action to be taken by the latter in the matter."

AUSTIN

¹ See *ante*, p. 657.

501.BB Palestine/2-2748

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by Mr. Robert M. McClintock

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] February 27, 1948.

Participants: U—Mr. Lovett
 USUN—Mr. Rusk¹

Mr. Rusk telephoned Mr. Lovett at 9:30 a. m. to inquire the Department's reaction to USUN's top secret 214, Feb. 26, and its confidential telegram 215 of the same date, which set forth the proposed Belgian and French amendments to the US resolution on Palestine of February 25. Mr. Lovett said that he desired to discuss these telegrams further with Messrs. Henderson and McClintock and that he would shortly call Mr. Rusk.

After some discussion Mr. Lovett then telephoned Mr. Rusk² and established the following position:

1. The US Delegate should vote against the first Belgian-French amendment, which calls for deletion of paragraph 1 of the US resolution. It was agreed that in all probability this Belgian-French amendment would fail to receive the necessary seven affirmative votes in the Council.

2. When the US resolution came to vote paragraph by paragraph, Ambassador Austin should vote for paragraph 1, but should not make any impassioned speeches in its defense. His remarks should be confined to restating quietly and clearly what had already been said in his address of February 24. Mr. Rusk interjected that the Delegation was under strong pressure from sideline advisers to become apoplectic in its approach but clearly understood the instructions from the Under Secretary.

3. In Mr. Rusk's opinion paragraph 1 of the US resolution would fail to pass the Council and attention would then center on the second paragraph of our resolution on which the French and Belgian delegations wished to submit other amendments. These were discussed:

a. It was agreed to accept the second Belgian-French amendment to insert after the word "establish" in paragraph 2 of the US resolution the words "in the light of the said resolution of the General Assembly."

b. It was agreed to accept the additional words "should circumstances permit" at the termination of sub-paragraph 2(*a*) of the US resolution, provided that the semi-colon were deleted precedent to this clause, as otherwise the clause would modify sub-para. 2(*b*) of the US resolution.

c. No objection was raised to the Belgian-French proposal to add a new sub-paragraph 2(*d*): "to give advice to the Security

¹ At New York.

² At 9:50 a. m. (Marginal notation by Mr. McClintock on telegram 214 from New York.)

Council as to the action to be taken by the latter in the matter.”³

Mr. Lovett inquired of Mr. Rusk what the position should be on the Colombian draft resolution of February 24 which would call for a special session of the General Assembly to reconsider the resolution of November 29, 1947. Mr. Rusk said that the US should not be in a position of vetoing this resolution and therefore he proposed that the Delegation abstain. Mr. Lovett agreed to this procedure but later requested Mr. McClintock to telephone Mr. Rusk and make clear that our attitude should be plainly set forth in the Council that we were opposed at this stage to the Colombian resolution.⁴ If it were possible to vote against that resolution without our negative vote being construed as a veto we should do so. This information was imparted to Mr. Rusk by phone at 10:50 a. m.

³ The proposed resolution was introduced by Belgian Representative Nisot on February 27; for text, see United Nations, *Official Records of the Security Council, Third Year, Supplement for January, February and March 1948*, p. 30. The resolution was virtually identical with that of the United States proposal of February 25, except for the deletion of paragraph numbered one and the addition of a clause to paragraph (c), which read “to report thereon to the Security Council together with any recommendation as to the action to be taken by the Council in the matter.” Mr. Nisot, in introducing his resolution, noted that Paragraph 1 of the United States proposal would require the Council to take a position before knowing the results of the work of the Committee of the five Great Powers, which it was instructing to investigate the situation (SC, *3rd yr.*, Nos. 16-35, p. 357).

⁴ The Colombian Representative withdrew his resolution on February 27 (*ibid.*, p. 365).

501.BB Palestine/2-2748

Mr. Robert M. McClintock to the Director of the Office of United Nations Affairs (Rusk), Temporarily at New York

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] February 27, 1948.

DEAR DEAN: Enclosed is memo of your conversation this morning with Mr. Lovett,¹ as seen from this end of the line.

I thought you might be interested to know for background purposes that Mr. Lovett set Loy Henderson straight on the future alternatives which confront the UN in the Palestine case.

Mr. Lovett said there was one possibility, which was that the SC would find that it could do nothing constructive on the Palestine problem; would call a special session on the GA to consider the matter anew; and that the Assembly would make a new recommendation for a solution along the lines of possibly a trusteeship. In this case the British might or might not be amenable to pressure designed to have them maintain law and order in Palestine for a while longer.

¹ *Supra*.

However, we could not formulate policy on the assumption that the British would be thus amenable.

Another possibility, said Mr. Lovett, was that the SC would find (and indeed there seemed to be ample evidence on hand already) that the situation in Palestine constituted a threat to the maintenance of international peace and security. In this case and with the British pulling out between May 15 and August 1, the UN might find it necessary to send forces to Palestine to maintain international peace. If, in the meantime, nothing had occurred to change the Assembly's recommendation of last November 29, we might find that the Palestine Commission would go to Palestine under the terms of that resolution and seek by negotiation to carry out the plan of partition with economic union. In that case it should be clear, however, that UN forces in Palestine were there to maintain international peace and not to enforce partition.

Mr. Lovett seemed to envisage clearly the possibility that some type of international force would have to be made available in Palestine by the UN, although he did not say as much in so many words.

[ROBERT M.] M[cCLINTOCK]

501.BB Palestine/2-2748 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

SECRET US URGENT

WASHINGTON, February 27, 1948—6 p. m.

98. Secretary Marshall made the following statement on Palestine at his press conference Feb. 26:

"I tell you now I will not answer detailed questions on Palestine because there must be no confusion between Ambassador Austin and myself as to what is being stated and any statement will be made from there rather than from here."

Following for Ambassador Austin's confidential information only. Secretary Marshall then made the following statement completely *Off the record*: "I will tell you this: That so far as I am concerned and the State Dept. is concerned, but particularly so far as I am concerned, that in this highly emotional period of extreme bitterness and violent attacks, my intention is to see that nothing is done by the State Dept. in guidance for the action of its delegates to the United Nations, in response to either military threats or political threats, one or the other, nothing whatever. My intention is to see that the action of the US Govt. is to be on a plane of integrity that will bear inspection and a common review and that there will be no bending to

any military threat or to any political threat so long as I am Secretary of State. *End of off the record.*"¹

MARSHALL

¹ At this point, in the official memorandum of the press and radio news conference appears the following: "Asked why this comment could not be made public, Mr. Marshall said that we had enough troubles already. He said such a statement would have to be cleared with the President. Asked if he was speaking of international political threats, the Secretary replied that he meant exactly what he said. . . . Citing the fact that Mr. Austin's statement on Palestine had been subjected to many interpretations, a correspondent asked if the Department planned to interpret the statement either before Congress or through a further statement. The Secretary replied that the Department intended to leave matters almost entirely to Mr. Austin so that there would be no confusion in expressions and sentences used."

The Secretary concluded his observations on Palestine with a denial that the Arab League nations had sent a note to the State Department stating that Arab countries would withdraw oil concessions if the United States pushed partition. (News Division Files).

CIA Files

*Report by the Central Intelligence Agency*¹

SECRET
ORE 7-48

[WASHINGTON,] 28 February 1948.

POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS IN PALESTINE

SUMMARY

It is apparent that the partition of Palestine into separate Arab and Jewish states (and an international zone), with economic union between the two states, as recommended by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) on 29 November 1947, cannot be implemented. The Arab reaction to the recommendation has been violent, and the Arab refusal to cooperate in any way with the five-nation United Nations Commission will prevent the formation of an Arab state and the organization of economic union. The Arabs will use force to oppose the establishment of a Jewish state and to this end are training troops in Palestine and other Arab states. Moreover, the United Kingdom has stated repeatedly that it will take no part in implementing a UN decision not acceptable to both Jews and Arabs. The British have also declared that when the mandate terminates on 15 May, they will not transfer authority to the UN Commission but will merely relinquish that authority, which would then be assumed by the UN. Thus, without Arab and British cooperation, the Commission will be unable to carry out the task assigned to it.

¹ According to a note in the source text: "The information in this report is as of 18 February 1948, at which time the report was submitted to the member agencies of the Interdepartmental Advisory Council for coordination. This paper was concurred in by the Intelligence Agencies of the Department of State, Army, Navy, and Air Force on 19 February. On 20 February CIA disseminated an Advance Copy of the coordinated report."

Even among the Jews there is dissatisfaction over the partition plan. Irgun Zvai Leumi and the Stern Gang, the two extremist groups, have refused to accept the plan and continue to claim all of Palestine (and even Transjordan) for the Jewish state. The Jewish Agency, official representative of the Jewish community, had hoped to obtain a larger portion of Palestine for the new state but has decided to cooperate with the UN Commission. Recruiting and training for Hagana, the Agency's military arm, have been increased, and the terrorist groups will join Hagana in the Arab fight despite their opposition to partition. The Jewish effort, however, will not be sufficient to enable the UN Commission to carry out partition as envisaged by the UNGA.

Since the complete partition plan cannot be implemented, the possible developments in Palestine resolve themselves into three main groups:

(1) *UN attempts to set up a Jewish state by force.*

Again, the UN would be balked by lack of Arab and British cooperation. While the UN might attempt to set up an international police force (which would have to be large and remain in Palestine indefinitely), the US and UK would have to consider the danger of permitting Soviet and/or Satellite troops to enter Palestine, and the USSR would undoubtedly object to any force not including these troops. It is possible that the SC might consider authorizing unilateral aid to the Jews by the member states of the UN, but such a course would be extremely dangerous to world peace. Since the USSR would take advantage of the opportunity to increase its influence in Palestine by supporting the Jews, the UK and the US would have good cause not to sanction such action in the SC.

(2) *No action by the UN.*

The UN would suffer a serious loss of prestige if it should wash its hands of the Palestine issue. Moreover, the Jewish-Arab conflict would increase and spread, and the USSR would be free to send troops into Palestine as it saw fit.

(3) *UN reconsideration of the whole issue.*

Reconsideration of the issue could be initiated in several ways. The SC might seek an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice on the legality of the UNGA recommendations and simultaneously arrange an Arab-Jewish truce. The Arabs would welcome such a step and the Jews would probably have to agree (though reluctantly) since the entire Jewish position is based on UN action. Jewish violence, however, would undoubtedly continue.

Should the issue be returned to the General Assembly, partition could be considered abandoned. Subsequent developments cannot be predicted, but it is reasonable to assume that any new solution would have to be acceptable to the Arabs, who would probably be willing to

make some concessions on the basis of the Minority Report of the UN Special Committee on Palestine.

1. *Aims in Palestine After the Partition Recommendation.*

a. Planned UN Course of Action.

When the UNGA voted on 29 November 1947 recommending the partition of Palestine into separate Arab and Jewish states, the course of action to be followed was clearly defined. A five-man commission with representatives from Denmark, Czechoslovakia, Bolivia, Panama, and the Philippines was to be organized in New York, together with a sizable secretariat of administrative officials and technical experts. After consultations with the mandatory power, the commission and its secretariat were to proceed to Palestine in the latter part of December 1947. When in Palestine, the UN Commission was to take over administrative responsibility from the UK in those areas from which the latter would progressively withdraw its troops. This withdrawal and the termination of the mandate were to take place not later than 1 August. (The mandatory subsequently announced that the mandate would terminate not later than 15 May.) During this period of transference of authority from the mandatory to the UN Commission, the latter was to cooperate with the Jewish Agency and the Arab Higher Committee in the formation of provisional councils of government of the prospective Jewish and Arab states and a Joint Economic Board. The provisional councils in both states were to be established by 1 April. Administrative authority was to be progressively turned over by the UN Commission to these two bodies, which would become the provisional governments of the two new states whose independence would be established not later than 1 October 1948. The UN Commission would also delimit the frontiers of the Arab and Jewish states. All these recommendations of the UNGA were to be carried out by the UN Commission with the guidance of the Security Council.

b. Planned UK Course of Action.

UK plans after the partition recommendation were exactly what they had been throughout the UNGA session. The British stated repeatedly that they would refuse to assist in implementing a UN decision not acceptable to both the Jews and the Arabs. They based their stand on the thesis that until the mandate was terminated they were bound by its provisions. On this basis, the UK was determined to retain undivided responsibility for the administration and internal security of Palestine until the mandate was terminated. Thereafter, the UK would retain responsibility in any areas occupied by its military forces until those forces were withdrawn. Finally, the UK stated unequivocally that it would not transfer administrative authority to the UN Commission but would simply relinquish that authority, which would be immediately assumed by the UN. The UK would not

obstruct the efforts of the UN Commission; nor would it participate in the work of the Commission.

c. Planned Arab Course of Action.

The UNGA recommendation on Palestine put the Arabs on the defensive, and consequently their plans were largely undeveloped. The very multiplicity of Arab states and of the groups within those states resulted in a spate of different proposals. In spite of these differences, however, the Arabs agreed that a Zionist state could not be tolerated in the Arab world. To prevent the formation of this state, the following general course of action was envisaged:

(1) To make military preparations, both in Palestine and the Arab states, to prevent by military action the formation and functioning of a Jewish state.

(2) To refuse to cooperate with the UN Commission in any way.

(3) To establish an independent unitary state embracing all of Palestine.

(4) To prevent further Jewish immigration until an immigration policy could be formulated by the unitary state.

Various Arab groups contemplated two additional lines of action. The most responsible and moderate groups considered further action in the UN, while the most extreme and nationalistic groups urged the cancellation of all diplomatic and economic relations with those states that had supported partition. While neither of these proposals was generally agreed to, the Arab states sent strong notes of protest to the respective US chiefs of missions.

d. Jewish Course of Action.

The Jewish plan of action after the UNGA recommendation was perfectly clearcut. While the Jewish Agency, the official representative of the Jewish community, had hoped to obtain a larger portion of Palestine, it decided to cooperate with the UN Commission in the establishment of the proposed Jewish state. In the meantime, it planned to build up its internal security forces, train an administrative corps, and propagandize the rest of the world for financial and military assistance against any Arab attempts to prevent the implementation of the UNGA recommendation. The aims, however, of the Revisionists, including Irgun Zvai Leumi and the Stern Gang, were more extreme: to fight both the British and the Arabs and to set up a Jewish state in all of Palestine and Transjordan.

2. Development of the Situation Since the Partition Recommendation.

a. UN Activity.

From the very beginning, the UN had difficulty in carrying out its intended course of action. In spite of repeated urgent appeals by Secretary General Trygve Lie, the members of the UN Commission were

not appointed by their respective governments until late in December and did not all reach New York for their first meeting until 9 January. Since then the UN Commission has made little progress, for its success was predicated on the assumption that it would receive the cooperation of the Jews, the Arabs, and the UK. Of these, only the Jews have fully cooperated. The Arabs have flatly refused to have anything to do with the Commission, and the UK's cooperation was considerably restricted by its interpretation of its responsibilities as mandatory power. UK refusal to allow the Commission to enter Palestine before 1 May (two weeks before the termination of the mandate) will make it impossible for the Commission to establish the provisional Arab and Jewish governments by the required date of 1 April. The UK refusal to relinquish any administrative authority in Palestine until after the termination of the mandate has prevented the progressive transfer of authority to the UN Commission. The Commission has also been compelled to recognize the deplorable security situation in Palestine and realizes that it cannot attempt to carry out the recommendations of the UNGA without an adequate international police force.

b. UK Activity.

UK activity since the partition vote has been twofold. In Palestine the mandatory administration, its police, and the UK forces have been attempting to maintain internal security. They have been hampered by two main factors: (1) evacuation plans have considerably obstructed UK security measures; and (2) the UK desire not to antagonize the Arab states has prevented the implementation of full-scale security measures to repress Arab-Jewish hostilities. In spite of these reservations, UK forces have been impartial in attempting to curb Arab-Jewish hostilities. The major aims seem to have been to prevent general anarchy and full-scale war—at least until the forces themselves have withdrawn.

In the UN, the UK delegates have taken pains to acquaint the UN Commission with the difficulties of the Palestine situation. They have advised the UN Commission on administrative matters, on the question of the projected Jerusalem Trusteeship, and on the setting up of provisional governments. They have refused, however, to assume joint responsibility with the Commission for the establishment of the new states in Palestine or to permit any development which might be interpreted as UK support of one side against the other. On this ground, the UK has refused to open a port on 1 February to unlimited Jewish immigration, as recommended by the UNGA resolution.

c. Arab Activity.

Arab reaction to the UNGA partition plan was prompt and violent. Strikes and demonstrations led to scattered riots within Palestine, and Arab League action was instituted by the Arab states. The sporadic violence in Palestine had developed by the middle of January

into more highly organized hostilities. By the beginning of February disciplined Arab bands were operating in different parts of the country, and the Arab Higher Committee claimed to be directing their activities. The nature of Arab activities indicated that until the British withdrawal Arab objectives were limited to: (1) avoiding, if possible, hostilities with the British forces; (2) purchasing and capturing essential supplies such as food, weapons, ammunition, and clothing; (3) disrupting Jewish commerce, transportation, and communications without launching full-scale attacks; (4) recruiting volunteer forces, within and without Palestine, and training them in guerrilla tactics; (5) setting up a unified military command; (6) establishing contact with Arab League channels of assistance. The entire emphasis has been on preparation for the British withdrawal, and the Arab leaders have apparently attempted to hold back their surging followers.

During a series of meetings at Sofar, Aley, and Cairo, Arab League representatives, despite differences of opinion, eventually evolved a program of action. The program, which in several particulars merely approved activities already under way, was immediately implemented and provided that: (1) the partisan movement in Palestine be supported with funds, arms, and men; (2) troops of the Arab states be stationed on the frontier of Palestine as a border watch; and (3) these armies not be sent into Palestine until after the British withdrawal. Funds were immediately raised in all the Arab states. Volunteers from Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Transjordan foregathered at Qatana in Syria for training; and by the middle of February over 8,000 were known to have slipped, uniformed and armed, into Palestine. Syrian, Egyptian, and Transjordan troops had been moved to the Palestine border; and Iraqi contingents were reported to be moving into Transjordan. Determined efforts were made to obtain arms and ammunition. Syria signed a contract with Skoda, and a first delivery is known to have been made.

While the Arab chain of command has not been announced, the forces will be commanded by former Syrian and Iraqi army officers and experienced guerrilla leaders.

d. Jewish Activity.

Having won the initial victory in the acceptance by the UNGA of the partition plan, the Jews concentrated (with some exceptions) on preparing for the new state. In the face of violent Arab opposition, the Jewish Agency immediately undertook: (1) to strengthen the internal defense forces of the prospective Jewish state; (2) to organize and train an administrative corps; and (3) to cooperate with the UN in implementing the UNGA decision. Recruiting and training for Hagana were increased; and, in spite of the fact that the mandatory refused to recognize its legality, it attempted to protect the Jewish

community from Arab attacks and also acted as a local police force. In time, Hagana adopted a policy of "active" defense and carried out terrorist raids against the Arabs similar in tactics to those of the Irgun Zvai Leumi and the Stern Gang against the UK forces. These two extremist groups continued their war against the British; and although they agreed to fight the Arabs together with Hagana, they refused to accept the partition recommendation and continued to claim all of Palestine (and even Transjordan) for the Jewish state.

3. *Possible Developments.*

a. General Considerations.

Partition as envisaged by the UNGA involves not only the creation of two states (and an international zone) but also economic union between the states. Such a plan cannot be implemented without Arab cooperation, and it is inconceivable that the Arabs will abandon their present violent opposition to partition. To the masses, the fight has become almost a religious tenet; to the governing classes, it has become a political creed which they dare not forsake. The Arabs can never be forced to acquiesce in a Western-sponsored movement which they believe is threatening the twentieth century renaissance of their indigenous civilization. With implementation of the complete partition plan hopeless, the possible developments in Palestine resolve themselves into three main groups: (1) UN attempts to set up a Jewish state by force; (2) no action by the UN; and (3) UN reconsideration of the whole issue.

b. UN Attempts to Set Up a Jewish State.

(1) Possible British Assistance.

An attempt might be made to persuade the UK to alter its current Palestine policy and to permit the formation of a Jewish militia, to agree to the "progressive transfer" of authority, to allow the UN Commission to come to Palestine earlier than 1 May, to open immediately a "port and hinterland" for Jewish immigration, and to suppress Arab guerrilla activities. However, in view of the UK's serious economic difficulties, its disinclination to antagonize the Arab world, and its consistently "neutral" policy since it turned the whole problem over to the UN last year, the British cannot be expected to change their stand between now and 1 August. Therefore, a Jewish state can be established only in the event that the UN Commission is given a police force sufficiently strong to withstand Arab aggression or that the Jews in Palestine are provided with enough military support from outside to overcome Arab opposition.

(2) Great Powers Police Force.

An international police force established by the Security Council may be of various types. Obviously, the most effective force would be one composed of units from the armed forces of the five great powers. The USSR can be expected to welcome an opportunity to send its

troops to Palestine; France, also, would probably be pleased to set foot once again in the Near East; China, for reasons of prestige, would want to be represented on an international police force but could scarcely afford to spare any troops from the civil war in China. The UK will almost certainly refuse to contribute. US troops, according to President Truman, will not be sent to Palestine. The dispatch of a force composed only of contingents from the USSR, France, and possibly China would present the UK and the US with the alternatives of exercising the veto or of opening Palestine to Soviet infiltration.

(3) *Medium Powers Police Force.*

A second possibility would be a force made up of contingents from the medium powers, but here again the UK and the US would have to consider the danger of permitting Soviet Satellite troops to enter Palestine. The USSR would probably veto the formation of any force that did not include Satellite representatives. Even if the great powers could agree on a force composed of contingents from the medium powers, it is unlikely that a sufficient number of nations would be willing to contribute adequate forces.

The formation of an international police force will depend, in the last analysis, not on a mere decision of the Security Council but on the willingness of nations to contribute to such a force. It is extremely unlikely that any nation would do so solely to maintain the prestige of the UN. In the present state of international security, probably no nation will send its troops to fight the Arabs in Palestine for the purpose of establishing a Jewish state unless its national interests are threatened by the failure of partition or unless it can hope to enlarge its sphere of influence. The USSR is the only nation that would gain from sending troops into Palestine. Since both the UK and the US have strong strategic reasons for refusing to allow Soviet or Soviet-controlled troops to enter Palestine, it is highly improbable that an international police force will ever be formed.

(4) *Assistance to the Jews.*

The only alternative method, therefore, is for military aid to be sent to the Jews in such quantities that they will be able to suppress all Arab opposition, both internal and external, and set up and maintain an independent state. Such aid might take the form of a volunteer "international" force, or the Security Council could presumably recommend to the other member nations of the UN that the Arab states be boycotted as deliberately resisting a decision of the SC and that the Jewish state be supported with shipments of funds, arms, and ammunition. The UN Commission might be retained as a liaison body between the Security Council and the new Jewish state. It could not delineate the frontiers recommended by the UNGA nor could it have any contacts with the Arabs, or establish a special administration in

Jerusalem. Thus the entire purpose of the UNGA partition resolution would be distorted from the creation of *two* independent states in Palestine to the organization and defense of *one* state—the Jewish state.

By sponsoring the formation of an “international” volunteer force, or by relinquishing the initiative and authorizing unilateral action by member states of the UN, the Security Council would recommend a course of action extremely dangerous to world peace. Since the USSR would be quick to take advantage of openings related to an SC decision to support the Jews, and thereby extend Soviet strategic influence into Palestine and the Near East, the UK and the US would have good cause not to sanction such action in the Security Council.

b. [sic] No Action by the UN.

If the UN were unable to agree on any action whatsoever, the consequences would be disastrous and appreciably decrease the prestige of the UN. The Jews and Arabs in Palestine would be completely free to solicit aid from and make alliances with individual nations. It would be practically impossible to localize the conflict; any nation with vital interests in the Arab world would inevitably be embroiled. Since the struggling Jews and Arabs would accept aid from whatever quarter offered, it is difficult to imagine how, under such circumstances, the USSR could be prevented from sending troops into Palestine.

c. Reconsideration by the UN.

(1) General Considerations.

Since the failure of partition is already evident, and in view of the dangers attendant on the establishment of a Jewish state, it appears that the only course open to the UN is to reconsider the whole issue. For the UN to admit error and to undertake reconsideration would be a momentous step necessitating considerable moral courage, but such procedure would be quite in line with the general practice of tribunals in permitting reargument where doubt is entertained as to the correctness of the original decision. To comprehend the overriding necessity for such a step, two factors must be understood: (1) that Arab opposition automatically invalidates the UNGA partition recommendations, whose basic assumption is Arab-Jewish cooperation; (2) that even if a Jewish state could be established and defended by force of arms, it would have to defend itself continuously not only against its hostile neighbors but against the resistance of 450,000 Arabs within its own borders until such time as Arab nationalism no longer existed; and (3) that full recourse to all judicial procedures before action is taken would help to establish world confidence in the fairness and justice of the UN as an instrument for world peace.

(2) Security Council Action.

Reconsideration by the UN of the Palestine issue could be initiated in several ways. The Security Council, after failing to agree on meas-

ures to implement partition, may ask the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion on the legality of the UNGA recommendations. At the same time, it might urge a truce between the Arabs and Jews and designate either the present Palestine Commission or some newly formed Security Council agent to arrange and supervise the truce. Since this step would constitute a completely new development, and one long urged by the Arabs, the Arabs would almost certainly agree to such a truce. Since the entire Jewish position is based on UN action, the Jews would have no alternative but to agree although Jewish violence would probably continue. The Security Council might, on the other hand, refer the question to the Little Assembly or take no action. The proposal for a UN Conciliation Board, if carried through, would furnish an opportunity for reconsideration without damage to UN prestige.

(3) *General Assembly Action.*

Should the Security Council fail to agree on any action whatsoever, the UN Commission, even if it agrees to go to Palestine to help the Jews set up their state, would probably report to the Secretary General that the UNGA recommendations could be implemented to only a limited extent. The Secretary General could then refer the issue to the Little Assembly or even summon a special session of the General Assembly to reconsider the whole question. (The Little Assembly itself has the authority to summon a special session of the General Assembly.) Once the issue had been returned to the General Assembly, partition could be considered abandoned. It is impossible to predict what new developments would take place, but it is reasonable to assume that any new solution would have to be acceptable to the Arabs, who would probably be willing to make some concessions on the basis of the UNSCOP Minority Report.

Editorial Note

In a statement before the Security Council on March 2, Ambassador Austin made known that the United States would not support the Belgian amendment. At one point, in discussing the United States draft resolution, he noted that "a vote for paragraph 1 would be a vote for partition as a solution of the Palestine question. The General Assembly voted for partition as a solution of the Palestine question. The United States voted for that solution, and still supports it. As we have stated before, the United States supports the General Assembly plan of partition as the framework of implementation by pacific means." He concluded his remarks by stating that "Taken altogether, paragraph 1 of the United States draft resolution means that the Security Council will do everything it can under the Charter to give effect

to the recommendation of the General Assembly." The full text of Ambassador Austin's statement is printed in SC, *3rd yr.*, Nos. 16-35, pages 398-401.

The British spokesman, Mr. Creech Jones, announced that his Government would not take part in the committee proposed by the two draft resolutions, would not vote for either and would not enter into any new or extended commitment in regard to Palestine. He concluded by stating that "the date of termination of our responsibility is irrevocably fixed." (*Ibid.*, pages 402-405)

Soviet Representative Gromyko concluded the discussion on March 2 by announcing his agreement in principle that the five permanent members of the Security Council should consult on the Palestine situation. His position, however, was that they hold direct consultations rather than through a committee, which he said, would only complicate and delay settlement of the question. He noted also that he had no objection to paragraph 1 of the United States draft resolution (*ibid.*, pages 405-407).

501.BB Palestine/3-448 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

NEW YORK, March 4, 1948—5:20 p.m.

242. For Lovett from Austin. I concur with contents of amended statement on UN responsibility for Palestine on May 15, 1948, contained in text authenticated by Rusk and McClintock.¹ Any confusion on the point should be clarified to avoid informal or accidental commitments by member governments on matter of that importance.

Timing of such statement is of great importance. If it should be made immediately after vote on Belgian amendment and US resolution, it might be misinterpreted as a negative attitude on our part merely presented to offer still further obstacles to UN action on Palestine. Whatever the voting in Security Council on Belgian amendment and US resolution, it now seems reasonably certain that some consultation by a committee or group of council with mandatory power, Palestine Commission, and Jews and Arabs of Palestine will take place concerning peaceful implementation of partition plan. US should insist by resolution that these consultations be held and, in absence of promising results, be wound up as rapidly as possible.

Unless there is a major statement by UK, Secretary-General Lie, or others directed to UN responsibility on May 15 prior to a report on the attempted conciliation, it appears US should make the proposed state-

¹ Not found in Department of State files; but for statement as finally approved, see telegram 108, March 5, to New York, p. 682.

ment at time of Security Council consideration of results of conciliation effort. In that event, statement should lead directly into positive proposals for further handling of Palestine matter by UN. Our legal analysis of question of responsibility on May 15 would strongly support necessity for prompt action along new lines and would make it clear to our own people why such proposals are essential.

Consequently, I recommend Department consider addition of following to present text of proposed statement:

[Here follow additions recommended by Ambassador Austin.²]

AUSTIN

² These suggested additions as redrafted in the Department appear in telegram 107, March 5, to New York, p. 679.

501.BB Palestine/3-448: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Tuck) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

CAIRO, March 4, 1948—9 p. m.

225. For Loy Henderson. I called on Minister Foreign Affairs yesterday to see his reaction to Austin's speech before the SC, text of which I had sent him.

Khashaba Pasha said he had read the speech with great interest and with "considerable relief" he stated that he feared that American official attitude toward partition might have been much closer to "four-point plan" advocated by certain prominent Americans, including Mrs. Roosevelt and Sumner Welles,¹ and which had been given considerable publicity in the local press.

Minister Foreign Affairs added that Austin's speech, while to him slightly ambiguous, appeared more acceptable and that while reaction in Egyptian official circles was guarded, it had been on the whole favorable. He was personally interested and gratified that Austin's speech had received support of President Truman. He told me that if Arab States could receive assurance that plan for establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine would be abandoned once and for all and that Jewish immigration would not be permitted on scale which would result in creation of a majority which would facilitate the forming of a Jewish state, then Arab countries would be prepared to discuss any form of compromise such as federalization or cantonization in Palestine.

I seized occasion to acquaint him with the purport of paragraphs 2 and 3 of Deptel 211 of February 23, 6 p. m.,² emphasizing the importance which our government attaches to prevention infiltration of

¹ Under Secretary of State, 1937-1943.

² This was a repeat of No. 34 to Damascus, p. 649.

fighting men and arms into Palestine. I told him that I felt that Egypt played a leading role in the Arab League and that an example of moderation in this respect might have its effect on other Arab Govts. Khashaba Pasha replied that while he had admitted the wisdom of such a policy it was indeed difficult, if not impossible, to convince the other members of the Arab League to this effect.³

TUCK

³ The reactions of leaders in other Arab lands to Senator Austin's statement were cautiously favorable (telegrams 121, February 26, from Damascus; 73, February 27, from Beirut; 195, March 2, from Baghdad; and 107, March 4, from Jidda). The Soviet reaction was given in a headline in *Trud*, which stated "USA Sabotages UN Decision on Palestine", and in the accompanying article which stated that "USA trying to delay still more and possibly even prevent fulfillment GA resolution on partition." (Telegram 388, March 1, from Moscow, 501.BB Palestine/3-148)

840.50 Recovery/3-548

*Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Truman and to the Cabinet*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] March 5, 1948.

[Here follow six numbered paragraphs on matters other than the Palestine question.]

VII. PALESTINE

Following Ambassador Austin's statement to the Security Council on Palestine on February 24, the United States introduced a resolution the first paragraph of which would accept, subject to the authority of the Security Council under the Charter, the requests made to the Council by the Assembly in its resolution of November 29, 1947 calling for implementation of the partition of Palestine. The second paragraph of the United States resolution would establish a committee of the Council to inform the Council regarding the situation in Palestine, to consider whether there was a threat to international peace and security in that situation, and to consult with the Palestine Commission, the United Kingdom and representatives of the principal communities of Palestine on how to carry out the General Assembly recommendation of November 29, 1947.

On February 27 the Belgian Delegation introduced an amendment to the United States resolution which retained the idea of a subcommittee but would delete the first paragraph of the United States resolution which calls on the Council in effect to agree to carry out so far as the Charter permits the partition of Palestine. Ambassador

¹ Drafted by William J. McWilliams, Assistant Director of the Executive Secretariat. A marginal notation states that the memorandum was "taken by hand by the Secretary to Cabinet meeting."

Austin, on March 2, made it clear to the Council that a vote on paragraph one would be a vote for or against partition by peaceful means.

It seems apparent that in the vote which is expected this afternoon the Belgian resolution deleting our first paragraph may carry by the necessary seven votes. It is almost absolutely certain that there are not seven votes in favor of the United States resolution with its first paragraph. The result will be that the Council will set up a subcommittee on Palestine and will ask the committee to use every effort of conciliation to see if there is some measure of agreement between the Arabs, Jews and the Mandatory Power to effect the partition of Palestine by means short of the use of force.

It seems certain that such efforts at conciliation will prove fruitless and at this time the Council must reach a decision in light of the facts whether or not still to attempt to carry out the partition. Without endeavoring to prophesy, the future trend seems to be that the Council will find itself unable to proceed with partition and that it will refer the Palestine problem to an immediate special session of the General Assembly for fresh consideration.

G. C. MARSHALL

501.BB Palestine/3-548: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

TOP SECRET

US URGENT

WASHINGTON, March 5, 1948—3 p. m.

NIACT

107. Careful review has been made of draft statement on United Nations responsibility for Palestine as of May 15, 1948 and of your 242, March 4.

It is our opinion that the essential factor in Security Council's consideration of Palestine problem is whether or not Council will accept plan of partition with economic union recommended by General Assembly last Nov. 29. This question is posed specifically to Council in Par. 1 of US Res. of Feb. 25. You again laid stress on this essential question in your remarks to Council on March 2.

We had thought it preferable to bring this issue to sharp focus in the vote today on US Res. of Feb. 25 and Belgian amendment seeking to delete Para. 1 of that res., dated Feb. 27.

However, following telephone conversations with USUN we defer to your judgment that it is essential for Council's conciliatory machinery to be used before final decision is taken. We shall be guided by your opinion that issue will mature more naturally in a week or ten days' time and that the conciliatory machinery of the Council will result in

showing beyond any doubt whatsoever that the differing attitudes of the Jews for partition, Arabs against partition, and the Mandatory Power for leaving Palestine, are at present irreconcilable.

Should the conciliatory process reach what seems to be this inevitable conclusion there is still need of a clear-cut decision by the Council on whether or not to accept the requests made of it by the General Assembly. We do not feel it incumbent on the United States to draw its own conclusions after the results of conciliation are known and then to suggest the specific program outlined in your 242. Rather, we feel that the matter should be brought to a vote, not at the instance of the United States but on the motion of some colleague such as Colombia or China. This could be done, for example, in a resolution pointing to the negative results of conciliation as confirming the Council's previous negative vote on paragraph 1 of the United States resolution of February 25.

On such a resolution the United States would abstain on the ground that it did not wish to cast a veto. This would indicate that we were impressed by the facts reported by the Conciliation Committee but would not force us to go on record as voting against partition.

As for the debate in the Council today, on the United States and Belgian Resolutions, you have already been instructed by telephone to indicate our strong opposition to the essential aim of the Belgian Resolution which is to delete Paragraph 1 of the United States Resolution. You will point out that a bare ten weeks intervene between now and May 15, the announced date of termination of UK responsibility for Palestine. You will stress that the Council cannot evade a decision on whether or not to accept the requests of the General Assembly's Resolution of November 29.

The approved text of the proposed statement on United Nations responsibility for Palestine after May 15 follows by separate telegram, with certain minor textual changes. You should add the following conclusion:

"Now that these conclusions have been made clear, what is the next task of this Council?

By the vote on March ——— it is evident that the Security Council has rejected the requests made of it by the General Assembly in its resolution of November 29, 1947. It is evident that the Security Council has rejected the partition of Palestine.

As I pointed out a few moments ago, my Government believes that the plan proposed by the General Assembly was an integral plan and, as the Chairman of the Palestine Commission clearly indicated, it would not succeed unless each of its parts were carried out.

The decision of the Security Council has been taken. This decision is contrary to the position which the United States Delegation has

taken but as a loyal member of this Council we defer to the will of the majority.

The Security Council now has before it clear evidence that the Jews and Arabs of Palestine and the Mandatory Power are not prepared to implement the General Assembly plan of partition through peaceful means. The announced determination of the Mandatory Power to terminate the Mandate on May 15, 1948, if carried out by the UK, would clearly result, in light of information now available, in chaos and heavy fighting in Palestine. We cannot believe that the UN, the Mandatory Power, or the inhabitants of Palestine could permit such a result. We believe that every possible effort should be made by all concerned to find a peaceful settlement prior to departure of British forces from that country.

The United States believes that the Security Council should take immediate steps for the maintenance of international peace and security and for finding of a settlement of the Palestine problem. The United States believes that the Security Council should now:

(a) Take all measures under the Charter to ensure that the situation in Palestine shall not become a threat to international peace and security.

(b) Request the Secretary-General to convoke immediately a special session of the General Assembly to consider further the question of Palestine.

(c) Continue its efforts, in consultation with Representatives of the principal committees of Palestine and the Mandatory Power, to ascertain whether there is any basis for agreement on a future government of Palestine which would permit the early attainment of independence by that country.

(d) In the event that the consultation foreseen in (c) above proves without affirmative result, to consider recommendation to the Special Session of the General Assembly that until the people of Palestine are ready for self-government they should be placed under the trusteeship system of the United Nations.

(e) Request the UK to reconsider its decision to terminate the mandate on May 15, 1948, pending further consideration of the problem by the General Assembly and in order that the United Nations may make further efforts to find a peaceful solution.

(f) Instruct the Palestine Commission to suspend its activities pending further recommendations by the General Assembly.

The United States makes these suggestions to the Council because of our deep concern over the prospective course of events in Palestine. As I stated in my remarks to Council on February 24, the United States seeks a solution for Palestine within the framework of the United Nations. That means, of course, that we would be glad to consider any other proposals from any source which might provide an answer for this complicated question. We are convinced, however, that whatever is to be done must be done promptly, and that further delay may become synonymous with disaster."

MARSHALL

501.BB Palestine/3-548: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the
United Nations (Austin)*

TOP SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, March 5, 1948—4 p. m.

108. Following is approved text of proposed statement by Ambassador Austin on situation in Palestine after British withdrawal May 15, 1948:

“In his statement to the Security Council on February 24, 1948, the Representative of the United Kingdom said, ‘My Government are bringing to an end the discharge of their responsibilities towards Palestine under the Mandate and are leaving the future of that country to international authority.’

On March 2, 1948, the Representative of the United Kingdom referred, in his statement to the Council, to ‘whatever procedure the United Nations may decide to adopt with a view to assuming responsibility for the Government of Palestine on May 15th’, and concluded with the statement, ‘finally, I must repeat that the United Kingdom cannot enter into any new or extended commitment in regard to Palestine. Our contribution has already been made over the years and the date of termination of our responsibility is irrevocably fixed.’

The status of Palestine will be equivocal because the United Kingdom seeks to give up the Mandate. Article 5 of the Mandate in respect of Palestine provides:

‘The Mandatory shall be responsible for seeing that no Palestine territory shall be ceded or leased to, or in any way placed under the control of, the Government of any foreign Power.’

In the premises there is the urgent need for a prompt decision by the Security Council on the General Assembly recommendation as well as an early clarification of United Nations responsibility toward Palestine.

The General Assembly and the Security Council have broad responsibilities in fidelity to the principles of justice and the aims of the Charter to assist in bringing about a pacific settlement of situations and disputes placed before them. The Security Council has specific obligations and powers where it finds a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression. I have already dealt, in my statement to the Security Council on February 24 and March 2, with these responsibilities.

The assumption of administrative or governmental responsibility by the United Nations is another matter. If the United Nations is to act as a government, a large administrative task is involved. The Organization itself becomes directly responsible for all phases of the life of the people over whom such powers are exercised. It is a formidable responsibility and a heavy financial commitment is incurred by all 57 Members of the Organization.

The United Nations does not automatically fall heir to the responsibilities either of the League of Nations or of the Mandatory Power in respect of the Palestine Mandate. The record seems to us entirely clear

that the United Nations did not take over the League of Nations mandate system.

The League of Nations Assembly on April 18, 1946, at its final session, passed a resolution which included the following two paragraphs:

‘THE ASSEMBLY

‘3. Recognizes that, on the termination of the League’s existence, its functions with respect to the mandated territories will come to an end, but notes that Chapters XI, XII, and XIII of the Charter of the United Nations embody principles corresponding to those declared in Article 22 of the Covenant of the League;

‘4. Takes note of the expressed intentions of the Members of the League now administering territories under mandate to continue to administer them for the well-being and development of the peoples concerned in accordance with the obligations contained in the respective Mandates, *until other arrangements have been agreed between the United Nations and the respective Mandatory Powers.*’

At the first part of the first session of the United Nations General Assembly, on February 12, 1946, the Assembly passed a Resolution regarding the transfer of certain functions, activities, and assets of the League of Nations to the United Nations. No transfer of functions concerning Mandates was mentioned. The Resolution included the statement that:

‘The General Assembly will itself examine, or will submit to the appropriate organ of the United Nations, any request from the parties that the United Nations should assume the exercise of functions or powers entrusted to the League of Nations by treaties, international conventions, agreements, and other instruments having a political character.’

Provision was made in the United Nations Charter for the voluntary placing of mandates under a trusteeship system by means of trusteeship agreements between the General Assembly or the Security Council and the states directly concerned, including the Mandatory Power. By such an agreement, the United Nations itself under article 81 of the Charter could become the administering authority for a trust territory. No such proposal has been made by the Mandatory Power with respect to Palestine and no action has been taken by the United Nations itself which would have that result.

We think it clear that the United Nations does not succeed to administrative responsibility for Palestine merely because the latter is a Mandate. Signing the Charter did not commit the signatories to a contingent liability for mandates, to become operative by unilateral decisions of Mandatory Powers to abandon their mandates.

Does the General Assembly recommendation of November 29, 1947 constitute an acceptance by the United Nations of governmental responsibility for Palestine?

On April 2, 1947 the United Kingdom directed the following request to the Secretary General of the United Nations:

‘His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom request the Secretary-General of the United Nations to place the question of

Palestine on the agenda of the General Assembly at its next regular Annual Session. *They will submit to the Assembly an account of their administration of the League of Nations Mandate and will ask the Assembly to make recommendations, under Article 10 of the Charter, concerning the future government of Palestine.*

'In making this request, His Majesty's Government drew the attention of the Secretary-General to the desirability of an early settlement in Palestine and to the risk that the General Assembly might not be able to decide upon its recommendations at its next regular annual session unless some preliminary study of the question had previously been made under the auspices of the United Nations. They therefore request the Secretary-General to summon, as soon as possible, a special session of the General Assembly for the purpose of constituting and instructing a special committee to prepare for the consideration, at the regular session of the Assembly, of the question referred to in the preceding paragraph.'

From this it is clear that the question of Palestine came before the General Assembly as a request for a recommendation. No proposal was made by the United Kingdom to the General Assembly that the United Nations itself undertake responsibility for the government of Palestine.

Following consideration of the question of Palestine in a special session, in a special committee (UNSCOP), and by an *Ad Hoc* Committee of the General Assembly at its Second Regular Session, the General Assembly passed a Resolution which recommended 'to the United Kingdom, as the Mandatory Power for Palestine, and to all other Members of the United Nations, the adoption and implementation, with regard to the future government of Palestine, of the plan of partition with economic union' set forth in the Resolution. Under the plan, the United Nations agreed, as a part of the recommended general settlement, to undertake administrative responsibilities for the City of Jerusalem. Further, the General Assembly agreed that a commission elected by it would perform certain functions to effect the transfer of responsibility from the Mandatory Power to the successor governments in Palestine. The limited responsibilities of the United Nations set forth in the plan are inseparable from the plan as a whole and are dependent upon the adoption and implementation of the entire plan. This essential unity of the General Assembly recommendation was emphasized by the Chairman of the Palestine Commission in his statement to the Security Council on February 24:

'I have put some stress upon the words "Plan of Partition as it has been envisaged by the General Assembly," since it is with the implementation of such Plan that our Commission has been entrusted. It is quite natural—and legitimate—for interested parties to concentrate their efforts preponderantly—if not exclusively—on such parts of the Plan as are intended more especially for their sake. The Commission is not in such a position; its duty, according to its terms of reference, is to provide for the implementation

of the whole Plan which has been conceived by the General Assembly as a whole . . .

'Since the Plan has been envisaged as a whole, the realization and sound functioning of one part of the Plan has been made, in a substantial degree, dependent upon the establishment and functioning of its other parts.'

The limited functions which the General Assembly offered to undertake in connection with its Palestine recommendation stand or fall with that resolution.

If it proves impossible to give effect to that Resolution, the United Nations will have, on May 15, 1948, no administrative and governmental responsibilities for Palestine, unless further action is taken by the General Assembly.

We conclude that a unilateral decision by the United Kingdom to terminate the Palestine Mandate cannot automatically commit the United Nations to responsibility for governing that country."

Conclusion of this statement will be as set forth in Dept's immediately preceding niact telegram.¹

MARSHALL

¹ *Supra*.

Editorial Note

Ambassador Austin, on March 5, reiterated to the Security Council the strong opposition of the United States to the Belgian amendment but announced that the United States would abstain from voting on the amendment to avoid raising any question of a veto (SC, *3rd yr.*, Nos. 36-51, page 25). Later in the discussion, he expressed his willingness, in the interests of harmony, to meet Ambassador Gromyko's wishes regarding direct consultation (*ibid.*, page 31).

The Council, the same day, moved to vote on the Belgian amendment, paragraph by paragraph. None of the paragraphs secured the necessary seven affirmative votes and the President of the Council ruled the Belgian amendment defeated (*ibid.*, pages 35-40, *passim*). The Council then proceeded to vote on the amended draft resolution of the United States, adopting the preamble, paragraph 2(a) and the final paragraph. The key first paragraph, however, received but five affirmative votes, those of the United States, the Soviet Union, Belgium, France, and the Ukraine, with six abstentions, and therefore failed of adoption. Paragraphs 2(b) and 2(c) fell one vote short of the required seven votes and also failed of adoption (*ibid.*, pages 40-43). For the text of the approved portions of the draft resolution, see telegram 164 to Jerusalem, *infra*.

501.BB Palestine/3-648: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Jerusalem*SECRET US URGENT
NIACT

WASHINGTON, March 6, 1948—6 p. m.

164. Security Council adopted resolution¹ on March 5 reading as follows:

“The Security Council

Having received the resolution of the General Assembly of 29 November 1947, on Palestine, and having received from the United Nations Palestine Commission its first monthly report and its first special report on the problem of security in Palestine:

Resolves:

To call on the permanent members of the Council to consult and

To inform the Security Council regarding the situation with respect to Palestine and to make as the result of such consultations recommendations to it regarding the guidance and instructions which the Council might usefully give to the Palestine Commission with a view of implementing the resolution of the General Assembly. The Security Council requests the permanent members to report to it on the results of their consultations within ten days.

Appeals to all governments and peoples, particularly in and around Palestine, to take all possible action to prevent or reduce such disorders as are now occurring in Palestine.”

Prior to adoption this resolution members USDel discussed question AHC participation in current UN discussions on Palestine with Arab reps at UN. Nakkleh, AHC rep New York, indicated AHC, on his recommendation, had decided not to take part in such discussions. Members USDel pointed out that *a*) failure to cooperate in UN efforts was creating unfavorable impression in UN circles and on world opinion; *b*) it was essential, for example, that SC have official AHC views as well as those of JA and mandatory power on which to base such conclusions as SC might reach; and *c*) AHC participation affords means through which AHC views come to world attention. Reps of important Arab states are believed to concur in latter views and have indicated they will endeavor to persuade AHC officials in Jerusalem to reconsider its decision not to participate in UN discussions. Nakkleh indicated he would reconsider question and might consult his superiors in Jerusalem.

US as one of permanent members SC is required under March 5 to consult on situation with respect Palestine and as longstanding friend of Arab world would particularly regret if reps of Arabs of Palestine refused to present their views in connection with these consultations.

Dept attaches great importance this matter and requests you discuss with AHC participation in SC discussions and in such consulta-

¹ Numbered 42 (1948).

tions as may be necessary under March 5 resolution. You might point out that such consultation would involve no commitments on part of AHC.²

Sent to Jerusalem for action; Repeated to Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Jidda and Cairo for information and for immediate informal discussion with ForOff.

MARSHALL

² Jerusalem, on March 8 sent the text of a communication from the Arab Higher Committee refusing to participate in discussions with the permanent members of the Security Council. Consul General Macatee concluded, after subsequent discussion with Hussein Khalidi, Secretary of the Committee, that the answer would probably have been in the affirmative if the reference to implementing the resolution of the General Assembly had not appeared in the Security Council resolution. (Telegram 271, S67N.01/3-848)

Cairo, on March 16, reported information from Azzam Pasha that the Arab Higher Committee had authorized its New York representatives to give information to the Security Council on an informal basis but had forbidden him to discuss partition in any form. (Telegram 263, 501.BB Palestine/3-1648)

Clifford Papers

*Memorandum by the President's Special Counsel (Clifford)*¹

[WASHINGTON?,] March 6, 1948.

PROPOSED PROGRAM ON THE PALESTINE PROBLEM

Unless immediate action is taken to preserve peace in Palestine, chaos and war will follow Great Britain's withdrawal on May 15th. Such a situation will seriously damage United States prestige and United States interests. It will surely be exploited by the Russians.

The policy of the United States must be to support the United Nations settlement of the Palestine issue. This Government urged partition upon the United Nations in the first place and it is unthinkable that it should fail to back up that decision in every possible way. To do so, the United States Government should adopt the following program of immediate action:

A. *Preservation of Peace*

1. During the period of Five-Power discussions, provided for by the Security Council Resolution of March 5th, the United States should exert every pressure it can bring to bear upon the Arab States to accept partition. Strong pressures may already have been applied, but it does not look that way to the American people. Rather, there have been numerous examples of what appear to be acts of appeasement toward the Arabs. It is inconceivable to most Americans and to

¹ Although the source text contains no indication of authorship, Mr. Clifford has stated that he was the drafter. (Memorandum of conversation by William M. Franklin, June 20, 1974, 501.BB Palestine/3-2248)

many other countries that we cannot—if we really wish to do so—exert effective pressure both on the Arabs and on the British.

2. At the conclusion of the ten-day period provided for under the Resolution of the Security Council, the United States should take the initiative in branding the Arab States as aggressors and should move in the Security Council that Arab action constitutes a threat to the peace.

3. The United States should further call upon the Security Council to require Great Britain to comply with the General Assembly's resolution to refrain from taking "any action to prevent, obstruct or delay the implementation by the (Palestine) Commission of the measures recommended by the General Assembly."

In particular, Great Britain should be required to:

a) permit immediate entry of the UN Commission into Palestine as directed by the General Assembly resolution;

b) set aside Tel Aviv and its vicinity as a port, in compliance with the General Assembly resolution.

B. Arab and Jewish Militias

1. The United States should call upon the Security Council immediately to create the Arab and Jewish armed militias provided for in the General Assembly's resolution, and to provide means for and supervise the procurement of the necessary arms.

2. The United States should immediately lift its unilateral embargo on arms to the Middle East. Shipments of arms should be freely allowed subject to limitations set by the UN Palestine Commission or the Security Council. This will give the Jewish militia and Hagana, which are striving to implement the UN decision, equal opportunity with the Arabs to arm for self-defense.

3. The United States should withdraw its instructions to the American Consulate General in Jerusalem which requires recalling the passports of all Americans serving in Arab or Jewish militia created by the UN.

4. The United States should cooperate fully with any programs set up by the UN Palestine Commission to carry out its functions in respect of Arab and Jewish militias.

C. International Security Force

1. The United States should cooperate to the fullest with the UN Palestine Commission in plans for establishing an international security force in Palestine.

2. The United States position on the composition of this force should continue as it was prior to the General Assembly's action: recruitment

from volunteers and not by calls on member states for national contingents. Thus, no American troops would be involved. But the United States should assume its part of the cost of recruiting, arming, and maintaining this international security force.

Further protections are wise :

a) the pattern should be the one followed in setting up the UN Palestine Commission: no recruitment from nationals of permanent members of the Security Council or from nations directly involved in the Middle East. This means a volunteer force from the smaller nations and excludes United States, Russia, and Great Britain.

b) Service should not be in national uniform. The international security force should be under UN control and supervision, and serve as a UN force.

3. If Russia vetoes the exclusion of volunteers from the great powers, the United States should concede that point, subject to the following conditions:

a) the total number of volunteers from the 5 great powers shall not exceed $\frac{1}{2}$ of the total authorized force; and

b) the number of volunteers who are nationals of any one great power shall not exceed $\frac{1}{5}$ of the quota reserved for the 5 great powers.

This would mean, for example, that Russian volunteers would not be more than $\frac{1}{10}$ of the total authorized international security force.

In the event such program be adopted, the United States should remove any limitations penalizing Americans for serving in such force. American citizens were not barred from joining the British Air Force or the Chinese Flying Tigers in the last war.

4. If competent military authorities determine that a force composed of individual volunteers cannot be made ready soon enough to meet the needs of the situation, then the United States should agree to proposals for the Security Council to exercise its authority under the UN Charter to call on member nations to provide troops.

But here too, the composition should be as above indicated; first, if possible, by troops supplied voluntarily by member nations; secondly, if that should prove to be impossible, by call on all nations. In either event, this force should be subject to the quota limitations above outlined.

5. Special attention should be paid to the needs of the City of Jerusalem, in order that on the withdrawal of Great Britain on May 15, Christian holy places and religious buildings and sites sacred to the entire Christian world would not be left at the mercy of fanatical Moslems.

Clifford Papers

*Memorandum by the President's Special Counsel (Clifford)
to President Truman*¹

[WASHINGTON ?.] March 8, 1948.

It seems to me that much of the discussion about our foreign policy—and specifically the Palestine issue—does not touch the fundamentals of the problem. I am, therefore, taking the liberty of presenting to you my own views.

At the outset, let me say that the Palestine problem should not be approached as a Jewish question, or an Arab question, or a United Nations question. The sole question is what is best for the United States of America. Furthermore, one's judgment in advising as to what is best for America must in no sense be influenced by the election this fall. I know only too well that you would not hesitate to follow a course of action that makes certain the defeat of the Democratic Party if you thought such action were best for America. What I say is, therefore, completely uninfluenced by election considerations.

I

There are some who criticize your actions last fall in actively supporting partition in Palestine. They argue that this embarked the United States on a new policy; that this new policy involves military commitments which we are unable to perform; and that, therefore, we should seek some other solution. This argument is completely fallacious.

Your action in supporting partition is in complete conformity with the settled policy of the United States. Palestine was Turkish territory prior to World War I. It was captured by the Allies. The Balfour Declaration favoring "the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people", was made November 2, 1917. Its text had been submitted to President Wilson and approved by him before its publication. It was publicly endorsed by the French and Italian Governments in April 1920. The principal Allied powers decided that the mandate for the government of Palestine should be entrusted to Great Britain and that the mandatory power was to be responsible for putting the Balfour Declaration into effect. The substance of the Balfour Declaration has been restated by Presidents Harding, Coolidge, Hoover, Franklin D. Roosevelt and yourself. The Balfour Declaration was approved by joint resolution of Congress June 30, 1922. It was reaffirmed in the American-British Palestine Mandate

¹ Although the source text contains no indication of authorship, Mr. Clifford has stated that he was the drafter. (Memorandum of conversation by William M. Franklin, June 20, 1974, 501.BB Palestine/3-2248)

Convention of December 3, 1924. The Balfour policy was again approved in a declaration by members of the Senate and the House of the 77th Congress, which was submitted to the President November 2, 1942, signed by 68 Senators and 193 members of the House.

In 1944 both the Democratic and the Republican National Conventions adopted resolutions favoring the establishment in Palestine of "a free and democratic Jewish commonwealth".

Under date of July 2, 1945, a letter was addressed to you signed by a majority of both Houses of Congress, stating "that the time for action is now" and urged "all interested governments to join with the United States toward the end of establishing Palestine as a free and democratic Jewish commonwealth at the earliest possible time." A letter to the same effect dated July 2, 1945 was addressed to you and signed by the governors of forty of the forty-eight states of the United States. On December 19, 1945, a concurrent resolution was adopted by Congress which resolved that the United States use its good offices towards the establishment of a democratic commonwealth in Palestine.

There are numerous other declarations of policy by the United States Government to the same effect. Your active support of partition was in complete harmony with the policy of the United States. Seldom has any policy of this government been so clearly and definitely established. Had you failed to support partition, you would have been departing from an established American policy and justifiably subject to criticism.

Partition unquestionably offers the best hope of a permanent solution of the Palestine problem that may avoid war. The policy of drift and delay urged by opponents of partition makes *absolutely certain* the very military involvements that they profess they want to avoid. Your action on partition in no wise extended the military commitments of the United States. It was a high-minded, statesmanlike adoption of *the one* course of action that may avoid military involvement.

II

Not only is partition in conformity with established American policy, not only is partition the only hope of avoiding military involvement of the United States in the Near East, but, in addition, partition is the only course of action with respect to Palestine that will strengthen our position vis-à-vis Russia.

One of the most fundamental objectives of American foreign policy is that no aggressive military power shall establish itself on the shores of Western Europe. Germany became a real threat to the United States when she moved to establish herself in Channel ports. Twice we went to war to throw her back from these.

Britain likewise has no desire to see an aggressive military power establish itself in Western Europe. But Britain also has primary inter-

ests all over southern Asia and Africa. Britain, therefore, must consider her military position on those continents. Economic exhaustion has necessitated the limitation of her military forces. To compensate for curtailment of her military forces in Asia and the Near East, Britain is deliberately building up an alliance with the Moslem world. Such an alliance, she undoubtedly feels, will give her friendly populations from Pakistan west across Asia Minor and all along the shores of North Africa.

While the British-Moslem alliance is undoubtedly extremely important to Britain, a similar alliance between the United States and the Moslem world is much less important to the United States. Our primary interests demand alliances with the nations to the south of us and along the shores of Western Europe.

III

Events have proved that, for the present at least, "one world" is impossible of attainment—either within the United Nations or otherwise. Normally, the cohesive force that holds an organization together is opposition from the outside. The absence of such opposition from the outside tends to cause the organization to break into factions. The existence of the Axis military was the cohesive force that held the Allied Nations together during the war. With the military collapse of the Axis, unity among the Allied powers ceased. When all the nations of the world unite in a peace organization, there is no outside opposition. We are in no danger from attack from Mars. Therefore, a world organization tends to break into factions. This is what happened to the League of Nations. It is also happening in the United Nations. The United Nations is now dividing between the Soviet faction and the United States faction.

IV

The development of factions within the United Nations compels the United States to determine its course of action vis-à-vis the United Nations.

We must admit that the possibility of the United Nations affording adequate military protection to us becomes more and more remote. One course of action that the United States might follow would be to make less and less use of the United Nations machinery. This would inevitably lead ultimately to the collapse of the United Nations. Such a policy, in my opinion, would be tragic.

In the first place, the United Nations is a God-given vehicle through which the United States can build up a community of powers in Western Europe and elsewhere to resist Soviet aggression and maintain our historic interests. It is the best conceivable mechanism to capitalize on the Marshall plan politically. We can cement alliances

immediately through the United Nations mechanisms which could not be brought about by fifty years of diplomacy.

Secondly, a jettisoning of the United Nations would be calamitous to American morale. The American people want peace. They fervently believe that the United Nations offers the best hope for peace. They would go to war to sustain the United Nations as an instrumentality for peace. The cruel fact is that American morale is collapsing right around us today because the American people feel that their government is aiding and abetting in the disintegration of the United Nations—the one great hope of the American people for peace. Nothing has contributed so much to this feeling as Senator Austin's recent statement. In large part, it seemed to be the sophistries of a lawyer attempting to tell what we *could not* do to support the United Nations—in direct contradiction to your numerous statements that we mean to do everything possible *to support* the United Nations.

Not only do the American people see their government failing to back up the United Nation's position on Palestine but now they hear talk of our entering into military alliances with the powers of Western Europe with no reference to such action coming within the framework of the United Nations. The American people grasped at the United Nations, believing it would save them from being engulfed in World War III. Suddenly, they see what they thought was dry land begin to sink—sink because of what they regard as supineness of their own government.

All of this is causing a complete lack of confidence in our foreign policy from one end of this country to the other and among all classes of our population. This lack of confidence is shared by Democrats, Republicans, young people and old people. There is a definite feeling that we have no foreign policy, that we do not know where we are going, that the President and the State Department are bewildered, that the United States, instead of furnishing leadership in world affairs, is drifting helplessly.

I believe all of this can be changed.

V

PROPOSED UNITED STATES POLICY

1. While recognizing that the United Nations will not afford us adequate military protection, we should nevertheless support it to the limit as an instrumentality for consolidating the anti-Soviet forces of the world. Here is an instrumentality already in existence which is well-nigh a perfect mechanism for such purpose.

Any military arrangement with Western European powers must be pictured as coming completely within the framework of the United Nations. If this is done, it will receive the support of the American people. If this is not done, we will see an isolationism develop in America that will make any military alliances or intelligent foreign policy well-nigh impossible within the foreseeable future.

2. In order to save the United Nations for our own selfish interests, the United States must promptly and vigorously support the United Nations actions regarding Palestine. We "crossed the Rubicon" on this matter when the partition resolution was adopted by the Assembly—largely at your insistence. A retreat now will be a body-blow to the United Nations. We cannot hope to cement alliances in South America and Western Europe if we back out now. Those countries would justifiably discount the value of any commitments we might propose to make in the face of our repudiation of a commitment we only made last November.

3. The British have announced that they intend to withdraw from Palestine by May 15th. Unless affirmative action is taken immediately by both the United States and the Security Council to preserve peace in Palestine, the withdrawal of Britain's military forces on May 15th will be followed by chaos and bloody war.

4. There is no more certain way of having Russia move into the Arabian Peninsula than for us to permit war to develop between the Jews and the Arabs—and this is as certain as the rising of tomorrow's sun, less we move promptly to prevent it. Furthermore, when this happens, Russia can move in unilaterally as the defender of world peace and champion of the United Nations. To permit this to happen would be disastrous.

5. It is argued that our Arabian oil supplies will be imperilled if we support the Assembly's resolution for partition of Palestine. The United States and Western Europe can only get oil from Arabia if there is peace in Arabia. Peace in Arabia can only be maintained by backing up the Arabs or by backing up the United Nations. The time for new solutions or compromises ended when the Assembly adopted the partition resolution. It is utterly unthinkable for the United States now to back the Arabs and openly oppose a decision of the United Nations Assembly, arrived at at your own insistence. The only alternative is, therefore, to back up the United Nations so that there will be peace in Palestine.

6. There are those who say that such a course of action will not get us oil, that the Arabs will not sell us oil if we back up the United Nations partition plan. The fact of the matter is that the Arab states must have oil royalties or go broke. For example, 90% of Saudi

Arabia's revenues come from American oil royalties. The Arab states have no customer for their oil other than the United States:

a) they must have dollars and can get dollars only from the United States;

b) their social and economic structure would be irreparably harmed by adopting a Soviet orientation, and it would be suicide for their ruling classes to come within the Soviet sphere of influence;

c) Saudi Arabia possesses the greatest oil deposits in this area. King Ibn Saud has publicly and repeatedly refused even to threaten the United States with cancellation of oil leases, despite his dislike for our partition position.

7. America's security and its oil interests in the Middle East depend upon effective enforcement of the United Nations decision on Palestine. In terms of military necessity, political and economic self-preservation will compel the Arabs to sell their oil to the United States. Their need of the United States is greater than our need of them.

8. There are those who say that partition will not work and that another solution must be found. This comes from those who never wanted partition to succeed and who have been determined to sabotage it. If anything has been omitted that could help kill partition, I do not know what it would be. First, Britain, the Mandatory Power, not only publicly declared she would have no part of it, but she has done everything possible to prevent effective action by the Palestine Commission. Next, we have placed an embargo on arms to Palestine, while Britain fulfills her "contract obligations" to supply arms to the Arabs. Thirdly, our State Department has made no attempt to conceal their dislike for partition. Fourthly, the United States appears in the ridiculous role of trembling before threats of a few nomadic desert tribes. This has done us irreparable damage. Why should Russia or Yugoslavia, or any other nation treat us with anything but contempt in light of our shilly-shallying appeasement of the Arabs. After all, the only successful opposition to the Russian advance has been in Greece and Turkey. You proclaimed a bold policy and stood your ground. The Truman Doctrine, so far, has been the one outstanding success in a disintegrating situation.

In case you are interested, I am sending you herewith a separate memorandum detailing suggestions for action in the Palestine situation.

[Annex]

SUMMARY OF PROPOSALS FOR AMERICAN POLICY IN PALESTINE²

Vigorous American support of UN's Palestine decision is the only policy which is in American interests in the Middle East.

² Attached to the summary of proposals is an undated nine-page paper entitled "Palestine", not printed. It is divided into four major sections: the legal status of the partition plan, the present situation in Palestine, a program of action for the United States, and American Foreign Policy in Palestine.

1. *American Security and Peace in Palestine*: American security and our vital interests in the Middle East's oil depend upon peace in Palestine. UN's failure to enforce its Palestine plan will bring bitter warfare between Arabs and Jews. Peace in Palestine depends on firm UN action, which is impossible without American leadership.

2. *American Security and Russian Penetration into Middle East*: UN abdication in Palestine leaves a military vacuum there after May 15 when Great Britain withdraws. Unless UN implements its Palestine decision, Russia may intervene unilaterally in the guise of preserving world peace and defending the UN Charter.

3. *American Security and Middle East Oil*: The Arab States will continue to sell oil to the United States. The Arabs need us more than we need them. They must have oil royalties or go bankrupt. 90% of Saudi Arabia's governmental revenues derive from American oil royalties, and King Ibn Saud has publicly refused even to threaten cancellation of United States oil leases despite his dislike of our partition position.

The Arab States must have dollars, and can get dollars only from the United States. The Arab leaders would be committing suicide to accept Russian orientation.

4. *American Security and Jewish Palestine*: Jewish Palestine is strongly oriented to the United States, and away from Russia, and will remain so unless a military vacuum in Palestine caused by collapse of UN authority brings Russian unilateral intervention into Palestine.

5. *American Security and UN's Palestine Decision*: Collapse of a UN decision taken at the insistence of the United States would cause serious loss of American prestige and moral leadership all over the world. Arab league negation of partition is not only open defiance of UN, but also deliberate and insolent defiance of the United States which vigorously espoused partition.

American self-interest, American military security, American interests in Middle East oil, and American prestige in international affairs all demand effective implementation of the UN Palestine decision. The most effective way to prevent Russian penetration into the Middle East and to protect vital American oil interests there is for the United States to take the immediate initiative in the Security Council to implement the General Assembly's Palestine resolution.

[Here follows a section entitled "Program of Action for the U.S.", which deals with the preservation of peace, Arab and Jewish militias, cooperation by Great Britain with the United Nations, and an international security force. This section, in the form of an outline, parallels in content the lengthier exposition set forth in the memorandum of March 6, *supra*.]

501.BB Palestine/3-848 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the
United Nations (Austin)*

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, March 8, 1948—noon.

116. The President has approved draft statement on situation in Palestine after May 15, 1948, with concluding remarks as set forth in Deptel 107, March 5, for use if and when necessary.

MARSHALL

501.BB Palestine/3-848

*Memorandum by Mr. Robert M. McClintock to the Under Secretary
of State (Lovett)*¹

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] March 8, 1948.

Subject: Check list on future Palestine developments.

If the trend in the Security Council continues to the point envisaged in the Department's telegram to Ambassador Austin, No. 107 of March 5 (which position has been approved by the President), we shall presently find ourselves involved in a special session of the General Assembly, whose probable outcome will be the establishment of a United Nations trusteeship for Palestine. In such event the emphasis will be shifted, so far as the maintenance of international peace and security is concerned, from the threat of Arab aggression to a new threat of Jewish attempts by violence to establish a *de facto* State in Palestine. The following check list is submitted as a matter of urgency to highlight certain of the problems for which this Government must find answers in the very near future.

1. *Trusteeship.*

Detailed draft trusteeship agreements² have been worked out by DA and NE calling for either a direct United Nations trusteeship over Palestine or a trusteeship of the three residuary legatees of World War I—United States, United Kingdom, and France. These draft agreements both stress the paramount powers of a strong governor.

¹ Addressed also to Mr. Henderson and John D. Hickerson, Director of the Office of European Affairs. Mr. McClintock transmitted a copy to Charles E. Bohlen, Counselor of the Department, with his memorandum of March 18.

² The first draft of a trusteeship agreement for Palestine found in the Department files by the editors was prepared on February 11, 1948, by officers of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs and of the Office of United Nations Affairs. The draft called for a Three-Power trusteeship by France, the United Kingdom and the United States as the remaining Principal Allied and Associated Powers. A second draft prepared by the same group and dated the following day, designated the United Nations as the Administering Authority. The drafts are presumably the documents referred to here; they are filed under 501.BB Palestine/2-1148.

2. *United States control over efforts of American Jews to send arms or emigrants to Palestine.*

The present arms embargo should suffice as a legal barrier to the efforts of American Jews to run guns and other implements of war into Palestine. However, our legal machinery seems somewhat defective in preventing Jewish corporations from purchasing American vessels for foreign registry with the eventual aim of using these ships for bringing clandestine emigrants to Palestine. The withdrawal of the British from Palestine and their replacement by a United Nations administration would presumably not alter our responsibilities to prevent the United States being used as a base for illegal immigration activity.

3. *Immigration.*

If the trusteeship were established the United States should strongly support measures for an orderly and increased immigration of Jews to Palestine. We should advocate that this migration should be controlled from the source by the IRO and at the destination by the new United Nations government of Palestine.

4. *Security Forces.*

If a United Nations trusteeship is established some form of force must be provided to maintain the integrity of the trusteeship. Such a force would include naval patrol vessels to prevent gun-running and illegal immigration, and land and air security forces to maintain the integrity of the land frontiers of Palestine, as well as internal order and security pending the development by the governor of Palestine of local security forces. Under either of the types of trusteeship envisaged by the Department, the United States would be a participant, and prompt study should be made on the basis of the experience of the British Government in Palestine of minimum security needs with a view to supplying the United States portion of those requirements by a May 15 deadline.

5. *Representations to the United Kingdom.*

The problems raised in this check list would be brought measurably closer to satisfactory solution if the United Kingdom could be prevailed upon to carry the major immediate burden for possibly six or eight months longer than the British Government now intends. If the United Kingdom could find it possible to maintain its existing naval patrol and to second officers and local security forces of the present government of Palestine to the trusteeship administration, the task of transition from one regime to the other would be greatly simplified. It would be politically impossible, no doubt, for the British Government to agree to shoulder the whole burden of the security problem, but the members of the United Nations have reasonable warrant to

look to the United Kingdom to cease its precipitate withdrawal from Palestine and to assume responsibility, even on a diminishing scale, until the new trusteeship government is squarely on its feet. Once the Security Council has reached a decision to call a special session of the General Assembly immediate representations would be in order to the British Government suggesting that the period of transition be extended beyond May 15 to the end of this year, with assurances that the United States will be willing to do its part in the joint UN effort.³

³ Marginal notation by Mr. Lovett: "We should attempt, I think, to supply naval & air support as our contribution at the outset."

501.BB Palestine/3-848

*Memorandum by Mr. Robert M. McClintock to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)*¹

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] March 8, 1948.

Subject: Big Five Consultation on Palestine Situation—First Meeting.

I telephoned Mr. Rusk at 3:20 p. m., to inquire the outcome of this morning's Big Five consultation in the office of Mr. Gromyko on the situation in Palestine, responsive to the Security Council's resolution of March 5.

Mr. Rusk said that the results had not been fruitful. Mr. Gromyko had been completely negative to the idea of setting up a working group or of taking testimony, in effect, from the interested parties such as the Palestine Commission, the Jewish Agency, the Arab Higher Committee, and the Mandatory Power. While he did not object to individual members of the Big Five consulting with the parties at interest, he was adamant in his insistence that the Big Five should not consult as a group with the parties. Mr. Gromyko contended that the consultation contemplated by the Council's resolution was limited to direct consultation between the USSR, US, UK, France and China.

Mr. Rusk plans to consult with the French and Chinese Representatives this afternoon and will report later on these conversations. In a preliminary way, however, he raised the question, "What should the Department advise if the Russians persisted in their present attitude?" Would it be better to terminate Big Five consultation quickly, report back promptly to the Security Council, and then give our speech on the situation after May 15?

I told Mr. Rusk that it seemed perfectly obvious that the Russians would persist in their attitude and that I would report the results of the morning meeting to Mr. Lovett.

¹ Addressed also to Mr. Henderson.

It seems to me that it would be unfortunate for the Big Five to go through perfunctory motions of consultation and then pitch the ball back at the Security Council. It seems to me that the following line of action could be tried :

1. The United States, France and China should ask questions of the United Kingdom as Mandatory Power. This would, in effect, constitute Big Four consultation and leave the Russians standing out as intransigents by their own choice.

2. The United States, France and China, collectively if possible, and severally if not, should query the Palestine Commission, the Jewish Agency, and the Arab Higher Committee on the situation in Palestine within the terms of the Assembly's resolution of March 5.

3. Following this "taking of testimony" we will be in a much better position to come back to Big Five consultation. We can then freely ask questions of the USSR and other permanent Members of the Security Council. More important, if the Soviet Union asks the United States leading questions such as whether we are still in favor of partition, we could, on the basis of the testimony previously gathered, express valid doubts.

4. Following this Big Five consultation a report could be made to the Security Council by March 15, after which the ground would be better prepared for Senator Austin's proposed statement.²

² Ambassador Austin furnished a detailed summary of the First Meeting of the permanent members of the Security Council on the Palestine question in telegram 256, March 8, 3:25 p. m., from New York, not printed. At one point in the meeting, he "stressed that we proposed to proceed with partition plan as the basis and find out whether there are any modifications in detail which would be acceptable both to the Jews and Arabs and therefore make it possible to implement plan by peaceful means." (501.BB Palestine/3-848)

501.BB Palestine/3-948

Memorandum by Mr. Robert M. McClintock to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] March 9, 1948.

Three telegrams¹ are attached for your signature pursuant to our conversation this morning.

I talked to Mr. Rusk at 11:25 a. m. by telephone. Fortunately USUN had arrived at the same conclusions as we, and Mr. Rusk has already had conversations with Mr. Tsiang of China and M. de Rose of France in which general agreement was reached on the need for interrogating the parties. The French and Chinese were pleased with our proposed questions and Tsiang expressed the opinion that they went to the core of the problem.

I suggested to Mr. Rusk that for the record an effort should be made again to invite Gromyko to participate and that we hoped that the

¹ Presumably telegrams 122, 125, and 172, immediately following.

interrogatories would be conducted by the Big Three as a group and not separately.

I drew to Mr. Rusk's attention the article on Page 3 of this morning's *New York Times*, in which the legal experts of the UN Secretariat are quoted as affirming the legal authority of the Security Council to partition Palestine by force, as well as establishing the opinion that the UN Palestine Commission "will become the legally constituted government of Palestine after Britain surrenders the mandate on May 15." Mr. Rusk said that this was a working paper which had been asked for by the Palestine Commission and that it was dated February 3. Secretary-General Lie had, however, submitted it informally to members of the Security Council yesterday.

I commented that it was most unfortunate for the public impression to get around that the UN Secretariat had prepared a refutation of Senator Austin's statement of February 24, to say nothing of rendering an opinion on the question of who had responsibility for Palestine after May 15. I suggested that Mr. Lie had better set the record straight as to the date and origin of this paper and that we might wish to inform Mr. Lie, since he had communicated to us as a member of the Council, that we did not concur in his legal opinion.

Mr. Rusk said we should not be surprised to see press accounts quoting "a Russian spokesman" to the effect that the Soviet Union will advocate that the Security Council implement by force, if necessary, the partition plan. The "Russian spokesman" is Mr. Gromyko.

501.BB Palestine/3-848: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

TOP SECRET

US URGENT

WASHINGTON, March 9, 1948—6 p. m.

NIACT

122. For Austin from Lovett. Despite negative Soviet attitude reported in your 256, March 8,¹ we feel it is essential for those permanent members of SC which are willing to cooperate to develop clearly the attitude of Jews, Arabs and the Mandatory Power with respect to the situation in Palestine. In particular it is necessary to show their opinion on whether the plan of partition with economic union can be implemented by peaceful means without agreement between the Jews and Arabs of Palestine. We suggest the following procedure:

The Soviet Union should today formally be invited to participate with the US, China and France in questioning the Jewish Agency, the Arab Higher Committee, the Mandatory Power, and the Palestine

¹ Not printed; but see footnote 2, p. 700.

Commission. Following anticipated Soviet refusal to participate in such questioning, the US, France, and China should collectively interrogate the parties. Approved questions for your use in this connection are listed in next telegram.² It would seem preferable to commence the interrogatory with the UK, since this would in effect constitute consultation among four of the five Permanent Members.

After testimony has been taken from the Jews, Arabs, the Mandatory Power, and the Palestine Commission, consultation should proceed among the Big Five according to the terms of the resolution of March 5. Since the attitudes of the parties in Palestine are known in advance it seems obvious that their replies to Big Three questioning will have served once more to show the utter irreconcilability of the attitudes of Jews, Arabs and the UK on the plan for partition with economic union.

In light of this testimony therefore, the question, directed severally to the Big Five, "Do you believe that the plan of partition with economic union can be implemented by peaceful means without agreement between the Jews and Arabs of Palestine?" can scarcely receive an affirmative answer.

If the Soviet Representative says "No" to this question he can later scarcely fail to object to the logic of our position as developed in Deptel 107, March 5. If the Soviet Representative says "Yes", the burden of proof will be on the USSR to show how partition can be carried out by peaceful means in the absence of agreement. If the Soviet Representative advocates the use of SC force to carry out partition he must refute the constitutional argument established in your statement of Feb. 24.

In view of scant time at your disposal it is hoped that immediate agreement can be found between US, France and China for procedure outlined above. You should apprise your British colleague of our intentions and of our expectation that UK cooperation will be informed, immediate, and imbued with realization of that responsibility which the British still hold for Palestine. [Lovett.]

MARSHALL

² *Infra*.

501.BB Palestine/3-948: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

SECRET US URGENT

WASHINGTON, March 9, 1948—6 p. m.

125. Following are approved questions for your use in ascertaining attitude of Jewish Agency, Arab Higher Committee, the Mandatory

Power, and the Palestine Commission, on the present situation in Palestine with respect to the Assembly's recommended plan of partition with economic union. You will note that the questions to be directed to the Jewish Agency and the Arab Higher Committee are, *mutatis mutandis*, identical. We feel in general that the questions should be limited in number and directed to the main issue which is whether the plan of partition with economic union is workable if carried out by peaceful means.

You should not be led into questions on whether or not the present situation in Palestine is a threat to international peace and security. This is a question which can only be directed to and answered by the Security Council and not by the Jews or Arabs of Palestine.

The questions follow *seriatim* :

To the Jewish Agency

1. Do the Jews of Palestine accept the Plan of Partition with Economic Union recommended by the General Assembly?

2. Do you believe that the Partition Plan can be implemented by peaceful means without agreement between the Jews and Arabs of Palestine?

3. Are the Jews prepared to accept responsibility for governmental administration and for the maintenance of law and order within the proposed Jewish State?

4. What is the attitude of the Arabs who would be within the proposed Jewish State toward the Partition Plan? Has any effort been made by Jewish leaders to obtain the agreement of Arab leaders to the plan of partition with economic union?

5. Which elements in the proposed Partition Plan are considered by the Jews of Palestine as absolutely essential?

6. What modifications do the Jews of Palestine consider might be made in the proposed Partition Plan to make agreement between the Jews and Arabs more possible of attainment?

7. Is the proposed Economic Union essential to the viability of the proposed Jewish State?

To the Arab Higher Committee

1. Do the Arabs of Palestine accept the Plan of Partition with Economic Union recommended by the General Assembly?

2. Do you believe that the Partition Plan can be implemented by peaceful means without agreement between the Jews and Arabs of Palestine?

3. Are the Arabs prepared by [*to*] accept responsibility for governmental administration and for the maintenance of law and order within the proposed Arab State?

4. What is the attitude of the Arabs who would be within the proposed Jewish State toward the Partition Plan? Has any effort been made by Arab leaders to obtain the agreement of Jewish leaders to the Plan of Partition with Economic Union?

5. Which elements in the proposed Partition Plan are considered by the Arabs as absolutely unacceptable?

6. What modifications do the Arabs of Palestine consider might be made in the proposed Partition Plan to make agreement between the Jews and Arabs more possible of attainment?

7. Is the proposed Economic Union essential to the viability of the proposed Arab State?

To the Mandatory Power

1. Does the Mandatory Power accept the Plan of Partition with Economic Union recommended by the General Assembly? Does the Mandatory Power include in its acceptance the "adoption and implementation" by it and other Members of the Plan?

2. Does the Mandatory Power consider that the Partition Plan can be implemented by peaceful means without agreement between the Jews and Arabs of Palestine?

3. Does the Mandatory Power believe that the proposed plan of economic union is essential to the viability of the proposed Jewish and Arab States?

4. Does the Mandatory Power consider that modifications of detail might be made in the proposed Partition Plan which would make it acceptable to both the Jews and Arabs of Palestine?

5. Does the Mandatory Power have any suggestion to make in connection with the statement by Sir Arthur Creech Jones, March 2, that "we shall welcome any effort to find a bridge, even at this late hour, across the gulf which now separates the two communities in Palestine."?

To the Palestine Commission

1. Has the Palestine Commission found sufficient acceptance of the Partition Plan on the part of (a) the Jews of Palestine (b) the Arabs of Palestine and (c) the Mandatory Power to afford a basis for its peaceful implementation?

2. Has the Palestine Commission discovered possible modifications in either the substance or the procedures of the Partition Plan which might offer a basis for agreement among the people of Palestine?

3. If no agreement has thus far been obtained on the Partition Plan between the Jews and Arabs of Palestine, what are the specific points at issue in such disagreement?

4. To what extent does the Palestine Commission consider it possible to implement a substantial part of the plan by peaceful means?

5. What would be the effect upon the proposed Economic Union of a failure to obtain the agreement of both the Arabs and Jews of Palestine?

MARSHALL

501.BB Palestine/3-948 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Jerusalem

SECRET US URGENT

WASHINGTON, March 9, 1948—6 p. m.

NIACT

172. Please explain to Khalidi the following points and urge him to reconsider decision mentioned in urtel 271, March 8 : ¹

(1) The US Govt's interpretation of the SC resolution is that it refers to peaceful implementation ;

(2) Under SC resolution consultations envisaged are informal and between the Big 5, who may wish to inquire attitudes of people of Palestine on situation there. Therefore, AHC should not be unduly concerned with reference to implementing resolution of GA.

Understand Nakhleh telephoning Cairo to request permission to participate in informal consultations and hope your representations to AHC will convince them of great desirability in Arabs' own interest in these consultations.

Sent to Jerusalem as 172; repeated to Cairo as 279; Baghdad as 74; Jidda as 70; Beirut as 99; and Damascus as 52. USUN as 128.

MARSHALL

¹ Not printed ; but see footnote 2, p. 687.

501.BB Palestine/3-1048 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

NEW YORK, March 10, 1948—1:50 p. m.

267. For Lovett from Austin. Following is text of letter I sent by messenger to Gromyko this noon.

"I wonder if it would not be possible for you to reconsider your views against participating in informal questioning of representatives of the Jewish and Arab communities of Palestine in connection with the resolution passed by the SC last Friday? I am asking my representatives to get in touch very informally this afternoon at Lake Success with your representatives and those of Dr. Tsiang ¹ and Mr. Parodi ² with a view to formulating for our consideration questions which

¹ Ting-fu Tsiang, Chinese Representative at the United Nations.

² Alexandre Parodi, French Representative at the United Nations.

might usefully be directed to representatives of the Jewish and Arab communities, as well as the mandatory power and the Palestine Commission.

Our examination of the matter leads me to the inescapable conclusion that there are many questions having a bearing on the possibility of implementing the GA partition plan by peaceful means for which there are no clear answers in the present record. I think it is of the utmost importance for us to get the answers to these questions in order to carry out effectively our responsibilities to the SC under its resolution of March 5, particularly with reference to implementation of the partition plan by peaceful means.

I earnestly hope, therefore, that you will find it possible to reconsider your views and participate with us in questioning representatives of the Jewish and Arab communities of Palestine, as well as representatives of the mandatory power and the Palestine Commission."

AUSTIN

501.BB Palestine/3-948 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Legation in Syria

SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, March 11, 1948—7 p. m.

58. Attitude of Syrian officials reported in your 135, March 9,¹ is of serious concern to this Govt as a steadfast supporter of UN. Presidential Secretary's complacent remark that to remove Arab threat of force might damage an increasing favorable situation reveals utter lack of comprehension of solemn undertakings entered into by Syrian Govt when it signed Charter of UN and ratified that instrument.

Your telegrams and other info reaching Dept lead to unmistakable inference that Syrian Govt could easily be charged with complicity in threatening international peace and security with regard to Palestine. In light of Ambassador Austin's statement of Feb 24 Syrian Govt should have no illusion as to where this Govt will stand in SC or elsewhere with respect to threats to international peace and security.

Please call on President Quwatly and state that while *démarche* suggested in Deptel 49, March 6,² is evidence of friendly regard which this Govt has for Arab world, Syrian Govt should by no means underestimate sincerity and fixity of purpose of the US to support measures by SC under UN Charter to maintain international peace and security. This purpose should seem of particular significance to Syrian Govt, which relied upon our support in 1946 in SC in securing withdrawal of French and British troops from Syrian territory.³

¹ Not printed.

² This is a repeat of telegram 164 to Jerusalem, p. 686.

³ For documentation on the policy of the United States concerning this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1946, vol. VII, pp. 751 ff.

It should be obvious to anyone that such arrangements as those reported in your 136, March 9,⁴ will merely serve to underscore evidence of Syria's participation in threatening the integrity of Palestine and that Defense Minister in providing facilities for this press junket to Qawukji's headquarters is merely preparing grave difficulties for his own govt.

Please repeat your reference tels to Arab capitals to which this telegram is sent for info.⁵

MARSHALL

⁴Not printed; it reported that Syrian Defense Minister Sharabati had informed various American reporters of the arrangements made for them to visit Fawzi Kawukji's headquarters on March 11 (501.BB Palestine/3-948). Kawukji was commander of the irregular Arab bands operating in northern Palestine.

⁵This telegram was repeated to Cairo, Jidda, Beirut, Jerusalem, and Baghdad.

501.BB Palestine/3-1148: Telegram

*The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)
to the Secretary of State*

SECRET

NEW YORK, March 11, 1948—8 p. m.

273. For Lovett from Austin. Following is account of meeting of permanent members held in my office from 10:30 to 12:30 this morning¹ pursuant to SC resolution of last Friday. Parodi, Tsiang, Gromyko and SYG Lie were present during the whole meeting and Cadogan came in on our invitation during last hour. Tsiang opened the meeting by asking if we should invite Cadogan to join us. I said I had been talking with Rabbi Silver² earlier in the morning and raised the question whether we should not invite him also to appear before us to answer questions.

Gromyko said he wanted to make his position perfectly plain: he cannot participate in consultations with the Jewish Agency, Arab Committee, Palestine Commission or mandatory power. In support of this position he repeated all of the arguments he used during our first meeting on Monday (mytel 256, March 8³).

Gromyko went on to say that if other delegations mentioning France, China, and the US by name, wished to invite anybody to participate they must take responsibility for doing so.

I then suggested that we review proposed questions to be directed to the Jewish Agency. Copies of these questions, as well as those proposed to be directed to the Arab Committee, mandatory power, and Palestine Commission, as revised in consultations at staff level with

¹For an account of the meeting held on March 9, see telegram 288, March 13, from New York, p. 720.

²Abba Hillel Silver, member of the American Section of the Executive of the Jewish Agency and a spokesman for the Agency at the United Nations.

³Not printed; but see footnote 2, p. 700.

Chinese and French representatives yesterday afternoon, had been distributed and Gromyko as well as others had read them. (Text of these questions follows in next telegram.⁴) Gromyko observed that all of these questions have been clarified many times both by Jews and Arabs. I asked him if he thought that question "do you believe that the partition plan can be implemented by peaceful means by agreement between the Jews and Arabs of Palestine?" had been answered. He replied that this question had been answered, strongly implying that on the record there was no possibility of the plan being implemented by peaceful means.

I asked him whether he thought the question "would modifications in the proposed partition plan make agreement between the Jews and Arabs more possible of attainment?" had been answered. He replied that it has been answered at least ten times. The Jews, he said, have made it clear that the partition plan is the minimum they will accept.

I asked him whether he thought the question "do you consider the principles of the proposed economic union essential to the economic life of Palestine as a whole?" had been answered. He replied in the affirmative saying that both Jews and Arabs so far as he knows consider economic union essential.

Gromyko then asked whether questions of this sort were aimed at changing the recommendations of the GA. I told him that what we were after is to find out whether there are any modifications that would make possible implementation of the partition plan by pacific means.

At this point I said that I did not think there was any sense in pursuing any further the procedural point of whether or not we were going to consult with the Jewish Agency and others.

We returned to the question of asking Cadogan to come in. Gromyko finally agreed to this on the clear understanding that Cadogan would be coming not as the beginning of consultations with the mandatory power but merely as a continuation of the questioning of Cadogan which began at our meeting on Tuesday afternoon when we put to Cadogan a number of questions concerning the security of Palestine.⁵

After some further discussion Gromyko finally agreed that we might also put to Cadogan the questions we had prepared for today concerning peaceful implementation of the partition plan. I thereupon telephoned Cadogan and asked him to join us.

During the interval before Cadogan arrived we discussed the proposed questions for the Palestine Commission and Gromyko finally agreed, although reluctantly, that these questions might be put to the Palestine Commission through SYG Lie.

⁴ No. 274, March 11, 8: 15 p. m., not printed.

⁵ See telegram 288, March 13, from New York, p. 720.

During this interval, I also served notice on Gromyko that I intended to invite Rabbi Silver to the next meeting of the group and I hoped Gromyko would stay. He merely repeated that he could not participate.

I questioned Cadogan closely along the lines of the proposed questions directed to the mandatory power and those directed to the Palestine Commission as follows.

In response to our first question, in effect requesting clarification of the meaning of "acceptance" by the mandatory power of the partition plan Cadogan said that his government wants to avoid doing anything that might be considered obstructive, but on the other hand they wanted to avoid participating in putting any plan into effect against the wishes of either party. They were trying to steer a course empirically between these two points and he could not furnish any general rule which would answer all questions. This was not very satisfactory to the rest of us perhaps but they were doing the best they could according to their lights. I asked Cadogan if in effect this meant that acceptance of the plan by the mandatory government was conditional upon its acceptance by both the Jews and Arabs. I stressed that all of us were trying to implement this plan by peaceful means. I asked if it might be assumed that failing agreement between the Jews and Arabs if there were acquiescence by both if the mandatory government would then not be inflexible.

Cadogan dodged the question of whether UK acceptance was conditional on acceptance by both parties. He said that if, of course, anyone could find a way of bringing the parties together he was sure this would be most welcome to his government. In stating his position Cadogan used additional language which helped to clarify the UK attitude. For example, he said that "we could not ourselves be instrumental in putting into effect a plan which is not accepted by the parties" and again "we cannot take an active part in implementing a plan not accepted by the parties."

In response to question number 2 concerning the possibility of implementation of the plan by peaceful means Cadogan replied that his government considered it very difficult to carry out a plan like this without the backing of force.

I asked him if he thought the plan could be implemented if the Jews could be provided with the militia contemplated in the plan and if they had the necessary arms. He replied that this was of course hypothetical. It was a matter of how much they had and how long they could hold out. He pointed out that placing arms in the hands of the Jews sufficient to permit the organization of a Jewish state would not of itself equal settlement.

It was obvious in Cadogan's responses to the first two numbered questions that he did not see any real possibility of implementation of the plan by peaceful means.

In response to question number three concerning the possibility of modification of detail which would make the plan acceptable to both parties, Cadogan said that he could not think of any modifications of detail, stressing the word detail, which would make the plan acceptable to both parties. In response to the next question concerning modification of the timetable he replied emphatically that so far as the UK is concerned no change in the timetable is contemplated. He indicated that there is no willingness on the part of the mandatory government to modify the date (May 15) of laying down the mandate. He went on to say that "in accordance with his existing instructions those dates are fixed and irrevocable." And he added that there were no modifications he knew of which would change the British view in this matter.

In response to the next question which concerned Creech Jones' statement about finding a bridge across the gulf separating the two communities, Cadogan said that his government had no suggestions to make. He said his government had made no efforts to bring the parties together since they brought the matter to the UN a year ago which action was of course in a way a confession of failure. While they would welcome the success of any such efforts they had no suggestions to make.

Cadogan had very little to offer by way of comment on the questions directed to the Palestine Commission.

He said that the mandatory had had no further conversation with the Palestine Commission regarding piecemeal relinquishment of the mandate (question 5) and he said that he has informed the Palestine Commission that his government is standing by the May 1 date for arrival of the commission in Palestine (question 6).

[Here follows an account of the views of John Fletcher-Cooke, Financial Under-Secretary in the Palestine Government, on economic and administrative matters in Palestine.]

None of the other permanent representatives had any questions to ask Cadogan today beyond those covered above.

Before this morning's meeting broke up Tsiang raised the question of our next meeting and Gromyko made some point of not wanting to meet before tomorrow afternoon. We therefore finally agreed on 2:30 tomorrow in Mr. Parodi's office. I again said that I intended to invite Rabbi Silver to meet with us. Neither Tsiang nor Parodi objected; Gromyko merely repeated that he could not participate in such consultation. However, it may not be without significance that

in response to a question from the UN press officer covering our meetings as to whether Mr. Gromyko would or would not participate in questioning of Dr. Silver, Gromyko replied that was a matter twenty-four hours away.

Before leaving Gromyko told me privately in response to the letter I sent him yesterday (mytel 267, March 10) that he had not changed his views concerning consultations.

AUSTIN

*Second Monthly Progress Report of the United Nations Palestine Commission to the Security Council*¹

[Here follows an account of the preparatory work of the Commission, which contains the texts of questions put to the Mandatory Power and the latter's replies; an analysis of the impossibility of implementing the provisions of the General Assembly's partition resolution of November 29, 1947, concerning establishment of Provisional Councils of Government and concerning the formation of militias in Palestine; and a discussion of relevant economic and financial questions.]

H. CONCLUSION

1. Negotiations with the Mandatory Power and the Jewish Agency will be continued. In view of the policy of the Mandatory Power not to co-operate in the implementation of the Plan adopted by the General Assembly, a satisfactory coordination of the plans of the Commission with those of the Mandatory Power, in many vital aspects, is precluded. This, together with the steady deterioration of conditions in Palestine, leaves little hope for the achievement of continuity in administrative services and for an orderly transfer of authority to the Commission upon the termination of the Mandate.

2. Information concerning present conditions in Palestine, received by the Commission from the Advance Party of the Secretariat in Jerusalem, fully confirms the conclusions set forth in the commission's first special report on the problems of security, and further emphasizes that unless security is restored in Palestine, implementation of the resolution of the General Assembly will not be possible.

3. The Commission, therefore, has the duty to reiterate that present indications point to the inescapable conclusion that when the Mandate is terminated Palestine is likely to suffer severely from administrative chaos and widespread strife and bloodshed.

¹ Reprinted from SC, 3rd yr., *Special Suppl. No. 2*, pp. 20, 27. The report, dated March 12, 1948, was transmitted by Chairman Lisicky to the President of the Security Council on March 15.

501.BB Palestine/3-1348: Telegram

*The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to
the Secretary of State*

SECRET US URGENT

NEW YORK, March 13, 1948—1:30 a. m.

284. For Lovett from Austin. Following is account of meeting of permanent members today at Parodi's offices between 2:30 and 5:30 p. m. [, March 12?].

Despite his position concerning "consultations", Gromyko stayed throughout the meeting. Silver and Shertok represented the JA and the greater part of the meeting was taken up with their response to questions reported to Department yesterday. We had supplied JA with copy of these questions yesterday afternoon to assist their preparation.

Tsiang opened the meeting by saying he was under obligation as President of the SC to call a meeting for Monday, March 15, at 2:30, in conformity with the 10-day limit established in the SC resolution of last Friday.

Gromyko made a statement at the outset saying he wished to confirm his previous statements concerning the whole question of consultation, and to repeat that each word in his statement stands.

I countered by asking him what suggestions he would have for peaceful implementation of the plan of partition. He replied that my question does not relate to the subject, and I observed I thought the whole purpose of our meeting was to study the implementation of partition. I then asked the President whether he contemplated having a meeting to determine what we were going to report to the SC.

Tsiang in reply made clear that he was not present in his capacity as President of the SC. He said we had no chairman in our group and no *rapporteur* and he confirmed a brief statement by Gromyko to the effect that each of us would make his own individual statement in the SC, that is, his own evaluation of the situation.

(Tsiang's observations on this point indicated clearly that there was no hope of getting any joint report by him as we had hoped, reporting the consensus of the views of at least three of us.)

I then asked Tsiang if his observations meant that our consultations were to be, therefore, wholly without any effect. Gromyko observed that I was attempting to confuse two things, and he asked me if the US proposal for consultation which I had made at our first meeting still stands. He apparently had in mind the general idea of consultation with the various groups. I told him that his question was no question at all and said I thought our mandate was clear under the resolution of the Council. I asked whether we were going to have an opportunity

among ourselves before returning to the SC to discuss what each of us felt about this whole matter. Tsiang said he thought we might have a further meeting on Monday morning for the purpose of determining how far apart the four of us were and how near together. He emphasized that this would be to facilitate the smooth proceedings of the SC. He suggested that we meet at 10:30 Monday in his office. No objection to this was expressed but Gromyko made some deprecatory comment.

Tsiang then made a statement which started off in effect by agreeing with Gromyko's position that the Council's resolution under which we were operating means consultation among the permanent members to consider the question of peaceful implementation. He would like, however, to see all four of us start with the same data, and for this reason it would be certainly useful for us to hear the principal parties. On the other hand, we must abide by the resolution but it would certainly be more fruitful if we could get at the fundamental issues and facts.

Gromyko reiterated that he could take part in no consultations; that those who wished to do so would have to take responsibility and bear the full consequences of complications and delay in dealing with this Palestine matter.

Parodi said that at least three of us had agreed yesterday to invite Rabbi Silver to attend our meeting. He was now here with us at our invitation the only purpose of which was to be helpful. Parodi's intervention gave Tsiang an opportunity to ask Rabbi Silver to go ahead.

After an expression of the usual amenities, Silver said that they were surprised at the question concerning possible modifications in the partition plan. Since this matter seemed to be in our minds, he thought it would be helpful if they were to restate their position before attempting to answer the various questions. He would like to indicate why the JA does not regard any reopening of the subject as helpful, why the present plan represented the irreducible minimum for them. He said that the proposed plan was to them the only practicable solution which had been arrived at after many other plans had been proposed and had failed of acceptance. The present plan was no easy solution but the whole question is a very difficult one.

Silver then emphasized that any solution which the UN would endorse and approve will require enforcement and this by now should be an axiom. He hoped that their position would not be interpreted as *intransigent*. Events and circumstances, however, make this plan mandatory and imperative.

He then said that he had certain suggestions concerning SC action which he would like to make later if the group so desired. He at this

point turned the floor over to Dr. Shertok who answered seriatim the questions directed to the JA as follows:

Question No. 1:

Shertok emphasized that the partition plan is acceptable to the Jews. This was repeatedly stated during the GA and there had not seemed to be any occasion for a formal statement to this effect during the present phase of the matter. He said that world Jewish public opinion overwhelmingly supports this plan. Any views to the contrary are relatively insignificant.

There could be no more effective form of ratification of the plan for the Jews than the setting up of the provisional council of government which the Jews were only too eager to begin doing. Shertok then criticized the mandatory power as being responsible for delays in setting up the PCG.

Question No. 2:

Shertok said this really involved two closely interrelated questions: (a) Can the plan be implemented by peaceful means and (b) can it be implemented by agreement between the Jews and Arabs of Palestine? In respect to (a) he gave a flat no, if by agreement is meant formal public agreement in advance of implementation.

Implementation by peaceful means on the other hand could not be answered so simply. The Jews had always reckoned on a measure of physical opposition, but on the other hand, a large measure of acquiescence by the Arabs of Palestine. If they were left alone to go ahead, they felt that considerable sections of the Palestinian Arab population would be willing to acquiesce and cooperate. The factor which has completely changed the picture is the armed intervention of neighboring states which constitutes the most blatant form of aggression under the resolution and the charter. This aggression involved not only the neighboring states but also the Arab League which has a separate interest of its own.

Question No. 3:

The JA endorsed the answer clearly implied in the first part of this question. Their readiness to form the PCG includes putting in working order and carrying out such tasks as might be put upon it under the resolution. They were constantly and actively working out the taking over of various administrative services, etc.

Here again the problem of transfer from the mandatory government was of great importance and lack of cooperation from the mandatory amounted to a request that the Jews give birth without a pregnancy.

The Jews could not predict a smooth process in establishing the PCG, and unless Arab aggression is checked, they would be faced with a more difficult situation after May 15. Even assuming however, that they are facing a turbulent period, they are confident they will be in a position to assert the authority of the Jewish state and maintain essential services. This presupposes the establishment and equipment of the militia contemplated in the plan. It also contemplates that restrictions on the importance [*importation?*] of arms would be lifted. If given what they have asked for, they believe they would be able to defend the Jewish population and territory.

This does not mean that they have abandoned the idea of an international force. They still believe this is necessary but it is a question for the SC to decide, particularly the permanent members.

If no international force is provided, this would mean much more serious losses both to Arabs and Jews.

Question No. 4:

Shertok said that they had had a great many conversations with Arabs, not only in Palestine but also outside.

Within Palestine they had not had any conversations with the AHC but with a number of Arab notables, many of whom had come to the Jews.

Soon after the UNSCOP report was made public, they had approached the SYG of the Arab League who rejected categorically, without reservation, any attempts to confer. The JA has the minutes of this conversation which they will make available in confidence, reserving the authority over its publication. Shertok also said that months ago a letter was sent to the SYG of the Arab League, to which no reply had been received. This letter would also be made available, if desired.

Shertok described at some length the tremendous potential opposition to the AHC among Arabs in Palestine, who did not, however, have sufficient courage in their convictions to be willing to fight for them.

Question No. 5:

Shertok said that all essential elements of the plan are essential. The combination of essential elements make up the irreducible minimum acceptable to the JA. This includes statehood, sovereignty, territory, control of immigration, a seat in the UN.

He said the JA would "view with alarm any attempt to tamper with any element of the plan". It was like tampering with a single block of a wall. In the process of tampering, the whole structure might collapse. The JA could not be party to any such attempt.

Question No. 6:

There are no modifications in the present plan which would commend themselves to the Jews. There were a number of modifications in favor of the Jews which would be, of course, acceptable, but they did not imagine we had such modifications in mind. They might be willing to give up territory here and take on more territory there, so long as the result did not amount to less territory.

Shertok saw no possibility of any modifications which would make the plan acceptable to the Arabs. He said that nothing less than complete subversion of the plan would satisfy them.

Question No. 7:

Shertok gave a flat no to this question as it is put. The particular form of economic union, as presented is not considered essential by the JA. It amounts to a substantial curtailment of sovereignty. It was finally reluctantly accepted as (a) part of the whole scheme and (b) because it has some appealing aspects. They accepted economic union, but did not ask for it. Economic union is not an obstacle to the creation of the Jewish state, nor is it a valid reason for failing to set up the Jewish state.

The UNSCOP report provided for economic union as a condition of establishment of the proposed state. As Shertok recalled it, it was proposed by the US in Committee 1 that a mere undertaking to cooperate in economic union, if and when established, was sufficient.

Question No. 8:

The answer is definitely yes. The Jews would cooperate in the administration of Jerusalem by the UN, considered, however, as a part of the plan. It was a hypothetical question, but if it were contemplated that Jerusalem might be administered by the UN quite apart from the plan, this would create a serious obstacle to cooperation. He reserved the position of the JA with regard to a change which the TC has made in the provisions of the GA resolution concerning proportional representation in the municipal council for Jerusalem. The TC had changed the fixed quotas, resulting in 18 Jewish members and 19 non-Jewish members.

Question No. 9:

The question of guarantees for the Arabs in the Jewish state has not been raised by them. Shertok made a rather lengthy statement to the effect that the Jews were ready for any paper guarantee that can be formulated, but they preferred trust in their good faith and self interest. It was obviously a basic principle in the self interest of the Jews to treat the Arabs fairly. There were too many Jewish hostages throughout the world. They would be living in a glass house in Palestine under the severe light of world public opinion.

I asked Rabbi Silver about his suggestions for SC action, and he read them to the group. The text of these recommendations follows in next telegram.¹

Parodi then asked if the SC should address a solemn appeal for a truce between all parties until the termination of the mandate, what would be the reception of this appeal by the JA. Would the Jews be able to control their own people and what would be the reception by the Arab community?

Shertok replied that the Jews would wait a certain number of hours to see the effect of this appeal on the Arabs. If the Arabs complied, there would be no violence. If the Arabs did not comply, the Jews would resist. While waiting, they would make preparations for defensive, protective measures against possible attack. There would be no attacks on the British if steps were not taken to prolong the mandate. His personal interpretation of the Arab attitude would be they would ask whether the UN intended to abandon the partition scheme or implement it. In the latter case, a simple appeal would have no effect.

I asked what the effect would be of an order by the SC under Article 40 of the charter. What would be the Arab states' attitude as members of the UN. Shertok replied that such an order, if it were specifically addressed to the Arab states, would be likely to be more effective than a general appeal without direction at all. Shertok went on to say that a pernicious doctrine was being spread in the Middle East that UN will not follow through. Therefore, the Arabs have nothing to worry about. An appeal or order would have to be backed by a show of force and great willingness to use force if necessary.

In respect to a question by Tsiang, Shertok said that the whole question of territorial modifications had been gone through in great detail time and time again. The Jews had already made very great sacrifices and he could not conceive of any territorial modifications which would make for acceptance by the Arabs.

In respect to a further question by Tsiang, Shertok said that the Jews insisted on control of immigration because this was a question of sovereignty. He went on to say that it is the most essential part of the whole scheme. The most fundamental root is that the Jews must have the keys to their own homeland in their own hands. There must be a place for Jewish persecutees in need of a home which would be solely in the control of Jews. And exclusive control of immigration was the most powerful argument in persuading the Jews to accept the partition plan.

On the other hand, the Jews recognized the necessity for sound planning. They had in mind a rate of immigration of 80,000 to 100,000

¹ No. 285, March 13, 2 a. m., not printed.

a year, subject to variation depending on the economic situation of the existing population, Arab as well as Jewish.

In respect to a question from me concerning the absorptive capacity of the Jewish state, Shertok replied that they contemplated about one million in the next decade.

Silver interjected to indicate that there was time when there was a great reservoir of Jewish immigration, especially in eastern and central Europe, amounting to 7 or 8 million Jews. This reservoir had given rise to Arab fears that Palestine would be inundated. Six million of these Jews had perished during the Nazi regime. They would expect, perhaps, as many as 700,000 or 800,000 Jews from Europe and perhaps 200,000 or 300,000 from other areas, principally the peripheral Arab states. There was no cause for any fear of inundation.

In response to my question concerning the emigration of Jews from Palestine, Shertok said that under the Turks, emigration had about equalled immigration. In the late 20's and early 30's, there had been a small backwash of emigration which had virtually ceased in 1932 and there was no emigration thereafter until after the war. The volume of emigration at this time is insignificant. In respect to a question by Tsiang, Shertok and Silver indicated that the ratio of Arabs to Jews in all of Palestine would be roughly half and half with two million Jews and two million Arabs. Tsiang asked whether there had been a rise in anti-Jewish feeling in the Arab states. Shertok replied that the Jews had at best been tolerated by the Arabs through the ages. They were second or third class citizens subject to all sorts of formal disabilities, the classic example being in the Yemen.

There were no more questions and Rabbi Silver and Shertok left the meeting.

Gromyko then attacked Lie for the press coverage of yesterday's meeting, in particular, Gromyko insisted that he had never said he would not attend a meeting at which the JA was represented. He had simply made clear that he would not participate in consultations with representatives of the JA or the AHC, etc.

After some discussion, it was then agreed that a new attempt should be made to have representatives of the AHC appear and answer the questions proposed to be directed to them. It was agreed also that Lie would present these questions to Nakkleh, the only AHC representative in NY, informing him of the meeting Monday morning. It was apparent that Gromyko would attend this meeting, making clear, however, that he was not participating in consultations with the AHC.

Following meeting, members of my staff took Lie to our offices, as a matter of convenience, where Lie met Nakkleh and handed him the questions explaining briefly that he had been asked to do so by the group of 4 permanent members and explaining the circumstances.

Nakkleh received the questions and said he would cable or telephone them to Jerusalem. In doing so, however, he wanted to make his own personal position clear, namely, that he was not participating in any consultations in so doing.

During this brief interview, there was a very unpleasant interchange between Nakkleh and Lie. Nakkleh charged Lie and the secretariat with a prejudiced position in favor of the Jews and Lie retorted he had not come here to be insulted. After Lie left, Nakkleh stayed behind and staff officers repeated to him once more our position re consultations with the AHC.

As Lie left, he told us privately that he was convinced of our sincerity in our efforts to find a way, if there is any way, of implementing the partition plan by peaceful means. He was therefore doing everything in his power to support this effort by us. He was afraid we would find, however, that it would be impossible to implement the plan by peaceful means. Therefore, it would have to be enforced. Otherwise the UN would go downhill rapidly to nothing.

AUSTIN

501.BB Palestine/3-1348 : Telegram

The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Childs) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

JIDDA, March 13, 1948—2 p. m.

129. ReLegtel 107, March 4.¹ Azzam Pasha informed me today that after conferring with King Abdullah it had been agreed that he, Azzam, should send a circular telegram to Arab states cautioning them against making any statements or committing any acts which might be interpreted by SC as threat international peace. He had pointed out Palestinian conflict was civil one and it was most important from Arab states' own interest not do anything which would give SC occasion use force in Palestine. Azzam indicated he understood and was in thorough accord viewpoint expressed by Department.

I acquainted him confidentially with situation reported Department's 76, March 11.² He immediately drafted telegram to Syrian Prime Minister referring Azzam's previous telegram of caution (sent about March 8) and repeating necessity Arab states do nothing which might imperil international peace and security Middle East. Azzam indicated he sympathized most heartily position Department as set forth its telegram 58 to Damascus.

Sent Department 129; repeated Baghdad 11, Cairo 37, Damascus 3. Cairo please pouch to Jerusalem, Beirut.

CHILDS

¹ Not printed.

² This was a repeat of telegram 58 to Damascus, p. 706.

501.BB Palestine/3-1348: Telegram

*The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to
the Secretary of State*

SECRET

NEW YORK, March 13, 1948—4:02 p. m.

288. The following is a running account of discussions held between Austin, Gromyko, Tsiang and Parodi on the one hand and Sir Alexander Cadogan on the other on Tuesday afternoon, March 9, concerning the security situation in Palestine. The UK had agreed to be present as mandatory power in order to furnish such information to the permanent members as they might need during their present consultations. Gromyko stated his willingness to discuss the matter with the UK in the latter's capacity as a permanent member but not as mandatory power. Gromyko made it clear that he did not thereby agree to consultations by the permanent members with the Palestine Commission or with the Jews or Arabs of Palestine.

The first question (US) was: have incursions by armed elements from outside Palestine occurred in addition to those already reported to the Palestine Commission by the mandatory power? Sir Alexander replied that all information at the disposal of the UK had been made available to the Palestine Commission; that a number of reports on security matters had come in since the Commission furnished its first special report to the SC; that the UK suggested that the Palestine Commission be asked to make available the large amount of material already furnished to the Commission by the UK on this subject.

The second question (US) was: has the mandatory power been able to identify personnel involved in such incursions? Sir Alexander replied that they had, of course, been able to determine that particular parts of the borders of Palestine had been infringed from particular adjacent countries but that the actual identification of individual persons involved was difficult. He referred again to the material already furnished the Commission and pointed out that such material would show that the UK considered that Iraqi, Syrians and Egyptians had been involved.

The third question (US) was: are these incursions privately organized by individuals or unofficial groups or are they supported and encouraged by governments outside Palestine? Sir Alexander said that he could not furnish a specific answer for lack of proof. He stated that the UK had made certain representations to neighboring governments regarding incursions into Palestine and that he would look into the matter and give us any further information which was available to him.

The fourth question (US) was: are arms now flowing into Palestine from outside sources to individuals or groups unauthorized by the mandatory power to possess arms? Sir Alexander replied that the

mandatory power would of course do everything it could to stop arms going in to unauthorized personnel. He stated that no arms are going to such personnel with the knowledge of the UK but that, of course, the interception of arms, particularly small arms, is a very difficult task under conditions now existing in Palestine. When asked further whether the UK knew of arsenals or stores of arms in other countries adjacent to the Palestine border, Sir Alexander stated that he had no such information.

The fifth question (US) was: what measures by the mandatory power are now in effect to prevent the movement of hostile elements into Palestine from outside Palestine? Sir Alexander replied that he must get this information for the permanent members because it involves the question of border patrols and he does not have the latest information. The difficulty was that the UK is now engaged in certain troop withdrawals and the answer to the question would of course involve such withdrawals. In general, however, the British security forces were doing what they could to protect Palestine from incursions and to maintain law and order inside the country.

The sixth question (US) was: to what extent are disorders inside Palestine due to participation by armed elements from outside Palestine? Sir Alexander replied that he would have to furnish such information later.

The seventh question (US) was: to what extent are disorders inside Palestine due to incitement to violence from outside Palestine? Sir Alexander replied that he would have to ask about that and report later.

The eighth question (US) was: does the mandatory power consider that there is a threat of force against Palestine which now constitutes a threat to international peace? Sir Alexander replied that the UK will be happy to furnish the permanent members all of the facts available to the UK but not an appreciation of what those facts meant; the question of what constitutes a threat to the peace is for the SC to decide. The members of the SC will have before them all of the information which is available to the UK. Austin pressed Cadogan further by reminding him that the UK is responsible for the government and the protection of Palestine and therefore could be expected to know more about the situation than anyone else. In that respect the UK is in a peculiar position to advise the Council on whether a threat to the peace exists. Austin asked how can the UN itself make such a finding if the UK has no reason to fear any such threat? Sir Alexander continued to decline to answer and indicated that he would refer the question to London, holding out no hope that the question would be answered.

At this point Gromyko asked what situation does the UK think will develop when British troops are withdrawn from Palestine? Sir Alex-

ander replied that the UK is fully responsible until May 15; that after May 15 the UK will maintain order only insofar as is required for the protection of British troops. Gromyko asked what the situation would be in the areas from which British troops are withdrawn? Sir Alexander replied that he could not say. Gromyko asked if there would be real fighting between Jews and Arabs. Sir Alexander replied that we must, of course, apprehend that that would be the case. He pointed out that the first areas to be evacuated by the British will be relatively quiet; that disorders will increase as the withdrawal occurs because the more controversial areas will by then be left without military authority.

Gromyko then asked whether the existing situation is a situation which constitutes a threat to the peace. Sir Alexander replied that he could not answer but that he would give all information available to the UK.

Gromyko asked if press information was accurate regarding thousands and thousands of "more or less" regular troops in Palestine from other countries. Sir Alexander replied that the numbers ran to about 2000. (Later information raised this to approximately 7000.) Sir Alexander said that they were not regular troops although they may have come across the border with the connivance of neighboring governments; they were irregulars who showed some appearance of training and good equipment; they crossed in bands and then dispersed into the population and were therefore difficult to find or eject.

Gromyko asked how such bands could cross and not be noticed. Sir Alexander replied that the UK does not have unlimited forces in Palestine, that there is a long frontier, that it is patrolled but that patrols are limited by the necessity for using troops to prepare for the withdrawal of British forces. Further, it was very difficult to stop the movement of small groups across the frontier of such country at night.

Gromyko then asked, "do the Arabs mean what they say?" Sir Alexander replied that that is anybody's guess and that the Arabs do not confide in the UK. USSR then referred to the entry of Kawukji who was reported to have entered with several hundreds or thousands of armed men and established headquarters in Palestine.

Austin then asked whether operations at sea have resulted in the capture of arms destined for Palestine. Sir Alexander replied that some interception may have been made at sea but that the UK has fairly effective control over the ports and it was unlikely that large quantities of arms were reaching Palestine from the sea.

The USSR then asked about the availability of ports. Sir Alexander replied that Tel Aviv would probably be free after May 15 insofar as the British were concerned but that the Haifa area would probably be retained as an enclave for the withdrawal of British troops between

May 15 and August 1. Sir Alexander pointed out that Haifa was the only satisfactory port in Palestine and that the others were so small that only the smallest vessels could dock alongside.

Austin asked whether the withdrawals of Abdullah's forces have now been accomplished. Sir Alexander replied yes, that the date will be furnished (he later corrected this on the basis of a schedule of withdrawal furnished to the permanent members). Gromyko then asked if Abdullah's forces would enter Palestine upon the termination of the mandate. Sir Alexander replied that he could not say, that he did not know Abdullah's intentions.

Austin asked whether the mandatory power has any evidence of preparation by Egypt with respect to Palestine. Sir Alexander replied that the UK has no evidence of direct military intervention but that there undoubtedly was some preparation of guerillas for infiltration into Palestine. Gromyko asked who would supply such guerillas with arms. Sir Alexander replied that he would look into the particulars. Austin asked to what extent is the opposition spontaneous among the Arabs and to what extent due to extremist Arab leaders. Sir Alexander replied that the opposition was spontaneous in a very large measure and that the Arabs were motivated chiefly by a fear of being "swamped" by outsiders.

Austin asked whether any heavy armament had been captured. Sir Alexander replied that certain mortars had been found. When asked by Austin whether these might be identified, Sir Alexander said that he was not sure that any mortars had actually been captured, only that mortar fire had been reported. Replying to a further question of Austin, Sir Alexander said that violent acts by illegal aircraft had been reported but that such reports were apparently not well founded; that such aircraft as had been used were very light planes which were used for reconnaissance only. Gromyko asked whether the Arabs in Palestine were armed better than the Jews. Sir Alexander said that he did not know.

Sir Alexander has, since this discussion, turned over to the permanent members a considerable amount of information which already been furnished to the Palestine Commission. Copies of this information have been furnished the Dept.

AUSTIN

501.BB Palestine/3-1448

Memorandum by Mr. Samuel K. C. Kopper to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

TOP SECRET

[NEW YORK,] March 14, 1948.

Conversations on the Palestine Question with several of the principal Arab Delegates to the United Nations, including Faris Bey

el Khouri (Syria), Camille Chamoun (Lebanon), Charles Malik (Lebanon) and Fawzi Bey (Egypt), during the past days have revealed certain important points which indicate that insofar as the Arab states are concerned they would be willing to suggest possible solutions to the Palestine Question which in the judgment of Mr. Wilkins and myself go further than any previous position taken by the Arab states. It now appears that the Arab states, and as a result the Arab Higher Committee, might be willing to agree to one of the following solutions which incorporated the following features:

1. A unitary state with

- (a) a democratic constitution and government;
- (b) explicit guarantees regarding minority rights and privileges;
- (c) a bicameral legislature in which the Jewish population would have equal representation in a Senate;
- (d) municipal autonomy for various towns or districts;
- (e) immigration of Jews up to 100,000 over a two or three year period and a lesser number each year thereafter;
- (f) a United Nations commission to observe development of the Palestine situation.

2. A Federal or cantonized state with

- (a) a democratic constitution and government;
- (b) explicit guarantees regarding minority rights and privileges;
- (c) a bicameral legislature in which the Jewish population would have equal representation in a Senate;
- (d) states or cantons similar to the constitutional organization of the United States or Switzerland;
- (e) immigration of Jews up to 100,000 over a two or three year period and a lesser number each year thereafter;
- (f) a United Nations commission to observe development of the Palestine situation.

3. Trusteeship with

- (a) terms of reference giving more responsibility for self-government than present times;
- (b) immigration features similar to those set forth in the preceding two paragraphs.

Thus it will be noted that the Arab states would now be willing to go further than they ever have before on the subjects of

- (a) constitutional organization,
- (b) immigration, and
- (c) guarantees for minorities.

However, trusteeship would be the least favorable solution in Arab minds.

The Arab states feel that the present Partition Plan should be abandoned. A special session of the General Assembly should be called. The Mandatory Power might be asked to stay on for two or three months

until a new solution were evolved. A transitory trusteeship might be established in the event that the Mandatory Power will not remain after May 15.

There is a growing amount of evidence from our missions in the field that moderate elements in the Arab states such as King Ibn Saud, Azzam Pasha, Secretary-General of the Arab League, Nokrashi Pasha, Prime Minister of Egypt and others are anxious to obtain a moderate solution of the Palestine Question and, to shelve permanently the Mufti and the extremist Arab elements in Palestine. It was likewise evidenced that the Arab League has King Abdullah of Transjordan under control.

They believe that the refugee problem should be handled by the UN and that the inherent responsibility should be assumed by other members of the UN to assist in handling the displaced persons problem.

501.BC/3-1548 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

NEW YORK, March 15, 1948—4:30 p. m.

295. For the Secretary from Austin. Following is account of fifth meeting of consultative group of permanent members of SC (Security Council) on Palestine in Chinese delegation offices, 10:30 to 12:30 this morning.

At outset of meeting I raised the question whether it would not be possible for the four of us to agree at least on a set of facts which could be reported to SC in response to first part of SC resolution of March 5 which called for a report on situation in Palestine.

Gromyko said that we have asked certain questions and received answers and perhaps the SYG (Secretary-General) should convey at once to all members of SC information we have received.

Tsiang said, "could we not agree on this as an established fact, that peaceful implementation of the plan of partition is out of the question?"

I said I thought we should consider this and decide what our viewpoint is and make a report on the question.

Lie asked if another question would be "is there a threat to international peace?" and I replied that we should also consider and report on this question.

Tsiang said that up to present moment, while we have had intrusion of bands into Palestine, we have no information that any state has taken part in the fighting. He said that if partition plan should be pushed forward the condition of fighting would become more serious.

I then raised question whether there is some method available to SC to quiet fighting down. Could we not proceed with a provisional order for a truce? Parodi said that as long as we have not taken the position that there is a threat to the peace we are in a good position to get both of the parties to accept a truce. A decision that there is a threat to the peace would have to be in effect against one of the parties. He thought that it would be a good first step to try to get a truce. He thought it would not be too difficult to get both parties to accept a truce. This would not only stop the fighting but increase the strength of the SC which has thus far lost strength on this matter.

I said that I had in mind the possibility of finding a threat to the peace under Article 39 and then getting a truce as a provisional measure under Article 40. As I understood it, Parodi had in mind trying to get a truce by agreement between the parties. Parodi agreed that this was the case.

He went on to say that the Arabs must have the impression that the SC is not very strong for partition. They are therefore less prepared to accept any agreement. The moral position of SC will be impossible if inaction leads to further massacre in Palestine. The SC is not strong for partition but it has no other plan. The only other plan that it seems might be suggested would be a federal state but even this assumes at least a minimum of Arab agreement and this, therefore, does not get us very far. He concluded that "very frankly the United Nations will not survive" if it fails to find a means of dealing with this situation quickly.

I said it now seemed to be clear that the Jews will take nothing but partition. The Arabs on the other hand will have nothing to do with partition. We must then ask if there is any other solution. If not, then the big remaining question is maintaining peace.

Parodi observed that even if we are not prepared to do anything, it is very important that we do not give this impression. If we do the Arabs will be hopeless. Even if we have no solution now perhaps we will have in a month or two.

Parodi went on to say that the Arabs have the impression we are drawing back; we must therefore do something, otherwise the situation will become more and more dangerous and finally very dangerous.

I said the situation has obviously been getting worse. We have information that preparations are going on in other countries such as recruiting, financing and the like. Does this mean anything? Is it just a bluff? Should we ignore it? If not, we cannot sit around hoping something will turn up. We will have to make up our minds to do something. I repeated that I still have hopes that all four of permanent members can agree at least on the facts.

Gromyko said the SC requested US for recommendations, not facts. The facts, he said, should be made available to the SC (pre-

sumably through the SYG). We had obtained some very interesting facts. The British had "admitted" that bands had crossed the frontiers, but the British are too reserved. He did not know why it was so difficult for the British to supply us with more information about these incursions.

Parodi said that he was not sure that all the information we had on these points was quite enough to indicate a real threat to the peace; that is, he said, "international peace within the meaning of the Charter." There was a threat to internal peace, of course. We really, however, needed more information from the Arab state, perhaps reports from our consuls or from the Arab states themselves.

Parodi then went on to say very clearly that he has in mind an appeal rather than an order for a truce.

I agreed that of course we must adhere to the pacific method as long as possible. It is for this reason, I said, that we are sticking to the partition plan if we can find a way of implementing it peacefully.

Gromyko asked if I had in mind a truce order directed to the neighboring states. I said yes and to the Jews and mandatory power and anybody else concerned.

Gromyko asked what the difference was between this and the last paragraph of SC resolution of March 5, and I pointed out that that was just an appeal.

Parodi then said that perhaps we could get agreement of both parties to implement the last paragraph of SC resolution. If they did not agree there probably would be a threat to the peace. It was understood that both my proposal and Parodi's proposal would be directed to all of parties concerned. Gromyko wanted to be particularly sure of this point.

I raised the question whether we should consult with Arab states and find out from them whether a truce by agreement would be possible. I emphasized it would not be enough to get a truce agreement with just the Jews, the Arab Higher Committee, and mandatory power. The Arab states have their organization, the Arab League, which has met on this subject frequently and taken votes in opposition to partition. The Arab League might also have an effect on the views of the Arab Higher Committee.

Parodi commented that he was not certain whether we should recognize formally the interests of Arab states in Palestine by discussing the truce with them since they had no right to engage in activities which such a truce would attempt to end.

Tsiang said that he thought the idea of trying to get agreement for a truce is a reasonable one. He thought, however, the chance was very small. He could not see the Arabs agreeing to a truce without at the same time declaring a sort of moratorium on the whole situation for a limited period.

(Nakkleh, representative of Arab Higher Committee here, came in at this point and we did not return to or answer Tsiang's question.)

[Here follow the discussion of the Security Council Representatives with Mr. Nakkleh of the Arab Higher Committee and the text of the communication the latter had received from the Committee "this morning" reiterating its rejection of any solution of the Palestine problem based on partition.]

Tsiang then raised the question of postponement of SC meeting which had been scheduled for this afternoon to discuss Palestine.

I raised in this connection the question of whether we should not address this question on a truce to the Arab states.

Parodi intervened that the Arab states could not be asked to agree to something affecting the internal situation in Palestine. Tsiang said that we would perhaps have to phrase the question differently.

I said that if the Arab states were not willing to agree, how could we get a truce. I added off the record that I doubted whether we can get a truce peacefully but I was willing to try. But in order to get a truce peacefully we must consult the Arab states. The time has also come to inform them that we mean business. I suggested that the President of the Council might consult the Syrian member of SC and other representatives here.

Tsiang agreed to consult the Syrian, Egyptian and Lebanese representatives. It was agreed to cancel the SC meeting today; to have a four-power meeting at 10:30 tomorrow morning in Gromyko's office; to postpone SC consideration of Kashmir dispute tomorrow afternoon and to hold tomorrow afternoon's meeting of SC on Palestine.

AUSTIN

501.BB Palestine/3-1648 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

TOP SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, March 16, 1948—10 a. m.

138. We have reviewed Security Council handling of Palestine problem since your statement of Feb 24 which established basic US thesis that under Charter Security Council must use its powers to maintain international peace and security but that it is not authorized to enforce political decision of partition on people of Palestine.

General line of tactics set forth in Deptel 107, March 5, and proposed statement on situation in Palestine after British withdrawal on May 15 as contained in Deptel 108, March 5, have been approved by the President for use when and if necessary (Deptel 116, March 8).

Following discussion today on outcome of Big Five consultation and presentation of suggested statement contained in your telegram 291,

March 14,¹ it seems to us that there will be rapid need of focusing basic issue of whether plan of partition with economic union can be successfully carried out by peaceful means in absence of agreement between Jews and Arabs of Palestine.

It is apparent that situation in Palestine grows daily more fraught with danger to international peace. Security Council must exercise its responsibilities for maintenance of international peace. However, once Council directs its inquiry to security situation in Palestine, if it has not already disposed of issue of partition with economic union, the two questions, although constitutionally separate, will become merged and we will find our efforts to maintain the peace made immensely more difficult because they will be construed by a majority of the people of Palestine as being a covert method of carrying out partition by force.

It is accordingly of the first importance that the Council dispose one way or another of the partition issue. Council has already by its action on March 5 failed to adopt first paragraph of US draft resolution of Feb 25 and thus has in effect tacitly refused to accept the three requests made of it by General Assembly in its resolution of last Nov 29. Issue presently before Council is whether Big Five consultation has or has not produced some new area of agreement which might make possible partition by peaceful means. Since statements summarized in your 291, March 14, clearly reveal that no party to Palestine problem believes partition can be carried out except by use of force it would seem that the necessary conclusions can rapidly be drawn. In this case you should make statement authorized in Deptels 107 and 108 in order that Council may proceed thereupon to consideration of security problem of Palestine divorced from political issue of partition with economic union.

The time factor is imperative and Council must act without delay.

MARSHALL

¹ Not printed; this message, sent by Mr. Rusk to Mr. McClintock, gave the draft text of proposed remarks, to be made by Ambassador Austin before the Security Council, on the consultations during the past week (501.BB Palestine/3-1448).

501.BB Palestine/3-1748

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by Mr. Robert M. McClintock

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] March 17, 1948.

Mr. Rusk¹ inquired early this morning if the Department would have any objection should the approved United States tactical posi-

¹ At New York.

tion on Palestine be presented to the Security Council, possibly at its next meeting on March 19, as a joint US, Chinese, and French proposal. He wished this point checked with Mr. Bohlen. I replied that offhand the suggestion seemed to be without objection, and later received a similar reaction from Mr. Bohlen.

In a later telephone conversation with Mr. Rusk the latter said that he and Mr. Ross had succeeded in persuading Ambassador Austin that the tactics reaffirmed in the Department's top secret telegram No. 138 of yesterday should be adhered to. (At one point yesterday there seemed to have been considerable danger lest Ambassador Austin find himself in outright disagreement with his instructions and that he had been tempted at least to discuss this disagreement with the President.) Mr. Rusk went on to add that in conversation this morning with Ambassador Austin one or two modifications of the basic position, as set forth in the Department's top secret telegram No. 107 of March 5, had commended themselves to Ambassador Austin and to Mr. Rusk. These modifications were to make clear in our presentation that the calling of a special session of the General Assembly to establish a United Nations trusteeship would be a temporary measure and without prejudice to whatever future settlement were arrived at by agreement between the peoples of Palestine. In other words, Ambassador Austin did not wish to knock partition on the head at this juncture but to leave that as one of a variety of possible solutions for the Palestine problem, which might be considered when the United Nations trusteeship for Palestine were terminated.

Needless to remark, the conversation which elicited this information was by no means as explicit as the foregoing paragraph.

Mr. Rusk said that if it were agreed that the three Powers jointly present this new suggestion it could be made to seem that the suggestions stemmed directly from their consultations pursuant to the Council's resolution of March 5. I said that this was entirely in line with the basic instructions set forth in Deptel 107.

Mr. Rusk thought it would be wise if there were consultation with London, Paris, and Nanking. I agreed and suggested that USUN reduce its views to writing, for immediate transmission to the Department, which would consider them and in turn send telegrams to the three capitals mentioned.

I observed to Mr. Rusk that on the basis of John Rogers' account in this morning's *Herald Tribune*, we had come mighty close to the Gromyko line of favoring an out and out finding by the Security Council that the Arab States had been guilty of a threat to international peace and security in and around Palestine. I said that we had been exerting great efforts in the Middle East to bring the Arab Governments to a more conciliatory frame of mind. I wondered if Ambassador Austin in his speech might not in turn make some friendly reference

to Faris el-Khouris statement yesterday to the effect that the Arab States would not interfere in subsequent fighting in Palestine so long as no other foreign force took part in it.

Mr. Rusk said that other members of the Council simply did not believe the statement of Faris el-Khouris. He said that Ambassador Austin would, as a minimum, insist on inserting a paragraph in his statement stressing the obligation of the Security Council under the Charter to maintain international peace and security, and citing the Articles of the Charter which gave it that power.

I said that I realized the Ambassador's stern devotion to the Charter but that we had worked very hard in the Arab capitals to bring forth one little green sprig of tolerance out of the mould and that I would not wish to see it shrivel up under the hot blast of righteousness. Perhaps the Ambassador could in a fatherly way admonish both the Arabs and Jews to be good.

A meeting has been set up in Mr. Bohlen's office for Thursday, March 18, at 11 a. m., to consider these proposals.

501.BB Palestine/3-1748

Memorandum by Mr. Robert M. McClintock to the Director of the Executive Secretariat (Humelsine)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] March 17, 1948.

There is little in UNA this morning for your telephone call to Mr. Lovett.¹

On Palestine Mr. Lovett should be told that any press report to the contrary there has been no agreement between the US, USSR, and France, to urge the Security Council to make a finding that international peace and security is threatened in and around Palestine. For Mr. Lovett's strictly private information it has seemed during the past few days that Ambassador Austin has been trending along the line followed by Mr. Gromyko which would place a finding of a threat to international peace and security as the prior business of the Security Council before it deals with the question of Palestine partition. However, Mr. Rusk telephoned me late last night to say that he thought it almost ninety percent sure that Ambassador Austin had been got back on the track and that the instructions which the Secretary and Mr. Lovett approved yesterday would hold.

Mr. Rusk telephoned at 9:25 this morning to inquire if the Department would have any objection if China, France, and the US jointly drew conclusions from the Big Five consultation of the past ten days

¹ Mr. Lovett had departed from Washington on March 15 for a vacation in Florida; he returned to the Department by March 27.

and on the basis of these conclusions recommended the program which the Department has reaffirmed to Ambassador Austin as being our tactical position, in order to dispose of the partition issue. I told Mr. Rusk that offhand I could see no objection but that I would check with Mr. Bohlen.

501.BB Palestine/3-1748: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY

NEW YORK, March 17, 1948—4:30 p. m.

304. Following is delayed account of sixth meeting of permanent members on Palestine held in Gromyko's offices from 10:30 to 1 yesterday morning.

Lie said he had presented to Jewish Agency the question on the possibility of their agreeing to a truce. He had received that morning a reply from Shertok indicating that they felt it necessary to refer the question to Palestine and expressed the hope that they might be granted a brief delay for a reply.

Tsiang said he had individually interviewed the heads of the six Arab states delegations here to ascertain their attitude towards a truce. They had individually agreed in their replies to the effect that if partition is suspended they will agree to a truce, otherwise not.

Tsiang went on to say that he wished to repeat what he had said before, that a military truce would have no validity without a political truce which equaled in effect suspension of partition.

Gromyko suggested that we study the nine points suggested by the Jewish Agency when we met with them. He thought some of these points might be agreed upon by the conferees and adopted by the SC. In response to a question by Tsiang he said he had in mind particularly the Jewish Agency's points 3, 4 and 5 relating respectively to a threat to peace, a call on the Arab states to stop recruiting, etc., and a call on the Arab states to stop warmongering.

I then distributed copies of paper we had prepared and read to them the point[s] concerning the finding of a threat to the peace and the necessity for SC action.¹

¹The paper, in the nature of a development of facts regarding the situation in Palestine, had been transmitted to the Department by New York in telegram 299, March 15, 9:15 p. m., not printed. Point 6 read: "A threat to international peace exists in the infiltration of hostile elements into Palestine from the outside whose purpose is to prevent by force the implementation of the General Assembly resolution."; point 10 read: "As a result of the consultations of the permanent members regarding the situation with respect to Palestine, they recommend (a) that the Security Council should make it clear to the parties and governments concerned that the Security Council is determined not to permit the situation in Palestine to continue as a threat to international peace, and (b) that the

Gromyko said he was not in a position to agree to any joint document but that it might be possible for the conferees to agree on some of the fundamental points, the first being that the situation in Palestine constitutes a threat to the peace. (This was point 5 of US paper.) The second point Gromyko suggested on which we might agree was that the SC as one (he emphasized one) of measures to be taken should order (he emphasized order) the Arab states to stop sending assistance of any kind to the Arabs in Palestine, and to take measures to withdraw elements which have crossed into Palestine. If agreement could be reached on these two points this would be a step forward. It would not exhaust the requirements of the situation but would nevertheless be a step forward. He said that the crossing of these groups into Palestine was "absolutely abnormal and dangerous."

I indicated that it would be very fortunate if the four of us could agree on strong, firm SC action to maintain the peace. With reference to the second part of the resolution passed by the SC on March 5, it would be fortunate if we could also work out something constructive regarding instructions to the Palestine Commission.

I said boiled down to the cold facts, we must find a way of getting these parties together because they must live together without force to hold them together. I did not mean to imply that we had abandoned the GA resolution. Our objective was to find a way, if possible, for peaceful implementation of the plan involving yielding on both sides so that the plan could go into effect without war.

Tsiang said he wanted to be cooperative but that with regard to finding that a threat to the peace exists, he felt that this finding must not be one-sided. It must apply to the infiltration of arms and armed forces by sea, as well as by land. He said it would be impossible to get a truce if a finding of a threat to the peace were one-sided. We must aim at the reduction of arms and armed forces by both sides. By making our action impartial we would promote prospects of an effective truce. He repeated that while he would like to see a truce be an effective truce, he did not see how we could bring this about if we had only a military truce without a political truce. He added that everyone knows the present situation is caused by the partition plan.

Gromyko said that paragraph 4 of our paper relating to the difficulty of peaceful implementation meant to him that the plan would be doomed at once automatically. Gromyko then went on to repeat in effect his arguments that there is at present a threat to peace in Palestine and that one of the steps that should be taken would be to

Security Council should take further action by all means available to it to bring about an effective truce in that country at the earliest practicable moment." (501.BB Palestine/3-1548)

For the text of the paper as subsequently revised, see telegram 953, March 18, to London, p. 739.

order that those states responsible should stop their actions at once and take measures to withdraw their forces from Palestine.

Gromyko then digressed to express at length his views to the effect that we had spent all our time this past week only discussing the question of consultation with the Jewish Agency, etc., and that we were just beginning today to discuss the substance of the matter.

I said that assuming that there is a threat to the peace now, if we directed a finding against the Arabs we would put an end forever to the possibility of getting peaceful implementation of the partition plan. I wondered whether there was no longer any hope of yielding by the Arabs on three essential points, namely, immigration, sovereignty and territory. I emphasized that we would never be able to maintain a situation permanently by a ring of bayonets.

I went on to say that of course there were a whole series of actions under Chapter VII provided for in Articles 40, 41, and 42, as well as 106, which might be taken if there were a finding of a threat to peace under Article 39. If, however, we adopted such actions now, would we not cut off the possibility of bringing the parties together?

Gromyko observed that in effect any effort to find a means of peaceful implementation by modification of the partition plan was not carrying out the partition plan and was merely causing delay. He said the undeniable facts must be taken into account, first, that the mandate terminates on May 15; there would then be bloodshed and war (maybe a small one) he said, and we must not allow such a situation. Second, the actions of those responsible (implying the Arab states) must stop.

Parodi questioned Gromyko rather closely on whether Gromyko felt that the partition plan could or could not be carried out by peaceful means.

Gromyko replied that he did not know whether it could be carried out by peaceful means or not. We must, he added, adhere to the plan as it is with no modifications.

I raised the question of whether a new vote on paragraph 1 of our original resolution relating to acceptance by the SC of the GA's request, subject to the authority of the Charter, would serve any useful purpose in order to determine how far the SC is willing to go.

Gromyko replied that the SC could take effective steps without formal approval of this paragraph 1.

Gromyko then went on to say in effect, let us get down to brass tacks. Do we agree that the situation in Palestine and its continuation constitute a threat to peace? If we agree to this, then do we agree on an SC order to the states responsible to cease their actions and withdraw forces already in Palestine?

Parodi said he wanted to make his position entirely clear. He was conscious of the great responsibility we had; he knew we were working

for implementation of the partition plan which he, incidentally, did not like very much. We also had the responsibility for the maintenance of peace. In effect, he said he was not prepared to go too far too fast. He said that at present there is a sort of threat to the peace. He is not sure that this would be the time to proclaim it. He thought we should agree today to give a warning and be prepared to go further later should this seem necessary. He thought that a clear warning to the Arabs would counteract their impression that the SC is going backwards. If we went further than this the difficulties of Arab cooperation would be increased immeasurably.

I said that if we avoided naming the Arabs or directing a finding of threat against them we would preserve the possibility of peaceful development.

At this point Gromyko weakened in his position and said that it might be okay not to name the Arab states. He said, "if we are not able to adopt a more concrete decision, maybe we could adopt a less concrete decision."

After we then spent a few moments discussing the form and details of a possible report to the SC on this point, Tsiang intervened with a strong objection that he could not approve a finding of a threat to the peace as it was being conceived and if this matter came to a vote in the SC he would have to abstain. He went on to say that we cannot under the Charter authorize any one party to implement a resolution by force. If the SC uses force that is one thing, but we cannot allow a private organization to use force. Tsiang then insisted that any finding of a threat to the peace be modified in such a way that Jewish as well as Arab elements be included.

After some further discussion of the differences in the various points of view I suggested that it would weaken the position of the conferees if an attempt were not made to report to the SC that afternoon as had been scheduled. It was agreed that at the Council meeting the president would merely say we needed a little more time for our consultations and would suggest that after hearing Chamoun's speech the SC should adjourn having in mind a further meeting of the conferees in Lie's office following the SC meeting.

Our meeting broke up at this point with Gromyko observing that he felt he would have to express at the SC meeting that afternoon his dissatisfaction with the progress of the consultations since we had spent all our time talking about the American proposal for consultations with the Jewish Agency, etc. I told him if he found it necessary to do this I would certainly reply.

501.BB Palestine/3-1748 : Telegram

*The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to
the Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET URGENT NEW YORK, March 17, 1948—3:21 p. m.

305. Eyes only for McClintock from Rusk. Ambassador Austin met today at 11:15 a. m. with Cadogan, Parodi and Tsiang (Tsiang was accompanied by one adviser) to discuss Palestine matter. Cadogan was present as an observer only.

The first item discussed was a draft set of conclusions which might be furnished jointly to the Security Council as a result of the recent consultations among the permanent members. The text of such conclusions follows:

[Here follow draft conclusions; for the draft as subsequently amplified, see telegram 953, March 18, to London, page 739.]

Following brief discussion of the above points, Austin referred to Tsiang's statement yesterday that a truce would be possible only if the truce applied both in the military and the political field. Tsiang had spoken of a "moratorium". Austin also referred to Tsiang's report that each of the six Arab states had told him that they would cooperate in every way with a truce if the implementation of partition is suspended.

Austin then said that the United States was primarily interested in maintaining the peace in the Palestine situation and in finding a peaceful solution within the framework of the United Nations. This was based not only upon our regard for the United Nations but also upon very serious humanitarian interests which are now at stake. He said that we therefore wished to do everything we could to meet the views of others, particularly of the permanent members, because he felt that those present could, by agreement, find a peaceful result.

Austin continued that we were concerned with the implications of a political moratorium in view of the situation which could be expected on May 15 upon termination of the mandate. He stated that he would like to propose to those present some additions to the conclusions already discussed, which, if accepted by them as a joint approach, might meet the situation on a realistic basis. He then read parts of a draft statement which he was considering making to the Security Council at an early date:

[Here follows draft statement, which in somewhat altered form was used by Ambassador Austin before the Security Council on March 19; see page 742.]

Austin underlined that we looked upon a trusteeship as a temporary arrangement designed primarily to maintain the peace and would be

entirely without prejudice to the nature of an eventual political settlement.

[Here follows further discussion by Ambassador Austin with the representatives of the United Kingdom, France, and China.]

It is most urgent that the Department communicate immediately with London, Paris and Nanking calling this new approach to their attention and strongly urge upon those governments to cooperate in an effort to maintain governmental authority in Palestine in such a way as to preserve the peace. It was clear from the nature of the discussion this morning that Tsiang and Parodi were both personally very favorably inclined to the idea. A joint approach by those represented at today's meeting would make a great impression on world opinion, would substantially strengthen the hand of the United Nations in dealing with this question, and would probably be supported by nine of the members of the Security Council.

Senator Austin impressed upon those present the great need for the utmost secrecy in dealing with this matter before the presentation of the joint views to the Security Council. Hence, any communications to London, Paris and Nanking should emphasize the implications which would be caused by premature leaks. [Rusk.]

AUSTIN

Editorial Note

On March 18 Dr. Chaim Weizmann, the Zionist leader who until December 1946 had been President of the World Zionist Congress, discussed the Palestine problem with President Truman. The editors have been unable to find an official record of this conversation. For the President's later report, see Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs by Harry S. Truman* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, 1956) volume II, page 161.

501.BB Palestine/3-1848 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

TOP SECRET NIACT

WASHINGTON, March 18, 1948—2 p. m.

952. Our next top secret telegram¹ contains text of draft working paper prepared by UN delegations of US, France and China with Trafford Smith of UK, technically present as an observer only, although he took an active part in discussion and drafting of the paper. This document sets forth conclusions drawn by US, France and China

¹ *Infra.*

(and also, we hope, the UK) as result of Big Five consultation on situation in Palestine pursuant to SC resolution of March 5.

Please immediately call on Foreign Minister (repeated for action also to Paris as 856, Nanking as 414) and leave with him a copy of this working paper, pointing out that it is yet a draft but that its main points have support of this govt.

You should orally add that, as was made clear in Amb. Austin's statement to SC, Feb. 24, US makes strong distinction between wide powers and obligation of SC under Charter to maintain international peace and security and its lack of any Charter authorization to use force to carry out a political recommendation or decision. We believe it should be made clear at this time that plan recommended by GA for partition of Palestine with economic union is an integral plan which cannot succeed unless each of its parts can be carried out. Palestine Commission, Mandatory Power, Jewish Agency, and Arab Higher Committee have indicated that partition plan cannot be implemented by peaceful means under present conditions. This being so, the SC is not in a position to go ahead with efforts to implement the plan. In particular, SC has no constitutional authority to enforce partition.

US believes that simultaneously with such SC action as may be necessary to bring about an effective truce in Palestine at earliest practicable moment special session of GA should immediately convene to establish a temporary trusteeship for Palestine without prejudice to eventual settlement of problem of independence for that country. We have not come to a decision as to what authority should administer this trusteeship and invite views of FonMin whether a direct UN trusteeship, or one administered by a single Power or several Powers jointly, would be preferable.

Please suggest to FonMin that if he concurs with this Govt's position immediate instructions be telegraphed to his Govt's representatives on SC which next meets to consider this problem Friday morning, Mar. 19.²

Repeated to USUN as 143.

THORP

² Michael R. Wright, Superintending Under-Secretary of State in the British Foreign Office informed an Embassy officer on March 19 of instructions sent to Sir Alexander Cadogan authorizing him to "inform suitable delegations that while it would not be in accord with consistent policy HMG to offer comments on details working paper, HMG has always made it clear HMG would welcome any effort to arrive at a settlement by an agreement with Arabs and Jews, and therefore HMG views with sympathy the present move towards this end." Regarding a possible British role in drafting a trusteeship agreement, Mr. Wright stated that the British Government would "place its knowledge and experience re Palestine at disposal UN . . . but HMG itself would neither draft agreement nor assume responsibility for it." (Telegram 1138, March 19, 3 p. m., from London, 501.BB Palestine/3-1948)

501.BB Palestine/3-1848 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

TOP SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, March 18, 1948—2 p. m.
NIACT

953. Following is text of draft working paper on Palestine¹ to which Deptel 952 today refers:

“I

The consultations among the permanent members of the SC and informal communication with the Palestine Commission, the mandatory power, the JA and the AHC held since March 5, 1948 have developed the following facts regarding the situation with respect to Palestine:

1. The JA accepts the partition plan, considers it to be the irreducible minimum acceptable to the Jews, and insists upon the implementation of the plan without substantial modification.

2. The AHC rejects any solution based on partition in any form and considers that the only solution acceptable to the Arabs of Palestine is the formation of one independent state for the whole of Palestine whose constitution would be based on democratic principles and which would include adequate safeguards for minorities and the safety of the holy places.

3. No modifications in the essentials of the partition plan are acceptable to the JA and no modifications would make the plan acceptable to the AHC.

4. The Palestine Commission, the mandatory power, the JA and the AHC have indicated that the partition plan cannot be implemented by peaceful means under present conditions.

5. The plan proposed by the GA is an integral plan which cannot succeed unless each of its parts can be carried out. There seems to be general agreement that the plan cannot now be implemented by peaceful means. This being so, the SC is not in a position to go ahead with efforts to implement this plan [in the existing situation.²]

6. The mandatory power has confirmed that a considerable number of illegal arms and hostile elements have entered Palestine both by land and by sea since November 29, 1947.

¹ Sent to the Department by New York in telegram 309, March 17, 11:30 p. m. (501.BB Palestine/3-1748). The Department made minor language changes and divided the twelve numbered paragraphs into two sections, before sending telegram 953.

² Bracketed portion in the source text.

7. The gradual withdrawal of the military forces of the mandatory power will, in the absence of agreement, result in increasing violence and disorder in Palestine. Warfare of a guerrilla type grows more violent constantly.

8. If the mandate is terminated prior to a peaceful solution of the problem, large-scale fighting between the two communities can be expected.

II

1. As a result of their consultations regarding the situation with respect to Palestine, the permanent members find and report that a continuation of the infiltration into Palestine by land and by sea of groups and persons with the purpose of taking part in violence would aggravate still further the situation, and recommend :

(a) That the SC should make it clear to the parties and governments concerned that the SC is determined not to permit the situation in Palestine to threaten international peace, and

(b) That the SC should take further action by all means available to it to bring about the immediate cessation of violence and the restoration of peace and order in Palestine.

3[2]. Under the charter the SC has both an inescapable responsibility as well as full authority to take the steps necessary to bring about a cease fire in Palestine and a halt to the incursions being made into that country. The powers of Articles 39, 40, 41 and 42 are very great and the council should not hesitate to use them if necessary to stop the fighting.

4[3]. In addition, we believe that further steps must be taken immediately not only to maintain the peace but also to afford a further opportunity to reach an agreement between the interested parties regarding the future government of Palestine. To this end we believe that a temporary trusteeship for Palestine should be established under the TC of the UN. Such a UN trusteeship would be without prejudice to the rights, claims or position of the parties concerned or to the character of the eventual political settlement, which we hope can be achieved without long delay. In our opinion, the SC should recommend the establishment of such a trusteeship to the GA and to the mandatory power. This would require an immediate special session of the GA, which the SC should request the SYG to convoke under Article 20 of the charter.

5[4]. Pending the meeting of the proposed special session of the GA, we believe that the SC should instruct the Palestine Commission to suspend its efforts to implement the proposed partition plan.”³

Repeated Paris as 857, Nanking as 415.

THORP

³ Ambassador Austin made a statement before the Security Council on March 19 on the results of the consultations among the permanent members of the Council. The substantive portion of his statement, which had the agreement of China and France, followed closely telegram 953, except for the omission of paragraph 5 of Section I and all of Section II except for paragraph 1. Ambassador Gromyko then gave his report to the Council on the consultations. He noted at one point that he had agreed to the decisions made in sub-paragraphs *a* and *b* of Section II of Ambassador Austin's statement, although the United States Representative had not pointed out this fact. For the texts of the statements by Ambassador Austin and Ambassador Gromyko, see SC, 3rd yr., Nos. 36-51, pp. 141-143 and 143-148, respectively.

501.BB Palestine/3-1748 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative
at the United Nations (Austin)*

TOP SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, March 18, 1948—3 p. m.
NIACT

144. Dept approves text of draft working paper submitted in your 309, March 17.¹

In view of possibility that UK may be inclined to support these general conclusions and that there is even stronger possibility that French and Chinese representatives will associate themselves therewith, proposed statement authorized in Dept's 108, March 5, may be considerably truncated in order that emphasis shall be on main problems confronting SC and not on legal theory as to what happens after termination of Palestine mandate by UK. This legal argument might more appropriately be reserved for use when effort is made to persuade UK to retain its responsibility for Palestine until Special Session of GA has succeeded in setting up UN trusteeship.

While Dept approves your draft paragraph 9(a) and (b)² you should not permit this important aspect of the problem to be concentrated on to exclusion of equally important decision confronting UN to call special session and get on with problem of administering Palestine as a trusteeship. In all probability Soviet Representative with active support of Jewish Agency will seek to confuse issue by stressing need to

¹ Not printed; but see footnote 1, p. 739.

² The same as paragraph II, 1, (a) and (b) in telegram 953, *supra*, except that the words after "bring about" in paragraph 9(b) of telegram 309 read "an effective truce in that country at the earliest practicable moment."

enforce peace to exclusion of need to establish a framework within which peaceful solution of Palestine problem can be found.

This Govt is not prepared to join in enforcement measures in Palestine for maintenance of international peace and security until UN trusteeship is established and then only to maintain the integrity of the trusteeship as a bulwark of international peace and security.³

Foregoing for your info only but should govern your course of action in forthcoming SC debate.⁴

THORP

³ Mr. Bohlen, in a marginal notation, stated that this paragraph had been cleared by phone with Secretary of Defense Forrestal.

⁴ A meeting in Mr. Bohlen's office, attended by Messrs. Bohlen, Armour, and Henderson and representatives of the Offices of United Nations Affairs and of European Affairs, during the afternoon of March 18, considered and approved telegram 144.

*Statement Made by the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) Before the Security Council on March 19, 1948*¹

[Extract]

.

The Security Council now has before it clear evidence that the Jews and Arabs of Palestine and the Mandatory Power cannot agree to implement the General Assembly plan of partition through peaceful means. The announced determination of the Mandatory Power to terminate the Mandate on 15 May 1948, if carried out by the United Kingdom, would result, in the light of information now available, in chaos, heavy fighting and much loss of life in Palestine. The United Nations cannot permit such a result. The loss of life in the Holy Land must be brought to an immediate end. The maintenance of international peace is at stake.

The United States fully subscribes to the conclusion reached by the four permanent members that the Security Council should make it clear to the parties and Governments concerned that the Security Council is determined not to permit the situation in Palestine to threaten international peace and, further, that the Security Council should take further action by all means available to it to bring about the immediate cessation of violence and the restoration of peace and order in Palestine.

Under the Charter, the Security Council has both an inescapable responsibility and full authority to take the steps necessary to bring about a cease-fire in Palestine, and a halt to the incursions being made into that country. The powers of Articles 39, 40, 41, and 42 are very

¹ Reprinted from SC, 3rd yr., Nos. 26-51, pp. 157, 167.

great, and the Security Council should not hesitate to use them—all of them—if necessary to bring about peace.

In addition, my Government believes that a temporary trusteeship for Palestine should be established under the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations to maintain the peace and to afford the Jews and Arabs of Palestine, who must live together, further opportunity to reach an agreement regarding the future government of that country. Such a United Nations trusteeship would, of course, be without prejudice to the character of the eventual political settlement, which we hope can be achieved without long delay. In our opinion, the Security Council should recommend the establishment of such a trusteeship to the General Assembly and to the Mandatory Power. This would require an immediate special session of the General Assembly, which the Security Council might call under the terms of the Charter. Pending the convening of the special session of the General Assembly, we believe that the Security Council should instruct the Palestine Commission to suspend its efforts to implement the proposed partition plan.

I shall now read three propositions which are being submitted by the United States. I am not making any representation for any other one of the permanent members. The United States propositions are contained in a paper entitled "Additional conclusions and recommendations concerning Palestine", which has been circulated to the members. It reads as follows:

"1. The plan proposed by the General Assembly is an integral plan which cannot succeed unless each of its parts can be carried out. There seems to be general agreement that the plan cannot now be implemented by peaceful means.

"2. We believe that further steps must be taken immediately not only to maintain the peace but also to afford a further opportunity to reach an agreement between the interested parties regarding the future government of Palestine. To this end we believe that a temporary trusteeship for Palestine should be established under the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations. Such a United Nations trusteeship would be without prejudice to the rights, claims or position of the parties concerned or to the character of the eventual political settlement, which we hope can be achieved without long delay. In our opinion, the Security Council should recommend the establishment of such a trusteeship to the General Assembly and to the Mandatory Power. This would require an immediate special session of the General Assembly, which the Security Council should request the Secretary-General to convoke under Article 20 of the Charter.

"3. Pending the meeting of the proposed special session of the General Assembly, we believe that the Security Council should instruct the Palestine Commission to suspend its efforts to implement the proposed partition plan."

Draft resolutions which would give effect to the above suggestions will be circulated shortly for the consideration of the Security Council.²

² At 3 p. m., shortly before Ambassador Austin delivered the above statement, Mr. Kopper met with Faris el-Khouri, Camille Chamoun, and Mahmoud Fawzi, representatives of Syria, Lebanon, and Egypt at the United Nations, and Isa Nakleh. He informed them of the position the United States had decided to take on the Palestine question and read the three conclusions in the Ambassador's statement. Although the Arab representatives were guarded in their comments, Mr. Kopper gained the impression that "they were pleased with this latest turn of events, but they did not gloat." (Memorandum of conversation, March 19, by Mr. Kopper, 501.BB Palestine/3-1948)

Mr. Henderson discussed Ambassador Austin's statement with representatives of the British Embassy on March 20. For the substance of their conversation, see Mr. Henderson's memorandum of March 27 to Mr. Lovett, p. 767.

According to Trygve Lie's memoir, *In the Cause of Peace* (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1954), the Secretary-General felt that the new United States position was a rebuff to the United Nations and to him personally. He recalls (p. 171) his suggestion to Ambassador Austin on March 20 that the two resign as a measure of protest against the Ambassador's instructions. The Ambassador was said to have replied that he would not resign and to have advised the Secretary-General not to do so either. Shortly after, Soviet Ambassador Gromyko expressed to the Secretary-General his hope and that of his Government that he would not resign.

Editorial Note

Ambassador Austin's statement of March 19 has been the center of a controversy concerning the extent of President Truman's knowledge and approval of the Ambassador's public advocacy of an international trusteeship for Palestine.

Margaret Truman, in *Harry S. Truman* (New York, William Morrow & Company, 1973) asserts that her father never formally committed himself to the trusteeship plan (page 387). She quotes on page 388 from her father's calendar for March 19 to the effect that the Austin statement represented the State Department pulling the rug from under him, that the State Department had reversed his Palestine policy and that with the Secretary and Under Secretary away, the third and fourth levels of the Department had succeeded in cutting his throat. Miss Truman notes on page 389 that not even in his memoirs did the President feel free to tell the whole story, although he hinted at it.

Indeed, in volume II of his *Memoirs*, President Truman on page 163 states that the March 19 statement was not a rejection of partition but an effort to postpone its effective date until conditions were more propitious. He averred that his policy on Palestine did not mean commitment to any set of dates or circumstances but was rather a dedication to international obligations and relief of human misery. In this sense, he said, the trusteeship proposal was not contrary to his policy. He expressed his certainty, however, that some State De-

partment officials anticipated that the Jews and Arabs would interpret the trusteeship proposal as an abandonment of the partition plan. In this sense, he stated, trusteeship was at odds with his attitude and policy.

Ian J. Bickerton, in an article entitled "President Truman's Recognition of Israel" in the December 1968 issue of the *American Jewish Historical Quarterly*, states flatly that President Truman agreed to the suggestion of Secretary Marshall that Palestine be placed under a temporary United Nations trusteeship (page 213 and again on pages 215-216). Then, on page 218, the author states that although the President had approved Secretary Marshall's suggestion for a trusteeship, he had given no directive for its implementation. Greatly disturbed by the Austin statement, the President learned through Clark Clifford that the Secretary of State had forwarded to him a memorandum (presumably the message received by the President on February 21, page 637) outlining the procedure for introducing to the General Assembly proposals for trusteeship over Palestine. The State Department had acted on the proposals in the belief that the President had given his formal approval. Apparently the President felt otherwise and regarded the timing of the release of the proposals as an attempt to force his hand.

A somewhat similar point of view is advanced in a memorandum of March 22, 1948, in the Files of Charles S. Murphy. The memorandum, presumably prepared by Mr. Murphy, who was Administrative Assistant to President Truman, reads as follows :

"The President had instructed the State Department to continue to support partition in the United Nations. He had authorized the trusteeship proposal to be advanced if, but only if, the Security Council finally voted down the implementation of partition notwithstanding its support by the United States.

"These instructions were garbled by the State Department, and when it became apparent that the Security Council would vote down partition in spite of its support by the United States, the trusteeship proposal was put forward without pressing for a final vote in the Security Council.

"This was done without the President's knowledge or approval.

"The end result might have been the same if the President's instructions had been followed, because partition could not have been implemented within the framework of the United Nations without a favorable vote of the Security Council. And the expressed attitude of the Council members seemed to make it clear that not more than five votes would be cast in favor of implementing partition.

"Nevertheless, the procedure which was followed failed to make the record clear and the failure to inform the President of the procedure left him in an insufferable position."

John Snetsinger's *Truman, the Jewish Vote, and the Creation of Israel* (Stanford, Hoover Institution Press, 1974), page 88, states

bluntly that President Truman "directly and knowingly" approved the change in American policy on Palestine.

Evidence of this point is included in several pages of penciled notes, dated May 4, 1948, in the handwriting of Mr. Clifford, which are among his papers in the Harry S. Truman Library at Independence, Missouri. Some of these notes outline the background of Ambassador Austin's speech of March 19. They read in part as follows:

"1. Marshall to Austin March 8[5] President has approved draft statement.

"2. President

"A. Summary of consultation.

"B. Question of responsibility after May 15.

"C. Proposals for further action by Security Council

"President has approved Point B and Point C. Had not approved actual language in C and probably not B.

"3. Marshall to Austin March 16—directs Austin to make speech. Marshall says Austin is to make speech as soon as possible as Austin believes appropriate.

"4. Austin and Rusk were not instructed to delay speech until final vote in Security Council.

"5. Marshall and Lovett left no word that President was to be informed when Austin was to speak.

"6. Text of Austin's speech was not submitted to President for his approval.

"A) It was the same substance as the draft previously submitted to President."

Mr. Clifford, on June 20, 1974, informed William M. Franklin, Director of the Department of State Historical Office, that his penciled notes of May 4, 1948, were prepared by him for use in the conference that was to be held eight days later at the White House to discuss the question of recognizing the Jewish State (memorandum of conversation by Mr. Franklin, June 20, 1974; 501-BB Palestine/3-2248). Regarding the conference of May 12, see the Secretary's memorandum of that date, page 972.

The text of other notes of May 4 by Mr. Clifford is presented in the editorial note on page 906.

Mr. Lovett's firm views that President Truman did approve a policy of international trusteeship for Palestine are set forth in Mr. Humelsine's memorandum of March 22, page 749.

501.BB Palestine/3-1948

Memorandum by Mr. Robert M. McClintock to the Counselor (Bohlen)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] March 19, 1948.

Since I shall not be in the Department this afternoon I thought it would be well to inform you that Paris and Nanking have instructed

their representatives at Lake Success to go along with us on the draft working paper submitted in USUN's 309 yesterday.¹ Mr. Rusk believes that with French and Chinese support it will be possible for Ambassador Austin to give our entire twelve-point program, rather than, as was suggested last night, to stop half way with the stress on the Security Council's responsibility for maintaining international peace and security.

I reaffirmed to Mr. Rusk this morning our strong view that our program was an integral one and that the suggestion for calling a special session to establish a trusteeship for Palestine was as important as any other aspect of the proposed statement.

I communicated the substance of the foregoing to Mr. Lovett on Carl Humelsine's phone this morning and summarized briefly the meeting in your office yesterday. Mr. Lovett thought that that portion of the Department's telegram 144 of March 18 to New York which you cleared with Mr. Forrestal should also be checked with the President.

For your convenience I attach a copy of the policy paper on Palestine which was approved by President Truman on February 21, 1948.² The policy regarding possible use of force to maintain international peace and security is set forth in Paragraph 8, while the position on calling a special session to establish a trusteeship is found in Paragraph 12.

¹ Dated March 17, not printed; but see footnote 1, p. 739.

² *Ante*, see p. 637.

L Files

*Memorandum by the Legal Adviser (Gross) to the Director of the
Office of United Nations Affairs (Rusk)*

[WASHINGTON,] March 19, 1948.

The attached memorandum,¹ dealing with questions concerning the legal status of Palestine, reaches the following general conclusions:

(1) The Principal Allied and Associated Powers held and exercised the legal power to dispose of Palestine following World War I.

(2) Under the mandate which Great Britain accepted, Great Britain was empowered, and accepted responsibility, to complete the tutelage of Palestine in order to bring the people of that country to attainment of full independence, which had been provisionally recognized in the Covenant of the League of Nations.

(3) When it considered the Palestine problem at the request of the Mandatory, the United Nations General Assembly recommended a particular plan to be adopted in bringing to a conclusion tutelage by the Mandatory. This plan was to be put in effect by action of the Mandatory, of United Nations organs, and of groups in Palestine.

¹ Dated March 19, by Leonard C. Meeker of the Office of the Legal Adviser, not printed.

(4) The Security Council is not empowered to alter the November 29, 1947 resolution of the General Assembly. While that resolution stands, groups in Palestine are authorized, and the Palestine Commission is required, unless the Security Council has taken action pursuant to Chapter VI or Chapter VII of the Charter recommending a political settlement other than that recommended by the General Assembly, to take the steps contemplated in the resolution for implementing the partition plan, Great Britain having stated its acceptance of the plan and acquiescing in its implementation.

(5) If, for any reason, in particular because of developments not anticipated when the General Assembly made its recommendation—such as violent opposition in Palestine, frustration by the Mandatory, inaction of the Security Council—the recommended plan appears unworkable, the General Assembly may repeal or alter its recommendation.

(6) Under articles 73 and 80 of the Charter of the United Nations, Great Britain has responsibilities with respect to Palestine which Great Britain must observe. Great Britain cannot discharge its obligation by disclaiming its trust. Great Britain's responsibilities continue until its tutelage of Palestine is completed as, for example, by the orderly working out of the General Assembly recommendation, or by a trusteeship for Palestine under the United Nations Charter.

(7) If the Mandatory should disclaim its trust by prematurely abandoning the mandate, questions might be raised as to the existence of legal continuity for the governing of Palestine, if at that time the General Assembly had repealed its recommendation. United Nations organs would, nevertheless, have their customary prerogatives and duties under the Charter.

(8) If the state or states having authority to provide a government for Palestine took no action, and the organs of the United Nations likewise remained paralyzed, there would be an absence of constituted authority in Palestine, which would leave the way open for the growth of one or more local agencies of administration. These might assume a governmental character and secure international recognition, thus achieving status as members of the family of nations, with corresponding rights and duties.

ERNEST A. GROSS

Editorial Note

According to Dan Kurzman, *Genesis 1948*, page 99. President Truman telephoned to Secretary Marshall at San Francisco on March 20 and instructed him to issue a statement making it clear that trusteeship had not been proposed as a substitute for partition but had simply been suggested as a temporary measure to fill the political vacuum in Palestine until partition could be effected.

Secretary Marshall held a press conference at Los Angeles on March 20 at which he stated that "The course of action with respect to the Palestine question which was proposed on March 19 by Ambassador Austin appeared to me, after the most careful consideration, to be the wisest course to follow. I recommended it to the President,

and he approved my recommendation. . . . The United States suggestion is that a temporary trusteeship should be established in order to maintain the peace and to open up the way to an agreed settlement. This trusteeship could be ended as soon as a peaceful solution can be found. The trusteeship itself would be established without prejudice in any way to the eventual political settlement which might be reached for Palestine." The full text of the Secretary's statement is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, March 28, 1948, page 408.

501.BB Palestine/3-2248

*Memorandum by the Director of the Executive Secretariat
(Humelsine) to the Secretary of State*

[WASHINGTON,] March 22, 1948.

MR. SECRETARY: Mr. Lovett gave me the following statement on Palestine this morning. He asked that a copy of it be passed along to you for your information.

When Clifford called me he took the line that the President said he had never approved the so-called "Mandate Speech" of Austin's,¹ which was submitted to the President and which carried at the end the recommendation for the trusteeship. Actually that document was taken over to Clifford (to be given to the President) by McClintock on March 6, the day after the President returned from his trip. That same day the President called me to come over around noon, and I asked him at that time if he had received the document which we had sent over earlier that morning. He said he had the document and would read it.

Then, as I recall, on Monday the 8th the Secretary took me to the White House to report on two things, ERP and Palestine. At that time I outlined the situation as follows: That on the 5th the Security Council had considered our no. 1 proposal (which was to accept the plan and implement it) and had voted that down. The Security Council then had moved to the remainder of our motion to take up paragraphs 2 and 3 (the consultation part of the thing), but although paragraph 1 had been voted down, that I (Lovett) would not consider this vote-down as a complete rejection. At that time the President asked me what the outlook was, and I said it was bad because we had only gotten 5 votes for implementation of the GA proposal, and our people in New York thought we could not get the 7 votes to pass it. I said that we would have to have an alternative and that was the trusteeship proposal contained in the latter part of the draft statement. The President said we were to go though and attempt to get approval of implementation of the GA resolution but if we did not get it we could take the alternative step. That was perfectly clear.² He said it to General Marshall and to me. I came back to the office, and then went to lunch.

¹ Ambassador Austin's statement before the Security Council on March 19; see p. 742.

² Underscoring here and in the two places later in this memorandum appear in the original.

When I got back from lunch I told McClintock the President had approved the mandate speech as a second step after we had gotten licked on the other. There is absolutely no question but what the President approved it.

There was a definite clearance there. I stress it because Clifford told me the President said he did not know anything about it.³

C[ARLISLE] HUMELSINE

³ In a memorandum of March 22 to Mr. Bohlen, the Secretary of State wrote:

"In my discussion of Palestine with the President today, he said that the reason he was so much exercised in the matter was the fact that Austin made his statement without the President having been advised that he was going to make it at that particular time. He had agreed to the statement but said that if he had known when it was going to be made he could have taken certain measures to have avoided the political blast of the press." (501.BB Palestine/3-2248)

501.BB Palestine/3-2248

*Memorandum by the Director of the Office of United Nations Affairs
(Rusk) to the Secretary of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] March 22, 1948.

In dealing with questions on Palestine, the following points are fundamental:

1. The United Nations itself reached a complete impasse on Palestine.

a. *The Security Council*

On March 5, 1948, the Security Council refused to pass an American resolution which would have accepted the General Assembly resolution as a basis for Security Council action. Our resolution got only 5 of the necessary 7 votes. During Big Five consultations over the past two weeks, no agreement was reached on a basis for further Security Council action on Palestine. In addition, informal consultations among the non-permanent members of the Security Council indicated very clearly that partition could never get 7 votes in the Security Council.

b. *The Trusteeship Council*

On March 16, 1948, there were only 4 affirmative votes for the Draft Statute for the City of Jerusalem, an essential part of the partition plan. There were 5 votes in opposition. The only way in which partition was saved this defeat was by postponing action in the Trusteeship Council until April.

c. *The Palestine Commission*

The Palestine Commission will not be able to proceed to Palestine without armed forces to support it, will not be able to establish an

Arab Government in the proposed Arab state, will not be able to establish an economic union, and will not be able to place in operation the international territory of the City of Jerusalem. Thus it is clear that the only part of the plan which the Palestine Commission might possibly carry out would be the announcement of a provisional council of government for the Jewish state itself.

2. Unless emergency action is taken, large-scale fighting will break out in Palestine on May 16.

The United Kingdom seems determined to terminate the mandate on May 15. There is no prospect that the partition scheme can now be made effective by that date. Any effort to establish a Jewish state by self-help on the part of the Jews would inevitably result in large-scale fighting between the Jews and the Arabs. The Arabs will insist that the termination of the mandate leaves Palestine as a single independent country, of course under Arab control.

3. The United States proposal for a temporary trusteeship is emergency action directed solely to the maintenance of peace pending a political settlement.

In discussing the nature of the proposed trusteeship, it is important to emphasize that it is a means for obtaining a truce. The military truce must be accompanied by a political truce, but the political truce requires governmental machinery to take over when the British leave. The proposal is without prejudice to the eventual political settlement. It is a conservatory effort.

4. In the trusteeship field, the United Nations is empowered to act as a *government* and is not making recommendations. There is therefore no Charter problem about enforcing law and order in Palestine in connection with trusteeship.

501.BB Palestine/3-2248

*Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by Mr. Robert M.
McClintock*

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] March 22, 1948.

Mr. Clifford telephoned me this morning to say that the President had requested him to prepare "a little study" of recent chronology on the handling of the Palestine case in the Security Council. He said that he had heard that on Friday I had talked to Mr. Lovett about a certain matter which had been cleared with Secretary Forrestal and which Mr. Lovett had requested be cleared with the President. I told Mr. Clifford that I had spoken to Mr. Lovett on the telephone Friday morning and had informed him of a certain security aspect of the Palestine problem which had been cleared by Mr. Bohlen with the Secretary of National Defense, and that Mr. Lovett had sug-

gested that this be checked with the President. I said that I had immediately sought to get in touch with Mr. Bohlen; that the latter was then at the Capitol; and that I wrote Mr. Bohlen a memorandum of the Under Secretary's instructions.

Mr. Clifford asked if anyone in the State Department had sought to gain White House clearance pursuant to Mr. Lovett's request. I said that so far as I was aware no one had unless it was Mr. Bohlen himself. However, I had been absent from Washington since Friday afternoon and was not personally aware what had gone on since my departure. I added that, since Mr. Bohlen had secured clearance from Mr. Forrestal, I thought that the White House clearance suggested by Mr. Lovett should go through Mr. Bohlen.

Mr. Clifford concluded the interview by asking me "Did you, yourself, try to clear this point with the White House?" I said I had not.

501.BB Palestine/3-2248

*Memorandum by the Counselor (Bohlen) to Mr. Robert M.
McClintock*¹

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] March 22, 1948.

With reference to the attached memorandum from Mr. McClintock:²

As I was on the Hill that morning I did not receive the memorandum until late in the morning upon my return. Since Mr. Lovett's suggestion with regard to that portion of the telegram³ already cleared with Mr. Forrestal referred *not* to any question calling for any action by Senator Austin in the Palestine question, but was merely for his information only—in order to safeguard against being committed indirectly to a course of action not in accordance with the President's program; and in view of the fact that the Security Council meeting at which the agreed program was to go forward was already in session, I did not consider it necessary to check this point with the President in the afternoon.

I would like to emphasize again that this point did not bear on the statement that Senator Austin was then making before the Security Council but was merely for his information concerning our eventual participation in a trusteeship agreement as set forth in the program—which would not arise even for consideration until the proposed meeting of the General Assembly to consider the principle of UN trusteeship.

CHARLES E. BOHLEN

¹ Addressed also to Mr. Humelsine.

² Presumably, the memorandum, *supra*.

³ Presumably, telegram 144, March 18, to New York, p. 741.

501.BB Palestine/3-2248 : Telegram

The Consul General at Jerusalem (Macatee) to the Secretary of State

SECRET US URGENT

JERUSALEM, March 22, 1948—5 p. m.

341. Jewish reaction Austin statement Friday one of consternation, disillusion, despair and determination. Most feel United States has betrayed Jews in interests Middle Eastern oil and for fear Russian designs. Foreign correspondents see Jewish determination set up state in any event and only decision to be made is whether state to be in area given under partition scheme or in all Palestine with Jerusalem as capital and Tel Aviv as seat of govt. Jewish Agency political and security officials confirm public sentiment and bitterness against US but feel that Jewish Agency executive, if meeting probably Tuesday, will not reach immediate decision establishment state.¹ As JA security officer said "if we do make such decision we poor Jews will be in the wrong again". While some believe US policy reversal will throw Jews into hands of Russians most feel Jews will have to "fight it out alone".

Arabs while pleased with United States abandonment of partition regard it as only natural return of US to principles of democracy and justice and are glad Arabs and Americans can resume traditional friendship. But all determined fight against Jews must continue until Zionism eradicated. Kawukgi, commander [Yarmuk] army, told American correspondents his army in Palestine not to fight partition but to crush Zionism. Arabs more optimistic but not overconfident.

Both Arabs Jews regard trusteeship scheme undesirable and most observers feel bloodshed will now increase tremendously with Jews desperate and Arabs feeling new strength.²

MACATEE

¹ The Jewish Agency and the National Council of the Jews in Palestine, the Vaad Leumi, adopted a statement on the question of a trusteeship for Palestine on March 23. The statement declared their opposition to any proposal designed to prevent or postpone the establishment of a Jewish State; rejected any plan to establish a trusteeship regime in Palestine; and asserted that by May 16, a provisional Jewish Government would begin to function; for text of the statement, see SC, 3rd yr., Nos. 36-51, p. 244.

² The reaction of the Arab States to Ambassador Austin's statement was favorable, although accompanied in some instances by a note of caution. The Syrian Government expressed its "gratitude for America's reversion to common sense and fairness in rejecting Palestine's partition as unworkable." (Telegram 153, March 20, 11 p. m., from Damascus, 867N.01/3-2048) The Saudi Arabian Government was "pleased." (Telegram 157, March 22, 1 p. m., from Jidda, 867N.01/3-2248) The Iraqi reaction was "good" and "hopeful", but satisfaction "must be tempered by uncertainty how matter will develop in SC and special session GA." (Telegram 252, March 22, 2 p. m., from Baghdad, 501.BB Palestine/3-2248) The Lebanese welcomed wholeheartedly the suggestion of the United States but emphasized "that our difficulties are far from solved." (Airgram 136, March 23, from Beirut, 501.BB Palestine/3-2348) The Egyptians "universally welcomed" the United States action. An important section of public opinion, however, was "inclined to await with reserve next US step. General agreement that even temporary trusteeship will be unacceptable if it permits continued immigration or assists otherwise in establishment Jewish state or if it blocks achievement ultimate Arab objective of independent, democratic Palestine state." (Telegram 289, March 24, 4 p. m., from Cairo, 501.BB Palestine/3-2448)

Editorial Note

Offices of the Department prepared two further draft trusteeship agreements for Palestine on March 22 and 23; regarding the earlier drafts of February 11 and 12, see footnote 2, page 697. The draft of March 22 proposed that France, the United Kingdom, and the United States serve as administering authority; the draft of the following day designated the United Nations for this role. Both drafts are filed under 501.BB Palestine/3-2248; the authors are not identified.

501.BB Palestine/3-2448

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State for
Political Affairs (Armour)*

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] March 24, 1948.

Mr. Clifford telephoned, said that last night about 7 o'clock General Carter of Secretary Marshall's office telephoned him and said that in the ordinary course of events the U.S. Delegate to the United Nations would introduce a resolution asking for a special call of the General Assembly. General Carter had said that in view of the fact that the President was having a meeting today with Secretary Marshall, he wondered what Mr. Clifford's reaction was as to Mr. Austin introducing the resolution. Mr. Clifford said he told General Carter that it would be unwise to introduce the resolution in view of the important conference the President was calling for today, and he thought it better be held in *status quo* until certain matters had been discussed. Mr. Clifford said he had tried to reach General Carter, and that he had also tried to reach Mr. Bohlen and Mr. Rusk without success, and that he wanted to be sure that the President's reaction on the matter had been clearly understood. He said that the President wanted absolutely nothing done until the President had discussed the matter with Secretary Marshall and others; that if such a resolution were introduced in all probability it would be accompanied by remarks, and that the President does not want anything said at present.

I said I would check into it immediately and would see that his instructions were carried out.

I checked into the matter and then telephoned Mr. Clifford that the telegram to Austin did not go out; that it had been cancelled and that it was distinctly understood at the UN that there were to be no remarks made, and that everything will be held in abeyance until after the President's conference today.

NORMAN ARMOUR

Clifford Papers

*Memorandum of Conference on Palestine, March 24, 1948, Prepared
by the President's Special Counsel (Clifford)*

Conference was held in the Cabinet Room and was attended by the President; Secretary of State Marshall, Loy Henderson, Chip Bohlen and Dean Rusk of the State Department; Howard McGrath, Oscar Ewing; Matt Connelly; Charles Ross; Dave Niles;¹ and Clark Clifford.

Lengthy discussion was held about various solutions for solving the problem of Palestine. One of the main subjects discussed was the lifting of the embargo on arms to the Middle East.

Those present at the conference, outside of the State Department representatives, were in favor of lifting the arms embargo as soon as possible. General Marshall stated that they were working on plans for a truce and that it was felt that there was a good possibility that a truce could be effectuated. Oscar Ewing thought it was important that it be ascertained as soon as possible if a truce could be obtained and if not that the embargo should be lifted. General Marshall was asked if the decision regarding a truce could be made by Thursday, April 1, which was the President's next Press Conference. A State Department representative stated that this was too soon but that they should know definitely within two weeks of the date of the meeting. This meant that they would have a definite answer on the question of a truce by April 7.

The general understanding was that, if they could not report that they had been successful in obtaining a truce by April 7, steps would be taken to release the embargo.²

CLARK M. CLIFFORD

¹J. Howard McGrath, United States Senator from Rhode Island; Oscar R. Ewing, Administrator of the Federal Security Agency; Matthew J. Connelly, Appointments Secretary to President Truman; Charles G. Ross, Press Secretary to the President; and David K. Niles, Administrative Assistant to the President.

²Secretary Marshall testified in Executive Session on the Palestine problem before the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate on March 24. A staff member of the Committee, in a letter of May 23, 1974, has informed the editors that the Committee prepared no stenographic record of his testimony. The session began at 10 a. m., and for one hour and fifty minutes heard Secretary Marshall discuss the entire range of American foreign policy. The *New York Times* of March 25, 1948, p. 1, has printed an account of the Secretary's testimony on the Palestine problem as received from "informants of the utmost reliability."

The letter of May 23, 1974 is filed under Department of State Accession No. P740059-1789.

501.BB Palestine/3-2448

*Memorandum Prepared in the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON, undated.]

Certain observations regarding the present status of the Palestine problem :

(1) Our present policy with regard to Palestine, that is, support of a temporary trusteeship, is leading us in the direction of taking certain heavy responsibilities which may be of almost indefinite duration. These responsibilities not only may be of a financial character but may eventually require the presence of American troops in Palestine and even the shedding of American blood in Palestine.

This policy is being inaugurated in the belief that (1) American public sentiment would insist on American armed intervention if necessary in order to prevent the slaughter of the Jews in Palestine; (2) such slaughter would take place following British withdrawal unless either American or Soviet troops intervene; and (3) if American troops are introduced into Palestine it would be preferable for them to go under the terms of a neutral trusteeship rather than in order to maintain law and order while partition is being carried out. It is likely that an attempt to carry out partition accompanied by the use of foreign force would eventually require the conquest by force and a continued military occupation of much of the Arab world.

(2) There are certain dangers and pitfalls inherent in our present policy. They would be inherent in any kind of a policy with regard to Palestine. A development which would render our policy a failure would be the lack of full cooperation on the part of Great Britain. Unless there is full British-American cooperation in the future with regard to Palestine, no Palestine policy can be successful; fighting will continue in that country and chaos will probably develop in the whole Middle East to an extent which will be injurious to our national interests and will adversely affect our national security.

(3) It will probably not be easy to obtain full British cooperation for our present policy because the British are extremely bitter at what they consider to be our lack of consideration for their difficulties with regard to Palestine in the past and because of their belief that internal political pressures and shifts in the United States will render the American Government an unreliable partner in the carrying out of any Palestine policy.

¹ Transmitted to the Secretary of State by Mr. Henderson with his memorandum of March 24.

(4) If we are, therefore, to obtain British cooperation we must be able to give assurances that there will not be deviations in our policy with regard to Palestine as a result of internal political pressures in the United States. It would be difficult for us to give any assurances of this kind: (a) unless the United States Government decides once for all that it will not permit itself to be influenced by Zionist pressures; (b) unless the Palestine problem is fully explained to the leaders of both great political Parties, including members of Congress and Presidential candidates, and informal undertakings are obtained from them that Zionism and Palestine will not be made an issue in the coming presidential campaign.

(5) If we are to obtain British cooperation, we must also let the British know that the Executive Branch will take all possible steps in order to see that the United States will bear its fair share of the financial and military responsibilities involved.

(6) Our present policy with regard to Palestine can not possibly be successful if we take a defensive rather than a bold clear-cut attitude with regard to it both in the international and in the domestic arena. In the international field in cooperation with Great Britain, France, China, and such other powers as are willing to participate, we should insist sternly upon the laying down of arms, the cessation of the illegal entry of either Arabs or Jews and of the cessation of all smuggling of arms into Palestine. Perpetrators of acts of violence in Palestine, once trusteeship is established, must be considered as ordinary criminals and terrorists and punished as such. Any weakness on our part in this respect would be disastrous.

Internally we should take the lead in calling upon all American citizens regardless of race, creed or political party, to refrain from taking any action which might encourage the continuance of violence in Palestine. It should be made clear that the encouragement of such violence might well lead to the shedding of American blood and would be opposed to the basic interest of the United States. It is possible that a carefully planned campaign might result in freeing many American Jews from the domination of Zionist extremists.

(7) It is important that energetic steps be taken to bring the moderate Jews and Arabs in Palestine together. Both Jews and Arabs in Palestine should be given to understand that their failure to reach an agreement can only mean loss of life and property in Palestine. In particular the Jews in Palestine should be made to understand that they will receive no United States backing in case they persist in following a course of violence.

501.BB Palestine/3-2448 : Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Gallman) to the Secretary
of State*

SECRET US URGENT

LONDON, March 24, 1948—7 p. m.

1218. Beeley advised Embassy today that Foreign Office has instructed Cadogan to tell USDel UN that while His Majesty's Government sympathizes with motives US Government in making further attempt to avert civil war Palestine, is not possible for His Majesty's Government to depart in SC from its neutral attitude.

2. Beeley referred to charge made Parliament March 23 to effect that State Department and Foreign Office together have been concocting settlement unfavorable Jewish state (Paragraph 7 Embtel 1207 ¹). He thought public support His Majesty's Government in SC would lend color to this widely-circulated false story and consequently probably not be helpful to Department.

3. Beeley said he was sorry that British Government's public attitude will seem unhelpful because it is not intention His Majesty's Government to be unhelpful. For example, Foreign Office hopes to reply at an early date to Department's questions regarding Palestine put to British Embassy, Washington. Beeley believes there may be further steps of same kind which can be taken. Personally, he is exploring idea of drafting interim arrangements for Jerusalem and holy places (see Paragraph 4 Embs 1191, March 23 ²).

4. Embassy has impression that personally British officials dealing with Palestine problem consider new attitude US Government as sound legally and can conceive no better move in present circumstances. However, British Cabinet and British politicians are deeply sensible of overwhelming popular demand in UK to get "the boys" home from Palestine and believe all sections British public would react strongly if for whatever cause under whatever aegis, an attempt were made to keep "the boys" in Palestine even for short while beyond announced period. Long experience of being shot at by both sides in Palestine and being vilified by Zionists all nations has, in view British politicians, so calloused British conscience that it is insensate on this particular subject. The British officials who are sympathetic with US Government motives and see logic US Government position are faced with problem getting a hearing from British politicians who now have a popular and firm Palestine policy which they will not abandon easily. However, these officials may be able to persuade their superiors after termination mandate (thus keeping pledge to British electorate) to venture in cooperation with US and/or UN somewhat beyond present

¹ Dated March 24, not printed.

² Not printed.

neutral position His Majesty's Government, although in present mood British public Embassy believes it most unlikely that any British troops will be made available for use in Palestine.

GALLMAN

501.BB Palestine/3-2548 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt

US URGENT

WASHINGTON, March 25, 1948.

337. Following statement was released by President today:

"It is vital that American people have clear understanding of position of US in UN re Palestine.

This country vigorously supported plan for Partition with Economic Union recommended by UNSCOP and by GA. We have explored every possibility consistent with basic principles of Charter for giving effect to that solution. Unfortunately, it has become clear that partition plan cannot be carried out at this time by peaceful means. We could not undertake to impose this solution on people of Palestine by use of American troops, both on Charter grounds and as matter of national policy.

UK has announced its firm intention to abandon its mandate in Palestine on May 15. Unless emergency action is taken, there will be no public authority in Palestine on that date capable of preserving law and order. Violence and bloodshed will descend upon the Holy Land. Large scale fighting among people of that country will be inevitable result. Such fighting would infect entire Middle East and could lead to consequences of gravest sort involving peace of this nation and of world.

These dangers are imminent. Responsible govts in UN cannot face this prospect without acting promptly to prevent it. US has proposed to SC a temporary UN trusteeship for Palestine to provide a govt to keep peace. Such trusteeship was proposed only after we had exhausted every effort to find way to carry out partition by peaceful means. Trusteeship is not proposed as substitute for partition plan but as effort to fill vacuum soon to be created by termination of mandate on May 15. Trusteeship does not prejudice character of final political settlement. It would establish conditions of order which are essential to peaceful solution.

If we are to avert tragedy in Palestine, immediate truce must be reached between Arabs and Jews of that country. I am instructing Ambassador Austin to urge upon SC in strongest terms that representatives of Arabs and Jews be called at once to Council table to arrange such a truce.¹

US is prepared to lend every appropriate assistance to UN in preventing bloodshed and in reaching peaceful settlement. If UN agrees to temporary trusteeship, we must take our share of necessary respon-

¹ In telegram 217, March 26, 6 p. m., to Jerusalem, repeated to Arab capitals, the Department advised that "In light President's statement re Palestine Mar 25 Dept considers it imperative that highly qualified representatives Arab Higher Committee be present in NY for further UN discussion re Palestine no later than Tuesday Mar 30." (501.BB Palestine/3-2648)

sibility. Our regard for UN, for peace of world and for our own self-interest does not permit us to do less.

With such truce and such trusteeship, peaceful settlement is yet possible; without them, open warfare is just over horizon. American policy in this emergency period is based squarely upon recognition of this inescapable fact."²

Sent Cairo as 337 repeated Baghdad as 91 Beirut as 129 Damascus as 81 Jerusalem as 215 Jidda as 91, London as 1050.

MARSHALL *

² A copy of the President's statement in the Elsey Papers contains a marginal notation in the handwriting of Mr. Elsey that the statement was drafted on March 24-25 by Messrs. Clifford, Bohlen, and Rusk, with the advice and counsel of Senator McGrath and Messrs. Ewing and Niles.

President Truman, in response to questions asked at his press conference of March 25 stated that "Our policy is to back up the United Nations in the trusteeship by every means necessary", but that did not necessarily mean that American troops would be used. He also said that his "position hasn't changed with regard to immigration in Palestine" and that he remained in favor of partition at some future date (*Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1948*, pp. 191, 192).

501.BB Palestine/3-2548 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET URGENT NEW YORK, March 25, 1948—12:50 p. m.

332. Am I authorized to reply to specific question:

"Would the US contribute armed forces to UN for maintenance of law and order in Palestine to maintain truce and trusteeship?"

What reply shall I make? ¹

AUSTIN

¹ Attached to an information copy of telegram 332 is a memorandum of March 29 sent by Gladys E. Schukraft, in the Under Secretary's Office, to Mr. Lovett which reads as follows: "Mr. Rusk asked me to give you the following:

"Question: Would the United States contribute armed forces to the United Nations for the maintenance of law and order in Palestine to maintain a truce and trusteeship?

"Proposed answer: Yes, if troops become necessary, along with other United Nations members."

Mr. Lovett, in a marginal notation, stated: "No—White House does *not* approve; language should conform to President's press statement of March 25th."

The editors have been unable to find a direct reply to telegram 332 in the Department of State files. Possibly Ambassador Austin was informed of Mr. Lovett's views by telephone.

The Clifford Papers contain an undated memorandum prepared presumably by Mr. Clifford for the President, which reads as follows: "State Department asked you late yesterday what Ambassador Austin should say today (Tuesday) if asked this question.

"I suggest this answer:

"In the first place, it has often been contemplated that UN forces should, whenever practicable, be made up of troops of the smaller nations which have no immediate partisan interest in the area to be policed, and should not be made up of units of larger nations with any special interest in the area. In the alternative, there can be an international volunteer force. . . .

"In the second place, it should be borne in mind that trusteeship is simply a method, a way station, a means to an end—and not the end, not the goal, not

S67N.01/3-2648

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Lovett)*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] March 26, 1948.

Participants: The Secretary
The Under Secretary
Mr. Moshe Shertok, Jewish Agency for Palestine
Mr. Eliahu Epstein, Jewish Agency for Palestine

Mr. Shertok called on the Secretary at the latter's request. He was accompanied by Mr. Epstein. The Secretary explained to these gentlemen that his purpose in asking them to come in was to find out from them the attitude of the Jewish Agency and the Palestine groups which it represented toward an attempt to bring representatives of the Jewish Agency and the Arab Higher Committee together in an effort to work out a cessation of hostilities and a truce.

Mr. Shertok asked for a more precise definition of the difference between the two expressions, and the Secretary pointed out that the normal concept was a cease fire order by both parties concurrent with a truce or immediately followed by negotiations for one. Mr. Shertok stated that the position of the Jewish Agency had been made clear in a formal statement and that the people of Palestine would not agree to a "truce" while "foreign troops were in Palestine and infiltration of reinforcements continued". By foreign troops he explained he did not mean the Mandatory Power but Arabs in substantial numbers (which he estimated at about 6,000) who had come into the country from Syria, Lebanon, Trans-Jordan, and Iraq. He mentioned particularly that these bodies of armed men were organized, equipped with arms, and in uniform, and that the British had done little or nothing to oppose them or eject them. He referred specifically to a group of several hundred Iraqi troops encamped at the location of the water supply of Jerusalem and in a position to seize it.

The Secretary pointed out that we were making earnest efforts to find a way of stopping the bloodshed and, through conciliation, to find some solution to the difficulties which remained unsolved and appeared almost insoluble in the light of the belligerent attitude taken by both of the parties involved. Picking up the statement of Mr. Shertok about the foreign troops in Palestine, the Secretary asked how they could be identified and whether they could be located. Mr. Shertok

the final result. The purpose of the suggestion of trusteeship is to obtain a peaceful implementation of the UN decision for partition. It may be that others in the UN will want to suggest some other and even better way of securing what the American Government has in mind—the preservation of the peace in aid of partition. Once the method which is best for this purpose is decided upon, the picture will become clearer for the decision of the kind and composition of any troops that may be useful to carry out that method."

replied that he did not know whether they could all be located, but that he felt in Palestine there were substantial numbers which could be identified. After further discussion along this line, Mr. Shertok was asked the direct question as to whether the Jewish Agency would agree to a truce if one of the terms provided for the withdrawal of such armed bands from Palestine. Mr. Shertok stated that this would not be enough, as the period of truce would be used by the Arabs to build up their forces through infiltration, to run in additional arms, and otherwise to improve their position, since the truce would assure them of a period of time during which they would not be attacked by the Haganah. He said that failure to require the withdrawal of the armed bands and prevent further border violation by infiltration or otherwise would be regarded by the Jewish communities in Palestine as a "complete capitulation to the Arabs". Long discussion brought out the fact that Messrs. Shertok and Epstein would recommend and they felt that the Jewish Agency would agree to the cessation of hostilities and accept a truce which provided :

- (1) For complete cessation of hostilities by each party and the strict prohibition of acts of terrorism, etcetera ;
- (2) That all "identifiable bodies of armed men" from neighboring states should be withdrawn from Palestine territory ;
- (3) That strict border patrol be instituted as a protection against any further infiltration ; and
- (4) That the rights of the Jewish Agency be "reserved" and its position be not "prejudiced" by this truce.

During the discussion Mr. Shertok emphasized that the Jewish Agency had been for some months perfecting its program for the take-over of the administrative functions on May 15 on the termination of the British Mandate. He explained that the British had reiterated again their purpose to lay down the mandate on the 15th of May and have their troops out by August 1, reserving in the meantime the military authority until the latter date, especially in certain areas. Mr. Shertok said frankly that the Jewish Agency would expect to continue during the truce its preparations for taking over the Jewish areas "allocated to them under the United Nations' Partition Program".

The Secretary questioned Mr. Shertok closely on the matter of the ability of the Palestine settlement to defend itself, and Mr. Shertok said that they were prepared to fight indefinitely, and that while they were "in desperate need of arms, including artillery, tanks and armored vehicles", they would fight and felt that they could do so successfully. When he was asked whether they were counting on foreign assistance if the Arabs began to get the upper hand, he said that he felt there would be Jewish volunteers coming in from all over the world and that this might cause international complications, as might "volunteered assistance from certain powers". He thought such a situa-

tion might cause the United Nations to use an "international force" to restore peace, and he felt that it would be far costlier than to do it now.

Toward the end of the conversation Mr. Shertok was asked whether he felt that there was any solution to the problem. After some thought he said that he did not feel that there was any which did not involve the use of "an international police force" which was, as he put it, as non-existent today as it was in November of 1947. He said that the Jewish Agency must insist on adequate immigration and that the Arabs, in his opinion, would oppose any increase over the present 1,500 a month. Mr. Epstein said that this was obviously inadequate and that in all of their efforts in the past to find a common ground with the Arabs they have ultimately broken on this point.

It was apparent that neither Mr. Shertok nor Mr. Epstein felt that the truce would solve anything basic, and they displayed considerable doubt that the trusteeship would help the situation. In fact, Mr. Shertok stated that it was wholly unacceptable to the Jewish Agency and that it would be "intolerable" if the British should remain as the operating trustee. He said that relations had deteriorated very rapidly over the past year and that the British part in the trusteeship was "unacceptable". Just before leaving Mr. Shertok made a strong plea for placing Jerusalem under an international trusteeship in order to keep it from falling into the hands of the Arabs. He said that the British had been turning it over little by little to the Arab tribal sheiks and that this was an appalling fact after 30 years of freedom from Moslem control. He said that the Jewish Agency would be prepared if necessary to deal with the question of Jerusalem separate from that of the rest of the Palestine question if there could be assurance that Jerusalem would be maintained as an internationalized holy city and not permitted to fall back into the hands of the Arabs.

In connection with his comments about the city of Jerusalem, Mr. Shertok said that a representative of the United Nations in Jerusalem had suggested that the Scandinavian token forces presently in Germany might be used as an international police force in Jerusalem and would be most acceptable to the Jewish Agency. The proposal apparently originated with a Norwegian officer. The Secretary asked Mr. Shertok if he had any indication that any of the Scandinavian countries might agree to such a proposal, or whether it had been taken up through the United Nations or otherwise. Mr. Shertok replied that he did not know but felt that the idea had merit and was well worth exploring.

He was bitter about the British position throughout and said that the Arab League was the agent through which the British worked in the Middle East and that it was intolerable that the British should put the Arab League over the Palestinians in a trusteeship or otherwise.

Mr. Epstein is returning to Palestine in about two weeks, and said he would make himself available to the Department upon his return for any information they might desire.

ROBERT A. LOVETT

867N.01/3-2648

*Memorandum of Conversation by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)*¹

RESTRICTED

[WASHINGTON,] March 26, 1948.

Participants: Dr. Charles Malik, Lebanese Minister
Mr. Henderson, NEA
Mr. Merriam, NE

Dr. Malik came in by appointment at his request. He said that it would be helpful if we could make available to him any background or comment relating to the President's press conference yesterday which would be of assistance to him in reporting to his Government. He indicated particular concern over the possibility that a trusteeship might be slanted toward, or be a subterfuge for, partition. He said that it was particularly important that his Government have accurate information regarding the background and purposes of trusteeship, since his Foreign Minister was just about to leave Beirut for an Arab League meeting in Cairo.

In reply, I quoted to Dr. Malik the following passage in the President's statement:

"Trusteeship is not proposed as a substitute for the partition plan but as an effort to fill the vacuum soon to be created by the termination of the mandate on May 15. The trusteeship does not prejudice the character of the final political settlement."

I said that I fully realized that the Arabs would be suspicious of a slanted trusteeship, and that I felt sure we had nothing of the kind in mind. I pointed out that Arab cooperation was essential for the success of trusteeship in the General Assembly, for if it were opposed by both the Arab countries and the Soviet bloc a two-thirds majority could not be obtained.

It was also pointed out to the Minister that the terms of the trusteeship agreement would constitute a safeguard, since it would be bound to contain specific provisions concerning the purpose of the trusteeship, the circumstances under which it would be terminated, immigration, and so on, and that it would be impossible to allow these matters to be dealt with in vague language open to various interpretations as was

¹ Drafted by Mr. Merriam.

done in the mandate. We would, of course, be bound by the terms of the trusteeship agreement.

Dr. Malik asked whether it was too early to secure information on our ideas for securing a truce. I said it was a little early but that I would let him know when the matter was further along.

In concluding I said that I did not believe trusteeship would work unless there was cooperation from both Arabs and Jews; that it would be an extremely difficult matter to secure the cooperation of both sides but that he could be sure we were urging cooperation as strongly upon the Jews as upon the Arabs.

L[OY] W. H[ENDERSON]

501.BB Palestine/3-2448: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, March 26, 1948—6 p. m.

1067. Embtel 1218 March 24. Dept regrets that FO has instructed Cadogan to tell USDel UN that while HMG sympathizes with motives USGovt in making further attempt to avert civil war Palestine it is not possible for HMG to depart in SC from its neutral attitude.

Dept suggests Ambassador Austin's statement Feb 24, his two statements March 19 in SC particularly latter and Sec's statement March 20 in Los Angeles re Palestine¹ clearly indicate constructive line which USGovt is following in UN in endeavor to prevent strife in Palestine and to create conditions under which it might be possible for Jews and Arabs in Palestine to reach agreement by peaceful means.

The President made statement March 25² on Palestine which further confirms constructive line USGovt is following at UN.

Statements by President, Secretary and Ambassador Austin to which reference is made, as well as official statements of HMG at UN and in London do not indicate, in Dept's opinion, nor could such contention seriously be maintained in press, that "State Dept and FO together have been concocting settlement unfavorable Jewish State." It would appear on other hand that future support by HMG in SC for measures proposed by USGovt to prevent strife in Palestine and make agreement possible would be in accord with HMG's traditional policies and would meet with favor in world press.

While Dept realizes necessity for immediate interim arrangements for Jerusalem and holy places it is suggested that it would be difficult to make any arrangements for Jerusalem without at same time con-

¹ Regarding the Secretary's statement of March 20, see editorial note, p. 748.

² See telegram 337, March 25, to Cairo, p. 759.

sidering arrangements for Palestine in its entirety, as became apparent when TC considered Jerusalem regime under partition plan. FonOff (Embtel 1191 March 23 ³) tacitly admits this fact by indicating that Jewish population of Jerusalem can be throttled by steps taken elsewhere in Palestine.

During recent years many proposals regarding possible trusteeship agreements have been given consideration publicly and privately. Dept feels certain HMG has constructive suggestions in this respect. Dept has given thought and study to this matter and stands ready informally to discuss draft agreements with HMG for purpose of developing most acceptable type of trusteeship agreement in light of present conditions.

Dept believes any discussion re trusteeship must of necessity take into consideration the following three types: (a) Single administering power; (b) Two or more administering powers; (c) UN as administering authority.

Dept does not consider first two as feasible under present circumstances because of political and military difficulties but believes that trusteeship with UN as administering authority would meet with greater approval in the UN and with greater success in Palestine. All types of trusteeship would in any event provide for governor general with broad powers acting within framework of trusteeship agreement under TC.

Trusteeship with UN as administering authority might provide that governor general could call on one or more powers, such as principal allied and associated powers of World War I, to furnish emergency forces under specific circumstances either in event local forces were not adequate for maintenance of internal law and order, or to maintain integrity of Palestine against external aggression.

Governmental administration would be detailed in trusteeship agreement to provide early working basis for independence.

Financial cost of such trusteeship, including security forces for maintenance of internal law and order would be borne by peoples of Palestine. Financial cost of security forces for maintenance of international law and order, should such be required, would be borne by members of the UN supplying them, or possibly pro rata among all members.

It would seem to Dept that informal discussions by HMG with responsible Brit leaders along lines of foregoing would dispel fears that the UN or any of its members were attempting to tie HMG up in new

³ Not printed; it advised that the "Palestine Government foresees that Arabs may cut Jerusalem water supply which would be disastrous to Jewish quarter. . . . If and when electric power lines are similarly cut, Jerusalem sewage pumps will stop. Combination of both may make Jewish part city untenable for inhabitants in short time." (S67N.01/3-2348)

agreement which would merely be a continuation of present Mandate.⁴ Repeated to USUN as 167.

MARSHALL

⁴ An Embassy officer discussed the substance of telegram 1067 with Mr. Beeley on March 27. The latter was reported to have said that the "new factor in Palestine situation to be evaluated was Arab and Jewish reaction to President's statement quoted Department's 1050 March 25 and President's replies to question at press conference. Beeley feels that Arabs 'who have shown themselves in principle ready to talk trusteeship' will interpret expression President's personal faith in partition and in immigration 100,000 as revelation 'true purpose' behind US trusteeship proposal and allege on strength President's remarks that US Government is maneuvering via trusteeship secure both partition and immediate immigration 100,000 Jews."

The officer "urged that neutral attitude HMG re constructive US proposals is making task US Government infinitely harder and asked Beeley to say frankly what would persuade HMG to emerge from its unhelpful passivity." Mr. Beeley replied that the British Cabinet "would not alter its attitude unless it were made 'absolutely clear . . . that US Government recognizes that any British participation in implementation US proposals would not take the form of provision of British forces.'" (Telegram 1248, March 27, 7 p. m., from London, 501.BB Palestine/3-2748)

Telegram 1050 was a repeat of 337 to Cairo, p. 759.

501.BB Palestine/3-2648 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED

Moscow, March 26, 1948—6 p. m.

550. *Red Fleet* March 26 carried first Soviet comment on US trusteeship proposal for Palestine under heading American Maneuver in Palestine Question, stressing repudiation UN 1947 decision as "open violation USA international obligations". Article quotes chairman House Subcommittee on armed forces UN decision mistake as endangering American oil interests Middle East. American policy determined by fact Palestine transfer station oil Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Syria. New York *Post* quoted Forrestal conducts campaign against UN partition ruling as member American oil companies. Although UN decision taken with American consent, narrowly selfish aims American monopolists destroy own decisions.

SMITH

567N.01/3-2748

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] March 27, 1948.

On the morning of March 20 Sir John Balfour and Mr. Bromley of the British Embassy called on me in order to discuss the statement

made on the preceding day in the Security Council by Senator Austin on Palestine.

During the course of our conversation I stressed the importance of British and American cooperation in bringing about a cessation of fighting in Palestine and in working out a temporary trusteeship for Palestine which would facilitate the maintenance of law and order in that country until a permanent solution of the Palestine problem could be achieved by peaceful means. I referred to certain efforts which our respective governments had been making to cooperate in maintaining peace and stability in the Middle East; I said that the one area with regard to which we had not been following parallel policies was Palestine; and I pointed out that the time seemed to have come when the two Governments could cooperate to their mutual advantage and in the interests of world peace in disposing of the Palestine problem. I added that the British could not escape the repercussions of civil war in Palestine merely by pulling out their troops. Developments threatening to undermine the security of the Middle East could not be ignored by Great Britain any more than by the United States. In fact Great Britain stood to lose more than the United States in case the tranquility of the Middle East should be seriously disturbed. I realized that the British did not wish alone to continue to bear the main burden of maintaining law and order in Palestine. I could understand the desire of the British to terminate the mandate and withdraw their troops from Palestine as soon as possible. Nevertheless, the American Government hoped that the British Government would be willing to maintain British troops in Palestine for a short time beyond May 15 in case it should so transpire that an effective trusteeship regime could not be set up by that date.

Balfour and Bromley promised to submit the request at once to their Government by telegram. They said that they felt that the British Government, in any event, would not wish to indicate that it would be willing to retain British troops in Palestine beyond May 15. Such an indication would give rise to public resentment in Great Britain and might result in a relaxation of the efforts of members of the United Nations to bring about a speedy solution of the problem. I agreed that it might not be wise for Great Britain to indicate publicly at this time its willingness to retain troops beyond May 15. I said, however, that we would like to have some private assurances in that regard. I added that various offices in the Department had been working on draft trusteeship agreements and that within a few days I might be able informally to show the Embassy some of the results of this work.

On March 26 Sir John Balfour and Mr. Bromley came in to see me again and left with me the attached top secret message from the

Foreign Office ¹ as well as the attached paraphrase of a telegram from the Foreign Office to Cadogan.²

During the course of the conversation I again emphasized how important it was in their own interest that the British should cooperate with us in the Palestine matter. I also handed to Balfour and Bromley copies of drafts which had been prepared in the Department of trusteeship agreements for Palestine. One of these drafts provided for the United Nations as administering authority and the other for the United States, Great Britain and France as the administering authority. I said that these drafts had been prepared at working levels; that they were still in an unfinished stage and would, of course, be subject to many alterations; that I had not had an opportunity myself to read them, and I doubted that any other director had read them. I said that I was handing them to the British Embassy, however, with the idea that it could send copies to the Foreign Office so that the working levels of the Foreign Office would understand the way in which the working levels of the Department of State were thinking. I stressed the fact that the documents in question should be treated as top secret.

Balfour said that he would send the drafts with the explanation which I had given him to the Foreign Office by courier leaving Washington on Sunday, March 28.³

L[OY] W. H[ENDERSON]

¹ Not printed.

² The paraphrase read: "The American appeal that we should support their new proposals on Palestine places us in a great difficulty. I sympathise with the motives which have led the United States Government to make this last minute effort to avert civil war in Palestine. But I feel that, for the time being at any rate, we must maintain our consistent line of abstention. The accusation has already been made, during last night's debate in the House of Commons on the Palestine bill, that the new American move was concerted with His Majesty's Government, and any support you gave to Austin in the Security Council would lend colour to this suspicion. For this reason I doubt whether our support would be helpful to the United States Government in dealing with their public opinion." The Foreign Office message was dated March 24.

³ Mr. Ross, on April 12, transmitted telegraphically to Mr. Rusk the text of an *aide-mémoire* dated April 9 left with him by Sir Alexander Cadogan. The message underscored the Foreign Office's doubts as to prospects for an agreement between the Arabs and the Jews on the basis of the trusteeship proposals handed by Mr. Henderson to Sir John Balfour on March 26.

The *aide-mémoire* stated that there was little reason to suppose that the Arab and Jewish communities in Palestine would come to an understanding on a plan for self-government; that the trusteeship would prove to be an interim one in name only; that the provisions proposed for terminating the trusteeship would rule out any possibility of partitioning Palestine, a factor which might cause rejection of the proposed trusteeship by the Jews; that the Arabs would oppose the trusteeship agreements in that they postponed independence indefinitely and empowered the Jews to veto the constitution of an independent unitary state; and that the Arabs would object to the immigration and land transfer provisions in the trusteeship proposals. (Telegram 425 from New York, 501.BB Palestine/4-1248)

501.BB Palestine/3-2748: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, March 27, 1948—6 p. m.

170. For Austin from Lovett.

1. The President's statement on Palestine March 25 makes amply clear urgent necessity for United States to exert every effort in SC to have a truce arranged between Jews and Arabs of Palestine. It is essential that representatives of JA and AHC state in SC their views on a possible truce.

2. Such a truce should be based on two fundamental considerations:

(a) It is absolutely essential that the violence and bloodshed cease in order that international peace may not be gravely endangered, particularly after May 15.

(b) Both JA and AHC must be prepared to accept truce arrangements which would not prejudice claims of either group at future date when atmosphere may be more conducive to peaceful solution of problem.

3. Following draft resolution on truce is sent for your guidance. You are authorized, however, to use broad discretion in final drafting terms in order to secure maximum support of other delegations for President's proposal.

"The Security Council, in the exercise of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security,

NOTES with grave concern the increasing violence and disorder in Palestine and believes that it is of the utmost urgency that an immediate truce be effected in Palestine;

Calls Upon the Jewish Agency for Palestine and the Arab Higher Committee to make available representatives to meet at once with the Security Council for the purpose of arranging a truce between the Arab and Jewish communities of Palestine;

Calls Upon Arab and Jewish armed groups in Palestine to cease acts of violence forthwith; ¹ and finally,

Calls Upon all governments, peoples, and groups, within and outside of Palestine, to prevent by all lawful means, and not to commit any act or acts which would further aggravate the situation in Palestine."

4. Resolution on truce should be submitted in SC Tuesday. In discussing its terms with other delegations you should also state US believes SC must also proceed rapidly with consideration of "Additional Conclusions and Recommendations Concerning Palestine" contained in your statement to SC afternoon of March 19. In particular we feel that it is essential for SC to request SYG to convoke special session of

¹ Acting Secretary Lovett, on March 29, instructed Ambassador Austin to end the text of the proposed resolution at this point (telegram 171 to New York, 501.BB Palestine/3-2748).

GA to consider further question of future government of Palestine. Accordingly you should also submit on Tuesday the following additional resolution:

"THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

Having on December 9, 1947, received the Resolution of the General Assembly concerning Palestine dated November 29, 1947, and

Having taken note of the United Nations Palestine Commission's First and Second Monthly Progress Reports and First Special Report on the Problem of Security, and

Having on March 5, 1948, called on the permanent members of the Council to consult, and

Having taken note of the reports made concerning those consultations,

REQUESTS the Secretary-General, in accordance with Article 20 of the UN Charter, to convoke a Special Session of the General Assembly to consider further the question of the future Government of Palestine."

5. Dept believes it more desirable not to mention trusteeship in resolution set forth in preceding paragraph. However, when introducing resolution in SC you should reiterate US position contained in your statement March 19, and reaffirmed in that of Secretary in Los Angeles March 20 and of President on March 25 that a temporary trusteeship should be established in order to maintain the peace and that it would be without prejudice to character of final political settlement. We believe a trusteeship is essential to establish conditions of order which are essential to a peaceful solution. We are not incorporating reference to trusteeship in our resolution at this time, however, as we believe SC may wish to discuss proposal further. Resolution on trusteeship can be introduced at later stage following further SC discussion.

6. Additional points regarding terms and type of trusteeship US would consider favorable will be forwarded to you as soon as possible.² [Lovett.]

MARSHALL

² Marginal notation by Mr. Rusk: "Cleared with Clark Clifford 5:45 p. m. March 27."

867N.01/3-2748

*Proposed Letter From President Truman to British Prime Minister Attlee*¹

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON, undated.]

MY DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER: I am taking advantage of the departure of Ambassador Douglas for London to send you this personal

¹ Drafted March 27 by Messrs. McClintock and Wilkins and transmitted to Mr. Lovett by Mr. Henderson with his memorandum of March 29; marginal notation, by Mr. Lovett: "Not approved".

letter expressing my deep concern over the trend of events in Palestine.

I am fully aware of the deep-seated popular feeling in the United Kingdom that the time has come for your Government to terminate its Mandate for Palestine and to withdraw the forces which thus far have maintained the integrity of the Mandate. I would not be candid if I did not tell you frankly that the rapidity of British withdrawal in the face of the uncertain future for Palestine very much complicates the task which lies before the United Nations if by May 15 of this year it is to establish some form of rule in Palestine which will maintain the peace, not only internally, but also with regard to the security of the Middle East.

You may have read the statement which I made on March 25 on the position of the United States Government with respect to the Palestine situation. In this statement, I stressed our belief based on recent consultations among the permanent members of the Security Council and with the Jews and the Arabs of Palestine that the plan for partition of Palestine recommended by the United Nations General Assembly on November 29, 1947 cannot be carried out at this time by peaceful means. I also emphasized that we cannot undertake to impose this solution on the people of Palestine by the use of force, since the Charter of the United Nations does not empower the Security Council or the General Assembly to enforce such political recommendations.

My statement concluded with the proposal that an immediate truce be observed by the two dissident communities in Palestine—the Arabs and Jews. At the same time, we proposed that the United Nations establish a temporary trusteeship for Palestine to provide a government to keep the peace.

It would seem to me that your Government would have a special interest in the arrangement of an immediate truce in Palestine since it is still the Mandatory Power. We are, therefore, counting upon the full support and cooperation of your Government in urging the Jews and Arabs of Palestine to agree to a cease-fire order by the Security Council and to a truce which shall be without prejudice to the eventual solution of the Palestine problem.

It is clear that without the full support of your Government it would be extremely difficult if not impossible to work out the terms of a trusteeship and to set up in Palestine in the near future a temporary trusteeship regime which could maintain law and order following the termination of the Mandate. Such a trusteeship, as I stated

on March 25, would not prejudice the character of the final political settlement.

There is a possibility that if the United Nations Trusteeship Council should accept responsibility to become the administering authority for Palestine and should appoint a governor with wide powers to maintain the integrity of that country, security forces might be required at the request of the Trusteeship Council or the governor to maintain international peace and security with respect to Palestine. The Government of the United States is prepared to join with the Governments of the remaining Allied and Associated Powers of World War I—in other words, the United Kingdom and France—to provide contingents to the Trusteeship Council and the Governor of Palestine, if such should be required under emergency conditions, for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security under the terms of the trusteeship agreement.

The Department of State has given considerable study to the details of a temporary trusteeship agreement which would incorporate some of the thoughts which I have expressed in this letter. I have no doubt, on the other hand, that your Government has been able to study this matter in greater detail in view of its long administrative experience in Palestine. It is, therefore, my hope that officials of the British Government will be prepared to cooperate with corresponding officials of the United States Government in the preparation of a draft trusteeship agreement. Such a draft agreement could subsequently be considered more formally by our two governments and perhaps by other interested governments prior to presentation to the United Nations. It is my understanding that measures for an interchange of views are under way. You may be assured that we are anxious to cooperate with you in this matter and we stand ready to supply such information as we may be in a position to contribute.

We feel that prompt action is imperative in view of the early date on which your Government plans to terminate the mandate for Palestine. In order to proceed under the trusteeship provisions of the Charter, it would appear necessary for the United Kingdom as Mandatory Power to present a draft Trusteeship Agreement to the United Nations at the earliest possible moment. Such action should be welcomed by the United Nations and should strengthen its handling of the Palestine question. We are convinced that peace in Palestine and a successful political settlement for Palestine will not be attained unless we approach this increasingly difficult question in a cooperative manner.

Sincerely yours,

Forrestal Papers

*Diary Entry for March 29, 1948, by the Secretary of Defense
(Forrestal)*

*Conversation With the President and Under Secretary Lovett re
Palestine Trusteeship*

Under Secretary Lovett called up this afternoon to say that the State Department anticipated that in connection with the United Nations debate on Palestine tomorrow and the United States proposal for a trusteeship under British-French-American Mandate, the question might be asked of Austin whether the United States was ready to bear its share of the police forces required to produce peace in Palestine under such an arrangement. I said that at the moment we did not have such forces available and that I did not see how we could escape making an effort to contribute.

I then talked to The President who said he did not want to make any firm commitment to send troops into Palestine, but I told him what Lovett's problem was and that he was simply trying to get something affirmative for Senator Austin to say in case he was cornered. The President then said that he felt that if we had to respond that we would participate in the implementation of the trusteeship mandate by the associated allied nations (UK, US and France) up to the limit of our ability. I then called Mr. Lovett and reported my conversation with The President and suggested to him that he write out the precise language which he proposed to have Senator Austin use and send it to the White House so there would be no possibility of a misunderstanding. He said that that was what he was in the process of doing.

501.BB Palestine/3-3048: Telegram

*The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to
the Secretary of State*

SECRET

US URGENT

NEW YORK, March 30, 1948—6:20 p. m.

NIACT

349. Please transmit following niact from Austin for the Secretary at Bogotá.¹

USUN today submitted two resolutions to SC, one calling for immediate cessation of hostilities and truce in Palestine and the other

¹ Secretary Marshall was, at this time, Chairman of the United States Delegation at the Ninth International Conference of American States, which met at Bogotá from March 30 to May 2, 1948.

for convocation of special session of GA to consider problem of future government in that country.²

Argentine delegation has been under consistent instructions from its government to refrain on all motions concerning Palestine. However, Ambassador Arce³ is tonight telephoning his Foreign Minister in Bogotá to request permission to vote affirmatively on both our resolutions. Arce is strongly in favor on humanitarian grounds of the US resolution proposing a truce and feels that our suggestion for a special session is only means of making progress at this juncture on Palestine problem.

You may accordingly feel that it would be opportune to suggest to Argentine Foreign Minister our view that calling of special session is indeed worthy of support of all members of SC.

While every indication is that Colombian representative will vote affirmatively on both motions, it might be useful if suitable representations were made to Colombian Foreign Office in order that this vote may be assured when Council meets on Thursday, April 1, at 2:30 p. m.⁴

AUSTIN

² For the text of Ambassador Austin's statement, see SC, 3rd yr., Nos. 36-51, p. 246.

³ José Arce, Argentine Representative at the United Nations.

⁴ Secretary Marshall replied, on March 31, that the Argentine Foreign Minister had authorized Dr. Arce to support the United States position and that the Colombian Foreign Office had advised of the standing instructions to its representative to support the United States position (unnumbered telegram from Bogotá, 501.BB Palestine/3-3148).

501.BB Palestine/3-3148 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

SECRET US URGENT

WASHINGTON, March 31, 1948—11 a. m.

NIACT

1099. USDel understands that UKDel intends vote for truce resolution in UNSC but to abstain on resolution calling for special session GAUN on Palestine.¹

Dept feels that UK would in no way be receding from its present neutral position by voting for resolution calling for special session as

¹ Mr. McClintock informed Mr. Rusk on March 30 that as of that afternoon seven named members of the Security Council were in favor of the United States truce resolution but that only six supported the resolution to convoke a special session. He conveyed the recommendation of the United States Mission at the United Nations that immediate representations be made at London and Paris to swing British and French votes to the affirmative on the latter resolution. (Telegram 350 from New York, 501.BB Palestine/3-3048)

the resolution is so worded as not to commit the GA to any particular plan (i.e. Trusteeship or any other plan).

In view of irresponsible Soviet attack on our position ² (USSR offering no constructive proposals) Dept feels it most desirable to get the maximum number of votes possible and you should strongly urge that instructions be sent to UKDel to support US resolution calling for special session.³

LOVETT

² For the text of Ambassador Gromyko's remarks before the Security Council on March 30, see SC, *3rd yr., Nos. 36-51*, p. 248; he asserted that the decision to partition Palestine into independent Jewish and Arab States had been a just one and he denounced Ambassador Austin's arguments as preparing the ground to bury the partition plan and justifying the new United States proposals.

³ A telegram similar to No. 1099 was sent to Paris on March 31 to secure French support for the calling of a special session (1023, 501.BB Palestine/3-3148).

Editorial Note

Mr. Shertok, on April 1, addressed the Security Council on the two United States draft resolutions. The truce resolution, he said, was a wrong starting point in the quest for peace in Palestine, for it omitted "all reference to the central and salient feature of the country's disturbed condition, namely the presence of Arab aggression from outside, sponsored and organized by Arab States, members of the United Nations, in an effort to alter by force the settlement envisaged by the General Assembly's resolution of 29 November 1947. . . . It is the presence of these foreign Arab forces on the soil of Palestine and the preparation for further incursions which constitute the main threat to law and order in Palestine today. But for these invasions from neighboring States, the situation in Palestine would hardly have raised a problem which could not be quickly resolved." He expressed astonishment, therefore, that the United States saw "the problem of violence in Palestine in terms of a conflict between the 'Arab and Jewish communities of Palestine.'"

He then raised various questions: "Is it legitimate for Member States to use force against a settlement adopted by the General Assembly?"; "Is it proper for the Security Council, having received conclusive evidence of aggression actually committed, to take no steps at all to suppress, nay, not even to condemn—nor even to record—that aggression?"; and "Is it a just interpretation of the Security Council's function in this question that it should obey the demand of the aggressor at pistol-point, and advocate a revision of a General Assembly resolution for no other reason than that resolution is assailed by armed force?"

Mr. Shertok concluded this phase of his statement by indicating that a truce would be most welcome, but must be accompanied by the

evacuation of foreign forces and the prevention of further incursions of armed bands into Palestine. He assumed further that "any arrangement for a truce will be carried out within the framework of the implementation of the resolution of the General Assembly and in strict conformity with time-table provided in that resolution."

Turning then to the second United States draft resolution, Mr. Shertok stated that although silent on the point, the resolution proposed a special session, which would establish a temporary trusteeship. He denounced the forcing of "trusteeship upon a country ripe for independence, without any assurance that a trustee is available, that means of enforcement can be supplied, that any section of the population will cooperate, that the General Assembly will approve an agreement, or that a working regime can be established by 15 May. The charted course of the implementation of partition is to be replaced by a leap into the perilous unknown." The Jews, he asserted, would refuse to accept postponement of independence (SC, *3rd yr.*, No. 52, pages 5-23).

The Egyptian Representative at the United Nations, Mahmoud Fawzi, in reply, emphatically denied participation by the Arab States in the conflict in Palestine. Then, commenting on the first United States draft resolution, he stated that "If, contrary to our belief, the truce were to be interpreted and applied to mean the use of armed force to keep the peace during the partition of Palestine, then each and every Arab is opposed to it. On the other hand, if it is order that is meant, then indeed the Arabs are all for it." (*ibid.*, pages 23-26)

The Security Council voted on the two draft resolutions on April 1. After United States agreement to delete the words "with grave concern", the Council unanimously adopted the first draft resolution. It then adopted the second draft resolution by 9 votes in favor, with the Soviet and Ukrainian representatives abstaining¹ (*ibid.*, pages 34, 35).

With regard to carrying out the latter resolution, Ambassador Austin stated that the United States had not yet formulated its views in finished form and he therefore invited his colleagues in the Security Council to meet with him informally on April 5 (*ibid.*, pages 37, 41).

¹The provisions of the resolutions, which are numbered 43 (1948) and 44 (1948), respectively, are summarized in the circular telegram of April 6, p. 800. Their texts are printed in United Nations, *Official Records of the Security Council, Third Year, Resolutions and Decisions of the Security Council, 1948* (hereinafter cited as SC, *3rd yr.*, *Resolutions, 1948*), pp. 14, 15.

With regard to proposals for a temporary trusteeship over Palestine, Ambassador Austin stated that the United States had not yet formulated its views in finished form and he invited his colleagues on the Security Council to meet with him informally on April 5 for discussion of such proposals (SC, *3rd yr.*, No. 52, pp. 37, 41).

501.BB Palestine/4-848

*Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State*¹

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] April 2, 1948.

DRAFT TRUSTEESHIP AGREEMENT FOR PALESTINE WITH THE UNITED
NATIONS AS THE ADMINISTERING AUTHORITY

PREAMBLE

WHEREAS the territory known as Palestine has been administered by His Britannic Majesty under a mandate confirmed by the Council of the League of Nations; and

WHEREAS Article 75 of the Charter of the United Nations, signed at San Francisco on 26 June 1945, provides for the establishment of an international trusteeship system for the administration and supervision of such territories as may be placed thereunder by subsequent individual agreements; and

WHEREAS under Article 77 of the said Charter the international trusteeship system may be applied to territories now held under Mandate; and

WHEREAS His Majesty accordingly has indicated his desire to place Palestine under the said international trusteeship system; and

WHEREAS the General Assembly has recommended that Palestine be provisionally administered under trusteeship, without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned or to the character of the eventual political settlement; and

WHEREAS in accordance with Articles 75 and 77 of the said Charter, the placing of a territory under the international trusteeship system is to be effected by means of a Trusteeship Agreement;

NOW THEREFORE the General Assembly of the United Nations hereby resolves to approve the following terms of trusteeship for Palestine.

Article 1

ESTABLISHMENT OF TRUSTEESHIP

The territory of Palestine, delimited on the east by Transjordan, on the north by the Republics of Syria and Lebanon, on the west by the Mediterranean and on the south by the Sinai Province of Egypt is hereby placed under the trusteeship system established in the Charter of the United Nations.

¹ Copies transmitted under instructions to officers in charge of missions at London, Paris, Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jerusalem, and Jidda on April 8 with the directive that they were "to be held without communication to anyone other than selected members of your office pending further telegraphic instruction from the Department."

Article 2

THE ADMINISTERING AUTHORITY

The United Nations, acting through the Trusteeship Council, is hereby designated as the Administering Authority for Palestine.

Article 3

POWERS OF THE ADMINISTERING AUTHORITY

Subject to the terms of this Agreement, the Administering Authority shall have full powers of administration, legislation, and jurisdiction over Palestine which shall be exercised through the agency of the Government of Palestine as hereinafter provided.

Article 4

GENERAL OBJECTIVES

1. The Administering Authority undertakes to administer Palestine in such a manner as to achieve the basic objectives of the international trusteeship system laid down in Article 76 of the Charter of the United Nations.

2. The administration will be conducted in such a manner as to encourage the maximum cooperation between the Jews and Arabs in Palestine leading to a form of self-government which will be acceptable to both communities.

Article 5

TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY

1. The territorial integrity of Palestine and its status as defined in this Agreement shall be assured by the United Nations.

2. The Governor-General shall inform the Trusteeship Council of any situation relating to Palestine the continuance of which is likely to endanger the territorial integrity of Palestine, or of any threat of aggression or act of aggression against Palestine, or of any other attempt to alter by force the status of Palestine as defined in this Agreement. If the Trusteeship Council is not in session and the Governor-General considers that any of the foregoing contingencies is of such urgency as to require immediate action by the United Nations, he shall bring the matter, through the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to the immediate attention of the Security Council.

Article 6

PRESERVATION OF ORDER

The Governor-General shall be responsible for the organization and direction of the police forces necessary for the maintenance of internal

law and order and for the protection throughout Palestine of the Holy Places, religious building, and sites.

Article 7

LOCAL DEFENSE AND THE MAINTENANCE OF LAW AND ORDER

1. The Governor-General shall, in accordance with Article 84 of the Charter, organize a volunteer force to provide for local defense and for the maintenance of law and order within Palestine.

2. Until such time as the force provided for in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be able to function effectively, or if subsequent to such time a situation arises with respect to which the force requires assistance, the Governor-General shall call upon the Governments of _____ to assist in the defense of Palestine or in the maintenance of law and order within Palestine.

Article 8

CITIZENSHIP

Without prejudice to the provisions of legislation which may subsequently be enacted in Palestine, the following categories of persons shall be regarded as citizens of Palestine:

(1) Persons resident in Palestine on July 1, 1947, who were not on that date nationals of any state outside of Palestine;

(2) Persons resident in Palestine on July 1, 1947, who were nationals on that date of a state outside of Palestine, if they have filed with the Government of Palestine at any time before November 1, 1948 a declaration, in such form as may be provided by the Government of Palestine, that they renounce their former nationality in favor of Palestinian citizenship;

(3) Persons who have resided in Palestine for three months and who, while continuing to be residents of Palestine, file with the Government of Palestine a declaration that they renounce the nationality of any state outside of Palestine of which they may be nationals, and take an oath of allegiance to the Government of Palestine;

(4) Children of Palestinian citizens, wherever born [provided such children have not at birth or subsequently acquired the nationality of a state outside of Palestine ²].

Article 9

FUNDAMENTAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS

1. All persons in Palestine shall enjoy freedom of conscience and shall, subject only to the requirements of public order, public morals and public health, enjoy all other fundamental human rights and free-

² Bracketed portion as in the source text.

doms, including freedom of religion and worship, language, education, speech and press, assembly and association, and petition, including petition to the Trusteeship Council.

2. No discrimination of any kind on grounds of race, religion, language or sex shall be made against any person in Palestine.

3. All persons in Palestine shall be entitled to equal protection of the laws.

4. No person within Palestine may be arrested, detained, convicted, or punished except according to due process of law.

5. No person or property within Palestine shall be subject to search or seizure except according to due process of law.

6. The legislation of Palestine shall ensure that accused persons shall have adequate rights of defense.

7. The legislation of Palestine shall neither place nor recognize any restriction upon the free use by any person of any language in private intercourse, in religious matters, in commerce, in the press or in publications of any kind, or at public meetings.

8. Except as may be required for the maintenance of public order, good government and public health, no measure shall be taken to obstruct or interfere with the enterprise of religious or charitable bodies of all faiths. No measure shall be taken which discriminates on grounds of religion or nationality against any representative or member of such bodies.

9. The family law and personal status of the various persons and communities and their religious interests, including endowments, shall be respected.

Article 10

ORGANS OF GOVERNMENT

1. During the trusteeship period, the Government of Palestine shall be composed of a Governor-General, a Cabinet responsible to the Legislature, a bicameral legislature, and a judiciary: Provided that, pending the coming into being of the Cabinet and Legislature and during such times as they may be dissolved or suspended, as provided in this Agreement, the Governor-General shall be assisted by an Advisory Council, which shall function until such time as in the opinion of the Governor-General the citizens of Palestine demonstrate their willingness to cooperate in a Cabinet and Legislature as provided in this Agreement or in any other form of government on which both Jewish and Arab communities have reached agreement.

2. The Advisory Council referred to above shall be composed of the permanent chiefs of the administrative departments of the Government and of representative Palestinian citizens appointed by the Governor-General from each community.

Article 11

SELECTION AND RESPONSIBILITY OF THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL

The Governor-General of Palestine shall be appointed by the Trusteeship Council and shall be responsible to it.

Article 12

TERM OF OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL

1. The term of office of the Governor-General shall be three years from the time of his appointment, provided that

(a) the Trusteeship Council may extend the term of office of the Governor-General in any particular case for such period as it may think fit;

(b) the Governor-General may resign his office upon due notice to the Trusteeship Council, and the Trusteeship Council may terminate his appointment for due cause at any time.

2. At the expiration of his term of office or extended term the Governor-General shall be eligible for reappointment.

Article 13

GENERAL POWERS OF THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL

1. The Governor-General shall be the representative of the United Nations in Palestine.

2. The Governor-General, on behalf of the United Nations, shall exercise executive authority in Palestine and shall act as Chief Administrator thereof, subject only to the provisions of this Agreement and Instructions of the Trusteeship Council. He shall be responsible for ensuring the peace, order and good government of Palestine.

3. The Governor-General and his official and private property shall not in any way be subject to the jurisdiction of the Legislature or of the courts of Palestine.

Article 14

POWER OF PARDON AND REPRIEVE

The Governor-General may grant to any offender convicted of any offence in any court of Palestine a pardon, either free or conditioned, or any remission of the sentence passed on such offender, or any respite of the execution of such sentence, for such period as the Governor-General thinks fit, and may remit fines, penalties or forfeitures which may accrue or become payable to Palestine by virtue of the judgment of any court of Palestine or of the operation of any legislation of Palestine.

Article 15

GOVERNOR-GENERAL'S EMERGENCY POWERS

1. If, in the opinion of the Governor-General, the administration of Palestine is being seriously obstructed or prevented by the non-cooperation or interference of persons or groups of persons in Palestine, the Governor-General during the period of the emergency shall take such measures and enact by order such legislation as he may deem necessary to restore the effective functioning of the administration, and such orders shall have effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any legislation in force in Palestine.

2. The circumstances in which the Governor-General may have exercised any power conferred upon him by this Article shall be reported to the Trusteeship Council as soon as may be practicable.

Article 16

ORGANIZATION OF THE ADMINISTRATION

1. The Governor-General, after consultation with the Trusteeship Council, shall appoint a Chief Secretary to assist him in his duties. He shall be neither a citizen nor a resident of Palestine.

2. The Governor-General shall appoint an administrative staff, including an Attorney General, the members of which shall be selected on a non-discriminatory basis for their competence and integrity and, whenever practicable, from the residents of Palestine. Subject to any Instructions of the Trusteeship Council and to any legislation of Palestine, the appointments of members of the administrative staff may be terminated by the Governor-General at any time.

3. In the performance of their duties, the administrative staff shall not seek or receive any instructions from any government or authority other than the Government of Palestine.

Article 17

ACTING GOVERNOR-GENERAL

If the office of Governor-General is vacant, or if the Governor-General is absent from Palestine or otherwise unable to exercise his powers or perform his duties, the officer holding substantively the appointment of Chief Secretary, or, if there is no such officer or he is absent from Palestine or unable to act, such person as may have been authorized to act in the circumstances by the Trusteeship Council, may exercise all the powers and perform all the duties of the Governor-General so long as the office of Governor-General is vacant or the Governor-General is absent from Palestine or otherwise unable to exercise his powers or perform his duties.

Article 18

DISQUALIFICATION FROM PUBLIC OFFICE

A person shall be disqualified from holding any public office, central or local, in Palestine, including membership of the Advisory Council and of the Legislature, if he holds any office under any other State: Provided that the Governor-General may appoint to any public office in Palestine for a limited period any person seconded from the service of another State.

Article 19

THE CABINET

1. The Cabinet shall be composed of Ministers selected by a Prime Minister, all of whom shall be appointed by the Governor-General. Each Minister shall, during his term of office, serve as head of one of the administrative departments. Under him shall be a permanent chief of the administrative department and permanent administrative staff appointed by the Governor-General.

2. The Cabinet shall be individually and collectively responsible to both chambers of the Legislature.

3. Upon a vote of no-confidence by either chamber of the Legislature, the Cabinet shall tender its resignation to the Governor-General who may then call upon responsible leaders in the Legislature to form a new Cabinet or may dissolve the Legislature and cause a general election to be held. The Cabinet shall also tender its resignation upon suspension or dissolution of the Legislature in accordance with the Agreement.

Article 20

LEGISLATURE

1. The Legislature shall consist of two chambers.

2. The House of Representatives shall be composed of Palestinian citizens 25 years of age or older elected from single-member districts, each of which districts shall be a geographical unit with a population approximately equal in number to that of every other electoral district.

3. The Senate shall be composed of 30 Palestinian citizens 25 years of age or older elected in equal numbers by the registered members of the Arab and Jewish communities in Palestine. The Arab representation shall consist of Moslems and Christians in proportion to their numbers in the Arab population. [This paragraph requires further consideration.³]

4. Legislative provision may be made as to disqualification for election to or membership in either chamber of the Legislature resulting from loss of legal capacity.

³ Bracketed portion as in the source text.

5. Remuneration of members of both chambers of the Legislature shall be determined by legislation.

Article 21

ELECTIONS TO THE LEGISLATURE

1. The members of both chambers of the Legislature shall be elected by the citizens of Palestine 21 years of age and over, on the basis of universal suffrage and by secret ballot.

2. Legislative provision may be made as to disqualification from voting resulting from loss of legal capacity.

Article 22

DURATION OF THE LEGISLATURE

1. The term of both chambers of the Legislature shall be three years from the date of its election unless earlier dissolved.

2. If, at the end of a three-year term of the Legislature, it is the opinion of the Governor-General that circumstances are inappropriate for the conduct of a general election, the Governor-General may temporarily prolong the term of the Legislature then in existence.

3. If, in the opinion of the Governor-General, the special objectives of this Agreement are being gravely imperilled by the conduct of either or both Houses of the Legislature, the Governor-General may temporarily suspend the Legislature as a whole and shall forthwith report the circumstances to the Trusteeship Council for instructions. The Trusteeship Council shall either instruct the Governor-General to revoke forthwith his order for the suspension of the Legislature, or maintain the suspension of the Legislature for such period as it may deem fit.

4. The Governor-General may at any time dissolve the Legislature. In the event of a dissolution, new elections shall be held as soon as circumstances are, in the opinion of the Governor-General, appropriate.

Article 23

LEGISLATION AND RESOLUTIONS

1. Bills and resolutions may be introduced in the Legislature by any member thereof.

2. The Governor-General, or a member of his staff designated by him, may make statements or answer questions before the Legislature or may introduce any bill or resolution and may participate without vote in the deliberations of the Legislature on the bill or resolution so introduced.

3. A bill adopted by the Legislature shall become law only upon approval and promulgation by the Governor-General except that on

the expiration of thirty days after the transmission of a bill to the Governor-General, if he has by that time neither approved nor disapproved it, he shall promulgate it as a law. The Governor-General may disapprove a bill, if, in his opinion, it is in conflict with the provisions of this Agreement, or it would impede the administration of Palestine or inflict undue hardship on any section of the inhabitants, and he shall then inform the Legislature of the reasons for his disapproval.

Article 24

LEGISLATION BY ORDER OF THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL

1. At any time when there is no Legislature for Palestine or the Legislature is suspended, the Governor-General may legislate by order and any such order shall become law.

2. If the Governor-General shall consider that it is essential to the normal functioning of the administration (which expression shall, without prejudice to its generality, include the obligations imposed by this Agreement and all matters pertaining to the creation or abolition of any public office or to the appointment, salary or other conditions of service of any public officer) that any bill or resolution introduced in the Legislature should have effect, and if the Legislature fail to adopt such a bill or resolution within such time and in such form as the Governor-General may think reasonable and expedient, the Governor-General may, at any time in his discretion, notwithstanding any other procedures for legislation set out in this Agreement or in the Standing Orders of the Legislature, declare that such bill or resolution shall have effect as if it had been adopted by the Legislature, either in the form in which it was so introduced or with such amendments as the Governor-General shall think fit which have been proposed in the Legislature. The said bill shall thereupon become law or the said resolution shall have effect.

3. The Governor-General shall forthwith report to the Trusteeship Council any action taken by him by virtue of this Article.

Article 25

STANDING ORDERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND THE SENATE

1. Each chamber of the Legislature shall adopt such Standing Orders for the conduct of its business as it may deem appropriate, provided that the Trusteeship Council shall have the authority to revoke any such Order.

2. Each chamber shall elect a chairman from its own membership: Provided that if a chamber fails to elect a chairman within a period

prescribed by the Governor-General, the Governor-General shall appoint the chairman.

3. The Governor-General shall convene the first session of each Legislature and may at any time convene an extraordinary session.

4. Subject to the provisions of Article 22 of this Agreement, subsequent sessions of the Legislature shall be convened annually on the first Monday of October.

5. The Governor-General may at any time prorogue or adjourn the Legislature.

6. Subject to the provisions of Article 22 of this Agreement, the Governor-General shall convene an extraordinary session of the Legislature upon the request of not less than a simple majority of the members of either chamber.

Article 26

IMMUNITY OF MEMBERS OF THE LEGISLATURE

1. No member of the Legislature shall be liable to any judicial or administrative penalty, or be called to account in any other way outside the Legislature, by reason of anything which he may have uttered, or of any vote which he may have cast, in the course of his duties as a member of the Legislature.

2. No member of the Legislature shall be liable during the sessions of the Legislature to criminal, administrative or disciplinary proceedings, nor shall he be deprived of his liberty, without a two-thirds vote of the chamber of which he is a member: Provided that he may be apprehended in the act of committing a crime and detained if his detention is or becomes imperative in the interests of justice or in order to counteract the effects of such crime, but in any such case his apprehension shall be reported as soon as may be practicable to the Legislature and he shall be released without delay should the chamber of which he is a member so request.

Article 27

JUDICIAL SYSTEM

1. There shall be established by legislation an independent judicial system for Palestine, including a Supreme Court and such subordinate and other courts as may be deemed appropriate. Such legislation shall establish the jurisdiction of the courts, and provide for their organization.

2. All persons within Palestine shall be subject to the jurisdiction of Palestine, subject to any immunity for which provision is made in this Agreement.

3. The Supreme Court shall consist of such number of Judges, not being less than three or more than five as the Trusteeship Council

may determine, of whom one shall be President of the Supreme Court and shall be designated Chief Justice. They shall be appointed by, and their appointments shall be terminated only by, the Trusteeship Council.

4. Judicial personnel other than the Chief Justice and the Judges of the Supreme Court shall be appointed and may be suspended or dismissed by the Chief Justice with the approval of the Governor-General, in accordance with any procedure for which provision may be made in the Instructions of the Trusteeship Council.

5. The existing status and jurisdiction of religious courts in Palestine shall be respected. In the case of any conflict regarding jurisdiction between religious courts or between religious courts and civil courts, the Supreme Court shall be competent to decide in which court the jurisdiction shall lie.

6. Decisions by the Supreme Court shall be by a majority of its members: Provided that, if in any case the opinion of the Court be equally divided, the opinion of the Chief Justice shall prevail.

Article 28

CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LEGISLATION AND OFFICIAL ACTION

1. In cases brought before the Courts of Palestine this Agreement shall prevail over any legislation or official action. The Supreme Court shall have original and appellate jurisdiction in all cases involving claims that such legislation or action is incompatible with the provisions of this Agreement.

2. In any case in which the Supreme Court decides that any legislation or official action is incompatible with the provisions of this Agreement, such legislation or official action shall be void and of no effect.

Article 29

IMMIGRATION

1. During the first two years of trusteeship, the immigration of Jewish displaced persons shall be permitted into Palestine. The selection and administration of the immigration of Jewish displaced persons to Palestine shall be conducted by the IRO, subject to the conditions of this Trusteeship Agreement and any regulations established thereunder by the Governor-General.

2. Thereafter, further immigration shall be without distinction between individuals as to religion or blood and shall be in accordance with the absorptive capacity of Palestine, as determined annually by the Governor-General: Provided that not more than persons shall be permitted to enter Palestine to establish permanent residence in any one year.

Article 30

ACCESS TO PALESTINE

Subject only to the requirements of public order and security, and of public morals and public health, freedom of entry into and of temporary residence in Palestine shall be ensured to all foreign pilgrims and visitors without any distinction as to nationality or faith.

Article 31

LAND POLICY

1. The Governor-General shall establish and maintain a land system appropriate to the needs of Palestine, in which there shall be no limitation on the sale, purchase, lease or use of land which discriminates on grounds of race, nationality, community or creed. However, under the authority of the Governor-General, adequate measures shall be taken to assure protection for the interests of small owners or tenants in cases of transfer of arable or grazing lands.

2. The Governor-General shall appoint a commission of impartial experts, who shall be neither Arab nor Jew, to recommend the criteria upon which the land system described in paragraph 1 shall be based.

Article 32

EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM AND CULTURAL AND
BENEVOLENT INSTITUTIONS

1. Education in Palestine shall be directed to the full physical, intellectual, moral and spiritual development of the human personality, to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and to the combating of the spirit of intolerance and hatred against other nations or racial or religious groups.

2. There shall be maintained in Palestine an adequate system of primary and secondary education on an equitable basis for the Arab community and for the Jewish community in their respective languages and in accordance with their respective cultural traditions.

3. Subject to such educational requirements of a general nature as the legislation of Palestine may impose, the right of any community or of any specific group within any community, to maintain its own institutions for the education of its own members in its own language shall not be denied or impaired.

4. Foreign education establishments shall be permitted in accordance with the legislation of Palestine: Provided that existing rights shall continue unimpaired.

5. Educational and cultural establishments, charitable institutions and hospitals shall not be liable to any form of taxation from which they were exempt on the day preceding the termination of the Mandate.

Article 33

FINANCE AND BUDGET

1. The legislation of Palestine shall govern, in accordance with principles laid down in this Agreement, the fiscal and credit policies of Palestine, including the operation of a system of currency, the establishment of a central bank, the conduct of international financial operations, the raising of funds through loans or taxation, the disbursement of such funds, and similar financial operations, the execution of which is not otherwise provided for in this Agreement.

2. The Governor-General shall be responsible for the preparation of the annual and supplementary budgets of Palestine, and only the Governor-General, or a member of his staff designated by him, shall introduce bills pertaining to budgets in the Legislature.

3. The expenses of government under this Agreement, except those incurred under paragraph 2, Article 7, and the salaries and emoluments of the Governor-General, Chief Secretary, and the Judges of the Supreme Court, shall be defrayed from the revenues of Palestine, provided that such funds as are deemed by the Governor-General and the Trusteeship Council essential to accomplish the provisions of this Agreement and which cannot be raised by the Government of Palestine, shall be provided by the United Nations, either through subsidies or through loans repayable from future revenues of Palestine. The salaries and emoluments of the aforementioned officials shall be borne by the United Nations.

4. Any subsidies or loans made by the United Nations under paragraph 3 of this Article shall be shared by the United Nations as a whole in the proportions according to which Members of the United Nations contribute to the budget of the United Nations at the time such subsidies or loans may be granted.

Article 34

LOCAL GOVERNMENT

1. Existing local autonomous units and such new local autonomous units as may be created in Palestine shall enjoy wide powers of local government and administration in accordance with the legislation of Palestine.

2. The Governor-General shall be responsible for the organization of local government in Palestine in such a manner as to encourage the maximum cooperation between all elements of the local citizenry.

Article 35

EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

1. Subject to the provisions of this Agreement, and to any Instructions of the Trusteeship Council, the Governor-General shall conduct the external affairs of Palestine.

2. The Trusteeship Council, and the Governor-General to the extent that he is given general or special authority so to do by the Trusteeship Council, shall make arrangements by means of special international agreements or otherwise for the protection abroad of the interests of Palestine and of its citizens.

3. The Governor-General, on behalf of Palestine, may sign treaties which are consistent with this Agreement.

4. The Governor-General shall adhere on behalf of Palestine to the provisions of any international conventions and recommendations drawn up by the United Nations or by the specialized agencies referred to in Article 57 of the Charter of the United Nations which may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of Palestine.

5. Such international undertakings entered into by the Governor-General shall be subject to approval by the Trusteeship Council, unless the Trusteeship Council should decide otherwise in any particular case or class of cases. The Governor-General shall inform the Legislature when it is in session concerning such international undertakings.

6. To the extent that they may be applicable to it, Palestine shall be bound by all international undertakings, both general and special, to which it has become a party. Subject to any right of denunciation provided for therein, such international undertakings shall be respected by Palestine throughout the period for which they were concluded.

7. Foreign powers shall enjoy immunities in respect of their property within Palestine no less than those in force on the day preceding the termination of the Mandate.

Article 36

HOLY PLACES, RELIGIOUS BUILDINGS AND SITES WITHIN THE CITY

1. The protection of the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites within Palestine shall be assured by the United Nations and shall be the special concern of the Governor-General.

2. If any question arises as to whether any place, building or site not hitherto regarded as a Holy Place, religious building or site shall be a Holy Place, religious building or site for the purposes of this Agreement, the Governor-General shall decide. For the purpose of deciding any such question, the Governor-General may appoint a Committee of Enquiry to assist him.

3. If any dispute arises between any religious communities or within any religious community in connection with any Holy Place, religious building or site, the Governor-General shall decide on the basis of existing rights. For the purpose of deciding any such dispute the Governor-General may appoint a Committee of Enquiry to assist him. He may also, if he shall think fit, be assisted by a consultative council

of representatives of different denominations acting in an advisory capacity.

4. A decision of the Governor-General under paragraphs 2 or 3 of this Article shall not be called in question in any court. No court shall have jurisdiction to determine any such question as is mentioned in the said paragraphs, and, if any such question shall arise in any proceeding in any court, the court shall refer the same to the Governor-General for decision.

5. If at any time it appears to the Governor-General that any Holy Place, religious building or site is in need of urgent repair, he may call upon the community or denomination or section of the community concerned to carry out such repair. If the repair is not carried out, or is not completed within a reasonable time, the Governor-General may himself carry out or complete the repair and his expenses of so doing shall be a charge on the revenues of Palestine but may be recovered from the community or denomination or section of the community concerned, subject to existing rights.

6. No form of taxation shall be levied in respect of any Holy Place, religious building or site which was exempt from taxation of that form on the day preceding the termination of the Mandate. No change in the incidence of any form of taxation shall be made which would either discriminate between the owners or occupiers of Holy Places, religious buildings and sites or would place such owners or occupiers in a position less favorable in relation to the general incidence of that form of taxation than existed on the day preceding the termination of the Mandate.

7. The Governor-General shall ensure by order that :

(a) decisions of the Governor-General under paragraphs 2 and 3 of this article are carried into effect and provision is made for the method of recovery of sums recoverable by virtue of paragraph 5 of this article;

(b) existing rights in respect of Holy Places, religious buildings and sites are not denied or impaired;

(c) subject always to the requirements of public order, decorum and public health, free access to the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites and free exercise of worship therein are secured in conformity with existing rights, and that, for this purpose, freedom of transit through Palestine shall be ensured to all foreign pilgrims and visitors without any distinction as to nationality;

(d) the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites are preserved;

(e) no act is committed which may in any way impair the sacred character of the Holy Places, religious buildings or sites; and

(f) generally that the provisions of this Article are carried into effect.

8. An order under paragraph 7 of this Article may contain penal provisions.

9. An order under paragraph 7 of this Article shall have effect notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any legislation enacted in Palestine.

10. The Governor-General shall transmit a copy of every order made under paragraph 7 of this article to the Trusteeship Council as soon as practicable and the Trusteeship Council may give such Instructions to the Governor-General in relation thereto as it may think fit.

Article 37

PROTECTION OF ANTIQUITIES

The legislation of Palestine shall provide for the protection of the antiquities of Palestine.

Article 38

EQUAL TREATMENT

1. In accordance with the provisions of Article 76 of the Charter of the United Nations and subject to the provisions of Article 39 of this Agreement, the Trusteeship Council, acting through the Governor-General, shall take all necessary steps to ensure equal treatment in social, economic, industrial and commercial matters for all Members of the United Nations and their nationals and to this end :

(a) shall ensure the same rights to all nationals of Members of the United Nations in respect of entry into and residence in Palestine, freedom of transit and navigation, including freedom of transit and navigation by air, acquisition of property both movable and immovable, the protection of person and property, and the exercise of professions and trades;

(b) shall not discriminate on grounds of nationality against nationals of any Member of the United Nations in matters relating to the grant of concessions for the development of the natural resources of Palestine, and shall not grant concessions having the character of a general monopoly;

(c) shall ensure equal treatment in the administration of justice to the nationals of all Members of the United Nations.

2. The rights conferred by this Article on nationals of Members of the United Nations apply equally to companies and associations controlled by such nationals and organized in accordance with the law of any Member of the United Nations.

Article 39

PUBLIC SERVICES AND MONOPOLIES

Measures taken to give effect to Article 38 of this Agreement shall be subject always to the over-riding duty of the Administering Au-

thority in accordance with Article 76 of the United Nations Charter to promote the political, economic, social and educational advancement of the inhabitants of Palestine, to carry out the other basic objectives of the international trusteeship system, and to maintain peace, order and good government. The Trusteeship Council, acting through the Governor-General, shall in particular be free :

(a) to organize essential public services and works on such terms and conditions as are considered just ;

(b) to create monopolies of a purely fiscal character in order to provide Palestine with the fiscal resources which seem best suited to local requirements, or otherwise to serve the interests of the inhabitants of Palestine ;

(c) where the interests of the economic advancement of the inhabitants of Palestine may require it, to establish or permit to be established, for specific purposes, other monopolies or undertakings having in them an element of monopoly, under conditions of proper public control ; provided that, in the selection of agencies to carry out the purposes of this paragraph, other than agencies controlled by the Government or those in which the Government participates, there shall be no discrimination on grounds of nationality against Members of the United Nations or their nationals.

Article 40

RECIPROCITY

Nothing in this Agreement shall entitle any Member of the United Nations to claim for itself or for its nationals, companies and associations the benefits of Article 38 of this Agreement in any respect in which it does not give to the inhabitants, companies and associations of Palestine equality of treatment with the nationals, companies and associations of the state which it treats most favorably.

Article 41

COOPERATION WITH INTERNATIONAL BODIES

The Trusteeship Council may arrange for the cooperation of Palestine in any regional advisory commission, regional technical organization or other voluntary association of states, any specialized international bodies, public or private, or other forms of international activity not inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations.

Article 42

COLLABORATION WITH THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND THE TRUSTEESHIP COUNCIL

1. The Governor-General shall collaborate fully with the General Assembly of the United Nations and the Trusteeship Council

in the discharge of all their functions as defined in Article 87 of the Charter of the United Nations, and to facilitate any periodic visits to Palestine which they may deem necessary.

2. The Governor-General shall make to the Trusteeship Council of the United Nations an annual report on the basis of a questionnaire drawn up by the Trusteeship Council in accordance with Article 88 of the Charter of the United Nations. The Governor-General shall also submit such special reports as may be requested by the Trusteeship Council. Such reports shall include information concerning the measures taken to give effect to suggestions and recommendations of the General Assembly and the Trusteeship Council. The Governor-General shall designate an accredited representative to be present at the sessions of the Trusteeship Council at which the reports with regard to Palestine are considered.

Article 43

AMENDMENTS

The terms of this Agreement may be altered or amended in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

Article 44

SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

If any dispute whatever should arise between Members of the United Nations concerning the validity, interpretation, or application of provisions of the present Agreement, such dispute, if it cannot be settled by negotiation or other means, may be submitted, by any party, to the International Court of Justice for decision, pursuant to Chapter XIV of the Charter of the United Nations and the Statute of the International Court of Justice. The decision of the Court shall be binding upon all parties to the dispute.

Article 45

ENTRY INTO FORCE

1. The present Agreement shall come into force upon approval by the General Assembly, acting by a two-thirds majority of the Members present and voting, [and by the Governments of the Administering Authority in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.⁴]

⁴ Bracketed portion as in the source text.

2. The governance of Palestine shall be based solely upon the Charter of the United Nations, the terms of the present Agreement, and measures pursuant thereto.

Article 46

TRANSITIONAL MEASURES

1. As a transitional measure during the period immediately following the entry into force of this Agreement and prior to such time as the Government of Palestine envisaged in this Agreement can be fully established, the Governor-General may utilize, conformably with the terms of the present Agreement, such governmental machinery as the Mandatory Power may, through prior agreement, leave in existence. During this period the Governor-General shall be empowered to act in accordance with paragraph 1, Article 24 of this Agreement.

2. All legislation in force in Palestine on the day preceding the entry into force of this Agreement, in so far as it is not inconsistent with the provisions of this Agreement, shall continue to apply to Palestine, with such modifications as may be required by reason of the entry into force of this Agreement, until such time as it may be amended or revoked by other legislation of Palestine.

Article 47

TERMINATION OF TRUSTEESHIP

1. In order to enable the inhabitants of Palestine to attain full self-government as soon as possible, it shall be the responsibility of the Governor-General to take all possible steps to bring about agreement between the leading citizens of both Palestinian Jewish and Arab communities upon a plan of government for Palestine, and when such a plan has been agreed upon, to arrange and conduct a plebiscite, under the supervision of the Administering Authority, to determine the acceptability of such plan to the people of Palestine.

2. Any plan which is approved by a majority of the registered members of both the Arab and Jewish communities of Palestine shall be submitted to the General Assembly for its approval.

3. This Trusteeship Agreement will terminate as soon as the General Assembly has approved a plan of government in accordance with paragraph 2 above and a government [or governments⁵] has [or have⁵] been established thereunder.⁶

⁵ Bracketed portion as in the source text.

⁶ Ambassador Austin presented the draft trusteeship agreement, with minor changes, to the First Committee on April 20; see editorial note, p. 835.

Forrestal Papers

*Draft Diary Entry for April 4, 1948, by the Secretary of Defense
(Forrestal)*

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY

[WASHINGTON,] 4 April 1948.

At 2:00 P.M., I met with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Gruenther and Dean Rusk to consider the number of troops which would be required to support a temporary trusteeship in Palestine, including any necessary control of the borders. Mr. Souers, Mr. Symington, and General Norstad¹ were also present, together with the principal planners of the Joint Strategic Plans Group. The meeting was the outgrowth of a specific request from Mr. Lovett for such an estimate, such estimate to be based upon the assumption that the following two conditions were met: First, that the Jewish Agency and the Arab Higher Committee agreed to cooperate by abstaining from further violence (i.e., a truce between the responsible elements), and second, that the United Kingdom agreed to share in the undertaking.

Mr. Rusk explained the State Department's proposed course of action, including the fact that Senator Austin would be called upon on 5 April 1946 to indicate generally the type of trusteeship which the United States had in mind. While Austin would not be required to make any definite commitments as to troops, and his meeting with other members of the Security Council would be merely tentative and exploratory, he could not conscientiously present and support the trusteeship proposal unless the U.S. was prepared, if the two conditions specified above were met, to furnish troops. He stated that the program being advanced had to be examined in relation to possible alternative courses of action. If we did nothing, it was likely that the Russians could, and would take definite steps toward gaining control in Palestine through the infiltration of specially trained immigrants, or by otherwise capitalizing on the widespread, violent civil war that would be likely to break out. Moreover, the slaughter of thousands and perhaps hundreds of thousands of Jewish residents would present difficult questions for the United States. In the event of such developments, the United States might be forced to intervene, and intervention under those circumstances might require a substantially larger force than the force required simply to support a trusteeship. He also pointed out that the presence of our forces in Palestine might be advantageous from a strategic standpoint, and would give us the opportunity to construct bomber fields in the Middle East.

Members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were of the opinion that a completely effective truce was impossible in Palestine. Even if the

¹ Adm. Sidney W. Souers, Executive Secretary of the National Security Council; W. Stuart Symington, Secretary of the Air Force; and Maj. Gen. Lauris Norstad, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations of the United States Air Force.

responsible elements should agree to terminate hostilities, there was little chance that the extremists on either side would feel bound by the commitments of the responsible agencies. For this reason, any determination of the forces required had to take into account: (a) the possibility of extensive violence by irresponsible groups, and (b) the possibility that the truce itself might, under such circumstances, break down. To meet the first of these contingencies, the Joint Chiefs of Staff estimated that a minimum of approximately 104,000 troops would be required. Subsequent developments might well indicate that this force could be greatly reduced, but the extent of such reduction would depend upon the general effectiveness of the truce. It would be unwise, however, from a military standpoint, to start with a lesser number in the optimistic anticipation of such developments. On the contrary, the presence of the larger number at the outset would in itself be an important factor in permitting such developments to take place. The Joint Chiefs felt that the particular type of operation was one which required almost exclusively ground troops rather than any substantial air components. They also appeared to agree with Rusk that the United States might be faced with a worse situation in the Middle East if it failed to support the trusteeship proposal. In the event that the truce itself should break down, then the number of troops required would have to be significantly increased—perhaps doubled or tripled.

It was agreed that the Joint Chiefs should prepare and submit a memorandum for the President² which would reflect the number of troops required to support the trusteeship under the conditions indicated above, the cost of providing a United States contingent and the effect of doing so upon (a) our reserve, and (b) the necessity for further increases in our total forces. In general, it seemed to be the view that the deployment of substantial forces to this area would be desirable, provided that such forces were available. In this connection, it was suggested that the British might undertake to hold the fort alone pending the augmentation of our forces following the adoption of selective service, gradually reducing the number as we became fully able to assume our share of the task.

² *Infra*.

Department of Defense Files

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to President Truman

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] 4 April 1948.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT (THRU THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE) :

Subject: Provision of U.S. Armed Forces in Palestine.

1. In a memorandum from the Secretary of Defense dated 2 April 1948,¹ subject, "Provision of U.S. Armed Forces in Palestine," the

¹ Not printed.

Joint Chiefs of Staff are asked three specific questions to be answered upon the assumption that the following two conditions, stated by the Acting Secretary of State, are in fact met:

a. That the Jewish Agency and the Arab Higher Committee agree to cooperate by abstaining from further violence (i.e., a truce between the responsible representatives of the two principal groups in Palestine).

b. That the United Kingdom agree to undertake its share of the responsibility for supporting the program proposed.

2. The questions asked, and the answers of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, are as follows:

Question *a.* What armed forces would be required to be supplied from outside of Palestine in order to maintain law and order under a temporary trusteeship, including any necessary action to control borders to prevent the illegal entry of persons, either Jewish or Arab, from other countries?

Answer *a.* Subject to the above assumptions and conditions, we estimate that the following forces would be required:

<i>Army</i>	<i>Naval</i>	<i>Air</i>
1 Corps of 3 Infantry Divisions plus appropriate Corps, Service and Special Troops, totalling 100,076 personnel.	6 Destroyers (or destroyer escorts) 6 PCs (for harbor patrol) 1 Air Reconnaissance Sqdn. About 3124 personnel.	1 Sqdn Troop C (16 a/c) 2 Sqdns Ln Type (32 a/c) 1 Sqdn Photo Ren (25 a/c) (Photo equipped Fighter Bombers) Necessary Maintenance Units. About 921 personnel.

It is our considered opinion that a truce between the responsible representatives of the Jewish Agency and the Arab Higher Committee would not assure the termination of violence by irresponsible elements. The extent of that violence cannot be predicted, but based on past history it must be assumed that it will be considerable.

Question *b.* From a United States military standpoint, what should be the composition of such forces in terms of the nations which should furnish contingents and in terms of the size of the contingent to be furnished by each such nation?

Answer *b.* Based upon the second assumption that the United Kingdom agrees to undertake its share of the responsibility for supporting the program proposed, it is our belief that the United States should share equally with the United Kingdom. However, because France is one of the remaining members of the Allied and Associated Powers, it is believed that that country should also participate. Moreover, French

participation would give the United Nations a broader representation. On this basis, we believe that the participation should be as follows:

United Kingdom.....	45%	46,800 personnel
United States.....	45%	46,800 personnel
France.....	10%	10,400 personnel

The above figures are subject to minor adjustments inasmuch as certain service functions provided by the United States and United Kingdom will be duplicated and overlapping in scope, for example, communications and engineers.

Question *c*. What are the military implications of the course of action proposed?

Answer *c*. (1) At least partial mobilization will be required, which includes the early implementation of Selective Service.

(2) The United States could not fully deploy its share of forces before 15 May.

(3) It would further over-extend the Armed Forces by increasing the dispersion of United States forces overseas.

(4) A supplementary budget would be required to defray additional cost, which expenditure quite probably will continue over a considerable period of time.

(5) The United States would have to accept the loss of the bulk of its general reserve for at least six months until new units could be constituted by partial mobilization.

3. The foregoing replies deal only with the stated specific questions, and are not intended to imply any conclusion as to the desirability of taking the action under consideration.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

WILLIAM D. LEAHY

Fleet Admiral, U.S. Navy,

Chief of Staff to the

Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces

501.BB Palestine/4-648: Circular telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices

SECRET

WASHINGTON, April 6, 1948—6 a. m.

You are hereby instructed immediately to see Prime Minister or Foreign Minister of countries to which you are accredited, or, in your discretion, chief of state and to discuss with him current developments with respect to Palestine. In your discussion you should present following line:

On Feb 25 American rep in SC introduced resolution providing for acceptance by SC of GA recommendation Nov 29 providing for Palestine partition. SC however refused accept these recommendations and

decided call upon permanent members SC to consult as to means by which GA recommendations might be implemented.

On Mar 19 American rep stated consultations among members SC had revealed partition plan could not be implemented by peaceful means and that it was clear SC was not prepared to go ahead with efforts to implement plan in existing situation. Immediate truce, special session GA, and temporary trusteeship for Palestine were suggested by American rep at that time.

On April 1 SC by unanimous vote adopted American resolution calling upon Arab and Jewish armed groups in Palestine to cease acts of violence immediately and calling upon Jewish Agency and Arab Higher Committee to make representatives available to SC for purpose of arranging truce between Arab and Jewish communities of Palestine; and emphasizing heavy responsibility which would fall upon any party failing to observe such truce. SC also adopted by 9 affirmative votes and 2 abstentions American resolution requesting SYGUN to convoke special session GA to consider further question of future govt of Palestine.

Regarding truce, Ambassador Austin remarked in SC Mar 30 that statement made by President Mar 25 indicated urgent necessity exerting every effort in SC to arrange truce between Jews and Arabs of Palestine. Such truce should be based on two fundamental considerations: First it is urgently essential that violence and bloodshed in Palestine cease for humanitarian considerations. We must prevent anarchy and preserve international peace. Second both Jews and Arabs of Palestine must be prepared to accept truce arrangements which would not prejudice claims of either group. Truce should include cessation of political as well as military activities.

Regarding temporary trusteeship USGovt adheres to views stated in SC Mar 19, reaffirmed by Sec Mar 20 and again by President Mar 25 that temporary trusteeship should be established to maintain peace. Trusteeship would be without prejudice to character final political settlement in Palestine. Trusteeship is essential to establish order inaugurated by truce and provide interim governmental machinery after May 15 without which peaceful solution Palestine problem cannot be found or put into effect.

On April 5 members SC with exception USSR, Ukraine, informally met Ambassador Austin's office NY to exchange views re trusteeship.¹ At this time Ambassador Austin on behalf USGovt presented working paper entitled "General Principles which Might be Included in a

¹New York transmitted an account of this meeting in telegram 382, April 5, 11:45 p. m., not printed.

Temporary UN Trusteeship Agreement for Palestine.”² It was made clear these general principles do not commit USGovt at this stage and that suggestions of other members on similar tentative basis would be welcomed. General principles are as follows:

“1. A temporary trusteeship agreement for Palestine would be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned or to the character of the eventual political settlement.

2. The agreement should be designed to be of indefinite duration, but subject to prompt termination whenever the Arab and Jewish communities of Palestine agree upon the future government of that country.

3. The agreement might designate the United Nations itself as administering authority. This responsibility could best be discharged by the Trusteeship Council. It would be undesirable for the Trusteeship Council to undertake day-to-day governmental functions. Administrative, legislative and judicial powers should be exercised in Palestine through a separate body called the Government of Palestine, acting in accordance with (1) the principles of trusteeship contained in the Charter and (2) such instructions as the Trusteeship Council might find it necessary to give in accordance with the terms of the agreement.

4. A temporary trusteeship agreement for Palestine could include many of the features developed by the Trusteeship Council for its draft statute for the proposed International Territory of Jerusalem.

5. The Government of Palestine should be headed by a Governor-General appointed by and responsible to the Trusteeship Council.

6. The Government of Palestine should include a Cabinet and a democratically elected Legislature, possibly in two chambers. In the event, however, that such a Legislature could not be assembled or if assembled could not function effectively, the Governor-General should have the authority to Legislate by order.

7. The Trusteeship Agreement should provide for the maintenance of law and order within Palestine. In so far as possible, the Government of Palestine should be responsible for law and order through its locally recruited police and volunteer forces under Article 84 of the Charter. When the forces of the Government of Palestine are insufficient for this purpose, the Governor-General should be authorized to call upon such states as would be specified in the Agreement to assist in the maintenance of security in Palestine. A separate protocol to this trust agreement would contain an undertaking by those named to accept such responsibility on specified conditions.³

8. The agreement should make it possible for the Government of Palestine to take over on a temporary basis existing arrangements in Palestine pending the establishment of the organs specified in the agreement.

² A copy of this paper, dated April 3 and comprised of the 15 numbered principles quoted in the circular telegram of April 6, is in the Truman Papers, President's Secretary's File.

³ The Department, on April 5, had informed New York that “If question arises in connection with para. 7 as to what part the U.S. is willing to play in maintaining security, it should be indicated that the U.S. should not be expected to answer that question alone and that this matter must be the subject of further discussions among member governments at an early date. We must not be drawn in at this stage on an American commitment. Further instructions on this point will be provided.” (Telegram 188, 501.BB Palestine/4-548)

9. The agreement should make specific provision for immigration and land purchase, on a basis to be negotiated in consultation with representatives of the Jewish and Arab communities of Palestine.

10. The standard of living and public services in Palestine under the temporary trusteeship should, in general, be those which can be supported by the resources of Palestine; large subsidies by the United Nations should not be anticipated. The costs of the government of Palestine under the trusteeship regime should, in general, be met from funds available to the Government of Palestine from Palestine revenues. This principle accords with the information which has been made available concerning the fiscal situation of Palestine under the mandate, which is to the effect that Palestine, except for extraordinary security expenditures, is budgetarily self-supporting.

11. Under a United Nations trusteeship, expenditures arising in connection with the employment of forces of Members of the United Nations to assist in the defense of Palestine or in the maintenance of law and order should be defrayed by those Members.

12. The United Nations would presumably wish to pay the salaries and emoluments of certain principal officers of the Government, such as the Governor-General and the Chief Justice, as an evidence of the responsibility of those officers to the United Nations.

13. If the General Assembly, on the recommendation of the Trusteeship Council, considers that funds which cannot be raised by the Government of Palestine are essential to accomplish the minimum purposes of the temporary trusteeship, those funds should be supplied, as subsidies or recoverable loans, by the United Nations as a whole on the regular scale of contributions to the budget of the United Nations. The Palestine budget should be handled by the United Nations as a separate budget, not as a part of the ordinary budget of the organization.

14. The agreement should contain adequate guarantees for the protection and preservation of the Holy Places in Palestine, for the settling of disputes pertaining to them and for assuring, subject to necessary safeguards of public order and security, freedom of entry into Palestine for all foreign Pilgrims and persons who desire to visit the Holy Places.

15. The trusteeship regime for Palestine should terminate as soon as a majority of the members of each of the two principal communities in Palestine—Arab and Jewish—have agreed upon a plan of government for Palestine. It should be a responsibility of the Governor-General to take all possible steps to bring about such an agreement.”⁴

Views Govt to which you are accredited would be appreciated.

For your background info only, Dept proposes to consult certain other govts shortly re armed forces indicated under point 7 above. Pending such consultations US Govt will not make any commitment or answer questions on this point. Fundamental consideration is that US does not propose to substitute itself for Brit in Palestine and will act only as member of UN.

⁴ The members of the Security Council, except for the Soviet Union, held a second informal private meeting on April 7 concerning Palestine. During the two-hour meeting, they discussed various aspects of trusteeship and the truce. A detailed summary was provided the same day by New York in telegram 395 (501.BB Palestine/4-748).

Sent for action to London, Paris, Ottawa, Brussels, The Hague, Canberra, Wellington, Cairo and Nanking. Sent for information and appropriate use to Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Jidda, Jerusalem, New Delhi, Karachi, Ankara, Tehran, Kabul, Buenos Aires, Moscow, Bogota, New York, Stockholm, Mexico City and Rio de Janeiro.⁵

LOVETT

⁵ The Department sent this circular telegram to Manila on April 9 for information and appropriate use (telegram 447, 501.BB Palestine/4-948). It also authorized the Embassy in Egypt, on April 12, to supply Azzam Pasha with the purport of the circular telegram, from the second paragraph through the fifteen general principles. (Telegram 404, 501.BB Palestine/4-1048)

Ambassador Tuck, on April 15, reported the reactions of Egyptian Prime Minister Nokrashy. The latter considered American advocacy of trusteeship as a step towards elimination of partition. "However, a grave doubt continued to exist in Arab minds that this proposed step of temporary trusteeship might not prove to be the 'burial' of partition. Therefore . . . means should be found for dissipating this doubt which could be done by statement specifying duration of trusteeship accompanied by an assurance that trusteeship would not jeopardize national aspirations of Arabs towards final complete independence of Palestine 'united Arab nation.'" The Prime Minister also noted that the trusteeship should be presented in a way to eliminate Arab fears of favors to the Jews, in connection with an increase in their armaments and numbers in Palestine and in purchasing land from the Arabs. (Telegram 373, from Cairo, 501.BB Palestine/4-1548)

Ambassador Tuck, on April 18, reported concerning the reaction of Azzam Pasha that "The Arab League does not favor American plan of temporary trusteeship which in League's opinion would serve only to create a new regime and bring about another phase of trouble between Arabs and Jews." The League was said to favor, as a practical matter, continuance of the British mandate, since the "use of existing British forces with moral and material backing of UN could contribute to final disarmament and in establishment of a new Palestine state to which present mandate could hand over." (Telegram 385 from Cairo, 501.BB Palestine/4-1848)

501.BB Palestine/4-948

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) to the Acting Secretary of State (Lovett)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] April 9, 1948.

I am attaching, for your approval and signature, proposed messages from me to Dr. Judah Magnes of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem and to Azzam Pasha, Secretary General of the Arab League, with regard to Palestine.¹

It has become apparent in recent days that the extreme public positions taken by the Jewish Agency and the Arab Higher Committee make it increasingly difficult for them to modify their positions sufficiently so that the United Nations can arrange a truce and provide interim governmental machinery after May 15 in Palestine.

It is my hope that the influence of moderate and temperate Jews and Arabs such as Dr. Magnes, Azzam Pasha and associates of their choosing might break the present log jam in the United Nations. I am, there-

¹ The telegrams were signed by Mr. Lovett and sent on April 10 as No. 258 to Jerusalem and No. 398 to Cairo, pp. 811 and 812, respectively.

fore, endeavoring to prevail on them to come to the United States as soon as possible. I hope that the proposed telegrams attached will persuade them to do so.

L[OY] W. H[ENDERSON]

501.BB Palestine/4-948 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, April 9, 1948—7 p. m.

1260. Cirtel April 6 outlines Dept views regarding necessity for truce and trusteeship for Palestine. Working draft possible trusteeship agreement has been furnished UKDel New York and additional copies being forwarded you airmail.¹

You are requested to see Bevin earliest practicable and seek UK agreement to following joint course of action :

1. US, UK and France to use maximum effort diplomatic and other means to obtain truce between Arabs and Jews of Palestine. Terms of truce should be conditional on attitude of parties but elementary basis would have to be military cease-fire coupled with political stand-still.

2. US, UK and France to agree to present trusteeship proposal jointly to GA. Dept considers draft statute for Jerusalem, recently worked out by TC (in which UKDel played most active and helpful role) could be quickly adapted for Palestine as whole and substantially shorten task of agreeing upon draft for joint sponsorship. This is, in effect, basis of working draft mentioned in Par. 1. Refinements could be worked out during course GA consideration.

3. Reference #7 general principles contained Cirtel April 6, US, UK and France to agree to accept jointly responsibility for assisting Governor-General Palestine maintain security if his locally recruited police and volunteers need reinforcement. Present expectation, of course, is that reinforcement will be required, scale depending upon course of truce negotiations.

4. US, UK and France to join in inviting number of other members UN to share security responsibility in order to provide broad UN basis and to maintain solid group of friendly states interested in peaceful settlement Palestine problem. Dept tentatively suggests such joint invitations be extended to Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Egypt, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden. UK suggestions regarding such list would be welcome.

In presenting matter to Bevin you should make following points to impress upon HMG critical importance to world peace and to security of US-UK that war in Palestine be avoided :

1. Security of Middle East is essential to security of Western World.

¹ See footnote 1, p. 778.

2. Large-scale fighting between Jews and Arabs over political settlement in Palestine must be prevented for humanitarian reasons. The continuance of such fighting would probably result in further Soviet exploitation of the situation which might result in the establishment of a Soviet satellite in at least a part of Palestine.

3. Present efforts to ensure the security of Greece, Turkey and Iran would be threatened by Soviet penetration of Palestine; settlement of the Palestine question for the time being would open the way for further steps by US and UK to ensure the security of the Middle East.

4. The temporary location of US, UK and French forces in Palestine would exert a stabilizing effect in this area which is particularly important at this time.

5. US cannot undertake unilateral commitments in the Middle East; if US and UK are unable to cooperate in preventing development of a situation in Palestine which would render that country vulnerable to Soviet penetration joint efforts on our part to maintain security of the whole Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East will be jeopardized.

6. Continued heavy fighting in the Middle East would seriously jeopardize ERP success because large scale European oil requirements from Middle East could not be met.

7. Unless some temporary settlement can be found, competing Jewish and Arab governments will be declared on May 15, each urging legal claim to legitimacy. Each would obtain recognition by a number of states and precipitate a situation of utmost gravity.

8. Failure of US, UK and France to bring about peaceful conditions in Palestine after May 15 would seriously impair prestige of the three governments and of UN and would result in loss of support of other nations which will be needed if the general political situation continues to deteriorate.

9. Unless US, UK and France exert genuine and responsible leadership in this situation, it will not be possible to obtain the firm action by overwhelming majority of UN necessary to settle Palestine question without giving USSR opportunity for exploitation of Palestine situation.

10. In view of UK insistence upon termination of mandate May 15, trusteeship offers only possibility providing emergency government for Palestine. Trusteeship is firmly rooted in governmental powers which UN has under the Charter and does not rest upon recommendation; under the Charter, UK is an essential party to a trusteeship agreement, else no legal basis for UN action exists.

11. As matters now stand, there will be no authority in Palestine (UN or otherwise) after May 15 capable of exercising governmental or administrative responsibility. The abandonment of Palestine under such circumstances will make UK in the eyes of world opinion solely responsible for the results of such abandonment.

12. Other members UN openly expressing increasing irritation at lack of UK cooperation in finding and sharing in UN solution to problem which UK itself placed before UN for recommendation. If UK continues to adhere to present attitude of refusal to participate in working out solution public opinion in this country is certain to be deeply aroused and may handicap us in obtaining the kind of close British-American cooperation which the international situation demands.

Instruction along same general lines is being sent to Paris.²

Repeated to USUN New York 202 for info.

LOVETT

² Telegram 1178, April 9, 7 p. m., not printed; it instructed the Ambassador in France to seek the agreement of Foreign Minister Bidault to the proposed joint action. It was virtually identical in wording to the telegram to London, except that points 5 and 12 were omitted from the message to Paris (501.BB Palestine/4-948). The following day, the Department instructed Paris to delete the words "by US and UK" in paragraph 3 of the points to be pressed on the Foreign Minister (telegram 1179, 501.BB Palestine/4-1048).

Truman Papers, Official File

Dr. Chaim Weizmann to President Truman

NEW YORK, April 9, 1948.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I had intended to take the liberty of addressing you in writing immediately after the interview which you kindly accorded me on March 18th. The events which followed, however, impelled me to wait until I could formulate some clearer impressions on the new situation which has developed. In inviting your consideration of my views at this time, I wish to thank you, Mr. President, for the personal kindness which you have so often shown me, and for the sympathetic interest which you have constantly devoted to the cause of our people in its grave ordeal.

I noted with satisfaction that in your statement of March 25 you indicated that the United States had not abandoned Partition as the ultimate political settlement in Palestine. I welcome this assurance because my long experience of this problem has convinced me beyond doubt that no more realistic solution exists. Palestine is inhabited by two peoples. These peoples have separate political aspirations and common economic interests. The settlement by Partition and economic union recognizes this logic. Partition is further reinforced by the support of two distinguished investigating Commissions (in 1937 and 1947), by the binding force of the General Assembly's Resolution and by the fact that a virtual Partition is now crystallising in Palestine. Jews and Arabs are both mature for independence and are already obedient in a large degree to their own institutions, while the central British Administration is in virtual collapse. In large areas Jews and Arabs are virtually in control of their own lives and interests. The clock cannot be put back to the situation which existed before November 29. I would also draw attention to the psychological effects of promising Jewish independence in November and attempting to cancel it in March.

It is the logic of partition and of the present situation in Palestine which compelled me to go on record against the idea of trusteeship.

One fails to see how any of the admitted difficulties of Partition are avoided by Trusteeship. The problem of enforcement becomes even more acute, as neither the Arabs nor the Jews of Palestine have accepted Trusteeship which appears likely to deprive each of them of Statehood. It is proposed to institute a Trusteeship in a country threatened by foreign Arab aggression, torn by internal warfare, and already moving inexorably towards Partition under a valid international resolution. The proposal is made without any assurance that a trustee is available, that Arabs or Jews will cooperate, that the General Assembly will approve an agreement or that any effective measures can be improvised by May 15th.

The difficult but clear course of implementing Partition is thus replaced by a leap into the unknown, and I am forced to regret, Mr. President, the great increase of trouble, danger and responsibility which must ensue for the United States from the unfortunate reversal on March 19th, with its inauguration of new uncertainty and new political conflict.

If I may venture to leave you, Mr. President, with one or two reflections on the major aspects of the problem, I would sound a note of solemn warning against any prolongation of British rule in Palestine. As you may know, I have cherished the British-Jewish relationship all my life. I have upheld it in difficult times. I have been grievously disappointed by its recent decline. It is because I hope for its renewal that I tremble to think of the wave of violence and repression which would sweep Palestine if the conditions and auspices of the recent unhappy years were to be continued under British, or indeed any foreign rule. I also know how passionately the British people desire the end of this troubled chapter. Should your administration, despite all this, press for any prolongation of British tenure, it would incur a responsibility for terrible events and, almost certainly, the equal resentment of the British and Jewish peoples.

I recall that it is exactly two years since the Anglo-American Committee so emphatically endorsed your moving plea for the immediate admission of 100,000 Jews from the Displaced Persons Camps to Palestine. They are still in those camps. Reports have reached me of the grave effect produced on their dwindling resources of hope and morale by the United States declaration of March 19th. I cannot for a moment believe, Mr. President, that you would be a party to the further disappointment of pathetic hopes, which you yourself have raised so high. Their hope is solely for personal and national integration in a Jewish State in Palestine.

In conclusion, I am convinced that the present situation in Palestine is making a profound impact on the conscience of the American people. Having recognized the right of our people to independence last No-

vember, the great powers now expose them to the risk of extermination and do not even grant them the arms to provide for their own defense. Arab aggression is now more confident than ever. Arabs believe that an international decision has been revised in their favour purely because they dared to use force against it. Mr. President, I cannot see how this belief can honestly be refuted. The practical question now is whether your Administration will proceed to leave our people unarmed in the face of an attack which it apparently feels it is unable to stop; and whether it can allow us to come directly or indirectly under Arab domination which is sworn to our destruction.

The choice for our people, Mr. President, is between Statehood and extermination. History and providence have placed this issue in your hands, and I am confident that you will yet decide it in the spirit of the moral law.¹

Respectfully yours,

CHAIM WEIZMANN

¹ A marginal notation on the source text by Rose A. Conway, Administrative Assistant in the President's office, indicates that the letter was not answered.

Dr. Weizmann transmitted a copy of the letter to the Secretary of State on April 9; it was acknowledged by Acting Secretary Lovett in a letter of April 24 which concluded as follows:

"I sincerely hope that action which has been and will be taken in the United Nations will lead to the restoration of peaceful conditions in Palestine and to agreement between Arabs and Jews resident there on their future government." (501.BB Palestine/4-948)

501.BB Palestine/4-1048: Telegram

*The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to
the Secretary of State*

SECRET URGENT

NEW YORK, April 10, 1948—12:09 a. m.

417. Following is report of third informal meeting of members of SC at the offices of USUN to discuss future of Palestine:

Present were delegates of all SC members except Gromyko. Hsia replaced Tsiang for China. SYG was absent. Sobolev and Protitch represented Secretariat. The meeting, which lasted more than two hours, began with an account by SC President Lopez of his meetings with representatives of AHC and JA to explore possibilities of truce in Palestine. Lopez stated he was discouraged at the prospects and could find no common ground between extreme positions as described by JA and AHC. He thought it was necessary for SC itself to decide what action it should take regarding truce and to make its own recommendations in this regard. Arguing with AHC and JA will not be successful. Two meetings with the two representatives separately showed that their conditions for a truce were incompatible. For example, with regard to immigration, JA would not stop what the Arabs

called "illegal" immigration. This, Lopez thought, was the crux of the problem. The JA viewpoint was that the Arabs were attempting to make the JA stop immigration "at the point of a pistol". Meanwhile, the Arabs said that immigration was illegal and must be stopped. On the other hand, JA accused AHC of illegal immigration with violent intent.

In the meantime, both sides claimed that because the mandate will end May 15, and that because administration is now steadily being dismantled and disrupted, they must create an administration in their zones to replace chaos and anarchy. In addition, the Arabs insist that nothing should be done to implement partition. "If nothing is done," said Lopez, "there will certainly be anarchy in Palestine. I fail to see how the SC can discuss new proposals (by which he meant trusteeship) or get the Arabs and Jews to cooperate. I have tried the very best I could to show both parties that their position would only be helped by having a truce and eventually by permanent cooperation."

Lopez added that Shertok said that JA action was "self-preservation", that UK was getting out of Palestine, and that "we must protect our lives." Shertok added that an administration and government were necessary for self-preservation. Lopez replied that, "you can't create a provisional government unless it is done under the GA recommendation." Shertok answered, "this is beside the point. Our lives are at stake and something must be done." Lopez thought both sides were too worked up emotionally to listen to reason.

Lopez concluded that the SC under these circumstances should not only appeal for a truce but should take another step and ask UK to keep the mandate for some time longer. Otherwise he felt that this most perplexing and unfortunate problem of Palestine would only become more complicated. "I doubt whether we can reach a settlement which will meet with Arab-Jewish agreement at the present time," he said. "I want the advice of members of the SC as to what to do next, but I fear that our efforts will bear no fruit unless we can ease the tension."

Following Lopez' statement, Tarasenko¹ stated, "you have told us in effect that the truce can not be implemented. You are suggesting new measures for the SC to take. Why are these suggestions being made outside of the SC?" Lopez replied that he took it for granted that before an official report was made by him to SC concerning his truce efforts, members of the SC should have private discussion. All members, he said, were invited to this meeting. All have the right to

¹ Vasili Arkady Tarasenko, Ukrainian Representative at the United Nations.

exchange views, and indeed one of those views might be that this very question of the truce should no longer be discussed at this meeting.

[Here follows remainder of informal discussion.]

AUSTIN

501.BB Palestine/4-1048 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Jerusalem

SECRET US URGENT

WASHINGTON, April 10, 1948—2 p. m.

NIACT

258. For Wasson¹ from Henderson. Unless you perceive some reason for not so doing it is suggested that you make arrangements at once to see Magnes and give him orally following confidential message from me:

"Gravest danger exists that unless success is achieved in UN efforts to bring about truce and an arrangement whereby interim governmental machinery will be provided for Palestine after May 15 chaotic conditions involving great loss of life and property will prevail in Palestine. At no time has there been a greater need for courageously conciliatory attitude such as yours on part of both Arabs and Jews. If such attitude is to prevail cooperation on part of moderate and conciliatory Arabs and Jews is essential. It is therefore hoped that you either alone or accompanied by such other Jewish leaders as you may consider appropriate will come to US at earliest possible moment."²

LOVETT

¹ Consul at Jerusalem.

² Henderson's message was delivered to Magnes on April 12. Jerusalem advised that Magnes had "indicated great interest in proceeding to US but in view precarious health must consult his doctors who heretofore have prevented his travelling. He also seemed concerned re auspices under which he would travel. He felt that his hand would be strengthened if he could say he had been invited by Senator Austin or by Dept. of State to assist in bringing about peace in Palestine. Failing this he mentioned possible creation ad hoc committee his friends and supporters in United States who would invite him." (Telegram 425, April 13, from Jerusalem, 501.BB Palestine/4-1348)

Henderson sent a further message to Magnes on April 15 which read in part as follows:

"I made my suggestion because of my belief that your presence in the U.S. during the discussions of the Palestine matter might have a helpful moderating influence on both Jews and Arabs. We feel that if a truce and an interim government are to be arranged for with a minimum amount of bloodshed the advice and assistance of outstanding Jewish leaders would be helpful. In my opinion your ability to aid might be adversely affected if the erroneous impression should be created that there was any special relationship between you and the U.S. Government. If you should come we would like to have you do so only because you personally feel that you may be helpful and not because of any suggestion which I have made. It is also essential that everyone understand that you have a free hand." (Telegram 269, April 15, to Jerusalem, 501.BB Palestine/4-1348)

Jerusalem advised on April 17 that Magnes agreed with Henderson's "view concerning relationship US Government" and that Magnes expected to arrive in New York on April 21. (Telegram 451, April 17, from Jerusalem, 501.BB Palestine/4-1748)

501.BB Palestine/4-1048 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt*SECRET US URGENT
NIACT

WASHINGTON, April 10, 1948—2 p. m.

398. For Tuck from Henderson. Unless you perceive some reason for not so doing please get in touch at once with Azzam Pasha and give him orally following personal message from me: .

“Unless we can achieve success in UN efforts to bring about truce between Arabs and Jews in Palestine and effect an arrangement whereby interim governmental machinery will be provided for Palestine after May 15 chaotic conditions will prevail in that country resulting in great loss of life and destruction of property and the security of whole Middle East may even be threatened. If this disastrous situation is to be avoided counsels of moderate Arabs and Jews must prevail. We therefore feel it is important that there should be wider representation of wise and temperate Arab leadership in US at present time. I urge therefore that you plan to come to US at earliest possible moment either alone or accompanied by other Arab leaders whom you consider might be helpful in this emergency.”¹

LOVETT

¹ The message was delivered to Azzam on April 11; Cairo advised Henderson that Azzam had “expressed warm appreciation for your views which indicated that ‘both you and he were united in objective.’ Definite decision not yet taken re trip to US but he firmly believes he can be more effective in achieving aims by remaining here where he can influence Arab leaders and governments in desired direction.” Cairo believed that “in spite of Azzam’s sincere reluctance to come [to] US he will in fact be persuaded by Arab leaders, Amir Faisal [the Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister] in particular, who are strongly urging his visit.” (Telegram 357, April 12, from Cairo, 501.BB Palestine/4-1248)

501.BB Palestine/4-1248 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

SECRET US URGENT

WASHINGTON, April 12, 1948—6 p. m.

208. For purposes of your conversations tomorrow with President Lopez and colleagues from delegations of UK, France and Canada on truce terms in Palestine Dept recommends that you urge following terms be incorporated in any truce proposal to be formulated by SC:

1. An immediate cease-fire and cessation of hostilities.
2. Assurances from both Arabs and Jews to permit continued functioning of essential public services in Palestine.
3. An agreement to suspend all activity of a military or political nature pending reconsideration of the Palestine problem by the Special Session.
4. Appointment of a Truce Commission to ensure the observance of a cease-fire order.

5. Admonition by SC to all peoples, governments and organizations to refrain from permitting or committing any acts which may tend to violence in Palestine or to breach of truce in Palestine.¹

LOVETT

¹In a memorandum covering his telephone conversation with Ambassador Austin on April 13, Mr. McClintock noted that the Ambassador was "considerably disturbed" with the text of telegram 208, preferring that the terms of the truce be spelled out in greater detail. Mr. McClintock explained that "there was no conflict between the more broad principles suggested by the Department and his [Ambassador Austin's] deductions from these principles." Mr. McClintock noted further that "Our conversation left Ambassador Austin much relieved in his mind. I cautioned him, however, that the Department's telegram had been signed by Mr. Lovett personally and had received White House clearance. In consequence it possessed the very highest authority. Ambassador Austin said that he might in the course of negotiation have to defer to the suggestions of others. I said that we should be delighted if this was the case since this was not an American truce but a Security Council truce." (501.BB Palestine/4-1348)

501.BB Palestine/4-1348

*Memorandum by Mr. Fraser Wilkins of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs*¹

SECRET

ACTION ON THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY'S RESOLUTION OF NOVEMBER 29, 1947 ON THE PALESTINIAN QUESTION

PROBLEM

To determine the position which the United States Delegation to the Special Session of the General Assembly should adopt with respect to action by that body on the General Assembly's resolution of November 29, 1947 on the Palestinian Question.

RECOMMENDATIONS

A. If the General Assembly's resolution of November 29 is amended at the Special Session, the United States should support changes which would have the effect of bringing about its peaceful implementation and of making it acceptable to the peoples of Palestine.

B. If a new resolution providing for a temporary trusteeship agreement is approved by a two-thirds vote of the General Assembly the United States should initiate or support the suspension of the General Assembly's resolution of November 29, preferably by statement to this effect in the new resolution.

¹Drafted on April 13 and transmitted the same day to Mr. Lovett with a joint memorandum by Messrs. Henderson and Rusk, which noted that the position paper had been cleared by NEA, UNA and L. A marginal notation by Mr. Lovett reads: "Approved by President & returned to me by Clifford on May 3, 1948—5:45 p[m]."

A copy of the memorandum by Mr. Wilkins is in the Truman Papers, President's Secretary's File.

C. If a new resolution providing for a political settlement is approved by two-thirds vote of the General Assembly, the United States should initiate or support the withdrawal of the General Assembly's resolution of November 29, preferably by a statement to this effect in the new resolution.

Discussion:

I—On November 29, 1947 the General Assembly adopted a resolution on the Palestinian question. This resolution provided for a plan of partition with economic union for Palestine. It included provisions for a future constitution and government of Palestine, boundaries, a special regime for the City of Jerusalem and an invitation with regard to capitulations in Palestine.

The General Assembly's resolution recommended to the United Kingdom, as the Mandatory Power for Palestine, and to all other Members of the United Nations the adoption and implementation with regard to the future government of Palestine, of the plan of partition with Economic union as provided for in that resolution.

The General Assembly's resolution also requested that :

"(a) The Security Council take the necessary measures as provided for in the Plan for its implementation ;

"(b) The Security Council consider if circumstances during the transitional period require such consideration, whether the situation in Palestine constitutes a threat to the peace. If it decides that such a threat exists, and in order to maintain international peace and security, the Security Council should supplement the authorization of the General Assembly by taking measures, under Articles 39 and 41 of the Charter, to empower the United Nations Commission, as provided in this resolution, to exercise in Palestine the functions which are assigned to it by this resolution ;

"(c) The Security Council determine as a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, in accordance with Article 39 of the Charter, any attempt to alter by force the settlement envisaged by this resolution ;

"(d) The Trusteeship Council be informed of the responsibilities envisaged for it in this Plan ;".

The General Assembly's resolution in addition called upon the inhabitants of Palestine to take such steps as may be necessary on their part to put this plan into effect ; and appealed to all governments and all peoples to refrain from taking any action which might hamper or delay the carrying out of these recommendations.

The General Assembly's resolution also contained authorization to the Secretary General with regard to expenses of the Commission provided for in the plan and for withdrawals from the working capital fund.

On December 1, 1947 the Trusteeship Council received Part 3 of the General Assembly's resolution of November 29 and commenced work on a draft Statute for the City of Jerusalem.

On December 9, 1947 the Security Council recorded that it had received the General Assembly's resolution of November 29 and, having been seized of this matter, had agreed to postpone further consideration.

On February 1, 1948 the Palestine Commission provided for in the plan, which had commenced its activities on January 9, 1948, submitted its first monthly progress report to the Security Council.

On February 16, 1948 the Palestine Commission presented its first special report on the problem of security in Palestine to the Security Council.

On February 24, 1948 the Security Council resumed its consideration of the Palestine question.

On February 25, 1948 the United States representative on the Security Council introduced a resolution providing for the acceptance, subject to the authority of the Security Council under the Charter, of the request addressed by the General Assembly to it in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of the General Assembly's resolution of November 29, 1947.

On March 1, 1948 the Palestine Commission submitted its second monthly progress report to the Security Council.

On March 5, 1948 the Security Council by a vote of five in favor with none against and six abstentions, declined to accept the requests of the General Assembly.

On March 12, 1948 the Trusteeship Council, having continued its work on a draft Statute for the City of Jerusalem, decided that it was in a satisfactory form and agreed that the question of its formal approval together with the appointment of a Governor of the City should be taken up at a subsequent meeting to be held not later than one week before April 29, 1948.

On April 1, 1948 the Security Council adopted by nine affirmative votes with two abstentions the United States resolution requesting the Secretary General of the United Nations to convoke a special session of the General Assembly to consider further the question of the future government of Palestine.

The action of the Security Council on March 5 in declining to accept the requests of the General Assembly under its resolution of November 29 in conjunction with the action on April 1 in requesting the convocation of a Special Session clearly indicates that the Security Council was not prepared to accept or implement the General Assembly's resolution of November 29.

II—The United Nations might adopt one of the following courses of action with regard to the General Assembly's resolution of November 29, 1947:

A. The General Assembly might amend its resolution of November 29.

B. The General Assembly might suspend its resolution of November 29.

C. The General Assembly might withdraw its resolution of November 29.

In the case of (A), amendments to the General Assembly's resolution of November 29 which would have the effect of bringing about its peaceful implementation and of making it acceptable to the peoples of Palestine would have the support of the United States Government in the United Nations.

In the case of (B), it may develop that the General Assembly will approve by a two-thirds vote a new resolution providing for a temporary trusteeship agreement for Palestine without prejudice to the rights, claims or position of the parties and without prejudice to the eventual political settlement relating to the government of Palestine. In this event, the question arises as to whether the General Assembly's resolution of November 29 should be suspended or withdrawn. If the trusteeship is for a temporary period; if it is without prejudice to the rights, claims or positions of the parties; and if it is without prejudice to the eventual political settlement relating to the government of that country, it follows that suspension rather than withdrawal of the resolution of November 29 would be equitable. Withdrawal of the General Assembly's resolution under such conditions would undoubtedly be considered as prejudicial to the rights, claims and position of one of the parties and would also undoubtedly be considered as prejudicial to the eventual political settlement. It would, accordingly, appear to be preferable to suspend the General Assembly's resolution of November 29 by a statement to this effect in the new resolution providing for a temporary trusteeship agreement.

In the case of (C), it may develop that a new resolution providing for a political settlement will be approved by a two-thirds vote of the General Assembly. In this event, it might be presumed that the new resolution would automatically supersede the resolution of November 29. It would be preferable, however, for the General Assembly to withdraw its previous resolution. Such action might be accomplished (a) by the introduction of a separate resolution before the passage of the new resolution; (b) by the introduction of a separate resolution after the passage of the new resolution; or (c) by a statement in the new resolution itself. From a parliamentary point of view no objection would appear to any of these three courses. From a politi-

cal point of view, however, it would appear that the preferable course would be by a statement in the new resolution. Such action would definitely link the new resolution with the previous resolution and might avoid the necessity for a separate vote on the withdrawal of the General Assembly's resolution of November 29.

867N.01/4-1348 : Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Wasson) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

JERUSALEM, April 13, 1948—5 p. m.

431. Early morning April 9 combined force Irgun and Stern Gang numbering over 100 attacked Arab village, Deir Yasin, several miles west Jerusalem. Attackers killed 250 persons of whom half, by their own admission to American correspondents, were women and children. Attack carried out in connection battle now still in progress between Arabs Jews on roads leading to Jerusalem from Tel Aviv.

Arab reaction to attack has been violent and emotions, already at high pitch following death April 8 of Abdul Kader Husseini (Arab Jerusalem commander) during Arab attempt retake village captured by Haganah, now at bursting point. Officer ConGen visiting Hussein Khalidi, secretary Arab Higher Executive, April 11, found him still trembling with rage and emotion and referring to attack as "worst Nazi tactic".

As indignation, resentment and determination to avenge Deir Yasin spread among Arabs, we believe, chance for cease-fire and truce increasingly remote. With growing criticism in Irgun and Stern Gang circles over Haganah leadership further attacks this nature can be expected and Arabs will react violently.

WASSON

501.BB Palestine/4-1348 : Telegram

*The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)
to the Secretary of State*

SECRET

US URGENT

NEW YORK, April 13, 1948—5:50 p. m.

431. For Rusk from Knox. Following is gist of statement made at private meeting in USUN offices of members of SC April 12. (Gromyko present for first time: all other SC members present. Secretariat represented by Sobolev; SYG Lie absent.)

Austin opened meeting stating he noticed news statement in press that USUN responsible for fact no news released concerning these private meetings. This was not a fact. Parodi replying, agreed that Austin had stated accurately the understanding regarding release of

news. "We are all in agreement," Parodi said, "that each delegation can say what it wants to the press but no delegation will state what the views of other delegations might have been."

Austin then stated that he hoped delegations had specific ideas concerning the truce. These ideas, he emphasized, would be entirely informal and not binding on their governments. He outlined his idea of the truce as follows:

- (a) The truce in Palestine should be a "standstill" arrangement.
- (b) The truce should be operative until the GA sets up a new governmental arrangement to replace the mandatory power.
- (c) The truce should maintain the *status quo* without making any political decisions.
- (d) The truce should provide that the inhabitants of Palestine, namely, the people who are now there should be able to live comfortably without fear of violence. For example, there should be no threat to them of a break in water supplies, food provisions or the means of carrying on their customary peaceful livelihood. There should be no interventions from outside during the period of the mandate except with the approval of UK.
- (e) Neither side is to import arms or material or people. The existing *status quo* of military organizations on both sides is to be kept static.
- (f) There is to be no political action by either side unless said action is approved by the constituted power, that is, by the UK during the period of the mandate and until the GA inaugurates the next government of Palestine.

"These ideas," Austin added, "are for members here present to consider. They may be changed if members so desire. Their main objective is tranquility."

[Here follow observations by various Representatives, particularly with respect to the question of immigration and as to whether the United Nations Palestine Commission would be the appropriate agent of the Security Council to supervise the truce in Palestine. Views of Ambassador Austin then follow.]

["]We must be sincere. We have heard the Syrian reaction to use of Palestine Commission to observe the truce.¹ This is a reasonable and natural reaction. I am inclined to favor Lopez' idea that we set up a commission of observation, but one that obviously and clearly to everyone will not be trying to put across any political settlement. Therefore, I think the commission should not be the Palestine Commission. This is no reflection on Palestine Commission which has another frame of reference. The truce is an entirely different matter. Furthermore, the Palestine Commission is a part of the GA recommendation and the Palestine Commission should be here in New York for the special session."

¹ Faris el-Khouri, the Syrian Representative at the United Nations, had asserted earlier in the discussions that the Commission had been appointed to establish partition and that its members were pro-partition.

[Here follow further views of various Representatives.]

At this point Gromyko intervened for the first time. He objected to such meetings "behind closed doors." He thought them without justification. He thought the truce was important. More important was the fact that a decision (the truce) of the SC was being ignored. This meant, he thought, that SC resolution was not strong enough. "Everybody knows who is responsible for violence in Palestine." Continuing, Gromyko said that US had expressed interesting ideas but overlooked who was responsible for the trouble in Palestine. UK took part in these meetings but the UK was either unable or unwilling to keep order in Palestine.

He thought that the question of Palestine should now be discussed in open session of SC; since the SC resolution was being ignored SC should find out who was ignoring it and if necessary carry out more effective steps. Someone might perhaps be embarrassed by an open discussion; maybe for that reason itself it would be better to have an open discussion.

Syria and Colombia denied that private meetings in any way were out of order.

Following the meeting, Colombia told certain members privately that there would be a meeting of some drafting experts at Colombian delegation offices, April 13, 10:30 a. m. for purpose of writing a truce proposal. All members of SC were welcome but those specifically invited to attend (and who accepted) were US, UK, France, Canada, China and Colombia.² [Knox.]

AUSTIN

² Mr. McClintock's memorandum of April 13 to Mr. Lovett noted that a draft resolution "was the product of a five-hour session today in the offices of the Colombian Representative to the Security Council, who consulted with Representatives of the US, UK, France, and Canada. This paper will be submitted to the other members of the Security Council at an informal meeting of tomorrow morning in Ambassador Austin's office. On the whole the paper seems to cover most of the points which were cited in the Department's instruction to Ambassador Austin contained in Deptel 208 last night." New York, in telegram 433, April 13, summarized the session (501.BB Palestine/4-1348).

In a marginal notation to Mr. Rusk on Mr. McClintock's memorandum, Mr. Lovett said: "I am doubtful about #4." Paragraph numbered 4 of the draft resolution read: "[The Security Council] Appoints a Truce Commission consisting of the Chief Consular Officers of those members of the Security Council which have Consulates in Jerusalem to assist the Mandatory Power in supervising this truce."

In a memorandum of April 14 to Mr. Rusk, Mr. McClintock noted Mr. Lovett's request to Mr. Rusk to clear the text of the draft resolution with Mr. Clifford. A marginal notation indicates that this was done (501.BB Palestine/4-1448).

Editorial Note

In telegram 438, April 14, 1:51 p. m., from New York, Mr. Ross sent to Mr. Rusk the informal, written comments of the Jewish Agency

on the American 15-point trusteeship program for Palestine. The telegram noted that Mr. Ross had received the comments the night before. At one point in the 14-page telegram, appeared the following Jewish Agency comment: "It is because the very concept of trusteeship is so flagrantly out of accord with the general principles and current realities of the Palestine situation that no improvement of the US proposals can make them a useful starting point in the quest for a political settlement." (501.BB Palestine/4-1448)

501.BB Palestine/4-1448: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

NEW YORK, April 14, 1948--2:30 p. m.

US URGENT

439. For Rusk from Ross. Following is revised text of draft SC resolution agreed upon at informal meeting of Council members in long session this morning. Gromyko, Tarasenko, and Khouri specifically reserved their positions. Council meeting set for 2:30 tomorrow afternoon.

"Considering the Council's resolution of 1 April 1948 and the conversations held by its president with the representatives of the JA for Palestine and the AHC with a view to arranging a truce between Arabs and Jews in Palestine;

Considering that as stated in that resolution, it is of the utmost urgency to bring about the immediate cessation of acts of violence in Palestine, and to establish conditions of peace and order in that country;

Considering that the UK Government, so long as it remains the mandatory power, is responsible for the maintenance of peace and order in Palestine and should continue to take all steps necessary to that end; and that in so doing it should receive the cooperation and support of the SC in particular as well as of all the members of the UN;

The SC:

1. Calls upon all persons and organizations in Palestine and especially upon the AHC and the JA to take immediately without prejudice to their rights, claims, or positions, and as a contribution to the well-being and permanent interest of Palestine, the following measures:

(a) Cease all activities of a military or para-military nature, as well as acts of violence, terrorism and sabotage;

(b) Refrain from bringing into Palestine armed bands or individuals, whatever their origin, armed or capable of bearing arms and from assisting or encouraging the entry into Palestine of such armed bands and individuals;

(c) Refrain from importing or acquiring or assisting or encouraging the importation or acquisition of weapons and war materials;

(d) Refrain, pending further consideration of the future government of Palestine by the GA, from any political activity which might prejudice the rights, claims, or positions of either community;

(e) Cooperate with the mandatory authorities for the effective maintenance of law and order and of essential services particularly those relating to transportation, communications, health, and food and water supplies;

(f) Refrain from any action which will endanger the safety of the holy places in Palestine.

2. Requests the UK Government for so long as it remains the mandatory power to use its best efforts to bring all those concerned in Palestine to accept the measures set forth under paragraph 1 above and subject to retaining the freedom of action of its own forces to supervise the execution of these measures by all those concerned and to keep the SC and the GA currently informed on the situation in Palestine.

3. Calls upon all governments and particularly those of the countries neighboring Palestine to take all possible steps to assist in the implementation of the measures set out under paragraph 1 above and particularly those referring to the entry into Palestine of armed bands, individuals armed or capable of bearing arms and weapons and war materials.”¹

AUSTIN

¹ Paragraph 4 of the original draft (see footnote 2, p. 819) was eliminated from the revised draft, for reasons indicated in telegram 446, April 14, *infra*. Otherwise the differences in the two drafts involved minor language changes. The Department, on April 15, authorized New York to support the draft resolution given in telegram 439 (telegram 217, 501.BB Palestine/4-1448).

501.BB Palestine/4-1448 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

NEW YORK, April 14, 1948—9:41 p. m.

446. For Rusk from Knox. With reference to USUN 439¹ containing draft of truce proposal to be discussed at SC meeting Thursday following is gist of comments made at private meeting of SC members, held at USUN office April 14. (All members of the SC were present, except Parodi who was represented by a staff member, Dr. Arce appeared for the first time following his return from Bogotá and Buenos Aires, Sobolev represented Secretariat, Lie was absent) :

Lopez explained that working paper containing truce terms which was to be discussed at the meeting had been prepared at the staff level by representatives of Colombia, UK, US, China, Canada and France.

¹ Dated April 14, *supra*.

Gromyko claimed that he had no knowledge that such drafting group was being formed and he apparently resented that this unofficial document had been prepared in his absence. There was a brief exchange between Gromyko and Lopez during which Lopez became rather heated. The matter ended when Gromyko indicated that the matter was not of great importance and when Lopez apologized for any misunderstanding which he (Lopez) may have unwittingly caused when he announced that this drafting meeting would be held.

Cadogan stated that his government wanted to get the views of the High Commissioner of Palestine on the proposed draft before committing itself.

El Khouri questioned the phrase (paragraph 1-*b*) "of military age". This he thought was too vague. It was subsequently changed to "capable of bearing arms".

Gromyko asked what clause in the resolution guaranteed the prevention of more armed bands from entering Palestine. Syria replied rather aggressively that Jews were coming into Palestine and that the Arabs in view of the present ratio of population had the right to enter Palestine in twice the number in order to keep the proportion even. This matter was settled, at least temporarily, when Lopez stated that the proposal was "for a standstill", and when Cadogan indicated that for the duration of the mandate the legal immigration quota of 1,500 per month would be continued.

Syria apparently accepted Canada's assurance that immigrants not armed or capable of bearing arms would not affect the military position in Palestine. Gromyko challenged point 4 of the proposed draft. This paragraph provided for a truce commission. Gromyko thought that the choice of members of the SC who had consulates in Jerusalem to compose the truce commission was arbitrary. At Lopez' suggestion this paragraph was eliminated (also some feeling in USUN that the presence of Syria on a truce commission might cause a bad public reaction to the commission and, by implication, to the truce proposal). Syria approved of the truce commission, and seemed determined not to withdraw voluntarily from the commission if it were eligible for membership.

During the paragraph by paragraph examination of the proposed draft, Austin suggested:

Insert "provisional" in paragraph 1 in order to make the phrase read "the following provisional measures". There was general objection, however, that this addition might shorten the duration of the truce.

In paragraph 1-*a*, Syria proposed substituting "as well as" in place of "including" and this was generally agreed to. In paragraph 1-*b* Syria supported by Canada and China replaced "military age" by wording which appears in USUN 439. In paragraph 1-*c*, Austin at-

tempted to replace "refrain from" by "prevent". There was general feeling, however, that the word "prevent" would encourage Arabs and Jews to enforce this provision on each other and hence increase the fighting. In paragraph 1-f, Austin suggested "protect" instead of "refrain from any action which will endanger". Members, however, objected that this might encourage Jews and Arabs to send armed forces to protect the Holy places.

Paragraph 2 was reworded as now appears in USUN 439 at the request of Cadogan. Paragraph 4 was dropped, because of Russian objection but might be introduced in the SC meeting on Thursday.

AUSTIN

501.BB Palestine/4-1548 : Telegram

*The United States Representative of the United Nations (Austin)
to the Secretary of State*

SECRET URGENT

NEW YORK, April 15, 1948—10:45 a. m.

449. [For] Rusk from Ross. Ambassador Austin, Jessup¹ and I called on Chaim Weizmann on his invitation late yesterday afternoon and had a very interesting talk with him for about three-quarters of an hour. Weizmann said he had tried very hard but could not understand the reasons for the "switch" in the US position. Was it fear of the Arabs? Was it oil? Or was it fear of Russia? He said there was no reason whatever to fear the Arabs. They were woefully weak. The Arabs could do nothing with their oil except sell it to the US. Did we fear they would sell it to Russia? If so, what would the Arabs do with Russian rubles? Were we afraid that the Jewish state would be dominated by Russia? There was no possible occasion for such fear. Bolshevik agents had tried very hard in the 1920's to get a foothold in Palestine and had failed miserably. Weizmann went on to say that the Jews were confronted with an extremely difficult psychological problem. They were granted independence in November and independence was withdrawn in April.

Assuming that there were no two-thirds majority in GA for trusteeship, the Jews would have the legal, and if not the legal certainly the moral right to go ahead with their plans to establish the Jewish state.

In response to our questions and comments, he said that the Jews had absolutely no fear of the Arabs and he elaborated on this by indicating that the Arab states were so disorganized and weak as to constitute almost the military factor of zero.

We made it clear that we felt such action by the Jews would be a mistake from their point of view.

¹ Philip C. Jessup, a representative of the United States at the Second Special Session of the General Assembly.

The Senator turned the conversation to the positive side and asked whether the Jews did not feel that their welfare would be far better if trusteeship would get a two-thirds vote in the Assembly.

This led to a discussion of essential Jewish requirements as Weizmann saw them. If trusteeship would include three essential points for the Jews, namely, immigration, land settlement, and economic development, it was wholly conceivable to Weizmann that trusteeship might be beneficial to the Jews, and also provide an opportunity for cooperation of the closest kind between Jews and Arabs, ending in due course to an agreed political settlement.

Weizmann, of course, undertook no commitment with regard to the foregoing but it was clear that his mind is rubbing strongly in this direction.

We did not discuss the question of possible US aid but we did discuss the possibility of UN assistance with particular reference to the specialized agencies, such as the FAO, the World Bank, and the WHO.

In concluding our conversation, the Senator indicated that he would like to deal in his Assembly opening statement with the question of economic development and Weizmann promised to have Eban, who was with us, send us material on economic development projects.²

AUSTIN

² Acting Secretary of State Lovett transmitted a copy of telegram 449 to President Truman in a memorandum of April 21, which stated in part: "The most interesting part of this telegram is found on the second page, where Dr. Weizmann suggests that a trusteeship which would include immigration, land settlement and economic development might provide an opportunity for an agreed political settlement between Jews and Arabs." (501.BB Palestine/4-1548; Truman Papers, President's Secretary's File)

501.BB Palestine/4-1548

*Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Director of the
Office of United Nations Affairs (Rusk)*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] April 15, 1948—11:15 a. m.

Mr. Clifford stated that he had received the draft truce resolution ¹ and the position paper on the attitude of the United States toward the November 29 resolution ² and had given them to the President at the nine o'clock meeting today. He said that the President would read them over at the earliest possible moment and would inform him of any comments he might have.

I told Mr. Clifford that it was necessary for Senator Austin to vote in the Security Council this afternoon on the truce resolution. Mr. Clifford then said that he thought we should proceed to instruct Senator Austin to support the resolution, since he (Mr. Clifford) had looked

¹ See telegram 439, April 14, from New York, p. 820.

² See undated memorandum by Mr. Wilkins, p. 813.

it over very carefully and had told the President that he saw no objections to it and that it was in conformity with our previous discussions.

I told Mr. Clifford that we would proceed to instruct Senator Austin but that, of course, if the President subsequently wished to raise any points, we would attempt to deal with them by telephone.

Editorial Note

The United States Delegation to the Second Special Session of the General Assembly held its first meeting on April 15 to discuss the "United States Position on Palestine". At this meeting, "Mr. McClintock suggested it would be unwise at the present time to talk with other delegations regarding the possibility of sending funds and troops to enforce a trusteeship plan. He thought it enough to say that we were prepared to carry our fair share of responsibility in cooperation with other United Nations members." (Excerpts from the Minutes of Meeting, IO files, US/A/1086.)

The Second Special Session of the General Assembly convened in New York on April 16 to consider further the future government of Palestine. The *Official Records* of the Session, published by the United Nations, consist of the following:

Volume I, *Plenary Meetings of the General Assembly: Summary Records of Meetings, 16 April-14 May 1948*, hereinafter cited as "GA (II/SS), *Plenary*".

Volume II, *Main Committees: Summary Records of Meetings, 16 April-14 May 1948*, hereinafter cited as "GA (II/SS), *Main Committees*".

Annex to Volumes I and II, hereinafter cited as "GA (II/SS), *Annex*".

Supplement No. 1, United Nations Palestine Commission, Report to the General Assembly.

Supplement No. 2, Resolutions, 16 April-14 May 1948, hereinafter cited as "GA (II/SS), *Resolutions*".

The Report of the Palestine Commission, dated April 10, 1948, reviewed the Commission's activities in connection with implementing the measures recommended by the General Assembly for the partition of Palestine, with economic union. The Commission concluded "that the armed hostility of both Palestinian and non-Palestinian Arab elements, the lack of co-operation from the mandatory Power, the disintegrating security situation in Palestine, and the fact that the Security Council did not furnish the Commission with the necessary armed assistance, are the factors which have made it impossible for the Commission to implement the Assembly's resolution." (page 36)

501.BB Palestine/4-1648: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

US URGENT

LONDON, April 16, 1948—3 p. m.

NIACT

1583. 1. Discussed with Bevin yesterday afternoon, before his departure for Paris, substance Deptel 1260, April 9, which had been promptly submitted to him for consideration; Deptel 1315, April 14;¹ and cirtel April 6, contents of which had been delivered to Bevin on receipt.

2. Bevin's personal view is as follows, though the matter has not been submitted to the Cabinet:

(a) While he cannot prejudge the decision of the Cabinet, he feels that to the extent to which he has discussed matter with one or two of his colleagues it would be unacceptable both to the Cabinet and to the House of Commons. Moreover, it would create a very unfavorable reaction in Britain.

(b) Goldmann² has been to see him recently. Bevin gathers from Goldmann that he and his group are trying to push for a settlement along the lines of the original British proposal of about two years ago with Cantons, et cetera established throughout Palestine.

(c) He hopes that there will be a meeting in Geneva during the course of the next two or three days, attended by some forty prominent Jewish residents of Palestine, among others the head of the University of Jerusalem. This meeting, he expects, will pass a resolution urging a truce and recommending a settlement along the lines of the original British proposal of some two years ago.

(d) He noted the peace parade which took place in Jerusalem the day before yesterday.

(e) When asked what proposal he would suggest as an alternative to the one which we had put forward, he said at the moment he would prefer to make no commitment, and that in his judgment it would be preferable to let developments in the GA proceed for a few days before taking a position.

(f) In view of the above, he prefers to postpone full Cabinet consideration until early next week.

(g) HMG has great influence with the Arabs and will be persuasive with them in regard to any reasonable proposal. HMG does not, however, have any influence with the Jewish faction.

3. Lewis Jones tells me that everybody in the FonOff with whom he has discussed the question is unanimously of the view that the inclusion and re-entry of French troops into the Arab world would be disastrous and would project violent reaction because of general Arab attitude towards France.

DOUGLAS

¹ Not printed.² Nahum Goldmann, American Zionist leader, at this time representing the interests of the Provisional Government of Israel at London.

*Resolution 46 (1948) Adopted by the Security Council on April 17, 1948*¹

The Security Council,

Considering its resolution 43 (1948) of 1 April 1948 and the conversations held by its President with the representatives of the Jewish Agency for Palestine and the Arab Higher Committee with a view to arranging a truce between Arabs and Jews in Palestine,

Considering that, as stated in that resolution, it is of the utmost urgency to bring about the immediate cessation of acts of violence in Palestine and to establish conditions of peace and order in that country,

Considering that the United Kingdom Government, so long as it remains the Mandatory Power, is responsible for the maintenance of peace and order in Palestine and should continue to take all steps necessary to that end; and that, in so doing, it should receive the co-operation and support of the Security Council in particular as well as of all the Members of the United Nations,

1. *Calls upon* all persons and organizations in Palestine, and especially upon the Arab Higher Committee and the Jewish Agency, to take immediately, without prejudice to their rights, claims, or positions, and as a contribution to the well-being and permanent interests of Palestine, the following measures:

(a) Cease all activities of a military or paramilitary nature, as well as acts of violence, terrorism and sabotage;

(b) Refrain from bringing and from assisting and encouraging the entry into Palestine of armed bands and fighting personnel, groups and individuals, whatever their origin;

(c) Refrain from importing or acquiring or assisting or encouraging the importation or acquisition of weapons and war materials;

(d) Refrain, pending further consideration of the future government of Palestine by the General Assembly, from any political activity which might prejudice the rights, claims, or position of either community;

(e) Co-operate with the Mandatory authorities for the effective maintenance of law and order and of essential services, particularly those relating to transportation, communications, health, and food and water supplies;

(f) Refrain from any action which will endanger the safety of the Holy Places in Palestine and from any action which would interfere with access to all shrines and sanctuaries for the purpose of worship by those who have an established right to visit and worship at them;

2. *Requests* the United Kingdom Government, for so long as it remains the Mandatory Power, to use its best efforts to bring all those concerned in Palestine to accept the measures set forth under Paragraph 1 above and, subject to retaining the freedom of action of its

¹ Reprinted from SC, 3rd yr., *Resolutions, 1948*, p. 15. The resolution was adopted by 9 votes to none, with the Soviet Union and the Ukraine abstaining.

own forces, to supervise the execution of these measures by all those concerned, and to keep the Security Council and the General Assembly currently informed on the situation in Palestine;

3. *Calls upon* all Governments, and particularly those of the countries neighboring Palestine, to take all possible steps to assist in the implementation of the measures set out under paragraph 1 above, and particularly those referring to the entry into Palestine of armed bands and fighting personnel, groups and individuals, and weapons and war materials.

501.BB Palestine/4-1648 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

TOP SECRET

NIACT

WASHINGTON, April 17, 1948—1 p. m.

1375. Personal from Lovett to Ambassador Douglas. I have just seen urtel 1583¹ and find Bevin's reply deeply disappointing. Please see him at the earliest possible moment and take up with him again the contents of Deptel 1260,² particularly the reasons why US-UK co-operation in finding settlement for Palestine is essential to vital interests of both countries. Tell him that we have not made the proposals contained therein in any belief that they or any other proposals are likely to work out in a fully satisfactory manner. We have not been able, however, to devise any more practical way out of a situation which is being created by the termination of the Palestine mandate. Some stand-still arrangement appears to us to be necessary to allow for cooling off before any agreed final settlement is possible. If Bevin has any alternative suggestions we would be glad to consider them at once.

You can not emphasize too much the vital necessity for joint US-UK action within the UN to prevent chaos and heavy fighting in Palestine. The feeling is growing rapidly in this country that UK is failing to cooperate with other Members of UN on the very question on which it has itself sought UN action. We are very much concerned by the increasingly bitter attitude to be observed among other delegations in UN. We find it difficult to believe that UK can continue to assume non-committal attitude and pursue a policy which will result in a situation so dangerous to its own security as well as to world peace.

It will be necessary for the United States Representative to speak at an early stage of the Special Session of the GA. The nature of our public statement will depend in large part upon the degree of cooperation which can be expected from the UK. We hope therefore to receive a more helpful reply at the earliest possible minute.

¹ Dated April 16, p. 826.

² Dated April 9, p. 805.

In pressing upon Mr. Bevin the serious threat to broad US-UK cooperation inherent in a failure of the UK to assume an active role in this problem, you should make it clear that we are merely stating the practical situation which will be faced by this government in dealing with Congress and the U.S. public. Our informal talks with Congressional leaders have left us in no doubt as to their attitude. Since you know the incalculable harm which will result to every aspect of US-UK interests and activities from a continuance of uncooperative UK attitude in this matter, you will be able in your own words to reflect the urgency which we place on this aspect of the Palestine question.³

(Sent London 1375 Rptd New York 224.)

LOVETT

³ This telegram was cleared with the White House.

501.BB Palestine/4-1848 : Telegram

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of United Nations Affairs (Rusk) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)

[WASHINGTON,] April 18, 1948.

MR. LOVETT: The attached draft¹ is for an initial statement, *provided* one has to be made by Senator Austin Monday morning. The Russians have refused to forego a general debate in plenary session, hence we may have to speak.

The attached speech does not drive hard on the British because it is too early to bear down on them; we need an answer to our latest effort.

I believe this is the minimum we should say in an opening statement.

On page 9, you'll find the paragraphs on troops² which have been cleared by the President and Mr. Forrestal. Jack Ohly, in Forrestal's office, later suggested informally that we insert the words "selected by

¹ Not printed; it was prepared for delivery by Ambassador Austin before the plenary meeting on April 19 of the Second Special Session of the General Assembly and was transmitted to New York in telegram 227, April 18, 6 p. m., not printed.

² These two paragraphs read: "The United States has raised with certain other governments the question of joint responsibility for the security of a temporary trusteeship. These discussions have thus far produced no tangible result. The United States is willing to undertake its share of responsibility for the provision of police forces which are required during a truce and a temporary trusteeship, along with other members who may be selected by the General Assembly and who are willing to carry out such a task in accordance with the will of the Assembly and with the provisions of the Charter.

"While the United States is prepared to carry its fair share of the United Nations burden involved in such a temporary trusteeship, it is not prepared to act alone in this matter. Our participation will be conditioned upon a readiness of other governments to provide similar assistance."

the General Assembly" after the word "governments" in the third line from the bottom of the page.³

For the record, Mr. Elsey stated that the President had read the two paragraphs and had written on the bottom of the sheet of paper the word "approved" and had initialed it. Clark Clifford had approved the text earlier.

D[EAN] R[USK]

³ The insert is to be made after the fifth from the last word in the latter paragraph of footnote 2 above.

Forrestal Papers

*Diary Entry for April 18, 1948, by the Secretary of Defense
(Forrestal)*

Under Secretary of State Lovett

Under Secretary Lovett came in this afternoon to discuss two things:

1. The continuous and extended disturbances in Central America. . . .

2. He stated that Senator Austin was scheduled to speak in the United Nations on Monday and that his statement would include an acceptance by the United States of the responsibility in making its portion of the contribution to the forces required for the maintenance of peace during the period of truce and trusteeship discussions. The nature of these forces, in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, will total 105,000 men of which the United States proportion would be on the order of 45,000. (Palestine)

501.BB Palestine/4-1848: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Tuck) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

CAIRO, April 18, 1948—9 a. m.

382. Azzam Pasha called yesterday to convey confidentially reaction Arab League to truce proposals suggested by UN to Arabs and Jews. Azzam said the "general lines" or instructions which would be sent representatives member states Arab League N.Y. as agreed upon by League Political Committee in which Arab Higher Committee is represented are:

1. League accepts in principle idea of an armistice or truce.

2. League will insist, however, that *status quo* of belligerents must be maintained. The truce in other words must not be used to increase armaments or number of belligerents through "infiltration by [land?] and/or sea".

3. This truce in League opinion is not an ordinary truce between belligerents but must have as its objective the bringing about of a final settlement and making further hostilities impossible.

4. Such a truce should give UN opportunity to seek pacific solution.

5. Partition in opinion of League is not a pacific solution since it can be implemented only by force. Therefore, it cannot be considered as a solution.

6. The League with a view to making this truce instrument of final pacification and rendering further fighting impossible is prepared to cooperate in complete disarmament population of Palestine, dissolution of all parliamentary organizations and dismantling of all military strongholds.

No other conditions were mentioned by Azzam. He stated his intention of informing British Ambassador of above and added he had already telephoned gist of it to his UN representative in New York. See also mytel 357, April 12.¹

TUCK

¹ Not printed.

501.BB Palestine/4-1848: Circular telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, April 18, 1948—8 p. m.

Reference Dept's Confidential instruction April 8, 1948,¹ forwarding copy of draft trusteeship agreement for Palestine. Copies this agreement have informally been made available on confidential basis to reps. of members of the SC, of certain other members of UN and of Jewish Agency and Arab Higher Committee. Dept has stressed that agreement is in draft form for use as working paper and that all suggestions for improvement would be welcomed. Dept has emphasized necessity for interim governmental machinery in Palestine following termination of British mandate on May 15 and has suggested that draft trusteeship agreement represents means of obtaining such machinery on sound legal basis under Charter.

You are authorized to discuss draft trusteeship agreement on similar basis with appropriate officials of govt. to which you are accredited. Thus far drafting rather than substantive changes have been made in draft. Important changes will be telegraphed shortly. In meantime draft in your possession may be used in your discussions.

Brief report re your discussions including views obtained and changes suggested is requested by telegraph as soon as possible.

¹ See footnote 1, p. 778.

Legation Damascus is also authorized to discuss with reps. AHC. ConGen Jerusalem is authorized to discuss with JA and to bring to attention of Palestine Govt.²

Sent to Jidda, Cairo, Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Jerusalem, London and Paris for action. Repeated to USUN, N.Y. for info.

LOVETT

² The Department, on April 19, authorized Ambassador Tuck to discuss the draft trusteeship agreement with Azzam Pasha (telegram 438 to Cairo, 501.BB Palestine/4-1948). Cairo reported, on April 22, that the latter was "frankly and bitterly hostile to agreement as unnecessarily replacing mandate by new regime possessing some handicaps, many additional defects and no redeeming features . . . Document would convince Arabs that US still sponsored eventual creation Jewish state not merely in part of Palestine but . . . in all Palestine." (Telegram 398, 501.BB Palestine/4-2248)

Consul Wasson, on April 21, discussed with Mr. Kohn the question of a trusteeship agreement. The latter, after consultation with members of the Jewish Agency, informed the Consul on April 30 that "the Jewish Agency does not find in the draft agreement even a basis for discussion, since it does not provide for establishment Jewish state." (Telegram 515, April 30, 6 p. m., from Jerusalem, 501.BB Palestine/4-3048)

501.BB Palestine/4-1948

The Secretary of Defense (Forrestal) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, 19 April 1948.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: In view of the position to be taken by the United States in the General Assembly with respect to Palestine, as discussed with Mr. Lovett yesterday afternoon, I believe it is desirable to consider the concrete consequences of this action in terms of our future course of action elsewhere. Every future decision must take into account the potential deployment of troops to that area, and I believe it may be helpful to all of us to outline briefly the results as I see them.

The United States commitment to undertake a proportionate share of the burden of providing the police forces required during a truce and temporary trusteeship in Palestine, is going to affect materially our ability to use military forces for any other purposes for a substantial time to come. Based upon the Joint Chiefs of Staff estimate as to the number of troops required to support this truce and trusteeship, and assuming the United States would have to supply, as would probably be the case, approximately 50 per cent of such forces, fulfillment of this commitment will probably require the deployment of approximately 50,000 men. This number represents substantially our entire present ground reserve, both Marine and Army. In other words, there will be no troops available for deployment to any other area, at least until such time as the strength of our total establishment has been

replenished through the operation of Selective Service, provided a Selective Service law is enacted. For at least six months, the United States will have to accept the loss of the bulk of its general reserve.

It should also be brought out that the logistical support of such troops will require a great deal of work within the zone of interior. This in turn may seriously affect our ability to carry out existing and projected programs of military assistance. Moreover, the acceptance of this undertaking will result in substantial additional costs to the National Military Establishment. These will in turn require the submission of a further supplementary budget of a size which cannot now be determined, or the reduction of other current military activities.

I bring out all these points because I feel that it may now be desirable to review the United States policy in such areas as Italy, Iran, Greece, China and Turkey, and its proposed policy with respect to Western Union. Since these policies are partly based on our ability to provide troops and military equipment, either currently or under certain future contingencies, the non-availability of such troops and equipment as a result of the United States position on Palestine may render these policies meaningless.¹

Sincerely yours,

JAMES FORRESTAL

¹ An "Excerpt from Minutes of Meeting of United States Delegation to Second Special Session of the General Assembly, April 19, 1948, 9:30 a. m." cites Mr. Rusk as stating that "the United States was not going to buy into a war between the Jews and the Arabs of Palestine. The United States had no troops to be used in such a war, and, if it had such troops, they would not be used in Palestine. A war in Palestine was beyond the military possibilities of the United States. The scale of warfare there would commit absolutely all of the strategic reserves of the United States, and such a commitment was impossible for the United States to undertake. He re-emphasized repeatedly that the United States was not going to buy into a war in Palestine.

"Therefore, every effort should be made to put across the Security Council Truce, and to make it effective. The United States would, and all other United Nations members should be persuaded to put all possible pressure on the Arabs to preserve the truce. This was fundamental to a settlement of the Palestine Question." (IO files, US/A/M (Chr)/79 Add. 1)

USUN Files

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] April 19, 1948.

During the past few weeks there has been increasing discussion in the press and among the delegates at Flushing and Lake Success (but not officially in the United Nations itself), with regard to the present danger of civil strife to the Holy City of Jerusalem.

These discussions indicate two main lines of approach :

(1) Immediate dispatch of security forces by the United Nations to Jerusalem as suggested by members of the French Delegation (USUN Telegrams Nos. 457 and 458 of April 16,¹ copies of which are attached) ;

(2) The setting up of a temporary trusteeship or some other form of interim government by the United Nations for the City of Jerusalem only.

I am also attaching a copy of Deptel No. 228 of April 18² in which it is stated that the main United States effort in the United Nations should be concentrated on the achievement of a temporary trusteeship for all of Palestine rather than for security measures or a temporary trusteeship in a part of Palestine. It also stated that in discussions between members of the United States Delegation and other delegations it would be helpful to obtain suggestions regarding a temporary trusteeship for Jerusalem as a preliminary to or part of a temporary trusteeship for all of Palestine. It is believed that if we approach the immediate problem of Jerusalem in this manner we will increase the likelihood of support for a trusteeship for all of Palestine and at the same time develop constructive suggestions with regard to the City of Jerusalem.

It is my thought that if the United Nations should give all of its attention to Jerusalem, we may end up with interim governmental machinery for Jerusalem and with no form of government for the rest of Palestine following the termination of the British Mandate on May 15. In such eventuality, I can envisage a situation, as has previously occurred in China and in Morocco, in which conditions of anarchy and famine would prevail beyond the borders of a restricted international area with thousands of refugees pouring into the area to obtain emergency protection, food and housing. If a situation of this character should develop in Palestine and if refugees from all parts of Palestine descended upon Jerusalem, the difficulties which would confront the United Nations administration would be almost insuperable.

If a special area for Jerusalem were extended to the coast to include the ports of Tel Aviv and Jaffa, conditions would undoubtedly be alleviated ; nevertheless, I feel we should be under no misapprehension regarding the difficult financial and administrative problems which would confront the United Nations. It is for this reason I recommend that we should continue to stress and support the necessity for a temporary trusteeship for all of Palestine rather than for a

¹ Neither printed.

² To New York, not printed.

restricted part of that country. At the same time I agree that, as a last resort, we should be preparing plans within the Department for the protection of Jerusalem and environs in case all else fails.

501.BB Palestine/4-1948

Memorandum by Mr. Robert M. McClintock to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)

[WASHINGTON,] April 19, 1948.

Mr. Rusk telephoned at noon to say that the Plenary Session this morning of the General Assembly decided not to stage any general debate on Palestine but to refer the matter immediately to the First Committee (Political and Security Affairs).¹ Since Ambassador Austin's statement will now be made before Committee 1, which meets at 10:30 tomorrow morning, there may be some minor textual changes in his speech which had been intended for delivery at the Plenary Session. Mr. Rusk says he knows what you have in mind for the statement but that he will endeavor to send us the text of any modification which might be made in Ambassador Austin's remarks.

Following the Plenary Session this morning, Ambassador Austin and Mr. Rusk told the press that the decision of the Plenary to suspend debate and send the question immediately to Committee 1 represented the fastest possible action and was therefore all to the good.

¹ See GA (II/SS), *Plenary*, p. 9. The Assembly decision was made by 44 votes to none, with 10 abstentions.

Editorial Note

Ambassador Austin set forth the United States position before the First Committee on April 20, calling for a truce in Palestine and the establishment of a trusteeship there; for text of his statement, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 2, 1948, page 568. The Ambassador, at the same time, presented as a working paper the United States draft trusteeship agreement, with minor changes from that printed on page 778; for text of the working paper, see GA (II/SS), *Annex*, page 12.

Mr. Jessup, on April 21, introduced a draft resolution into the First Committee which called for reference of the United States working paper to the Fourth (Trusteeship) Committee; for Mr. Jessup's statement on that occasion, see GA (II/SS), *Main Committees*, page 26. The text of the draft resolution is printed in GA (II/SS), *Annex*, page 31.

IO Files : US/A/1070, US/S/462

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Dean Rusk of the United States
Delegation at the United Nations*

SECRET

[NEW YORK,] April 20, 1948.

At my request I had an hour's discussion with Fawzi Bey¹ at Lake Success this afternoon. I told him that I had been looking forward to an informal and personal conversation for some time and that what I had to say was of a personal rather than an official character.

I told Fawzi Bey that we had been thinking for some time about an international force which might be required in connection with a truce and trusteeship for Palestine. It seemed to us important that a number of governments who could be relied upon to carry out the wishes of the General Assembly should agree to accept responsibility for the security of Palestine if the police available to the Governor General proved inadequate. I said that it was common knowledge that this question had been raised with the British and the French but that I felt he would be interested in knowing that we had given considerable thought to Egypt's participation along with ten or twelve other United Nations Members in such a force. Any such proposal would, of course, be presented to the Egyptian Government for its consideration and we would not wish to embarrass Egypt by raising the question if they were unwilling to participate. I said that a considerable number of states would be desirable, even if their contributions varied considerably, in order to underline the broad United Nations aspect of the question and to afford a representative group of members. Egypt's position as a leading member of the Arab League and the moderation shown by their delegations in the United Nations had led us to believe that Egypt could play an important and helpful role in this matter.

Fawzi Bey replied that he appreciated my letting him know informally that we had been thinking about this matter and that he realized that I was not making any proposals to him. He stated that such participation would raise serious questions for them among certain Arab groups who would not be enthusiastic about Egypt playing this role. He wondered if we had considered Trans-Jordan. I told him that we had but had supposed that there would be political difficulties about Trans-Jordan's participation, particularly in view of the fact that that country was not a Member of the United Nations and the fact that our suggestion of Trans-Jordan might be seriously misunderstood. He agreed that that might raise many difficulties. He then said that the Arabs as a whole were not very enthusiastic about international forces coming into Palestine. He did not wish to question any motives of any government but he merely wished to report the concern among

¹ Mahmoud Fawzi, Egyptian Representative at the United Nations.

many Arabs lest an international force brought into Palestine for one purpose might suddenly be turned to another. I told him that our thought was that the nations who might be willing to contribute such forces would agree among themselves by means of a special protocol as to the numbers, role and conditions of such a joint venture and that Egypt's participation might itself be a guarantee that the agreed purposes of the international force would in fact be followed.

[Here follows Mr. Rusk's account of the remainder of the conversation.]

501.BB Palestine/4-2048 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET US URGENT
 NIACT

LONDON, April 20, 1948—11 a. m.

1630. Personal for Lovett from Douglas.

1. I had a long discussion with Bevin last evening reviewing the substance of Deptel 1260, April 9, and considerations which should prompt US-UK cooperation in finding solution to the problem of Palestine. (Deptel 1375, April 17, received here Sunday.)

2. Bevin is deeply concerned, and I am confident is not deliberately adopting a "Dog-in-the-manger" attitude. Indeed, he is particularly anxious that UK's position be not interpreted as non-cooperative. He is, however, at his wit's end to know what to do. He is giving the matter, I am confident, earnest thought, will discuss it with his colleagues, and will discuss the matter again with me tomorrow.

3. For your information, the Conservative Party would vigorously oppose any suggestion that British troops be retained in Palestine. More than a week ago Churchill¹ stated this view to me in unqualified terms. Most of the Labor members of Parliament would be equally opposed. This political situation which, I am confident I accurately assess, makes Bevin's position doubly difficult.

4. I regret that I cannot give you any assurance in these circumstances that HMG will agree to our proposal. It is remotely possible that Bevin may suggest some alternative plan. Will cable again as soon as I see him tomorrow.

DOUGLAS

¹ Winston S. Churchill, leader of the Conservative Party.

Editorial Note

The Trusteeship Council, on April 21, adopted a Draft Statute for the City of Jerusalem. The Council prepared this twenty-one page

document pursuant to a directive from the General Assembly to elaborate and approve a detailed Statute for the City.

The Statute defined the special international regime for the City of Jerusalem, constituting it a *corpus separatum* under the administration of the United Nations in accordance with the resolution of the General Assembly on November 29, 1947; for the text of the Statute, see United Nations, *Official Records of the Trusteeship Council, Second Session, Third Part, Annex*, page 4.

The British military authorities in the Haifa area, on the night of April 21, announced withdrawal of their forces to the airport, port area, and main road of that city. They made known also their firm intention not to interfere in clashes between Jews and Arabs or in any other problems apart from the British security and evacuation program. That same night fighting broke out between the Jews and Arabs for control of the evacuated area. (Telegram 29, April 22, from Haifa)

The Jews were successful in the fighting (telegram 33, April 23, from Haifa). Local Mufti-dominated Arab leaders urged all Arabs to leave the city and large numbers did so, the British providing convoy escorts to Lebanon and sea transport to Acre (telegram 40, April 22, from Haifa). By April 26, some 6,000 to 7,000 Arabs had fled from Haifa, the Arab Higher Committee, "reportedly" ordering all Arabs to leave. The Jews wanted the Arabs to "remain for political reasons to show democratic treatment[;] they will also need them for labor although Jews claim latter not essential." (Telegram 44, April 26, from Haifa)

The Arab States protested vigorously to the British Foreign Office that British withdrawal from most of Haifa was contrary to the understanding under which they agreed to refrain from intervention in Palestine until May 15. They also accused the British of giving the Jews a considerable advantage for which the Arabs were unprepared. (Telegram 1717, April 23, from London)

The American Consul at Haifa, Aubrey E. Lippincott, drew the following conclusions:

"1. The local Arabs are not 100% behind the present effort. Those who are fighting are in a small minority.

"2. A large number of Arabs in this country are entirely depending on outside forces to settle this dispute.

"3. Such forces as the Arabs have are quite amateur. Although they have some organization, the essential discipline for such an organization is lacking. Their sense of organizational supply and tactics is almost nil.

"4. For the time being we shall probably see large Jewish successes in the field. Unless the Arabs get some organization and training, they will be a very minor obstacle to the Jews on the battlefield. If outside forces come in, the whole matter is a different story. Here again, however, there are signs of disorganization, and there have been as yet

no signs of discipline and training comparable to that of the Jews.”
(Airgram 5, April 23, from Haifa)

All telegrams cited in this editorial note are filed under 867N.01.

501.BB Palestine/4-2148 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

TOP SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, April 21, 1948—3 p. m.
NIACT

1418. UK Delegation to UN in press conference at NY yesterday made following 4 points as reported in today's *NY Times*:

“(1) Britain will retain no civil responsibility in Palestine after May 15.

(2) No British troops will be left in Palestine for any purpose whatever after Aug. 1.

(3) Between these two dates, there will be no enforcement by British forces of any settlement not having the agreement of both Jews and Arabs.

(4) Within these limits, however, the British Govt. will cooperate in every way possible with any authority established in Palestine.”

In addition, official spokesman of UK delegation said that if any group of other powers were to request it, British Govt. would be willing to consider what adjustments could be made in its plans for withdrawing from Palestine, so as to help bridge gap while forces of this UN group were being organized and transported to Palestine. Britain would consider using its forces if necessary, even after May 15, for execution of SC political and military truce in Palestine. UK now urgently preparing next steps in this truce attempt.

Goldmann's report of his conversation with McNeil, as set forth para. 1, your 1635, Apr. 20,¹ would seem to corroborate foregoing press statement. However, para. 3, your 1630, Apr. 20, suggests that both Labor and Conservative Parties “would vigorously oppose any suggestion that Brit. troops be retained in Palestine.” If press conference statement and remarks attributed to McNeil are a correct reflection of British policy, we feel that this opportunity to utilize UK forces for an interim period should be promptly availed of.

Please check these points immediately with Bevin. Stress to him our hope that UK will find it possible to fill the breach in Palestine until a UN solution such as temporary trusteeship or some other arrangement can be found. You should make it clear, however, that we have not ceased to hope that UK, France and other Powers may find their

¹ Not printed.

way clear to join with us in sharing burden of implementation of temporary trusteeship if such a trusteeship is voted by GA.

Repeated to USUN as 240.

LOVETT

867N.01/4-2248

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] April 22, 1948.

In a little more than three weeks, unless some change can be effected in the situation, the British will abandon their mandate and will relinquish responsibility for law and order in Palestine. There is no necessity to enlarge upon what is likely to happen in the Middle East if the British wash their hands of Palestine before some kind of arrangements can be effected for the maintenance of law and order in that country.

The National Security Council decided some time ago, after considerable deliberation, that the security of the Middle East was vital to the security of the United States.¹ The developing situation in Palestine threatens the security of the United States and world peace. Any kind of an international arrangement which we may effect for preserving world peace on a basis which would be compatible with the security of the United States is lacking in substance so long as the cancerous Palestine situation continues to develop unchecked. We are not likely to make much headway in the atmosphere of indecision and confusion which envelops the United Nations at the present time unless Palestine is tackled by us at once dramatically and energetically as one of our most vital and urgent international problems.

The present policy of the United States Government with regard to Palestine is two-fold: 1) The United States will act on the Palestine question only as a Member of the United Nations. The United States will accept no unilateral responsibility and will take no unilateral action in this situation. 2) The United States is now supporting the Security Council's call for a truce in Palestine and believes that a temporary trusteeship for Palestine should be established by the General Assembly which would provide interim governmental machinery in Palestine following the termination of the British Mandate on May 15 and which would be without prejudice to the rights, claims and position of the Jews and Arabs of Palestine and without prejudice to the eventual political settlement for Palestine.

¹ See letter of November 24, 1947, from the Acting Secretary of State to President Truman, *Foreign Relations*, 1947, vol. v, p. 623.

In dealing with the Palestine problem through the United Nations we must face this problem on at least four fronts:

1. We must persuade the more moderate Jews in this country to break the hold which a minority of extreme American Zionists now has on American Jewry so that Jewish leaders in this country, instead of continuing to push Palestine Jews into an extremely nationalistic position, will endeavor to impress upon them the importance of assuming a reasonable and moderate attitude of cooperation with the Arabs.

2. We must make the Arab leaders, particularly those of the Arab League and of the Arab countries, understand that unless they on their part are willing to adopt a conciliatory and reasonable attitude of cooperation with the Jews, the security and prosperity of the whole Middle East will be gravely threatened.

3. We must sternly insist that Great Britain and other democratic powers join us wholeheartedly and energetically in an effort to find a peaceable way out of the Palestine impasse and point out to them that our failure in this respect may well undermine the security of the Western world.

4. We must impress upon both Republican and Democratic leaders, including Presidential candidates and members of Congress, the gravity of the Palestine problem and endeavor to gain their cooperation in seeing that the Palestine problem is no longer to be treated as a football of domestic politics, but as a matter seriously involving the security of the United States.

Recommendations:

A procedure along the following lines is recommended, subject, of course, to the approval of the President:

1. That you suggest to the Secretary that as soon as he can do so without seriously risking the success of the Conference, he leave Bogotá, announcing that he is returning to the United States to devote a major portion of his time and energy to the Palestine problem.

2. That the Palestine problem again be considered by the National Security Council as a matter of urgent national importance and that a firm, clear-cut decision be taken with regard to it which meets with the approval of the President and the Secretary.

3. That in consultation with the President, the Secretary have a conference or a series of conferences with leaders of Congress and the two political parties in order to remove Palestine from domestic politics and to give it its rightful place as a dangerous and difficult international problem. The support of these leaders for the decision taken by the National Security Council should be solicited.

4. That in consultation with the President, the Secretary call a conference of the outstanding leaders of the Jewish Community in the United States in order to obtain their support for our policy as developed by the National Security Council. Their cooperation should be requested to the end that the Jewish Community in the United States do its utmost to prevail upon the Jews in Palestine to adopt a reasonable and conciliatory attitude. The influence of Americans of Italian origin exerted in the Italian elections is an example of what might be done along this line.

5. That he talk both in Washington and in New York with representatives of the Western Powers in order to obtain their cooperation with regard to Palestine and that he send personal messages on the subject to Bevin and other key persons.

6. That he impress in personal conversations upon representatives of the Arab countries in the United States the fact that the Arab world will face political and economic disaster if the Palestine situation develops into mass fighting, and that unless the Arabs adopt a reasonable and conciliatory attitude, such fighting involving an increasing number of peoples and nations is likely to take place. These talks should be followed up with appeals to key Arab leaders abroad. These appeals should be of a friendly but stern nature.

7. Every effort should be made to explain through the press, radio, public addresses, etc., our position to the American people and to gain public support. We should abandon our present defensive attitude and take the offensive in a confident and courageous manner, calling upon all loyal citizens to back up the policy of the Government in an effort to achieve bipartisan support.

L[OY] W. H[ENDERSON]

Editorial Note

President Truman, in reply to a question at his press conference of April 22, 1948, concerning the possible sending of American troops to Palestine, stated: "We offered to furnish our share of a United Nations police force. That is the only way we will send troops anywhere under the United Nations. As a part of a United Nations police force for the enforcement of the orders of the United Nations, we will furnish our share, just as Mr. Austin said we would." (*Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1948*, page 229.)

867N.01/4-2248 : Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Wasson) to the Secretary of State

JERUSALEM, April 22, 1948.

468. Following is text of declaration adopted by General Zionist Council in Tel Aviv April 12:¹

"We have decided, relying on the authority of the Zionist movement and the support of the entire Jewish people, that upon the termination of the mandatory regime there shall be an end of foreign rule in Palestine, and that the governing body of the Jewish state shall come into being.

"The state which the Jewish people will set up in its own country will guarantee justice, freedom and equality for all its inhabitants

¹The Department, citing press reports of April 13, had requested the text of this declaration (telegram 265, April 13, 6 p. m., to Jerusalem, 501.BB Palestine/4-1348).

regardless of religion, race, sex, or land of origin. It is our aim to make it a state in which the exiles of our people are gathered together, in which happiness and knowledge shall prevail and the vision of the prophets of Israel shall illumine our path.

"At this hour, when bloodshed and strife have been forced upon us, we turn to the Arabs in the Jewish state and to our neighbours in adjacent territories with an appeal for brotherhood, cooperation and peace. We are a peaceful people, and we are here to build in peace. Let us then build our state together, as equal citizens with equal rights and obligations, with mutual trust and respect, each with a true understanding of the others needs.

"Our lives are dedicated to defending the liberty of our people. If further trials and battles are in store for us, we shall defend with all our might the achievement upon which we place our hopes.

"Right is on our side. With us are the hopes of the past generations of our people. With us is the conscience of the world. With us are deposited the testament of the millions of our martyred dead and the resolute will to live of the millions who have survived. The sanctity of our martyrs and heroes rests upon us, and the God of our Fathers will help us."

WASSON

501.BB Palestine/4-2248: Circular telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices

SECRET

WASHINGTON, April 22, 1948—7 a. m.

Reference is made to Dept Radio Bulletin No. 94 of April 20 quoting statement regarding Palestine by Ambassador Austin in the First Committee of the General Assembly on that date.

Particular attention is directed toward those paragraphs dealing with efforts which US has made in concert with other members of UN since Special Session of May 1947 to achieve solution of Palestine problem which would be acceptable to Jews and Arabs of Palestine.

Particular attention is also directed to conclusion informally reached by members of SC on March 19 that "it was impossible to find the necessary agreement, either among the peoples of Palestine or among the members of the Security Council, to permit the peaceful implementation of the Assembly Resolution" of November 29, 1947 which provided for partition with Economic Union. It was for this primary reason that US thereafter suggested necessity for immediate truce in Palestine, early convocation of Special Session of GA and temporary trusteeship for Palestine which would provide interim governmental machinery in Palestine following termination British Mandate on May 15.

Call for truce was issued by SC April 17; Special Session GA was convoked April 16; US submitted draft trusteeship agreement April 20

as working paper to members UN for their consideration as feasible form interim governmental machinery for Palestine following termination British Mandate May 15. It is hoped other members UN will have suggestions to make concerning this draft, that it will be debated shortly and that if any members have alternative suggestions as to other forms interim governmental machinery they will make them as soon as possible.

You are instructed to discuss question of Palestine along foregoing lines immediately with Prime Min, For Min or Chief of State or if you deem it helpful with all of them. You should make it clear during your talks that unless way can be found at once to prevent situation in Palestine from developing into open warfare security of whole ME will be seriously threatened and economic situation of Arab world is certain to deteriorate with result that its economic development will be retarded for many years to come. You should also make it clear that so long as Palestine situation continues to remain serious threat to peace of ME it would seem to be pointless for US to endeavor to enter into any arrangements of political or economic nature looking forward to promotion of security or economic improvement of ME.¹

You should impress upon officials with whom you are talking that no matter how deep an interest US may have in maintenance of security of ME and in development of ME prosperity it feels that there are no effective measures which it can take in this direction until way is found out of Palestine impasse.²

Sent to Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Jidda and Cairo for action; repeated to Jerusalem, London, Paris and New York for info.

Baghdad, Beirut and Jidda please await immediately following telegram³ before taking action.

LOVETT

¹ The Office of Financial and Development Policy called a meeting on May 7 to discuss the economic implications of the political situation in the Middle East. The meeting was attended by nine economic officers and two NEA representatives. The memorandum covering the conversation was prepared by Samuel J. Gorlitz of the Division of Investment and Economic Development. It stated that "after general discussion, it was agreed that the circular telegram of April 22 to Middle East missions should be interpreted to mean that despite our long-range policy of positive economic assistance to the Middle East states, execution of specific projects should be delayed until the Palestine situation has been clarified, but that planning activities should continue." (890.50/5-748)

² Ambassador Tuck conveyed the purport of the circular telegram of April 22 to Egyptian Prime Minister Nokrashy on April 24. He advised that "Nokrashy Pasha listened attentively, then remarked that message which I had delivered was very serious. While he did not say so in as many words, I had the inescapable impression that my statement to him—with reference to pointlessness for US to endeavor to enter into any arrangement of a political or economic nature looking forward to promotion of security or economic improvement of the ME pending solution Palestine impasse—was, in fact, an attempt by our government to force Arab states to modify their present policy toward defense of Palestine." (Telegram 410, April 24, 5 p. m., 501.BB Palestine/4-2248)

³ See telegram 117 to Baghdad, April 22, p. 850.

501.BB Palestine/4-2248

*Memorandum by Mr. Robert M. McClintock to the Under Secretary
of State (Lovett)*

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] April 22, 1948.

The following comments present a preliminary view and are offered on my own responsibility as I have not had an opportunity to discuss them with Mr. Rusk:

1. On the basis of the initial reception of our trusteeship suggestion it is apparent that the delegations in New York City are distinctly lukewarm. They await concrete evidence of our willingness to send troops to Palestine to maintain a temporary trusteeship. They will not vote for such a trusteeship unless there is implementation by the United States, to say nothing of other powers.

2. Ambassador Douglas reports in his #1672 today¹ (attached) that an agreed truce by the Arabs and Jews is most unlikely; that, in the absence of agreement between the parties, the proposal for trusteeship will require the use of substantial force; and that the British will not participate in the use of force against either the Arabs or Jews to impose an unacceptable regime.

3. The Australian Delegation announced yesterday that it would today introduce a resolution (copy attached²) which, in effect, would reaffirm the recommendation of November 29, 1947, for the partition of Palestine. The Australian resolution does not indicate by what means this recommendation can be carried out. It is much to be doubted whether the Australian resolution could muster a two-thirds vote of the members of the United Nations. However, it is possible that the Australian resolution, in light of the fact that there will be many abstentions on the vote, may receive a majority in Committee 1 of those delegations which do vote.

4. As indicated in my earlier memorandum to you, the French Representative, Ambassador Parodi, has strongly urged that something be done to save Jerusalem. It seems probable that this will strike a responsive chord in the United Nations and elsewhere. Measures to protect Jerusalem will be popular measures; they will be highly attractive to the Jews, who are concerned for their 100,000 fellows now cut off in the capital city, and they will give the impression to the world that the United Nations is "doing something" about Palestine. The chances are strong, therefore, that the basic Palestine problem will

¹ *Infra*.

² Copy not found attached; see UN document A/C.1/279, April 21.

presently be placed to one side in favor of immediate measures for the security of the Holy Places in Jerusalem or, in other words, Jerusalem itself. A copy of the French resolution on Jerusalem is attached herewith.³

5. I have a strong hunch that if the Jerusalem enclave, as traced on the map⁴ which I sent you this morning, is established by the General Assembly and if the other Powers subscribe forces for its protection, the Palestine problem may be well on the road to a more or less automatic solution. If the enclave were defended against the admission of refugees from without (which is a valid point raised by Mr. Henderson in his memorandum to you of April 19), the partition of Palestine along the lines of ethnographical boundaries would come about almost automatically except for the two cities of Jaffa and Haifa, each of which have large segments of both Jewish and Arab inhabitants.

6. It seems to me that, not receding from our present position in favor of trusteeship (which gives us leverage in both directions with either the Arabs or the Jews), we might find it convenient to go along with the French suggestion for special measures in behalf of Jerusalem; secure, on the basis of a crusading contribution, the dispatch of a fairly numerous group of armed contingents from United Nations members for the protection of Jerusalem, and then sit down to let nature take its course.⁵ A further step at this Assembly would be, in light of our proposal for a temporary trusteeship, to move the suspension pending further developments of the Assembly's resolution of November 29, 1947. An additional and necessary step would be an agreement by Great Britain, the United States, and France, under United Nations auspices, to maintain a naval patrol of the Palestinian coasts to prevent illegal immigration, while at the same time undertakings should be given by the Arab States to prevent immigration from the land frontiers of Palestine.

7. Although prophesy is perilous, it is possible that the establishment of a hard core of security from Jerusalem to the sea would bring about a *de facto* partition of Palestine with the Jewish State centered on Tel Aviv and extending north along the coast to almost, if not including, Haifa.⁶ I should not care if Transjordan, Lebanon, Syria, and Egypt took over the rest of the country.

³ Copy not found attached : see UN document A/C.1/280, April 22.

⁴ Copy not found in Department of State files.

⁵ Marginal notation by Mr. Lovett: "I have talked to Rusk and told him we must push Jerusalem safety as directed."

⁶ Marginal notation by Mr. Lovett: "I think you are wrong."

501.BB Palestine/4-2248 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

LONDON, April 22, 1948—11 a. m.

1672. Deptel 1375, April 17. For Lovett from Douglas.

1. Very late yesterday afternoon, after Bevin had discussed our proposals on Palestine with the Prime Minister and his colleagues, he spent an hour reviewing the matter with me. We meet again today to continue.

2. Bevin's views expressed yesterday were as follows:

(a) He and his colleagues think that an agreed truce by the Arabs and the Jews is most unlikely;

(b) That in the absence of agreement between the parties, the proposal for trusteeship will require the use of substantial force; and

(c) That HMG will not participate in the use of force against either the Jews or the Arabs to impose an unacceptable regime.

3. I can assure you that Bevin is deeply concerned; that he recognizes the dangerous possibilities in the situation; that his attitude is not inspired by an unwillingness to cooperate. Should the British use force against either party, and should Arabs lose lives as a result, the consequences extending from Pakistan through the Middle East may present us both with an even more dangerous problem. Bevin hopes that we understand the dilemma. He will talk with me further about the matter today.

DOUGLAS

501.BB Palestine/4-2248 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

NEW YORK, April 22, 1948—2:46 p. m.

488. For Henderson and McClintock from Kopper. Following is summary of conversation which took place early yesterday evening between Prince Faisal, Sheikh Hafiz Wehba, and Sheikh Alireza of Saudi Arabian delegation to Special GA and Jessup and Kopper:

Conversation took place in Faisal's apartment after it had been suggested to Saudi Arabian delegation that it might be helpful for two delegations to exchange views regarding draft US working paper on trusteeship agreement for Palestine. Conversation lasted almost two hours. Alireza acted as interpreter.

Faisal commenced conversation with general observations expressing Arab attitude regarding current situation in Palestine, trusteeship as a principle, immigration, land policy duration of trusteeship, and other matters.

Faisal declared Arabs were concerned about establishment of trusteeship. Experience of Arabs during past 25 years with mandate system had been unsatisfactory. They were inclined therefore to look with apprehension on trusteeship in light of this experience. He expressed view that in any event trusteeship should be in conformity with UN Charter. He did not think US paper followed Charter in some respects, particularly immigration. He observed other trusteeship agreements did not have provisions for immigration. He wondered what sort of UN agency would actually be the administering authority for Palestine. He said trusteeship agreement, termination of which was dependent upon achieving agreement between Jews and Arabs, was unsound. Jews would never agree to plan for government of Palestine until they had succeeded in bringing in sufficient number of immigrants to point where Jews were in majority in Palestine. Faisal also felt that there would have to be more adequate provisions on question of land policy. In addition, he thought powers vested in governor-general left little to peoples of Palestine who were in reality able to govern themselves.

Faisal continued by saying Arab states were anxious to cooperate with US in finding just solution for Palestine question. It was his opinion, however, that US had not been firm enough in face of Jewish demands. He stated Zionist demands for their own state were recent in origin and that at time of Balfour Declaration and as recent as 1939 Zionists had no idea of achieving a national state. It was only because of the support which they were able to obtain in this country that they pressed their aspirations to the point of establishing a state. He said Arab states had clearly demonstrated their desire to cooperate in finding a solution. Arabs were willing to support system in Palestine which would guarantee fullest protection to minorities. Arab governments could not, however, be unaware of public opinion at home. Public opinion in Arab states would not stand for Arab governments agreeing to solution which was unjust to Arabs of Palestine.

Jessup replied along following lines:

After expressing appreciation to Faisal for his frank and openly expressed views he assured latter that US was aware of Arab feeling regarding mandate system. He pointed out however trusteeship proposal contained in US working paper gave Arabs great measure of self-government. Jessup also explained that we were making a concerted effort to find solution to fill vacuum which might exist in the very near future in Palestine. We had come to conclusion that trusteeship was the most equitable and just method for solving situation at this time. He explained that UN trusteeship with Trusteeship Council

in [charge of?] administration seemed more desirable to US than single trusteeship. Regarding question of whether US had been firm enough with Jewish demands, Jessup pointed out to Faisal that it must be quite apparent to latter that US Government was being attacked by sympathizers of Zionist cause for being too lenient in face of Arab demands.

On subject of immigration, Jessup pointed out to Faisal that US had been willing to face up to this most difficult problem by incorporating a provision on it in draft trusteeship articles. This was an effort to assist in solving DP problem and find formula which would be acceptable to both parties. Faisal asked why Palestine should absorb all Jewish DP's. He thought Palestine had received fair share. In addition, recent immigration of Jewish persons to Palestine had been from Eastern Europe and were not legitimate DP's. Jessup pointed out to Faisal that US believed that any article on immigration in trusteeship agreement should insure that only legitimate DP's be allowed in Palestine. Faisal was reminded of remarks made by Secretary on subject last October. Jessup observed that we thought some progress had been made in US Congress regarding entry of DP's into US.

Conversation then turned to truce. Faisal thought an impartial commission might be useful and he said Arabs would cooperate in truce if it were very clear that its terms would be fairly applied to both sides and that Jewish groups would not continue to follow political ambitions. It was pointed out that SC resolution contained stipulation on importation of armaments and entry of fighting personnel. He had raised questions about these points and did not seem to be thoroughly apprised of the content of the SC resolution.

Conversation then turned back to trusteeship and Faisal reiterated necessity for finding more suitable article on termination. He then remarked that one major factor which ought to be taken into consideration by US was danger of communism in Near East. Jessup assured him US was quite well-aware of problem of communism. There ensued an interchange regarding amount of Communist infiltration into Palestine during recent years and number of Communists on *Pan York* and *Pan Crescent*. After 10 or 15 minutes inconclusive discussion on this subject, Jessup suggested conversation be resumed Thursday and that we discuss trusteeship proposal article by article.

Conclusion: Though evidently apprehensive regarding trusteeship, Faisal at no time dismissed it as possible solution. On contrary, it appears that, if articles on immigration, land policy, and termination can be drafted more specifically, likelihood of Arab acceptance of trusteeship plan is strong.

AUSTIN

501.BB Palestine/4-2248: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Iraq

SECRET

WASHINGTON, April 22, 1948—7 p. m.

117. Cirtel April 22. Reference is made in this connection to assistance which Iraq Govt has informally requested in relation to serious politico-economic situation described Embtel 288 April 17.¹ Dept views this situation with deep concern and requests you express our feelings this sense to Regent and other officials with whom you discuss matter adding our hope that situation may soon be alleviated. You should, however, point out that while USGovt is sincerely desirous of being of assistance, it would be difficult for USGovt to give consideration to appropriate measures in this respect as long as Palestine question remains unsettled. (Reference last two substantive paras cirtel April 21 [22] ²)

Sent to Baghdad for action; repeated to Beirut 179, Damascus 127, Jerusalem 285, Jidda 140, Cairo 449, London 1445, Paris 1345 and to New York 243 for info.

LOVETT

¹Not printed; Ambassador Wadsworth described the Iraqi situation as "seriously disturbing", citing drought conditions, crop failure, bread shortages and riots, soaring food costs, unseasonable unemployment, and strikes. He advised that the Foreign Minister, a fortnight ago, had requested United States support of an Iraqi application to the Food and Agriculture Organization for 40,000 tons of cereals and that the Prime Minister had discussed with the Ambassador the possibility of a dollar loan or a dollar advance by American oil companies against future royalties (501.BB Palestine/4-1748).

²The Department, on April 22, sent telegram 180, of similar import to Beirut, repeated to Baghdad, Jidda, and other posts, in connection with "recent informal approaches by Lebanese Legation to Dept in connection with plans for carrying out broad program for development of agricultural, hydro-electric and other resources of Lebanon." (501.BB Palestine/4-2248) The approaches were made in an undated memorandum by the Lebanese Legation and were received in the Division of Near Eastern Affairs on April 9 (890E.61/4-948).

501.BB Palestine/4-2248: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

US URGENT

LONDON, April 22, 1948—8 p. m.

1697. For Lovett from Douglas. Deptel 1418, April 21.

1. Neither Bevin nor the Foreign Office have any knowledge of the press conference nor of the points made.

2. Bevin says that while paragraphs One to Four in your cable represent the official British position, that which was represented to have been said as summarized in the paragraph succeeding No. Four is without authority.

3. I pressed on Bevin our hope that the UK would fill the breach in Palestine until a UN solution had been found, and made it clear

to him that we had not abandoned the hope that the UK, France and other powers might be able to join US in sharing the burden of implementing a temporary trusteeship if it were voted by GA. Bevin said that he cannot participate in the use of force to impose a regime which is unacceptable to the parties. He did, however, write out for me the following:

"We were in fact willing to play a part if there were agreement, but much has happened since, and withdrawal has gone so far. In the absence of agreement between Jews and Arabs it is impossible to speculate, but if agreement were reached and we were approached, we would, of course, give it immediate consideration."¹

DOUGLAS

¹ London, on April 23, advised of information from the British Foreign Office that the British Delegation at New York had given a press conference making the points set forth in telegram 1418 to London but that "only *New York Times* correspondent saw in statement hint of new British policy." The Foreign Office also indicated that point 3 of Department's telegram 1418 might be better expressed by saying that while the British Government would not enforce a truce, it might consider a supervisory role until August 1 if both sides were to accept a truce. (Telegram 1704, 501.BB Palestine/4-2348)

501.BB Palestine/4-1948

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Forrestal)

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, April 23, 1948.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: I have received your letter of April 19 outlining certain of the possible implications, from the standpoint of United States foreign policy in other areas, of the decision of this Government to declare its readiness to undertake a share of the burden of providing the police forces required during a truce and temporary trusteeship in Palestine.

I have taken careful note of your views, and you may be sure that they will be given full consideration by this Department in any contributions that it may make to the formulation of national policy.

I think I should point out, however, that the contingency that you describe, under which this country would be required to deploy approximately 50,000 men for service in Palestine, is still not an actuality, and we cannot yet know whether, or in what form, it will materialize. In any case, it would represent a difference of degree, rather than substance, as compared with the situation which has existed heretofore. In fact, leaving the possible use of an American contingent in the United Nations police force for Palestine out of the picture entirely, it seems clear from your letter that the forces available at present are inadequate to support fully our policies in the other areas mentioned, or elsewhere.

It has rarely been possible for us to feel that the armed establishment maintained by our Government at any particular moment would

be adequate, without further strengthening, to support the major objectives of our foreign policy in the face of all eventualities. Very often, in the past, the sanction for the position taken by this Government in international affairs has unavoidably had to be, in large measure, the reserve military potential of this country rather than its forces in being.

The Department of State has consistently endeavored, by testimony before committees of Congress and in all appropriate ways, to advocate the strengthening of the military, naval and air forces of the United States through rapid establishment of the Selective Service System and the more long-range program for universal military training. You can be assured of the Department's fullest cooperation in doing everything possible to accomplish the speedy passage of legislation which will put this Government in a better position to meet its many responsibilities in the realm of foreign policy, some of which, as you point out, may require the availability and possible use of armed forces.¹

Sincerely yours,

ROBERT A. LOVETT

¹ Secretary Forrestal replied the same day, his letter to the Secretary of State stating in part: "I appreciate that the contingency which I described has not yet become an actuality. My sole purpose in writing was to indicate some of the military consequences which might result in the event that the deployment of troops to Palestine should become necessary as a result of the United States proposals. In any event, I believe our thinking must take into account that this contingency does in fact exist." (501.BB Palestine/4-2348)

Editorial Note

On or about April 23, the Department submitted for White House clearance a draft resolution to be introduced into the Security Council, which read as follows: "The Security Council establishes a truce commission for Palestine composed of representatives of those members of the Security Council except Syria which have career consular officers in Jerusalem, whose functions shall be to assist the Security Council in bringing about the implementation of the resolution of the Security Council of 17 April, 1948; requests the commission to report to the President of the Security Council within 48 hours regarding its activities and the development of the situation, and subsequently to keep the Security Council currently informed with respect thereto." A marginal notation by Mr. McClintock on a carbon copy of the draft resolution notes Presidential approval at 5 p. m., April 23 (501.BB Palestine/4-2348).

At the meeting of the Council on the same day, Ambassador Austin introduced the draft resolution, but added a preamble and two paragraphs dealing with the right of travel by the proposed Commission and the furnishing of personnel to it. The text of the draft, as intro-

duced, is printed in SC, *3rd yr.*, No. 62, page 15. During the discussion that followed, Ambassador Austin accepted a number of amendments. In the ensuing voting, the Council accepted the resolution calling for establishment of a truce commission, by eight votes in favor, with the Colombian, Soviet, and Ukrainian Representatives abstaining. For the official text of the resolution, numbered 48 (1948), see SC, *3rd yr.*, *Resolutions, 1948*, page 17.

501.BB Palestine/4-2348

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] April 23, 1948.

In event the United Nations is unable to bring about a truce in Palestine and is unable to agree on interim governmental machinery for Palestine following the termination of the British Mandate on May 15, the present fighting in that country will undoubtedly increase and conditions of anarchy will prevail. It now appears that the Members of the United Nations at the Special Session in New York are anxious to make some sort of an arrangement for the protection of Jerusalem and surrounding Holy Places, not only for religious and humanitarian reasons but also in the hope that a nucleus of international control in the Jerusalem Area might at a later date be extended to the rest of Palestine.

At the present moment it is uncertain whether the General Assembly will go along with the United States suggestion of a temporary trusteeship for all of Palestine, whether some other form of interim governmental machinery will emerge or whether the General Assembly will do nothing at all. As this uncertainty is continuing, the Department has prepared a trusteeship plan for the Jerusalem Area which may be introduced at the United Nations as soon as it is considered desirable to do so.

This agreement is brief and contains only an essential grant of powers to the Governor-General for the emergency period.

A draft agreement for this purpose is attached as Tab A.¹ Your attention is called to the following considerations:

Territorial Scope

It is believed that the Jerusalem Area should include not only the present municipality of Jerusalem, together with the surrounding

¹Not printed; for revised version, see telegram 256, April 26, to New York, p. 860.

villages and towns but should also include the area of Palestine between Jerusalem and the Mediterranean and should include the ports of Tel Aviv and Jaffa and the airport at Lydda in order to prevent the inland isolation of Jerusalem and its environs and to provide access to the sea and the outside world. (See map attached Tab B² and Explanatory Notes Tab C³).

Security Forces

The United States is willing to undertake its share of responsibility along with other Members of the United Nations which may be selected by the General Assembly for the provision of police forces which will be required to maintain interim law and order in the Jerusalem area, which would include the City, its environs and the area between them and the coast. (If no other Members of the United Nations are willing to undertake their share of such responsibility, the United States, as a last resort, would if authorized by the United Nations, assume this task on behalf of the United Nations. It is contemplated, however, that such action as the armed forces might take would be preliminary and of limited duration pending the establishment of a United Nations administration and the recruitment of United Nations security forces for the City of Jerusalem and the area between it and the coast.)

Financial Aspects

Apart from extraordinary security expenditures, Palestine as a whole has been financially self-supporting. It has been estimated that the City of Jerusalem, under the provisions of the resolution of November 29, 1947, would have been virtually self-supporting, but only because it was entitled to receive from 5 to 10 percent of the custom receipts of Palestine under the economic union. Since it may be impossible to make a similar provision in a special arrangement for protecting the Holy Places, particularly if the rest of Palestine is in a disordered condition after May 15, there will undoubtedly be a deficit in the ordinary administration of the territory in addition to the expense involved in the maintenance of outside security forces.

It would seem most feasible to separate the expenses of administration from those of providing outside security forces. The United Nations as a whole could provide financial support for the administration of the territory while the expenses of security forces could then be borne by those Members of the United Nations which supply forces. Possibly a plan could be worked out by which part of the money thus supplied by the United Nations could be recoverable from the future revenues of Palestine after a final settlement for the territory as a whole has been reached.

² Not found attached.

³ Not printed.

Administrative Measures

During the initial period of the establishment of control over the area, it would probably be necessary, because of the likelihood of considerable disorder, to combine in the military commander both military and civil powers of administration. This could be accomplished by having him appointed as Governor of the area. He would thus be free to act in time of crises without being delayed by the necessity of consulting a civilian administrator. It would not be desirable, however, to prolong such a concentration of authority in a territory under United Nations control, any longer than necessary. Therefore, after a relative condition of order has been established, the civilian administration should be separated from the military commander and placed in the hands of a civilian Governor.

Legal Basis

The provision of a firm legal basis for the actions of the United Nations in this case would seem particularly important because it appears inevitable that the use of armed forces will be required. Probably the most satisfactory legal basis would be obtained in the use of the United Nations trusteeship system. This would, in the first place, provide a clearly legal means of transition for changing the status of the territory. Moreover, by the designation of the United Nations as the administering authority, the trusteeship provisions of the Charter would not only create an obligation on the part of the United Nations to ensure the maintenance of law and order in the territory, but also provide justification for United Nations action in fulfilling its obligation.

501.BB Palestine/4-2348 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET US URGENT

LONDON, April 23, 1948—4 p. m.

1705. For Lovett from Douglas.

1. As you know, discussions with Bevin on Palestine are, because of British sensitiveness to the subject, extremely delicate. This morning's British newspapers carry headlines to the effect that the British are considering joining with other countries in a trusteeship and imply that I am putting pressure on HMG to this end. These stories seem to emanate from Washington, because nothing has been said to the press here either by anyone in the Embassy or, in so far as I can tell, anyone in the Foreign Office. One story from Lake Success gives as its authority "source close to US Cabinet." You will understand, I know, why these press accounts make my task, difficult at best, even harder. I know your difficulties. (Embtel 1697, April 22.)

2. Am confident that the British will not agree to participation in a trusteeship, unless preceded by a truce, and unless it does not involve the use of force to impose on the two parties a regime which is unacceptable to them.¹

3. It is, however, in my judgment remotely possible that if a truce can be arranged and the Jews and the Arabs can be persuaded in good faith to sit down around the table for the purpose of amicably settling their differences, the British might be persuaded to assume a major, if not exclusive, role within the limits of their reduced forces and administrative personnel in Palestine. If you agree, I should like to put the question to the British as to whether they would lend such assistance on these conditions.

4. I have not found Bevin stubborn or unfriendly. He is, however, in view of his assessment of the situation, at a loss to suggest a proposal in which he has confidence and which meets the specifications arising out of an extraordinarily delicate political situation here. In this connection, I confirmed yesterday my previously reported opinion that the Conservative Party and practically all of the Labor Party would oppose bitterly the retention of troops in Palestine.

5. As I view the situation, it divides itself into two parts: The first is the naked question of Palestine; the second is the way in which British position, as represented publicly in the US, is casting a cloud on our relations, and probably will cause, unless the situation changes, greater tension to the disadvantage of both countries everywhere. Both questions I have, of course, discussed with Bevin; the latter in an endeavor to persuade him to take some position in regard to the former. I think, however, that the matter is of sufficient importance for me to suggest tactfully to him that I discuss the issue with him and the Prime Minister, particularly stressing the second part of the question.

DOUGLAS

¹ Marginal notation on an information copy of this message in the handwriting of Mr. McClintock: "Analogous to U.S. position as stated by Austin April 20."

501.BB Palestine/4-2348: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

TOP SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, April 23, 1948—6 p. m.

1469. For Douglas from Lovett. Your 1705, Apr. 23, has been given careful consideration:

1. Answer to your para. 1 would seem to be as set forth in para. 1, your 1704, Apr. 23.¹ We are fully aware of extra difficulty which such press accounts impose on both govts.

¹ Not printed; but see footnote 1, p. 851.

2. Position set forth in your para. 2 is closely analogous to statement of Amb. Austin in Committee 1, Apr. 20, when he indicated that truce was of utmost importance and emphasized that US was not prepared to act alone in this matter.

3. You are authorized to inquire of British whether they would lend assistance in working out a concrete solution for Palestine along lines indicated your para. 3. Without indicating any intention of this govt. to favor a special arrangement for Jerusalem, you should also sound out Bevin as to his attitude on French proposal introduced in 1st Com. yesterday calling for special measures to assure safety of Jerusalem, its Holy Places and inhabitants. For your secret info., while we by no means have altered our primary objective to secure truce with temporary trusteeship for Palestine as a whole, we would not oppose special measures for security of Jerusalem if they won substantial measure of support from other delegations.

4. You are authorized to discuss these matters in your discretion also with Prime Minister along lines of your para. 5 and within instructions set forth in Deptels 1375, Apr. 17 and 1260, Apr. 9.

Repeated USUN as 249.

LOVETT

501.BB Palestine/4-2448 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Jerusalem

SECRET US URGENT
NIACT

WASHINGTON, April 24, 1948—1 p. m.

298. We believe that career Consuls General of France, Belgium, and U.S. in Jerusalem should comprise SC Truce Commission under resolution adopted by SC yesterday, text of which was repeated to you by telegram. Dept's next telegram will provide you with text of SC Truce resolution April 17.

An informal working group of representatives of France, Belgium and U.S. will however meet in New York for purpose of consulting with Jewish and Arab leaders now in New York as well as with Creech Jones and other U.K. representatives.

USUN expects shortly to telegraph Dept outline of possible articles of Truce and this working paper will be sent to you for guidance although at this stage it should not be regarded as committing this government.

Please establish immediate contact with High Commissioner and leaders of JA and AHC. You will of course immediately consult with your French and Belgian colleagues as to organization of Truce Commission and, in concert with High Commissioner, how its work can most expeditiously be carried out.

In your conversations with JA, AHC and British you should emphasize extreme importance which this government attaches to prompt compliance with SC Truce resolution by parties concerned.

Repeated to USUN, London, Paris, Brussels, and Arab capitals for info only.

LOVETT

501.BB Palestine/4-2548 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

US URGENT

NEW YORK, April 25, 1948—7 p. m.

502. For Lovett from Rusk. Following two talks with Proskauer¹ and two talks with Fawzi Bey, I have drawn as a purely personal document the following draft articles of truce for Palestine in an effort to find some basis for agreement between Jews and Arabs on a truce. These articles envisage the possibility that we may get a truce without getting any further arrangements for government on May 15, hence they provide certain minimum responsibilities for orderly public line under the general supervision of the SC Truce Commission. Obviously, if our trusteeship proposals succeed or if some other arrangements are adopted, they could be quickly fitted into truce arrangement.

On the procedural side, it has been emphasized both to Proskauer and Fawzi Bey that these suggestions have no official standing whatever and are an attempt to ascertain a basis on which some go-between such as Entezam or Padilla Nervo² might bring the parties together. If these articles become public they should be disclaimed and should be considered as one of several efforts being made by private persons to find some agreement.

Both Proskauer and Fawzi Bey have been sufficiently receptive to encourage a further effort along these lines. For example, Fawzi Bey now has permission from Cairo (which he says must mean the Arab League as well) to sit down with a go-between and Jewish representatives for an informal talk not involving a commitment on his part.

Since both Jews and Arabs may be commenting further on these draft articles, any comments which Department may have will be welcome. One eventual use of such articles might be a public demonstration of the efforts which have been made to obtain a truce along reasonable lines in the event that one or both parties prove completely intransigent and we face inevitable large-scale fighting on May 15. Some consideration might be given to a statement by the Secretary at the appropriate timing [*sic*] which might disclose such intransigence,

¹ Joseph M. Proskauer, President of the American Jewish Committee.

² Nasrollah Entezam and Luis Padilla Nervo, Iranian and Mexican Representatives, respectively, at the United Nations.

set forth the reasonable basis for such truce proposals and mobilize public opinion in support of a truce, or at least prepare public opinion for the increased fighting which we will not have been able to avert.

Text of articles of truce for Palestine now follows:

[Here follow the 15 articles which formed the basis for the Informal Truce Proposals for Palestine, printed on page 866.]

[Rusk]

AUSTIN

867N.01/4-2648

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)¹

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] April 26, 1948.

Participants: Asad al-Faqih, Minister of Saudi Arabia
Mr. Henderson, NEA
Mr. Merriam, NE

The Minister called by appointment at his request. Referring to Prince Feisal's desire to have a quiet talk with me in New York, the Minister said he hoped that I would be able to go to New York for this purpose. He said that the Arabs were not convinced that the United States really wanted trusteeship. If it did, the United States would have been using its influence in support of trusteeship far more than it had. He intimated that if the Arabs were convinced that the United States wanted trusteeship, the Arabs would quite possibly support it if their fears on the key problems of immigration, land sales, and duration of the agreement could be set at rest. He thought that a talk between Prince Feisal and myself would help the Arabs to make up their minds.

I said that I wanted very much to see Prince Feisal but up to the present time I had simply been unable to get away. I hoped to be able to do so in the near future.

I pointed out that the problem was very different from what it had been last fall. We were unwilling to press trusteeship in the absence of Arab and Jewish acquiescence. Neither the United States nor any other country would undertake any responsibility with respect to trusteeship if it would have to be imposed. Our difficulty was that the Arab and Jewish positions were still far apart. I asked if the Arabs had been in touch with any moderate Jews such as Dr. Magnes.² The Minister indicated that they had not.

¹ Drafted by Mr. Merriam.

² Judah L. Magnes, President of the Hebrew University at Jerusalem.

The Minister said he felt that if the Arabs were convinced that the United States was serious about trusteeship, and if their principal fears could be overcome, there was a good chance that, with United States and Arab influence and support, trusteeship would get a two-thirds vote in the General Assembly.

He entirely agreed with my remark that the Near East would be ruined if peace was not established in Palestine, and expressed grave fears over Communist designs. He was convinced that the Communists wanted to create chaos and that if things went badly for the Arabs the Communists would supply them with arms in order to keep the fighting going.

501.BB Palestine/4-2648: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

SECRET US URGENT

WASHINGTON, April 26, 1948—2 p. m.

256. There follows working paper on possible draft trusteeship agreement for security zone of Jerusalem. This paper is sent for your comment but not for discussion with other delegations pending final clearance in Dept.

As indicated by telephone to Rusk this morning Dept strongly feels that special regime for Jerusalem should be UN trusteeship:

TEMPORARY TRUSTEESHIP AGREEMENT FOR THE JERUSALEM AREA

PREAMBLE

WHEREAS the territory known as Palestine has been administered by the Government of the United Kingdom under a mandate assigned by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and confirmed by the Council of the League of Nations; and

WHEREAS Jerusalem and its surrounding area contain many Holy Places sacred to Christians, Jews and Moslems alike; and

WHEREAS it is imperative that pending a final settlement of the Palestine problem the Jerusalem area be protected;

NOW THEREFORE The General Assembly of the United Nations hereby resolves to approve the following terms of trusteeship for the Jerusalem Area:

ARTICLE 1

The Trust Territory of Jerusalem, consisting of _____ as defined on the attached map and hereinafter referred to as "the Trust Territory", is hereby placed temporarily under the Trusteeship System of the United Nations.

ARTICLE 2

The United Nations is hereby designated as the Administering Authority for the Trust Territory. The Trusteeship Council, operating under the authority of the General Assembly, shall exercise the functions of the Administering Authority.

ARTICLE 3

The Administering Authority shall have full powers of administration, legislation, and jurisdiction over the Trust Territory which shall be exercised through the agency of the Government of the Trust Territory as hereinafter provided.

ARTICLE 4

1. The Government of the Trust Territory shall consist of a Governor-General and such organs of self-government as in the opinion of the Governor-General will meet with cooperation from the various communities of Palestine.

2. The Governor-General shall be appointed by and may be removed by the Trusteeship Council, subject to the provisions of Article 5, paragraph 3.

3. The Governor-General shall be subject to the instructions of the Trusteeship Council. He is hereby invested with full powers to administer the Trust Territory in accordance with the provisions of this agreement and the terms of the Charter of the United Nations.

ARTICLE 5

1. The Governor-General shall be responsible for the organization and direction of the police forces necessary for the maintenance of internal law and order.

2. The Governor-General shall organize volunteer forces in accordance with Article 84 of the Charter of the United Nations, to provide for local defense and the maintenance of internal law and order.

3. Pending the organization of the forces provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article, the Governor-General is empowered to call upon the Govts of _____, which shall, for a period of time to extend not later than Dec. 31, 1949 provide for local defense and the maintenance of internal law and order.

ARTICLE 6

1. The territorial integrity of the Trust Territory and its status as defined in this Agreement shall be assured by the UN.

2. In the event that the Governor-General is unable, through the use of the forces provided in Article 5, to maintain the territorial integrity of the Trust Territory against an act or threat of aggression, he shall request the Secretary General to bring the matter to the immediate attention of the Security Council.

ARTICLE 7

The Governor-General shall, under the authority of the Trusteeship Council, assure the protection of the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites within the Trust Territory, as well as of educational and cultural establishments and charitable institutions and hospitals, the rights of which will be maintained as they were before the termination of the Mandate.

ARTICLE 8

1. The Trusteeship established for the Trust Territory by this agreement shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims or position of the parties concerned in the Trust Territory and the remainder of Palestine, or to the character of the eventual political settlement for the Trust Territory and the remainder of Palestine.

2. It shall be the duty of the Governor-General to ensure that no activity prejudicial to the eventual political settlement for the Trust Territory and the remainder of Palestine shall take place within the Trust Territory.

ARTICLE 9

1. This agreement may be altered or amended in accordance with Article 79 of the Charter of the United Nations.

2. This agreement shall terminate upon Dec. 31, 1949 unless otherwise determined by the General Assembly.¹

MARSHALL

¹The Department, on April 27, informed USUN that the White House had cleared the draft trusteeship agreement transmitted in telegram 256. The Department also requested deletion of the words "subject to provisions of Art. 5, para. 3" from subparagraph 2, Article 4. (Telegram 258 to New York, 501.BB Palestine/4-2748)

867N.01/4-2648: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Tuck) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

CAIRO, April 26, 1948—6 p. m.

422. Current plans for entrance Arab states forces into Palestine prior May 15 now being discussed Cairo with participation regent of

Iraq, have hit snag in opposition Egyptian Government to such participation, according to well informed source. Nokrashi Pasha¹ opposes such action generally, and by Egypt in particular, because: (1) Fear of repercussions in Egypt at UN with adverse effect on Anglo-Egyptian relations; (2) All Egyptian forces now required in Egypt for internal political reasons. These believed to be fear of Wafdist disturbances, possible attempt at coup and renewal of police strike; (3) Troops inadequately armed and equipped, hence would be ineffective. This argument believed inspired by view that defeat Egyptian Army at hands of Jews would effectively destroy Egyptian contention that it can defend itself without foreign assistance; (4) Fear that Arab forces might prove ineffective in protecting Palestinians, therefore permanently damaging Arab cause in Palestine.

Presence here Abdul Ilah² with Iraqi Army officers believed due to desire to influence King Farouk to support resolution relative participation Arab armies in Palestine as prepared recent discussions Arab League Military Commission in Amman.³ Regent is said to be urging King Farouk with argument Egypt cannot continue to do less for Palestine than other Arab countries without losing place and prestige in Arab world.

Sent Department as 422; paraphrase sent Arab capitals.

TUCK

¹ Egyptian Prime Minister.

² The Regent of Iraq.

³ London, on April 26, reported the substance of a telegram of the previous day from British Minister Sir Alec S. Kirkbride to the British Foreign Office, which stated that King Abdullah, Regent Abdul Ilah, the Lebanese Prime Minister, the Iraqi Minister, the Transjordan Ministers and General Ismail Safwat, an Iraqi, who was Chairman of the Arab League Military Staff Committee, had met at Amman on April 24. The upshot of the meeting was that the "Lebanese Prime Minister is going Cairo with letter from King to Azzam stating Transjordan cannot cope alone with Palestine situation and before moving wants assurance full support all Arab states re men, money and materials. Letter asks for pounds 1 and ½ million credit. Regent is also going Cairo to ascertain whether Egyptian Govt prepared help." (Telegram 1733, S67N.01/4-2648)

Editorial Note

Mr. Jessup made a statement before the First Committee on April 27, in which he discussed several questions involved in the United States conception of trusteeship for Palestine (Department of State *Bulletin*, May 9, 1948, page 592). The United States draft resolution calling for the reference of the United States working paper on the matter to the Fourth Committee was defeated later the same day, when the First

Committee by a vote of 38 to 7, with 7 abstentions, decided to undertake its own examination of the working paper (GA (II/SS), *Main Committees*, page 129).

501.BB Palestine/4-2748 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

[Extract]

TOP SECRET

NEW YORK, April 27, 1948—12:30 a. m.

511. For Lovett from Rusk. Preceding telegram contains latest draft articles of truce¹ which Shertok asks Wasson deliver JA representatives Jerusalem. Similar text will be furnished Arab representatives New York early Tuesday for their consideration. I recognize some possibility this personal activity may complicate matters, yet both parties are clearly within range of agreement and both prefer this indirect and unofficial procedure. If Department sees points of danger as discussions continue, I shall try to guide us back into desired line, but my theory thus far has been to give parties their maximum chance since they are moving toward agreement.²

Proskauer has been most helpful with Shertok. At meeting late Monday night of Proskauer, Shertok, Ross and Rusk, Proskauer told Shertok that opinion in US was rapidly concluding that fighting must stop before anything else can happen and that JA must watch closely its public relations at this juncture. Unfortunately short time limit in latest draft was effort to meet Jewish fear that we had in mind some "indefinite" truce which to them seems to mean permanent truce. Although I should have preferred to leave duration up to SC if we can get Palestine question into discussion stage between Arabs and Jews, resort to arms will become increasingly difficult.

Proskauer drafted new text of Articles 6 and 7. My estimate is that once Arabs can confess their willingness to accept immigration article, final agreement will turn upon wording of Article 6.

¹ No. 510, April 27, not printed. The draft articles are in the memorandum prepared in the Department of State on April 28, p. 866.

² Mr. McClintock, in a memorandum of April 27, notified Mr. Lovett of telephonic information from New York the same day that the conversations by Mr. Rusk and his associates with Jewish and Arab spokesmen had been making hopeful progress. Practically all articles had been agreed to by Mr. Shertok and Fawzi Bey as spokesman for the Arab League. Disagreement was still manifest on the question of immigration but discussions were continuing (501.BB Palestine/4-2748).

If truce can be agreed along lines these articles, result may have substantial bearing upon our trusteeship proposals. Both JA and AHC dislike trusteeship and may prefer some ad hoc arrangement of less formal character. US delegation's position thus far has been sufficiently flexible to permit adjustment to any alternative preferred by Arabs and Jews. [Rusk.]

AUSTIN

867N.01/4-2748 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

TOP SECRET US URGENT

WASHINGTON, April 27, 1948—7 p. m.

NIACT

1506. For Douglas. We are concerned at reports which are reaching us to effect that Abdullah is planning invasion of Palestine in near future with armed forces of Trans Jordan and that armed forces of other Arab countries may also cross Palestine borders.

If armed forces of any Arab country should invade Palestine we do not see how US Govt could avoid taking energetic position in UN pointing out that invasion is violation of Charter and insisting that appropriate steps including if necessary despatch of forces under auspices UN be taken to eject invaders. If enforcement action proposed to SC was vetoed it seems likely that five permanent members under Art. 106 would consult to provide necessary military forces. Developments of this character might lead to extensive warfare in ME and give Russia opportunity to send Soviet forces into area. Furthermore such developments might well nullify all efforts which Brit and US Govts have been making during past year to work out parallel policies in ME for purpose of maintaining security in that area. If forces of Abdullah invade Palestine it would be difficult to dispel impression not only in US but throughout the world of Brit complicity in matter in view of close military and economic relations existing between UK and Trans Jordan.

Please discuss this matter at earliest possible moment with Bevin and Attlee and point out to them how important it is in interest of security of Middle East, world peace and efficacy of Brit-Amer co-operation that Brit Govt use all its influence to restrain Abdullah from engaging in such an adventure.¹

Sent to London for action, repeated to New York 259, for info only.

MARSHALL

¹ Marginal notation : "OK H[arry] S. T[ruman]".

501.BB Palestine/4-2748

*Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State*¹

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] April 28, 1948.

TEXT OF INFORMAL TRUCE PROPOSALS FOR PALESTINE²

"The Arab Higher Committee and the Jewish Agency for Palestine accept the following articles of truce for Palestine effective midnight, April 30-May 1, 1948 and accept responsibility for insuring compliance by the Arab and Jewish communities of Palestine therewith:

"ARTICLE 1

"All military or para-military activities, not authorized by the Security Council Truce Commission, as well as acts of violence, terrorism and sabotage, shall cease immediately.

"ARTICLE 2

"Armed bands and fighting personnel, groups and individuals, whatever their origin, shall not be brought into Palestine nor be assisted or encouraged to enter Palestine during the period of the truce.

"ARTICLE 3

"Weapons and war materials shall not be acquired or imported into Palestine by the Arab Higher Committee and the Jewish Agency for Palestine, nor shall any assistance or encouragement be given to the importation or acquisition of such weapons and war materials.

"ARTICLE 4

"All Jewish and Arab armed elements in Palestine shall be immobilized and their activities during the truce shall be under the supervision of the Security Council Truce Commission.

"ARTICLE 5

"Any person or group of persons found by the Security Council Truce Commission, after proper investigation, to have committed acts

¹ Transmitted to Mr. Lovett by Mr. McClintock with his memorandum of April 28.

² As set forth in telegram 510 and as modified in telegram 515, both dated April 27, from New York. The former message, sent by Mr. Rusk to Mr. Lovett, requested the Department to "relay following text of articles of truce to Wasson in Jerusalem for his information and for delivery to Dr. Leo Kohn, Jewish Agency for Palestine, at the request of Moshe Shertok. Wasson should understand unofficial nature of these draft articles which are basis for go-between effort in New York and are not U.S. official proposals. Wasson is at liberty show these privately to his French, Belgian and British colleagues but should not show them to Arab authorities or discuss with Jewish and Arab authorities at this juncture." (501.BB Palestine/4-2748) Consul Wasson, on April 27, acknowledged receipt of the two relays from New York and advised that the previous day he had met with his French and Belgian colleagues to discuss

of violence, terrorism or sabotage contrary to the terms of this truce, shall be immediately expelled from Palestine or placed in custody under arrangements to be made by the Security Council Truce Commission.

“ARTICLE 6

“During the truce, and without prejudice to the future governmental structure of Palestine, existing Arab and Jewish authorities shall accord full and equal rights to all inhabitants of the area in which such authorities are functioning; further, no steps shall be taken by Arab or Jewish authorities to proclaim a sovereign state during this truce.

“ARTICLE 7

“The Arab Higher Committee and the Jewish Agency for Palestine accept the Security Council Truce Commission during this truce as a mediator to maintain by mutual collaboration public order and essential public services and to adjust administrative problems.

“ARTICLE 8

“All persons, groups and organizations in Palestine pledge their maximum effort to preserve the holy places and to protect all activities connected therewith.

“ARTICLE 9

“All traffic and communications throughout Palestine of the nature declared by the Security Council Truce Commission to be peaceful and nonprejudicial in character shall be allowed complete freedom of movement and operation by all parties in Palestine.

“ARTICLE 10

“During the period of the truce, 4,000 Jewish displaced persons shall be allowed to enter Palestine each month. The selection and administration of such immigration shall be assumed jointly by the International Refugee Organization and the Jewish Agency for Palestine, in consultation with the Security Council Truce Commission and the Arab Higher Committee. The Security Council Truce Commission and the Arab Higher Committee shall determine, in consultation with the Jewish Agency for Palestine, the quotas and selection of all non-Jewish immigration.³

organization of the Truce Commission (telegram 491 from Jerusalem, 501.BB Palestine/4-2748). President Truman, on April 28, nominated Mr. Wasson to be United States Representative on the Truce Commission, subject to Senate confirmation (telegram 264, April 28, to New York, 501.BB Palestine/4-2848).

³Mr. McClintock's memorandum of April 28 to Mr. Lovett noted that “all [articles] except Article 10 dealing with immigration have been provisionally agreed upon, subject to approval by their principals, by representatives of the Jewish Agency and the Arab League in New York City.” (501.BB Palestine/4-2748)

"ARTICLE 11

"The Security Council Truce Commission shall institute or arrange patrols both by land and by sea to ensure that immigration into Palestine does not exceed the agreed number and conforms with the selection requirements set forth in Article 10, above.

"ARTICLE 12

"The Arab Higher Committee and the Jewish Agency for Palestine undertake to assist the United Nations in the establishment of a temporary international zone, as a matter of emergency, for the protection of the city of Jerusalem.

"ARTICLE 13

"The Arab Higher Committee and the Jewish Agency for Palestine undertake to participate in the establishment of a Palestine truce council, composed of three representatives of each, to effect the joint action necessary for the execution of this truce and to assist the Security Council Truce Commission in carrying out its functions.

"ARTICLE 14

"This truce shall remain effective for three months, and thereafter unless either the Arab Higher Committee or the Jewish Agency for Palestine gives at least thirty days notice of termination to the Security Council Truce Commission. The Security Council Truce Commission shall immediately notify the Security Council of the receipt by it of any such notice of termination."

867N.01/4-2848

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Lovett)*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] April 28, 1948.

Participants: The Right Honorable the Lord Inverchapel, British Ambassador
Mr. Lovett, Under Secretary of State
Mr. Llewellyn Thompson, Deputy Director for European Affairs

The Ambassador handed me a copy of the attached memorandum on Palestine.² I indicated that it was a rather late date for Mr. Bevin

¹ Drafted by Llewellyn E. Thompson, Jr., Deputy Director of the Office of European Affairs.

² No. G.96/ /48, dated April 28, not printed; it cited a report from the High Commissioner at Jerusalem of "increasing indications that the Jews were con-

to be bringing to our attention the situation in Jerusalem, as we had been doing our utmost to arrange a truce both in Palestine generally and in Jerusalem particularly and to prevent armed action. I referred also to the fact that the Jews appeared to have gone further toward agreeing to the arrangements proposed for Jerusalem than the Arabs. I pointed out that at the very moment we were talking the United States was struggling with this problem in the United Nations and that last night we had received indications that a truce might be arranged. The Jews appeared ready to agree, but the Arab representative was obliged to cable home for instructions.

The Ambassador said that the British representative in Jerusalem thought that the police there were not adequate to preserve order and that dependence on them was not realistic.

I replied that I agreed that it was unrealistic unless a truce could be arranged. If a truce could not be brought about and lived up to, we might be forced to take some action such as a financial embargo against Palestine and countries of the Middle East. We would hate very much to be obliged to take such measures as we knew that none of the countries in the Middle East were in good shape. I expressed surprise that Mr. Bevin felt we had any influence whatever over the Jewish attitude and added that in any event we had no information to justify Mr. Bevin's comment that the Jews were considering a large-scale attack on Jerusalem. I felt he should present this whole Palestine situation and our views frankly to Mr. Bevin.

I informed the Ambassador that we had instructed our Ambassador in London to impress upon Mr. Bevin the importance of not allowing the Arabs to take armed action against Palestine. I said that the fact that Great Britain had trained and officered the Transjordan Legion might create an impression both in the United States and elsewhere, in case the Transjordanese troops should invade Palestine, that such invasion had been acquiesced in by Great Britain.

The Ambassador replied that the reports about Abdullah did not appear to be correct and that they did not understand that he was contemplating any such invasion. I pointed out that some of these British-trained troops were already in Palestine and again stressed the importance of preventing armed action.

L[OVETT]

sidering large-scale attacks on Jerusalem." The memorandum conveyed Mr. Bevin's request that the United States exercise its influence with the Jews to prevent such attack. The memorandum noted also that British representatives in the Arab States had been instructed to urge restraint on the Arabs. (501.BB Palestine/4-2848)

501.BB Palestine/4-2848: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Egypt (Tuck)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, April 28, 1948—1 p. m.

470. You should bring following to attention Azzam Pasha re his interpretation of paragraphs five and six of Depcirtel April 22¹ as constituting threat to withhold economic aid and to disinterest ourselves in promoting stability or maintaining security of ME should Palestine situation continue.² It was our purpose to point out inutility and pointlessness of further US endeavors to promote economic well-being or political security in ME in face of rapidly deteriorating conditions in the whole Middle East arising from inability of Arabs and Jews to acquiesce in some kind of an arrangement which would bring peace in Palestine.

Rather than being threat alleged by Azzam Pasha purpose of message was to make clear and emphatic need at this critical juncture for Arab cooperation in UN efforts to bring end to chaos in Palestine and to bring home fact that US consideration of economic and political aid to ME would of necessity be useless while unsolved Palestine problem progressively becomes more serious and threatens peace of that portion of world.

Our advocacy of trusteeship could in no sense be imputed to make US "more responsible than any other power for present situation." On contrary, it was in recognition of fact that GA recommendation of Nov 29 could not be implemented by peaceful means that truce and trusteeship proposals were advanced by US. US Govt meant what it said by stating that trusteeship proposal is advanced without prejudice to final political settlement for Palestine.

Finally, it may be said that US has most earnestly sought—and it continues to seek—a just solution within the framework of UN designed for settlement of world problems such as that faced in Palestine. Our advocacy of an interim arrangement such as trusteeship proposal through established procedures of UN certainly does not make US responsible for fighting in Palestine.

If it were possible for just and final settlement of Palestine problem to be achieved now and without violence, this Govt would be among first to welcome it. Until such solution is found truce and trusteeship proposals offer immediate means by which peace can be restored to Palestine. A just and lasting solution could then be sought free from passions and violence that are daily mounting.

Sent Cairo, repeated Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut, Jidda, Jerusalem, New York, London, Paris for info and use at discretion.

MARSHALL

¹ *Ante*, p. 843.

² Azzam Pasha's views had been conveyed to the Department in telegram 417, April 25, noon, from Cairo (501.BB Palestine/4-2548), not printed.

501.BB Palestine/4-2848 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

SECRET US URGENT
 NIACT

WASHINGTON, April 28, 1948—1 p. m.

261. When French plan for safeguarding Jerusalem¹ is discussed in TC this afternoon US rep. should express gratification at initiative of French del. in offering concrete proposals. French del. should be asked how quickly it feels 1,000 volunteer policemen can be brought to Jerusalem; what emoluments and pay they would receive; what arms they would possess and whence these arms would be obtained; and to what authority would they look for their own authority.

Since 1,000 men would be unable to establish order in a large city if Jews and Arabs were engaged in active hostilities it is presumed that essential condition to sending such a special police force would be agreement by Arabs and Jews not to fight in Jerusalem. Please ask the French if there is any prospect of such agreement.

US rep. should add that the French proposal for sending a volunteer police force to Palestine would require some adequate legal basis. We would gladly support French proposal, provided it has some chance of acceptance by Arabs and Jews, if it were placed within framework of definite trusteeship under TC.

You are authorized in your discretion to use all or such portions of draft trusteeship agreement transmitted in Deptel 256, Apr. 26, as may meet this requirement.

MARSHALL

¹The General Assembly, on April 26, by a vote of 46 to none, with seven abstentions, approved a resolution calling on the "Trusteeship Council to study, with the Mandatory Power and the interested parties, suitable measures for the protection of the city and its inhabitants, and to submit within the shortest possible time proposals to the General Assembly to that effect." For discussion in the Assembly, see GA (II/SS), *Plenary*, p. 10. The full text of the resolution is printed in GA (II/SS), *Resolutions*, p. 5.

The resolution was based on a French draft resolution that was amended by Sweden; for texts, see GA (II/SS), *Annex*, p. 32. The United States supported these measures before Committee I; for text of Mr. Jessup's statement of April 26, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 9, 1948, p. 591.

867N.01/4-2848 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Tuck) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

CAIRO, April 28, 1948—5 p. m.

436. While Arab states probably reached overall agreement April 24 regarding dispatch their armies to Palestine, it is believed basis information supplied by Azzam Pasha and other informed sources that implementation will be delayed until 1) Ibn Saud, Lebanese and

Syrian Governments approve; 2) further effort is made by volunteers supplied with all remaining arms; 3) essential steps taken to mobilize armies and coordinate effort. Azzam Pasha left today for Beirut, Damascus, Amman, possibly Riyadh to "coordinate efforts". Hilmi Hussain Bey left yesterday for Riyadh with message from King Farouk. Nature agreement among Arab states not yet disclosed by [but?] informed source believes Transjordan, Iraq and Syrian forces will comprise strength, with units from Lebanon. Egyptian contribution prior May 15 will be principally funds.

Attitude Iraq, Transjordan and Egyptian delegation at Arab conference apparently that sufficient action must now be taken by Arab Governments to dissipate rising pressure public opinion. Egyptian Government opposition continues to entrance official troops prior May 15 (Embtel 422, April 26). No reason to believe King Farouk has reversed categorical statement to me that Egyptian troops would not enter Palestine prior departure Great Britain troops (Embtel 1387 December 3, 1947¹). British Embassy has been informed that notwithstanding movement Egyptian troops Al Arish to satisfy public opinion such troops will not enter Palestine before May 15. Well informed Egyptian army source has admitted to this Embassy that two trains left Cairo April 27 for Al Arish carrying an expanded headquarters group, with reinforced infantry battalion, and machine guns and light artillery units totaling approximately 1100 men. Consul Buell Alexandria has reported entrainment at Alexandria last night infantry battalion field artillery unit destination reportedly Palestine. Naval units also reported patrolling coast southern Palestine.

Azzam informed Ireland² that recent events indicating intention of Jews to face world with state as *fait accompli* had swung him over to favoring entrance Arab armies prior May 15 notwithstanding probable repercussions UN. He felt in any case that Arab withdrawal from UN was inevitable.

TUCK

¹ *Foreign Relations*, 1947, vol. v, p. 1295.

² Philip W. Ireland, First Secretary of Embassy in Egypt.

501.BB Palestine/4-2848 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

US URGENT

NEW YORK, April 28, 1948—7:50 p. m.

519. Following arrangements for truce in Walled City of Jerusalem were agreed upon at TC meeting April 28 by representatives of AHC and JA:

"The representatives of the AHC and of the JA for Palestine, in consultation with the TC, have agreed to recommend to their respective communities in Palestine

- (1) That all military operations, and acts of violence shall cease forthwith within the Walled City of Jerusalem;
- (2) That cease-fire orders will be issued to take effect in the Walled City at the earliest possible moment;
- (3) That the keeping of the truce shall be observed by an impartial commission which shall report to the TC; and
- (4) That the specific terms of the truce will be elaborated in consultation with the two parties."

AUSTIN

501.BB Palestine/4-2948 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

URGENT

NEW YORK, April 29, 1948—12:35 p. m.

526. For Lovett from Rusk. Prospects for a truce now turn on dealing with the question of immigration on which there is a very wide gap between the parties. Each side faces pressure of explosive Arab and Jewish public opinion and the serious threat of extremist and terrorist groups. There is little hope that we can get formal agreement in advance on immigration but some chance that we could get acquiescence in an arrangement "imposed" from the outside which would keep their respective records clear, establish no precedent in principle and leave both sides entirely free in later negotiations on the future of Palestine. The same kind of problem probably will arise in connection with other issues such as land purchase and land tenure.¹

Both sides appear to agree that it would be a pity to lose a truce over these issues, yet each seems to be unable to extricate itself from its present position. It occurs to me that there is some possibility in an agreement that, during the period of the truce and without prejudice to the future governmental structure of Palestine, the SC Truce Commission might be given emergency authority to determine a temporary

¹ Messrs. Jessup and Rusk and other members of the United States Delegation met at Prince Faisal's apartment in New York on April 28 for a three-hour discussion on the articles of truce with the Chairmen of the Saudi Arabian, Syrian, Iraqi, Egyptian, and Lebanese Delegations. Mr. Kopper's memorandum of conversation states that "The attitude of the Arabs regarding immigration was summed up by Prince Faisal as follows: The Arabs cannot sign any document which would permit the entry of a single Jew into Palestine. Speaking for the Arab Delegations, however, he wished to point out that they were most anxious to do their utmost to find a final solution. While they could not legally accept immigration, they might restrain themselves from any action against immigration if the following conditions could be present:

"1. Immigration would take place for a limited period of time not to extend [beyond] the truce. After the truce, immigration would cease altogether.

"2. The amount of immigration should not exceed the present quota of 1500 per month.

"3. All immigrants should be women and children but not young warriors.

"If these conditions were fulfilled, the Arabs would promise to curb the Arab people and to acquiesce although they could not sign any document. This according to Prince Faisal was frankly all that could be done at this time." (IO Files, US/A/C.1/684)

solution which could be acquiesced in but need not be accepted by the parties. Such authority might be granted on the basis of an understanding or an exchange of letters between the members of the SC Truce Commission and the parties setting forth the general lines which the SC Truce Commission would follow with respect to an issue like immigration.

Any such arrangement would be subject to the termination of the truce on proper notice from either party. However, this would considerably enlarge US involvement in Palestine issues because of our membership in the SC Truce Commission. I believe we should be prepared to pay that price for a truce for three or four months since we should at long last get the parties into some form of collaboration and into negotiations with each other. Every week of such joint effort reduces the possibility of eventual open warfare. I am reluctant to suggest this to the parties, even on a personal basis, without some assurance from the Dept that the US would be willing for the SC Truce Commission to undertake the tasks agreed to in accordance with the revised articles of truce which follow.

If the Dept is willing for me to proceed on this line, we should have Arab and Jewish reactions within a day or so. At that point Dept must consider whether the time has not come for full governmental effort to establish a truce on basis of position representing maximum agreement between parties, using diplomatic and other means to the limit. The emphasis being placed by other GA delegations upon implementation and forces together with extreme reluctance of other governments to assume any responsibility makes effective assembly action most unlikely if there is no truce.

Text of revised articles, on which your comments are urgently needed, now follows:

[Here follows text of revised articles. Revised Article 8 read: "During the period of the truce, the AHC and the JA for Palestine accept, as a matter of emergency, the authority of the SC Truce Commission to adjust administrative problems such as the repatriation of Arabs and Jews displaced from their homes in Palestine, immigration, the applicability of existing laws, and similar questions."]

[Rusk]
AUSTIN

501.BB Palestine/4-2948

Mr. Moshe Shertok to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, April 29, 1948.

DEAR MR. MARSHALL: I hasten to clear up a serious misunderstanding which seems to have arisen. I understand that at an off-the-record press conference yesterday you are reported to have said that an

agreement for truce had virtually been reached between the Jewish Agency and the Arab League on 13 out of 14 points, the outstanding point on which a reply from the Arab League is yet due, being that of immigration.¹

I regret to have to say that this is not the case. I was shown on Monday night, April 26th, a draft on which I made my comments. I indicated a number of difficulties and objections which it involved from our point of view. On the substance I remained non-committal and made it clear that I would have to consult my colleagues and that the final decision would be taken by the Executive in Palestine. Indeed, having given further thought to the matter, the difficulties grew in my estimation and yesterday morning I explained them to a member of the United States Delegation at Lake Success, when I expressed great skepticism whether the whole arrangement in its present form would be acceptable. The draft and my comments have been telegraphed to Palestine and the reply is awaited.

The main objections as I saw them were: first, that the proposed truce entails the deferment of statehood and renders its attainment in the future most uncertain, thereby gravely prejudicing our rights and position; second, that as the effective operation of the truce obviously involves the presence and the use in Palestine of a considerable force, we cannot but assume that the intention is to keep the British forces in occupation and control of Palestine.

I was also greatly concerned about the gross inequality under which we would be placed as regards arms and military training: the Arab states would be entirely free to acquire arms and stock-pile them for eventual use in Palestine against us; Palestinian and other Arabs would be free to train en masse in any of the neighboring countries; we would be precluded from either acquiring arms abroad or from any large scale training—training which we could only organize in Palestine.

¹The memorandum of the press and radio news conference of the Secretary of State on Wednesday, April 28, 1948, recorded the off-the-record remarks as follows: "He [Secretary Marshall] said that, in addition to the various moves and resolutions which had been made by the Security Council, the Assembly and the Trusteeship Council, there was an unofficial effort being made to try to establish the basis for a truce until matters could be straightened out. He explained that through the offices of one of our people the representatives of the Jewish organizations and the spokesman of the Arab League had reached an agreement on 13 of 14 points establishing the basis for a truce. He said that the point on which they had not agreed concerned the question of immigration. Secretary Marshall said that the Arab League spokesman had referred back his agreements to the people in the Middle East, and that, although an answer had not yet been received from them, much progress had been made toward establishing the basis for a truce. It was not at all sufficient, said Mr. Marshall, to say we agreed to a truce since the great difficulty in any truce was the question of what the terms of the truce would be. Referring to his experience in China, the Secretary explained that one got a tremendous number of obligations involved, particularly when there was not the same sort of mediation in the middle for each particular issue." (News Division Files)

We are most vitally interested in a truce, but, with every desire to be helpful, I am sure you will appreciate our anxiety to protect ourselves from the grave dangers with which it may confront us.²

Very sincerely yours,

MOSHE SHERTOK
*Executive of the Jewish Agency
for Palestine*

² Mr. Henderson, on April 29, pointed out to Mr. Epstein "the great desirability of moderation in efforts to secure a truce. He [Mr. Epstein] stated that he regretted the misunderstanding which had made it necessary for Mr. Shertok to write the letter of today's date to the Secretary, but had felt that it was necessary that the Jewish position be clear. He agreed that there was great necessity to make every effort to achieve a truce, but said that the JA could not agree to a truce which would involve 'surrender'." Earlier in their conversation, Mr. Epstein had stated that "The Jewish State already exists and the Jews have no use for trusteeship" and "That no foreign troops are necessary. The Jews need arms and diplomatic action to prevent the invasions of outside countries." (Memorandum of conversation by Mr. Henderson, S67N.01/4-2948)

501.BB Palestine/4-2948 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET US URGENT
NIACT

LONDON, April 29, 1948—8 p. m.

1842. 1. Late yesterday afternoon was the first possible occasion I had to confer with Bevin and Attlee regarding Deptels 1469, April 23, and 1506, April 27. Events in the House of Commons combined with the Silver Jubilee made prior meeting impossible.

2. Discussed situation for an hour, Bevin doing most of the talking and Attlee giving assent to what Bevin said and occasionally interrupting with short comments of his own.

3. Latest information as of Tuesday night received by British from Transjordan indicates that rumors to the effect that Abdullah is planning invasion of Palestine are without foundation.

4. British will use all influence possible to deter Abdullah from movement of Transjordan armed forces across Palestine frontier.¹

¹ Mr. Bevin informed Ambassador Douglas on April 29 that the British Government had sent a message to Amman, Damascus, Cairo, and Baghdad urging that no aggressive acts be undertaken. The replies thus far received indicated that "if the Jewish forces desist from provocative attacks and aggressive action against Arab areas in Palestine, they, the Arab forces, will not engage in offensive military operations. Several of the replies indicate, however, that the Jews are on the offensive everywhere, and that if this behavior continues it will be difficult for the Arab forces to refrain from engaging in retaliatory action." (Telegram 1843, April 29, 8 p. m., from London, S67N.01/4-2948).

The same telegram contained an "appreciation of the situation" by High Commissioner Cunningham, which stressed the fear of the Jewish Agency "that the United States may attempt to impose trusteeship. These fears have finally convinced the Agency that their only course now is to establish a Jewish state

5. British will bring to bear upon Arabs all their influence to agree to a truce if the terms of the truce are reasonable. (What are our latest ideas about general terms of a truce?)

Bevin believes that a truce should be effected within the next six to eight days, and that the US is the only power that can bring persuasion effectively to bear upon the Jews.

6. In the event truce can be arranged, the Jews and Arabs agree to sit around a table in good faith in an effort to settle their agreements [*arguments?*], and the British are asked to cooperate with others either by Security Council, Trusteeship Council, or other United Nations agency, they will reconsider their entire position on the understanding that they are not left in a solitary position of responsibility.

DOUGLAS

and launch an all-out offensive against the Arabs to demonstrate Jewish military strength."

The official British account of this conversation was conveyed to Secretary Marshall by Lord Inverchapel in his note G.96/55/48, dated April 30, not printed (867N.00/4-3048).

501.BB Palestine/4-3048

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of United Nations Affairs (Rusk)*¹

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] April 30, 1948.

I had twenty minutes at four o'clock this afternoon with the President on the subject of a prospective truce in Palestine. The President opened by saying that he wanted the full story and wanted to know what he could do to help the situation. He said that he did not wish to approach the matter from the point of view of personal political considerations but wished to get the matter settled. He paused at this point and I remarked that an immediate truce in Palestine seemed to me to be our fundamental objective. He said "Yes, that is the thing. We are trying to stop the fighting."

I then outlined to the President the course of the informal negotiations which have been going on in New York. I told him that it had become apparent that there were sound reasons why both the Jews and the Arabs needed a truce and that we had become convinced in New York that it was possible to get agreement on a great many points which would go into a truce. I described briefly the successive steps of the conversations and pointed out that immigration developed as the substantial bar to an agreement. I then indicated how we proposed to handle it, namely, by getting the parties to agree to let the Security Council Truce Commission make the actual decisions on immigration during the period of the truce. I told him that we would need to tell

¹ Carbon copies of this memorandum, filed with the original, bear the initials of Secretaries Marshall and Lovett.

the parties in identical language at the time of signing the truce how we would proceed as a member of the Security Council Truce Commission to handle immigration. We would emphasize that security and public health considerations would govern immigration and that full provision must be made for them before their entry into the country and that during the truce immigration should be of a compassionate nature (families and women and children), and that the truce should not be used as a cloak for a change in the military position of either side. The President interrupted at this point and said "absolutely, that is fundamental". I then added that the proposed line of action on immigration should include a statement to the Jews and Arabs that we would be prepared to admit up to 4,000 displaced Jewish persons per month.

I told the President that there was a sharp difference of view inside the Jewish Agency, that men like Dr. Goldmann and Shertok (and according to my information Jewish leaders in Palestine) were inclined to take a moderate view and to consider that a truce was necessary. On the other hand, extremists like Dr. Silver made up a formidable war party which complicated our task considerably. I then said that one of the serious obstacles to our negotiations was the suspicion which had developed on both sides as to just what the United States was after. I told him that the Jews suspected us of trying to trap them into trusteeship against their wishes and of trying to trap them into a continuance of British authority in Palestine. On the other hand, the Arabs were afraid that we were trying to lure them into an enforced partition. I said that I had indicated informally to both the Jews and Arabs that if they had some such truce and then decided that they did not want a trusteeship but would join in working out an alternative provisional government, there would be no great difficulty in meeting their agreed wishes in that respect. I added that we had received hence [*hints?*] from both sides that there might come a time very soon when it would be necessary for the United States to move in strongly and push the wavering parties into a final acceptance. The President said that he would be glad to do everything possible to help out in such a situation and that he wanted Secretary Marshall to know that he (the President) was ready to take whatever steps the Secretary thought would hasten the completion of a truce. The President said he wanted to give the United Nations every possible support in bringing about this truce and was prepared to go the limit.

I then told the President that he should consider the possibility that the Arabs would accept the truce and that Jews would not, and that that might create difficult problems for him. He replied that "if the Jews refuse to accept a truce on reasonable grounds they need not expect anything else from us". I added that I had been given the impression by leaders of Jewish opinion in New York that American

Jews were for the most part insisting strongly on a truce as a next step. I told the President that the Department would be in touch with him immediately if his own intervention were required to complete the negotiations.

The President then asked specifically if there was anything that he could do at the moment. I told him that we must remove the element of suspicion from the minds of the parties. He said "I understand that General Hilldring's appointment² may have caused some complications". I said, yes, that had been questioned, particularly since the announcement had come just after a very long and highly successful meeting between ourselves and the heads of all of the Arab Delegations. I told him I wanted to be able to be absolutely clear with the Arabs and the Jews on the future course of our policy. The President said our policy will not change. We want a truce. Tell the Arabs that our policy is firm and that we are trying to head off fighting in Palestine. Remind them that we have a difficult political situation within this country. Our main purpose in this present situation is to prevent a war. He expressly stated his concern over the Russian aspect of the situation. He ended by saying "go and get a truce. There is no other answer to this situation. Good luck to you and let me know if there is any way in which I can help."

² John H. Hilldring accepted appointment on April 28 as Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Palestine Affairs. He advised Secretary Marshall, on May 26, that he was unable to take up these duties "for reasons of ill health". For the Department's announcements of his appointment and of his declination of appointment, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 9 and June 6, 1948, pp. 618 and 751.

S67N.01/4-3048 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Tuck) to the Secretary of State

CAIRO, April 30, 1948.

445. Arab League note to Embassy later released press re protection Holy places Jerusalem stated League anxious safeguard shrines during defense against Zionist aggression says Arabs prepared accept measures ensure safety and agree accept truce on following lines:

(1) Suspend all fighting within city and all attacks directed against, in or from it.

(2) Arab and Jewish city guards not to be disarmed.

(3) Absolute *status quo ante* shall be maintained within city. No objection extension truce area to include Mount of Olives. Willing to confide maintenance Holy places to religious organizations. League will contribute to Coast Guard group to implement protection plan for Holy places throughout Palestine.

Text being pouched.

TUCK

501.BB Palestine/4-3048 : Telegram

*The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to
the Secretary of State*

NEW YORK, April 30, 1948—5:25 p. m.

536. Following telegram from Palestine Truce Commission to SC President read to Committee 1 on April 30:

"General situation Palestine deteriorating rapidly. Government departments closing daily. Normal activities country coming to a standstill. JA is acting as a general organizing body for Jewish areas and attempting to replace suspended governmental activities. Arab areas are depending on municipal authorities within the townships and villages without any central authority. Telegraph facilities ceased in most areas as have telephone trunk lines. Telephones still work locally but with decreasing efficiency. Lydda airport is out of operation and regular air communication and airmail service in and out of country have stopped. Intensity of fighting is increasing steadily. Camps and other important areas vacated by British forces immediately become battlegrounds. Operations on larger and more important scale than Haifa expected shortly. Rumors tending to increase the nervous tension in the country."

AUSTIN

501.BB Palestine/5-148 : Telegram

*The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to
the Secretary of State*

SECRET URGENT

NEW YORK, May 1, 1948—6:44 p. m.

542. In our estimate of the present situation the prospect of success of the unofficial truce negotiation would be improved if some action of the GA could be taken along lines which would indicate to the JA that persistence in a course of action which stakes their success on military victories in Palestine would encounter disapproval by the UN.

At the same time the situation in Committee 1 has reached the point where debate is drying up and where it would be unrealistic, particularly in the light of rapidly deteriorating situation in Palestine, to press for further consideration of trusteeship proposal whether in Committee 1 or subcommittee in the absence of forces to implement trusteeship or at least the minimum of agreement between the Jews and Arabs which is represented by our Articles of truce.

We believe also that some such action as this is necessary to lay groundwork for further action which might be taken in case truce negotiations fail, GA is unable to reach definite conclusions by May 15 and Jewish and Arab states are proclaimed on that date.

Any GA action of this character would require some stand concerning the present status of the resolution of November 29. We are,

therefore, considering the possible desirability of the introduction, possibly on Monday, of a resolution along the following lines:

The resolution would begin with a recital of the resolutions adopted by the SC on March 1, April 1, April 17 and April 23 and of the communication to the first committee by the president of the SC. Following this recital the resolution would continue as follows:

The GA:

Appeals to all persons and organizations in Palestine and especially the AHC and the JA and to all governments and particularly those of the countries neighboring Palestine, to comply with the foregoing resolutions of the SC;

Affirms that its resolution of 29 November 1947 does not afford justification to any person, organization or state to withhold its compliance with the said resolutions of the SC;

Requests the SC to continue to keep it informed of all reports received from its truce commission for Palestine and of all subsequent action which the SC may take in regard to the situation in Palestine;

Declares its determination to continue its study of the future government of Palestine in accordance with the provisions of the call for its present special session.

Are we authorized to introduce a resolution along these lines ourselves or to attempt to get some other friendly delegation to do so with promise that the US will support it if introduced.

Possibility of SC meeting on Palestine Monday afternoon reinforces desirability of some action by Committee 1 along above lines Monday morning.¹

AUSTIN

¹ According to telegram 291, May 8, 3 p. m., to New York, the Department did not concur in USUN's suggestion. This decision, made by Mr. Lovett, was communicated by telephone to Mr. Ross by Mr. McClintock at 10:15 a. m., May 2 (501.BB Palestine/5-748).

501.BB Palestine/5-148: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Jerusalem

SECRET US URGENT

WASHINGTON, May 1, 1948—11 p. m.

NIACT

340. Our next telegram repeats substantial text telegram addressed to President of Security Council, Parodi, by Shertok, Jewish Agency, today alleging Arab invasion of Palestine.¹ SC may meet May 3 to consider JA telegram and factual situation in Palestine, keeping in mind its basic responsibility for maintenance of international peace and security.

¹ Mr. Shertok's communication alleged that Syrian, Lebanese, and Trans-jordanian regular armed forces were attacking Jewish settlements in the Gallilee and in the Jordan Valley and that Egyptian forces had crossed Palestine's southern border; for text, see SC, 3rd yr., *Supplement for May 1948*, p. 37.

We understand that SC President has telegraphed Truce Commission asking for full and immediate report on allegations in JA telegram.

Please telegraph niact your appreciation present situation Palestine (repeated for action also to Beirut as 200 Damascus 149 Baghdad 133 Cairo 499 Jidda 157). (1) Have Arab armies entered Palestine? (2) If so from which territory? (3) Have they been sent by Govts or are they irregulars or volunteers? (4) Has UK as Palestine Govt or otherwise invited entry of Arab Legion?

Jerusalem and London likewise telegraph full report Jewish military operations. We are mindful that JA telegram may be intended to divert attention from activities of Haganah and other Jewish armed organizations.

Repeated London as 1565 with request immediate inquiry be made Foreign Office and other informed authorities as to facts of situation.²

MARSHALL

² United States diplomatic establishments at Arab capitals advised telegraphically on May 2 and 3 that Arab armies had not entered Palestine. Some of the messages, however, noted that various Arabs forces had been put on a war footing or had moved to the Palestine border and that about 650 Egyptian and North African volunteers had crossed into Palestine within the last ten days. London advised, on May 2, that the British Foreign Office had no information concerning the entry of Arab forces into Palestine or that they were likely to do so before May 15 (telegram 1885, 501.BB Palestine/5-248).

867N.01/5-248

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] May 2, 1948.

Participants: Mr. Beeley, British Foreign Office
 Mr. T. E. Bromley, First Secretary, British Embassy
 Mr. Loy W. Henderson, Director for Near Eastern and African Affairs
 Mr. Fraser Wilkins, Division of Near Eastern Affairs

On this Sunday morning, Mr. Beeley, who works on Palestinian affairs in the British Foreign Office, accompanied by Mr. Bromley of the British Embassy, came in to see me at the British request. Mr. Fraser Wilkins was present during the conversation.

Mr. Beeley told me that his call, of course, was not of an official nature; that he had come down from the British Delegation in New York merely because he did not want to leave the country without having a chat with me; and that any idea or opinion which he might express during our talk should be considered as his own, not that of his Government. I have known Mr. Beeley fairly well for several years

and am convinced that what he said to me was personal, and that in talking with me he was not carrying out any instruction of the British Government. Nevertheless, I shall try to set forth my impressions of some of the views and opinions of Mr. Beeley, based on my conversation with him, since they may aid in obtaining a better understanding of British policies.

CERTAIN IMPRESSIONS OBTAINED FROM CONVERSATION WITH MR. BEELEY

1. Mr. Beeley indicated that in his opinion trusteeship would have been the best way to prevent the Palestine situation from developing into open warfare which might engulf the whole Middle East. The decision of the General Assembly last fall, however, has encouraged the proponents of the Jewish State to such an extent that he does not believe that the Jews would now agree to any trusteeship which did not state definitely that it was merely preparatory to the establishment of a Jewish State. It was, therefore, too late to attain trusteeship without prejudice to the rights, claims or position of either Jews or Arabs. It was too late because, in his opinion, the Jewish community would not consent to such a trusteeship, and the United States or any other Western Power would not be willing to fight the Jewish community in Palestine in order to impose by force a trusteeship. The Jewish community in Palestine can afford to take a strong position since it is confident that no western country would be willing to oppose the Jewish community by force.

2. He also believed that the chances for a truce were not very good. The British Government, in his opinion, would welcome a trusteeship of a neutral character provided it was acquiesced in by the Jewish and Arab communities. It was not, however, coming out in favor of such a trusteeship for two reasons:

(a) It felt that there was little chance of such a trusteeship being attained; and

(b) Its support of such a trusteeship would be certain to arouse greater Jewish opposition to it.

3. He believed that the chances for the Jews and Arabs agreeing voluntarily to a truce were unfavorable. Nevertheless, the British Government was doing everything possible to bring about such a truce. It had to move cautiously in this respect also in view of Jewish suspicions.

4. In any event, the mandate would be terminated on May 15 and the British Government would consider that after that date its responsibilities so far as Palestine is concerned would be the same as those of any other member of the United Nations, with the single exception that it must take steps to protect British troops in the process of withdrawal from Palestine. The British Government, in case

there was no truce, could take no responsibility for preventing the entry into Palestine by land or sea of arms or immigrants. The British Government would probably permit the Jews in Cyprus to leave for Palestine.

5. In case no truce comes into effect, it was Beeley's opinion that on May 15 or 16 the Zionists would announce the establishment of a Jewish State in Palestine. They would justify their announcement on the resolution of the General Assembly last November, but would not necessarily consider that the boundaries or the terms set forth in that resolution were binding upon them. In other words, the Zionists would probably take the position, although they might not announce it, that the limits and form of the new Jewish State would be determined by developments.

6. It was Mr. Beeley's opinion that upon the announcement of the establishment of a Jewish State, the armies of the Arab countries would invade Palestine and that there would be extensive fighting between Jews and Arabs. It was his opinion that for some time at least the Jews, strengthened by recruits entering by sea, could withstand and possibly defeat the poorly organized and badly equipped Arab armies.

7. As a result of the fighting between Arabs and Jews, a number of developments were possible, including:

(a) The reaching of an understanding between Arabs and Jews which would result in the partition of the Arab portions of Palestine among various Arab countries and the tentative recognition by the Arab countries of the existence of a Jewish State.

(b) The hostilities becoming a long-term war which would gradually sap the energies and security of the whole Middle East and which would poison relationships between the Middle East and the Western world.

(c) A decision on the part of the United Nations that the Arab States, by invading Palestine, were guilty of aggression, and a consequent intervention of the United Nations for the purpose of halting the aggression. Such intervention might eventually lead to a breaking up of the present political structure of the Middle East. It would be impossible to prophesy what the Middle East would look like from a political, economic and social point of view after stabilization had again been effected. It is probable, however, that there would be no stabilization except under some kind of a powerful dictatorship.

8. Mr. Beeley said that it was his opinion, based on conversations with British legal advisers, that if there should be no truce, Palestine would be a "no man's land" on and after May 15 and that in case the Arab population should invite the Arab countries to send armies into Palestine, at least into those areas in which the Arabs are in the majority, the United Nations would have no justifiable grounds for charging that the Arab countries had violated the principles of the United Nations.

9. Mr. Beeley said that, in his opinion, the only hope for preventing the situation in Palestine, in case no truce could be achieved, from developing in a manner which would threaten the security of the whole Middle East was for an arms embargo to be proclaimed by the United Nations against Palestine and all the Arab countries. Great Britain, in spite of its treaties, could, he believed, join in enforcing such an embargo if the United Nations should request it. He believed the Arab countries at present could not spare enough arms unless they could obtain more from without to offset the arms already in the possession of the Jews.

10. It was also his personal opinion that if the United Nations could find a way out, its best course would be to encourage the partition of Palestine between the invading Arab forces and the Jews. Such partition, of course, would be only a temporary measure since it was clear that whenever the international situation would permit, the Jews on their part would endeavor to extend their state, and the Arabs on their part would try to overwhelm the Jewish State. It was likely, therefore, that Palestine for many years to come would be a breeding ground for international bad feelings.

During my talk with Mr. Beeley, speaking on a merely personal basis and making it clear that I in no way was representing the views of the Department of State, I pointed out that:

1. I was inclined to feel that it would be difficult for the United States to regard the invasion of Palestine by armies of the Arab countries either before May 15 or after as other than a violation of the principles of the Charter. It seemed to me likely that the United States would press for action in the Security Council in case of such an invasion.

2. In my opinion, any kind of development which would permit the entry of Russian troops into Palestine would be disastrous, but also any kind of development which would result in seriously undermining the influence and prestige of the United Nations would be disastrous. It was difficult for me to understand how the United Nations could maintain its prestige if after it had considered the problem, that problem could have no permanent solution and would be solved only on a temporary basis as a result of fighting between Jews and Arabs.

3. I would not be frank if I failed to point out that in our endeavor to prevent the situation in Palestine from becoming a serious threat to world peace we had not received the degree of cooperation from our British friends which we considered ourselves entitled to expect. Even though the British might believe that they had grounds for resenting certain statements and activities on the part of the American Government or American citizens with regard to Palestine in the past, they should, nevertheless, realize that in view of the critical international situation, this was not the time to permit old grievances to influence present policies. We might also have grounds for criticizing past Brit-

ish actions in or with regard to Palestine. We have felt that since the breakdown of order in the Middle East would be disastrous to world peace and particularly to Great Britain and the United States, and since, for the most part, the policies of our two countries in the Middle East pursued a parallel rather than a conflicting course, the British should consider it to be in their own interest to cooperate with us in our efforts to find some peaceable way out of the Palestine muddle. We have noted with regret that instead of cooperation, most of our suggestions have been greeted with official reticence or unofficial sneers: We could not continue indefinitely to carry on alone. We might soon be compelled to take the position that we had done everything in our power to prevent further bloodshed and violence in Palestine; that we could do no more; and that it was up to Great Britain, which as the Mandatory Power was in great part responsible for the present situation in Palestine, to assume the lead in finding a peaceful solution for the problem.

Mr. Beeley said that he did not think that it was quite fair to say that the British had greeted our suggestions with "unofficial sneers"; that although some of the British newspapers had taken a derisive attitude toward American efforts, those papers had not reflected the views of the British Government; that the British Government felt that particularly during the last three months the United States Government had been making sincere although sometimes hesitating efforts to meet the Palestine situation; that the British Government had failed to take a more positive attitude because of its feeling that in view of Zionist propaganda and of Arab suspicion, its support of any plan might do more harm than good; that the British Government felt British-American cooperation in the Middle East was imperative; and that once the mandate was terminated, the British Government would feel more free to give a fuller extent of its cooperation to the United States Government and other governments in working on the Palestine problem.

L[oY] W. H[ENDERSON]

501.BB Palestine/5-348 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

PRIORITY

NEW YORK, May 3, 1948—11:50 a. m.

554. For Lovett from Rusk. Following is summary of major points covered in conversations which I had with Fawzi Bey (Egypt) and Prince Faisal (Saudi Arabia) yesterday morning. I was accompanied by Kopper during each conversation. During conversation with Faisal, Hafiz Wahba and Ali Reza were present.

1. In both conversations I reviewed in brief my conversations with the President.¹ I emphasized that there was no change in US policy in spite rumors to contrary. Securing of truce is still our main objective.

2. It was also pointed out that President and Secretary were keenly interested in obtaining a truce and are ready at any time to do what they could to achieve this goal.

3. Both Fawzi Bey and Faisal were told that US would direct its policy to support a truce and against either party which opposed or obstructed truce or violated it once it had been arranged and agreed upon.

4. Question of immigration dominated both conversations. Underlying theme of both Fawzi Bey and Faisal was that Arab states could not acquiesce in any arrangement which permitted over 1,500 displaced persons to enter Palestine per month. Fawzi Bey was slightly more flexible on this question when he again suggested possibility of Arab acquiescence to entry of 20,000 per year for a period of three years. This is at rate of slightly less than 1,700 per month. As a result I have distinct impression that it will be most difficult to gain Arab acquiescence to anything like rate of 4,000 during period of truce. I told Fawzi Bey and Faisal that we were concerned about establishing control over the character of immigration into Palestine. SC Truce Commission had been suggested as possible machinery for controlling immigration in view of apparent hopelessness of agreement by Arabs and Jews on this point.

5. Both Fawzi and Faisal seemed rather skeptical over any advantage being derived from immediate SC cease-fire order. However, they did not discuss [*dismiss?*] it offhand.

6. Fawzi Bey wondered whether something drastic might be done at this time such as the suspension of GA for 10 days and establishment of "tight body" to study truce. During this period no military advantages would be sustained. Further it would be necessary to return to the *status quo ante-bellum*. The immigration quota of 1,500 per month could be continued. I pointed out that such a step would raise the question of the suspension of the November 29 resolution by the GA. Fawzi Bey said that if May 16 came without anything constructive having been done, spiraling difficulties would ensue. It might then become necessary for Arab states to assist Arabs in Palestine. This would not, however, be for purpose of annexing any part of Palestine or simply to fight Zionism, but to establish law and order as depositories of a trust until UN or some other constituted authority could take over. I told him any such situation would raise grave ques-

¹ For the conversation of April 30, see p. 877. The editors have been unable to find a record of any other conversation between the President and Mr. Rusk on the Palestine question at this time.

tions for all of us and that our present efforts should be directed to the prevention of the situation.

7. In conversation with Faisal I emphasized our concern over security position in Near East and long-standing cooperation and close ties between Saudi Arabia and US. Faisal stated Arabs were more anxious than anyone for peace in Near East. Arabs would have been more than glad to continue cooperation with US if they were sure US was really interested in Middle East as a whole. Arabs, however, had lost faith in America after American action in support of partition and Zionists. Hope rose somewhat when US appeared to recognize moral obligation to friendly governments in Middle East and to peace. However, during recent weeks the Arabs had not been impressed with our presentation of trusteeship proposals or of content of proposals. Faisal stated draft trusteeship terms worse in some respects than partition. Cited provisions on (a) powers Governor General, (b) immigration, (c) land policy, and (d) citizenship.

8. Reference truce proposals, Arabs are skeptical that truce might be used to calm situation down until time when gates can be opened to Zionists.

9. Faisal categorically asked what final position US was re partition of Palestine. I replied that on February 24 US had under difficult political circumstances declared it had reached conclusion that as a matter of principle the UN could not impose by force a political recommendation of the GA such as the November 29 resolution. I said further that the US will act with respect to Palestine only through the UN and will not act unilaterally. I would not be frank, however, if I did not say that the President considers partition a fair and equitable solution for Palestine, subject to the conditions for UN action contained in the charter and subject to our determination not to take unilateral action. US, however, would be happy to support any arrangement which was acceptable to the two communities of Palestine.

10. Faisal asked whether US believed that it was to its own interests to see Jewish state established in Palestine. I replied this would depend on character of political situation and characteristics of state. If it were clear that such a state would be at war permanently with Arab world or would serve as base for hostile elements, US obviously would not consider it to her own interests to see such state established. Faisal said that Arab states could not ever accept Jewish state. It would be an abcess to the political body of the Arabs. I added that we did not believe a Jewish state would necessarily have the characteristics mentioned and that US interests might be prejudiced in the sense indicated.

11. Faisal strongly advised us not to ask Arab states or representatives to be more lenient lest we provoke suspicions of true US intentions. Some had recently received indications from their governments

that they had gone too far on the truce proposals. Fawzi had remarked earlier that reaction of Arab governments to truce proposals was not too imaginative.

Detailed memoranda of conversations follow. [Rusk.]

AUSTIN

S67N.01/5-34S: Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Wasson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET URGENT
NIACT

JERUSALEM, May 3, 1948—noon.

530. [1] ReDeptel 340, May 2[1] following is appreciation present position in Palestine. Palestinian Government has generally ceased to function and central public services no longer exist. In Jewish areas Jews have taken effective control and are maintaining public services within those areas. Preparations for establishment Jewish state after termination mandate are well advanced. Confidence in future at high peak and Jewish public support for leaders overwhelming. In Arab areas only municipal administration continues without any central authority. In Samaria food and gasoline are in very short supply. Morale following Jewish military successes low with thousands Arabs fleeing country. Last remaining hope is in entry Arab regular armies spearheaded by Arab Legion. Jerusalem is quiet with enforced 48-hour cease-fire in Katamon suburb. Brit maintains *status quo* having warned Arabs and Jews further disturbances will not be tolerated. Both sides regrouping for battles in areas not affecting British lines of communications. Unless strong Arab reinforcements arrive, we expect Jews overrun most of city upon withdrawal British force. British bringing in heavy reinforcement troops, tanks and armor to keep both sides under control until withdrawal to Haifa enclave completed. British Army expected pursue tougher policy.¹

[2] GOC British troops in Palestine informed me categorically last night that Arab Armies have not entered Palestine. He called recent reports re Arab invasion "complete moonshine." Stated RAF had made full air reconnaissance morning May 2 of northern area and found nothing except three Jewish light planes on Rosh Pinna air-strip. He said Arab irregulars and volunteers are still dribbling in and estimated present strength "Yarmuk Army of Liberation" at 7,000 (other estimates have placed number at 10,000). Fact that they are trained and equipped by government neighboring states is well known but they do not form component regular armies.

¹ The rapid deterioration of the general situation in Palestine was underscored in a cablegram of April 30 from the Chairman of the Palestine Truce Commission to the President of the Security Council; for text, see SC, 3rd yr., *Supplement for May 1948*, p. 38.

[3] When asked whether Jewish Agency was disseminating this and similar untrue reports as propaganda [and?] was part of war of nerves or as planned psychological warfare for purpose hoodwinking, UN, GOC replied that he thought that it was simply because Jews wished detract attention from recent Jaffa operation that if they keep repeating these reports, they might one day become true and British would be blamed for failure take action.

4 Re Arab Legion GOC stated that approximately 1500 men in Palestine at present under his command. They have been involved in certain incident without authority and GOC has reprimanded Glubb Pasha, Commanding Officer Legion. All Arab Legion but two companies will leave Palestine by May 12. Remaining companies will depart May 14.

5 Replying to inquiry as to reason for return to Palestine of British troops and armor, GOC said general situation had deteriorated seriously and that IZL (Irgun Zvai Leumi) might attempt aggression before termination mandate. Referring to enforced truces in Jaffa and Katamon suburb of Jerusalem, GOC said his patience was exhausted with both sides. He made significant remark which he repeated that he would attack relentlessly any regular force entering Palestine before May 15.

Main Jewish operations carried out by Haganah which were trained and equipped with automatic weapons and mortars. Relations with British satisfactory and GOC states "Jewish Agency and Haganah determined not to attack British". Jewish operations at beginning were defensive against Arab attacks. However, have now changed to defensive offensive with main object improve defense positions and liquidate Arab interference. Up to present Haganah has not attempted seize territory outside partition boundaries for motives territorial aggrandizement. Full mobilization man and woman power Jewish community still in progress. Haganah leadership good with most leaders trained in British Army. Irgun Zvai Leumi and Stern gang continue aggressive and irresponsible operations such as Deir Yassin massacre and Jaffa. Until recently Irgun started such operations; if successful were continued by Haganah; if not were repudiated by responsible Jewish quarters. This more difficult now with signature agreement between Haganah and Irgun providing for Irgun to be under Haganah but retain identity and have representation in Haganah High Command. Recent Jaffa battle undertaken by Irgun with Haganah taking over in midst of battle. Irgun stated objective was capture Jaffa while Haganah stated objective was defense Tel Aviv against Arab attack. British Army went into action killing over 70 Irgun members. According GOC this action has given Haganah

courage to combat Irgun and in Haifa Haganah has succeeded in disarming majority Irgun. Stern gang undertakes joint operations with Irgun but less active. GOC stated that while Irgun ready attack British "Stern gang wants to murder British". Estimated strength Irgun and Stern 8000.

We believe that Haganah operations will remain defensively offensive until May 15 after which they will go on all-out offensive to secure frontiers new Jewish state and improve lines of communication. So far Arab resistance has been ineffective and GOC and others believe Jews will be able sweep all before them unless regular Arab armies come to rescue. With Haifa as example of Haganah military occupation, possible their operations will restore order.

WASSON

501.BB Palestine/5-348 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

TOP SECRET US URGENT
NIACT

WASHINGTON, May 3, 1948—7 p. m.

1586. For Douglas from Lovett. The President has approved following emergency action with respect to Palestine, to be proposed by US Delegation at Lake Success:

"1. An immediate and unconditional cease-fire for ten days beginning May 5.

2. An extension of the mandate for ten days.

3. A recess of the Special Session of GA for 10 days.

4. Immediate movement by air of following party from NY to Middle East to expedite truce negotiations between authorities on both sides who have full authority of decisions:

a. Designated reps. of Arab Higher Committee and Arab States.

b. Designated reps. of Jewish Agency for Palestine.

c. Designated reps. of those countries holding membership on SC Truce Commission (US, France, Belgium).

(Note—Airplane to be furnished by President of US).

If Jerusalem cannot be agreed upon as common ground by both sides, each to select its own location, Truce Commission should undertake go-between functions. These truce negotiations to be brought to conclusion within a ten-day period."¹

¹ The quoted portion of this telegram was telephoned by Mr. Rusk, at New York, to Mr. McClintock at 10 a. m., May 3. Mr. Lovett communicated the gist of Mr. Rusk's telephone message to President Truman at 10:40 the same morning. Mr. Lovett's memorandum of conversation states that "The President said he approved the tentative program outlined by Mr. Rusk and was willing to make an airplane available. I said that this did not mean that we had to send the *Independence* but that any good C-54 would do." Later the same day, the Rusk proposals were incorporated in New York's telegram 557, with a request

We are cognizant of fact that an act of Parliament has been passed requiring termination of mandate for Palestine by May 15 and that in consequence British acquiescence to Point 2 above would require legislative action.

Please call on Bevin (and Attlee at your discretion) and explain that this provision is designed to provide some continuing framework of government in Palestine for a minimum period after truce deliberations have—as we hope—assured a cessation of hostilities. This brief respite would enable GA to recommend some more enduring, even though temporary, form of government for Palestine which would act as a caretaker until permanent solution can be found.

You may add to Bevin, however, that we attach principal importance to necessity of negotiating a cease-fire and an effective truce. The recent decisive military action taken by British authorities in Palestine is encouraging and gives us earnest to believe that British sense of responsibility will continue irrespective of formal dates.

If proposal for sending special truce party by air to Middle East materializes, President has indicated personal interest in doing all possible to further success of this venture. We are confident that British authorities in Palestine and elsewhere will likewise lend their utmost cooperation.

Repeated for info only to USUN as 280, Jerusalem as 348, Cairo as 508, Baghdad as 139, Damascus as 154, Beirut as 206, Jidda as 162, Brussels as 651, Paris as 1500.

MARSHALL

Footnote continued from preceding page.

that the message be relayed to Consul Wasson at Jerusalem for transmittal to the Jewish Agency. The Department relayed the message at 6:30 p. m., eight minutes after its receipt.

Mr. Rusk, at 4:25 p. m., the same day, dictated by telephone a "Re-write" of a possible White House statement on the Rusk proposals, which was read by Mr. Lovett to Mr. Clifford at 6:05 p. m. President Truman discussed the matter at his press conference of May 6 (*Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1948*, pp. 248-249), but did not use the proposed statement. The Department papers cited in this footnote are all filed under 501.BB Palestine/5-348.

Editorial Note

The First Committee of the General Assembly, basing its discussions on a Guatemalan draft proposal GA (II/SS), *Annex*, page 33, passed a resolution on May 4, by 33 votes to 7, with 13 abstentions. This measure established a subcommittee to formulate and report a proposal concerning a provisional regime for Palestine. The subcommittee was to take into account "(a) Whether it is likely that such proposal

will commend itself to the Jewish and Arab communities of Palestine, (b) Whether it is possible to implement this proposal and make it workable, and (c) The approximate cost of such proposal." The full text of the resolution is printed GA (II/SS), *Annex*, page 35.

501.BB Palestine/5-448 : Telegram

Mr. Moshe Shertok to the Director of the Office of United Nations Affairs (Rusk), at Washington

NEW YORK, May 4, 1948—11:05 a. m.

I have now had an opportunity of consulting my colleagues with reference to the suggestion that Arab and Jewish representatives as well as representatives of the United States and possibly France and Belgium be flown to Palestine immediately in an airplane to be furnished by the President of the United States. We understand that the purpose of this mission is to achieve a truce in Palestine. I do not need to repeat that the Jews were not the aggressors; that we are keenly anxious for the restoration [of] peace. But we do not consider that the somewhat spectacular proceeding now suggested is warranted. Peace can in present circumstances best be achieved by an unconditional agreement for an immediate "cease fire". The Jewish authorities in Palestine have previously indicated their readiness for such an arrangement and we desire now in the most formal way to state that we are ready forthwith to agree to a "cease fire" order provided the Arabs do likewise. The procedure now indicated, apparently ignores the action already taken by the Security Council in regard to the appointment of a truce commission and bases itself on the proposals privately advanced by the American delegation. It would involve us in a moral responsibility in respect of those proposals which we cannot possibly accept. Nor could we lend ourselves to the suggestion that the British Mandate should be prolonged, whether *de jure* or *de facto*, beyond the appointed date. Permit me to add that insofar as consideration on the spot in Palestine is called for, the truce commission appointed by the Security Council could no doubt be relied upon to undertake any consultations with Jewish representatives there. Indeed our fully authorized representatives in Palestine are in close contact with this commission. With regard to the Arabs, it must be observed that not a single member of the Arab Higher Committee remains in Palestine, whereas Mr. Jamal Husseini, Vice-Chairman of the Arab Higher Committee and its accredited representative, is of course available in New York, as well as representatives of the other

Arab states. Permit me again to emphasize our sincere desire to do all that we properly can to restore peace and order in Palestine.¹

MOSHE SHERTOK

¹ New York reported, on May 5, a telephone conversation by Mr. Ross with Mr. Shertok on the question of the articles of truce. The latter expressed readiness "to agree to a cease-fire throughout the country immediately the other side does. Meanwhile, there is a duly established truce commission in Jerusalem and our people there are fully competent to deal with them." Mr. Ross interpreted this view as an "indication that Jewish Agency representatives here are trying to move out from under US pressure by substituting the formality of the truce commission for informality of our conversations, and by transferring the scene of discussions from New York to Jerusalem. Also reflected, I think, is diffusive effort . . . after turning down our ten-day unconditional cease-fire." (Telegram 576 from New York, 501.BB Palestine/5-548)

501.BB Palestine/5-448

*Draft Memorandum by the Director of the Office of United Nations Affairs (Rusk) to the Under Secretary of State (Lorett)*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] May 4, 1948.

Subject: Future Course of Events in Palestine

The refusal of the Jewish Agency last night to agree to our proposal for on-the-spot truce negotiations in Palestine on the grounds that they could not accept the "moral obligation" to undertake such conversations rather clearly reveals the intention of the Jews to go steadily ahead with the Jewish separate state by force of arms. While it is possible that Arab acceptance of our proposal might place the Jewish Agency in such a position vis-à-vis public opinion that it would have to go through the motions of looking for a truce, it seems clear that in light of the Jewish military superiority which now obtains in Palestine, the Jewish Agency will prefer to round out its State after May 15 and rely on its armed strength to defend that state from Arab counterattack.

Military operations after May 15 will probably be undertaken by the Haganah with the assistance of the Jewish terrorist organizations Irgun and Stern. Copies of Consul General Wasson's excellent reports, as set forth in his telegram 530 of May 3, are attached, and provide the estimate of the British General Officer Commanding as to the probable course of military events after British withdrawal on May 15.

If these predictions come true we shall find ourselves in the UN confronted by a very anomalous situation. The Jews will be the actual aggressors against the Arabs. However, the Jews will claim that they

¹ Drafted by Mr. McClintock; a marginal notation states it was not sent.

are merely defending the boundaries of a state which were traced by the UN and approved, at least in principle, by two-thirds of the UN membership. The question which will confront the SC in scarcely ten days' time will be whether Jewish armed attack on Arab communities in Palestine is legitimate or whether it constitutes such a threat to international peace and security as to call for coercive measures by the Security Council.

The situation may be made more difficult and less clear-cut if, as is probable, Arab armies from outside Palestine cross the frontier to aid their disorganized and demoralized brethren who will be the objects of Jewish attack. In the event of such Arab outside aid the Jews will come running to the Security Council with the claim that their state is the object of armed aggression and will use every means to obscure the fact that it is their own armed aggression against the Arabs inside Palestine which is the cause of Arab counter-attack.

There will be a decided effort, given this eventuality, that the United States will be called upon by elements inside this country to support Security Council action against the Arab states. To take such action would seem to me to be morally indefensible while, from the aspect of our relations with the Middle East and of our broad security aspects in that region, it would be almost fatal to pit forces of the United States and possibly Russia against the governments of the Arab world.

Given this almost intolerable situation, the wisest course of action might be for the United States and Great Britain, with the assistance of France, to undertake immediate diplomatic action seeking to work out a *modus vivendi* between Abdullah of Transjordan and the Jewish Agency. This *modus vivendi* would call for, in effect, a *de facto* partition of Palestine along the lines traced by Sir Arthur Creech Jones in his remark to Ambassador Parodi on May 2, as indicated on Page 3 of USUN's telegram [549], May 2,² which has been drawn to your attention.

In effect, Abdullah would cut across Palestine from Transjordan to the sea at Jaffa, would give Ibn Saud a port at Aqaba and appease the Syrians by some territorial adjustment in the northern part, leaving the Jews a coastal state running from Tel Aviv to Haifa. If some *modus vivendi* along these lines could be worked out peaceably, the United Nations could give its blessing to the deal.³

² Not printed.

³ Ambassador Austin, on May 4, transmitted to the Department the text of a telegram from King Abdullah to Secretary-General Lie, received the same day

Footnote continued on following page.

501.BB Palestine/5-448 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary
of State*

TOP SECRET US URGENT

LONDON, May 4, 1948—1 p. m.

NIACT

1917. For Lovett from Douglas.

1. Have just discussed fully with Bevin Deptel 1586, May 3. He handed me the following statement which he proposes to make in the House of Commons this afternoon for release 3:30 London time:

[Here follows proposed statement, announcing that the British Government would not depart from its position to retain the mandate over Palestine until May 15. The statement noted also that British forces had intervened to halt Jewish attacks on the Arabs in Jaffa and Jerusalem and that the British Government had used its influence to prevent invasion of Palestine by Arab countries. Thus Mr. Bevin's position was that so long as the British remained responsible in Palestine, they would not tolerate aggression. At the same time, there was no question that the British would refrain from enforcing a settlement not agreed to by the Jews and Arabs; but that if there were agreement between them and if the British were approached, "in conjunction with others", a new situation would be created and the British Government would consider the matter most carefully.]

2. Bevin is unwilling to make any commitment in advance of a known situation, for fear that it may be misconstrued in several quarters.

3. I interpret the above statement, when combined with my conversation with Bevin, to mean that (a) if the GA approves of the proposal put forward by US delegation; (b) if an unconditional cease-fire is effected; and (c) if truce is agreed to; Bevin and the cabinet of HMG will consider sympathetically accepting a continuation of responsibility for a very short period. I am also, however, convinced that

Footnote continued from preceding page.

in New York. The message vehemently denounced such "unparalleled massacres" as that at Deir Yasin (see telegram 431, April 13, from Jerusalem, p. 817). The King concluded his message with the statement: "We now declare our readiness to give the Jews in Palestine full Arab nationality in a unitary state sharing all that we share while yet enjoying a special administration in particular areas. Thus will end the slaughter and the people will live in peace and security forever." (Telegram 569 from New York, 501.BB Palestine/5-448)

Britain will not be placed in a position which may lead to a continuation of a solitary acceptance of responsibility.

4. HMG will, of course, lend utmost cooperation to an effective cease-fire and truce.¹

DOUGLAS

¹New York advised, on May 4, of the negative British attitude toward the United States proposals for a ten-day ceasefire and for an extension of the mandate for ten days. Mr. Beeley had pointed out the "great legal and time-consuming difficulty of amending present legislation calling for laying down mandate May 15 and related public opinion argument" and the fact that "It is only present deadline of May 15 which has brought parties to point of even considering truce. Any extension of deadline would harden respective positions of parties and greatly impair chances of truce." He also had indicated the British view that an "extension of mandate would be misinterpreted in light of British troop reinforcements to Palestine over last few days." (Telegram 565, 501.BB Palestine/5-448)

501.BB Palestine/5-448 : Telegram

*The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)
to the Secretary of State*

SECRET

NEW YORK, May 4, 1948—1:28 p. m.

567. For Rusk from Jessup. In anticipation of the situation which would be created as of May 15 if no temporary solution is agreed upon by the GA before that date, and if a Jewish and a Palestinian state are then proclaimed, we believe we must be prepared to take a position. The anticipated danger is that the Jewish and Palestinian states might be recognized by various governments.

In particular, Soviet recognition of a Jewish state may be contemplated. Such recognition might afford the Russians a basis for invoking article 51 of the charter and providing assistance to the Jewish state to fend off "aggression". The plausible legal basis for such a Soviet *démarche* might be undermined by GA support of the SC truce resolution. A more effective step might take the form of a specific further GA resolution affirming that the proclaiming of any such state as of that date would be a violation of the SC's truce resolution. A question may be raised as to whether article 25 of the charter would be applicable to that truce resolution. We hope that the Department will be able to give some advance consideration to this problem. Possible desirability of some announcement of position in such a contingency prior to May 15 might also be considered. [Jessup.]

AUSTIN

IO Files : US/A/C.1/685

*Memorandum by Mr. John E. Horner*¹

SECRET

[NEW YORK,] May 4, 1948.

FUTURE OF PALESTINE

At the present stage, trusteeship as a concept for the solution of the Palestine problem seems virtually to have been abandoned by almost all delegations. Present thinking appears largely to be limited to the possibility of realizing a truce in all of Palestine, a minority also believing in the feasibility of accompanying such a truce with the establishment of a "neutral regime" of an undefined nature. With the exception of some Latin American delegations, little hope presently is held for implementing a UN regime through the use of armed forces.

Many delegations, particularly those from Western Europe and the British Commonwealth, remain distrustful of US policy with respect to Palestine. They see our policy as oscillating between one based upon considerations of our own long-term interests in the Near and Middle East and a policy deriving its force from the requirements of the domestic political situation. Thus these delegations feel it unwise to commit themselves to support us lest we should suddenly commit an about-face, leaving them in an untenable position.

Obviously, an ideal US policy on Palestine would seek to reconcile our long-term Near East interests, which may best be defined as keeping that area out of the Russian grasp, with domestic political considerations, namely the necessity for the administration not unduly to antagonize the Jewish minority in the US. In seeking to find such a policy, we thus far seem to have succeeded only in antagonizing both Arabs and Jews, creating mistrust for our consistency in the minds of thinking European nations, and in placing ourselves, only eleven days prior to the scheduled ending of the British mandate, in a position where we have no tenable solution to offer.

The advantages of a partition scheme for Palestine, recommended by the General Assembly on November 29, 1947 are various. If it could have been carried out by peaceful means, that is, had it been acceptable to both Arabs and Jews, it would have offered a relative permanent solution to the problem. Furthermore, it is in consonance with domestic political requirements, and has the added advantage of meeting the humanitarian feelings of those persons who have been concerned with the sorry plight of disseminated Jewry. However, partition, as it was developed last November, seems most unlikely to be acceptable to the Arab League and hence cannot be regarded as promoting the stabilization of the Near East.

¹ Adviser to the United States Delegation at the Second Special Session of the General Assembly; regularly attached to the Office of European Affairs.

Similarly, the establishment of a unitary state in Palestine, even on a cantonal basis, would meet with adamant refusal of the Jews to cooperate. Its advantages include the fact that it is acceptable to Arabs and in general would promote US objectives in the Near East.

The third solution up to yesterday promoted by the US delegation at the Special General Assembly, was that of a temporary trusteeship. That solution was not only absolutely unacceptable to the Jews but is basically contrary to the aspirations of the Arabs. Furthermore, it could not even be regarded as a solution, since it would merely postpone the day of reckoning. In any event, as yesterday's events seem clearly to have shown, trusteeship, as a concept, has met with little active support on the part of other delegations, including many wholly friendly to American objectives in general.

The British proposal put forward in a speech yesterday by Creech Jones was little more than a vague call for a "neutral administration", designed to hold the fort in Palestine. It is difficult to appraise it since it is couched in such vague terms as to hardly be a proposal at all. Whether it is intended to provide for administration by the UK, the US and France, the remaining allied and associated powers, it is not yet clear. If it is, and France and the UK are preparing to join with the US in sending armed forces to Palestine, it may offer a way out. On the other hand, such a regime would suffer from the disadvantage of being outside the UNO system, and its implementation undoubtedly could be accomplished only with a certain amount of bloodshed. In general, it is hard to see wherein such a regime would offer any material advantages over the trusteeship proposal already in effect rejected.

There is one further possibility of a Palestine solution which, I understand, already has been considered and, for reasons with which I am not familiar, rejected by the Department. That proposal in effect calls for the annexation by the Kingdom of Trans-Jordan of that part of Palestine which the November 29 scheme had intended to be a separate Arab state. Its most obvious advantages would seem to be (1) that it would be acceptable to the Jews, (2) that it probably would be acceptable to King Abdullah, (3) that it is not basically incompatible with the November 29 recommendation, (4) that it offers a relatively permanent solution, (5) that it would create a viable Arab state in the enlarged Trans-Jordan thereby achieving the objectives of the economic union proposal of November 29, (6) that it would effectively eliminate the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem and his followers, and, most important, *it would face up to the inescapable fact that a Zionist State already is in being in Palestine.*

A primary objection to this proposal is that it would tend to break up the Arab League, presumably aligning the Hashemites against the other members. In this regard it is believed that the Arab League

essentially is held together only by the Palestine issue and that it would tend to break up in any event. Should Abdullah, supported by Iraq, accept this compromise solution, it seems highly unlikely that warfare would develop since the remaining Arab states do not possess armed forces comparable either to the Arab Legion, or Haganah. I understand that relations between the Jewish Agency and King Abdullah have always been good and thus a solution agreeable to both would be likely to promote a stabilized situation in the Near East.

It may be argued that the accomplishment of such a compromise solution would create increased hostility towards the U.S. on the part of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria and The Lebanon. Whether such hostility would be lasting is open to question, firstly, because the regimes in those countries seem largely to be dominated by conservative elements not at all certain to remain indefinitely in power, and secondly, because Moslem aspirations could be at least partially satisfied through the incorporation of Arab-Palestine into Trans-Jordan.

Undoubtedly there would be charges of power politics levelled at the United States. However, these can be expected for almost any solution arrived at and in any event would come mainly from the Soviet bloc.

How to accomplish such a compromise solution, assuming it is considered desirable, clearly is a question of major importance. Whereas the US, before the calling of the present Special General Assembly on Palestine, might have espoused such a solution openly, our best tactics at the moment would seem to be to remain in the background. I understand from Rabbi Silver that in all probability such an arrangement could be made directly between the Jewish Agency and Abdullah. If that is the case, the US would have two principal immediate tasks, (1) to make plain to both parties, in confidence, that we favor such a solution and (2) to make certain of British concurrence. Assuming agreement is reached between Abdullah and the Jewish Agency, and the British are agreeable, Trans-Jordan forces would on May 16 occupy that part of Palestine set aside by the November 29 resolution as an Arab state. A proposal could then be introduced into the General Assembly calling for approval of a plebiscite in the Arab section of Palestine on the question of union with Trans-Jordan. That plebiscite might be supervised by the UN and presumably would result in a victory for Trans-Jordan, since the alternative, a separate Arab state, presumably would have little appeal to Arab nationalists. An additional consideration in this regard is the fact that Trans-Jordan was part of the original Palestine mandate and thus there is a natural bond between the Arabs in Trans-Jordan and those remaining in the present Palestine.

To make this solution more attractive to the Arabs and at the same time more lasting, it is suggested that an exchange of population

between Trans-Jordan and the Zionist state should take place, using as a precedent the similar exchange between Greece and Turkey which followed World War I. Obviously this would consist in the main of the movement of Arabs to Trans-Jordan, and generous financial assistance would have to be provided to resettle them there. In addition UNO or the US alone might offer economic inducements such as a Jordan Valley Authority and other long-range and large-scale projects designed to increase the amount of arable land available for settlement. With these additional measures it should be possible to create two ethnically separate states which would have their origin in agreement between the two groups.

There remains the problem of Jerusalem, which might be solved in either of two ways. Preferably this city might be made a condominium of Trans-Jordan and the Zionist state. However, if no agreement could be reached on this point, it would still be possible to establish it as a permanent UNO trusteeship.

It appears to the writer that in the context of present conditions and the short remaining time, the proposal outlined at length above is the only one now capable of settling the Palestine question and at the same time preventing the Soviets from exploiting the present inflamed situation to their advantage. No doubt it will meet with numerous objections, particularly on the part of those in the Department concerned with Near Eastern matters, but it is also true that any solution thus far advanced has serious shortcomings. Unlike these others, the present proposal, if it can be accomplished expeditiously, would effectively keep the Soviet Union out of this vital area, while being satisfactory to Zionists and relatively so to the Arabs.

JOHN E. HORNER

501.BB Palestine/5-548

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] May 4, 1948.

Participants: S—The Secretary
 Dr. Judah Magnes
 UNA—Mr. Robert McClintock

I received Dr. Magnes, the President of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, at his request at 2:30 this afternoon. We exchanged complimentary remarks on Sir John Dill, who at one period of his career had been High Commissioner in Palestine and for whose character, charm and integrity we both had the highest regard.

I told Dr. Magnes that the essence of the problem in Palestine was

¹ Drafted by Mr. McClintock; initialed by the Secretary of State.

the absence of trust between the parties at issue. Neither side would believe the other and this, coupled with the fact that the problem was overlaid by side issues and affected by politics, made the matter one of immense difficulty. I said that on the military side I could clearly foresee what was going to happen. The Jews had won the first round and were encouraged by their successes. At this point Dr. Magnes said that time was on the side of the Arabs. The Jews were short on time. They sought to strike quickly, without realizing that the Arabs could afford to wait and would eventually overwhelm them.

Dr. Magnes said that the first of the points he desired to make was that great pressure could be brought to bear on both Arabs and Jews if the United States would impose even partial financial sanctions. He pointed out that the Jewish community in Palestine is an artificial development and that, although the work of the Jews had resulted in many beautiful accomplishments such as farms, universities, and hospitals, which resulted from contributions from the United States, the money now contributed to the Jewish community was being used solely for war "which eats up everything." Dr. Magnes said that the Hagannah costs \$4 million a month to run. He was certain that, if contributions from the United States were cut off, the Jewish war machine in Palestine would come to a halt for lack of financial fuel.

On the Arab side Dr. Magnes said that Syria was in very shaky financial straits, and that the situation in Iraq was also precarious. I asked him if his proposed embargo would apply to all financial relations with Palestine and the Arab States, or only to contributions. He said that at this juncture he thought it should refer to the latter and not to ordinary commercial transactions.

Speaking of the truce, Dr. Magnes greatly doubted that a truce could be worked out by the United Nations, operating some six or seven thousand miles distant from the scene. He thought a real truce could only be developed on the spot in Palestine. As for the nature of a truce, there were two possible alternatives. There could be a voluntary truce, which Dr. Magnes thought was now almost out of the question, or an imposed truce, which would call for the use of force. It seemed from the debates at Lake Success that no country was willing to take up the American offer to send troops to implement a trusteeship provided other governments did likewise. Accordingly, the prospects for an imposed truce—unless this could be accomplished by financial sanctions—did not seem bright.

Dr. Magnes then turned to the problem of Jerusalem. He said he had lived in Jerusalem for 25 years. He knew its people, both Arabs and Jews, perhaps as well as any living man. He assured me with great conviction and intensity that the populace of Jerusalem—Arab and Jew alike—is heartily sick of the situation in which they find themselves and that their burning desire is peace.

Dr. Magnes said that if the United Nations could send some man of integrity and character to Jerusalem, preferably a man from a religious call of life, he thought that the populace of Jerusalem would gather behind such a leader to provide a regime of peace for the Holy City. He said that there were both Arab and Jewish municipal councils and that there were separate Arab and Jewish police forces, each numbering 300 men. It would be necessary for the United Nations Commissioner to do something immediately to enable the populace to restore certain public services, particularly the water supply. However, Dr. Magnes was certain of success if such a United Nations Representative of the proper qualifications were sent. In response to a question he said that there was always the danger of physical violence, since the young Jewish zealots believed fanatically in their cause and were truly idealistic in the thought that they had a mission to restore the land of the Jews to its people. However, a small bodyguard—and Dr. Magnes said it was beyond his province to estimate its number—would suffice to ensure the physical safety of the United Nations Representative.

When asked if Dr. Magnes had any names in mind for the Jerusalem post, he said that he thought either Dr. Bromley Oxnam, a prominent Methodist divine who was formerly President of the Federal Council of Churches, or the present President of that organization, Mr. Charles Taft, of Cincinnati, would be ideally qualified for the task.

On the broader question of sending a United Nations Representative to establish a truce for all of Palestine, Dr. Magnes thought that this man should have perhaps other qualifications. He should be a man of action and capable of rapid decisions. He thought someone like Lord Louis Mountbatten would be the type of man for this task. I remarked that I thought Lord Mountbatten would probably not be available, as he had about reached the limit of his endurance after a variety of difficult tasks, and we agreed that his British nationality would probably militate against him for such a post. After discussion of several other possibilities, McClintock mentioned the name of Lt. General Mark Clark, with the comment that he now had little to do after having accomplished some very impressive jobs, and that the fact that he was half Jewish might in this particular situation be useful. Dr. Magnes said that he had not known that General Clark was half Jewish and this fact alone indicated that General Clark could not be regarded as pro-Zionist. I said that the suggestion had considerable interest.

Dr. Magnes stressed his belief that, even if fighting had broken out in Palestine between Arabs and Jews, the United Nations should still send representatives to Jerusalem and all of Palestine. He cited the

example of Indonesia where, although hostilities were in progress, the United Nations Consular Commission, succeeded by the Good Offices Committee, had succeeded in securing observance of a cease-fire order and principles of agreement.

Dr. Magnes said he would be frank in remarking that he thought American spokesmen at Lake Success had been too apologetic in putting forward our trusteeship proposals. He said there was no solution for the Palestine problem outside of trusteeship at the present time. Trusteeship could take a variety of forms. It could be made up of states, as in the federal union, or it could consist of cantons or provinces inhabited by Jews and Arabs separately. He said that our phrase that the temporary trusteeship should be without prejudice to the eventual settlement, should be amended to read "without prejudice to that settlement which will be worked out by the Arabs and Jews". He said he was absolutely certain that there could be no settlement of the Palestine problem unless the Arabs and Jews sat down to work out their own solution.

As for the government of the trusteeship, Dr. Magnes felt that the British had made a mistake in their government of the Palestine mandate. In none of the important offices of government were there any Arabs or Jews in posts of responsibility. The British had implanted a foreign regime on the people of Palestine. If the United Nations should implant a regime which was made up of the populace, drawing equally on Arabs and Jews, the trusteeship might develop into a more lasting settlement.

I told Dr. Magnes that this was the most straightforward account on Palestine I had heard, and asked him if he had an appointment to see the President. He replied that he had not but very much hoped it would be possible to call at the White House. I asked McClintock to make arrangements for Dr. Magnes to see the President.

As Dr. Magnes was leaving, he asked permission to direct a very blunt question: "Do you think there is any chance to impose a solution on Palestine?". I replied that imposition of a regime implied the use of force. It was clear as daylight that other governments were eager to sidestep and leave Uncle Sam in the middle. I did not think it was wise for the United States alone to take the responsibility for military commitments in Palestine but I would be glad to give this matter further thought.²

² A memorandum of May 5 by McClintock to Carter indicated that the ribbon copy of this memorandum of conversation, marked "Preliminary Draft", was sent to Clifford for the President's information prior to his meeting with Magnes that morning. (501.BB Palestine/5-548. The ribbon copy is in the Truman Papers, President's Secretary's File.)

Magnes' account of his meeting with the President, as subsequently related to McClintock, is contained in a memorandum by McClintock to Secretary Marshall, May 5 (501.BB Palestine/5-548).

501.BB Palestine/5-448: Telegram

*The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)
to the Secretary of State*

SECRET PRIORITY

NEW YORK, May 4, 1948—2:50 p. m.

568. For Rusk. Supplementing phone conversations, we feel strongly prompt initiative should be taken in first committee to suspend November 29 resolution and to support SC truce terms. Urgently request authorization to introduce resolutions along following lines:

Suspension of November 29 resolution:

"The first committee:

In accordance with the resolution of the GA of 19 April 1948 referring to the first committee for consideration and report 'further consideration of the question of the future government of Palestine'; Recommends to the GA the adoption of the following resolution:

The GA:

Recognizing:

That in view of the actual situation in Palestine the plan of partition with economic union as set forth in its resolution No. 181 (11) of 29 November 1947 cannot be put into effect on 15 May 1948;

Resolves:

To suspend, as of this date, the recommendations to the UK as the mandatory power of Palestine and to all other members of the UN, the requests to the SC, the responsibilities imposed upon the TC and upon the UN Palestine Commission, the call addressed to the inhabitants of Palestine, the appeals to all governments and peoples, and the authorizations to the SYG, as set forth in its resolution of 29 November 1947."

Support of SC truce terms:

"The GA:

Taking account of the resolutions adopted by the SC with reference to Palestine on March 1, April 1, April 17 and April 23, 1948, and

Taking particular note of the SC's resolution of 17 April 1948, which set forth the specific terms of a truce for Palestine;

Appeals to all persons and organizations in Palestine and especially the AHC and the JA, and to all governments and particularly those of the countries neighboring Palestine, to comply with the resolution of the SC of 17 April, 1948."¹

AUSTIN

¹ In a memorandum for the files, dated May 6, Mr. McClintock stated in part: "On receipt of telegram 568, May 4, from USUN, suggesting that the Department authorize the introduction of a resolution by the United States Delegation to suspend the November 29 resolution on the partition of Palestine, Mr. Lovett directed that no such action be taken.

"Following consultation with Mr. Rusk, I telephoned Mr. Ross in New York City and at 6 p. m., May 4, said that the Department could not give approval to the suggested draft resolution. I stressed that our principal effort at the moment should be on the truce and cease-fire. One of the articles of the proposed truce did, in fact, include provision for suspending the effect of the resolution of November 29, 1947, for the duration of the truce." (501.BB Palestine/5-648)

Editorial Note

The Clifford Papers contain several pages of penciled notes in the handwriting of Mr. Clifford, dated May 4, 1948. Some of these notes deal with the question of American recognition of the anticipated Jewish state and read as follows:

- "1. Recognition is consistent with U.S. policy from the beginning.
- "2. A separate Jewish state is inevitable. It will be set up shortly.
- "3. As far as Russia is concerned we would do better to indicate recognition.
- "4. We must recognize inevitably. Why not now.
- "5. State Dept. resolution doesn't stop partition."

For other penciled notes of Mr. Clifford, dated May 4, 1948, see the editorial note on page 744.

867N.01/5-548

The British Ambassador (Inverchapel) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET IMMEDIATE
G96/80/48

WASHINGTON, 5th May, 1948.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY: When we met on the evening of the 3rd May ¹ you expressed to me the very strong hope that Mr. Bevin would accept the emergency proposals to secure a truce in Palestine which were put to both Jews and Arabs on that day by the United States Delegation to the United Nations. In particular, you hoped that Mr. Bevin would agree to the extension of the Mandate for ten days.

I informed Mr. Bevin immediately of what you had said. As you will no doubt already have heard from Mr. Douglas, Mr. Bevin, while viewing these efforts with all sympathy, feels unable to depart from the date already set for the termination of the Mandate. He has asked me to explain to you the cogent reasons which have impelled His Majesty's Government to take this decision.

If His Majesty's Government were to agree to an extension of the Mandate even for a short period, they would be accused by the whole world of double-dealing and the fact of their having sent reinforcements to Palestine would be held as evidence that they never intended to keep to the date of the 15th May. Moreover, if the Jews and Arabs knew that His Majesty's Government were to be responsible for another ten days, they would no doubt seek to spin out the talks for the extra period and matters would be no further advanced. In Mr. Bevin's view, it is only by confronting both sides with a definite deadline that even the present willingness to negotiate has been achieved. If the date

¹ The editors have been unable to find a memorandum covering this conversation in the Department of State files.

were now to be changed (and this is in any event precluded by the recent Palestine Act passed by Parliament in the United Kingdom, that advantage would be altogether lost.

A telegram from the High Commissioner at Jerusalem indicates that, in addition to the possibility that the retention of British troops in Jerusalem might prejudice the efforts for a truce now being made there by the International Red Cross on the basis of the withdrawal of all troops by the end of the Mandate, considerable difficulties from the military point of view would also attend an extension of the Mandate. In the first place, communications with Jerusalem are daily becoming more difficult and the roads are mined. Secondly, the troops in Jerusalem, being entirely dependent upon oil, are only just able to maintain themselves until the 15th May as the railway is out of action and military oil tankers have left the country. Thirdly, a later departure would raise serious administrative problems, including the deferment of the release of troops. Fourthly, the army would be faced with a serious refugee problem with which they would be unable to cope.

In all these circumstances Mr. Bevin feels compelled to maintain the position he has taken, as defined in his speech to the House of Commons on the 4th May, a copy of the relevant portion of which I enclose.² But if His Majesty's Government were asked by the United Nations and by both Arabs and Jews to provide local security for premises in Haifa, for example, in which the negotiations could be continued after the 15th May, His Majesty's Government would be quite prepared to consider it, since they do not want to impede last-minute efforts to secure peace in Palestine by whatever means.

The difficulties which I have outlined are, in Mr. Bevin's view, very real, and I should like to emphasise that they are in no way enumerated with a view to discouraging the efforts which the United States Government is making to secure a truce. On the contrary His Majesty's Government wish these efforts every success.

Yours sincerely,

INVERCHAPEL

² Not printed.

IO Files : US/S/500 or US/A/C.1/689

Memorandum by the Deputy United States Representative on the Security Council (Jessup) to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

CONFIDENTIAL

[NEW YORK,] May 5, 1948.

In considering the problems which may arise in the Security Council, particularly if Chapter 7¹ action seems to be indicated as the Palestine

¹ This Chapter dealt with action concerning threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression.

situation develops, I believe that certain basic legal points are in need of clarification. Our position book on Palestine under Tab 4 c. includes a memorandum on the legal status of Palestine.² This opinion was written before some aspects of the problem developed and does not seem to me to give conclusive answers at this time.

The basic question is the status of Palestine after May 15. Under this head perhaps the first question is our position concerning the right of the United Kingdom to terminate the Mandate in the absence of previous agreement with the United Nations. In the position paper at page 13, it is said: "If the General Assembly should repeal its recommendation [of November 29] ³ before May 15, 1948, Great Britain would be obligated to continue the Mandate until another solution could be found and carried out". It is not clear to me whether we intend to hold the United Kingdom to this view in case the resolution of November 29 is merely suspended, or in case it is negatived by the force of events without formal General Assembly action for repeal or suspension.

If we take the position that the Mandate is not terminated on May 15, we must assert that the United Kingdom continues to have full responsibility and that the question of Jewish armed activities or the entry of the armies of the Arab states is primarily a problem for Great Britain. Such military activities could be considered by Great Britain as a revolt against its authority, or, if countenanced or invited by Great Britain, they might be considered legalized.

Another possible position in line with a general previous view of the United States would be that the Mandate is terminated as of May 15, and that the United States, France, and the United Kingdom succeed the Mandate as the principal allied and associated powers. If we take this view, we would share jointly with the other two powers the responsibility for law and order in Palestine and the military activities of Jews and Arabs would involve the question of the authorization of acquiescence of the three powers.

Under either of the above hypotheses there would be no legally delimited Jewish state or Arab state and the movement of armed forces in any area in Palestine could be considered a question of civil rebellion against the constituted authority (namely the United Kingdom, or the United Kingdom jointly with France and the United States). It seems clear that in considering the "invasion" of Arab armies, under either of the above hypotheses, it would not be the Jewish Agency which could raise the question, but only the single or triple legal authority.

A third possible hypothesis would be that the United Kingdom can legally terminate the Mandate, and that the United States and France

² Mr. Gross' memorandum of March 19 to Mr. Rusk, p. 747.

³ Brackets appear in the source text.

by renunciation or acquiescence surrender their rights as principal allied and associated powers. In general, the discussions in the First Committee have proceeded along these lines and have reached the conclusion that the resulting situation would be a vacuum. It is on this basis that it has been argued that the United Nations must assume the authority as of May 15. If the United Nations is the legal authority in Palestine on May 15, then any anticipated military action would be action against the United Nations itself.

A fourth possible hypothesis, which I believe the United States is not prepared to accept, is that by virtue of the November 29 resolution it would be legally permissible for the Jews and the Arabs to proclaim their states in that area.

Involved in the above situations is the question of the recognition of a proclaimed Jewish state or of a proclaimed Palestinian state. If we are prepared to take the position that either the United Kingdom or the principal allied and associated powers constitute the legal authority in Palestine as of May 15, it would be a violation of international law for other states to recognize these newly proclaimed states until the lawful authorities had clearly reached the point of being unable any longer to assert their authority over them, in other words, until they had actually achieved their independence by force of arms without any prospect that the lawful authorities could reassert their authority.

If we follow the theory that a legal vacuum is created on May 15 and if Jewish and Palestinian states are proclaimed, even before these proclaimed states are recognized they might give color of legal authority to any outside forces which came in at their request.

So far as the instructions which we have received are concerned, I do not find that we have clear answers to these problems. I think it may be difficult to map a consistent course of action in the Security Council until our position on these points is clear. In a recent conversation with Mr. Parodi, I gathered that he, as President of the Security Council, is also worried about the answers to these problems.

USUN Files

Memorandum by Mr. Charles P. Noyes¹ to the Deputy United States Representative on the Security Council (Jessup)

SECRET

[NEW YORK,] May 5, 1948.

I agree with the conclusion in your memorandum of May 5 that it is important if not urgent for us to have a clear legal position as to the status of Palestine on May 15 under the various possible sets of

¹ Adviser on Security Council and General Assembly Affairs at the United States Mission at the United Nations.

circumstances which may exist. I also agree that the Department's legal memorandum solves few if any of these problems.

It seems to me that it is helpful to consider our legal difficulties from the practical point of view. Whatever the technical legal position may be, it seems to me clearly impractical for us to attempt to base our policy after May 15 upon the legal position that the United Kingdom has no right to, and therefore has not laid down its mandate. Insistence on this position would bring us into direct contradiction with the British, with all supporters of partition, including the Jews, and probably with a number of other States who sympathize with the British. In fact I doubt whether we would receive any substantial support for our position. In practical terms, the British will have gotten out; will cease to exercise any control; and those who disagree with our legal position, particularly pro-partitioners, will act on the basis of their own theory, namely, that the Jews have a right to set up a State of their own. I can see no practical advantage whatever, and grave disadvantages, in attempting to assert this legal position, whatever its inherent merits.

It seems to me that it would be even less practicable and wise for us to stand on the legal position that when the mandate is terminated the United States, France and the United Kingdom succeed to the sovereignty. It is certainly late in the day for us to attempt to put this legal principle forward. We probably waived it in agreeing to the partition decision last fall. We shall certainly face a refusal by the British to agree to this and probably also a refusal by the French. Again, all the pro-partitioners, including the Jews, will oppose it vigorously. And finally, it seems to me, very doubtful that the United States should attempt to assume responsibility for events in Palestine which the acceptance by the Assembly of such a legal theory would entail. In any case, in my view we would stand no chance whatever of having our position accepted and, in my opinion, the advantages, if any, of taking this position are far outweighed by the disadvantages, regardless of the inherent correctness of the legal position.

The third and fourth hypotheses you mention, it seems to me, are based on the same legal principle, namely, that when Britain declares the mandate terminated, Palestine becomes an independent country in the same way that Iraq, Syria, Trans-Jordan, etc., have done. Of course if a trusteeship is approved, the country would not become independent. This outcome does not now seem to be likely.

It seems to me that whatever the legal merits may be, the United States will, because of the practical necessities of the case, acquiesce in the legal principle that Palestine becomes independent on May 15. I would assume that whatever arrangements the General Assembly may make for a truce, or for any other provisional regime along the lines of the British suggestion, the legal position would be the same, namely,

Palestine would be an independent country.² Sovereignty would therefore lie with the people. It will therefore be legally permissible on the 15th or 16th for the Jews to declare a Jewish state in their area and for the Arabs to declare an Arab State over the whole of Palestine. It seems that it is certain this will be done unless a truce along the lines of the Security Council truce is worked out. Most of the legal problems that will arise after the 15th will depend upon the question of recognition by the members of the United Nations of these two States. It may be assumed that all the Arab States, including some of the other Moslem countries at least, will immediately recognize a Palestinian Government over the whole of Palestine. It may also be confidently assumed that the Russian group plus some South American States and possibly other strong pro-partitioners will immediately recognize a Jewish State. It is likely that these two groups will then proceed to make arrangements for economic and military support for the State which they have recognized.

If this analysis of what will happen is substantially correct, supporters of both sides in the Security Council and the General Assembly will attempt to justify what they are doing from the legal point of view by reference to the fact that they are dealing with the recognized government of part or all of Palestine and that any military or other action which they may be taking is at the request of that Government and therefore is not in any sense an act of aggression or otherwise a violation of the Charter. Until there is some determinative decision as to which side is correct, both are in the position of acting under color of legal arrangements. It may well be that neither the Security Council nor the General Assembly will be in a position to muster sufficient supporters for any determinative decision on this question, or any other resolution directed at either side in the dispute. For example, the Russians in the Security Council would almost certainly veto any proposal which is directed against the Jews or which would prevent the Russians from having free access to the Jewish State either for men or munitions. On the other hand it is not likely that the Council would be able to get seven votes for a resolution directed against the Arabs in view of the position taken by the Syrians, Colombians, Argentinians and Chinese. Similarly, it may be that neither side could obtain a two-thirds vote in the General Assembly against the other. The legal problem hence becomes merged in a political problem. It seems highly unlikely in this kind of a situation that the legal question ever would be determined by the International Court. It will probably in the end be determined by political considerations, and the test may be the number of United Nations which eventually recognize the Jewish State or a single Arab State.

² Marginal notation : "or countries".

If the United States decides to acquiesce in the legal principle that Palestine will at the termination of the mandate become independent, it seems to me of urgent importance that it should determine what its policy will be with regard to the recognition of a single State or two States. Even if all of the present efforts to find agreement between the parties are successful, we shall probably have to face that policy decision.

Editorial Note

Mr. Beeley, of the British Delegation at the United Nations on the morning of May 5, submitted to the United States Delegation a draft resolution proposing a provisional regime for Palestine. The draft was based on the assumption that truce efforts would not be successful, except for Jerusalem. It called for creation of a United Nations commission, with headquarters at Jerusalem, to be at the disposal of the Arabs and Jews for the purposes of controlling the administration of those central services entrusted to it by the two communities, serving as liaison between them in matters of common interest and mediating between them in order to arrive at an agreed decision on the future government of Palestine (telegram 577, May 5, 3:30 p. m. from New York, 501.BB Palestine/5-548).

501.BB Palestine/5-548 : Telegram

Mr. John C. Ross to the Secretary of State

NEW YORK, May 5, 1948—2:30 a. m.

574. Text follows of "Report to the General Assembly" adopted by the Trusteeship Council¹ early today:

I. Summary of Proceedings:

1. The Trusteeship Council, in pursuance of the request of the General Assembly of 26 April to study and report on suitable measures for the protection of Jerusalem and its inhabitants, considered a French suggestion to send immediately to Jerusalem a United Nations official with powers to recruit, organize, and maintain an international force of 1,000 police.

¹ The telegram was undoubtedly drafted on the evening of May 4. The Trusteeship Council began its discussions on the protection of Jerusalem on April 27, concluding them on May 4 after ten sessions. A summary record of these discussions is printed in United Nations, *Trusteeship Council, Official Records, Second Session, Third Part*, pp. 10-133, *passim*. The Committee adopted its report on May 4 by nine votes to none, with two abstentions (*ibid.*, p. 133). For the full text of this report, see *ibid.*, *Annex*, p. 1.

2. The Council also considered a United States proposal for placing Jerusalem under temporary trusteeship with provision for the maintenance of law and order.

3. The Council gave consideration to each of these proposals, in consultation with representatives of the two interested parties and with the mandatory power. The Council found it impossible to secure mutual agreement of the interested parties to either proposal.

4. The representative of the Arab Higher Committee declared that his people were opposed to the introduction of any foreign police or troops into Jerusalem or the placing of Jerusalem under trusteeship. The representative of the Jewish Agency declared that any arrangement proposed should also guarantee free access to Jerusalem and the maintenance of food and water supplies. The Jewish Agency did not consider trusteeship as a suitable form for an international regime in Jerusalem. The representative of the United Kingdom said that, since the trusteeship proposal as submitted by the representative of the United States was not acceptable to both Arabs and Jews, he would have to abstain from acting in favor of the proposal.

5. The representatives of Australia and of the Jewish Agency considered that the proper course was to adopt the draft statute for Jerusalem and as an emergency measure bring into force such portions of it as were applicable in the circumstances. This was not acceptable to the Arab Higher Committee for the reason that this would amount to a total or partial implementation of the partition plan, and the Council did not pursue this question.

6. At its forty-fourth meeting on 3 May, the Council was informed by the representative of the mandatory power that provision for carrying on the minimum necessary administrative services in Jerusalem after 15 May might be made through the appointment by the High Commissioner of a neutral person, acceptable to both Arabs and Jews, as Special Municipal Commissioner and that he was advised that existing legislation would retain its effect after the mandate expires. Some members of the Council felt that the task of maintaining law and order in Jerusalem should also be entrusted to the Special Municipal Commissioner, but the representative of the United Kingdom explained that the Jerusalem Municipal Commission Ordinance did not give the Municipal Commissioner any power to maintain law and order in Jerusalem, and that therefore the Special Municipal Commissioner would not have any such powers.

Having regard to this and as the representative of the Arab Higher Committee objected on political grounds to any suggestion that the Special Municipal Commissioner should be entrusted with the function of maintaining law and order, the suggestion that he might undertake

this function in addition to his ordinary municipal duties was abandoned.

7. The question of the relationship of the Special Municipal Commissioner to the United Nations was raised; for example it was suggested that he be nominated by the United Nations. No agreement, however, was reached with the representative of the Arab Higher Committee on this question.

8. The Trusteeship Council, while welcoming the information presented by the representative of the mandatory power, noted that the suggestion for the appointment of a special Municipal Commissioner did not provide for the maintenance of law and order.

9. The Trusteeship Council gave its attention continuously to bringing about a truce in the entire municipal area of Jerusalem as a necessary preliminary step.

II. *Conclusions and Recommendations:*

1. Following consultations with the Trusteeship Council, the Arab Higher Committee and the Jewish Agency for Palestine ordered on 2 May 1948 within the walled city of Jerusalem a cease-fire which is now in effect. The two parties have further agreed that the specific terms of a truce in respect of the walled city will be elaborated in Jerusalem in consultation with the High Commissioner for Palestine.

2. The Trusteeship Council also brings to the notice of the General Assembly the undertakings given by the representatives of the Arab Higher Committee and the Jewish Agency for Palestine that their communities will respect and safeguard all holy places.

3. The Trusteeship Council has been informed that the mandatory power would be willing, if the General Assembly agrees, to appoint under Palestine legislation before 15 May 1948, a neutral acceptable to both Arabs and Jews, as Special Municipal Commissioner who shall, with the cooperation of the community committees already existing in Jerusalem, carry out the functions hitherto performed by the Municipal Commission. The Trusteeship Council recommends to the General Assembly that it inform the mandatory power of its full agreement with such measure.

4. The Council recognizes that the measure hereabove recommended does not provide adequately for the protection of the city and of its inhabitants. It considers also that urgent attention should be given by the General Assembly to the necessity of providing for the custody of the assets of the Government of Palestine in Jerusalem and for an effective maintenance of law and order in the municipal area pending a final settlement.

501.BB Palestine/5-548 : Circular telegram

*The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices*¹

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 5, 1948—7 a. m.

Deptel 1586 May 3 to London. Following are possible terms of truce informally developed during past few weeks by USUN which might serve as basis for agreement between JA and AHC. This truce proposal should not be confused with basis for ten day cease fire proposal.

[Here follow the 11 articles of the draft truce terms; for the text of the proposed articles of truce as approved by President Truman on May 7, see the circular telegram of that date, page 927.]

MARSHALL

¹ Sent to the diplomatic representatives in Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, and Jidda.

501.BB Palestine/5-548 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 5, 1948—7 p. m.

1618. Deptel 1586 May 3. For Douglas. Following telephone conversation between Dept and AmEmbassy Cairo May 3 Ambassador Tuck sent Secretary Ireland to Damascus by plane to ascertain Arab views regarding informal truce arrangements which have been developing at NY and regarding ten day cease fire.

In subsequent telephone conversation May 5 between Dept and AmEmbassy Cairo Ambassador Tuck and Secretary Ireland (latter having just arrived in Cairo from Damascus by plane) stated Ireland had talked yesterday and today with Azzam Pasha and other Arab leaders and had obtained impression that Arab League was deeply interested in cease fire proposal but that it was unwilling to accept unless convinced Brit would be prepared continue maintain their responsibilities Palestine until at least ten days after May 15. Azzam Pasha was not prepared at this time to admit Arab armies would refrain from invading Palestine even though Brit might remain. Ireland did not believe there was any truth in report that Arab League had decided to accept ten day cease fire proposal (as rumored in NY through Brit channels).

Azzam Pasha flatly refused to agree to any increase in Jewish immigration during the period of truce for Palestine in excess of 1500 monthly because Arabs had never agreed to any Jewish immigration (although they would accept 1500 monthly in maintenance of *status*

*quo*¹), and because Arabs could see no reason for Jewish insistence on increased immigration during the period of truce when unsettled conditions in Palestine prevailed (unless Jews desired precedent of Arab agreement to Jewish immigration or to use immigration for strengthening Jewish armed forces).

When Ireland asked Azzam Pasha if Arabs had considered grave responsibilities which they were assuming before world in invading Palestine at time when matter was before UN Azzam Pasha replied Arabs had given serious consideration to all consequences and had determined they could do no other than to send armed forces into Palestine. Ireland said every possible argument had been used to convince Azzam Pasha and other Arab leaders of necessity for arranging 10 day cease fire and truce.

Azzam Pasha stated Arab armies were poised ready for entry into Palestine and that if they should fail to enter on May 15 these forces might gradually disintegrate so that they would no longer be really effective at later date.

Ireland obtained impression from Azzam Pasha and other Arab leaders particularly former that failure of members of Arab League to invade Palestine by force in near future might lead to dissatisfaction and mutual recriminations among Arabs; that relatively moderate elements of Arab League including Azzam Pasha would be overthrown; and that unity of Arab League would be endangered. There was also apparently fear that some Arab governments might be overthrown as result rising passions among Arab populations.

Ireland said anger among Arabs had been heightened by reported action among certain Jews of violating Arab women. Such stories were particularly effective in view sensitive attitude of Arabs regarding their women.

Tuck promised endeavor communicate with Egyptian FO to obtain definite reply as to whether Arabs had agreed to 10 day cease fire proposal and to reach Chargé d'Affaires Damascus to ascertain latter's information.

Sent to London 1618, repeated Cairo 529, USUN New York 285, Jerusalem 364, Damascus 157, Baghdad 144, Beirut 214, Jidda 169.

MARSHALL

¹ In telegram 471, May 5, 9 p. m., Cairo clarified Azzam Pasha's views on the immigration question, namely that the "Arabs would not agree to rights of Jews to immigration. Never had done so and could not now begin. Would, however, accept existing conditions whereby 1,500 Jews per month were permitted, but would not agree to inclusion of any mention of immigration in truce." (501.BB Palestine/5-548)

*Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly on the Report of the Trusteeship Council*¹

187 (S-2). PROTECTION OF THE CITY OF JERUSALEM AND ITS INHABITANTS: APPOINTMENT OF A SPECIAL MUNICIPAL COMMISSIONER

The General Assembly,

Having asked the Trusteeship Council to study, with the Mandatory Power and the interested parties, suitable measures for the protection of the city of Jerusalem and its inhabitants and to submit within the shortest possible time proposals to the General Assembly to that effect,

Takes note of the conclusions and recommendations of the Trusteeship Council, as set forth in its report to the General Assembly on the protection of the city of Jerusalem and its inhabitants;

Approves these conclusions and recommendations;

Recommends that the Mandatory Power appoint under Palestine legislation, before 15 May 1948, a neutral acceptable to both Arabs and Jews, as Special Municipal Commissioner, who shall, with the co-operation of the community committees already existing in Jerusalem, carry out the functions hitherto performed by the Municipal Commission;²

Decides that continuing urgent attention should be given by the First Committee or its subsidiary bodies to the question of further measures for the protection of the city of Jerusalem and its inhabitants.

¹ Reprinted from GA (II/SS), *Resolutions*, p. 7. The resolution was adopted on May 6 by a vote of 35 to none, with 17 abstentions. For the record of Assembly discussions, see GA (II/SS), *Plenary*, pp. 10-27.

² Dr. José Arce, President of the General Assembly, and Secretary-General Lie notified Sir Alan Cunningham, High Commissioner for Palestine, by cable on May 13 that "after consultation with the Jewish Agency for Palestine and the Arab Higher Committee both parties have agreed to the appointment of Mr. Harold Evans, Philadelphia attorney and member Board American Friends Service Committee as Special Commissioner for Palestine". (United Nations press release PAL/165, May 13)

501.BB Palestine/5-648: Telegram

Mr. John C. Ross to the Secretary of State

SECRET

NEW YORK, May 6, 1948—8:50 a. m.

585. From Ross. [Here follows Mr. Ross' account of his conversation with Judge Proskauer.]

Shertok-Silver. I called on Shertok by appointment this afternoon;¹ when I arrived his office he said Silver had indicated desire sit in our discussion. We discussed truce about an hour, Shertok leading by saying principal objection to ten-day proposal was extension of man-

¹ Presumably on May 5.

date. This, they thought, would greatly impair their position re establishment Jewish state.

Silver said, however, they were prepared to accept immediate unconditional cease-fire for indefinite period if other side would accept. They had authority from JA Executive in Palestine for such action.

I asked what they meant by unconditional cease-fire. Silver replied it means what it says, explaining that Jews were not trying to shoot Arabs out of Arab state but Arabs were trying to do this to Jews. If Arabs will stop shooting, stop their aggression (in other words, stop interfering with establishment towards Jewish state), Jews will stop shooting. They would not attempt take new positions nor attack Arab communities, etc.

I inquired how recent affairs in Jaffa and Jerusalem squared with idea that only Arabs were aggressors. They replied with well-known line re protecting their people and positions, somewhat embarrassed, however, re Jaffa.

I brought up articles of truce, asked what were main difficulties. Silver took burden of reply to effect two principal difficulties: (1) postponement establishment Jewish state; (2) impairment their relative military position. I asked if these two points were considered more crucial than immigration.

Silver replied immigration secondary factor assuming, of course, reasonable compromise could be worked out along lines four, five, six thousand, with four thousand as rock bottom figure, and other two points he had mentioned definitely not difficult for JA. His remarks re immigration figures largely talking for effect but it was perfectly clear that present position is immigration distinctly secondary.

On question postponement establishment of state, Silver asked if this included also postponement of establishment provisional government in Jewish area.

I told him principal objective was to avoid political action establishment Jewish state May 15. Our idea was if truce could be arranged, local communities would carry on so far as possible own self-government. Here was big distinction in my mind between Jews governing themselves in their own areas and proclamation of sovereign state.

Silver then went on to say if they could establish provisional government they could forego establishment sovereign state provided there was guarantee that at end of truce period they could go ahead and establish their state.

I tried unsuccessfully to argue them out of this position, indicating that if I understood meaning word truce it meant standstill, while they were asking for a flat guarantee. We were dealing with three possible alternatives; first, on the one extreme would be renunciation for good and all of any claim to statehood. We were not asking them to accept this. Second, that the other extreme was guaranteed statehood whether

May 15 or later. We were trying to establish a condition which was midway between these two extremes which would not prejudice their position.

I went on to point out that in my view if truce were not established they ran a very serious risk of not being able to establish their state and moreover of losing a great deal of the gains they have made over the past years, and particularly since November 29, in developing their political institutions.

Silver and Shertok argued vigorously against this point of view, Silver holding forth at some length on attitude of US Government which he described as "hostile" government in which, in effect, they had no confidence at all. How could we ask them to accept a truce and pretend to be friendly in doing so if we were not prepared to support creation of Jewish state and defend it against external aggression.

[Here follows one paragraph regarding a document given to Mr. Ross by Rabbi Silver.]

After further discussion I told Silver I wanted to be as clear as possible as to position he had stated and developed re truce. As I understood it JA might be prepared postpone establishment of state as part of truce terms provided (1) they could establish their provisional government, and (2) that objective of truce would be establishment of Jewish state or alternatively (3) that US would guarantee to prevent aggression into Palestine from neighboring Arab states. Silver confirmed this but Shertok hedged and said that two and three were essential.

During course of conversation I asked whether their worry about postponement of proclamation of sovereign state derived from fear their legal position would be impaired if they did not do so upon termination of mandate. They replied in affirmative. In this connection Silver emphasized heavy reliance JA is placing on November 29 resolution as legal basis for its action.

At another point Shertok asked why we were worried about Jews going ahead with proclamation their state May 15. Were we worried, he inquired, lest Jews might seek recognition from left to right but more left than right? If this were the case, they could assure us that they had no intention of looking in that quarter and intended to move very slowly on question of recognition.

I replied that our motive in political standstill was to prevent Jews taking the one step which would call forth counter-steps from Arab side and plunge Palestine into war. We had no motive beyond this.

Silver inquired with some suspicion about Creech Jones' proposal for some neutral administrative regime.² Was this a device to keep the British in or was it simply trusteeship under another name?

² For the British proposal, see editorial note, p. 912.

I replied I could not speak for British but as I understood proposal it was simply taking recognition of fact that a number of central administrative services are essential to welfare of community as a whole and that it might facilitate agreement between Jews and Arabs to continue these minimum services. Silver indicated by implication that Jews could be cooperative in this regard with assistance of UN.

In discussion some of legal points, Shertok turned back clock considerably to effect that establishment of Jewish state in area contemplated by November 29 resolution was very much less than Jewish position called for, their original position being Jewish state for whole of Palestine. If on May 15 Arabs proclaim Arab state for whole of Palestine rather than for Arab position, Jews would then feel free to revert to original position and proclaim Jewish state for whole of Palestine.

Although results of this conversation rather gloomy and I feel Jewish position has hardened very considerably, on other hand I feel we have two elements we may be able to develop, namely, their willingness expressed for first time to my knowledge to forego proclamation of Jewish state May 15, and their statement re accepting an immediate unconditional cease-fire for indefinite period, despite in both cases impractical conditions attached.

Ross

501.BB Palestine/5-648 : Telegram

*The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)
to the Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET

NIACT

NEW YORK, May 6, 1948—2:15 p. m.

587. Eyes Alone For the Secretary and Lovett From Rusk. Dr. Goldmann came in this morning at his own request to discuss the truce. He said he was greatly disturbed by the present situation and considers the shortage of time makes immediate drastic action necessary. He said two questions were bothering the JA. First was how far the Jews could go short of declaring sovereignty in organizing their state. I told him that if there was to be any prospect of Arab agreement to a truce, the formula which refers to "existing Arab and Jewish authorities" was as far as we could go. I pointed out that in fact that would permit them to operate as a kind of provisional government within the Jewish community but that I believed any attempt to establish a formal provisional government claiming authority throughout the boundaries set out in the November 29 resolution would be bitterly resisted by the Arabs. His second point was one which has been recurring in recent talks with the Jews, namely, what assurances could the Jews have that a period of truce would not be followed by large-scale intervention by the Arab states. He pointed out that the Arab states could complete

their military preparations during the truce and that this would work a severe hardship on the Jews, an argument he had found it difficult to meet inside the Agency. I told him that no government would commit its armed forces in advance to a hypothetical situation of the sort he raised, nor could anyone give the Jews a blank check without reference to the future course of Jewish action. I pointed out that the Jews could not expect greater security than everyone else in the world has at the present time. I told him I would raise the possibility of a policy statement by the US to the effect that our policy, including our arms embargo, would be directed solidly in support of a truce and against those who violated it or attempted to take advantage of its provisions to create warfare in Palestine. He seemed to think some such statement would be most useful in meeting this particular Jewish anxiety.

On immigration, he inquired how much progress we had made with the Arabs. I told him there was still a wide gap and that my only suggestion was that both Arabs and Jews must realize that the gap was not worth a major war. To overcome this obstacle, we were suggesting that immigration for the period of the truce be left to the SC Truce Commission but that it be advised on this point by an immigration advisory board comprising representatives of three governments, one to be selected by each of the parties and the third by the two governments so named. He seemed to think that would be very acceptable from the Jewish point of view and was a good formula.

I then outlined to Dr. Goldmann my own personal views on what situation would confront the Jews on May 15 if there is not truce. I said that (1) both Jews and Arabs will declare sovereign state and both will probably obtain some recognition. Arabs would be expected to obtain more recognitions in short run because of support from Arab and Moslem states; (2) without a truce, no international action can succeed in assisting the Jews in Jerusalem and a considerable part of Jewish effort must be spent in securing this Jewish enclave; (3) Jews will face long war of attrition with Arabs, with Arabs employing guerrilla tactics which Jews will find it difficult to handle with small forces at their disposal; Arabs will probably not engage in the fixed battles between major forces which would give the Jews a chance to force an early decision; (4) November 29 resolution will undoubtedly be suspended by the special session or by the SC acting under Chapter VII if it becomes apparent that the resolution is an obstacle to a truce; (5) the SC can be expected to order a truce with sanctions against one or both sides if truce is not accepted. If SC is blocked by a veto, the US and other members of the Council may have to apply sanctions anyhow; (6) the JA will face increasingly difficult problems of control over its own extremists who will take advantage of the need for Jewish solidarity to impose increasingly extreme policies upon the JA. Present moderates among the Jews would be displaced during the

course of the fighting; (7) the probable course of events will identify Russian and Jewish interests in such a way as to create bitter hostility and anti-Semitism in the western world.

Goldmann stated that although my wording might be a little exaggerated, he agreed with the general analysis. Goldmann then said he had come to see me on a completely off-the-record basis to say that the time had now come in his opinion for the Secretary to intervene at once by calling in Shertok, and possibly Silver (but not Goldmann) and speak very bluntly to them along the lines of the points I had enumerated. Goldmann said that the moderates in New York had been temporarily outnumbered in discussing a truce.

[Here follow various personal observations by Mr. Goldmann.]

I asked him if he had any views on whether our intervention should be by the President or the Secretary. He said he was "thinking aloud" but his impression was that blunt talk was necessary and that the President might be moved by internal political considerations to add promises or qualifications which might not help in this situation. I then asked whether Washington was better than New York for such intervention. He said the place would make no difference. Commenting further, he did not know whether Dr. Silver should be included because he realized that Silver's presence might lead merely to "a big argument". On the other hand, Silver's group was the one which had to be convinced of our determination to pursue a truce policy in Palestine.

Goldmann asked that his visit and remarks to me be kept entirely secret.

We are trying to arrange a meeting this afternoon with Creech Jones, Parodi and Nisot to discuss a further draft of truce terms being sent Department by teletype. If these four governments conclude that the truce terms are fair and reasonable, we have the basis for SC action to order a truce under Chapter VII. Subject to the attitude of the other three, I recommend that the Secretary call Shertok and Silver to Washington on Friday and talk bluntly of our determination to bring about a truce. I believe such talks must be based, however, upon a policy decision by the President that (1) we are prepared to insist upon a truce along the lines of our latest Articles of truce with such changes as may be acceptable to Arabs and Jews, (2) that we are prepared to join with others in pressing action in the SC under Chapter VII to obtain such a truce, (3) that if SC action is frustrated by a veto, we are prepared to join with other UN members to support the truce by our own policies, (4) that we are prepared to support the sanctions envisaged in the Charter in support of a truce, (5) that we are prepared to support a suspension of the November 29 resolution in the special session of the GA, and (6) that we shall direct our policy, including our arms embargo policy, toward the support

of a truce and against those who violate it or seek to disturb the existing military situation by indirection of subterfuge.

The Arabs would probably accept Articles of truce with the exception of the immigration point. I recommend that we be equally firm with the Arabs that the rest of the world cannot permit hostilities to go on merely because of inability to reach agreement on immigration and that we believe that the SC Truce Commission, advised by a specially selected board of three governments, should decide this question during the truce.

Above is subject to further comments after meeting with British, French and Belgians this afternoon, but believe you should be considering policy questions raised.

AUSTIN

501.BB Palestine/5-648 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET URGENT NEW YORK, May 6, 1948—11:40 p. m.

596. From Ross. Jessup, Rusk, Kopper and I met with Parodi, Creech Jones and Nisot (Belgium) at 6 this afternoon for two hours on status of truce discussions and future procedure. We presented following paper as basis for discussion, making clear it was not even an informal proposal of US Government:

"Representatives of the US, as one of the three members of the SC Truce Commission for Palestine, have had a number of informal conversations in New York with representatives of the JA, the AHC and the Arab States in an effort to determine if a basis could be found for agreement between the parties on specific truce terms.

Draft 'articles of truce' have served as a basis for the conversations referred to. Copies of this draft have been given to the parties to these conversations. Copies have also been given to representatives of the Belgian and French Governments, as the other members of the Truce Commission, and of the UK Government, as the mandatory power. The representatives of these three governments have been kept informed of the progress of the conversations.

It must now be reported that a basis for agreement on truce terms has not been found.

It is very unlikely that the Arabs will acquiesce in a figure for Jewish immigration higher than the present quota of 1,500 a month under the mandate. Otherwise it is believed that the truce terms might be acceptable to the Arabs.

The Jews would expect a minimum immigration figure of 4,000 a month. There is evidence, however, indicating that immigration is a secondary factor in the JA's consideration of truce terms.

The principal Jewish objection to the truce terms is that it would be necessary for them to forego proclamation of a sovereign Jewish state on May 15.

The Jews also feel strongly that they would be put in an unfair position relative to the Arabs regarding the acquisition and importation of war materials.

The Jews might agree to forego proclamation of a sovereign state on May 15 provided (1) they were permitted under the truce terms to establish a provisional government for the Jewish part of Palestine, and (2) establishment of the Jewish state were considered as the objective of the truce or, alternatively (3) adequate guarantees were forthcoming that Arab 'invasion' of Palestine would be prevented in the event that with the ending of the truce the Jewish state were proclaimed.

In the light of the situation reported above the following steps should be considered:

1. Immediate consultation by representatives of the three governments represented on the Truce Commission and of the mandatory power to determine plan of action.

2. Review by said representatives and such revision as may be needed of articles of truce.

3. Formal presentation of proposed articles of truce as agreed upon by said representatives to representatives of JA and AHC. Presentation of terms to each party separately by M. Parodi in his dual role of representative of France as member of Truce Commission and President of SC. Representatives of Belgium and US to participate.

4. Simultaneous distribution by M. Parodi of proposed articles of truce to other members of SC to permit them time to consult their governments and determine their positions in preparation for later consideration in council. Query: Would it be desirable for M. Parodi to release truce terms to press, say 24 hours after giving to parties?

5. Three, or at most four day deadline for replies from parties.

6. SC meeting to consider replies and nature of any action required before May 15."

[Here follows an account of the discussions on the question of immigration.]

SC phase:

Parodi raised question sanctions in event either or both parties refused compliance with truce terms. He said would be relatively easy apply sanctions against Jews, whether economic or military. He did not see how sanctions could be effectively applied against Arabs.

Creech Jones said "we must be realistic about what the SC is up against." He said that a decree by the SC now directed against assistance by Arab States to Arabs in Palestine would make it exceedingly difficult for governments Arab States to maintain themselves in office. Most of these governments in position where they must help the Arabs in Palestine in response to inflamed public opinion, even against UN. Arab governments attempting to restrain people in compliance UN order would be swept to one side. Apart from resulting political chaos in these Arab States, gangs and more or less disorganized groups of

fighters would cross from states into Palestine. Very large forces would be required to keep them out.

If threat were made to apply sanctions against Jews involving stopping of funds, "use of your naval forces" to patrol coasts and stop immigration would being [*bring?*] upon us during election year all of odium British have carried in past years.

Meanwhile, Creech Jones went on, the Russians would become involved by recognizing a Jewish state, provide forces, funds and supplies.

In view of presence French and Belgian, we refrained with some difficulty from pointing out to Creech Jones that we had taken some pains to point out all these factors and others besides in the situation to his government through Mr. Douglas, more than three weeks ago, in connection question providing forces to implement trusteeship.

[Here follow discussion of the subject of "procedure next 48 hours" and comments by Messrs. Nisot and Parodi.]

British policy:

General line of comments by Creech Jones this afternoon strengthens impression growing in my mind that objective present British policy is along lines Creech Jones set forth in our conversation with him last Sunday in Senator's apartment, namely, invasion by Abdullah and effective partition with Jewish state north of Jaffa.

Further comments by Rusk will follow next telegram.¹ [Ross.]

AUSTIN

¹ Mr. Rusk commented later the same day on the unsatisfactory meeting with the United Kingdom, France, and Belgium and expressed his belief that "further talks on Friday with same delegations plus Jews and Arabs are essential before high level US intervention. As matters now stand, proposals I made earlier today would probably put us out in front again on unilateral basis without UK and French support." (Telegram 597 from New York, 501.BB Palestine/5-648)

501.BB Palestine/5-748

Memorandum by Mr. Robert M. McClintock to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] May 7, 1948.

I called Mr. Rusk at 2:15 p. m. today to say that a copy of USUN's telegram 588, May 6,¹ setting forth revised provisional draft of articles of truce, had been left with Mr. Clark Clifford at the White House for clearance with the President this afternoon.

I communicated to Mr. Rusk your suggestion that time may now have arrived for making official and public our proposals regarding

¹ Not printed; it gave the text of the third provisional draft of the articles of truce. (501.BB Palestine/5-648). For the draft as approved by President Truman, see the circular telegram of May 7, *infra*. The approved articles followed closely the draft in telegram 588.

a truce. I suggested that it might be possible to put our proposals on record before the Security Council this afternoon.

Mr. Rusk said that he thought if this line of action were adopted it would be preferable to have a session of the Security Council tomorrow or Monday for that purpose. He said the Council at its meeting today had already dropped the subject of Palestine; he had not yet officially communicated to the Jewish Agency our latest terms of truce; and the President of the Council, Ambassador Parodi of France, might feel that he were being disregarded if we rushed our statement into the Council today without first having consulted him. Mr. Rusk thought that he would like to talk to Parodi first and suggested that possibly Parodi as President of the Council could officially communicate our truce proposals to the other members of the Council with a notation that we had already given this draft to the Arab Higher Committee and the Jewish Agency.

I said that I thought there would be no objection to this procedure but that I thought a meeting of the Council should be held, at which time our own Representative would formally place on the record what the United States had done. I suggested that our statement should be tied in with the Security Council's truce resolutions of April 1 and April 17, to make it clear that we were not by-passing the UN as the Jews have insinuated, but were acting in the spirit of these resolutions in our endeavor to make truce possible.

Mr. Rusk said that his appointment with Shertok had been postponed until 5:30 this afternoon and that he would communicate with me prior to that appointment in the expectation that White House clearance for our truce articles would have been received by that time.

On the question of immigration, Mr. Rusk said that the Arab Representatives in New York seemed enthusiastic at our latest formula. I checked again my understanding of this point which was as represented to me this morning by Mr. Rusk; namely, that during the period of the truce the present rate of immigration would continue at 1,500 Jews a month, leaving open to the parties and the British arrangements as to the disposal of the 20,000 Jews on Cyprus. Mr. Rusk felt that the British were in such a position vis-à-vis the Arabs that they could scarcely fail to accede to Arab demands with regard to keeping the Cypriote Jews *in situ*.

Mr. Rusk added that despite the fact that the proposal accepted yesterday by the General Assembly for the appointment of a neutral municipal commissioner in Jerusalem had from the outset been a British proposal for which the UK Delegation voted yesterday, instructions had today been received from London ordering the British to reverse their stand and to say that they would not appoint a commissioner for Jerusalem. (Mr. Wilkins reported separately from New York that apparently Bevin had sent a letter to this effect to Señor

Arce, President of the General Assembly.) Although the press ascribed this reversal in position to Mr. Bevin, the British were making a lame attempt to make the High Commissioner for Palestine the scapegoat. I told Mr. Rusk that I did not see any reason in the world to let the British off on this one. They had invented the idea, fought for it, and voted for it, and we should insist that they honor this commitment.

501.BB Palestine/5-748 : Circular telegram

*The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and
Consular Offices*¹

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, May 7, 1948—6 a. m.

The President has today² approved the following draft of proposed articles of truce which USUN has today handed to Representatives in New York City of JA and AHC:

"The AHC and the JA for Palestine accept the following articles of truce for Palestine effective midnight, May 12-13, 1948, and accept responsibility for insuring compliance by the Arab and Jewish communities of Palestine therewith.

ARTICLE 1

All Military or para-military activities, except police functions authorized by the SC Truce Commission, as well as acts of violence, terrorism and sabotage, shall cease immediately.

ARTICLE 2

During the period of the truce, armed bands and fighting personnel, groups and individuals, whatever their origin, shall not be brought into Palestine nor be assisted or encouraged to enter Palestine.

ARTICLE 3

During the period of the truce, weapons and war materials shall not be imported into Palestine, nor shall any assistance or encouragement be given to the importation into Palestine of such weapons and war materials.

ARTICLE 4

Any person or group of persons found by the SC Truce Commission, after proper investigation, to have committed acts of violence, terrorism or sabotage contrary to the terms of this truce, shall be immediately expelled from Palestine or placed in custody under arrangements to be made by the SC Truce Commission.

ARTICLE 5

During the period of the truce, and without prejudice to the future governmental structure of Palestine, existing Arab and Jewish au-

¹ At Baghdad, Cairo, Damascus, Beirut, Jidda, and Jerusalem.

² May 6.

thorities shall function as temporary truce regimes in the areas in which such authorities are now exercising control and shall accord full and equal rights to all inhabitants in such areas.

ARTICLE 6

During the period of the truce, and without prejudice to the future governmental structure of Palestine, no steps shall be taken by Arab or Jewish authorities to proclaim a sovereign state in a part or all of Palestine or to seek international recognition therefor.

ARTICLE 7

During the period of the truce, the AHC and the JA for Palestine accept, as a matter of emergency, the authority of the SC Truce Commission to arrange the necessary collaboration between Arab and Jewish authorities required for the maintenance of public order and essential public services.

ARTICLE 8

During the period of the truce, freedom of movement and communications shall be accorded all persons and traffic throughout Palestine except as may be declared by the SC Truce Commission to be in violation of the truce or prejudicial to a final political settlement.

ARTICLE 9

All persons displaced from their homes in Palestine by recent disorders shall be permitted to return to their homes and resume their normal occupations unless the SC Truce Commission shall decide in specific cases that such repatriation would jeopardize these truce arrangements.

ARTICLE 10

During the period of the truce, existing Arab and Jewish authorities shall continue to apply the existing laws of Palestine unless otherwise authorized by the SC Truce Commission.

ARTICLE 11

During the period of the truce, and without prejudice to future decisions on the question of immigration, the AHC and the JA for Palestine accept, as a matter of emergency, the authority of the SC Truce Commission to deal with the question of immigration into Palestine.

ARTICLE 12

All persons, groups and organizations in Palestine pledge their maximum effort to preserve the holy places and to protect all activities connected therewith; to this end the AHC and the JA for Palestine accept, as a matter of emergency, the authority of the SC Truce Commission to establish special security arrangements for the protection of the city of Jerusalem and of the holy places.

ARTICLE 13

The AHC and the JA for Palestine undertake to participate in the establishment of a Palestine truce council, composed of three repre-

representatives of each, to effect the joint action necessary for the execution of this truce and to assist the SC Truce Commission in carrying out its functions.

ARTICLE 14

This truce shall remain effective for three months, and thereafter unless either the AHC or the JA for Palestine gives at least thirty days notice of termination to the SC Truce Commission. The SC Truce Commission shall immediately notify the SC of the receipt by it of any such notice of termination."³

MARSHALL

³In a circular telegram of May 13, 10 a. m., Secretary Marshall directed Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut, Jidda, and Cairo to present informally the text of the proposed articles of truce to the appropriate Foreign Office. The circular was repeated for information to Jerusalem. (501.BB Palestine/5-1348)

Clifford Papers

*Mr. Moshe Shertok to the Secretary of State*¹

[WASHINGTON?,] May 7, 1948.

DEAR MR. MARSHALL: I apologize for troubling you again in an attempt to clear up what seems to be a persistent misunderstanding. I gather that reports are still current both in the State Department and in the White House to the effect that I had agreed to conditions for a military truce and political standstill in Palestine informally proposed by representatives of the United States Delegation. In my letter to you of April 29, I took the opportunity to point out that this was not the case. Indeed, I must emphasize that I had indicated all along that the provision for deferring the proclamation of a sovereign state was a major obstacle, particularly if it were interpreted as precluding the coming into existence of a provisional government for the area of the Jewish State.

It was my sincere desire to explore all avenues for an acceptable truce consonant with the preservation of essential Jewish interests. The fact, however, that with this in view, I continued to take part in the informal conversations, could not be interpreted as implying acceptance of the scheme proposed. There were some provisions to which I did not raise serious objection; but there were others to which I took strong exception; and I repeatedly indicated that the decision on the proposal as a whole would have to be taken in Palestine.

Our contacts with Palestine have unfortunately been very irregular, and in response to an urgent call from the Jewish Agency Executive there I am flying to Palestine for consultation. As things stand, I see

¹Copy sent to Mr. Clifford by Samuel I. Rosenman under cover of a letter of May 9. Mr. Rosenman had been Special Counsel to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman. The editors have not found a copy of Mr. Shertok's letter in the files of the Department of State.

no prospect of an agreement which would preclude the setting up of a Provisional Government for the Jewish State or entail the prolongation of British rule.

I know that individual Jews who have been in touch with the State Department or the President recently, have differed from the line taken by the Jewish Agency in this matter. All I can say is that while those concerned are perfectly entitled to their own private views, they do not represent the Jewish people of Palestine, they bear no constitutional responsibility for its future, and they are not in a position to give effect to the policy which they advocate.

At the same time, I must make it clear that it would be utterly wrong to impute to the Jewish Agency a refusal to enter into a truce arrangement. From the moment when, at the instance of the Mufti, the disturbances broke out, we declared repeatedly that we are ready to accept an immediate cease fire throughout Palestine provided the Arabs do likewise. We are likewise ready to negotiate a more comprehensive truce agreement, on the understanding that it would not jeopardize fundamental Jewish rights and place us, in relation to our defense preparedness, at a disadvantage vis-à-vis the Arabs.

I regret to have had again to obtrude on your time, but I felt obliged, in the interest of truth and clarity, to write you this letter.

Faithfully yours,

MOSHE SHERTOK

501.BB Palestine/5-848

Memorandum by Mr. Dean Rusk to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

[NEW YORK,] May 8 [7?],¹ 1948.

The fact that Mr. Moshe Shertok wishes to see you before his departure for Jerusalem is of considerable significance. There is a bitter debate going on within the Jewish Agency on the subject of the truce and the basic decision will be made upon Mr. Shertok's arrival in Palestine. Moderate elements within the Agency such as Dr. Goldmann, Mr. Epstein and possibly Shertok himself strongly favor a truce. More extreme elements such as Rabbi Silver and Ben Gurion are pressing for the immediate establishment of the Jewish State by force if necessary.

It is believed that our proposed Articles of Truce (Tab A)² will be

¹ A carbon copy of the memorandum, now filed with the record copy, is dated May 7. The editors are of the opinion that the date on the carbon copy is the correct one. Presumably, the Secretariat, on May 8, retyped for the use of the Secretary the carbon copy sent by New York to the Department and gave it the later date. The record copy, dated May 8, bears the Secretary's initials.

² Tab A, which bears the heading "Third Provisional Draft; Articles of Truce for Palestine," dated May 6, 1948, is similar to the draft embodied in the circular telegram, *supra*.

the subject of Mr. Shertok's visit. The following comments on specific articles are furnished for your background in preparation for this talk:

ARTICLES 1, 2 AND 3

Articles 1, 2 and 3 are based upon a truce resolution already passed by the Security Council (Tab B)³. *There does not appear to be any serious difference between Jews and Arabs on these three articles* although the application of certain phrases will undoubtedly lead to minor issues before the Security Council Truce Commission. For example, the definition of "fighting personnel" in Article 2 may cause trouble since the Arabs will attempt to interpret that as meaning personnel of military age. In Article 3 the Security Council resolution includes a prohibition of the "acquisition" of arms by either party. The Jews have pointed out that this does not prevent the indirect acquisition of arms by the Arabs via the Arab States and also that Jews can acquire arms indirectly for the use of the Jewish Agency. Since the essence of the truce problem is to prevent the importation of arms into Palestine, the present Article 3 is restricted to importation.

ARTICLE 4

Article 4 represents an attempt to reconcile (a) the demand of the Jews that invading Arab bands be expelled from Palestine and (b) the demand of the Arabs that large numbers of illegal Jewish immigrants be expelled from Palestine. For the purpose of the truce, Article 4 would leave it to the Security Council Truce Commission to determine that those who have been guilty of certain acts contrary to the truce may be either expelled from the country or placed in custody in Palestine. Obviously this may become difficult to apply, but in major cases it will be useful to have agreement to such a principle.

ARTICLE 5

Article 5 is the most important single article because it attempts to deal with the problem of statehood. The Jews wish to organize and declare an independent Jewish State on May 15. The Arabs are determined to fight against such a Jewish State and are fearful of any move which would appear to implement partition. In addition, the Arabs can be expected to proclaim a state for Palestine as a whole which will seek the assistance of the neighboring Arab States to maintain it against the Jews. This assistance from the Arab States will take the form of direct military intervention, at least by Transjordan. The present wording of Article 5 has been carefully drawn

³ Tab B, not found attached to the source text, was presumably the text of the Security Council Resolution of April 17, p. 827.

to recognize existing Arab and Jewish authorities in Palestine in such a way as not to prejudice (at least in theory) a final political settlement. The application of the terms of this article to certain local situations in Palestine will prove to be difficult and will give the Security Council Truce Commission a substantial negotiating problem. However, it is believed that the present draft (*a*) permits the Jews to exercise the authority which they already are exercising in Jewish areas and (*b*) by dealing with existing authorities as "Temporary Truce Regimes" postpones the problem of recognition of permanent Jewish and Arab authorities until the future government of Palestine can be negotiated further.

ARTICLE 6

Article 6 contains a single prohibition against the proclamation of a sovereign state by either Arabs or Jews in a part or all of Palestine. This provision appears essential since such a proclamation on either side would be treated as an immediate *casus belli* by the other.

ARTICLES 7, 8 AND 9

These articles deal with certain minimum administrative arrangements which appear to be essential if the truce is not followed by some provision for a government of Palestine. As they now stand, they do not appear too controversial as between Jews and Arabs.

ARTICLE 10

Article 10 represents a standstill in existing legislation, subject to changes specially authorized by the Security Council Truce Commission. In a disturbed and disorganized situation such as can be expected beginning May 15, there is considerable value in maintaining existing laws in order to stabilize the enormous complex of individual and commercial rights and obligations required by the community. *However*, the maintenance of existing laws raises the difficult question of land purchase and land tenure. The Jews will wish to amend these laws in one direction, the Arabs in the other. On balance, the Arabs would prefer the *status quo*. If Mr. Shertok objects to Article 10, you should tell him that we believe Article 10 could be negotiated further without upsetting the possibility of a truce.

ARTICLE 11

This article is second only to Article 5 in importance since it deals with immigration. In principle the Arabs want no immigration at all, and the Jews want full Jewish control of unrestricted Jewish immigration. During the course of negotiations, the Arabs indicated a will-

ingness to "acquiesce" in a monthly quota of 1500 since that is the present arrangement under the mandate explained as a part of a general standstill. The Jews would not accept a figure substantially lower than 4000 per month. By Article 11 the parties would agree to accept the authority of the Security Council Truce Commission to deal with this question on the theory that immigration alone is not worth the impending warfare. Nevertheless, it will be necessary for the United States, France and Belgium to indicate both to the Jews and Arabs the basis on which the Security Council Truce Commission expects to deal with immigration. Our formula on this is as follows: The Security Council Truce Commission will concern itself only with a monthly quota of 1500 as a continuation of the *status quo*. The Truce Commission, the Jews and the Arabs, however, are aware of British determination to move 18,000 to 20,000 Jews from camps in Cyprus to Palestine over the course of the next few months. Our suggestion is that the Security Council Truce Commission not interfere with such British plans, but leave to the British the question of making their own peace with the Arabs and the Jews on the manner in which the move from Cyprus is carried out. This would give the Arabs a chance to accept a *status quo* in principle and submit to the British evacuation of Cyprus as a step involved in the liquidation of the mandate. It would give the Jews from 4000 to 6000 immigrants per month during the course of the truce, depending upon the duration of the truce.

ARTICLE 12

This article has two purposes: (a) to emphasize the protection of the Holy Places, and (b) to open the way for special arrangements for the City of Jerusalem. Apart from the Holy Places, the Jerusalem problem is serious from the standpoint of the Jews because there are approximately 100,000 Jews in that city who are surrounded by Arabs and are in the position of hostages. A substantial Jewish military effort would be required to maintain and protect the Jews in Jerusalem. Hence, the Jews are most anxious for some international arrangement which would relieve them of this burden. For your own private information, our interest in special arrangements for Jerusalem are based not only upon public interest in the Holy Places but also upon the support which we are obtaining from large and influential groups of American Jews for a truce effort which includes some arrangement for Jerusalem.

ARTICLE 13

This article merely provides three Arab and three Jewish representatives to constitute a Palestine Truce Council to assist the Security Council Truce Commission in carrying out its functions.

ARTICLE 14

This article on the duration of the truce is fundamental to the acceptance of the entire scheme by both sides. By its terms, the truce (after a minimum of three months) can be terminated on thirty days notice. This would provide four months for further negotiations on a peaceful settlement. The short duration of the truce is unfortunate since it may be terminated just before the next regular session of the General Assembly and the American elections. Nevertheless, both Jews and Arabs have raised objections to an arrangement which extends over a longer period because each has a number of reservations about the truce and wishes the right to terminate it if its terms become onerous.

Special Note: One point which seriously worries the Jews is the possibility that the Arab States (not bound by the truce) may use the period of the truce greatly to improve their military position while the Jews are prevented by the truce from continuing their own preparations. Shertok will probably want some assurance on our attitude on this question. We do not believe the Jewish fears will materialize. It is more likely that Arab interest in military intervention in Palestine will decline after May 15. However, we have told Shertok that if the truce were signed we would watch developments very carefully and that if we found either side engaging in activities which would upset or abuse the truce, we would take the matter up with other governments and in the Security Council.

GENERAL

We have already impressed upon Mr. Shertok the importance we attach to the truce and have made the following points:

1. The United States will make every possible effort to bring about a truce in Palestine in order to stop the fighting and save life.
2. The United States Government considers the Articles of Truce as now drawn to be fair and equitable and is prepared to back these articles in every appropriate way.
3. If a truce is not agreed, we believe that the situation with respect to Palestine will constitute a threat to international peace and will urge the Security Council to take the necessary action to remove that threat to the peace. In connection with such Security Council action, the United States will direct its own policies and conduct in support of the Security Council decisions.
4. If the truce is agreed, we shall support compliance and will oppose violations. If we discover that either party, or outsiders, are taking advantage of the truce to create military advantage for one side or the other, the United States will vigorously oppose such attempts.
5. The United States has no hidden purposes in connection with

this truce; we shall act as a member of the Security Council Truce Commission with complete impartiality and in accordance with the terms of the Articles of Truce and the directives which the Security Council may give to the Security Council Truce Commission.

Clifford Papers

Memorandum by the President's Special Counsel (Clifford)

[WASHINGTON ?,] May 8, 1948.

In a conversation with Mr. Dean Rusk this morning, May 8th, he indicated the following:

In a conversation with Mr. Dean Rusk this morning, May 8th, he Authority Plan". He more or less characterized the British position as one of doing nothing between now and May 15th when the mandate is surrendered.

2. He believes that sufficient votes are available in the General Assembly to approve a simplified trusteeship for Palestine if a truce is not obtained before the 15th. He sees such a simplified trusteeship plan as amounting to a substitute for the November 29th Resolution, with the advantage of placing the Arabs in the position of being brought before the Security Council in case of invasion after the 15th. (Of course this is true now to the same extent with respect to the November 29th Resolution; and the Jews would be faced with similar Security Council action if they forcibly oppose such a trusteeship).

3. Mr. Rusk indicates that the chief desire of the United States is for a truce agreement before the 15th. It is probably that the so-called simplified trusteeship plan, for which Mr. Rusk believes the necessary votes are available, is being held in reserve pending efforts to obtain a truce.

I urged that the United States take no position between now and the 15th which would tie the hands of the United States after May 15th. I pointed out the likelihood that the Jew and the Arab States would be proclaimed and the United States should then be in a position to deal with the result and that a truce was just as likely to be feasible then as between now and the 15th; that there was strong indication of actual partition now and we should be in a position to reconcile the two peoples under the actual situation without creating a United Nations' legal substitute for partition; that there was just as much danger of continued conflict under such a substitute as under the existing Resolution and that when each had made proclamations there might be a better chance of conciliation. I said that if the United States were seeking an armed truce without a political truce there would be no difficulty.

Mr. Rusk denied that there was actual partition along the lines of the November Resolution, saying that the Jews were in control of only about one-third of the area of the Jewish State as described in the November Resolution. He meant that Negeb was not under their

control and indicated the problem would be simpler if in November the delineation of the Jewish State had been different.

The matter seems to me to sum up as follows :

1. The United States as represented in this conversation with Mr. Rusk prefers and thinks it can obtain a simplified trusteeship plan in preference to the British neutral authority plan, unless the efforts of the United States for a truce succeed ;

2. Mr. Rusk prefers such a trusteeship plan to leaving the November 29th Resolution untouched when May 15th arrives. He does not see the British plan as seriously impairing the November 29th Resolution ;

3. The present principal effort of the United States is directed towards a truce, armed and also political in the sense of excluding the proclamation of States.

501.BB Palestine/5-848 : Telegram

*The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)
to the Secretary of State*

SECRET NIACT

NEW YORK, May 8, 1948—2 p. m.

610. From Ross. Hare, Wilkins and I spent about three hours last night discussing with Beeley and Trafford Smith for the UK and Hopkins and Lewis for Canada the question of trusteeship for Palestine.¹ We told them we saw practical value of suggestions made by Creech Jones for carrying on minimum of central administrative services.

The great weakness of Creech Jones' plan, however, was lack of sound legal foundation in UN charter. In order to provide such sound legal foundation we had originally suggested trusteeship.

Difficulty with attempting to provide interim administrative regime based on SC powers under chapter 7 of charter was involvement in veto.

Canadians suggested possible legal basis for Creech Jones' proposals might be article 14 of charter, providing that GA "may recommend measures for the peaceful adjustment of any situation." We pointed out such recommendation had no more validity than recommended solution by partition in November 29 resolution. Russians would be free to ignore and follow any course suited to their political objectives.

In support of necessity basing political regime on trusteeship provisions of charter we made following points :

1. When UK lays down mandate May 15 there will be no successor authority unless created by UN. Doctrine of principal allied and associated powers (US, UK, France) not accepted by British and involves

¹ See editorial note, p. 912.

US on too narrow a basis. US objective is broad sharing of responsibility in UN.

2. In absence of UN constituted authority with sound legal basis in charter Jews would undoubtedly argue legal foundation in November 29 resolution for proclamation their state. This legal argument could be forestalled only by involvement in very embarrassing debate in special session for suspension of November 29 resolution.

3. On Arab side, in absence of sound legal basis of trusteeship we would encounter legal difficulties with regard to Arab invasion, if Abdullah, for example, on invitation of Palestinian Arabs goes into Arab portion of Palestine.

4. If UN action taken on flimsy legal basis, problem of recognition with particular reference recognition of Jewish state by Russia and satellites would be very difficult to deal with. Thus Russian penetration of area and incidentally embarrassment to Jews themselves would be greatly facilitated.

We gave Beeley on informal and noncommittal basis text of simplified draft for provisional regime based on chapter XII of charter.² Text follows in next telegram.³ We pointed out that this draft was effort to combine our concept of necessity basing provisional regime on trusteeship provisions of charter with "British empirical" approach. Beeley said that statements made by Creech Jones in opposition to trusteeship were based on concept of trusteeship, either requiring force to implement or agreement of both parties. Beeley said Creech Jones was not opposed necessarily to concept of trusteeship as legal basis for action. In appearing to brush trusteeship aside he merely wanted to emphasize necessity of focusing attention on simple practical measures that might be taken.

We pointed out that our present concept did not require force to implement but would provide opportunity to seek forces if necessary.

We also pointed out that at present we do not have in mind imposing trusteeship in absence agreement of parties. On other hand if we have sound legal framework we feel getting agreement of parties on specific administrative steps to be taken would be facilitated.

Canadians raised question how we would deal with problem of warfare in Palestine in absence of forces to implement trusteeship. We replied that if circumstances indicated threat to peace in Palestine this would be matter for SC. This comment led us into discussion of sanctions. British outlined probable developments as they envisage them. Haganah in alliance with Irgun were on the march and could not be restricted to Jewish area. They would be in effect the aggressors against Arab communities and Arab parts of Palestine. Arab action would probably be restricted to "invasion" only of Arab areas and defensive operations against Jews. There would probably be weak

² This chapter dealt with the international trusteeship system.

³ No. 611, May 8, 2:10 p. m., not printed; but for later text drawn up informally with British and Canadian spokesmen, see telegram 614 from New York, May 9, p. 942.

legal basis for sanctions against Arabs. In any event if by sanctions we meant force this impossible because forces required would be very large and are not forthcoming. British position not to supply forces for this purpose reiterated flatly.

On question of economic sanctions against Arabs, British said they could not envisage any economic sanctions we might apply that would not hurt us more than it would the Arabs. They said flatly that in the British view any attempt to apply economic sanctions against the Arab states would wreck the Marshall Plan and everything we are trying to do in Western Europe. They mentioned the essentiality of oil supplies in this connection. Beeley said that relations with the Arab world were basic to Commonwealth policy.

On question of sanctions against Jews, Beeley expressed frank doubts whether US Government would in show-down apply against Jews only effective sanction which would be to stop flow of dollars which enabled Jews to support their military potential. We replied question was obviously hypothetical and we could not undertake to say what US Government might do. We did say, however, that our present mood is considerably firmer in this regard than it has been.

Beeley said there was one sanction which he felt might be most equitable and feasible against both Jews and Arabs, namely, arms embargo not only for Palestine but for entire Middle East if necessary. He was quite categorical in his statements to effect that flow of arms to Arab states could be controlled.

The main question in his mind, however, was whether US would maintain effective embargo on shipment of arms from US to Jews.

We indicated that US control of shipments from this country was rigid. We raised question of necessity of blockade to control importation of arms, whether by Jews or Arabs. Beeley agreed blockade necessary and we asked him if British would be prepared to participate in contribution naval forces for this purpose. He said he could not speak for his government but his personal guess was that they would agree to participate.

In response to Canadian question, Beeley said UK Government would certainly not contribute as much as 80 percent.

It was clear in context of Beeley's remarks that he envisaged some kind of joint UN action, although probably by or on behalf of powers administering trusteeship.

On this later point British are very skeptical of our concept of UN itself as administering authority. They appear to have in mind possibility of group of powers in which connection Beeley said that UK would not necessarily be willing to be one of administering powers.

We all agreed that prospects for large majority in favor of specific proposal based on compromise of US and UK views would be very

good and that we could probably get one or two other members of UN to introduce such proposal, if desirable.

Canadians said very emphatically they would support anything on which US and UK agreed.

In conclusion we agreed to cooperate in development of draft compromise proposal. Beeley is cabling London to find out if UK Government will support legal concept of trusteeship, and will do his best to get reply by Monday.

He asked us if his government replied in negative whether US would support proposal along lines Creech Jones' suggestions. We replied we did not like to say no but we very strongly preferred our trusteeship approach. We agreed to ask Department for answer to Beeley's question.

Entire foregoing conversation was on most informal basis and without any commitments given or implied by participants.

We cannot emphasize too strongly very tight time schedule against which we are now operating. Assuming maximum of good will on part of most members of Assembly and minimum of obstructionism from Soviets, their satellites and few others, we have to get through subcommittee, committee one itself, and plenary session and meanwhile carry on intensive negotiations outside of committee structure. We consider, therefore, that decision on line we are to follow is essential by Monday at latest.

We are continuing work with British in effort to develop compromise draft which we hope to send you tonight or tomorrow morning.

Our general impression following this conversation is rather more heartening than impression we had following conversation with Shertok yesterday afternoon.⁴ British seemed to be making effort to cooperate with us. On other hand, we cannot but recall that these matters have been discussed very fully for several months with British here, in Washington and in London without being productive of British willingness to support, and it is a little difficult to understand this apparent sudden change in attitude at this eleventh hour, and to determine whether present conversations will result in real and continuing support for a compromise plan.

New impression we get out of this discussion with reference to Abdullah invasion and effective partition with Jewish state concept, is that instead of pursuing clear-cut objective British seem to take it for granted that this is inevitable solution which will result after laying down mandate, together with defeatist attitude toward possibility of guiding this or any other solution through peaceful channels rather than leaving it to parties to shoot it out.

British appeared to be working on hypothesis that intervention by neighboring Arab states, aside from Transjordan, would be of negli-

⁴ See telegram 585, May 6, p. 917.

gible importance but that Transjordan would be factor with which to reckon. We noted that such being the case British, through their special relations with Abdullah, would be in position to exercise decisive influence in stabilizing situation. Beeley made evasive reply to effect that British control of Abdullah not as great as might be imagined.

AUSTIN

501.BB Palestine/5-848: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Bevin)*¹

TOP SECRET

US URGENT

WASHINGTON, May 8, 1948—6 p. m.

NIACT

I have just completed a lengthy meeting with Moshe Shertok of Jewish Agency who has left for New York by air and flies to Palestine tonight.² Shertok, in reporting a conversation he had just had with Creech Jones, had gained the definite impression (which was apparently strongly influencing Jewish Agency attitude) that Abdullah would move his Arab Legion into Palestine but would occupy only the Arab section and not the presently defined limits of the proposed Jewish state. Shertok said that Creech Jones predicted that the Jews would have their Jewish state on May 15; and stated that the United Kingdom is anxious not to permit a general invasion of Palestine, but that he (Creech Jones) believed that Abdullah would not commit aggression against the Jews and asked Shertok whether that would not suit the Jewish Agency.

Shertok also repeated information which he read from a cable that Brigadier Glubb's assistant, Colonel Goldy, had made contact with Haganah in order to coordinate their respective military plans in order to "avoid clashes without appearing to betray the Arab cause."

I understand that Creech Jones is now at sea returning to London. Shertok gave us the definite impression that Creech Jones' statements reflected British policy. Shertok also gave us the definite impression that as a result of his conversation with Creech Jones there was a very limited possibility of the Jewish Agency accepting a truce.

¹ Sent to the Embassy in the United Kingdom in telegram 1672, with the introductory portion reading "Please transmit the following message from me to Foreign Secretary Bevin:"

² No specific memorandum of this conversation has been found. It appears that Shertok was accompanied by Eliahu Epstein and that Under Secretary Lovett was also present. Additional observations on this discussion will be found in Secretary Marshall's memorandum of conversation of May 12, p. 972. An account is also in the memoir published by Moshe Sharett (Shertok) under the title *Be-Sha'ar ha Umot* [At the Threshold of Statehood], Tel Aviv, Am Ovid, 1958.

Objections to truce expressed by Shertok today took substantially different line from that taken by him during truce negotiations of past three weeks.

I transmit this to you to apprise you of the situation at the moment.

MARSHALL

501.BB Palestine/5-848 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

TOP SECRET NIACT

WASHINGTON, May 8, 1948—6 p. m.

1673. With reference to my message to Bevin,¹ transmitted in immediately preceding telegram, please endeavor to ascertain from Foreign Secretary whether Shertok's report of his conversation with Creech Jones accurately reflects British policy and Bevin's understanding of Abdullah's intentions. We should also wish to know whether Creech Jones' statements as reported mean that Bevin feels that further truce effort is unnecessary.

British Embassy has just telephoned that word has been received from Foreign Office, London, to effect that UK Govt welcomes our truce proposals and thinks they are good.

In light of these conflicting reports, it is imperative that we have prompt indication of what Bevin's real policy is.

MARSHALL

¹ *Supra.*

USUN Files

*Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by Mr. John C. Ross*¹

SECRET

[NEW YORK,] May 9, 1948.

Participants: Mr. Dean Rusk, United States Mission
 Mr. John C. Ross, United States Mission
 Dr. Philip C. Jessup, United States Mission

Mr. Rusk said that he had discussed the current situation this morning with Mr. Lovett, Mr. Armour and Mr. Henderson with the following tentative conclusions:

(1) We must be certain that we do not get into a theoretical position which would be wide of the factual situation.

(2) We must clear up the books making clear the efforts which have been made for a peaceful settlement which has failed because of the lack of cooperation from the parties.

(3) The Palestine Commission and the Truce Council cannot carry out their responsibilities under the 29 November Resolution but we probably should not erase this Resolution altogether.

¹ Initialed by Ambassador Austin.

(4) We are not willing to take on as a member of the Truce Commission any additional administrative responsibilities. More specifically, we definitely will not do so if the United Kingdom will not.

Mr. Rusk indicated that according to Mr. Shertok the Jews are not likely to proclaim their State right away but would start out only by establishing their provisional government.

Mr. Lovett's present view was inclined against the United States putting in any formal proposal at this stage. He also appears to feel that a trusteeship for all of Palestine would be unrealistic in the light of the present situation as it is developing.

JOHN C. ROSS

501.BB Palestine/5-948 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

NEW YORK, May 9, 1948—2:26 p.m.

614. The following is text of an arrangement for possible provisional regime based on chapter XII of the Charter worked out informally with the British and Canadians. Comments follow. Text begins:

DRAFT RESOLUTION OF THE GA RELATING TO THE FUTURE GOVERNMENT OF PALESTINE

PREAMBLE

Whereas the United Kingdom as mandatory power will cease to exercise authority over Palestine on May 15, 1948; and

Whereas the maintenance and furtherance of international peace and security require that the UN should as a matter of emergency exercise temporary authority in (the city of Jerusalem and throughout) Palestine; and

Whereas Chapter XII of the Charter authorizes the UN to exercise such temporary authority:

I

Now therefore the GA of the UN, without prejudice to the ultimate political settlement, decides that temporary authority in Palestine shall, from May 15, 1948 be exercised in accordance with the following articles:

ARTICLE 1

The UN is designated as the administering authority for Palestine. The TC, operating under the authority of the GA, shall assist in carrying out the functions of the administering authority.

ARTICLE 2

The administering authority shall exercise such powers of administration, legislation, and jurisdiction over Palestine as are set forth in these articles and as may be subsequently determined to be necessary by the TC.

ARTICLE 3

A high commissioner for Palestine shall be appointed by the TC and shall be subject to it in the exercise of his duties.

ARTICLE 4

The high commissioner shall encourage local or community authorities in such a way as to secure their maximum cooperation. He shall use his good offices to arrange for the operation of such common services as may be agreed upon by the principal communities.

ARTICLE 5

The high commissioner is empowered to exercise the right of the administering authority to organize and make use of locally recruited police and volunteer forces.

ARTICLE 6

The high commissioner shall cooperate with the Truce Commission for Palestine appointed by the SC on 23 April 1948 and shall give it every possible assistance in carrying out the truce resolution adopted by the SC on 17 April 1948 and any further truce arrangements concluded by the Truce Commission or otherwise under the authority of the UN. In connection with his duties under this article the high commissioner may communicate with the SC through the SYG.

ARTICLE 7

The high commissioner shall use his best endeavors to mediate between the principal communities in Palestine with the object of reaching agreement on the future government of Palestine.

ARTICLE 8

The expenses of the government of Palestine shall be defrayed from the revenues of Palestine, supplemented, when deemed necessary by the TC, by funds provided by the UN either through subsidies or through loans repayable from future revenues of Palestine.

ARTICLE 9

The special municipal commissioner for the city of Jerusalem appointed in accordance with the recommendation of the GA of 6 May

1948 shall continue to exercise his functions under the authority of the UN high commissioner.

ARTICLE 10

The high commissioner shall use his best endeavors in cooperation with the communities and authorities concerned to assure the protection of the holy places, religious buildings and sites in Palestine.

ARTICLE 11

The high commissioner may, with a view to the promotion of the welfare of the inhabitants of Palestine, invite the assistance and cooperation of appropriate specialized agencies of the UN such as the WHO, of the International Red Cross, and of other governmental or non-governmental organizations of a humanitarian and non-political character.

ARTICLE 12

The temporary authority of the UN as set forth in these articles shall terminate on January 1, 1950 or on such earlier date as may be determined by the GA or upon notification to the TC by the high commissioner that agreement has been concluded by the principal communities of Palestine for the future government of Palestine.

II

During the currency of this resolution the GA suspends the implementation of its resolution of November 29, 1947 on the future government of Palestine 181 (II).

III

The GA calls upon all persons, organizations and governments to cooperate in the implementation of this resolution and to refrain from any action which would be inconsistent with this resolution.

AUSTIN

501.BB Palestine/5-948 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Jerusalem

SECRET US URGENT

WASHINGTON, May 9, 1948—6 p. m.

377. Please deliver texts of Third Provisional Draft Articles of Truce¹ to your French and Belgian colleagues. French and Belgian Governments are expected to instruct them separately along following lines. Three governments represented on SC Truce Commission will

¹ See circular telegram of May 7 and footnote 1 to Mr. McClintock's memorandum, pp. 927 and 925, respectively.

present Truce Articles informally to JA and AHC and Arab League in Palestine. If any basis of agreement on truce can be found in such articles or in revised texts as may be worked out in Palestine, SC Truce Commission should then present them formally to parties and report such action to the Security Council.

Crucial articles are 5 and 11. Latest text Article 5 was intended to give somewhat greater recognition to existing Jewish regime by reference to "Temporary Truce Regime" without going as far as "provisional government". Shertok apparently thought "Temporary Truce Regime" weakened the Article, hence those words could be dropped.

Article 11 merely states that Truce Commission would deal with question of immigration during period of truce. Actually, we have in mind that SC Truce Commission would be concerned with existing quota of 1500 monthly, but all parties would be aware that British are determined to empty their Cyprus camps into Palestine during truce. Article 11 would thus permit Arabs to take *status quo* in theory but acquiesce in fact to substantial Jewish immigration during truce. Jews on other hand would get 4,000-6,000 per month into Palestine during truce, a figure on which they could never hope to get Arab agreement.

Present estimate Dept is that Arabs might now accept truce along lines Third Provisional Draft but that Jewish Agency's attitude has stiffened considerably in past few days. Shertok plainly reflected in talks with Dept yesterday that JA is prepared to gamble on "now or never" basis and possibility of arrangement with Abdullah partitioning Palestine between Jews and Abdullah. US has had no part in such deals and will not be able to assist Jews if they gamble on any such arrangement and lose. We shall continue to follow truce policy so long as there is fighting and will seek truce on any reasonable basis which will in fact stop the fighting in Palestine.

Most unlikely that informal truce efforts in New York can now produce any result; main weight of truce negotiations now shifts to SC Truce Commission. Commission should use broad discretion in trying to find basis for cease fire as situation develops.

MARSHALL

867N.01/5-948 : Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Wasson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET URGENT

JERUSALEM, May 9, 1948—10 a. m.

566. Chief Secretary¹ informed me confidentially that their legal advisers had ruled that mandate will terminate at 12 o'clock midnight Friday May 14, and not on May 15 as is generally believed. High

¹ Of the Palestine Government.

Commissioner and remaining officials of Palestine Government will depart afternoon May 14 for Haifa.

Chief secretary expects Trans-Jordan and other Arab states to invade Palestine on May 15 or 16 with objective to occupy Arab areas. He seemed positive that there would not be an attack in Jerusalem.

WASSON

501.BB Palestine/5-948 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET US URGENT

NEW YORK, May 9, 1948—6:43 p. m.

617. From Ross. Parodi called meeting of British, Belgian, American, French representatives last night to discuss situation regarding truce and possible action which SC may be called to take following May 15. Hare and I attended.

Parodi said time fast running out and essential to make up minds now regarding certain problems.

He said that as of May 15 we would be faced by declarations two states of Palestine coupled with entrance of Abdullah. Regarding latter two ideas are current. The first is that if Abdullah moved beyond own frontier it might constitute an act of aggression. The second idea was that if he entered on invitation of Arab population of Palestine his act might not constitute aggression. Parodi said he was inclined to second theory and thought conclusion to that effect would avoid endless argument. Question which he wished to raise was whether truce proposal ran contrary to this thesis.

We said in our opinion we should continue pressure to obtain truce.

Beeley, UK, agreed we should try to get truce. As he envisaged situation there were 3 alternatives. First if truce were obtained Abdullah should be persuaded to observe it. Second, if negotiations were still continuing for truce it was not clear what action Abdullah would take. Third, if truce negotiations broke down it would not seem advisable to challenge Abdullah's entry on basis of crossing frontier but critical point would be when he actually came in contact with Jewish forces.

Parodi said that he had seen Goldmann of JA who had given him impression that Shertok returning Palestine to assert moderating influence. Parodi had also seen Husseini who at one and the same time had been intransigent but doubtful as to what he should do. However Husseini expressed strong continuing opposition immigration.

We inquired if any foundation report that JA planning negotiation with Abdullah. Beeley said there had been contact between JA and Abdullah but that Abdullah had been unable to recognize territorial limitations of November 29 resolution. However, Beeley thought agreement between them quite possible, although Jews might have to make some territorial concessions to Abdullah for maintenance his prestige.

We inquired if agreement JA and Abdullah possible before May 15. Beeley hesitated and then said he doubted it.

We asked if existence truce would stop Abdullah. Parodi doubted it. Beeley said since truce only between Arabs and Jews of Palestine Jews could not complain if Abdullah's forces stayed in Arab area. We pointed out that terms of SC truce resolution of April 17 called upon all governments particularly those of neighboring states to facilitate truce. We told Parodi we were instructed to emphasize continuance of truce efforts and to suggest that Parodi as president of SC request the Truce Commission in Jerusalem to present to the parties the third provisional draft of articles of truce and simultaneously inform the other members of the SC.

Parodi felt and Nisot agreed that Parodi could not as president of council request the Truce Commission to take proposed action unless he had received prior approval by SC of articles of truce and proposed procedure. As the representative of France he would have no difficulty in associating himself with procedure without consulting his government. Nisot agreed with Parodi's view but said he would have to clear instruction to Belgian Consul through Brussels. After some further discussion we all agreed following procedure would be followed as given to Rusk by telephone. (1) US would request Wasson to make copies of third provisional draft available for French and Belgian colleagues. (2) Each government would instruct its representative on Truce Commission to join with colleagues in joint presentation to the parties of truce articles as representing view of respective governments that these articles constitute fair and equitable basis for truce. Truce Commission should report to Parodi as President of Council before May 15.

Parodi returned question Abdullah observing Abdullah's entrance into Palestine would be incompatible with truce if obtained. He recalled Beeley's statement regarding restraint which would be exerted on Abdullah in such circumstances. Beeley agreed but added that truce in any event would depend on action by Arab League of which Transjordan was member and consequently should Abdullah agree to truce he would undertake obligation not to enter Palestine.

Beeley said reaction of London to second draft of truce terms had been received and it was favorable. However London would wish

reconsideration endorsement in light of changes of third provisional draft particularly articles 5 and 6. We suggested that to save time any comments UK Government has should be made available through High Commissioner to Truce Commission in Jerusalem as well as to delegation here.

Beeley added his instructions from London specified British not prepared to use non-acceptance of truce as means of exerting pressure on either party.

Returning Abdullah question Parodi observed question of getting matter before SC. He thought he as President of Council should raise question as development within purview of Palestine case as already on Council's agenda and thus avoid possibility of some other member particularly Russia taking initiative and raising as threat to peace. Nisot raised technical objection but we supported Parodi's views. We raised question continuance Truce Commission after May 15 stating we felt truce efforts should continue and Commission kept in existence for purpose. Parodi and Nisot agreed but reserved formal confirmation.

Parodi raised Jerusalem question stating fear that if no truce situation in Jerusalem would get completely out of hand in view of development hostilities in surrounding areas. He felt essential some action be taken either along lines originally suggested by France for international voluntary force or along lines of trusteeship. Ambassador Garreau spoke at length on this problem indicating rather strong feeling in favor trusteeship as providing soundest legal basis.

Beeley stressed that cease-fire for Jerusalem already obtained and prospects very good for truce governing essential factors of freedom of movement of Jews and assurance of food supplies, et cetera. Beeley thought Abdullah would surely respect truce for Jerusalem but doubtful if he would respect either trusteeship or international force.

We expressed view that matter of Jerusalem of obvious importance. We were prepared to explore fully two alternatives mentioned by Parodi, our preference [being?] for legal reasons stressed by Garreau for trusteeship for legal and practical reasons.

In concluding meeting Parodi restated his view of Abdullah problem as he anticipates it will arise in SC and indicated he hoped views of 4 delegations present could be concerted as to policy and said he wanted to have further meeting of 4 delegations before SC meeting.

After meeting I stayed behind and pursuant to phone conversation with Rusk gave Parodi outline of Shertok conversation with Secretary. Parodi very appreciative over keeping him informed. [Ross.]

AUSTIN

501.BB Palestine/5-948 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

PRIORITY

NEW YORK, May 9, 1948—10:25 p. m.

615. The following is explanation of text of an arrangement for possible provisional regime based on Chapter XII of the Charter as transmitted in USUN 614.¹

General outlines of text were worked out in informal conference yesterday with Hopkins and Ignatieff (Canada) with brief participation of Trafford Smith (UK). Text discussed this morning with Beeley and Trafford Smith and Hopkins. Subject minor questions Beeley indicated he would telegraph text immediately to London presumably with indication it is satisfactory if it is decided to proceed on basis Chapter XII of Charter.

Basic considerations:

1. To meet principal lines of objection as well as suggestions raised in debate in first committee on our working paper. New text represents compromise between British "empirical" approach and widespread demand in GA for firmer, less equivocal legal basis for action.

2. To provide sound legal basis under charter for provisional emergency regime in Palestine.

3. Reduction to minimum of responsibilities for administering authority. There is widespread agreement that some minimum responsibilities should be assumed but they should be on strong legal basis.

4. Combined idea of minimum arrangements parties can agree upon with role of UN as mediator building upon cooperation and agreement of parties.

5. Suspension of operation of GA resolution of 29 November 1947 but as part of positive proposal with sound legal basis in Charter. The idea is to avoid complexities of 29 November resolution without discarding it entirely, providing affirmative substitute as interim provisional regime and overcoming the argument that existing *de facto* partition is identical with compliance with November 29 resolution.

6. Providing a link with the Truce Commission of the SC and assisting in correlating and unifying Palestine efforts of various UN organs.

7. Affording legal foundation for any desired subsequent action by US and other states in support of UN solution without prior commitment to send armed forces while avoiding interfering with realistic developments along the lines, for example, of Abdullah proposal.

¹ Dated May 9, p. 942.

8. Taking advantage of actual subcommittee situation resulting from willingness of members of committee one to consider Creech Jones approach supported by Canadians; since Canadians now working with US and British on new ideas tactical situation would facilitate bringing proposal into subcommittee and getting favorable consideration.

9. Reduces to minimum idea of UN making empty gestures and developing futile paper schemes involving obligations which cannot be discharged; obligations in present approach can be discharged. On the other hand, we would avoid letting UN get into position of virtual bankruptcy re Palestine and also avoid US, after strong leadership, getting into position of washing hands.

Comments on text.

Preamble is designed to point out charter authority and to stress emergency and temporary nature of proposal. Parenthetical reference to situation of Jerusalem in second paragraph of preamble included to cover possibility of taking account of some special trusteeship or other regime for Jerusalem.

I. First paragraph following preamble is considered implicit suspension of resolution of November 29. This paragraph is intended to reserve the ultimate political solution and should be read together with II re suspension November 29 resolution. This paragraph alone, however, is implicit suspension.

Article 1 retains our previous concept of UN as administering authority and seems preferable to named group of powers. We doubt possibility in time available of making agreement on the powers to be named (see additional comments below).

Article 2 is designed to avoid filling details in this agreement by providing residual authority for TC to develop functions if agreement between the two parties is expanded.

Article 3 follows original US working paper on method of appointing high commissioner.

Article 4 embodies the concept which lies at the heart of the Creech Jones approach. The second sentence is taken from the British draft based upon that approach. Emphasis is here put upon thought that high commissioner will function chiefly through Jews and Arabs with a minimum of direct legislative or executive power.

Article 5 is based on Article 84 of Charter and contemplates use only of locally recruited police and volunteer forces. While this would discard idea of international force whether contributed by states or com-

posed of volunteers recruited among member states this article should be considered in light of additional comments below.

Article 6 frankly faces fact that high commissioner could not cope with large scale hostilities. This article ties in the SCTC and indicates that the business of truce and the containment of full scale organized conflict between Jews and Arabs remains primarily a question for the SC.

Article 7 closely reproduces another cardinal point in the British suggestions following the Creech Jones approach, namely stress on mediatory functions and the realistic concept that progress towards ultimate solution depends upon agreement of parties.

Article 8 regarding defraying of expenses should probably be supplemented by some appropriate provision possibly making use of UN working capital fund to meet preliminary expenses of high commissioner.

Article 9 is designed further to integrate all actions of UN bodies and to assure continuing authority of the special municipal commissioner if he is appointed, in accordance with the recommendation of the GA of 6 May 1948. If he is not appointed, this article would be eliminated and high commissioner would presumably exercise his functions.

Article 10 with regard to protection of holy places, etc. might be supplemented by provisions for special regime in Jerusalem if such action is decided upon.

Article 11 ties in the general suggestions made by the US representative in first committee on April 20, takes account of current activities of International Red Cross and also takes account of British idea and emphasis in subcommittee on necessity for such practical steps, for example, as securing cooperation of both groups with WHO assistance re epidemics.

Article 12 on termination takes account of Jewish and Arab objections to indefinite duration of trusteeship as outlined in our original working paper. If parties reach agreement, the agreed regime should immediately supplant UN regime as soon as high commissioner notifies the TC. Suggested date of January 1, 1950 would give GA further opportunity to consider matter in its 1949 regular session if no agreement reached by parties before that date.

II was included on basis of strong belief of Canadians and British that it would be virtually unavoidable. In order to avoid confusion we agree that this issue might as well be frankly faced. Since in first committee such a resolution would probably be voted on paragraph by paragraph by simple majority, members would have an opportunity

to abstain or vote against this particular paragraph while subsequently voting for resolution as a whole. At the same time, the question of suspension would be merely part of positive affirmative proposal and would not emerge strongly as separate issue which would otherwise almost certainly be the case.

III is intended to afford justification for any supporting action which we might later decide was desirable. It is further designed to eliminate plausible legal foundation for fishing in troubled waters by Russians or others.

Additional comments.

Referring to above comments on Articles 1 and 5 the trusteeship concept as developed in this draft obviously appeals to Beeley as providing strong legal basis for minimizing risk (a) of Russian interference (on theory that it would make illegal proclamation and recognition of Jewish or Arab state); and (b) that conflict could not be confined to Palestine if Abdullah plan gets out of hand. While reiterating British position against use of British forces inside Palestine, Beeley himself [seems?] to have made up his own mind that UK should be prepared, if necessary, should either or both (a) and (b) above materialize, to participate in embargo, naval patrols, or any other action which seemed suitable and desirable without, however, involving any prior commitment to take such action. While speaking personally Beeley feels that our present concept might appeal to London for reasons indicated.

Beeley seems to feel that while our original working paper goes too far in the direction of implementation by force, the present draft may not go quite far enough. For this reason and perhaps for others he is inclined to feel that a group of states rather than the UN itself should be the administering authority.

In discussing alternatives with British and Canadians at conclusion of informal meeting this morning, we tentatively suggested possibility of including an article which would establish a board composed of representatives of France, UK and US (possibly others) authorized to advise and assist the high commissioner in the discharge of his duties. We also discussed as another alternative the idea of giving either the high commissioner or the TC authority to seek outside assistance if necessary.

General estimate—recommendations.

Our estimate of general situation is that we could pass such a proposal as this by a two-thirds vote. If such a proposal is to be introduced we could probably get another delegation to propose it, but feel on balance it would be preferable for us to do so for reasons stated below

although we can see some advantage if Canadians would jointly or separately introduce proposal if assured of UK and US support. If proposal along these lines is not introduced, we must take account of likelihood of some other delegation introducing a less satisfactory resolution involving propositions it would be embarrassing either to support or oppose. Further, we estimate that Russian bloc will be content to let situation drift and avoid all action by GA in the belief that resulting factual situation will be to their liking.

In our opinion introduction of resolution such as we propose would be acceptable to Arabs and might be a strong factor in inducing Jews to accept truce.

We feel that US would be in a very weak and vulnerable position in terms of American public opinion and general prestige in the UN if we come forward with no definite suggestion before GA adjourns. We have consistently insisted that our trusteeship working paper was not a proposal and we are, therefore, in the position of having called the special session without having made any specific proposal to it for meeting the situation. Other delegations are constantly coming to us offering to help and asking our guidance and leadership.

If we make no specific proposal for GA action before May 15 and if Arab armies move in, we believe opinion generally will be convinced that we have instigated or are supporting Arab action against the Jewish state. Also, if we fail to introduce specific proposal and press hard for its adoption, and also if we rest on our oars at this point and *de facto* situation develops in Palestine along Abdullah lines, the two facts taken together will make US vulnerable to accusations either of incredible naivete or power-politics machinations.

If Russians in SC charge Arab states with aggression legal arguments about invitation from Palestinian Arabs would not meet public demand. One possibility we see to meet such a contingency would be for SC to attempt to stabilize situation by ordering parties not to move their forces across lines laid down in GA resolution of November 29, which lines would for this purpose be taken as demarcating cease fire basis. If JA could then work out agreement on such a basis position of US and UN might be less vulnerable. Such a procedure in the SC could more appropriately be followed if proposed UN provisional regime based on Chapter XII had been adopted.

Thus, formal proposal of such plan in our opinion would enhance likelihood of concluding truce now or subsequent to May 15; would not commit US to placing armed forces in Palestine; would strengthen the UN and the US position in the organization and in general would meet in advance more contingencies and afford a sounder basis for possible future action than any other course.

AUSTIN

867N.01/5-1048: Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Wasson) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL NIACT

JERUSALEM, May 10, 1948—noon.

URGENT

582. High Commissioner handed me morning of May 10 the propounded terms of a truce for Jerusalem which Palestine Government is communicating to both the Jews and the Arabs.¹ Text of terms follow:

1. In this memorandum the word "Jerusalem" means the town planning area of Jerusalem.

2. All hostilities within Jerusalem shall cease. No fire shall be directed into Jerusalem or from it.

3. No arms or warlike stores shall be permitted to enter Jerusalem.

4. Supplies essential to the civil life of the population of Jerusalem shall be allowed to be brought to Jerusalem subject to check by an impartial body acceptable to both Arabs and Jews which will ensure that supplies other than such essential supplies do not pass into Jerusalem.

5. At least one of the following routes shall be open for the transport to Jerusalem of essential supplies (subject to such control) from each of the places where they are available and for the movement of unarmed persons from the place where they may be, that is to say, the Tel Aviv-Jerusalem road via Bab el Wad when possible or Ramallah, and the main roads leading to Jerusalem via Ramallah, Jericho and Bethlehem; provided that no movement shall take place leading to any substantial increase in the Arab or Jewish population of Jerusalem or any exchange of population calculated to increase Arab or Jewish military strength in Jerusalem.

6. Jews, whether living within or without the Old City, shall have the right of free entry and exit to the Jewish quarter of the Old City and from there to the Wailing Wall. Such entry and exit shall be effected through the Zion gate. For the purpose of ensuring that no arms are taken into the Old City, control shall be established at a point outside the Zion gate by the impartial body referred to in Paragraph Four.

7. Jews shall evacuate the Arab quarters of Qatamon now occupied by them.

8. Any dispute concerning the meaning or application of these terms (including the interpretation of the term "essential supplies") shall be decided by the impartial body referred to in Paragraph 4.

WASSON

¹The High Commissioner, on May 7, met at Jericho with Azzam Pasha and other Arab representatives in order to obtain a cease-fire for Jerusalem. The communiqué issued by the Palestine Government noted that "The Arab League representatives agreed to maintain the cease-fire in Jerusalem as from 12 noon tomorrow on the understanding that the Jews also abstain from firing." (Telegram 558, May 7, from Jerusalem, 867N.01/5-748)

The High Commissioner informed the Truce Commission on May 9 that the Jewish delegation had not appeared for talks scheduled for that morning. Bad flying weather was the reason given by the Jews for their nonappearance; but Consul Wasson understood that they "resented keenly not having been brought into cease-fire discussion prior to issuance official communiqué re Jericho talks." (Telegram 570, May 10, 10 a. m., from Jerusalem, 867N.01/5-1048)

501.BB Palestine/5-1048 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the
Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET US URGENT
NIACT

LONDON, May 10, 1948—8 p. m.

2028. Deptel 1673, May 8, received yesterday. Impossible see Bevin Sunday. Saw him this afternoon after previously transmitting to him message contained Deptel 1672, May 8.¹

You ask three questions:

1. Whether Shertok's account of his talk with Creech Jones accurately represents British policy.
2. Whether it reflects Bevin's understanding of Abdullah's intentions.
3. Whether it indicates that Bevin is of the opinion that further truce effort is unnecessary.

As to the third question, Bevin says categorically that it does not mean that he feels that further truce effort is unnecessary. On the contrary, he endorses truce efforts and believes, after a preliminary review of the amendments, truce proposals are sound and has advised the Arabs to accept them. This is in connection with his general view about the matter which he will send me in writing, and which will serve as an answer to the first question which you have raised.

As to the second question, Abdullah's intentions are not clearly and precisely known to Bevin, but he believes that if Abdullah's troops move into Palestine at all, they will confine their movement only to the legitimate and clearly recognized Arab portions.

In addition to the above, Bevin, orally, told me his views which may serve as a partial answer to your first question, but will be amplified in writing. For the moment they are as follows:

- a. He has attempted, and will continue to hold Abdullah back.
- b. He instituted vigorous steps to terminate the attack on Jaffa.
- c. He has taken vigorous measures to keep the Jews out of the Arab quarters in Jerusalem.
- d. He would like to keep the Arabs out of the Jewish areas.
- e. He would like to keep the Jews out of the Arab areas.
- f. Thus he believes there will develop, if it has not already largely developed, a natural what he calls "sorting out of Palestine" which would set the conditions under which a truce, established under a resolution of the UN, could be made effective.
- g. If this develops, he is contemplating an immigration of 4,000 Jews a month from Cyprus.
- h. If Palestine having been so sorted out and truce established under UN resolution accompanied by some sort of a commission, Abdullah's Arabs in the Arabian areas and Haganah's forces in the

¹ See footnote 1, p. 940.

Jewish areas might provide the militia to preserve order and administer affairs of Palestine.

i. The terms of reference of the commission should be as simple as possible and should include those items to which both the Jews and the Arabs agree.

j. He thinks that if the truce for Jerusalem can be obtained as proposed, while it may be but a beginning, an extension to all of Palestine will be facilitated and the remainder of the problem simplified.

k. As a final word, he said that he thought Jaffa and Haifa should be open cities, and that Gaza should be reserved for the Arabs.

I am sending under separate cable ² a report from the UK delegation to the UN to the Foreign Office describing Creech Jones' views as presented to a closed meeting of the sub-committee of Committee One in the afternoon of the 7th of May.

Bevin is extremely anxious that the above, given to me orally, be treated with the greatest secrecy.

DOUGLAS

² No. 2029, May 10, not printed.

867N.01/5-1048 : Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Wasson) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL
NIACT

URGENT

JERUSALEM, May 10, 1948—9 p. m.

584. Haganah forces commenced battle to open Jerusalem-Tel Aviv road at Bab el Wad Saturday night and after fairly heavy fighting succeeded in opening road later Monday afternoon. 4500 persons are reported as having been engaged but number was probably much less. Haganah believed in brigade strength. Arabs pushed back initial Jewish attacks but Jews brought up reinforcements and took key hills and occupied wide area each side of road. American correspondent visiting scene stated that road block presented no problem to clear away and that Jewish engineer units with bulldozers were in action. Food convoy from Tel Aviv is expected Tuesday.

High Commissioner commented to me on Monday that while Jews would undoubtedly be able to open road, it would soon be closed by Arab Legion armor. He said Arab Legion and other Arab armies would march into Arab areas of Palestine after mandate ends.

With opening of Jerusalem-Tel Aviv road Arabs' strongest bargaining point for truce has disappeared and it is believed doubtful Jews will be willing consider any truce not based on their maximum conditions. While Jews say they are prepared continue cease-fire arrangements, they appear ready to take over Jerusalem if necessary. Con-

sequently, Arabs will have either make considerable concessions to obtain truce or give up what they now hold.

WASSON

501.BB Palestine/5-1148

Memorandum by the Department of State to President Truman

SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 11, 1948.

The Department of State recommends that the President approve the following position on Palestine for the United States during the remainder of the Special Session of the General Assembly, and authorize the United States Delegation to introduce necessary resolutions, if that appears desirable in the light of the negotiating situation at Lake Success.

1. The General Assembly should strongly support by resolution the present efforts of the Security Council to obtain a truce in Palestine.

2. The General Assembly should appoint a United Nations Commissioner for Palestine, who shall have the following functions:

a. The United Nations Commissioner shall use his good offices as a mediator with the local and community authorities in Palestine to

- (1) Arrange for the operation of common services necessary to the maintenance of law and order in Palestine and the health and well-being of its population.
- (2) Assure the protection of the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites in Palestine.
- (3) Assist in reaching agreement between the local and community authorities on the future government of Palestine.

b. The United Nations Commissioner shall cooperate with the Truce Commission for Palestine appointed by the Security Council in its resolution of April 23, 1948.

c. The United Nations Commissioner may, with a view to the promotion of the welfare of the inhabitants of Palestine, invite the assistance and cooperation of appropriate specialized agencies of the United Nations such as the World Health Organization, of the International Red Cross and of other governmental or non-governmental organizations of a humanitarian and non-political character.

d. The United Nations Commissioner shall render monthly progress reports, or more frequently as he deems necessary, to the Security Council and to the Secretary General for transmission to the Members of the United Nations.

e. The United Nations Commissioner shall be guided in his activities by the provisions of this resolution and by such instructions as the Security Council may consider necessary to issue.

f. Measures taken by the United Nations Commissioner under the terms of the present resolution shall become immediately effective unless the United Nations Commissioner has previously received contrary instructions from the Security Council.

3. The General Assembly should establish a Temporary United Nations Trusteeship for the City of Jerusalem under the direction of the Trusteeship Council or some other form of special regime under the United Nations auspices for that city.

4. The November 29, 1947 resolution should stand, except that the General Assembly should relieve the Palestine Commission of any responsibilities thereunder and should take note of any directive given by the General Assembly to the Trusteeship Council regarding an alternative course with respect to the City of Jerusalem.¹

¹ Marginal notation by Mr. McClintock: "Approved by President May 12, 1948"; the memorandum, prior to its approval by President Truman was transmitted to New York in telegram 298, May 11, 4 p. m. (501.BB Palestine/5-1148).

Editorial Note

On May 11, the United States presented a draft resolution to the First Committee, calling for the creation of a subcommittee to examine further measures for the protection of Jerusalem and make recommendations to the First Committee as promptly as possible (GA (II/SS), *Main Committees*, page 229); for text of the United States proposal, see GA (II/SS), *Annex*, page 35. The First Committee the same day adopted the United States proposal, as amended; for text of the resolution, see *ibid.*, page 36.

France and the United States, in a joint document given United Nations control number A/C.1/SC.10/1, May 11, proposed to Subcommittee 10 of the First Committee creation of a temporary international regime for Jerusalem, to exercise authority in that city from May 15. New York sent an "unofficial" text to the Department in telegram 638, May 12, 9:04 p. m. This text designated the United Nations as the administering authority in Jerusalem, with the Trusteeship Council to exercise the functions of the administering authority. The government of Jerusalem was to consist of a high commissioner, to be appointed by the Trusteeship Council, who would be responsible for the maintenance of internal order (501.BB Palestine/5-1248).

Subcommittee 10 made its report to the First Committee on May 13; for text, see GA (II/SS), *Annex*, page 37. Incorporated in the report was the revised version of the joint French and American proposals, which retained the substance of the original proposals.

The First Committee, on May 14, adopted a motion by the United States to transmit the report of Subcommittee 10 to the General Assembly without a vote. The motion carried by 15 votes to none, with 26 abstentions (GA (II/SS), *Main Committees*, page 274).

The General Assembly considered the report of Subcommittee 10 at the last meeting of Second Special Session on May 14. The draft resolution, as amended by the Assembly, received 9 affirmative votes and 15 negative votes. There were nine abstentions. The President of the Assembly ruled the measure rejected, since it failed to receive the required two-thirds majority (GA (II/SS), *Plenary*, pages 28-36).

867N.01/5-1048

Memorandum by the Legal Adviser (Gross) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)

[WASHINGTON,] May 11, 1948.

RECOGNITION OF NEW STATES AND GOVERNMENTS IN PALESTINE

The attached memorandum discusses, from the legal point of view, the question of recognition by the United States of the existence of a new state or states in Palestine after May 14, 1948, and the question of extending diplomatic recognition to a government or governments in the new state or states. The memorandum reaches the following conclusions on the basis of the facts presently existing:

(1) The Arab and Jewish communities will be legally entitled on May 15, 1948 to proclaim states and organize governments in the areas of Palestine occupied by the respective communities.

(2) Inasmuch as recognition of any new state and government in Palestine during the current special session of the General Assembly might be considered to contravene the Security Council resolution of April 17, 1948, it would be desirable that the special session be concluded before the recognition of any new state and government in Palestine.

(3) The United States will be free to recognize the existence of any new states and their governments, proclaimed by the communities of Palestine in the areas occupied by them respectively. Whether it should do so is a matter of executive discretion which may be decided upon the basis of the political interests of the United States.

(4) Neither community will be legally entitled to proclaim a unitary state and organize a government for all of Palestine without the consent of both communities. The United States therefore should not recognize a unitary state and government for all of Palestine proclaimed without the consent of both communities.

ERNEST A. GROSS

[Annex]

*Memorandum by the Legal Adviser (Gross) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)*¹

[WASHINGTON,] May 13, 1948.

RECOGNITION OF SUCCESSOR STATES IN PALESTINE

The possibility exists that the Jewish Agency for Palestine will proclaim a Jewish state in part of Palestine on May 15, 1948, and that the Arab Higher Committee will at the same time proclaim an Arab state for all of Palestine. The present memorandum considers from the legal point of view what the attitude of the United States should be toward recognition of one or both of these states and their respective governments. It is assumed, for present purposes, that the United Nations General Assembly will not repeal its Palestine resolution of November 29, 1947; if the General Assembly were to do so, presumably its action would be taken under circumstances of a truce and provisional settlement for Palestine which would obviate the proclamation of any new state in Palestine with a new government.

Recognition of a new state.

If Jewish and Arab states were proclaimed in Palestine, the problem of recognition in relation to them would be first a problem of recognizing the existence of a new state or states—a question separate from the extension of diplomatic recognition to a new government. Premature recognition of a new state's existence within the territory of a previously existing state is wrongful in international law because such recognition constitutes an unwarranted interference in the affairs of the previously existing state. The present memorandum is limited to consideration of the legal question, and does not concern the political question whether the existence of a new state ought to be recognized. If the United States is legally free to recognize the existence of a new state, it is entirely a question of policy whether recognition shall be given or not.

We have now to consider whether recognition of the existence of any new states in Palestine would constitute an international tort against any previously existing state. This inquiry calls first for a determination concerning the legal status of Palestine just prior to the proclamation of any new states in that country. The whole territory of Palestine, including the Trans-Jordan, was detached from the former sovereign, Turkey, in the World War I peace settlement. A Class "A" mandate for Palestine, under Article 22 of the Covenant

¹ This text is the later of two versions found by the editors in the Department of State files. The earlier version of May 10, which constituted the original annex to Gross' memorandum of May 11, is not printed.

of the League of Nations, was conferred on Great Britain by the Principal Allied and Associated Powers. The mandatory power was given general powers of administration over Palestine. The mandate could be altered by Great Britain with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations, or could be terminated by completion of the tutelage of Palestine by Great Britain and the grant of full independence to the people of Palestine as contemplated in Article 22 of the League Covenant.

On April 2, 1947 Great Britain asked the General Assembly to consider the question of the future government of Palestine. This request could lead either to a recommendation by the Assembly to the mandatory on the manner in which Palestine's tutelage should be completed and full independence granted, or to an act of consent by the General Assembly to alteration of the mandate terms.* It is possible to interpret the General Assembly's resolution of November 29, 1947 as constituting either of the two actions just mentioned. When Great Britain first asked the General Assembly to examine the Palestine problem, the request appears to have been made with a view to securing a General Assembly *recommendation*. Later, at the regular 1947 session of the Assembly, Great Britain announced that the mandate would be terminated and that Britain would not take the undivided responsibility for implementing any solution which was not agreed to by both Arabs and Jews, thus implying a changed British theory concerning the nature of the action sought from the General Assembly. On either theory, the mandatory power and Great Britain together were competent to make a legally effective political settlement for Palestine. By virtue of the Assembly's passage of the resolution and Great Britain's "acceptance" of the plan, these authorities appear to have made a legal disposition for the future of Palestine.

The Palestine plan contained in the General Assembly's resolution of November 29, 1947 provided for termination of the mandate, provisional arrangements for administration, and subsequent emergence of two independent states and an international territory (the City of Jerusalem); the partition of Palestine was to be accompanied by economic union. The working out of this Plan required the active functioning of the General Assembly's Palestine Commission. That body has now suspended its political operations, and the Plan cannot be carried forward without a resumption of activity by the Commission (including the designation of provisional councils of government).

On May 15, 1948 the mandate for Palestine will end, pursuant to the provisions of the Plan; at that time Great Britain will withdraw its

*The mode of devolution of League of Nations functions and powers to United Nations organs is not discussed in the present memorandum. It is the opinion of this Office that the General Assembly could decide to exercise the power—formerly held by the Council of the League of Nations—to consent to an alteration of the Palestine mandate. [Footnote in the source text.]

mandatory administration, even though other steps contemplated by the plan are not being taken and even though Great Britain herself has failed to take some important measures called for by the General Assembly resolution of November 29, 1947. Under these circumstances, British abandonment of the mandate may be a breach of Great Britain's international obligations; but as a practical matter the mandate would nevertheless be terminated. According to the plan, the Palestine Commission was to be legally responsible for the administration of Palestine upon termination of the mandate, pending transfer of authority to the successor governmental agencies. If the Commission after May 14 is suspended, or is paralyzed and makes no effort to administer Palestine, the question must be asked whether any other authority can have legal capacity to carry on with the governing of Palestine.

At this point we must consider the role of the remaining Principal Allied and Associated Powers. It was these powers which allocated the Palestine mandate to Great Britain after World War I. Possibly they retained some residuary rights of disposition over Palestine after the mandate was granted. If such rights persisted, they might be asserted in the event that the mandate ended abruptly without provision for a future political settlement. Such might be the case if the General Assembly before May 15, 1948 repealed its resolution of November 29, 1947 and no other legally effective disposition of Palestine should be made by the Assembly and Great Britain. But in the absence of such repeal by the Assembly of its resolution, it seems particularly doubtful that the remaining Principal Allied and Associated Powers could assert any residuary rights.†

We are then faced with the situation where the only agencies claiming to have governing powers over Palestine are organizations within that country.‡ The law of nations recognizes an inherent right of people lacking the agencies and institutions of social and political control to organize a state and operate a government.

Article 22 of the League Covenant provided

"Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone."

†Apart from the legal aspect of this matter, it appears highly unlikely from the political point of view that the United States, United Kingdom, and France would assume responsibility for the government of Palestine in their role as the remaining Principal Allied and Associated Powers. [Footnote in the source text.]

‡The present memorandum does not discuss the question of the power of the Security Council to take action under the United Nations Charter in the form of assuming provisional administration over Palestine. [Footnote in the source text.]

Palestine was covered by this Article, later being made a Class "A" mandate. Just what constituted the "communities" referred to in Article 22 was not made clear. Quite evidently Palestine as a whole was not *a community*, as is shown by the fact that the mandatory in 1946 detached the Trans-Jordan from Palestine and gave it independence. The Palestine mandate instrument referred specifically to "communities" and in a manner so as to make clear that the principal religious communities of Palestine—Jewish and Arab—were intended by the reference.

There is, of course, in the background of the mandate and of the League Covenant, the Balfour Declaration of November 2, 1917 by the British Government, declaring in favor of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people. When the Council of the League of Nations gave its approval to the Palestine mandate so that the instrument could become effective, the Council in its approving resolution cited the agreement of the Principal Allied Powers that Great Britain "should be responsible for putting into effect the declaration originally made on November 2, 1917, by the Government of His Britannic Majesty, and adopted by the said Powers . . .".[§] It is therefore apparent that the disposition of Palestine by the competent Powers after World War I included a provision, having the nature of a trust, in favor of a Jewish national home in Palestine. This was to be, however, without prejudice to the civil and religious rights of existing communities in Palestine. One of the ways in which this trust might be carried out would be through the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine.

The existence of this trust together with the inherent right recognized in international law afford a legal basis for the formation of a state and government by the Jewish community in the areas of Palestine which that community occupies.¶ Such action would also have the moral sanction of the partially implemented disposition of Palestine made by the mandatory and the United Nations General Assembly in the Partition Plan. Similarly, the Arab Community would be entitled to organize a state and government in the areas of Palestine which it occupies.¶

It should be noted that the proclamation of a state and government by either community during the current special session of the General Assembly would be contrary to the provisions of paragraph 1(d) of the Security Council truce resolution of April 17, 1948. This resolution

§ The relationship of the United States to the Palestine mandate was set forth in the Anglo-American Convention of 1924. [Footnote in the source text.]

¶ In this connection, the Jewish Agency for Palestine occupies a special position in relation to the Jewish community under the terms of the mandate instrument. [Footnote in the source text.]

¶ Questions concerning doubtful areas, in dispute between the communities, would have to be adjusted. In this matter the Partition Plan would naturally provide a basic guide. [Footnote in the source text.]

does not bind legally either community nor would it bind the states and governments proclaimed, since none of these are or would then be members of the United Nations.**

The same resolution called upon governments "and particularly those of the countries neighboring Palestine to take all possible steps to assist in the implementation of the measures set out under paragraph 1 above, and particularly those referring to the entry into Palestine of armed bands and fighting personnel, groups and individuals and weapons and war materials". This provision, binding upon members of the United Nations, might be construed to cover the recognition of any new states in Palestine during the special session of the Assembly.

One may conclude, therefore: (1) the United States probably should not recognize the existence of any new state in Palestine during the special session, unless the Security Council should repeal its April 17 resolution; (2) the United States, after the special session, will be legally free to recognize the existence of Jewish and Arab states in the areas of Palestine occupied by them, respectively; (3) the United States should not recognize the existence of either an Arab or Jewish unitary state for all of Palestine in the absence of consent by the communities, since to do so would contravene obligations and rights arising out of the provisions of the League Covenant, the mandate instrument, the General Assembly resolution of November 29, 1947, and the principles of the law of nations regarding self-determination of peoples.

Recognition of a new government.

In any situation where the United States is free under international law to recognize the existence of a new state, the determination of whether diplomatic recognition should be accorded to a particular regime as the government of that state is entirely a question of policy. United States policy in this matter has been set forth in a paper of the Policy Planning Staff (PPS 24), dated March 15, 1948,² which was subsequently approved. Relevant Policy Planning Staff recommendations are attached at Tab A.³

Certain criteria, relating to the character of the government under consideration, have in the past been employed in deciding on the granting or withholding of recognition. These are:

(a) *de facto* control of the territory and the administrative machinery of State, including the maintenance of public order;

** It is possible that compliance with the April 17 resolution would be made one of the criteria in passing on applications of the new states for membership in the United Nations. But it is questionable to what extent this would affect consideration of the applications, both communities and the states bordering Palestine having frequently violated the Security Council truce resolution. [Footnote in the source text.]

² Vol. ix, p. 17.

³ Not printed.

- (b) the ability and willingness of a government to discharge its international obligations;
- (c) general acquiescence of the people of a country in the government in power.

In Tab B⁴ of this memorandum there are collected a number of illustrative instances in American history.

ERNEST A. GROSS

⁴ Not printed.

USUN Files

*Transcript of Remarks Made by Mr. Dean Rusk in Conversation by Telephone With Mr. Jessup and Mr. Ross on May 11, 1948*¹

Mr. Jessup: Did you see the newspaper stories this morning from London about the Russian-United States agreement to settle all their difficulties.² Is there anything in that?

Mr. Rusk: I think there is, yes.

Mr. Jessup: If we now make a switch over to the side the Russians have been defending³ it would be an implication that we have a deal with them on the ME.

Mr. Rusk: Yes, but regardless of what people have said, we have never fundamentally abandoned this other plan. We have taken some time out to try to get a truce and a trusteeship.

I have a simplified view of this thing. It seems if we go back to what we are after, it has been all along a peaceful settlement of this thing in Palestine. As late as March 17 we were trying to find some inkling of some sort of agreement between the Jews and the Arabs with the help of the Security Council, with some effort to adjust the partition plan to what they would accept, but we went black-out because the Arabs would not talk about it. So we shifted on March 19, the whole emphasis, to a straight truce. That truce would have taken us beyond May 15 and beyond the period when there was no government in Palestine. If we had gotten a truce we were prepared to go in on a trusteeship to formalize the truce arrangement and for that we made suggestions to

¹ Mr. Rusk was in Washington; Messrs. Jessup and Ross in New York City. The transcript was classified secret.

² For documentation on the conversations between Walter Bedell Smith, American Ambassador in the Soviet Union, and Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov, which took place at Moscow from May 4 to May 9, see vol. iv, pp. 845-854, *passim*. At the conversation on May 9, the Foreign Minister handed to Ambassador Smith the text of an oral statement, which read in part as follows: "The Soviet Government shares the desire, expressed in this statement by the Government of the USA, to better these relations, and is in agreement with the proposal to proceed with this aim towards a discussion and settlement of the difference existing between us." The text of the statement is presented in telegram 867, May 10, from Moscow, *ibid.*, p. 854.

³ The reference is to the Soviet support of the partition of Palestine into Jewish and Arab States.

various governments about going in with us to establish this trusteeship. The President never did decide we had to impose a trusteeship against the wishes of either community. At the present time the situation is we have no truce and also we have no basis here for trusteeship unless it is asked for at least by some of the parties. The UK has not asked for a trusteeship. They have not in fact turned it down but they're playing around with this thing. The Jews certainly have not asked for it and would bitterly oppose it. The Arabs have not asked for it. Under certain conditions they might vote for it but certainly are not seeking a trusteeship.

Mr. Ross: I think they are.

Mr. Rusk: They may now but they have not made any formal proposal that that be done. They could still come in to ask for trusteeship for Arab parts of Palestine.

If the UK comes forward with a proposal for any UN responsibility, I guess we will have to extend the Mandate long enough to permit the UN to give it consideration. They certainly cannot expect action in the next few days which would indicate a change of mind on the part of the UK. The simple question is what is the UN responsibility on May 15. We clearly stated on March 19 that it will not have overall administrative governmental responsibility for Palestine. If it is to have such responsibility somebody has to ask for it. I don't think it is up to us to ask for it if the UK, the Jews and the Arabs are not asking for it. Our interest is in a peaceful settlement and not in the interest of pushing or imposing a truce on the people of Palestine. It seems the present parliamentary situation is that we have had in fact a rejection of a truce. Rejection of the truce cuts the heart out of trusteeship unless the parties come in on a trusteeship. It seems we must pursue a truce line in the Security Council. It seems the General Assembly might among other things stand by to help but specifically the General Assembly might authorize the Trusteeship Council to establish a trusteeship for Jerusalem in negotiation with the Jews and Arabs and with suitable arrangements for security of the City and if the General Assembly authorized the Trusteeship Council to take that necessary action with regard to Jerusalem, leave the truce negotiations in the hands of the Security Council, and ask that both report back to the next Session of the General Assembly if there is further action the General Assembly might possibly take to assist in getting a peaceful settlement, we have about all we want out of the situation. It is true but the main thing across the way is if this is going to happen anyway, why don't we go ahead and get credit for it and we are trying to break that off. It sets our noses in a direction which we can't disregard here.

I am not assuming for the moment it is a pushover at all, nor that it will develop that way, but I think as the pattern has got to develop

within the efforts of the Security Council to get a truce. Otherwise you put the General Assembly in a position of putting something on paper that either somebody will enforce or will not be represented by the facts on the ground.

I would say as soon as the Special Session adjourns, then the truce resolution, that particular paragraph, of course, dissolves, but my guess is it is a ———⁴ resolution at this stage and does not really bind the parties.

I think the General Assembly should back up the Security Council truce effort. Whether you do it in terms of a specific resolution or simply by means of a strongly worded General Assembly resolution in support of the idea of a truce is something else, but I think the terms of the truce ought to be negotiated between the parties solely on the grounds of what will stop the fighting, and I don't think the Security Council or the General Assembly should lay down terms of the truce except in direct reference to the state of affairs in Palestine.

I think we ought to go ahead in the Security Council but I do think that there is a difference between the Security Council establishing provisional measures of a stricter military nature and the Security Council ordering cessation of political activity. I think the two elements are on different footing and I think the Council ought to be careful it shouldn't put itself in an artificial position.

It hasn't ordered them not to but has called upon them.

Phil, I think what is likely to come out from down here, particularly across the way,⁵ is the idea that something has happened in fact over there. It is not according to plan but nevertheless there is a community in existence over there,⁶ running its own affairs. Now that community apparently is going to get an open shot at establishing itself. We have told them that if they get in trouble don't come to us for help in a military sense. Nevertheless, I don't think the boss⁷ will ever put himself in a position of opposing that effort when it might be that the US opposition would be the only thing that would prevent it from succeeding.

I don't know whether the Arabs are going to do that and whether the Arabs are going to invite Abdullah in, but it seems to me that what you have there then is simply a continuation of the status quo in this sense. You have people, each fairly responsible for its own community but with a political settlement which has to be negotiated because you have these succeeding claims.

⁴ As in the source text.

⁵ The White House.

⁶ The Jewish community in Palestine.

⁷ President Truman.

I don't quite see—I think the way you state the possibility is entirely accurate and it may take all sorts of different forms. We have no assurance at all that there is any agreement between any Jews and any Arabs on anything. Nevertheless, unless we assume that our basic problem is a negotiated settlement between the Jews and the Arabs, then we get into the possibility of either having to enforce something or imposing something, which is merely a piece of paper, and has no connection with what is going on in Palestine.

I think the idea that they worked on here yesterday was that the Palestine Commission would be discharged of its responsibility but that the plan would stand as an expression of the views of the General Assembly on what the future of Palestine ought to be.

Ross: In principle?

Rusk: That's right. It seems to me that one of the positive things we need do is authorize the Trusteeship Council in negotiation with the Jews and Arabs to undertake international administration for the City of Jerusalem if that can be arranged because I do think that might avoid a terrific battle between the Jews and Arabs and one which both might accept. The Jews are committed to accept it, in one sense.

Yes, I think making a full disclosure of our truce negotiations would be entirely reasonable and possible, and also, a disclosure of the basis on which they were turned down. I think, Jack, your third alternative is one which is going to be bought down here.

You, remember, Jack, that the Committee 1 effort and the trusteeship discussions have always been embarrassed by the fact—and our basic position paper—the fellow carrying that was always looking over his shoulder at the progress of the truce negotiations and those didn't materialize.

Yes. I can tell you right now that Bob Lovett is most anxious to have a completely clean breast of all these negotiations, and I think you can assume that our efforts from, oh, certainly March 19 on, would be a completely appropriate basis for a good statement. In other words, we have literally done our damndest on this thing. Now if it doesn't work, we certainly aren't going to take this thing on our own backs single-handed and it is not up to us to continue to bat our brains out on the theory we are solely responsible for what the General Assembly does on this situation and what action the Assembly takes has got to be something which is either a provisional or final solution of this thing.

That part of the GA which is critical to trusteeship is not willing to approve it.

Jessup: Yes but I think we can count on two-thirds.

Rusk: Yes, but if the UK and France are unwilling to step in and help implement it you really haven't got anything yet.

Yes, but we have had some difficulty though calling something an administering authority which would be something less than the central government of Palestine. If the UN becomes administering authority the UN becomes responsible in X number of ways—the UN would thereby take on unbeknownst to itself an unlimited number of obligations merely because it becomes the government, and we don't know what those obligations are, and I think our British friends would like nothing better than to trap us in an arrangement like that so that we would take on an excess number of responsibilities or liabilities.

I think if we start taking up any of these things, the only possible way would be to extend the Mandate for a long enough period to be able to consider it. The caboose has gone by on a number of this stuff and they would have to start a new train here.

Jessup: When do you think we will get some word from you, Dean?

Rusk: I definitely hope this afternoon.

I think you better be quiet during the morning unless I can call you back. I think what we can do is to go ahead on the Jerusalem thing, but don't you think there is a possibility the General Assembly might authorize the Trusteeship Council with a certain amount of discretion to negotiate an international zone for Jerusalem?

Jessup: Yes.

Rusk: So that these truce negotiations will always have the possible element in them as one way of reducing friction between the Jews and Arabs. I hope by early afternoon we can give you the green light to go full speed ahead at a snail's pace.

501.BB Palestine/5-1148: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Jerusalem

SECRET US URGENT
 NIACT

WASHINGTON, May 11, 1948—6 p. m.

384. Absence of report of action in response to Dept's 377, May 9, 6 p. m., suggests that you may have misconstrued Dept's intention as set forth first paragraph that telegram. If you have not already done so, please informally give draft of truce articles as transmitted Depcirtel May 7, 6 a. m. to representatives of Jewish Agency, Arab Higher Committee, and Arab League in Palestine. This should be done preferably in concert with your colleagues of SC Truce Commission, but if they are without instructions you may act alone.¹

MARSHALL

¹ Mr. Wasson, joined by the other members of the Truce Commission, informally handed the draft of truce articles to representatives of the Jewish Agency and of the Arab Higher Committee, presumably on May 12 (telegram 602, May 13, 3 p. m., from Jerusalem, 867N.01/5-1348).

501.BB Palestine/5-1148 : Telegram

*The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to
the Secretary of State*

SECRET

NEW YORK, May 11, 1948—6:51 p. m.

628. From Ross. Following are my notes on further telegram Beeley has received from Foreign Office on status of negotiations here. This telegram is based on comparison in London of two alternative draft texts.

Foreign Office considerably more negative today than yesterday on question of trusteeship, and greatly prefers resolution along lines Anglo-Canadian text. UKDel instructed to concentrate on securing approval of resolution along lines Creech Jones proposal in simplest terms. Much of telegram detailed and now out of date so will record in memorandum. Principal points to note here are :

(1) Foreign Office feels great advantage in building on the existing Truce Commission.

(2) Foreign Office cites objection to Anglo-American draft as not providing means of isolating conflict and preventing means of penetration (Russia). To meet this defect UK instruction suggests adding new point running as follows: "To take all practical steps to secure observance of SC truce resolution 17 April and with this object to seek advice and assistance from other powers as it may be necessary."

Hopkins (Canada) also feels strongly need of some provision, regardless of form of GA action which will provide opportunity of assistance re Russian penetration and isolating conflict, if needed, outside of SC framework, and handed me following formula in separate conversation this afternoon :

"The Commission (administering authority) may seek advice and assistance in the exercise of its functions from any member of the UN (state) willing to provide such advice and assistance."

In conversation with Beeley, referred to above, I told him we expected our instructions this afternoon and we would want to work very closely with them in developing program we might be able to agree upon.

I told him I wanted to say a few things very frankly on a personal basis and made clear I was not acting under instructions.

I said very unlikely we would approve trusteeship but for reasons somewhat different than UK Government's views. Principal difficulty was improbability success of truce efforts before May 15; this difficulty resulting from very noticeable stiffening Jewish attitude resulting, in

turn, from temptation they obviously reveal to play with Abdullah idea.¹

Second reason, I said, for probability we would not push Trusteeship idea further was that before we made our original trusteeship proposal three or four weeks ago we had asked the British if they would be willing to participate in necessary implementation and had got what must be described as flatly negative response. Show of cooperation by UK during past three or four days and indication of participation in effective action by naval patrol, etc., must be described as eleventh hour effort but too little and too late. Time at present was too short to permit working out details of such cooperation. For this reason, approach, I anticipated we would be getting in our instructions this afternoon, would be a very simple one and I hoped our close cooperation over past few days could be continued. [Ross.]

AUSTIN

¹ Jerusalem reported, on May 10, that a spokesman for the Jewish Agency "hinted broadly that there was an understanding with Abdullah whereby Trans-jordan forces would occupy areas allotted to Arabs under partition plan. He said that the Jews and Abdullah got along well and that they placed little stock in bellicose statements Abdullah, pushed by Arab states, was making." (Telegram 585, 867N.01/5-1048)

867N.01/5-1148 : Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Wasson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET URGENT
NIACT

JERUSALEM, May 11, 1948—10 p. m.

591. Contel 582, May 10. During meeting with Truce Commission morning May 11, High Commissioner said that Jews were short-sighted not to accept his proposed terms of truce for Jerusalem. He went on to say that flushed with victory Jews did not realize that Arabs could keep Tel-Aviv-Jerusalem road closed, thus starving population of Jerusalem.

During interview High Commissioner said that he perceived no objection to Truce Commission's issuing an appeal to people of Jerusalem to continue to observe the "cease-fire" in order that the Truce Commission might pursue its work, although he said that his responsibility for truce negotiations had not ended. High Commissioner observed that he would invite Truce Commission to be present at meeting with Jews, should they appear, at which time he would turn over to Truce Commission entire responsibility for conducting future negotiations.

During afternoon meeting of Truce Commission, at which Azcarate of UN was present, Berman of JA informed us that Jews were pre-

pared to continue observing "cease-fire" provided Arabs did likewise. Truce Commission is having difficulty finding any representative Arabs. They have apparently fled or gone underground.

Berman said that there had been more fighting on the Tel-Aviv road and that the situation was confused. The impression which Berman left us was that Jews will be most difficult to deal with in truce talks, since they appear to feel that they have nothing to gain by a truce unless it gives them everything that they wish in Palestine. It appears to us that they are delaying discussions for the purpose of setting up their government and improving their position.

There are unconfirmed reports that Jews will receive large quantities of military equipment, now in various Mediterranean ports, after May 15. From our very limited vantage point in Jerusalem, it appears that Jews are now prepared to gamble everything for unlimited immigration and the formation of their state.

It is my opinion that truce talks for all of Palestine have very slight chance of success. Our efforts to maintain a "cease-fire" in Jerusalem may succeed for a time. Each side is already accusing the other of breaking the "cease-fire". The Arabs say that by sending Jewish troops to clear the Tel-Aviv road, the Jews did so. The Jews accuse the Arabs of sniping. The Truce Commission will do its best to maintain the uneasy "cease-fire" while discussing terms for a truce in Jerusalem.¹

WASSON

¹The High Commissioner, in the afternoon of May 12, informed the Truce Commission that neither side had replied to the terms of truce proposed for Jerusalem by the Palestine Government and requested the Truce Commission to assume responsibility for further truce talks (telegram 595, May 12, 8 p. m., from Jerusalem, 867N.01/5-1248).

501.BB Palestine/5-1248

*Memorandum of Conversation, by Secretary of State*¹

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] May 12, 1948.

Participants: The President

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

Messrs. Clark Clifford, David Niles, Matthew Connelly—The White House

Fraser Wilkins (NE)—State Dept.

Robert McClintock (UNA)—State Dept.

The President said that he had called the meeting because he was seriously concerned as to what might happen in Palestine after May 15.

¹ Drafted by Mr. McClintock.

Mr. Lovett gave a lengthy exposition of recent events bearing on the Palestine problem. He recalled that on the preceding Saturday, May 8, the Political Representative of the Jewish Agency, Mr. Moshe Shertok, had called upon the Secretary and himself, accompanied by Dr. Epstein. Mr. Shertok had related that the British Minister for Colonial Affairs, Sir Arthur Creech Jones, had told him that Abdullah, the King of Transjordan, might enter the Arab portions of Palestine but that there need be no fear that Abdullah's forces, centered upon the British subsidized and officered Arab Legion, would seek to penetrate Jewish areas of Palestine. Furthermore, Mr. Shertok told the Secretary that a message, a week delayed in transmission, had been received from the Jewish Agency in Palestine, recounting overtures by a Colonel Goldy, an officer of the Arab Legion, suggesting that a deal could be worked out between Abdullah and the Jewish Agency whereby the King would take over the Arab portion of Palestine and leave the Jews in possession of their state in the remainder of that country.

Mr. Lovett said that this intelligence had obviously caused an abrupt shift in the position of the Jewish Agency. Only a week before, the Jewish Agency had officially communicated to the Security Council its charges that Arab armies were invading Palestine. Likewise, only a week before, Mr. Shertok and other representatives of the Jewish Agency had seemed seriously interested in proposed articles of truce. Now, however, their attitude had shifted and they seemed confident, on the basis of recent military successes and the prospect of a "behind the barn" deal with Abdullah, that they could establish their sovereign state without any necessity for a truce with the Arabs of Palestine.

I intervened at this juncture to recall what I had told Mr. Shertok on May 8. I had stressed that it was extremely dangerous to base long-range policy on temporary military success. There was no doubt but that the Jewish army had gained such temporary success but there was no assurance whatever that in the long-range the tide might not turn against them. I told Mr. Shertok that they were taking a gamble. If the tide did turn adversely and they came running to us for help they should be placed clearly on notice now that there was no warrant to expect help from the United States, which had warned them of the grave risk which they were running.

Later during the conversation a telephone call was received from General Carter² stating that a UP press despatch from Tel Aviv reported that following two interviews with me by Mr. Shertok the latter had flown to Tel Aviv bearing a personal message from me to Mr. Ben Gurion, who was styled in the press despatch as the forth-

² Marshall S. Carter, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State.

coming President of the Jewish State.³ The despatch likewise was reported as saying that Shertok had informed me of the intention of the Jewish Agency to establish a sovereign state on May 16.

I directed, with the President's concurrence, that no comment be made on this press story. In actual fact, no message had been sent to Mr. Ben Gurion, and I did not even know that such a person existed. Furthermore, Shertok had not told me of any intention to establish a Jewish State on May 16.

Resuming his summary of the situation, Mr. Lovett read a telegram just received from New York City, indicating that, while the United Kingdom Government was prepared to support our draft resolution, it desired that the United States give further consideration to the possibility of a commission being appointed by the General Assembly to deal with the administration of Palestine, this commission to be made up of Belgium, France and the United States.

It was generally agreed that the British had played a lamentable, if not altogether duplicitous, role in the Palestine situation and that their last-minute approaches and indications of a change in heart could have no effect upon our policy.

The President then invited Mr. Clark Clifford to make a statement. Mr. Clifford said that he had three main suggestions to offer, based upon consultation with colleagues of the White House staff.

Mr. Clifford said that he objected to the first article of our draft resolution which would place the General Assembly on record as reaffirming support of the efforts of the Security Council to secure a truce in Palestine. He said this reference was unrealistic since there had been no truce and probably would not be one. He said that on March 24, Mr. Rusk at a White House conference⁴ had estimated that a truce could be negotiated within two weeks but this goal was still not in sight. Instead, the actual partition of Palestine had taken place "without the use of outside force".

Mr. Clifford's second point was strongly to urge the President to give prompt recognition to the Jewish State after the termination of the mandate on May 15. He said such a move should be taken quickly before the Soviet Union recognized the Jewish State. It would have distinct value in restoring the President's position for support of the partition of Palestine.

Mr. Clifford's third point was that the President, at his press conference on the following day, May 13, should make a statement of his intention to recognize the Jewish State, once the provision for democratic government outlined in the resolution of November 29, had been complied with, which he assumed would be the case. The proposed

³ David Ben Gurion, Chairman of the Executive of the Jewish Agency, in fact became the first Prime Minister of Israel.

⁴ See Mr. Clifford's memorandum of March 24, p. 755.

statement would conclude: "I have asked the Secretary of State to have the Representatives of the United States in the United Nations take up this subject in the United Nations with a view toward obtaining early recognition of a Jewish State by the other members of the United Nations".

The rebuttal was made by Mr. Lovett. With regard to Mr. Clifford's reference to the article on truce, Mr. Lovett pointed out that the Security Council was still seized of this matter under its resolutions of April 1, April 17 and April 23. The United States in fact was a member of the Security Council's Truce Commission on Palestine. Surely the United States could not by its unilateral act get the Security Council to drop this matter and it would be most unbecoming, in light of our activities to secure a truce.

On the question of premature recognition, Mr. Lovett said that it would be highly injurious to the United Nations to announce the recognition of the Jewish State even before it had come into existence and while the General Assembly, which had been called into special session at the request of the United States, was still considering the question of the future government of Palestine. Furthermore, said Mr. Lovett, such a move would be injurious to the prestige of the President. It was a very transparent attempt to win the Jewish vote but, in Mr. Lovett's opinion, it would lose more votes than it would gain. Finally, to recognize the Jewish State prematurely would be buying a pig in a poke. How did we know what kind of Jewish State would be set up? At this stage Mr. Lovett read excerpts from a file of intelligence telegrams and reports regarding Soviet activity in sending Jews and Communist agents from Black Sea areas to Palestine.

Mr. Lovett also failed to see any particular urgency in the United States rushing to recognize the Jewish State prior to possible Soviet recognition.

I remarked to the President that, speaking objectively, I could not help but think that the suggestions made by Mr. Clifford were wrong. I thought that to adopt these suggestions would have precisely the opposite effect from that intended by Mr. Clifford. The transparent dodge to win a few votes would not in fact achieve this purpose. The great dignity of the office of the President would be seriously diminished. The counsel offered by Mr. Clifford was based on domestic political considerations, while the problem which confronted us was international. I said bluntly that if the President were to follow Mr. Clifford's advice and if in the elections I were to vote, I would vote against the President.

Mr. Lovett and I told the President that naturally after May 16 we would take another look at the situation in Palestine in light of the facts as they existed. Clearly the question of recognition would have to be gone into very carefully. A paper presenting the legal aspects

of the problem had been prepared in the Department and would be promptly sent to Mr. Clifford.

The President initialed the draft resolution and the underlying position paper of May 11, and terminated the interview by saying that he was fully aware of the difficulties and dangers in the situation, to say nothing of the political risks involved which he, himself, would run.

Editorial Note

Undated notes on the White House meeting of May 12 by Mr. Elsey state that it was held at 4 p.m. Attached to the notes is a statement prepared for the May 12 meeting drafted by Max Lowenthal, an unofficial White House consultant, with changes by Elsey. Also attached is a revised statement by Elsey, printed *infra*.

Elsey's notes indicate that this statement was read to the group, presumably by Mr. Clifford, and received a "violent reaction from Marshall: This is just straight politics. 'You wouldn't get my OK.' CMC was enraged—& Marshall glared at CMC. State had no policy except to 'wait'."

Page 2 of Mr. Elsey's notes presents "CMC's position, as worked out with GME on 12 May & as expounded by him at 12 May meeting [:]

"1. Recognition is consistent with U.S. policy from the beginning.

"2. A separate Jewish State is inevitable. It will be set up in a few days.

"3. Other nations will recognize it. We shall have to, also, in a few months.

"4. It is better to recognize now—steal a march on U.S.S.R.

"5. The proposed State Dept action would accomplish nothing at all (i.e. memo of 11 May)". (Elsey Papers)

The "memo of May 11" is Mr. Gross' memorandum to Mr. Lovett, page 959.

These five numbered points bear a marked resemblance to those in the editorial note on page 906.

John Snetsinger, *Truman, the Jewish Vote, and the Creation of Israel*, presents on pages 107–109 an account of the May 12 meeting based on the author's interviews in 1968 with Messrs. McClintock and Henderson and with Carlton Savage, who in 1948 was Executive Secretary of the Policy Planning Staff.

Various details of the meeting are also presented in Kurzman, *Genesis, 1948*, page 215, and in Jonathan Daniels, *The Man of Independence* (Philadelphia and New York, J. B. Lippincott Company, 1950), page 319. Kurzman's account states erroneously that the meeting took place on May 11.

For the discussion by Messrs. Lovett and Clifford on May 14 concerning the question of the recognition of the State of Israel, see Mr. Lovett's memorandum of conversation dated May 17, page 1005.

Elsey Papers

*Statement Presented by the President's Special Counsel (Clifford)
at the White House Meeting of May 12, 1948.¹*

[WASHINGTON, undated.]

I would like to make a brief statement of my views on the situation in Palestine.

When the United Nations Committee on Palestine concluded its study of the Palestine problem last fall, it recommended a plan of partition with economic union. The United States Government, after most careful consideration of all aspects of this plan, decided to support it, with certain comparatively minor modifications. The General Assembly of the United Nations, by the overwhelming vote of 33-13, approved this plan with the modifications we favored in a Resolution passed on November 29, 1947.

The United States Government felt that partition was the best possible solution to the Palestine problem and hoped that all members of the United Nations, and all elements of the population in Palestine, would abide by the terms of the Resolution of November 29, 1947. Unfortunately, disorder and strife became widespread in Palestine during the weeks following the passage of that Resolution, and it became apparent to the United States Government that the terms of the Resolution of November 29 could not be put into effect peacefully by May 15, 1948, the date of the termination of the mandate. This Government decided to make every effort to obtain a peaceful solution to the Palestine problem, even at the expense of temporary postponement of partition. We requested a special session of the General Assembly in the hopes that an intermediate step could be devised which would lead to the peaceful implementation of the partition Resolution of November 29.

Secretary Marshall stated on March 20th and I stated on March 25th that the most important consideration in our minds was to avert violence and bloodshed, and to this end we sought every method of

¹ The source text bears the following notation in the handwriting of Mr. Elsey: "As done by G[eorge] M. E[lsy], based on Lowenthal Draft. Used & read by C[lark] M. C[lifford] at 4:00 12 May Conference."

The statement was possibly intended for the President's May 13 press conference, but was not used by the President on that date. (Marginal notation by McClintock on State Department file copy, 501.BB Palestine/5-1348) For the remarks actually made by President Truman at his press conference of May 13, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1948*, p. 253.

action through the Security Council as well as through the General Assembly. As we then said, we were trying to get a temporary bridge, in the form of trusteeship, on the road toward peaceful implementation of the partition plan approved by the United Nations Assembly.

The date set for partition in the Resolution of the Assembly of November 29, 1947, is at hand, and it appears that a Jewish State will be set up in the very near future, and an Arab State sometime thereafter.

I look with favor on the creation of a Jewish State in accordance with the provisions laid down in the Resolution of November 29, and I assume that, when a Jewish State is set up, the provisions for democratic government outlined in that Resolution will be complied with. When the Jewish State is set up in accordance with those provisions, I favor the recognition of that State by the United States Government.

I have asked the Secretary of State to have the representatives of the United States in the United Nations take up this subject in the United Nations with a view toward obtaining early recognition of a Jewish State by the other members of the United Nations.²

I also hope that when the peoples in the portion of Palestine assigned for an Arab State have set up a State in accordance with the provisions of the Resolution of the Assembly on November 29, 1947, similar recognition will be granted to that State by the United States and by the other members of the United Nations.

² At this point in the statement as originally drafted the following sentence appears: "I believe that the United States should recognize the Jewish state promptly after its establishment." This sentence had been penciled out by an unidentified person.

501.BB Palestine/5-1148: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

SECRET
NIACT

US URGENT

WASHINGTON, May 12, 1948—7 p. m.

301. The President has approved position paper of May 11, text of which was set forth in Deptel 298, May 11,¹ and draft resolution of May 12 as perfected by telephone between Dept and USUN. Final text of this draft is repeated for the record:

"The General Assembly

Taking account of the resolutions adopted by the Security Council with reference to Palestine on March 5, April 1, April 17, and April 23, 1948,

¹ Not printed.

I

Strongly affirms its support of the efforts of the Security Council to secure a truce in Palestine and calls upon all persons, organizations, and governments to cooperate in making effective such a truce.

II

1. *Empowers* a United Nations Commissioner for Palestine, to be chosen by a committee of the General Assembly composed of representatives of China, France, the USSR, the United Kingdom, and the United States, to exercise the following functions:

a. To use his good offices as mediator with the local and community authorities in Palestine to

- (1) Arrange for the operation of common services necessary to the safety and wellbeing of the population of Palestine,
- (2) Assure the protection of the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites in Palestine,
- (3) Promote agreement on the future government of Palestine.

b. To cooperate with the Truce Commission for Palestine appointed by the Security Council in its resolution of April 23, 1948.

c. To invite, as seems to him advisable, with a view to the promotion of the welfare of the inhabitants of Palestine, the assistance and cooperation of appropriate specialized agencies of the United Nations such as the World Health Organization, of the International Red Cross, and of other governmental or non-governmental organizations of a humanitarian and non-political character.

2. *Instructs* the United Nations Commissioner to render progress reports monthly, or more frequently as he deems necessary, to the Security Council and to the Secretary General for transmission to the members of the United Nations.

3. *Directs* the United Nations Commissioner to conform in his activities with the provisions of this resolution, and with such instructions as the Security Council may issue.

4. *Authorizes* the Secretary-General to pay the United Nations Commissioner an emolument equal to that paid to the President of the International Court of Justice, and to provide the Commissioner with the necessary staff to assist in carrying out the functions assigned to the Commissioner by the General Assembly.

III

(Here would be inserted any arrangements for the City of Jerusalem which may be approved on the recommendation of Subcommittee 10.)

IV

The General Assembly, as of this date, discharges the Palestine Commission from the further exercise of responsibilities under its Resolution 181 (II) of November 29, 1947."

You are authorized to support foregoing resolution if introduced by another delegation, as we hope may be the case, or, if necessary, to introduce it if that appears desirable in light of negotiating situation at Lake Success.

MARSHALL

501.BB Palestine/5-1248

Memorandum by the Legal Adviser (Gross) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)

[WASHINGTON,] May 12, 1948.

I believe that the draft General Assembly resolution transmitted to the Department today by the Mission in New York is susceptible of alternative interpretations on the question of what authority or authorities may legally govern Palestine from May 15, 1948. The alternatives, both of which appear possible under the draft resolution, are: (1) Upon the termination of the mandate local and community authorities in Palestine will exercise governmental functions in their respective areas and will be legally entitled to proclaim states and organize governments; and (2) Upon the termination of the mandate there will be no legally constituted authority exercising governmental functions in Palestine, and no states may be proclaimed or legal governments organized until after the United Nations Commissioner has gone to Palestine and sought to carry out the mediatorial functions assigned to him in the draft resolution.

If, in view of the improbability that the special session of the General Assembly will provide a legal authority to succeed the mandatory in Palestine (as, for example, by a trusteeship), it is desired to avoid a situation in which no legally constituted authority is available to govern Palestine after May 14, the draft resolution should be amended to remove any doubt on this point. To this end it is suggested that two changes be made:

- (1) A paragraph should be inserted between I and II reading:

"Recognizes that after May 14, 1948 local and community authorities will exercise the powers of government in Palestine [except in the city of Jerusalem]."¹

- (2) Subparagraph II (1) (a) (3) of the draft resolution should be amended to read:

"Promote agreement on the political settlement in Palestine."

The effect of these changes would be to make clear that the General Assembly resolution did not postpone the organization of a legal government or governments and the legal proclamation of a new state

¹ Brackets appear in the source text.

or states beyond the date of the mandate's termination to a time after the United Nations Commissioner had exercised his mediatorial function under the Assembly resolution. The changes would also make clear that the General Assembly in paragraph I of the draft resolution was not affirming support for paragraph 1 (*d*) of the Security Council resolution of April 17, 1948 (calling for a standstill on political activity) and was not urging the Security Council to press political truce efforts.

ERNEST A. GROSS

501.BB Palestine/5-1248

Memorandum by Mr. Robert M. McClintock to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] May 12, 1948.

Subject: This morning's developments at Lake Success re resolution on Palestine.

Last night our delegates discussed the draft resolution which you approved this morning with representatives of the British and Canadian Delegations in New York City on a purely tentative and informal basis. I am now informed by Mr. Ross that the British Delegation has received a telegram from London authorizing it to support this resolution. I am likewise informed that the Canadian Delegation will give warm support if certain that the resolution is approved by the United States and the United Kingdom. Apparently our delegation has been working on the assumption that the resolution would be introduced by the United States Delegation. I said that you were highly allergic to this idea but the delegation stressed that in the present position at Lake Success no other delegation seems willing to propose a motion which would be suitable to us and that it will be difficult—provided we desire our resolution to pass—to refrain from sponsoring it.

In their conversations in New York, the United States Delegation has been careful to describe our resolution as a draft worked out in New York without commitments on the part of the delegation and submitted to Washington for further instructions.

For your convenience I attach a clean copy of the resolution ¹ which you approved this morning. The authors of this draft were principally Mr. Rusk here and Dr. Jessup in New York City. Mr. Henderson has concurred with this draft. Mr. Gross likewise concurs but has suggested alternative language for Article Ia [II(1)(a)](3). A copy of Mr. Gross' draft language is likewise attached.²

[Here follows final paragraph about a purported leak of information.]

¹ Not printed ; for text, see telegram 301, May 12, to New York, p. 978.

² Not found attached.

501.BB Palestine/5-1248: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Sweden*SECRET US URGENT
NIACT

WASHINGTON, May 12, 1948—7 p. m.

327. For the Ambassador. It is probable that Spanish Session of United Nations General Assembly in concluding its consideration of Palestine problem will seek to appoint a UN Commissioner for Palestine whose principal duties will be to mediate between Jews and Arabs of Palestine with view to eventual solution of problem of govt. in that country. UN Commissioner would also seek to arrange for operation of common services necessary to maintenance of law and order and of public health, assure protection of the Holy Places and cooperate with Security Council Truce Commission.

For your secret info name of Count Folke Bernadotte has been mentioned in this connection. While this is strictly a UN appointment, we are favorably impressed by Bernadotte's qualifications and would like your immediate indication whether you feel he would be available for such an important post and whether Swedish Govt would object to his accepting that appointment. You should not give any indication that this govt. is pressing for Bernadotte.¹

Repeated to USUN 302.

MARSHALL

¹ Stockholm, on May 13, reported information from the Swedish Foreign Office that while there would be no objection in principle to Count Bernadotte's appointment, such a development would present a delicate problem for the Swedish Government. Ambassador Matthews evaluated the situation to mean that the Swedish Government would prefer that Count Bernadotte decline appointment as an individual (telegram 585, 501.BB Palestine/5-1348).

Truman Papers, Official File

Dr. Chaim Weizmann to President Truman

NEW YORK, May 13, 1948.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: The unhappy events of the last few months will not, I hope, obscure the very great contributions that you, Mr. President, have made toward a definitive and just settlement of the long and troublesome Palestine question. The leadership which the American government took under your inspiration made possible the establishment of a Jewish State, which I am convinced will contribute markedly toward a solution of world Jewish problems, and which, I am equally convinced is a necessary preliminary to the development of lasting peace among the peoples of the Near East.

So far as practical conditions in Palestine would permit, the Jewish people there have proceeded along the lines laid down in the United Nations Resolution of November 29, 1947. Tomorrow midnight, May

15th, the British Mandate will be terminated, and the Provisional Government of the Jewish State, embodying the best endeavors of the Jewish people and arising from the Resolution of the United Nations, will assume full responsibility for preserving law and order within the boundaries of the Jewish State; for defending that area against external aggression; and for discharging the obligations of the Jewish State to the other nations of the world in accordance with international law.

Considering all the difficulties, the chances for an equitable adjustment of Arab and Jewish relationship are not unfavorable. What is required now is an end to the seeking of new solutions which invariably have retarded rather than encouraged a final settlement.

It is for these reasons that I deeply hope that the United States, which under your leadership has done so much to find a just solution, will promptly recognize the Provisional Government of the new Jewish State. The world, I think, would regard it as especially appropriate that the greatest living democracy should be the first to welcome the newest into the family of nations.¹

Respectfully yours,

CHAIM WEIZMANN

¹ President Truman replied on May 15 as follows:

"I appreciated very much your letter of May thirteenth and I sincerely hope that the Palestine situation will eventually work out on an equitable and peaceful basis." (Truman Papers, Official File)

800.00 Summaries/5-1348: Circular telegram

*The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices*¹

SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 13, 1948—2 a. m.

Daily Report Palestine (infotel):

Arab Situation—Internal weaknesses in various Arab countries make it difficult for them to act in Pal. Whole govt structure Iraq is endangered by political and economic disorders and Iraq Govt can not at this moment afford to send more than handful of troops it has already dispatched. Egypt has suffered recently from strikes and disorders. Its army has insufficient equipment because of its refusal of Brit aid, and what it has is needed for police duty at home. Syria has neither arms nor army worthy of name and has not been able to organize one since French left three years ago. Lebanon has no real army while Saudi Arabia has small army which is barely sufficient to keep tribes in order. Jealousies between Saudi Arabs and Syrians on one hand and Hashemite govts of Transjordan and Iraq, prevent Arabs from making even best use of existing forces. Without Brit officers, Transjordan army will not make as good a showing as it would otherwise since organization of army depends on Brit officers in key

¹ At London, Arab capitals, and Jerusalem.

positions. This does not mean however that over long period Jewish State can survive as self-sufficient entity in face of hostility of Arab world. If Jews follow counsel of their extremists who favor contemptuous policy toward Arabs, any Jewish State to be set up will be able survive only with continuous assistance from abroad.

Your comment on above estimate would be appreciated.

MARSHALL

501.BB Palestine/5-1348

Memorandum for the Files by Mr. Robert M. McClintock

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] May 13, 1948.

Dr. Jessup telephoned me at 9:20 a. m. to inquire to what extent he had leeway to accept verbal modifications of the resolution which the President approved yesterday for General Assembly action on Palestine. Dr. Jessup also wished to know with respect to Article IV ("The General Assembly, as of this date, discharges the Palestine Commission from the further exercise of responsibilities under its Resolution 181 (II) of November 29, 1947") what action he should take if other delegations, as he thought probable, would seek to amend this article in order to further diminish the effect of the resolution of November 29.

I referred Dr. Jessup's inquiry to Mr. Lovett, who said that the delegation should keep in close touch with the Department on any verbal changes and that our delegation should be careful to accept no alterations which would change the sense of our proposed draft resolution. As for our attitude on proposals further to diminish the effect of the resolution of November 29 Mr. Lovett said that, since we were acting in the Assembly and no veto applied, we should vote "No" on any amendment which would seek further to reduce the effect of the resolution of November 29.

Mr. Lovett confirmed this instruction by reference to the White House and so informed me at 10 a. m.

At 10:01 a. m. I communicated the foregoing to Mr. Ross in New York City, who said that he would at once get in touch with Dr. Jessup, who was then en route to Lake Success.

ROBERT MCCLINTOCK

867N.01/5-1348 : Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Wasson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

JERUSALEM, May 13, 1948—1 p. m.

599. Recent successes of Haganah forces have given Jews new hope and courage. Proclamation of Jewish state following termination of mandate is awaited by Yishuv¹ with greatest excitement and jubila-

¹ The Jewish community in Palestine.

tion. Jewish national administration which is already functioning in wholly Jewish areas and partly in Jerusalem will become government of new Jewish state. So far with exception of Irgun attack on Jaffa and Haganah occupation of certain areas on Jerusalem-Tel Aviv road Jews have strictly observed territorial limits imposed by UN resolution of 29 November. However speculation is rife as to whether new-found strength may not encourage Jews to attempt to acquire more territory. Jewish Agency spokesman when asked by (AP?)² correspondent whether Jewish Agency would regard invasion of Palestine by Arab Armies as releasing Agency from obligations of 29 November resolution, replied that Ben Gurion had always said that main aim of Jews was to get all of Palestine. Jewish Agency officials have steadfastly maintained intention to remain within UN boundaries and Consulate General has seen no particular indication up to present that they have changed their plans. Most observers believe that Jews are winning first round at least of their battle and will desire consolidate positions.

Arab opposition to Jews in towns has completely disintegrated. Haifa is under Jewish domination; Jaffa is a deserted city and has been declared "open city"; and the Arabs have been given much needed breather by cease-fire. It is not believed Jerusalem Arabs would be able to present much opposition to Jews if latter decided to occupy city. Most representative Arabs have fled to neighboring countries and Arabs of authority are found only after most diligent searching. Consequently truce and cease-fire talks are greatly hampered and slowed down. It is possible Arabs do not wish to be placed in difficult position of having to make definite decisions which would be public admission of fact that Jews have upper hand. Perhaps they hope events will decide future course of policy. We believe Arab Legion and possibly other Arab armies will march into Arab areas of Palestine after termination of January date³ but will not risk major operation with Jews. Existence of informal arrangements between Jews and Abdullah should not be overlooked. Abdullah's desire for additional territory and lucrative neighbor as well as his present strong position with fellow rulers may make such agreement possible of execution.⁴

WASSON

²As in the source text.

³"January date" which appears in the source text should presumably read "mandate".

⁴London advised, on May 11, of information from Mr. Burrows that "In urging Arab states to accept truce past few days British representatives on Foreign Office instructions have taken line that it is better for Arab Governments to stand fast against popular demand for intervention than to intervene unsuccessfully. In latter event governments could not hope weather popular rage at failure. Burrows considers this effective argument since no Arab state is in any financial or supply position to conduct lengthy campaign Palestine." (Telegram 2053, 867N.01/5-1148)

867N.01/5-1348: Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Wasson) to the Secretary of State

JERUSALEM, May 13, 1948—11 p. m.

605. There is quoted below text of letter dated May tenth addressed to Chief Secretary, Palestine Government by General Secretary, Executive of the Jewish Agency, setting forth its stand on subject of "cease-fire" imposed by mandatory power:

"I am directed by the Executive of the Jewish Agency to lodge a formal protest against the manner in which the 'cease-fire' arrangement for Jerusalem was fixed for May 8 at 12 p. m. without the Jewish Agency having been consulted. The Jewish Agency has accepted and will honour the arrangement. I must, however, protest against the arrangement having been put into force on the basis of consultations with the Arab side only. The Jewish Agency expressed its readiness to agree to a cease-fire all over Palestine if the other side agreed to it. The government has not imposed any such country-wide cease-fire upon the Arabs. The Jews for their part cannot agree that the Arabs could select one particular place in which they are concerned for a cease-fire arrangement, and that the cease-fire should thereupon be imposed on the Jews by the government without their even having been consulted.

"I am to add that if there is no arrangement before hand on arrangements of this kind; the Jewish Agency must reserve to itself freedom of action".

WASSON

Editorial Note

A review of the summary records of the meetings of Subcommittee 9, which were held in private, indicates that the United States advocacy of trusteeship for Palestine was discussed only briefly. Finally, on May 13, Mr. Jessup introduced the United States draft resolution (General Assembly document A/C.1/SC.9/1) and "explained that it had been submitted in an attempt to ascertain the area of agreement that had been reached in the discussion. The United States had not abandoned its view that a temporary trusteeship would have afforded the most satisfactory solution, but it was clear that that had been dependent upon the negotiations [*sic*] of a truce before 15 May. The draft resolution . . . was based upon the two points upon which general agreement appeared to have been reached at the previous meeting, namely, support for the action of the Security Council in its efforts to negotiate a truce and the idea of good offices and mediation." (*Summary Record of the Tenth Meeting of Subcommittee 9, A/C.1/SC.9/SR/10* corr. 1, pages 1, 2, IO files) One section of the United States draft provided for the discharge of the Palestine Com-

mission from further responsibilities under the resolution of November 29, 1947.

Subcommittee 9 submitted its report to the First Committee on May 13. The report included a proposed resolution based on the United States draft, with modifications; for text, see GA (II/SS), *Annex*, page 42. The First Committee began immediate consideration of the report, Mr. Jessup addressing the Committee in support of the document. He noted that "neither Jews nor Arabs were willing to sacrifice their interests to enable a temporary trusteeship to operate effectively. It was clear that in the absence of agreement between the parties, armed forces would be essential to any trusteeship plan. The United States had offered to contribute a share of the required forces and had approached certain other Governments which it felt might have a similar interest . . . but these Governments were not in a position to participate." (GA (II/SS), *Main Committees*, page 242) Later in the same address, he stated that "The United States proposal was based on the need to satisfy two conditions: first, that any proposal should be based on the authority of the Charter, and secondly, that it should be practical and take into account the existing situation and the importance of bringing an end to the conflict. The proposals sought to add the authority of the Assembly to the truce endeavors of the Security Council. The second part of the proposal rested on mediation. Since the use of force to impose a solution was impossible, they had been driven to choose mediation as the central theme of Assembly action." (*Ibid.*, page 246) The First Committee, on May 14, adopted the United States draft resolution, as amended, by 35 votes to 6, with 10 abstentions (*ibid.*, page 262).

501.BB Palestine/5-248

The Secretary of State to the Australian Ambassador (Makin)

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 14, 1948.

MY DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: I should be grateful if you would transmit the following message to Dr. Evatt: ¹

"The President has asked me to reply to the message ² which you were good enough to send him in respect to the problem of Palestine.

¹ Herbert V. Evatt, Australian Minister for External Affairs.

² Dr. Evatt's message was incorporated in a letter of May 2 from Ambassador Makin to President Truman, not printed. The President, on May 3, read to Mr. Lovett excerpts which "proposed that the only way to save the Palestine situation would be by direct intervention of the Great Powers—thus including the USSR. The President shared my [Mr. Lovett's] view that such a proposal was preposterous." (Memorandum of conversation by Mr. Lovett, 501.BB: Palestine/5-348)

The President and I appreciate the high purpose which motivated you to offer your assistance in arranging a meeting between the leaders of the three great powers for the purpose of settling this and other problems which threaten the maintenance of peace.

"It is the view of the United States Government that the current situation in Palestine is such that the most urgent problem is to prevent the spread of armed conflict which threatens to cost the lives of countless Jews and Arabs. The United States Government is making strenuous efforts in the Special Assembly to prevent further bloodshed. "

"With respect to the possibility of a three-power meeting, you are doubtless aware of the initiative taken by the Government of the United States in the series of conferences that were held with the British and Soviet Governments in an effort to find solutions for the problems arising out of the war. The British and the United States Governments made every effort in a spirit of genuine cooperation to meet the point of view of the Soviet Government in order that settlement might be reached on the most pressing of these problems, so necessary to enable the peoples of the world to devote their energies to the tasks of reconstruction. The developments that followed conferences at Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam, as well as the many meetings held for the purpose of negotiating the peace treaties, show clearly that agreements reached with the Soviet Government on paper do not in themselves constitute a solution. It is apparent that certain conditions must come into being before a genuine settlement can be achieved. As I recently stated to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the United States House of Representatives, the underlying problem in the immediate future, in our opinion, is to bring about as quickly as possible the restoration of economic, social and political health in the world and to give to the peoples of the world a sense of security, which is essential for them to carry on the task of recovery. The Government of the United States maintains normal diplomatic relations with the Government of the Soviet Union and is always ready to examine with the greatest objectivity any proposals put forward by the Soviet Government. The United States Government is constantly endeavoring to advance constructive proposals in the United Nations and elsewhere whenever there appears to be an opportunity for progress to be made. We do not believe, however, that in the present circumstances a meeting of the Heads of Government would serve a useful purpose. On the contrary, since it would dramatically raise the hopes of the peoples of the world, its probable failure under existing conditions would result in a very depressing reaction which would make the moves for eventual solution of the many problems all the more difficult."

You will have seen the reports of the recent interview between the American Ambassador in Moscow and the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, as well as the statements made to the press by the President

and myself concerning this matter. I believe these statements make clear the position of this Government.³

Faithfully yours,

G. C. MARSHALL

³ For documentation on these matters, see vol. iv, pp. 822-857, *passim*.

Truman Papers, President's Secretary's File

*The Agent of the Provisional Government of Israel (Epstein)
to President Truman*¹

WASHINGTON, May 14, 1948.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have the honor to notify you that the state of Israel has been proclaimed as an independent republic within frontiers approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations in its Resolution of November 29, 1947, and that a provisional government has been charged to assume the rights and duties of government for preserving law and order within the boundaries of Israel, for defending the state against external aggression, and for discharging the obligations of Israel to the other nations of the world in accordance with international law. The Act of Independence will become effective at one minute after six o'clock on the evening of 14 May 1948, Washington time.

With full knowledge of the deep bond of sympathy which has existed and has been strengthened over the past thirty years between the Government of the United States and the Jewish people of Palestine, I have been authorized by the provisional government of the new state to tender this message and to express the hope that your government will recognize and will welcome Israel into the community of nations.²

Very respectfully yours,

ELIAHU EPSTEIN

¹ Mr. Epstein sent an identical letter to the Secretary of State on May 14 (867N.01/5-1448).

² The undated George M. Elsey notes cited in the editorial note on p. 976 indicate also that on Friday May 14 "C[lark] M C[lifford] spent the afternoon getting arrangements made, including arrangement that Epstein would send in the request to U.S. Gov't for recognition." (Elsey Papers)

For further details on the activities of May 14, see the memorandum of conversations by Under Secretary Lovett, p. 1005.

Editorial Note

For an account of high-level conversations on May 14 regarding the question of the recognition of Israel, see Mr. Lovett's memorandum of conversations, May 17, page 1005.

867N.01/5-1448: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

SECRET US URGENT

LONDON, May 14, 1948—5 p. m.

2113. Following obtained from Foreign Office sources today re Palestine:

1. Foreign Office has no confirmation press story dated Cairo May 13 to effect Arab states henceforth will pay TJ 3,000,000 per year for services Palestine and that half this sum already paid TJ for first six months, Egypt's share being pounds 630,000.

2. Kirkbride¹ telegraphed from Amman at 10 a. m. today that (a) Arab plans for tonight are as follows: Syrian and Lebanese column will attack from Lebanon. Another Syrian column will attack from Samakh. Iraq forces will attack Jisr Majani. Arab legion will establish itself Hebron, Ramallah and Nablus and then extend its sector; (b) it is understood Amman that High Commissioner and GOC have left Jerusalem² 18 hours in advance schedule as understood by Arabs with result Arabs protesting; (c) British Army has been asked assist AL units cut off from Jerusalem to reach Rafah and to return TJ via Akaba.

3. According earlier Foreign Office information last two companies AL will leave Palestine today. This will be announced Commons.

DOUGLAS

¹ Sir Alec S. Kirkbride, British Minister in Transjordan.

² Jerusalem reported, on May 14, that these two officials and all senior members of the Palestine Government departed from Jerusalem at 0900 hours local time that morning. Mr. Wasson stated that the "High Commissioner . . . will proceed Haifa and board British cruiser for Malta at midnight tonight thereby officially terminating mandate." (Telegram 606, 867N.01/5-1448) The British Government, in a statement prepared for public information by the Colonial Office and the Foreign Office, released a White Paper in 1948 entitled *Palestine, Termination of the Mandate, 15th May, 1948* (London, His Majesty's Stationery Office).

867N.01/5-1448: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom*TOP SECRET US URGENT
NIACT

WASHINGTON, May 14, 1948—6 p. m.

1761. For Douglas. Please inform Bevin or other responsible official Brit Govt that we have reason to believe that provisional govt of new Jewish state will make request at once for recognition and that in

present circumstances we feel that we should grant recognition to Jewish provisional govt as de facto authority of Jewish state.¹

MARSHALL

¹The Department of State, simultaneously, sent telegrams of similar import to Paris (1675) and to Brussels (722). The same day, it also sent a circular telegram to Missions at Cairo, Jidda, Baghdad, Beirut, and Damascus, and to Consulates at Alexandria, Port Said, Dhahran, Jerusalem, Haifa, Aden, and Basra, which stated: "For your secret info and for such precautions as you may consider it necessary to take this Govt may within next few hours recognize provisional Jewish govt as *de facto* authority of new Jewish state." (867N.01/5-1448)

867N.01/5-1448: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Tuck) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

CAIRO, May 14, 1948—7 p. m.

519. In commenting on infotel May 13,¹ Embassy suggests that while internal weaknesses Arab countries mentioned do exist in greater or lesser degree they will not affect to extent indicated immediate action in Palestine by Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Transjordan. Effect will be more observable in long run. Believed also that existence of internal dangers as in Iraq will in fact force Arab Governments to press positive action in Palestine with all vigor in order to ward off rising resentment and to justify Palestine policy. Egypt has suffered recently particularly from police strike, but it must be pointed out that fear of recurrence of such event has not prevented government from dispatching 10-12,000 troops to frontier with all possible equipment, from declaring martial law, from initiating censorship and taking other measures for preservation order. Military equipment is lacking for Egyptian Army but not because of "its refusal of British aid". On the contrary, equipment is lacking through refusal of British and other Western Powers to provide earnestly-sought military equipment. Apparent determined effort now under way by Egyptian Government to obtain arms from any source available, including Czechoslovakia.

Influence internal weaknesses on military action other countries best judged by Missions countries concerned but believed here Iraq can spare more than "handful of men." Best estimate of Arab military strength held to be that from British source to Military Attaché, transmitted to Defense Department, secret telegram 105, May 11, which estimates total Iraq strength in Transjordan at about 5,000 men, available strength of Syria at about 4,500 while Lebanon and Saudi Arabia negligible.

Jealousies among Arab countries will undoubtedly prevent making best use of military forces but participation of Egypt, generally regarded as best friend Saudi Arabia, with Brigadier Sabur with three

¹ The circular telegram of that date, p. 983.

senior officers as chief of staff to King Abdullah may indicate that efforts to bridge existing differences are bearing fruit. Obvious that Transjordan Army without British officers will not make as good showing as otherwise but evidence exists that some British officers have been retained and others hired to lead Arab Legion.

In view hostility Arab world to Zionist state since Balfour Declaration which recent events obviously will not decrease Jewish state will survive only [with] difficulty. Embassy agrees that Jewish state will probably require continuous economic and military assistance from abroad whether or not Zionists follow contemptuous attitude to Arabs. Department will recall that estimates supplied by Zionists as essential to finance working program for next four years called for about quarter billion dollars of external aid.

Informed circles here also agree that military aid will probably be obtained from abroad both on short term and long term basis, with possibility turning Palestine into second Spain and probable disastrous effects on long-range ME security and stability (see also mytel 513, May 13²).

Sent Department 519. Paraphrase sent by pouch to all Arab capitals.

TUCK

² Not printed.

867N.01/5-1448

The Secretary of State to Mr. Eliahu Epstein, at Washington

WASHINGTON, MAY 14, 1948.

DEAR MR. EPSTEIN: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of May 14, 1948 and to inform you that on May 14, 1948 at 6:11 p. m., Washington time, the President of the United States issued the following statement:

"This Government has been informed that a Jewish state has been proclaimed in Palestine, and recognition has been requested by the provisional government thereof.

"The United States recognizes the provisional government as the *de facto* authority of the new State of Israel."¹

Sincerely yours,

G. C. MARSHALL

¹ Marginal notation by Mr. Henderson on May 17: "Original handed to Mr. Epstein on his call at the Department today." For Mr. Henderson's account of the considerations governing the preparation of the Department's reply to Mr. Epstein, see his memorandum of May 16 to Mr. Lovett, p. 1001.

A photographic copy of President Truman's statement, showing his signature and date and time of approval, together with the handwritten changes penned in at the last moment, is presented in Bernard Postal and Henry W. Levy, *And the Hills Shouted for Joy: The Day Israel Was Born* (New York, David McKay Company, Inc., 1973), between pp. 206 and 207.

Editorial Note

In a letter of June 13, 1974 to the Historical Office, Dean Rusk gave the following information concerning some of the events in which he had participated relating to the recognition of Israel by the United States on May 14, 1948:

"The General Assembly was in session that day. About 5:45 that afternoon I got a call from Mr. Clark Clifford, Special Counsel to President Truman, telling me that the State of Israel would be declared at 6:00 p. m., that the United States would recognize Israel immediately and that the President wished me to inform our Delegation at the United Nations. I said, "But this cuts across what our Delegation has been trying to accomplish in the General Assembly under instructions and we already have a large majority for that approach." Mr. Clifford replied, "Nevertheless, this is what the President wishes you to do." I thereupon telephoned Ambassador Warren Austin, who had to leave the floor of the Assembly to take my call. He made a personal decision not to return to the Assembly or to inform other members of our Delegation—he simply went home. My guess is that he thought that it was better for the General Assembly to know very clearly that this was the act of the President in Washington and that the United States Delegation had not been playing a double game with other Delegations.

"Just after 6 p. m., a member of the New York Delegation called me to find out what it was all about. I had thought it was Phil Jessup, but he has informed me that it was not he who called. Perhaps it was Jack Ross. Meanwhile, Mr. Jessup's colleague Francis Sayre had gone to the podium, and, in effect, said he didn't know anything about the American recognition of Israel. A few minutes later Mr. Jessup returned to the Assembly (which was then in pandemonium), read the press ticker, and confirmed that it was in fact correct.

"When I use the word pandemonium, I think I am not exaggerating. I was later told that one of our U.S. Mission staff men literally sat on the lap of the Cuban Delegate to keep him from going to the podium to withdraw Cuba from the United Nations. In any event, about 6:15 I got a call from Secretary Marshall who said, "Rusk, get up to New York and prevent the U.S. Delegation from resigning *en masse*." Whether it was necessary or not, I scurried to New York and found that tempers had cooled sufficiently so that my mission was unnecessary.

"I cannot vouch for this, but there was a story later that some of Secretary Marshall's friends had told him that he ought to resign because of this incident. He was reported to have replied, "No, gentlemen, you do not accept a post of this sort and then resign when the man who has the Constitutional authority to make a decision makes one. You may resign at any time for any other reason but not that one." (Dean Rusk to William M. Franklin, Accession No. P740066-0003.)

Editorial Note

The General Assembly began discussion of the United States draft resolution, as amended by the First Committee, on May 14. Mr. Jessup read two statements to the Assembly, the first of which was President Truman's statement according United States recognition to the Provisional Government of Israel. The second set forth the view that "The desire of the United States to obtain a truce in Palestine will in no way be lessened by the proclamation of a Jewish State. We hope that the new Jewish State will join with the Security Council Truce Commission in redoubled efforts to bring an end to the fighting, which has been, throughout the United Nations consideration of Palestine, a principal objective of this Government." (GA (II/SS), *Plenary*, page 42). The Assembly adopted the resolution later the same day by 31 votes to 7, with 16 abstentions (*ibid.*, page 45; for text, see *infra*).

*Resolution 186 (S-2) Adopted by the General Assembly on May 14, 1948*¹

The General Assembly

Taking account of the present situation in regard to Palestine,

I

Strongly affirms its support of the efforts of the Security Council to secure a truce in Palestine and calls upon all Governments, organizations and persons to co-operate in making effective such a truce;

II

1. *Empowers* a United Nations Mediator in Palestine,² to be chosen by a committee of the General Assembly composed of representatives of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, to exercise the following functions:

(a) To use his good offices with the local and community authorities in Palestine to:

(i) Arrange for the operation of common services necessary to the safety and well-being of the population of Palestine;

(ii) Assure the protection of the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites in Palestine;

¹ Reprinted from GA (II/SS), *Resolutions*, p. 5.

² Count Bernadotte was appointed United Nations Mediator for Palestine on May 20. He telephoned Secretary-General Lie the following day and confirmed his acceptance of the post (United Nations press releases PAL 172 and PAL 174, May 20 and 21, respectively).

(iii) Promote a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine;

(b) To co-operate with the Truce Commission for Palestine appointed by the Security Council in its resolution of 23 April 1948;

(c) To invite, as seems to him advisable, with a view to the promotion of the welfare of the inhabitants of Palestine, the assistance and co-operation of appropriate specialized agencies of the United Nations, such as the World Health Organization, of the International Red Cross, and of other governmental or non-governmental organizations of a humanitarian and non-political character;

2. *Instructs* the United Nations Mediator to render progress reports monthly, or more frequently as he deems necessary, to the Security Council and to the Secretary-General for transmission to the Members of the United Nations;

3. *Directs* the United Nations Mediator to conform in his activities with the provisions of this resolution, and with such instructions as the General Assembly or the Security Council may issue;

4. *Authorizes* the Secretary-General to pay the United Nations Mediator an emolument equal to that paid to the President of the International Court of Justice, and to provide the Mediator with the necessary staff to assist in carrying out the functions assigned to the Mediator by the General Assembly;

III

Relieves the Palestine Commission from the further exercise of responsibilities under resolution 181 (II) of 29 November 1947.³

³ The Palestine Commission, at its 75th meeting on May 17, adjourned *sine die*. United Nations press release PAL 169 of the same date gave the general view of the Commission members "that the General Assembly resolution of last November 29 remained intact and that therefore the Commission was not and could not be legally dissolved."

Editorial Note

In a telegram of May 15 to Secretary-General Lie, Moshe Shertok, signing as Foreign Secretary of the Provisional Government of Israel, applied for admission of the State of Israel to membership in the "family of nations"; for text, see SC, 3rd yr., *Supplement for May 1948*, page 88.

867N.01/5-1548: Telegram

The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Childs) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL PRIORITY

JIDDA, May 15, 1948—10 a. m.

281. News recognition *de facto* by US Government Jewish State has profoundly shocked Saudi Arabs. My Arab secretary, recalling

interpretation US Palestine policy set forth in Deptel 55, February 23, 6 p. m.¹ which Legation instructed present SAG raises question how far this latest move may shake SAG confidence in our policy assurances. Although explanations we may offer likely have little effect hope Department may supply us soonest such arguments as may be appropriately offered.

I have heretofore not been uneasy re possible break Saudi-US relations, latest US action coupled with entrance Arab forces Palestine and evident determination Arabs settle by such means available to them what they consider, from King on down, threat national existence not only Arabs Palestine but Arabs in adjacent states, raises apprehensions my mind possible consequences including possible break with US and possible early necessity US evacuate several thousand Americans Saudi Arabia. There is no slightest doubt in my mind that King and his Ministers are determined support Arab cause Palestine and Arabs are believed united as they have never been before (Legtel 257, May 6 and 277, May 13²) we are only deluding ourselves if we still cling to notion Arabs can be bluffed or can be persuaded to abate their unalterable opposition Jewish State. King and Ministers have repeatedly affirmed to me their deep-seated conviction [that it?] is a question Arabs national existence and that it is better for them to go down fighting in total defeat than to yield.

It is perhaps too early as yet to foresee immediate consequences to us here but I hazard opinion we must be immediately prepared rejection any and all our requests including turning from now on deaf ears to any consideration prolongation our tenancy Dhahran air base. Possibility must not be excluded we may be invited evacuate base.

If American forces sent Palestine we must be prepared immediately break relations.

Situation has so many ominous possibilities I am requesting Consulate Dhahran hold conference with Colonel O'Keefe there view to perfecting without delay plans evacuation Americans should this unfortunately become necessary.

Repeated Dhahran 152, Baghdad 25, Cairo 61, Damascus 7, Beirut 16, London 77.

CHILDS

¹ This was a repeat of 34 to Damascus, p. 649.

² Neither printed.

867N.01/5-1548: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Tuck) to the Secretary of State

SECRET MOST IMMEDIATE

CAIRO, May 15, 1948—1 p. m.

522. Certain Chiefs Mission Diplomatic Corps were summoned by Minister of Foreign Affairs to Foreign Office this morning at intervals

of fifteen minutes. When my turn came Khashaba Pasha informed me—evidently in a set speech—of motives which he [said] decided Egyptian Government to send its troops into Palestine. Purport his remarks are contained in a memorandum which he requested me to make known to my government. (See Embtel 523, May 15.¹)

Minister Foreign Affairs then asked me whether it was true that our government had decided to recognize the provisional Jewish government as the *de facto* authority of new Jewish state. I replied that I had received official advice to that effect and that reports appearing in this morning's press could be considered as substantially correct. After a long pause Khashaba Pasha said that despite everything he still believed that the future of Arab states lies in a close relationship with the West.

Sent Department 522, repeated London 38.

TUCK

¹Not printed; the memorandum stated that Egyptian armed forces had penetrated Palestine "to reestablish order, peace and security" and that Egyptian intervention was not directed against the Jews of Palestine but against the "bands of terrorist Zionists." (867N.01/5-1548)

Ambassador Tuck, on May 14, had reported that "In apparent effort to lay blame on America for necessity to intervene Palestine [Egyptian] govt spokesman today declared to press that Egypt and Arab countries had ignored American demands that they should not resort to armed intervention in Palestine. Such warning on contrary had increased the determination of the Arabs to prevent creation of a Zionist state." (Telegram 521 from Cario, 883.00/55-1448)

The Egyptian Foreign Minister, in a telegram of May 15, notified the President of the Security Council of the entry of Egyptian forces into Palestine; for text, see SC, 3rd yr., No. 66, p. 3. Similarly King Abdullah, in a telegram of May 16, notified Secretary-General Lie of the entry of Transjordanian armed forces into Palestine; for text, see SC, 3rd yr., Supplement for May 1948, p. 90.

501.BB Palestine/5-1548: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET URGENT

NEW YORK, May 15, 1948—2:30 p. m.

653. From Ross. Beeley came in this morning at his request and read me two telegrams from London as follows:

A. The first telegram dealt with legal questions involved in the problem of recognition and the relation of this problem to possible situations in the SC re Palestine. This telegram may be summarized as follows:

1. Foreign Office view is that it is not correct to consider that the 29 November resolution establishes a legal basis for creation of a Jewish state.

2. The residual authority over Palestine does not revert to the principal allied and associated powers.

(a) The Treaty of Lausanne merely involved a renunciation of Turkish sovereignty without any specific renunciation of authority to the principal allied and associated powers.

(b) It is very doubtful whether these powers can still be regarded as existing as an entity.

(c) It is more than probable that even if these powers had had any rights over Palestine they would have been extinguished when the mandate was duly constituted.

3. With the end of the mandate and pending the emergence of one or more states in Palestine to which international recognition can be accorded, Palestine will be *res nullius* (belonging to nobody—?).¹ Theoretically sovereignty will probably lie in the people of Palestine but it will be latent and there will be no international entity recognizable as a sovereign state or states in or comprising Palestine.

4. The practical consequences of this doctrine are:

(a) Pending some new decision by the UN claims to recognition cannot be supported by appeal to UN authority.

(b) As regards action by other (Arab) states leaving aside aggressive action (use of armed force) there is probably nothing in law to prevent acts of a peaceful character directed to the setting up by other state or states a government or governments in Palestine or to incorporate part of the country in the territory of neighboring states, provided such other state or states concerned were not acting inconsistently with an Assembly resolution by which they could be regarded as bound.

5. Concrete applications of Foreign Office doctrine as follows:

(a) If the Jews claim to set up a state within the November frontiers and the Arabs governing the whole of Palestine, there is nothing legally to choose between these claims. (It is recognized, however, that public opinion particularly in the US would give an appearance of legality to the November 29 resolution.)

(b) If the Arab armies invade the territory of Palestine without coming into conflict with the Jews, they would not necessarily be doing anything illegal or contrary to the Charter.

(c) If Arabs crossed the November frontier they would not *ipso facto* be doing anything illegal.

(d) If Arabs come into conflict with Jews a situation undoubtedly would be created which the SC would be asked to take cognizance of as a breach of the peace.

B. Beeley's second telegram instructed him to say to us privately that US action in recognizing the Jewish govt seems to have an important bearing on our truce proposals. He is further instructed to ask what we intend to do about the truce proposals in the light of US recognition action.

Beeley observed that he imagined Foreign Office had Article 7 of truce proposals in mind.

¹ As in the source text.

I told Beeley that I had no specific instructions but I understood that the general view of the Dept was that the truce efforts should be pushed because we were naturally just as much interested as ever in putting a stop to the fighting. Speaking personally I said I thought that the previously proposed Articles of truce would have to be reviewed carefully in the light of the new situation.

Beeley said he understood British Embassy Washington had been instructed to raise same question with Dept. I would appreciate it if Dept can keep us closely informed here of any exchanges with British in Washington.

In concluding my conversation and in light of call of SC meeting this afternoon, we discussed briefly the question of the status of the JA as representing the Jewish people before the SC. I have just discussed this with Rusk on the phone and we would appreciate getting fairly fully developed views of the Dept as this question may arise fairly soon in SC if not this afternoon. [Ross.]

AUSTIN

501.BB Palestine/5-1648

*The Secretary-General of the United Nations (Lie)
to the Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET PERSONAL

LAKE SUCCESS, 16 May 1948.

MY DEAR SECRETARY OF STATE, I am sending to you with this a copy of a secret and personal letter which I have sent to all permanent members of the Security Council in connection with the communication from the Egyptian Government dated 15 May 1948, which is now being considered by the Council.

You will appreciate, I am sure, the position which I have taken as Secretary-General in this matter. My primary concern is for the future usefulness of the United Nations and its Security Council.

I am convinced that the Security Council must act decisively and quickly in dealing with this matter under the Charter, irrespective whether its efforts succeed or fail. If the Security Council, by slow and ineffective action, permits the Egyptian Government, through the use of its forces, to establish a *de facto* position beyond its own frontiers, then I believe a precedent will have been created which will prejudice the future usefulness both of the United Nations and its Security Council. I must do everything in my power to prevent this.

Time is the vital factor in this situation. The longer action by the Security Council is delayed, the less chance will there be of halting the forces which are now in movement. I appreciate the political factors which might influence certain Great Powers to let matters in the Middle East take their course, but I am convinced beyond all doubt that if this happens—when the case has already been brought

to the attention of the Security Council—that the Security Council will have destroyed its usefulness, and indeed will have created a precedent for any nation to take aggressive action in direct contravention to the Charter of the United Nations.

I have been informed of some of the difficulties which presently exist between the governments of the United States and the United Kingdom in approaching this problem. For this reason, because of the great influence those two powers can exercise [with others] in ensuring that effective action is taken in the Security Council, and because time was so short, I was most anxious that you and your Under-Secretary of State should have been consulted personally on this matter so that you might have known my views and so that—with your concurrence—I might have been able to approach the British Government in dealing with this vital problem.

I appreciated that my personal presence in Washington at this time could have been misinterpreted, and for that reason from 7:00 p. m. on Saturday evening last efforts were made to arrange for my personal representative to wait on you and Mr. Lovett. I greatly regret this consultation could not take place for if there had been any action which I could have taken as Secretary-General to influence the Government of the United Kingdom and other Governments, I would have been prepared to do so, and if necessary to despatch my personal representative to London immediately after he had reported to me the result of the consultation in Washington.

Yours sincerely,

TRYGVE LIE

[Enclosure]

The Secretary-General of the United Nations (Lie) to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

SECRET

[LAKE SUCCESS,] 16 May 1948.

MY DEAR MR. AUSTIN: The Egyptian Government has declared in a cablegram to the President of the Security Council on 15 May, that Egyptian armed forces have entered Palestine and that it has engaged in "armed intervention" in that country. On 16 May I received a cablegram from the Arab League making similar statements on behalf of the Arab States.

Since this matter is now before the Security Council, it is not necessary for me to invoke the provisions of Article 99 of the Charter, under which the Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.

I consider it my duty, however, to emphasize to you that this is the first time since the adoption of the Charter that Member States

have openly declared that they have engaged in armed intervention outside their own territory.

Moreover, this armed intervention has taken place in a territory which has been the special concern of the United Nations. A Truce Commission appointed by the Security Council has been active in Palestine for some time and it is only a matter of hours since the General Assembly adopted a resolution establishing a United Nations Mediator with the mandate of seeking agreement of the parties to a peaceful adjustment of the situation in Palestine.

The very first of the purposes of the United Nations is to maintain international peace and security. In Article 24 of the Charter the Members conferred on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security "in order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations".

The opening discussions of the Council on 15 May have shown that there is danger that such prompt and effective action will not be forthcoming unless members of the Council take a decisive stand in support of the authority of the Charter and of the United Nations.

Hostilities have already begun. There is grave danger that they will increase in intensity, and there is likelihood that other parties will become involved to the menace of the peace of the Middle East.

A failure of the Security Council to act under these circumstances can only result in the most serious injury to the prestige of the United Nations and the hopes for its future effectiveness in keeping the peace elsewhere in the world. Moreover, it may undermine the progress already made by the Council in other security problems with which it is now dealing.

I most earnestly urge that your Government should take account of the extreme seriousness of the situation which now faces the United Nations and of the necessity for prompt action at this crucial moment.

I have sent a similar communication to each of the five permanent members of the Security Council.

Yours sincerely,

TRYGVE LIE

867N.01/5-1448

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] May 16, 1948.

In order to complete the record on recognition, Mr. Epstein's letter to the Secretary of May 14¹ should be answered and in our opinion the answer should also be dated May 14.²

¹ See footnote 1, p. 989.

² For text of letter to Mr. Epstein, dated May 14, see p. 989.

We should reply to this letter since we understand that it is the basis of the statement of the President that recognition of the provisional government had been requested.

In drafting this reply we have taken the following into consideration :

1. In order that it may be clear why the announcement and our letter are dated May 14, whereas the mandate did not terminate until May 15, and that there may not be any misunderstanding as to the time of recognition, the letter of reply should show the exact moment at which recognition took effect, namely the moment of issuance, 6:11 p. m., Washington time or 12:11 a. m. May 15, Palestine time.

2. Epstein should be given no title in our communication to him³ since we have not as yet been informed officially as to who are members of the government of the new State, or that Mr. Epstein is qualified to speak for the new State in Washington. We have apparently taken the position that Mr. Epstein, as a representative of the Jewish Agency up to 6 p. m. May 14, had the right to speak for the Jewish Agency and the coming successor of the Jewish Agency, the Provisional Jewish Government. We do not as yet know officially what his capacity and title are after 6 p. m., and will not know until we have been informed.

3. We have limited the reply to an acknowledgment of the letter and to a statement as to the time and substance of the President's announcement, because we do not consider it suitable to go any further in communicating with a person whose representational position has not as yet been clarified. We have not, for instance, indicated whether by granting *de facto* recognition to the provisional government of the state of Israel we recognize the boundaries of the new state to be identical with those set forth in Mr. Epstein's letter to the Secretary. At the appropriate time we might desire to indicate that our *de facto* recognition does not necessarily mean that we recognize that the frontiers of the new Jewish state are the same as those outlined in the recommendation of the General Assembly of November 29, 1947, that those boundaries had been determined upon with the understanding that there would be an economic union of all Palestine and a special international regime for Jerusalem.

It seems to us that the new government of Israel should give us further information with regard to its composition, purposes, structure, etc. This matter, however, will be made the subject of a special memorandum.

L[OY] W. H[ENDERSON]

³ The communication was addressed to "Mr. Eliahu Epstein, 2210 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W., Washington 8, D.C."

867N.01/5-1648 : Telegram

The Minister in Lebanon (Pinkerton) to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED

BEIRUT, May 16, 1948—11 a. m.

180. Foreign Minister delivered to entire diplomatic corps in Beirut memorandum adopted by Arab League Political Committee in

Damascus yesterday. This contains historical statement on Palestine followed by Arab declaration now that mandate has ended with no "legally constituted authority" to administer law and protect life and property. Main points this declaration are:

(a) Right to set up government pertains to its population.

(b) Peace and order have been completely upset in Palestine with result that more than quarter million Arabs have been compelled by Jewish aggression seek refuge in other Arab countries, and Palestine has been left with no administrative authority "entitled to maintain and capable of maintaining a machinery of administration of the country adequate for the purpose of ensuring due protection of life and property."

(c) There is threat "that this lawlessness may spread to neighboring Arab states where feeling is already very tense on account of the prevailing conditions in Palestine."

(d) Arab states sincerely wish UN might succeed in finding just solution of problem.

(e) Arab states are responsible for maintenance of law and order in this area "by virtue of their responsibility as members of Arab League which is a regional organization within the meaning of chapter 8 of the Charter of the UN."

(f) "For these reasons and considering that the security of Palestine is a sacred trust for them, and out of anxiousness to check the further deterioration of the prevailing conditions and to prevent the spread of disorder and lawlessness into the neighboring Arab lands, and in order to fill the vacuum created by the termination of the mandate and the failure to replace it by any legally constituted authority, the Arab Governments find themselves compelled to intervene for the sole purpose of restoring peace and security and establishing law and order in Palestine."

(g) Arab states recognize independence of Palestine and maintain that lawful inhabitants are alone entitled to set up administration for discharge of government functions without external interference, and as soon as that stage is reached, Arab intervention will be ended.

(h) Arab Governments confirm "that the only fair and just solution to the problem of Palestine is the creation of a unitary state of Palestine based upon the democratic principles which will enable all its inhabitants to enjoy equality before the law and which would guaranty to all minorities the safeguards provided for in all democratic constitutional states, affording at the same time full protection and free access to holy places."

The Arab states emphatically and repeatedly declare that their intervention in Palestine has been prompted solely by the considerations and for the aims set out above and that they are not inspired by any other motive whatsoever. They are therefore confident that their action will receive the support of the UN as tending to further the

aims and ideals of the UN as set out in its Charter (end of declaration).¹

Foreign Minister says copies of this memorandum will be delivered diplomats in all Arab capitals. This telegram therefore not repeated any mission.

PINKERTON

¹ For a further exposition of the views of the Arab League on the question of Palestine, see Secretary-General Azzam's cablegram of May 15 to Secretary-General Lie, SC, 3rd yr., *Supplement for May 1948*, p. 83.

867N.01/5-1648 : Telegram

The Prime Minister of the Provisional Government of Israel (Ben-Gurion) to President Truman

TEL AVIV, May 16, 1948—4:45 p. m.

MH30. On behalf of Provisional Government of State of Israel beg to extend to you expression of profound gratitude and appreciation for your great gesture in according prompt recognition to Provisional Government as *de facto* authority of new State of Israel. Your consistent and wise advocacy of justice of our cause in national and international councils, your insistence on admission to Palestine of large numbers of survivors of Nazi oppression in Europe, your direction of the United States policy giving United States delegation leadership at November Session of Assembly in favor of creation Jewish state in Palestine and finally your lead to whole world making United States the first power in history to recognise State of Israel have been decisive in shaping destinies of Holy Land and Jewish people. State of Israel in its present trials and tribulations is confidently looking forward to your and your peoples' continued sympathy and support for final solution of Palestine question which will end agelong Jewish tragedy and enable State of Israel to become stabilising and progressive force in Near East and to contribute its humble share to welfare and peace of human race.¹

For Provisional Government [of] State of Israel:
DAVID BEN-GURION

¹ The White House referred Mr. Ben-Gurion's communication to the Department of State for reply. The Secretary of State made acknowledgement to Mr. Epstein on May 27, stating:

"It is the hope of the United States Government that the efforts of the United Nations to bring about conditions of peace in Palestine will be successful and that Israel will cooperate with the United Nations in these endeavors.

"I extend to Israel the felicitations of the United States Government and express the hope that Israel will be able to look forward to long years of tranquillity, prosperity and honor as one of the community of nations."

Moshe Shertok, as Foreign Secretary of the Provisional Government of Israel, addressed a communication to the Secretary of State which expressed his

Government's deep gratitude to the United States and the Department of State for according prompt recognition. This communication was transmitted to the Secretary of State in a letter of May 17 signed by Mr. Epstein as "Representative" of the Provisional Government of Israel. The Secretary of State made acknowledgement to Mr. Epstein on May 27, with an expression of the sincere appreciation of the United States Government for the message from Mr. Shertok (867N.01/5-1748).

867N.01/5-1748

*Memorandum of Conversations, by the Under Secretary of State
(Lovett)*

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] May 17, 1948.

On Friday afternoon¹ following lunch Mr. Clifford told me that the President was under unbearable pressure to recognize the Jewish state promptly.

He recalled that on Wednesday afternoon previously I had vigorously attacked the proposals then advanced by the President's advisers that the President should make a statement at his Thursday press conference promising recognition, etc.² He stated that he felt the State Department criticisms had been persuasive and that the fact that General Marshall and I had opposed it had caused the President to change his mind and agree to a "postponement of recognition".

Clifford indicated that the most persuasive arguments were the fact that, by stating in advance of any request from the Jewish Agency that he would recognize the state, it would place this country in the position of being a sponsor and increase responsibility thereby; that while the UN special session was still considering the matter, this act by the President would be a grave breach of propriety and would be labelled a doublecross; that the boundaries were unknown and the President would be putting this country in the position of buying a pig in a poke without knowing who the Government was³ or anything about it. Clifford said the President was impressed by these facts as he had been, but that at six o'clock Friday night there would be no government or authority of any kind in Palestine. Title would be lying about for anybody to seize and a number of people had advised the President that this should not be permitted. The President had decided to do something about recognizing the new state if it was set up but that he would agree to wait until the request had been made and until there was some definition of boundaries. He would postpone the

¹ May 14.

² See memorandum of conversation by the Secretary of State, May 12, p. 972.

³ Jerusalem reported, on May 20, that the portfolios in the Provisional Council of Government of the State of Israel had been distributed the previous day, with David Ben-Gurion as Premier and Moshe Shertok as Foreign Secretary (telegram 673, 867N.01/5-2048). It reported further, on June 2, that the Premier had concurrently become Minister of Defense the previous evening (telegram 822, 867N.01/6-248).

decision to the last until he was satisfied that the interests of this country would be adequately protected if such a step were taken. He asked the State Department to recommend language to put into effect recognition in the event the President decided upon it. He said that the White House had been informed that an appeal would be made for immediate recognition by the new state, which had been proclaimed that morning and which, according to information given the White House, proposed to live within the conditions of the November 29 General Assembly resolution and to restrict its claim to the borders therein defined.

I replied to Mr. Clifford that the legal paper the Department had provided him with⁴ indicated that there was, strictly speaking, no legal bar to recognition. However, indecent haste in recognizing the state would be very unfortunate for some of the reasons I had mentioned on Wednesday. I therefore urged the President to delay action for a day or so until we could confirm the details of the proclamation. Clifford replied that he felt sure we would have adequate details to indicate a recognition of the provisional government but that the timing of the recognition was "of the greatest possible importance to the President from a domestic point of view". I said that it was hard for me to believe that one day could make so much difference, and emphasized especially the tremendous reaction which would take place in the Arab world. I mentioned specifically that we might lose the effects of many years of hard work in the Middle East with the Arabs and that it would jeopardize our position with the Arab leaders and would probably bring our missions and consular representatives into personal jeopardy. Mr. Clifford replied that we should take every precaution against that and that he would hope that we could get messages out in time to forewarn the personnel and inform them of the situation.

I said that we also ought to notify the head of our UN delegation, Senator Austin, and the British, French and Belgian Governments in advance, and asked if the President could not withhold the decision until the next day so that we could be sure that the messages would get through in time. Clifford said that the President could not afford to have any such action leak and that we should try to insure against it. I told him that it was manifestly impossible to time messages to arrive in a distant capital when we did not know when the decision would be made. Clifford said that he hoped the final answer would be given us in the late afternoon and that they were awaiting the formal request, which he again repeated they were sure would be received.

Telephone conversations continued during the afternoon on the subject and the White House was apparently advised by phone that

⁴Mr. Gross' memorandum of May 13 to Mr. Lovett, p. 960.

the message was on its way. The general sense was given me by Mr. Clifford and we started to prepare a statement for Mr. Ross to use in connection with our continuing efforts on the truce. The language to be used in the White House release was arrived at at a final conference in the middle of the afternoon in the Department prior to notice of the President's decision but based on the assumption that it would be in favor of recognition.

After the completion of this, sometime about 5:30, I called Mr. Clifford and told him that the General Assembly was in session and was winding up, and that it was our guess that it would be over by around ten o'clock that night. I asked him if he would endeavor to delay the announcement until after the General Assembly, but he said again that time was terribly important and that he did not feel that the President would do this although he would discuss it with him. I reminded Clifford that we had to have time to get the message to Senator Austin and asked him to let me know as soon as the final decision was reached. Mr. Clifford was with the President at the time and said that he would call me back after they had talked it over.

About twenty minutes to six I was told that the President was going to make the announcement shortly after six o'clock and that it was all right to call Senator Austin and tell him of the action. Mr. Rusk called the Senator about a quarter to six and gave him the information. The various cables had been released on the basis of this action being possible so that they had gone out some time before.

In this memorandum of conversation I have omitted, for the sake of brevity, the long arguments back and forth throughout the afternoon. My protests against the precipitate action and warnings as to consequences with the Arab world appear to have been outweighed by considerations unknown to me, but I can only conclude that the President's political advisers, having failed last Wednesday afternoon to make the President a father of the new state, have determined at least to make him the midwife.

ROBERT A. LOVETT

501.BB Palestine/5-1748

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] May 17, 1948.

At my meeting with the President at 12:30 today we first took up the question of the position paper for our representatives at the Security Council for the meeting this afternoon. I read the draft to him,

and Rusk and I explained some of the details to all of which he agreed and formally approved the paper.¹

Following this I had Mr. Rusk explain to him the present situation regarding the arms embargo and following that I stated that I was not certain that Mr. Rusk had made the facts clear enough. The President then said "I will recite how I understand it" and did so reflecting correct understanding of our point of view.

After Mr. Rusk's departure I again referred to the arms embargo and read the section of the Resolution of April 17 that referred to it and made a particular point of the fact that we must proceed in this matter with extreme care or we will give a final kick to the UN. The President agreed to that view of the matter. I went on to say that we had to see what happened and he said he agreed, that we have to see who does what to whom and quoted my language to the press. I added some other explanations of possibilities in the case all of which he agreed with.

Incidentally he did not know up to that time what had occurred at the Security Council in the absence of Ambassador Austin and the fact that Sayre² was unaware of what was coming, and treated it somewhat as a joke as I had done but I think we both privately thought it was a hell of a mess. I went on to say that we felt that the United States had hit its all-time low before the UN and that we must be most careful what we do in relation to this arms embargo.

[Here follow two paragraphs of discussion on candidates to head the United Nations program of relief for Palestine refugees.]

There were no other matters discussed.

G. C. MARSHALL

¹ For Ambassador Austin's statement before the Security Council on May 17, see *infra*.

² Francis B. Sayre, a member of the United States Delegation at the United Nations.

*Statement Made by Ambassador Austin Before the Security Council
on May 17, 1948.*¹

MR. AUSTIN (United States of America) : The Security Council now has adequate information to demonstrate that its earlier efforts to bring an end to the fighting in Palestine have been unsuccessful. Actually, fighting now in progress in Palestine, together with the statements being made by all the parties directly involved, clearly indicate to the United States Government that there is a threat to the peace and a breach of the peace within the meaning of Article 39 of the Charter. We believe, therefore, that the Security Council should find that the situation with respect to Palestine constitutes a threat

¹ Reprinted from SC, 3rd yr., No. 67, p. 2.

to the peace and a breach of the peace under Article 39. We believe that the Security Council should issue an order as a provisional measure under Article 40 calling upon all authorities who are in control of armed elements now operating in any part of Palestine to bring about an immediate standstill in all military operations.

I shall read at this point a draft resolution on the Palestine question herewith being submitted by the United States delegation.

"The Security Council,

"Taking into consideration that previous resolutions of the Security Council in respect to Palestine have not been complied with and that military operations are taking place in Palestine,

"Determines that the situation in Palestine constitutes a threat to the peace and a breach of the peace within the meaning of Article 39 of the Charter;

"Orders all Governments and authorities to cease and desist from any hostile military action and to that end to issue a cease-fire and standfast order to their military and para-military forces to become effective within thirty-six hours after the adoption of this resolution;

"Directs the Truce Commission established by the Security Council by its resolution of 23 April 1948 to report to the Security Council on the compliance with these orders."

Meanwhile, in order to permit the Security Council's Truce Commission to proceed with maximum speed, the Security Council should ascertain which Arab authorities are responsible for the Arab aspects of the situation in Palestine, and ensure that such Arab authorities have designated representatives to deal with the Truce Commission. The United States considers that additional information on Palestine is desirable. The Security Council may wish to put a number of questions to the principal authorities. Some of these questions will be familiar, but it seems necessary to bring together in compact form all of the relative facts that can be obtained for the further information of the Security Council, and to obtain these facts before a decision is made.

I am submitting the type of questions which we think should be propounded to all of the parties interested in the following matters:

I. *Questions to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Transjordan, Iraq, Yemen, Syria and Lebanon:*

(a) Are armed elements of your armed forces, or irregular forces sponsored by your Governments, now operating in Palestine?

(b) If so, where are such forces now located and under what command are they operating, and what are their military objectives?

(c) On what basis is it claimed that such forces are entitled to enter Palestine and conduct operations there?

(d) Who is now responsible for the exercise of political functions in the Arab areas of Palestine?

(e) Is such authority now negotiating with Jewish authorities on a political settlement in Palestine?

(f) Have the Arab Governments entered into any agreement among themselves with respect to Palestine?

(g) If so, what are the terms of the agreement?

II. *Questions to the Arab Higher Committee:*

(a) Is the Arab Higher Committee exercising political authority in Arab sections of Palestine?

(b) What governmental arrangements have been made to maintain public order and to carry on public services in Arab sections of Palestine?

(c) Have the Arabs of Palestine requested assistance from Governments outside of Palestine?

(d) If so, from what Governments, and for what purpose?

(e) Have you named representatives to deal with the Security Council Truce Commission for the purpose of effecting the truce called for by the Security Council?

III. *Questions to the Provisional Government of Israel:*

(a) Over which areas of Palestine do you actually exercise control at the present time?

(b) Do you have armed forces operating outside areas claimed by your Jewish State?

(c) If so, on what basis do you attempt to justify such operations?

(d) Are you negotiating with Arab authorities regarding either the truce or a political settlement in Palestine?

(e) Have you named representatives to deal with the Security Council Truce Commission for the purpose of effecting the truce called for by the Security Council?

(f) Will you agree to an immediate and unconditional truce for the City of Jerusalem and the Holy Places? ²

²The questions submitted by Ambassador Austin were discussed at both sessions of the Security Council on May 18 and adopted with changes. The stipulation was made that the questions be answered within 48 hours from noon, May 19. For the record of discussions on May 18, see SC, *3rd yr.*, No. 68. The text of the questions, as adopted, is printed in SC, *3rd yr.*, *Supplement for May 1948*, p. 90.

The reply by Transjordanian Foreign Minister Mulki was a refusal to answer the questions; its text as read to the Security Council by Ambassador Austin on May 22 is printed in SC, *3rd yr.*, No. 72, p. 42. All the other recipients of the questions gave substantive replies. Those by Egypt, Israel, Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon are printed *ibid.*, pp. 6-16; that by Saudi Arabia is printed in SC, *3rd yr.*, *Supplement for May 1948*, p. 96. The replies from Yemen and the Arab Higher Committee have been released by the United Nations in documents S/774 (Add. 1) and S/775.

867N.01/5-1848 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Durbrow) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, May 18, 1948.

937. Soviet press May 18 carried texts of note Foreign Minister of Israel Shertok requesting Soviet recognition Israel and Molotov's note conveying Soviet Government's affirmative decision.

Department pass Jerusalem 10.

DURBROW

News Division Files

Memorandum by Mr. Michael J. McDermott of the Press and Radio News Conference by the Secretary of State on Wednesday, May 19, 1948

[Extract]

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When a correspondent asked for comment on the status of the studies in this country on the revision or modification of the arms embargo to the Middle East, Mr. Marshall replied that we had had the matter under consideration for some time. He explained that we also had to consider the attitude of the Security Council on this matter. When asked if we had made any attempt to find out the attitude of the Security Council, he replied that we had proposed a resolution relating to Chapter 7 of the Charter but that no action had been taken one way or the other as yet. Mr. Marshall explained that Chapter 7 involved such a question, and said that on April 17th the Security Council had made an announcement calling on all parties for certain action and certain reservations, one of which applied to arms. Asked if this meant that there would be no announcement on embargo policy until after the Security Council announced its decision, he repeated again that we would have to observe the attitude of the Security Council.

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MICHAEL J. McDERMOTT

867N.01/5-1048

The Secretary of State to the British Ambassador (Inverchapel)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 19, 1948.

DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: I appreciate the courtesy of your letter of May 10¹ with regard to the efforts which the High Commissioner at

¹ No. G.96/—/48, not printed.

Jerusalem has made in recent days to secure a truce for the whole of Jerusalem.

The developments of the past week in Palestine have broadened the issue beyond merely the problem of Jerusalem, but have not lessened the anxiety of this Government for the preservation of the city and the Holy Places in Palestine.

Our efforts in the Security Council must now be centered on ways and means to maintain the peace in Palestine.

As for the suggestion in your final paragraph that this Government exert special pressure on the Jews to accept a truce for Jerusalem, I feel that such action will now become merged in the larger issue. This Government, however, will do its utmost to exert pressure on both the principal communities of Palestine in an endeavor to establish peace in that country.

Faithfully yours,

G. C. MARSHALL

701.67N11/5-1948 : Telegram

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Provisional Government of Israel (Shertok) to the Secretary of State

TEL AVIV, May 19, 1948.

MH98. I have the honour to inform you that the Provisional Government of Israel having taken cognizance of its recognition by the United States Government has decided to seek the approval of the United States Government, which I confidently hope will be forthcoming without delay, for the establishment of the Legation of Israel in Washington and to appoint Mister Eliahu Epstein, former Representative of the Jewish Agency for Palestine, as the Minister of Israel in Washington.

I trust that the Legation will be accorded all proper facilities and that the cordial personal relations existing between Mister Epstein and officials of the State Department will continue in the new auspicious phase of his duties.

The Provisional Government of Israel hopes that the United States Government may soon see its way to establishing a Legation of the United States in the State of Israel and to sending for this purpose its representative to Tel Aviv with the status of a Minister.

I take this opportunity of reiterating the deep appreciation of the Provisional Government for the prompt recognition granted to it by the United States Government as the *de facto* authority. In the State of Israel as well as of expressing my own gratitude to you for the

personal consideration which you have so kindly shown to me and to Mister Epstein in the past.

For the Provisional Government of the State of Israel:

MOSHE SHERTOK
Foreign Secretary

501.BB Palestine/5-1948: Telegram

*The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)
to the Secretary of State*¹

TOP SECRET

NEW YORK, May 19, 1948—2:15 p. m.

674. For Marshall from Austin. For your personal information and that of the Department, the following appraisal of the present position of the US in the UN is transmitted with a view to its utility in framing further instructions for the guidance of the Mission in regard to the Palestine case and other political issues in the SC, the IC, and in the next session of the GA.

It is our best estimate recognition of the Provisional Government of Israel last Friday evening has deeply undermined the confidence of other delegations in our integrity and that this is a factor which the Department will want to keep in mind in the immediate future and for some time to come.

The following is our estimate of the way in which a large number of delegations view the sequence of events in the special session of the GA culminating in the announcement of our recognition of the Provisional Government:

1. Recognition constituted reversal of US policy for truce plus trusteeship as urged in special session of GA and, in later stages, US compromise resolution laying stress on truce plus mediation;

2. Concerning efforts to secure truce, both in SC and in informal truce negotiations, we had heavily emphasized that there should be no action of a political character which would alter the *status quo* or prejudice the rights, claims or positions of either Arabs or Jews. This was generally understood to apply primarily to the establishment of the Jewish state. SC truce resolution which had our strong backing included appeal to all governments to take all possible steps to assist in implementation of truce;

3. In carrying through this truce program under instructions which we understood had highest clearance, we persuaded other delegations of correctness of our position and induced them to come forward and

¹ A copy of telegram 674 was sent by Brig. Gen. Carter to Mr. Connelly under cover of a memorandum which read as follows: "Secretary Marshall asked me to see that the attached message is brought to the immediate attention of the President." (Truman Papers, President's Secretary's File)

carry a large share of the burden. They thus became publicly identified with our position;

4. The feeling is that although the Jews had not accepted the truce they disregarded the admonitions of the SC, violated spirit of truce effort, and prevented conclusion of formal truce. US immediately not only condoned but endorsed these violations, thus striking heavy blow at prospect of concluding any truce and equally heavy blow at prestige and effectiveness of SC and UN generally;

5. US by its immediate act of recognition of the Provisional Government, violated the terms of the SC truce resolution;

6. The consequence of foregoing is a lack of confidence in the integrity of US intentions and disbelief of further statements of future US intentions and policies;

7. This attitude in turn leads to strong desire to avoid being committed to any US position which might be reversed without notice;

8. As a further consequence, other governments feel the necessity of recapturing their own freedom of action to make spot decisions instead of supporting us or relying on UN, since this appears to them to be current US attitude;

9. An important contribution to foregoing attitude was failure of US to inform or consult before announcement of final step. We had developed here closest and most friendly relations large number other delegations which desire to support our foreign policies not only in UN but generally. We had kept each other informed, working out mutually acceptable points of substance, strategy, and tactics. Method by which US recognition action was taken without prior notice or consultation deeply offended many of those who had collaborated closely with us;

10. With two or three exceptions our closest and most consistent supporters among other delegations, while expressing friendly personal feeling are manifestly mistrustful of continuing cooperation on basic questions of policy or strategy, or even of tactics.

It, of course, was to be anticipated that the delegations of the Arab states would be particularly bitter, but the reaction of other delegations such as those of Canada, China and a number of the Latin American states is not based on the merits but is due to a feeling, frankly expressed by them, that they have been double-crossed.

With particular reference to our immediate policy on Palestine and specifically the resolution which we have introduced in the SC calling for action under Chapter VII, the situation in our estimation is that if we press this to a vote it will not receive more than three or four affirmative votes. Delegations of governments which are generally well-disposed and friendly feel that a finding of breach of peace under Article 39 is unrealistic unless sanctions, if necessary, will be assured. In this connection delegations are completely mistrustful of our readiness to participate in sanctions. Current newspaper comment concerning possible US action on the existing arms embargo is an element mentioned by other delegations as contributing to their mistrust.

In the long run, of course, identity of interest between the US and various other governments will tend to outweigh current reactions, but it will take time to diminish current attitude of distrust. This means that positions taken by the US on a variety of topics may continue to be viewed with suspicion, and that other delegations will not be inclined to support us for fear that a change in our position will leave them vulnerable. We must, I feel, exercise particular care not to advance major proposals on political issues, particularly in the SC, without careful previous canvassing of delegations here. In many cases our objectives might best be obtained through support of proposals introduced by other delegations. In general, I believe we should be responsive to indications of fear of Russian expansion on the part of many delegations, and their underlying conviction of identity of interest with us.²

AUSTIN

² Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt, on May 16, had written a letter to the Secretary of State in which she stated that "The way in which the recognition of Palestine came about has created complete consternation in the United Nations." She commented also that although favorable to the recognition of the "Palestine State", she "would not have wanted it done without the knowledge of our representatives in the United Nations" and without "a very clear understanding beforehand with such nations as we expected would follow our lead."

The Secretary of State replied on May 18 as follows: "I have just read your note of May 16 regarding the recognition of Palestine. All I can say in reply is that in relation to the United Nations, Ambassador Austin was advised shortly before the recognition was to be made public, but unfortunately he was not present with the Delegation at the time the public announcement became known, and Mr. Sayre had not been advised of the situation by Mr. Austin.

"We were aware here of the unfortunate effect on our situation with the United Nations, which is much to be regretted. More than this, I am not free to say." (867N.01/5-1648)

867N.01/5-1948: Telegram

The Minister in Lebanon (Pinkerton) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

BEIRUT, May 19, 1948—6 p. m.

191. *Marine Carp* now in Beirut is being searched and transit passengers destined Palestine together with their baggage being specially examined. Jews of military age regardless of citizenship may be removed and interned in Lebanon as they are regarded as reinforcements of Jewish forces in Palestine and therefore as danger to Lebanon, particularly as Lebanese Army is now in Palestine. Decision is not yet definite and immediately upon being informed of proposed intention I intervened with Foreign Office with view obtaining release American citizens but was informed public opinion both in Lebanon and other Arab states would probably make it impossible accede my request. Officer of Legation has been present during search and exami-

nation. Authorities are doing everything possible avoid delaying ship regardless of decision.

Will cable as soon as decision is taken and ship has departed.¹

PINKERTON

¹ In telegram 193, May 20, 11 a. m., Beirut reported that Lebanese authorities had removed 40 American citizens of Jewish descent from the *Marine Carp* and that "This Legation protested against removal passengers but as Lebanese stated they would be removed by force if necessary, Americans were advised that physical resistance might only lead to bloodshed. Result was that there was no violence and no use of force." (867N.01/5-2048) The telegram was received at 7 p. m. on May 20, one hour after telegram 252, p. 1017, was sent to Beirut. Other information in telegram 193 is included in the statement released by the Department on May 21; for text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 30, 1948, p. 712.

501.BB Palestine/5-2048 : Telegram

*The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET US URGENT

NEW YORK, May 20, 1948—11:18 a. m.

678. From Ross. Referring to phone talk with Rusk, following are questions I put to Beeley yesterday on personal and confidential basis:

"(A) As we understand it, the present UK position is:

1. To oppose a finding under Article 39 of the Charter that a threat or breach of the peace exists in Palestine;²

2. To continue assistance to Abdullah and other Arab States pending action by the UN which would make such continuance of assistance contrary to UK obligations under the Charter.

(B) These two points seem to be inconsistent and mutually exclusive and suggest a number of questions:

1. Does the UK Government consider that it is premature to take measures which would help put a stop to military action by the Arab States in Palestine?

2. Does the UK Government consider that military action by the

¹ The Department repeated this communication to London for information in telegram 1836, May 20, 6 p. m.

² Sir Alexander Cadogan addressed the Security Council on May 19 and outlined the United Kingdom's grave doubts concerning the invocation of Article 39 in the United States draft resolution. He then submitted a redraft of that resolution, the text of which is printed in SC, *3rd yr.*, No. 69, p. 6. Ambassador Austin immediately made known the opposition of the United States to the British measure, stating that that measure would transfer the problem out of Chapter 7 of the Charter and into Chapter 6, which dealt with the pacific settlement of disputes (*ibid.*).

Arab States in Palestine should be permitted to continue for the time being?

3. Does the UK Government consider that continuance of such military action would lead to stabilization of the political situation in Palestine?

4. If the answer to question (3) is in the affirmative, in precisely what way does the UK Govt envisage that continuance of such military action might lead to political stability?

5. Does the UK Govt consider that continuance of such military activity, coupled with Jewish resistance, will involve a serious risk that both the military and political situations in Palestine will get completely out of hand?

6. Is the UK Govt taking any specific steps, particularly in its relations with the neighboring Arab States, intended to prevent the situation in Palestine from getting out of hand?

7. With particular reference to relations between the UK Govt and Abdullah, what specific steps, if any, are being taken by the UK Govt which might help prevent the situation in Palestine from getting out of hand?

8. Does the UK Govt have any present views with regard to (a) the continued service of its officers in Abdullah's army and (b) the continued payment of subsidies to Abdullah?

9. Under what circumstances would the UK Govt consider as appropriate a finding under Article 39 of the Charter that a threat to and/or breach of the peace exists in Palestine?

10. Under what circumstances would the UK Govt consider as appropriate the application of sanctions under Article 41 against (a) the Jewish Provisional Govt. (b) the Arabs of Palestine or the Arab States, or (c) both Jews and Arabs?

11. Under Article 42?

12. To what extent would the UK Govt be prepared to participate in sanctions under Article 41 against (a) Jews, (b) Arabs, (c) both?

13. Under Article 42?

14. In the event of the inability or unwillingness of the SC to deal effectively with a threat to and/or breach of the peace in Palestine does the UK Govt. have any views concerning alternative methods of dealing with the situation?"

[Ross]
AUSTIN

867N.01/5-2048 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Legation in Lebanon

SECRET US URGENT

WASHINGTON, May 20, 1948—6 p. m.

252. Your intervention on behalf of American Jewish citizens under detention by Lebanese authorities is approved. In event these Ameri-

can citizens not yet released or if American citizens are detained in future merely because they are Jews please inform Lebanese Govt that you have been instructed by your Govt to make it clear that US considers that all bearers of US passports, regardless of race, color or creed, are entitled in an equal measure to protection of US Govt and that US Govt must insist that Govts of other countries do not discriminate against bearers of US passports on ground of race, color or creed. You may add that the US Govt would be compelled to view seriously any discrimination of this character by any Govt against US citizens.

Sent Beirut 252; rptd Damascus 182, Baghdad 161, Jidda 187, Cairo 620, Jerusalem 436, London 1834.

MARSHALL

501.BB Palestine/5-2148

*The Secretary of State to the Secretary-General of the United Nations
(Lie)*

[WASHINGTON,] May 21, 1948.

DEAR MR. SECRETARY GENERAL: I have your personal letter of May 16 on the need for effective Security Council action on Palestine, delivered to the State Department on Monday, May 17. As you were informed orally by Ambassador Austin, the resolution proposed by the United States on May 17 was intended to establish a basis for Security Council action to pacify that situation.

As for consultations between your office and the Department of State, please be assured that the Department will always be ready to discuss with you or your representatives issues which are pending before the various organs and bodies of the United Nations. We necessarily rely very heavily upon Ambassador Austin as our permanent Representative to the United Nations and would suggest, therefore, that you take up with him the question of whether direct discussions between the Department of State and the Secretariat would be desirable under any given set of circumstances.

I now plan to be in New York on Tuesday, May 25, and hope that we can have lunch together, with Ambassador Austin, at the Waldorf-Astoria. If so, we can discuss the questions raised in your letter which need further attention.¹

Faithfully yours,

G. C. MARSHALL

¹ The editors have found no official record of a conversation between Marshall and Lie on or about May 25, but see Henderson's memorandum of May 25 to the Secretary, p. 1044.

867N.01/5-2148

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Lovett)*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] May 21, 1948.

Participants: Mr. Lovett

Sir John Balfour, British Chargé d'Affaires

Mr. Henderson, NEA

Mr. Rusk, UNA

Sir John Balfour called upon me today in order to convey orally certain views which he had just received from Mr. Bevin by telegram regarding developments in Palestine.

Sir John explained that Mr. Bevin thought it desirable for Mr. Marshall to have these views in mind so as to avoid the British getting to unnecessary cross-purposes with the Americans, and so that Mr. Marshall should be aware that there were certain courses of action to which the British Government could not agree. The following is a summary of the views of Mr. Bevin as set forth by Sir John :

Mr. Bevin is particularly anxious that, over Palestine as over other matters, the British and the Americans should not drift apart, and it would obviously be dangerous if the situation were to develop in such a way that the Americans were giving increased support to one party and the British to the other.

Nonetheless, there are certain points of policy concerning Palestine from which Mr. Bevin cannot deviate. He does not intend in the near future to recognise the Jewish state, nor to support any proposal that it should become a member of the United Nations. In this connection, Mr. Bevin hopes that, even though the United States Government may have recognised the Jewish state *de facto*, they will not commit themselves to any precise recognition of boundaries. It might well be that, if the two sides ever accept a compromise, it would be on the basis of boundaries differing from those recommended in the partition plan of the General Assembly.

Mr. Bevin also hopes that the United States Government will feel able to maintain its arms embargo. If this is raised, HMG will almost certainly be obliged to raise their own embargo on the export of arms to certain Arab states, and the unfortunate position will then be reached of one side being largely armed by the Americans and the other by the British.

Mr. Bevin cannot agree to any action under Article 39 of the United Nations Charter at least at this stage, since the situation in Palestine is so confused that an impartial assessment of the true position is needed before any such drastic action is taken, the effect of which would be to place the blame upon one party only.

Further, it must be remembered that, under the terms of the British treaty with Trans-Jordan, HMG would be obliged to go to Trans-Jordan's assistance in the event of an incursion by forces from outside into Trans-Jordan territory, and that this situation may come about should the Jews obtain military successes and pursue retreating Arab forces over the frontier into Trans-Jordan.

Mr. Bevin points out that the development of United States policy over Palestine has unfortunately placed a heavy strain on Anglo-American cooperation in the Middle East. It has had the effect of arousing bitter Arab resentment against the United States in an area which the British and American Governments regard as of high strategic and political importance to both of them. Unless the Arab countries can be induced to retain some confidence in the friendly understanding and fairness of both the United States Government and HMG on the Palestine issue, they may turn away from Western countries altogether.

With these thoughts among many others in mind, Mr. Bevin earnestly hopes that the United States Government will acquaint HMG with any further initiatives on their part which might compel the latter to take a different line or oppose their actions. His Majesty's Government are anxious that the actions of the United States and themselves should conform to the real interests in the Middle East which they share in common.

PPS Files, Lot 64 D 563, Near and Middle East, 1948

*Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennan)
to the Secretary of State*¹

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] May 21, 1948.

The Policy Planning Staff, while fully cognizant of the limitations on formulation of policy in the Department on the Palestine matter, wishes to record once more its deep apprehensions over the trend of U.S. policy.

The Staff paper No. 19 of January 19, 1948² and the supplement of January 29 made clear the view of the Staff that this Government should not take any action which would:

- (a) lead us to the assumption of major responsibility for the maintenance and security of a Jewish state in Palestine; or
- (b) bring us into a conflict with the British over the Palestine issue.

The second of these documents specifically warned, in section 4, against our acceptance of the thesis that armed interference in Palestine by the Arab states would constitute aggression, which this Gov-

¹ Addressed also to the Under Secretary of State.

² See p. 546.

ernment would be bound, as a member of the United Nations, to join in opposing.

The course of action we are now embarking on in the UN leads us in the direction of all of these situations. It thereby threatens not only to place in jeopardy some of our most vital national interests in the Middle East and the Mediterranean but also to disrupt the unity of the western world and to undermine our entire policy toward the Soviet Union. This is not to mention the possibility that it may initiate a process of disintegration in the United Nations itself.

The fact that we have not yet been able to obtain the support of a Security Council majority for the courses we are advocating relieves us of none of our responsibility.

The Staff considers, therefore, that the problem of the wisdom of this course is a grave and crucial question of national security which should be decided only on the advice of the National Security Council and after the most careful and thorough deliberation.

GEORGE F. KENNAN

PPS Files, Lot 64 D 563, Near and Middle East, 1947-1948.

*Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Lovett) to the
Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] May 21, 1948.

I forward the attached memorandum¹ on the subject of Palestine from the Policy Planning Staff with concurrence in their recommendation that the course which this Government embarks upon should be cleared with the National Security Council after careful consideration. (You will recall, in this connection, that you presented the memorandum outlining the course of action now being followed in the Security Council to the President when you were accompanied by Mr. Rusk, and that the President approved the procedures being followed.²)

I am unable, however, to join the Policy Planning Staff in the views expressed in their January 19 and January 29 papers on this subject insofar as they state that "this Government should not take any action which would bring us into a conflict with the British over the Palestine issue". I would gladly agree if the policy were to join the British when they are right and oppose them when they are wrong. I cannot believe that the United States should give the British an implied warrant to take any course of action they may choose, however irresponsible, provocative, or unjust. I feel that this Government should endeavor to

¹ *Supra*.

² See the initial paragraph of Secretary Marshall's memorandum of May 17 to Mr. Lovett, p. 1007.

cooperate fully and loyally with the British and that it should try to reach agreement on a parallel course of action wherever possible, but I think that it is of at least equal importance that this Government pursue a course which it feels to be just and in keeping with the obligations we have undertaken as a member of the United Nations. If this brings us into conflict with the British, I think we should face up to this fact and not join them in actions we feel to be improper merely to avoid the conflict.

I agree fully with the Policy Planning Staff that major responsibility for the maintenance and security of a Jewish state in Palestine should not be assumed by this Government. It is my understanding that the present policy of this country is to act only as a member of the United Nations and, as such a member, to undertake only its pro rata share of any obligation accepted by the United Nations, and then only if other countries do likewise.

It is hard for me to follow a line of reasoning which suggests, by implication at least, that "a process of disintegration in the United Nations" is initiated by the United Nations carrying out its primary functions—to maintain international peace and security. It would seem to me to be equally logical to suggest that, if the United Nations does not exercise its appropriate functions in the preservation of international peace and security, it seals its own doom.³

ROBERT A. LOVETT

³ Marshall S. Carter, in a memorandum of May 25, transmitted to Secretary Marshall the memoranda by Messrs. Kennan and Lovett, noting that "the Policy Planning Staff has been recording its deep apprehensions over the Palestine policy for about the last six or eight months." A marginal notation by the Secretary states: "I read this and agree with Lovett."

In a memorandum of June 3 to Secretary Marshall and to Mr. Lovett, George H. Butler cited a meeting of the Policy Planning Staff the day before, when "It was agreed that we should begin immediately to develop a paper on Palestine and its overall policy implications, particularly with respect to the Middle East, for submission to you and eventual clearance through the National Security Council." The memoranda by Carter and Butler are filed in the Policy Planning Staff papers, PPS Files, Lot 64 D563, Near and Middle East, 1947-1948.

867N.01/5-1748

Memorandum by the Legal Adviser (Gross) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] May 21, 1948.

Subject: Egyptian and Syrian Blockade of Palestinian Waters.¹

Discussion:

The Government of Egypt has delivered to our Embassy in Cairo a memorandum calling attention to the danger to American shipping

¹ Documentation on the question of possible Egyptian restriction of the right of transit through the Suez Canal in 1947 is presented in *Foreign Relations*, 1947, vol. v, pp. 755-776.

approaching the Palestinian coast, while the Government of Syria has proclaimed a blockade of the maritime waters of Palestine.²

The action of Egypt follows that Government's previous announcements declaring an embargo on cargoes being trans-shipped through Egypt to Palestine and a military proclamation regarding the right to requisition all ships at Port Alexandria, Port Said and Suez. The latter problems, however, concern action contemplated within the bounds of Egyptian jurisdiction so that it is considered desirable to disassociate them from the attempt to establish a blockade of Palestinian waters.

The Maritime Commission has been informed of the purported blockade in order that this information can be furnished to American shippers, although no recommendations have been made as to the action which the shipping companies should take.

A blockade may be declared only during time of war, and some degree of effectiveness must be exercised.

In view of the threat to American shipping, it is considered desirable that the United States Government reserve its rights by filing a protest to the announcements of the Egyptian and Syrian governments, basing the protest on the freedom of navigation of the high seas and the absence of any rights on the part of Egypt and Syria to extend their control to areas outside their jurisdiction.

Recommendations:

It is recommended that the attached telegrams be sent, instructing the Department's representatives to protest the announcements by Egypt and Syria of a blockade of Palestinian waters.³

Concurrences: SD, NE, CP, UNA, IS, NEA.

Attachments: Telegrams to Cairo and Damascus.

² The Egyptian and Syrian actions were brought to the attention of the Department in telegrams 534, May 17, from Cairo, and 300, May 19, from Damascus, neither printed (867N.113/5-1748 and 867N.01/5-1948).

³ Marginal notation by Mr. Lovett: "ok". The telegram to Cairo is printed *infra*; that to Damascus is not printed.

867N.01/5-1748 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt

SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 21, 1948—7 p. m.

633. Urtel 534, May 17,¹ for info Emb and use at your discretion. Dept of view that blockade may not be declared under international law in absence state of war and in absence exercise of sufficient power

¹Not printed.

to make blockade effective. Please deliver following note Egyptian FonOff:

"I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's note dated May 17, 1948 to which was attached a memorandum in which your Excellency requested this Embassy urgently to draw the attention of my Government to the 'positive dangers at present existing for every ship, whether merchantmen or transport, approaching the Palestinian coast where it would be exposed to the measures that the Royal Egyptian Government finds itself immediately obliged to take, in order to insure the security of its troops in Palestine, in consideration of the realization of its ends . . .'

"I have been instructed by my Government to inform your Excellency that with regard to the memorandum attached to your note of May 17, 1948, the Government of the United States feels itself bound to protest the action of the Egyptian Government in attempting by its announcement to prohibit the freedom of navigation of the high seas of the Mediterranean and to extend its control to any waters beyond the jurisdiction of the Government of Egypt and hereby gives notice that it cannot recognize as valid any action of the Egyptian Government which may be taken pursuant to the announcement."

Similar instruction being forwarded Damascus² in response to FonOff notice of "maritime blockade".

Please advise when note has been delivered in order that press release may be issued if considered desirable.

Sent Cairo 633, repeated London 1859, Damascus 186, Jerusalem 448, Jidda 193, Beirut 256.

MARSHALL

² In telegram 185, May 21, 7 p. m., not printed.

501.BB Palestine/5-2148: Telegram

*The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)
to the Secretary of State*

CONFIDENTIAL URGENT NEW YORK, May 21, 1948—8:30 p. m.

689. Mytel 678.¹ From Ross. Following handed me this afternoon by Beeley in response to questions I gave him May 19:

"You will understand that the following answers to the questions you handed me on the 19th May have no more authority than my personal opinion.

"I will comment first on your definition of the present position of the UK Government. It seems to me that there are at least two serious objections to proceeding under chapter VII of the Charter:

"(I) In our view the word 'peace' in Article 39 must be read as

¹ Dated May 20, p. 1016.

meaning 'international peace'. A decision that what is now happening in Palestine constitutes a threat to international peace might imply conclusions concerning the juridical status of Palestine which we feel would not be justified in present circumstances. We consider, as the terms of our amendment to your draft resolution indicate, that the juridical status of Palestine is still obscure.

"(II) In Charter terms, your resolution appears to contain: (a) a determination under Article 39, and (b) a proposal for provisional measures under Article 40. The last sentence of Article 40 provides that 'the SC shall duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional measures'. It therefore seems likely that the approach to the problem through Chapter VII might very quickly lead to proposals for economic or military sanctions against one party in the present conflict.

"We do not think that a procedure which might end in sanctions against either Arabs or Jews, involving in the first instance a prolonged discussion on the question of responsibility for the present state of affairs and eventually the risk that our two governments might reach different conclusions on this question, is one which we can afford to adopt in the present state of international relations. What we would prefer is to see the situation in Palestine treated, without reference to the question of responsibility for its origins or continuance, as a situation containing a potential threat to world peace. This attitude towards it leads us to the conclusion that action should first be taken under Chapter VI of the Charter. But it does not exclude, in my view at least, subsequent or even concurrent, action to seal off the area of conflict in order to prevent its effects from spreading and from involving wider international relationships. If it proves possible to take comprehensive and effective measures to this end, I think the UK Government will be found ready to bring their relations with the Arab states into conformity with these measures.

"In other words, the 'action by the UN' which, as you state, is a condition of reconsidering the treaty obligations to certain Arab governments, need not necessarily take the form of a finding under Article 39 with the consequences which on present evidence we are disposed to think might follow from that finding. It follows that the two principles with which your paper begins are not mutually inconsistent. They do, however, involve the opinion that the UN should act impartially on an issue in which we believe that neither party has a claim to the backing of the UN against the other.

"Now for your questions.

"Nos. 1 to 2. It is not within the power of the UN to stop the fighting in Palestine at present. Noting the form of your questions, I would add that the UK Government would certainly not approve of measures to stop military action by the Arab states only.

"Nos. 3 to 4. It is my personal view that there can be no stabilization of the political situation in Palestine without a period of fighting. I think there is a good chance that this fighting may convince both Jews and Arabs that they cannot obtain the whole of their claims, and that

it will end in some kind of military stalemate which will probably indicate the lines along which a permanent political settlement can be found. The value of the UN mediator is that his presence on the scene when that stage is reached will provide machinery through which the two parties can begin to negotiate with one another as soon as they begin to appreciate the inevitability of a compromise.

"No. 5. There are certainly risks involved in letting matters take their course for a time. The most important of these is that the Soviet Union might in some way exploit the situation. I am doubtful, however, whether they will be strongly tempted to intervene directly in Palestine to any important extent. My own speculation is that their primary aims are the following:

"(I) To drive a wedge between the Arab world and the US.

"(II) To create conditions likely to weaken the present regimes in the Arab countries. They no doubt foresee that either weakness in supporting the Palestine Arabs or military reverses in Palestine would bring down the governments at least of Iraq and Syria and might even create a revolutionary situation in those two countries.

"You will forgive me for saying that the Russians must be reasonably satisfied with developments so far. I think they will not commit themselves more deeply than they have already done in support of the Jews, but will keep their hands sufficiently free to take advantage of the political changes for which they are hoping in the Arab states.

"Nos. 6 to 7. The UK Government has used all its influence to urge moderation on the Arabs. In particular, they used their influence with every Arab government and with the SYG of the Arab League in favor of acceptance by them of the articles of the truce which were under consideration until they were rendered out of date by the proclamation of a Jewish state on the 14th May. The UK Government are still urging the Arab states to act with a sense of their responsibility as members of the international community, but it must be remembered that British influence with these states depends upon:

"(I) Their conviction that in broad objective, if not always in detail, our policies and theirs are harmonious.

"(II) The absence of overwhelming pressure from their own public opinion in a direction contrary to that indicated by British advice.

"In view of the present mood of the public in all Arab countries, our influence is for the moment limited. On the other hand, there is evidence that our present policy is strengthening the confidence of the Arabs in our intentions towards them and this should enable us to use our influence with appreciable effect when the time comes for the UN mediator to bring the parties into contact in Palestine.

"No. 8 has been answered by a Foreign Office spokesman in London.

"Nos. 9 to 14. I think the answers to these more hypothetical questions are implied in what I said about our present position at the beginning of this note. I do not think our policy is intended to exclude either support for sanctions applied impartially against both Jews and Arabs, or even participation in the necessary measures to make those sanctions effective. But, of course, any precise proposals made would have to be considered on their merits when they were put forward."

[Ross]
AUSTIN

501.BB Palestine/6-3048

*Memorandum by the Department of State to President Truman*¹

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 22, 1948.

The Department of State finds it necessary to instruct Ambassador Austin promptly with regard to the policy of the United States on the shipment of arms and military equipment to the Near East.

From the point of view of the foreign policy of the United States, the basic factors in the situation are:

(a) The increasing violence in Palestine and our determination to do everything we can as a Member of the United Nations to bring about a cease-fire in that country;

(b) Our policy in accord with the Security Council resolution of April 17, 1948, to take all possible steps to assist in securing a cease-fire and a cessation of hostilities in Palestine. Article 3 of that resolution calls upon all governments to take such steps "and particularly those referring to the entry into Palestine of armed bands and fighting personnel, groups and individuals and weapons and war materials".

(c) The increasingly serious strain being placed on the relations between the United States and the United Kingdom by the position of the United Kingdom with respect both to their assistance to the Arabs and to United States efforts to obtain prompt action by the Security Council.

It is recommended that the President authorize the Department of State to instruct Ambassador Austin on the basis of the following statement of United States policy:

(a) The United States continues to urge that the Security Council act immediately to bring about a cease-fire in Palestine. The most immediate action which it can take is to direct an order under Articles 39 and 40 of the Charter to all governments and authorities controlling

¹ The Department, on May 26, notified New York that this memorandum had received tentative White House approval (telegram 327, 501.BB Palestine/5-2648). Filed with this telegram is an undated copy of the memorandum to President Truman, which contains a marginal notation by Mr. Lovett that the memorandum was "Approved by President & original initialed. Cleared again May 27th".

armed forces in Palestine, requiring them to issue an immediate cease-fire order to such armed forces. That is the basis of the resolution proposed by the United States in the Security Council on May 17, 1948, and will continue to represent our views so long as fighting continues.²

(b) If the Security Council issues such an order under Articles 39 and 40 of the Charter (or calls upon the parties under Chapter VI of the Charter to effect a cease-fire for all of Palestine), the United Nations must expect prompt compliance from all governments and authorities involved in the fighting in Palestine. If there is failure to comply, the United States will be prepared to adjust its arms embargo policy to support the action of the Security Council.

(c) The United States should support action by the Security Council under Article 41 to order all governments to refrain from the shipment of weapons and war materials, and the rendering of other military assistance, to governments and authorities now participating in hostilities in Palestine. This order by the Security Council would remain in force so long as the cease-fire order is complied with by the governments and authorities participating in hostilities in Palestine.

(d) If the Security Council succeeds in bringing about a cease-fire and in placing an effective general arms embargo against all those participating in any way in the fighting in Palestine, the United States will retain its present arms embargo on the entire Near East until such time as there is no longer any danger of hostilities.

(e) If the Security Council is unable to take effective action to bring about a cease-fire or to impose a general arms embargo the United States will inform the Security Council that we shall resume our freedom of action with respect to the licensing of arms shipments.

The Department of State wishes particularly to invite the attention of the President to the fact that the policy proposed above engages the most solemn powers and responsibilities of the Security Council and involves a major political commitment on the part of the United States. If such a policy is to have the desired effect, it must be pursued with vigor and singleness of purpose; otherwise, the Security Council will be demoralized and our attitude toward lifting the arms embargo itself might become the cause of even greater bloodshed in Palestine.

² In a telephone conversation at 1 p. m., May 27, with Mr. Beeley, Mr. Jessup stated "That we simply can't go back on the stand we took on May 17. We have got to stand by our insistence on our feeling that this does require definite action under Chapter VII. Now, we are not planning to put in any resolution today, but we can't take in the Council the initiative on anything which would suggest any change in our attitude because there has been none. Our general feeling is this, that our proposal on the 17th having been turned down and your initiative having been taken on the milder form of the resolution and no definite conclusion having come out of that, that we look to you to suggest the next step." (Undated memorandum by Mr. Jessup, USUN files)

Editorial Note

The Security Council voted on the United States draft resolution and the British amendments on May 22. Paragraph two of the United

States proposal, which called the situation in Palestine a threat to, and a breach of, the peace, within the meaning of Article 39, received 5 votes in favor, with 6 abstentions. The paragraph was not adopted, having failed to secure 7 affirmative votes. Colombia, France, the Ukraine, and the Soviet Union joined the United States in voting for this paragraph (SC, *3rd yr., No. 72*, page 54). For the text of the resolution adopted later the same day, see *infra*.

Ambassador Austin made a statement before the Security Council prior to the final vote on the resolution, in which he expressed the belief of the United States that the resolution was "not wholly adequate to accomplish what is required in Palestine." He noted also that "The United States will vote for this amended resolution solely as it contains a call made to the parties to issue a cease-fire order within thirty-six hours after the stated time." He concluded that if the parties did not promptly comply, the Security Council would have to consider further action (SC, *3rd yr., No. 72*, page 65).

*Resolution 49 (1948) Adopted by the Security Council on May 22, 1948*¹

The Security Council,

Taking into consideration that previous resolutions of the Security Council in respect to Palestine have not been complied with and that military operation are taking place in Palestine,

1. *Calls upon* all Governments and authorities, without prejudice to the rights, claims or positions of the parties concerned, to abstain from any hostile military action in Palestine and to that end to issue a cease-fire order to their military and paramilitary forces to become effective within thirty-six hours after midnight New York standard time on 22 May 1948;

2. *Calls upon* the Truce Commission and upon all parties concerned to give the highest priority to the negotiation and maintenance of a truce in the City of Jerusalem;

3. *Directs* the Truce Commission established by the Security Council by its resolution 48 (1948) of 23 April 1948 to report to the Council on the compliance with the two preceding paragraphs of the present resolution;

4. *Calls upon* all parties concerned to facilitate by all means in their power the task of the United Nations mediator appointed in execution of General Assembly resolution 186 (S-2) of 14 May 1948.

¹ Reprinted from SC, *3rd yr., Resolutions*, p. 19.

867N.01/5-2248 : Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Wasson) to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED

JERUSALEM, May 22, 1948—9 a. m.

692. Now extremely difficult get in touch with prominent and representative Arabs but such Arab reaction to American *de facto* recognition of Israel as has become available to us is that United States has betrayed Arab States. Arab opinion reaching us extremely bitter against United States. Feeling among some Arabs is that foundation state of Israel is menace security well-being Arab states. These persons state that if Arab Armies defeated in major engagement with Jews public reaction in such countries as Egypt and Iraq will be so unfavorable that present governments will fall and both domestic and foreign Communist elements will take advantage of resultant situation to attempt foment public disorder and undermine national security. Foundation State of Israel has been described by some Arabs here as "made to order as bridge head for penetration of Near East by USSR".

Turkish Consul in conversation with Consul General officers said "I am entirely unable understand US policy. On one hand, you help Greece and Turkey and on other hand you undermine us from rear".

Jews are of course elated and Consul General informed that demonstrations took place in Tel Aviv and Haifa. In Jerusalem Jews are faced with immediate and grim task of warfare and have not been able give much thought to anything but business at hand. Jew feelings seems be that US recognition must be followed by strongly positive action to give support to Jewish state as well as to Jews of Jerusalem.

WASSON

Editorial Note

Lebanese Foreign Minister Frangié informed Minister Pinkerton on the evening of May 15 that the "Political Committee of Arab League in session at Damascus was deeply disappointed and shocked by President's recognition of new Jewish State of Israel." (Telegram 182, May 16, 1 p. m., from Beirut, 867N.01/5-1648)

At Damascus, "Intense preoccupation with movement Arab armies, closing university and martial law have held expressions public resentment against US recognition state to minimum. . . . Most observers agree, however, current calm may swiftly turn into anti-American explosion after first serious Syrian defeat or with further active US

support of Zionists such as lifting arms embargo." (Telegram 295, May 16, 1 p. m., from Damascus, 867N.01/5-1648)

Official reaction in Cairo was said to be "comparatively mild" (telegram 529, May 16, 7 p. m., from Cairo, 867N.01/5-1648).

An *aide-mémoire* of May 21 from King Ibn Saud stated that United States recognition of the Jewish State had crushed the hopes of the Arabs (telegram 307, May 22, from Jidda, 867N.01/5-2248)

867N.01/5-2248 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

LONDON, May 22, 1948—8 p. m.

2213. For Lovett from Douglas. I am convinced that crevasse widening between US and Britain over Palestine cannot be confined to Palestine or even to Middle East: It is already seriously jeopardizing foundation-stone of US policy in Europe—partnership with a friendly and well-disposed Britain. Irrespective rights and wrongs of question, I believe worst shock so far to general Anglo-American concert of policy since I have been here was sudden US de facto recognition Jewish state without previous notice of our intentions to British Government. Far beyond substance of act of de facto recognition, for which there is ample justification, was manner in which British Government and people have been shaken by what is here regarded as unilateral and precipitate US action deeply affecting a common problem in which US and UK have basically common interests—peace in Palestine and Middle East.

Worst prospect I can see on horizon American-British relations is possibility that we may raise embargo on Middle East arm shipments to favor Jews. If we do so, it will be only short step until British Government, impelled by what it conceives to be its vital interests in Middle East extending as far as Pakistan (see Embassy's 2138, May 17 and Embassy's 2161, May 19¹) may lift embargo re arms to Arabs. When this happens, the two great democratic partners will indirectly be ranged on opposite sides of a battle line scarcely three years after May 8, 1945.

Bevin who has been at Scarborough² has asked to see me tomorrow morning re Palestine.³

DOUGLAS

¹ Neither printed.

² Site of the Labour Party Conference.

³ This telegram was presumably drafted on May 21.

867N.01/5-2248 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the
Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET US URGENT

LONDON, May 22, 1948.

NIACT

2225. For the Secretary and Lovett from Douglas. At Bevin's request, I met with him this morning, in Michael Wright's presence, for a long discussion of Palestine. Many points covered in the conversation will be reported to you later. At the moment, however, there are several aspects of the problem of immediate significance.

1. (a) Bevin urges, with complete sincerity, that we give support to the British resolution pending in the Security Council calling for a cease-fire among the hostile forces. If accepted, he means that all hostilities shall cease, and that the Jewish and Arab forces, respectively, will be permitted to move within those portions of Palestine which are clearly Arab or Jewish as the case may be, to the extent that they do not come in conflict with opposing forces.

He believes this is the most realistic and hopeful approach, and that any suggestion involving evacuation or a standstill would certainly be rejected by both sides.

He does not suggest that we accept the British resolution necessarily, as it is presently drafted without modification, but that we support it with such amendments or changes as may fall within its general meaning.

(b) He believes that before Article 39 of the Charter is invoked and before sanctions are applied, the two hostile groups should be given an opportunity to accept or reject the cease-fire proposal, and if they accept it, to determine under the auspices of the mediator what peaceful settlement can be arranged.

(c) Moreover, he believes that invoking Article 39 probably will mean ultimate Soviet interference in Palestine and in the Middle East.

2. He hopes that at least until after having had an opportunity to review the situation, we will not precipitately lift the embargo on arms. The British are under great pressure to permit the free flow of arms into the Arab states. They have so far successfully resisted this pressure which is mounting every day. They will continue to resist, if we do not remove our embargo. If, on the other hand, we do lift it, it will be impossible for the British to maintain theirs. Thus a situation far more serious than the present one, encompassing a much wider area probably would be created.

3. Bevin says that having relinquished the mandate, and having been divested of direct responsibilities under it, he, personally, though this has not been cleared with the Cabinet, is prepared to examine the position from a fresh vantage point.

4. At the Scarborough meeting of the Labor Party heavy influences were brought to bear upon him to speak of Palestine. These influences he repelled, because he was fearful that in defending the government's position, he might make some statement which might intensify the tension between our two governments on this question and might cast a cloud on Anglo-American relations generally. If, however, we insist on invoking Article 39 of the Charter and lift the embargo, it will be impossible for him to refrain from answering questions in the House of Commons which he knows, under these circumstances, will be put to him. In responding, he will naturally have to defend the government's position and will find it impossible to avoid making statements which may be misunderstood at home and may have the effect which he was fearful any comments at Scarborough might have produced.

5. Berger¹ has just returned from the Scarborough Labor Party conference and tells me that although nothing was said openly during the meeting, his personal associations, covering a wide range of party membership, indicated concern and disquiet about our relations with the British in Palestine and the Middle East.

6. From my personal knowledge, reinforced by what Bevin and Berger tell me, I feel that we should try to relax the pressure on the British by accommodating them on the two questions which Bevin has raised namely, the substance of the British resolution and the embargo on arms and by otherwise refraining from taking action, until at least there has been an opportunity to make a careful and joint appraisal of our respective positions. This appraisal on the British side will be given us immediately.

7. Since dictating the above, Bevin has just extended an invitation to me to meet with himself, the Prime Minister, Minister of Defense, Chiefs of Staff, and Minister of Commonwealth Relations early next week for the purpose of discussing the broad political and extensive strategic relations implicit in the Palestinian situation.

DOUGLAS

¹ Samuel D. Berger, First Secretary of Embassy in the United Kingdom.

501.BB Palestine/5-2348 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt

SECRET US URGENT
NIACT

WASHINGTON, May 23, 1948—6 p. m.

641. Jerusalem's 716 May 23¹ reports that at 2045 local time official representatives of Jewish Agency informed Consulate General that Provisional Govt of Israel, in compliance with resolution adopted by

¹ Not printed.

SC yesterday, was prepared to observe cease-fire in all of Palestine, including Jerusalem, from 2000 hours "Jewish local time", which we take to be 12 noon EST. This would be in strict compliance with 36 hour cease-fire order of SC. Jewish readiness to observe cease-fire would be conditional upon similar Arab compliance, and could be effected earlier if Arabs willing.

Please call immediately upon FonMin or head of State, in your discretion, and state that this Govt is gravely disturbed at present course of developments in Palestine and hopes that Govt to which you are accredited will, as fellow member of UN, cooperate by compliance with SC cease-fire of May 22.²

Sent for action to Cairo 641; Damascus 188; Beirut 260; Jidda 194; Baghdad 166; Jerusalem 457; and for info to London 1878; Paris 1777; Brussels 775; USUN 319.

MARSHALL

² The Department, on May 24, directed Jerusalem to "ascertain from appropriate Jewish authorities whether order includes all Israel forces and has been agreed to by IZL and Stern." (Telegram 460, 867N.01/5-2348)

Jerusalem advised, on May 25, of information from a spokesman for the Jewish Agency that the cease-fire order included all Israeli forces, including IZL and Stern, and that both organizations "definitely accepted authority of Haganah". Vice Consul Burdett gave it as his opinion that their complete obedience to the Haganah command was still questionable (telegram 740, 867N.01/5-2548).

867N.01/5-2248

The British Embassy to the Department of State

SECRET

SUMMARY OF A TELEGRAM FROM THE FOREIGN OFFICE REPORTING A CONVERSATION ON PALESTINE BETWEEN MR. BEVIN AND THE UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR IN LONDON ON THE 22ND MAY

On the 21st May, I sent a message to Mr. Douglas that I should like to see him on the morning of the 22nd May to discuss further the question of Palestine, and, in particular, our grave concern at the increasing divergences of American and British policy on this question.

2. In the course of a long talk with Mr. Douglas this morning (22nd May). I said that we had made great progress with the United States over the questions of ERP, the Brussels Treaty and security measures for Europe. We were perturbed at the possible consequences of a continued drift apart. I said that changes in United States policy and some of the initiatives taken had left us bewildered and frustrated. Although His Majesty's Government had not felt able to agree to certain of the United States proposals, they had brought heavy and successful pressure to bear on the Arab Governments to withhold action until the 15th May in spite of constant Jewish provocation. On

the 14th May, we had been insistently urging the Arab States to agree to the United States truce proposals. But the immediate *de facto* recognition of the Jewish State by the United States Government had cut the ground from under the efforts which we were making, not entirely unsuccessfully, with the Arabs on the basis of these United States proposals.

3. United States recognition of the provisional Jewish Government was followed by the sudden introduction into the Security Council of the United States resolution proposing action under Article 39. If we agreed to the American proposal, we should be opening the door to Soviet intervention in the Middle East, and since no other powers were, so far as we knew, prepared to participate in consequential action, the result must be to discredit still further the United Nations.

4. I felt strongly that the implications of the present situation and of any remedial action in the United Nations designed to meet it needed to be very fully and carefully thought out. Palestine was a question of deep concern to the countries of the Middle East, to Pakistan and to other countries with Moslem inhabitants. American policy was antagonising these nations and making them feel that considerations of justice and fair dealing were being subordinated to electoral pressure from the Zionists in New York. All the facts unfavourable to the Arabs were being emphasised and none of the facts unfavourable to the Jews. Take the case of Jerusalem, the High Commissioner had succeeded in securing the agreement of both parties to a cease-fire for eight days and the agreement of the Arabs to a truce. The Jews had refused a truce and had then proceeded to break the cease-fire. That was the reason why fighting was now taking place in Jerusalem, and who could justly blame the Arabs? The Jews had occupied Jaffa and Acre, both of them Arab cities, as well as a large part of Western Gallilee. These facts were overlooked or concealed. His Majesty's Government were trying to hold the balance even to prevent international action which would be as unjust as it would be unwise. But for this they were being abused and threatened.

5. I made it plain to Mr. Douglas that His Majesty's Government would not abandon the line which they believed to be right. But I was genuinely concerned at where all this was leading. The attitude of the whole Moslem world, and American and British interests in the Middle East, were at stake. I appealed for measured discussion between us of all the issues involved before matters proceeded further.

6. Mr. Douglas said that he fully agreed that it was most important that we should discuss and weigh together the whole range of political and strategic questions involved before either of us took further action, and said that he would inform his Government of my views.

7. We have therefore agreed to supply Mr. Douglas with an ap-

preciation of the position in relation to defence and of likely developments arising from the Palestine situation throughout the Middle East, India and Burma. He will discuss this with his Government, and it has also been arranged that he should meet myself, the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, the Minister of Defence and the Chiefs of Staff here on this matter on the 25th May.

8. I earnestly trust that the United States Government will respond to our plea, and will suspend any further attempt to invoke Article 39 of the Charter or to raise their arms embargo pending the proposed joint review of the whole situation.¹

WASHINGTON, 24th May 1948.

¹ In an attached memorandum of May 24 to Mr. Lovett, the Secretary of State advised that he had read to President Truman the summary of the British Foreign Office telegram, "together with related documents particularly Douglas' message and his views. The President approves the proposal of Mr. Bevin in paragraph 8." In a marginal notation, Mr. Humelsine stated that he had read the Secretary's memorandum to Messrs. Henderson, Hickerson, and Rusk and that "Action already had been taken at the time of my reading on the para. 8 proposal by Mr. Henderson." Ambassador Douglas' message and views are contained in his telegrams 2213 and 2225, both dated May 22, pp. 1031 and 1032.

501.BB Palestine/5-2448

*Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the Under Secretary
of State (Lovett)*

TOP SECRET EYES ONLY

[WASHINGTON,] May 24, 1948.

I went over with the President the serious situation regarding Palestine matters particularly with reference to his reception of Mr. Weizman and its possible implication of *de jure* recognition,¹ and also the

¹ As set forth in the Legal Adviser's memorandum of May 24 to Mr. Lovett, not printed; but see Mr. Lovett's memorandum of May 26 to President Truman and footnote 1, p. 1051. In an undated memorandum to the President, drafted by the Legal Adviser on May 22, the Department stated: "In view of the confusion which may exist concerning the significance of the proposed visit of Dr. Weizmann to Washington for discussion with the President, it is suggested that at the next press conference held by the President the following question and answer might dispel doubts concerning the legal effect of Dr. Weizmann's visit to the President:

"Q. Does the reception of Dr. Weizmann by the President constitute a change in the character of the recognition of the provisional government of Israel?"

"A. No. This Government recognizes the provisional government of Israel as the *de facto* authority of that state. The President wanted to greet Dr. Weizmann and to talk with him again before his departure for Israel."

A marginal notation by Mr. McClintock states that the memorandum was delivered to Mr. Clifford by Mr. Lovett on May 22 (501.BB Palestine/5-2248). For the remarks made by President Truman at his press conference of May 27 on the visit of President Weizmann, see telegram 1978, May 28, to London, p. 1072.

dangerous aspects involved in the question of the arms embargo. This was done along with reading numerous documents to him including Bevin's current message² and Douglas' views. I emphasized the tragic results which might well follow any action not carefully considered, its devastating results to him, not to mention the situation in the Middle East, and I said the only protection that I could see at the present time was a very careful maintenance of a relationship between Clark Clifford and you, Lovett, so that no action be taken that had not been either cleared by the State Department or the conditions implied explained for the President's information. He agreed to this.

Incidentally I told him of the difficulty we had in preventing a number of resignations among the members of our delegation to the United Nations and the State Department. He was unaware of this and seemed much perturbed at the possibility.

I cleared several matters which have been indicated in appropriate memorandum in addition to this.³

² *Supra.*

³ Mr. Humelsine, in a marginal notation, states that he read this memorandum to Messrs. Rusk, Henderson, and Hickerson. The editors have been unable to identify the "appropriate memorandum" cited in the last paragraph.

390.1115/5-2448

*Memorandum by the Director of the Office of United Nations Affairs
(Rusk) to Brigadier General Marshall S. Carter*

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] May 24, 1948.

The memorandum of today's date from Mr. Henderson to the Secretary,¹ with regard to the security of American citizens in the Levant, concludes with the following paragraph:

"In connection with the above, it is extremely important that no moves be taken which may further inflame the situation, such as a decision which would lead to the sending of arms to the State of Israel by the United States; action extending *de jure* recognition of the State of Israel; or further denunciation of the Arabs by American representatives before the Security Council, until our missions in the Near East have been warned and have had an opportunity to take steps to warn American citizens."

This memorandum has received the approval of the President.

It is suggested that the Secretary at luncheon tomorrow with Ambassador Austin may wish to draw the substance of this paragraph to the Ambassador's attention.

¹ Copy not found in Department of State files.

S67N.01/5-2448 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

LONDON, May 24, 1948—10 a. m.

2226. For the Secretary's eyes only from Douglas. Bevin has sent me the following note about Transjordan for your top secret information:

"On the termination of the British mandate, all the units of the Arab Legion which had been serving in Palestine under British command had been evacuated from Palestine except for one company which was unable to extricate itself in time, owing to the British troops in Jerusalem moving earlier than was expected. HMG then ceased to be responsible for the Arab Legion.

"It is suggested that HMG still have a moral responsibility because of the British subsidy, the loan of British officers and the supply of war material. All these are part of our treaty obligations.

"As regards the subsidy, the last installment was paid in April and the next will become due in July. We will naturally consider the whole situation before paying it.

"As regards the officers, for the top secret information of Mr. Marshall, their instructions are that they must withdraw to Transjordan if the Legion becomes involved in hostilities with the Jewish state as a result of an attack on the state within the frontiers recommended by the Assembly.

"As regards the supply of war material, this is confined, in accordance with our general policy, to the completion of existing contracts.

"The Jewish Agency informed Mr. Marshall some time ago that there was contact between the Jews and the Arab Legion, through the intermediary of a British officer. We have received similar top secret reports. We understand that the Jews knew the Arab Legion would enter Arab areas of Palestine and that this was not unwelcome to them. We have always thought that there might be considerable advantage in an arrangement by which the Haganah and the Arab Legion might be given responsibility for maintaining law and order in different areas.

"The Arab Legion have not entered any part of the area recommended for the Jewish state by the Assembly.

"The Arab Legion attack on parts of Jerusalem was the direct consequence of the breaking of the cease-fire there by the Jews. We are confident the attack would not have taken place if the Jews had

accepted the truce for Jerusalem. Latest information suggests that the Arab Legion will henceforth be mainly on the defensive in Jerusalem."

DOUGLAS

501.BB Palestine/5-2448 : Telegram

The Vice Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

US URGENT

JERUSALEM, May 24, 1948—noon.

NIACT

725. Deptel 457 May 23.¹ In view of friendly relations informally maintained with Transjordan officials by this ConGen would Dept wish consider suggestion that we transmit to King Abdullah or Transjordan Prime Minister personal message from Stabler² or alternatively from "American Consulate General" along following lines:

US Government gravely disturbed by present-course developments in Palestine and hopes that Transjordan Government will find it possible to cooperate in the carrying out of the cease-fire which is proposed for all fronts in Palestine to come into effect at 1800 hours local Arab time tonight. Embassy (or we) shall be glad to transmit to the Department of State any reply which Your Majesty (or the Transjordan Government) may desire to send.

Department's urgent instructions requested as we understand Arab League Political Committee is now meeting in Amman.³

BURDETT

¹ This was a repeat of No. 641 to Cairo, p. 1033.

² Wells Stabler, Vice Consul at Jerusalem.

³ The Department, on May 24, approved the suggestion for an informal approach by the Consulate General to the Transjordan Government regarding a cease-fire (telegram 458 to Jerusalem, 501.BB Palestine/5-2448).

867N.01/5-2448 : Telegram

The Minister in Lebanon (Pinkerton) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

BEIRUT, May 24, 1948—3 p. m.

208. Foreign Minister informed me Lebanese Government prepared release US citizens (remytel 193, May 20, 11 a. m.¹) interned from *Marine Carp* provided arrangements made for their direct repatria-

¹ Not printed, but see footnote 1, p. 1016.

tion to US.² He added that they could not be released to proceed to Palestine to join Jewish forces which are making constant commando raids into Lebanon. This information will be conveyed to internees who will be asked whether they are prepared to accept this arrangement and Department will be advised of their decision. Committee of internees is reported to have told American journalist that they wished proceed Palestine to fight alongside their people.³

[Here follows one paragraph dealing with individual internees.]

PINKERTON

² On May 22 the Lebanese Government had made a negative reply to the Minister's demand for the release of American citizens who had been aboard the S.S. *Marine Carp* (telegram 203, 867N.01/5-2248) ; for text of the Lebanese note, see Department of State *Bulletin*, June 6, 1948, p. 749.

³ Beirut informed the Department on May 27 that all the American citizens interned in Lebanon had expressed their willingness to return directly to the United States (telegram 217, 867N.01/5-2748).

501.BB Palestine/5-2448 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

US URGENT

LONDON, May 24, 1948—4 p. m.

NIAC

2235. For Lovett from Douglas. Bevin informed me this morning that Azzam has called a political meeting of the Arab League and has requested a short delay in the discussions of the cease-fire proposals now before the Security Council.

Bevin thinks that since the Arab leaders have to be assembled from their respective countries this is reasonable and I am inclined to agree with him provided that the delay is short. He suggests 48 hours. He has sent a telegram to New York to this effect and has asked our support.

Bevin tells me that meanwhile he is bringing strongest possible pressure to bear on Arab leaders to accept.¹

Since dictating the above, I have just heard from the FonOff that they have this moment received a cablegram from Baghdad to the effect that the cease-fire proposal was not received until the night of the 23rd, that the Regent is leaving today for Amman, that if the cease-fire order were agreed to by the Arab League at Amman, a certain amount of time would be required to get the necessary orders to the field. This is an example of the physical impediments to speedy ac-

¹ According to information furnished to Mr. Ross by Mr. Beeley, such pressure was exerted through "very strong representations" in all Arab capitals and by personal messages from Mr. Bevin to Abdullah, Farouk, and the Iraqi Regent (telegram 697, May 24, 9:25 p. m., from New York, 501.BB Palestine/5-2448).

ceptance by the Arab leaders with which the Israelite state is not confronted. It reinforces the view that more time is necessary than the 36 hours to permit the Arab leaders; first, to assemble in Amman from relatively remote parts; secondly, to arrive at a decision, and third, if the decision is favorable to get orders to the troops in the field. Accordingly, it seems fair to extend the 36-hour period by 48 hours in order that the purely physical difficulties which the Arabs have to resolve will not prevent a mutual acceptance and execution of the cease-fire proposals.²

In this connection Goldmann has just called upon me. On hearing that the British were exerting every influence to persuade the Arabs to accept the cease-fire proposition and on the suggestion that more time be permitted the Arabs, he agreed that this was a fair suggestion.

DOUGLAS

² The Lebanese, Syrian, and Iraqi Governments, on May 24, made known before the Security Council that the time limit provided for in the resolution of May 22 was insufficient for consultations among the Arab States (SC, 3rd yr., No. 73, p. 37). British, United States, and French representatives supported an extension of the time limit, whereupon the Council granted a 48-hour extension, until noon, May 20 (*ibid.*, pp. 38-41).

867N.01/5-2448 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Iraq (Wadsworth) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

BAGHDAD, May 24, 1948—8 p. m.

350. Herewith comment on Jerusalem's telegram 650, May 19 as requested by Department circular May 20.¹

Apart from military intelligence broad estimate substantially equal strength Arab and Jewish forces (on which subject we have reported all locally available information) key points made by Consul General appear to be:

1. Arab armies will be content take over Arab areas of country (by which Consul General appears take in all Palestine except eastern Galilee Esdraelon Haifa area and central coastal plain).

2. US moral support supplemented by reasonable Jewish policy towards Arabs may create favorable atmosphere in which Israel may grow. On first point our view is: While Arab strategy may have the appearance at this time of taking over such "Arab areas" we do not agree that if this phase of Arabs campaign be successful they will be "content". Basically they are fighting to prevent establishment any Jewish state because they believe all Palestine is rightfully Arab and part of Arab world and because they truly fear any Jewish state would constitute continuing and increasingly aggressive threat to Arab world.

¹ Not printed.

On second point our views are: US moral support of Jewish state can do nothing towards creating, so far as concerns Arabs "favorable atmosphere" for that state's growth but it can seriously damage Arab-American relations. Further to Arabs it is contradiction of terms to speak in same breath on [of?] Jewish rule and of reasonable Jewish policy towards Arabs.²

Sent Department 350; repeated Arab capitals, pouched London.

WADSWORTH

² Minister Childs, on May 25, commented that Arab strategic objectives centered around the annihilation or defeat of Jewish forces to render impossible the establishment of a Jewish state. He noted also that "Azzam Pasha informed me some months ago Arabs might be induced accept token Jewish state Tel Aviv similar Vatican area. However, both Azzam and Ibn Saud are now likely be more influenced by flow events than be in position control and direct them." (Telegram 311 from Jidda, 867N.01/5-2548)

Ambassador Tuck, on May 25, gave it as his opinion that "Arabs intend to consolidate Arab areas Palestine state as first step in their endeavor to eliminate Israel." He noted also that "if US strengthens Jews by raising embargo in their favor, we feel that our tactical and strategic security throughout whole Middle East would vanish overnight." He concluded that "present US policy is actually prolonging and encouraging the conflict in Palestine and furthermore that it may result in jeopardizing US national security even to the extent of affecting Anglo-American cooperation." (Telegram 598 from Cairo, 867N.01/5-2548)

Truman Papers, President's Secretary's File

*Memorandum by the President of the Provisional Government of Israel (Weizmann) to President Truman*¹

[WASHINGTON ?,] May 25, 1948.

Subject: Israel's two basic problems.

1. Israel is now wrestling with two basic problems: first, national survival in the face of Arab aggression supported by the British; second, the resettlement and rehabilitation of the homeless DP's.

2. There is little hope that the Arabs will accept the cease fire order without crippling limitations. The British still feel that they can divide American opinion and render American policy irresolute; the Arabs still rely on guidance and assistance by the British. Only action can bring peace to the Middle East, and the most effective action with the British and Arabs is a modification of the arms embargo established by the United States.

3. Military aid is thus the first basic problem which confronts the new State. It requires especially anti-tank weapons; anti-aircraft weapons; planes; and heavy artillery. By American standards the needed quantities are extremely limited but in the context of the

¹ Dr. Weizmann left this *aide-mémoire* with President Truman during their conference at the White House on May 25. The editors have found no official record of this meeting; Weizmann's account is in his *Trial and Error*, p. 480.

current activity in Israel they may well be decisive. Above all speed in the provision of such arms is urgently necessary. Would it be possible to make limited quantities of these weapons available from depots or other store places in the Middle East?

4. The second basic problem confronting Israel arises from the desperate situation of the Jewish DP's. Israel plans to empty the camps at the rate of 15,000 persons per month. To transport, equip, house, and rehabilitate these impoverished people requires expenditures which by Israel's standards are enormous, and which must be made at a time when Israel is engaged in a struggle for national survival.

5. Israel is now applying to the Export-Import Bank for a loan. It was thought that funds could be obtained more speedily in this way rather than by requesting at this time a gift or a grant. Israel can and will satisfy the necessary banking requirements. An indication from you, Mr. President, that you are sympathetic to our application would make certain that speedy action, so urgently required, will be forthcoming.

501.BB Palestine/5-2548

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. John C. Ross

SECRET

[NEW YORK,] May 25, 1948.

Participants: Secretary of State Marshall
Ambassador Austin—U.S. Mission
Ambassador Alexandre Parodi—Representative of
France
Mr. John C. Ross—U.S. Mission

Ambassador Parodi said that while he did not express any opinion on the lifting of the United States arms embargo, he felt that it would be desirable if we *do* lift the embargo to get assurances from the Jews that they would not indulge in excesses such as bombing cities in the Arab States.

The general line stated by the Secretary, not for repetition, was as follows:

1. The Secretary emphasized the continued great importance we attach to getting a cease-fire.
2. He thought that it might be possible to get a cease-fire in Jerusalem first and spread it out from there.
3. He was doing and would continue to do everything he could to have this case dealt with through the Security Council but action was necessary.
4. Making clear that he was not implying that we were likely to lift the arms embargo, he said that if we did, this act might have a strong psychological effect but it would be at least a month before it would have any material effect.
5. The Secretary wanted to correct what seemed to be a wide mis-

understanding. The United States had maintained a strict arms embargo for some months past, while other nations had in fact been shipping arms into the area. The fact that other nations had been doing this while we had not ~~made his task in developing the United States arms embargo policy an extremely difficult one.~~ With a tremendous political pressure in this country to have us do so made our position extremely difficult and the maintenance of the embargo by us an impressive fact.¹

6. There were three factors which stiffened the Jewish position before May 15 and may have caused failure of truce efforts at that time, namely, (a) initial military successes of the Jews; (b) the bait held out by Creech Jones concerning a possible compromise solution along the Abdullah lines, and (c) the fact that a Colonel on Brigadier Glubb's staff (Arab Legion) had visited the Jews and talked about a possible compromise.

7. The Secretary said that the British seemed to be better aware of their position and seemed to be active in a constructive sense. He thereby had some hope that practical proposals might be forthcoming.

JOHN C. ROSS

¹ The overlined words were included in the memorandum as prepared by Mr. Ross. Marginal notations indicate that the Secretary of State deleted these words and supplied the remainder of the sentence.

501.BB Palestine/5-2548

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] May 25, 1948.

I am listing a number of points with regard to Palestine and the relationship of the United Nations to Palestine, some of which you may care to touch upon during the course of your conversation with Mr. Lie and Senator Austin:

1) The Palestine situation is extremely complicated and explosive. Both Arabs and Jews can present convincing arguments that their respective causes are based on accepted international principles and on elemental justice. Although both have good arguments, both have committed grave mistakes. The Arabs and Jews are not alone guilty, however, for what is happening in Palestine. The governments of various countries, by following confused, contradictory, and opportunistic policies in the past, have added to the complications and injustices inherent in the situation.

2) The Palestine problem, unless handled with extreme care, might in present world conditions produce a situation in which the security of the entire Middle East as well as that of the whole world could be endangered.

3) The United Nations is an instrument for the preservation of world peace on the basis of the principles set forth in its charter. In making use of this instrument, the various States which are members

of the United Nations must exercise caution in handling problems such as Palestine lest they wreck rather than strengthen world security. It is true that if the United Nations fails to take prompt action when the basic principles of the Charter are being violated, it weakens its effectiveness as an instrument for peace. Nevertheless, its members must bear in mind that it may be more harmful to the United Nations for it to take action likely to undermine the peace than to take no action. This is particularly true when there is some doubt as to which party is right and which is wrong.

4) In taking action with regard to Palestine it is important that the Security Council make sure that it is pursuing simultaneously the following objectives:

- a) upholding the principles of the Charter;
- b) upholding them in a manner which would promote rather than undermine world security;
- c) upholding them in a manner which would be free from bias and partisanship; and
- d) upholding them in a manner which, so far as possible, would not threaten the integrity of the United Nations or would not weaken it by the creation of new antagonistic blocks, as for instance, a bloc of Asiatic countries or a bloc of peoples of non-European origin who feel that the principles of the Charter are being applied differently to them than to peoples of European origin.

5) It seems clear that the majority of the thinking peoples of Asia are convinced that the Zionists, with the aid of certain western countries, have for years been engaged in a slow process of aggression against the Arabs of Palestine and that this process is now reaching the stage of armed aggression. Furthermore, many of them are convinced that the Zionist ambitions extend beyond the confines of what the Zionists now call their state. So long as this feeling exists, the organs of the United Nations must exercise great circumspection in making decisions and proceed with caution in enforcing decisions which so many peoples believe to be based upon considerations other than a determination to uphold the principles of the Charter.¹

L[OY] W. H[ENDERSON]

¹ Mr. Rusk, in a memorandum of May 25 to Brigadier General Carter, stated: "Mr. Henderson's memorandum is all right as far as it goes, but does not lead up to any thoughts on what we or the Security Council should now do about Palestine. In view of our recognition of Israel and our Chapter VII effort, Senator Austin and Mr. Lie may be puzzled about our attitude if the Secretary should limit himself to the attached memorandum [by Mr. Henderson]."

"I suggest the Secretary emphasize that

"(a) An immediate cease-fire in Palestine is essential

"(b) The United States does not expect to take hasty action on the arms embargo since we wish to afford the Security Council every opportunity to pacify the situation

"(c) We are particularly concerned about Jerusalem and are ready to assist in making special arrangements for the security of that city and the Holy Places."

Brigadier General Carter returned the memorandum to Mr. Rusk with a notation that the Secretary had seen it (501.BB Palestine/5-2548).

501.BB Palestine/5-2548 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Jerusalem

CONFIDENTIAL US URGENT WASHINGTON, May 25, 1948—1 p. m.

467. Burdett authorized informally to represent this govt on SC Truce Commission pending appointment by the President of official representative replacing Wasson.¹ Repeated to USUN as 321, Paris as 1787, Brussels as 779, London as 1898. Jerusalem repeat to Arab capitals.

MARSHALL

¹ Consul Wasson, on his return to the Consulate General at Jerusalem from a meeting of the Security Council Truce Commission on May 22, was fatally wounded by a sniper's bullet and died the next day; for Ambassador Austin's report of May 22 on the matter, see SC, 3rd yr., *Supplement for May 1948*, p. 94.

867N.01/5-2548 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET US URGENT

LONDON, May 25, 1948—2 p. m.

NIACT

2251. For Lovett from Douglas. At meeting this morning (paragraph seven Embtel 2225, May 22)¹ which will be described in later telegram, Bevin again raised with me question as to whether "cease-fire" order by Israel will effectively include Irgun and Stern groups. He asked me as matter of great urgency to suggest to you in interest of securing Arab acceptance cease-fire that USG urge upon Israel, whose President is now Washington, desirability of immediate statement by Israel to effect (a) that cease-fire on Jewish side includes Irgun and Stern groups and (b) that Israel for duration cease-fire will not permit immigration or will at least limit it to women and children.²

2. Bevin, speaking obviously with approval Attlee and at what amounted to informal meeting of Defense Committee, said that statement on these two points might help restore modicum belief in Jewish good faith among Arabs who cannot forget how Irgun and Stern have broken earlier cease-fires and that Jewish immigrants now arriving Palestine consist largely fighting men.

3. Bevin said for his part he undertook to advise Arab states today not to impose strict conditions as price acceptance cease-fire.

¹ *Ante*, p. 1032.

² The Department, on May 26, informed London that time and circumstances did not permit the action suggested by Mr. Bevin on these two matters. It noted also that it had queried Jerusalem on the Irgun-Stern matter (telegram 1929, 867N.01/5-2648). Regarding the query and the reply of Jerusalem, see footnote 2, p. 1034. The nature of the reply from Jerusalem was sent to London on May 25 in telegram 1896 (867N.01/5-2548).

4. Bevin expressed belief Jews would gain by Weizmann's issuing at this critical moment as gesture of good faith a statement along lines paragraph one above.

5. Bevin is hopeful next 48 hours will produce real chance to grapple with Palestine problem.

6. I undertook to put Bevin's views to you most urgently.

7. I have just been advised that FonOff telegram in sense paragraph three left London for Arab capitals in highest priority at 1 p. m. today.³

DOUGLAS

³ A marginal notation in the handwriting of Mr. McClintock, on an information copy of this telegram, states that this message was "Passed to White House 11 a. m. May 25 by Mr. Humelsine at Mr. Lovett's direction."

867N.01/5-2548 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

LONDON, May 25, 1948—8 p. m.

2267. Embassy's 2213, May 21 [22].

1. Further evidence British Government shares my concern re gulf widening between US and British over Palestine was calibre group assembled by Attlee and Bevin this morning at latter's private residence for secrecy purposes (Embassy's 2225, May 22, paragraph 7). Besides persons named above, present were Secretary State for Commonwealth Relations, Minister Defence, Lord Tedder of Air Ministry, Vice-Admiral Sir J. Edelston of Admiralty, Lt. General Templar of War Office, Major General Hollis of Ministry of Defence, Sir Orme Sargent and F. K. Roberts of Foreign Office. I was accompanied by Lewis Jones. Purpose of gathering was to make available to USG through me latest British views re political and strategic aspects Palestine problem.

2. Re strategic implications, Tedder said that strategically Palestine is not problem Arabs vs Jews but one of geography since Palestine is not only part of Middle East bridge between east and west, but also between Asia and Africa. British Chief of Staff believe Middle East is "other foot" of defense of UK and western Europe and that this also true with regard to USG vis-à-vis USSR because trans-polar route is "inadequate" and not likely be decisive. Tedder said Middle East oil is vital militarily both in peace and war. Speaking for British Chief of Staff, Tedder said that Moslem ideology is one of world's strongest, embracing as it does area from Casablanca through Pakistan into Indonesia. British Chief of Staff believe Moslem ideology capable of being worked up along anti-western lines because of Palestine and

if this happens it will constitute almost insuperable military problem. Tedder said that military criteria for Palestine solution were first, that it must not be one which would open Palestine to Soviet influence and, second, not be one which will alienate Moslem good-will towards US and UK. It is plain USSR wants to be in Middle East for same reasons US and UK wish to keep USSR out.

3. Re sanctions, Bevin said it is susceptibility Middle East countries to Soviet influence which in large measure caused him to take such a firm stand against UN sanctions. Few people seem to remember far-reaching difficulties experienced with 1935 sanctions against Mussolini which proved that there is no such thing as "half-sanctions": i.e., if applied to Middle East countries we could not hope to continue to get oil from these countries or to continue oil development and pipeline programs considered so vital militarily and for recovery of Europe. There is no doubt in his mind that very least Moslem states would do would be to ignore sanctions and this would in itself tend to pit west versus east. Bevin said Iraq offered excellent test re results sanctions. Iraqi Government is already tottering and has asked British Government for funds pay current expenses. Effect sanctions on Iraq (stopping oil royalties and oil exports) would be to topple Iraqi Government into chaos. Bevin had hoped that by this time in conjunction with USG large irrigation project in Iraq along lines TVA would have been started. Palestine has stopped this project because any funds or support given Iraq at this time would result in accusations this done to help fight Jews. If Iraq in which Communists already have strong foothold should be pauperized by sanctions it would be wonderful opportunity for USSR to intervene. British military intelligence recently reported secret offer by USSR to back Iraqi currency with gold loan.

4. I inquired where British Government thought Pakistan stood on Palestine question and was told that mainspring Pakistan is Moslem faith. Pakistan who regard themselves as leaders Moslem world, are showing not only solidarity with Arabs but also disturbing tendency to strengthen ties with USSR. It is not unlikely Pakistan token force may be sent Palestine and GOP would certainly not apply sanctions. Interestingly enough Palestine is one of few issues on which GOI and GOP see eye to eye.

5. Regarding Iran, Bevin said that Azerbaijan incident had already shown Iran's susceptibility to Soviet machinations. He thought Iran which as UN member would be called upon to apply sanctions would not comply and would be drawn into any Moslem anti-west orientation and in this event would serve as door to Soviet expansion.

6. Regarding Turkey, Bevin expressed view that if Arab countries are driven to adopt anti-west attitude, this coupled with Iranian

weakness would do what Turks have always feared most—encircle Turkey—which “would then become a satellite”.

7. Regarding military sanctions, Tedder said flatly “these were impractical” and Attlee asked “who would do it?” Bevin said speaking for himself, he was not willing advise UK take part in military sanctions. He understood USG unwilling to take leading role military sanctions: If this were true “military sanctions would be left largely to USSR”.

8. Bevin said Arab states now fighting in Arab Palestine are in “state of desperation” which could rapidly be converted to the “anti-west movement which we fear”. He had felt impelled during recent weeks to be “fair” (Embassy’s 2182, May 20¹) lest Arab tie with west via UK be severed.

9. Tedder expressed opinion that Jews, whose forces are numerically superior by about four to one and who are better armed, are likely win first phase fighting although that does not mean that “in matter of years Arab guerillas cannot wear down Jews”. Fact is neither Arabs nor Jews can get on without one another and “if we can hold the ring” best hope is fighting stalemate in which both sides will face necessity of living at peace with one another. What Tedder feared was repetition of civil war in Spain during which both sides were supplied with arms by different sets of outside powers.

10. Bevin said most important objective at moment is achieving cease-fire (Embassy’s 2251, May 25) and he thought next 48 hours might give opportunity to grapple with Palestine situation. Tedder said it would be extremely difficult for Arabs to establish effective cease-fire quickly. Bevin said this was true particularly with regard to Iraqi and Syrian volunteers. He thought cease-fire orders would be obeyed by armies of Egypt and Transjordan. However, Arabs are wary regarding Jewish promises since Jerusalem cease-fire was broken by Jews. What would make Arabs accept cease-fire order “almost certainly” would be statement by Jews that their cease-fire will include Irgun and Stern gang and that Jews for duration cease-fire will not permit immigration or will at least limit it to women and children (paragraph one, Embassy’s 2251, May 25). On first point it is likely USSR will endeavor incite Stern gang to break cease-fire; on second point Arabs know majority new Jewish immigrants are fighting men and ask rather naturally “if Jews bring in fighters by sea, why should we not do so by land?” Bevin hopes USG would urge the Jews, possibly through Weizmann, to make immediate statement this sense and said for his part he would advise Arabs not to set strict condition as price acceptance cease-fire.

11. I emphasized depth of resentment in US re presence in Arab Legion of British officers who are popularly believed in US to be actually leading Arab Legion contingents in Jerusalem fighting.

¹ Not printed.

12. Bevin said result of this meeting, he hoped, would be to lay foundation for US and UK working together re Palestine "which must be moved to sphere where it can no longer poison US-UK relations".

13. I said that I thought it would be helpful for British officers to be withdrawn from all participation in Jerusalem fighting and asked for precise information on this subject.

In reply representative British Chief of Staff stated that there was one regiment Arab Legion involved in Jerusalem fighting. He drew distinction between 30 British officers plus four or five enlisted men seconded to Arab Legion and soldiers of fortune of British nationality such as Glubb Pasha. Latter stated not to be under British Government control any more than were American soldiers of fortune in South American revolution. (While drafting this telegram I was advised that latest Foreign Office information is that no British officers in Arab Legion are engaged in fighting old city Jerusalem). Until today there was one volunteer British officer and one other British officer in Arab Legion in new city. These two are being withdrawn and Kirkbride at Amman has been instructed make every effort ensure Abdullah will withdraw all British officers (whether regular or volunteer), from Jerusalem area. Regular British officers, according Tedder, have in any case standing orders to leave their Legion units from moment units enter Jewish part Palestine, which has not occurred despite presence Jewish forces western Galilee and other Arab areas.

14. It is clear that Bevin hopes that considerations which emerged from this meeting will be kept in view by both US and UK in shaping their future policies re Palestine. Bevin feels that if agreement can be reached on assessment basic factors, US and UK will be at least half-way towards alignment of their policies.²

DOUGLAS

² Ambassador Douglas, on May 27, forwarded his reflections on the meeting discussed in this telegram, stating that "genuine hope of US-UK cooperation in solving Palestine problem exists only if neither government is so carried away with emotional factors as to back either one or other side for military victory. Peace in Palestine, not a sweeping victory by either Arabs or Jews, should be common US-UK objective. . . . we need a truce between the US and the UK under which both governments undertake to deal with two sides in Palestine on same objective footing and in close collaboration." (Telegram 2304 from London, 501.BB Palestine/5-2748)

Truman Papers, President's Secretary's File

*The President of the Provisional Government of Israel (Weizmann)
to President Truman*

NEW YORK, May 26, 1948.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Before leaving the shores of the United States, I should like to express to you my warmest thanks for the friendly re-

ception which you accorded me yesterday and for the kind hospitality given to Mrs. Weizmann and myself and to the members of my party at Blair House. This official visit, coming soon after the recognition given to the new State of Israel, will be a source of satisfaction and encouragement to my people.

I trust that the two questions of military assistance, and of financial help for constructive work and for the absorption of Jewish Displaced Persons, will receive urgent and favorable consideration. I shall not go into the details here as these are contained in the *aide mémoire*¹ which I had the opportunity of leaving with you.

There is, however, one matter to which I only made brief reference and which is of some importance to us. We are anxious that the United States recognition of the State of Israel should be put on a regular basis by an exchange of diplomatic representatives. In anticipation of this arrangement, we have designated Mr. Eliahu Epstein, who is now acting as the representative of the Provisional Government of Israel in this country, as the prospective Minister in Washington. Mr. Epstein, a Palestinian with intimate knowledge of the whole Middle East, has spent the last three years in Washington as the representative of the Jewish Agency for Palestine and has done invaluable work in explaining our aims, problems and activities. I am confident that he will be successful in the new task of increasing the ties between Israel and the United States and of deepening the friendly relations between the two peoples. I hope, Mr. President, that it may be possible for the United States to appoint a Minister to Israel at a very early date.

In taking my leave of you, Mr. President, I should like warmly to commend Mr. Epstein in whom I have every confidence.

Yours very sincerely,

CH. WEIZMANN

¹ Dated May 25, p. 1042.

701.67N11/6-448

*Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to President Truman*¹

SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 26, 1948.

REQUEST OF ISRAEL FOR EXCHANGE OF DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES

1. The Secretary of State has received a request from Moshe Shertok,² Foreign Secretary in the Provisional Government of Israel, to approve the establishment of an Israeli Legation in the United States, with Eliahu Epstein as Minister. The same request expressed the hope that the United States would soon establish an American

¹ This memorandum was a copy of a memorandum of May 24 from the Legal Adviser to Mr. Lovett, except that some minor deletions were made in the third paragraph of the earlier memorandum (701.67N11/5-2448).

² See telegram MH98 of May 19, p. 1012.

Legation in Israel and send a representative to Tel Aviv with the status of Minister.

2. The President on May 14, 1948 stated that the United States recognized "the provisional government as the *de facto* authority of the new State of Israel". The effect of the President's announcement was that: (1) the United States recognized the existence of the State of Israel as a new state among the community of nations, and (2) the United States recognized the "provisional government" of Israel as the *de facto* authority in control of the new state. This latter expression did not constitute a recognition of the "provisional government" as the government *de jure* of Israel. It simply acknowledged that the "provisional government" was actually in control of the new state, and it implied that the United States would deal with this *de facto* authority concerning matters of mutual interest to Israel and the United States.

3. The establishment of legations and the exchange of accredited diplomatic representatives between Israel and the United States would constitute recognition by the United States of the "provisional government" as the government *de jure* of Israel. (Oppenheim, *International Law*, Vol. 1, p. 143). The visit of Dr. Chaim Weizmann would effect recognition *de jure*, unless the President were to make perfectly clear that Dr. Weizmann's reception did not constitute recognition *de jure*. Such recognition is, of course, dependent upon intention. (Oppenheim, *International Law*, Vol. 1, p. 140).

4. Whether or not the United States is to grant recognition *de jure* to the "provisional government" of Israel is entirely a matter of policy, to be determined according to the interests of this Government. (Hackworth, *Digest of International Law*, Vol. 1, p. 161). No legal requirements remain to be met, nor are there any legal reasons calling affirmatively for recognition *de jure*.

5. The differences in effect between recognition *de jure* of a government and recognition of a provisional regime as the *de facto* authority in a state are not of great legal importance in the case of Israel. The principal difference is a political difference of prestige; a government recognized *de jure* naturally enjoys much greater prestige, with all the political and psychological consequences of prestige.

A government recognized *de jure* is treated in the recognizing state as the authority entitled to control and dispose of state property, while a "government" recognized only *de facto* has been held not entitled to the assets of the state which it controls. (*Haile Selassie v. Cable and Wireless Ltd.* (No. 2), [1939] Ch. 182).

Although state property is entitled abroad to the benefits of sovereign immunity, the representatives of a government recognized only *de facto* are not accorded personal diplomatic immunity. Recognition by the United States of the "provisional government" as the *de facto*

authority in Israel would, of course, permit practical working relationships between that regime and the Government of the United States, to be carried on by special representatives of the "provisional government" and the United States.

6. United States policy in the past, with respect to the according of recognition *de jure*, does not furnish any consistent line of precedents. (See Hackworth, *Digest of International Law*, Vol. 1, pp. 222-318). The element of time between the establishment of a regime and its recognition by the United States has varied greatly. For example, the interval in the case of the Soviet government of Russia was sixteen years, while in the recent case of Pakistan recognition *de jure* was granted on the same day as the new government and state of Pakistan came into existence. The ascertainment of boundaries of the state controlled by a new regime has never been regarded as determinative in according recognition *de jure* to the regime. The element of constitutionality in the creation of a regime has sometimes (in the Wilson administration and occasionally thereafter) been mentioned as a criterion for the granting or withholding of recognition *de jure*. More consistently, mention has been made in official United States pronouncements of (1) actual control by a regime over the state, (2) popular acquiescence and stability, (3) willingness and ability of the new regime to discharge the state's international obligations.

It can only be concluded from an examination of the precedents in American history that none of the above "standards" have governed United States policy on recognition *de jure*. From time to time one or more of the "standards" in varying combinations have been invoked to justify a result grounded actually in policy, national interest, or expediency.

[ROBERT A. LOVETT]

867N.01/5-2648 : Telegram

The Vice Counsel at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

US URGENT NIACT

JERUSALEM, May 26, 1948.

755. Kohn of Jewish Agency has just given us following text of announcement from provisional government at Tel Aviv.

"Provisional Govt of Israel at its meeting this afternoon considered developments during the last 48 hours in regard to the cease-fire call issued by the Security Council. The Provisional Govt decided to renew the cease-fire order to all Jewish forces on all fronts for 2100 hours local Jewish time this evening, this being conditional upon the enemy's ceasing fire at that same hour."

Repeated to all Arab capitals.

BURDETT

501.BB Palestine/5-2648 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the
United Nations (Austin)*

SECRET US URGENT
NIACT

WASHINGTON, May 26, 1948—1 p. m.

326. There are three possibilities with regard to the response of the Arab Govts to the SC cease-fire order of May 22, the extended date-line of which terminates at noon, EST, today:

1. Affirmative response to cease-fire order.
2. Qualified acceptance of cease-fire, predicated on conditions laid down by Arab Govts.
3. Flat rejection of cease-fire order.

If Arab States accept the cease-fire there is obviously no problem and Ambassador Austin's remarks will be congratulatory. However, if, as seems more probable, Arab Govts seek to attach conditions as prerequisite to their complying with cease-fire order, following line of action is suggested:

If conditions attached to compliance with cease-fire seem possible of negotiation with Jewish authorities you should urge on Council that it today propose to Arab Govts that their conditions not be regarded as prerequisite to observing the cease-fire order but that cease-fire take effect immediately while their conditions are negotiated out with Jews as basis for more extended truce. This would seem well within purview of SC resolution of May 22, which calls upon all govts and authorities, without prejudice to rights, claims or position of parties concerned, to abstain from hostile military action in Palestine. You should urge in strongest possible terms that there is a duty on both parties to this conflict to prevent further bloodshed and to make possible reestablishment of peace in Palestine. Reference should also be made, in discussing conditions of cease-fire to permit negotiation, to the useful functions of SC Truce Commission and the UN Mediator who is empowered, under Paragraph 1(a)(iii) of GA resolution of May 14, to promote a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine.

If either Jews or Arabs reject foregoing proposal this would be regarded as further refusal to comply with SC cease-fire requests.

If Arabs Govts flatly reject the SC cease-fire order, problems of very grave importance arise. Although you should make no reference to the fact, Council will then be confronted by question whether it should seek to impose cease-fire under threat of sanctions, presumably commencing with those measures outlined in Article 41.

Dept requests your best estimate of disposition of other members of SC to vote such sanctions. For your secret info Dept is giving in-

tensive study to this problem. We do not, however, desire to see action taken in this regard until we know (a) whether Council will in fact vote for universal sanctions to be applied by all members of UN against parties failing to observe cease-fire order and (b) sufficient time is had to safeguard American citizens residing in Near East. Dept does not favor the imposition of unilateral sanctions.¹

In consequence of foregoing considerations, should Arab response be flat refusal of cease-fire order, you should state that this presents a new and serious development in the Palestine situation upon which you must consult immediately with your govt. For your info we would, in light of President's recognition of State of Israel, consider that an Arab agreement to observe cease-fire, on condition that State of Israel be regarded as non-existent, was an outright refusal of cease-fire order.

MARSHALL

¹ As originally drafted, this sentence continued as follows: "*per se*, but, of course, relaxation of our arms embargo would, if decided upon by the President, be regarded by the Arabs as a unilateral sanction and would have immediate and grave repercussions upon US interests in Arab area". These words were deleted by Mr. Lovett.

501.BB Palestine/5-2648 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET US URGENT

NEW YORK, May 26, 1948—4:15 p. m.

707. From Ross. [Here follows discussion with Mahmoud Fawzi, Egyptian Representative at the United Nations, regarding a cease-fire in Palestine.]

Following is delayed report on conversation with Dr. Asil¹ late Monday afternoon, primarily on question of cease-fire.

Asil took a fairly moderate line to effect that Arabs could agree to a cease-fire but only on condition that Jewish immigration of fighting personnel and importation of arms be stopped and that further entrenchment of Jewish state politically be stopped. He referred to SC truce resolution of April 17.

I told him I saw substantial difference between cease-fire and truce. It seemed to me that the first most urgent, most essential thing was the cease-fire. Once there were a cease-fire other steps could be considered.

He said that it seemed to him an appropriate procedure to start with a cease-fire provided there could be assurances that other steps, which might be called part of truce, could be taken up next. Asil, in course

¹ Naji al-Asil, Iraqi Representative at the United Nations.

of our conversation, speculated on possible eventual settlement which he said he had discussed with Mr. Henderson. Asil described it as a "United States of Palestine". Thus, the Jews could have their own state and their own flag just as he observed in his short stay here, New York State had its own flag.

Asil said he fully understood and sympathized with factors which have conditioned development of American policy. He added that he was one of those who thought that friendship between Arab states and US should surmount all barriers.

Asil went on to say that he thought we were perhaps either not fully aware of or did not take fully enough into account the wider ramifications of problem of Palestine. As he saw it in terms of friendship between US and Arab states, we should not consider Palestine narrowly. We should not even consider Palestine in terms alone of the Middle East. We should rather, however, consider this problem in terms of much wider ramifications of the highest political importance in two directions: first, the effect of our Palestine policy throughout the Moslem world which extended much further than the Middle East; second, we should consider the matter in terms of the position of Russia in the world and the very serious risk that our entire policy of containment of Russia was being endangered. He thought the statement made by the Turkish Foreign Minister a couple of days ago was based on this same fear.

Dr. Asil went on to say that the game of the Soviet Union in present situation was obvious. For some years through their propaganda and in many other ways they had demonstrated strong feeling for Arab states. The Iraqi Government and other Arab Governments had then taken very strong measures to suppress and outlaw communism in their countries. At this point Soviet Union swung to support of world Zionism. Their effort now was, first, to establish a bridgehead in Middle East through their support of Zionist state; second, to cause disruption in Arab states; and third, to drive a wedge between UK and US in the area.² [Ross.]

AUSTIN

² Dr. Asil, in a statement before the Security Council on May 26, submitted the reply of the Arab League, on behalf of all the Arab States, to the Security Council's cease-fire request. The reply neither accepted nor rejected, explicitly, the cease-fire but raised these questions: "Is the cease-fire likely to put a stop to the flow of Jewish immigrants into Palestine to fight the Arabs, as well as the importation of arms? Is the cease-fire likely to stop the terrorists undertaking acts of violence and guarantee the safety of the Arab civilian population?" Dr. Asil concluded the reply with: "And yet, anxious to realize the purpose of the efforts of the Security Council, namely the arrival at a just solution and a lasting peace, I am authorized to inform you that the Political Committee of the Arab League is ready to study, within a time limit of forty-eight hours, any suggestion which the Security Council may make to them along the line of a solution of the Palestine problem." For the full text of the Arab reply, see SC, *3rd yr., No. 74*, pp. 47-49.

867N.01/5-2248: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Legation in Lebanon

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, May 26, 1948—7 p. m.

267. Retels 203 May 22,¹ 208 May 24, Deptel 252 May 20 and 259 May 21,² please inform Lebanese Govt that this Govt considers the grounds for the detention of the Americans taken from *Marine Carp* set forth in FonOff Legtel 203 unsatisfactory. So far as US Govt has been advised, Lebanese authorities do not purport to have acted under the authority of any law or legal process of Lebanon; the Lebanese Govt has made no showing that these men have been charged with any offense against Lebanese law, or that the Govt's action has been in conformance with basic processes of law recognized throughout the world relating to arrest, charge of commission of a crime, hearing and trial. Accordingly, US Govt cannot but view the action of the Lebanese Govt as in disregard of the established principles of international law relating to the rights and duties of a state with respect to aliens.

The US Govt protests the continued detention of these American citizens and requests their immediate release.³

In the event Legation has any info concerning violation of local law, or charge to that effect by Lebanese authorities, please report fully urgently.

Also inform Dept whether in your discussions or those of Lebanese authorities with Americans any individuals professed to be proceeding to Israel to take oath of allegiance or to join Israeli Army, and whether individuals adhere to purpose of travel expressed in their passport applications.⁴

MARSHALL

¹ Not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 1040.

² No. 259 not printed.

³ At this point in the telegram as originally drafted appeared the following two paragraphs which were deleted by Mr. Lovett: "You may add that the US Govt in the meantime is investigating the purposes of the travel of these American citizens to Palestine. The US Govt does not issue travel documents to American citizens going to foreign areas for the purpose of participating in hostilities."

"Inform Leb Gov that in this case US Gov will make all appropriate efforts to effect the repatriation of those American citizens who are found to have improperly used American passports. In making these statements please make it clear that they should not be considered in any way as an undertaking on the part of the American Govt as a consideration for the release of the group."

⁴ An appropriate note was delivered by Beirut to the Lebanese Foreign Office on May 29 (telegram 226, May 29, 4 p. m., from Beirut, 867N.01/5-2948); for the Department's statement, released May 30, see Department of State *Bulletin*, June 13, 1948, p. 780.

The Secretary of State, in a letter of June 22 to Eliahu Epstein, replied to the latter's *aide-mémoire* of May 29 which had requested "that every effort be made by the United States Government to assure the safe arrival of passengers on United States flag vessels bound for Israeli ports". After reviewing the action taken by the United States regarding the action of the Lebanese Government, the Secretary concluded: "The Government of the United States has protested and will continue to extend diplomatic protection to its nationals where action on the part of a foreign state is in disregard of the established principles of international law." (867N.01/5-2948)

501.BB Palestine/5-2648: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET US URGENT

NEW YORK, May 26, 1948—10:26 p. m.

713. For Rusk from Jessup. Following represents without any attempt at final drafting general nature of suggestion I made to you by telephone this evening for possible SC resolution which we might introduce tomorrow afternoon:

"The Security Council noting with grave concern the failure of certain governments to comply with its resolution of 22 May relative to the issuance of a cease fire order in Palestine,

Attaching particular importance to the continuation of hostilities in the City of Jerusalem despite the high priority accorded in that resolution to a truce in that city, which has been the object of special concern to the UN,

Declares that the Holy City must be preserved from destruction,

Decides that the conducting of any hostilities in the City of Jerusalem by any government or authority after 12 o'clock noon New York time, May 28, would constitute a breach of the peace and a violation of the charter of the UN,

Directs all governments and authorities controlling armed forces in Palestine to comply with this decision and to inform the SC that they have complied,

Instructs its Truce Commission, in collaboration with the UN mediator in Palestine, to assist in arranging for civilian supplies, etc., to be brought to Jerusalem under appropriate international supervision after the cessation of hostilities on May 28."

Manning of UP was told by Al-Asil (Iraq) after SC meeting that conclusion of his statement to SC meant Arab League will wait in Amman 48 hours for whatever suggestion SC wishes to send to it. [Jessup.]

AUSTIN

701.67N11/5-2748

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to President Truman

SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 27, 1948.

Subject: United States Government Representation in Palestine

At the present time the United States Government is represented in Palestine by a Consulate General at Jerusalem and a Consulate at Haifa.

On May 14 the United States recognized the Provisional Government as the *de facto* authority of the new State of Israel.

On May 19, 1948 Moshe Shertok, Foreign Secretary in the Provi-

sional Government of the State of Israel, telegraphically requested the Secretary of State to approve the establishment in Washington of a Legation of Israel. Mr. Shertok at the same time asked the approval of the United States to the designation of Mr. Eliahu Epstein as the Minister of Israel. Mr. Shertok expressed his hope that the United States would soon establish an American Legation in Israel and would send a representative to Tel Aviv with the status of Minister.

Consideration should, therefore, be given to what changes may be required in United States Government representation in Palestine.

The Department of State recommends:

1. The Consulate General at Jerusalem should be continued. Jerusalem is the principal city of Palestine. It is revered by Christians, Jews and Moslems.

2. The Consulate at Haifa should be continued. Haifa is the principal port in Palestine.

3. A Mission of the United States should be established in the capital of the new state of Israel for the purpose of performing political and consular functions. It is believed that Tel Aviv or a suburb of that city will be selected as the capital by the Provisional Government of Israel. This Mission should be headed by a Special Representative of the United States.

4. Approval should be given to the establishment of a Mission of the Provisional Government of Israel in Washington, headed by a Special Representative of the Provisional Government of Israel. The United States should agree to the designation, by the Provisional Government of Israel, of Mr. Eliahu Epstein as Special Representative of the Provisional Government of Israel in the United States.

The above type of exchange of Missions and Representatives is recommended by the Department of State as being appropriate to maintain between the two Governments the *de facto* relationship expressed in the President's announcement of May 14, 1948, when he stated that the United States recognized "the Provisional Government as the *de facto* authority of the new state of Israel".

In view of the fluid situation in Palestine it is our suggestion that the consular districts be not specifically delimited at the present time. The consular offices in Jerusalem, Tel Aviv and Haifa will report directly to the Department of State and each of them will deal in questions regarding the protection of American lives and property with those authorities with whom each of the consular offices may be able to maintain contact.

Attached to this memorandum is a draft of a letter which the Department proposes to send to Mr. Epstein in Washington, in reply to the request of the Provisional Government of Israel set forth in Mr. Shertok's telegram of May 19, 1948. If this letter is approved, the Department also contemplates making a copy available to the Jewish

authorities in Palestine through the American Consulate General in Jerusalem.¹

ROBERT A. LOVETT

¹ Marginal notation by Mr. Wilkins: "Approved by the President according to Mr. Lovett—May 27, 1948 2:45 p. m." For the letter sent to Mr. Epstein, see p. 1074.

In a memorandum of June 15 to President Truman, the Acting Secretary stated:

"Pending the selection and appointment of a special representative to head the Mission of the United States in Israel the Department proposes to establish its Mission in Tel Aviv or a suburb of Tel Aviv and will provide the necessary personnel. The Department has assigned Mr. Charles Frederick Knox, Jr., an American Foreign Service Officer, to the staff of its Mission and is assigning him as Acting Special Representative pending the selection and appointment of a Special Representative." (701.67N11/6-1548)

In a memorandum of June 16 to Mr. Clifford, George M. Elsey discussed Mr. Lovett's memorandum of the previous day. He observed that Max Lowenthal, an unofficial consultant in the White House, opposed Mr. Lovett's proposals in that they entailed a further delay in the *de jure* recognition of Israel. Mr. Elsey concluded that "I see nothing to be gained by an announcement at this time and I recommend that Lovett be informed that no action be taken until the President returns to Washington and a decision has been reached on the U.S. representative to head our mission to Israel. The designation of a Foreign Service officer as a temporary head is a snub." (Elsey Papers) The editors have found no evidence that Mr. Lovett's proposals were rejected.

867N.01/5-2748

*Memorandum Prepared in the Division of Near Eastern Affairs*¹

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON, undated.]

EFFECT OF THE REPEAL OF THE ARMS EMBARGO TO PERMIT AID TO
ISRAEL

In the opinion of United States diplomatic and military observers in the Near Eastern capitals, repeal of the United States arms embargo in favor of the Jews would be regarded throughout the Near East as a virtual American alliance with the Jewish war effort and an American declaration of war against the Arab States. Such a move would immediately evoke hostile and violent mob reactions against the United States and irreparably damage American-Arab relations. It would result in the destruction of American tactical and strategic

¹ Transmitted to the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Mattison) in a memorandum of May 27 by Mary E. Hope of the same Division; it summarized telegram 598, May 25, from Cairo and telegrams 599 from Cairo, 214 from Beirut, 326 from Damascus, and 751 from Jerusalem, each dated May 26. These telegrams were sent in reply to a Departmental circular telegram of May 24, 1 a. m., which had requested appraisals of the six factors covered in the memorandum.

security throughout the entire Near East, and would lead ultimately to the loss of the American stake in this area.

The specific effects of repeal of the arms embargo would be the following:

(1) The security of United States Government officials and American citizens in the Arab States and in Arab-occupied areas of Palestine would be in jeopardy, making evacuation of American citizens advisable prior to or immediately following repeal.

(2) United States Government property, American educational institutions, oil installations and other private property in the Arab States and in Arab areas of Palestine would be singled out for molestation, destruction, or seizure as a result of popular reaction to the lifting of the arms embargo. In Egypt, American investments might eventually be excluded entirely.

(3) Although the Governments of the Arab States would endeavor to maintain the security of their local Jewish communities, it might be impossible to control local reactions, particularly in the event of Arab military reverses arising from the lifting of the embargo. Expected attacks on local Jews might spread to anti-foreign demonstrations as well.

(4) Popular hatred of the United States Government and people would be general, intense, and probably lasting in Lebanon. In Egypt, the United States can expect no further political or economic concessions as a result of United States *de facto* recognition of Israel, and this attitude would be intensified by repeal of the arms embargo. Syria, which considers that an "act of aggression" against the Arabs has already taken place, would shift the major blame to the United States if the embargo were lifted. In Transjordan and Arab-occupied areas of Palestine, the initial reaction against the United States and its citizens would be extremely violent.

(5) The attitude of the Arab States and of Palestinian Arabs towards the United Nations and the Western world, currently one of disillusionment and cynicism, would be intensified if the arms embargo were repealed. Since the United Nations and the United States positions on Palestine are generally regarded as synonymous, the United States could be expected to bear the major blame. Eventually, this would either lead to repudiation of the West, as in Syria, or the consolidation of the British position at the expense of the United States, as in Transjordan and Arab areas of Palestine.

(6) The effect on the preservation of law and order would be to prolong hostilities in Palestine; to jeopardize public security in Lebanon and to provide a powerful weapon for local demagogues in Syria; to endanger American lives and property in Palestine; and to increase the possibility of anti-foreign, anti-Jewish, and anti-Christian violence throughout the Moslem world.

867N.01/5-2748 : Telegram

The Vice Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

JERUSALEM, May 27, 1948—2 p. m.

767. Battle of Jerusalem has now reached what may be described as near stalemate. Jews are in control of most areas of city while Arabs with sizeable garrison Arab Legion and irregulars still retain old city, except Jewish quarters and all approaches to old city except Zion and Jaffa gates. Neither side has been able to break grip of other side on areas held by it. Arab Legion and Arab operation army artillery continue bombardment several times daily of Jewish quarters new city from northern outskirts Jerusalem and Arab armies have blocked all roads leading into Jerusalem. Mortar, automatic and sniper fire continues daily throughout city in varying intensity and it appears that major effort has, however, shifted on both sides to battle for roads leading to Jerusalem. Evidence exists that Arab Legion and Egyptians have deployed toward Babelwad from Sheik Jarrah and Bethlehem areas respectively.

Jews report they have sufficient food and water to last for long period in new Jerusalem and that they prepared turn city into "another Stalingrad." However American correspondents believe that food, fuel and water supply situation in new Jerusalem is grave. Conditions in Jewish quarters old city desperate and may only be question of time before inhabitants and Haganah there capitulate. Arabs in old city probably have sufficient water for considerable period and are able receive food and fuel from Jericho area and Transjordan.

It, therefore, seems that Arabs are preparing for long siege of Jewish Jerusalem in hope starving inhabitants into submission while at same time Jews equally preparing withstand siege. Nobody cares hazard guess how long such siege could last.

BURDETT

501.BB Palestine/5-2748 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, May 27, 1948—4 p. m.

331. Following is draft instructions which have not been finally cleared but which are forwarded for your study pending clearance:

1. The attitude of the US remains the same as that expressed by us in the meeting of the SC on May 17. We believe that the situation in

Palestine constitutes a threat to the peace and a breach of the peace and that the SC should order the parties to bring about a cessation of hostilities. We do not wish at this time to charge either party as being an aggressor.¹ The SC did not accept our resolution of May 17 and we went along with the proposed action under Chap. VI in the hope that such action might succeed in bringing about a cease-fire. Thus far that has not been the result. We would, therefore, be glad to hear the views of the other members of the Council as to how the Council might now proceed.

2. Although the position of the US continues to be that stated in para. one above, nevertheless the Arab replies might open up the possibility of a short unconditional cease-fire, say for two weeks, during which time the Jews and Arabs could negotiate through the Truce Commission and the Mediator the conditions for a longer truce or even for a final political settlement. We do not believe the US should appear to weaken its position by urging such temporary solution in the SC. That should be the responsibility of the UK since they have opposed Chap. VII action and have strongly urged negotiations under Chap. VI. You should, therefore, privately indicate to the UK Delegation that if there is to be any further breathing spell for negotiations under Chap. VI they must take initiative in the SC. Further, we believe that additional delays are unsatisfactory unless such delays are accompanied by an immediate cease-fire. Extension of the deadline accompanied by a continuation of the fighting is no proper basis for SC action at this time.²

3. With regard to Jerusalem, the US supports any move to bring about a truce in Jerusalem. However, in order not to appear to be weakening our position, initiative in bringing about a special arrangement for Jerusalem must be assumed by another member of the Council. We presume Parodi will be willing to take such initiative. In supporting special arrangements for Jerusalem, you should point out that we have not changed our attitude toward the whole of Palestine (see para. one above) but we would welcome a truce in Jerusalem and would hope that such a truce would lead promptly to a truce for the whole of the country.

LOVETT

¹The Department, on May 29, quoted this sentence in a further message to New York and emphasized that "Our purpose is to achieve a cessation of hostilities in Palestine and your statements should be couched in language which will achieve this end." (Telegram 346, 501.BB Palestine/5-2848)

²For Ambassador Austin's statement along these lines before the Security Council on May 27, see SC, *3rd yr.*, No. 75, p. 14.

501.BB Palestine/5-2748 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative
at the United Nations (Austin)*SECRET US URGENT
NIACT

WASHINGTON, May 27, 1948—4 p. m.

332. The President has approved position paper whose text was set forth in Deptel 327, May 26, 4 p. m.,¹ but we doubt whether you will find it useful to take action in accordance with these instructions today.

The President has likewise approved position which US should take in today's meeting of SC, as contained in Deptel 331, May 27.²

LOVETT

¹ The telegram is not printed; for the position paper, see p. 1027.

² Mr. Lovett stated, in a marginal notation on a draft copy of telegram 331, that the message was "Cleared by President 1245 May 27th".

501.BB Palestine/5-2748 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary
of State*TOP SECRET US URGENT
NIACT

LONDON, May 27, 1948—7 p. m.

2311. For Secretary and Lovett from Douglas.

1. Further to my 2305, May 27.¹ I have just received from Bevin full text instructions under which UK delegation UN will deal with Palestine problem in SC today. Bevin referred to our meeting May 25 (Embassy's 2267, May 25) and pointed out that these instructions go a long way towards what he hopes will be a closer alignment of UK-US policy. He directed particular attention to concluding section of these instructions authorizing Cadogan to say that if British resolution is adopted for standstill cease-fire, during this period Britain will even suspend the small arms deliveries HMG is still making under existing treaties to Egypt, Transjordan and Iraq. Moreover, without conditions, Cadogan is authorized to announce withdrawal from Palestine all British officers seconded to Arab Legion (21 officers and 5 men) and to say that payment Arab Legion subsidy (due July 1948) will be made only if in accord UN decisions.

2. Bevin hopes fervently that in the spirit of the ideas he advanced May 25 US Government will feel able to support British resolution, and that at the very least, US Government will not oppose it. In his view it is of the utmost importance that advantage be taken of presence of Arab League leaders in Amman for next 24 hours to press for cease-fire. Once leaders are scattered it may be difficult to reassemble them and meanwhile emotions in Palestine, Iraq, Syria, and Egypt

¹ Not printed.

may grow so intense that it will be impossible for leaders to accept any cease-fire.

3. Bevin hopes that US Government if it supports or acquiesces in British resolution, will parallel his efforts with the Arabs by steps designated to secure Jewish acceptance standstill cease-fire under terms of British resolution.²

4. Summary British instructions appears in next following telegram.

DOUGLAS

² Mr. Bevin, in the morning of May 28, reiterated to Ambassador Douglas "his very strong hope" that the United States would support the British proposals in the Security Council. The Ambassador, in reporting this information to the Department the same day, observed that "the British proposals provide a substantial satisfaction of our general position, and that since the British are sincerely attempting to meet us and to move hand in hand with us in the Middle East, we should, on our part, acknowledge their sincere efforts in this direction by agreeing to their proposals." (Telegram 2316 from London, 501.BB Palestine/5-2848)

501.BB Palestine/5-2748 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the
Secretary of State*

SECRET US URGENT
NIACT

LONDON, May 27, 1948—7 p. m.

2312. Following is summary instructions sent by Bevin to Cadogan this afternoon:

1. While disappointment Arab reply suggests possibility constructive development. Bevin impressed by view apparently held by some Arab leaders that it would be easier for them to agree to cease fire or to negotiate if they were faced with overwhelming UN pressure. Cadogan authorized make statement following lines:

2. While disappointing Arabs have not accepted SC cease fire resolution Arab reply nevertheless is in conciliatory language and merits careful consideration. Point re SC resolution April 16 is valid and pertinent because this resolution has been broken by all parties concerned. Jews and those who recognize their claim to set up state have offended against provision that no political action should be taken to prejudice positions of either community. Arabs have broken provisions against bringing fighting men into Palestine. Jews have probably done same. HMG has always felt situation must be looked at as whole and that it is unfair to seize on last of series of developments and deal with that in isolation.

3. Concluding passages Arab reply constitute request to SC to suggest settlement terms for dispute as SC is entitled to do under Article 37.

4. SC cannot put forward proposals in 24 hours or while actual fighting continues. Object must be to bring fighting to end and create

conditions in which proposals for settlement can be considered. Therefore SC should make renewed effort to secure cease fire and should at same time instruct mediator and truce commission to be ready to use their good offices between two parties both to ensure observance of cease fire to begin discussion of proposals for final settlement.

5. Cadogan instructed suggest, in order to secure cease fire, it now seems necessary to incorporate some conditions and undertakings going beyond May 22 resolution and leading more directly to search of final settlement. He should say at same time that in view failure of previous recommendation under Chapter 6 HMG recognizes that if present proposals are unsuccessful Chapter 7 will have to be invoked. The SC Resolutions should therefore be cast somewhat in following form:

6. Preamble showing resolution is without prejudice to rights, claims and positions of either party.

7. Calling for cessation of acts of armed forces and for cease fire.

8. Calling on both sides to give undertaking not to bring fighting personnel or men of military age into Palestine.

9. Calling on all members of UN and on both sides to refrain from bringing war material into Palestine.

10. Calling on both sides to be particularly careful re cease-fire Jerusalem and to protect Holy places.

11. Instructing mediator to verify whether above provisions were being observed and for that purpose to appoint military observers responsible to himself.

12. Instructing mediator as soon as cease-fire is in force to make contact with both parties in concert with truce commission with view to making recommendations to SC about eventual settlement for Palestine.

13. Calling on all concerned to give greatest possible assistance to mediator.

14. Cease-fire would be stated to last say four weeks by which time mediator would report progress to SC.

15. SC would give short time-limit for replies to this resolution and if it were not accepted SC would consider matter under Chapter 7 with view to determining which party was the aggressor and considering imposition of sanctions. Resolution ends.

16. Cadogan authorized to announce in SC following decision re British treaty obligations to Arab states:

(a) HMG making immediate arrangements withdraw 21 seconded British officers from Arab Legion in Palestine. HMG has no control over 16 officers not seconded and therefore not subject British instructions.

(b) Re Transjordan subsidy, next quarterly installment due July twelfth. HMG will review situation before that date in light UN decisions.

(c) Re supply war material, if it were decided in pursuance resolution proposed above or independently, that there should be general embargo which would effectively prevent supply of arms to Jews and Arabs alike in Palestine. HMG would be willing to join in such action and stop such small deliveries which HMG's at present making to Egypt, Iraq, and TJ in completion of existing contracts.¹

DOUGLAS

¹ Ambassador Douglas, on May 27, opined that "Bevin's instructions to Cadogan go as far as we can expect British Government to go in establishing its neutrality toward Palestine" and that "USG should do no less to establish our own neutrality". He then recommended that "in formulating our policy for use in SC today we should not lightly reject, but should make every effort to accommodate our position to the British proposal which seems to me to be first important milestone on road ahead for genuine US-UK collaboration on this problem". (Telegram 2313, from London, 501.BB Palestine/5-2748)

501.BB Palestine/5-2748 : Telegram

*The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)
to the Secretary of State*

NEW YORK, May 27, 1948—9:48 p. m.

717. Following USSR proposal submitted in Security Council on May 27:

"Considering that the Security Council's resolution of 22 May on the cessation of military operations in Palestine has not yet been complied with, considering that military operations in Palestine are increasing in intensity and that the number of casualties is growing; and considering that as a result of these events the situation in Palestine constitutes a threat to peace and security within the meaning of Article 39 of the Charter of the UN, orders the governments of the states involved in the present conflict in Palestine to secure the cessation of military operations within 36 hours after the adoption by the SC of this resolution." ¹

AUSTIN

¹ For the revised text of the Soviet resolution submitted to the Security Council on May 29, see SC, 3rd yr., *Supplement for May 1948*, p. 101.

501.BB Palestine/5-2748 : Telegram

*The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)
to the Secretary of State*

SECRET

NEW YORK, May 27, 1948—10:04 p. m.

719. Text of Soviet and UK resolutions ¹ introduced this afternoon in SC are being transmitted separately.

Soviet resolution closely parallels our resolution of May 17. We feel we must give it our unqualified support. Since it was introduced first

¹ See *supra* and *infra*, respectively.

it will have priority and we propose to attempt to have it given priority in the discussion at the beginning of the Council meeting in the morning before the UK resolution is discussed. The defeat of the Soviet resolution under present circumstances seems certain.

After this has occurred we would be free to discuss the UK resolution on its merits. We recommend that the US give it our general support in the same way that we gave the British Chapter VI amendment our support after our Chapter 7 resolution of May 17 was defeated. We would place special emphasis in supporting the British resolution on the last paragraph, which commits the Council in principle to take action under Chapter 7 if this effort fails.

There are a number of minor points in the British resolution which have arisen in discussions here and which have occurred to us may require modification. In regard to the last paragraph, as reported by Jessup to Rusk on the telephone, the UK instructions apparently contemplated stronger language for this paragraph along the line that the Council might have to apply sanctions to any party who refused to carry out orders of the SC under Chapter 7.

Beeley informs us that they wish to leave the impression in the minds of both sides that this would be the case, but that they wished to leave this question open in the resolution. They apparently do not wish to commit themselves at this time on exactly what form of Chapter 7 action they are prepared to take. There are some indications that the delegation at least is thinking in terms of general embargo applied to both sides without undertaking to assess which party is in the wrong.

Re paragraphs 3 and 4 of the UK resolution regarding the introduction of military personnel and the importation of war material into Palestine, the British admit that there may be difficulties of enforcement. They contemplate that perhaps 20 or 30 military observers should be supplied to the Truce Commission to help them carry out their task of supervision. They contemplate that personnel and supplies arriving in Israel after the date of the cease-fire may cause real practical difficulties, for example as to how the personnel should be handled and whether the material should be unloaded or held in bind, etc. They admitted the validity of the argument which the Jews will probably raise concerning the inequity of allowing the Arab states to continue to import war material and mobilize additional armed forces on their frontiers, while the Jews were not in a position to do likewise. They made it quite clear that this resolution was not intended to prevent them from continuing the supply of the Arab states under their treaties. Beeley indicated, however, that he thought the UK might be prepared to accept modification of these paragraphs so that they would call on all states to ban exports during the cease-fire period,

thus requiring Britain to temporarily cease shipments to the Arab states.

Will attempt to secure views JA on British proposal this evening and report further.

AUSTIN

501.BB Palestine/5-2748: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

NEW YORK, May 27, 1948—10:05 p. m.

720. Secretariat released on May 27 following suggested draft of UK resolution (final form to be circulated later):

“The SC

Desiring to bring about a cessation of hostilities in Palestine without prejudice to the rights, claims and position of either Arabs or Jews,

Calls upon both parties to order a cessation of all acts of armed force for a period of four weeks,

Calls upon both parties to undertake that they will not introduce fighting personnel or men of military age into Palestine during the cease-fire,

Calls upon both parties and upon all governments to refrain from importing war material into Palestine during the cease-fire,

Urges both parties to take every possible precaution for the protection of the holy places and of the city of Jerusalem,

Instructs the UN mediator for Palestine in concert with the Truce Commission to supervise the observance of the above provisions, and decides that they shall be provided with a sufficient number of military observers,

Instructs the UN mediator to make contact with both parties as soon as the cease-fire is in force with a view to making recommendations to the SC about an eventual settlement for Palestine,

Calls upon all concerned to give the greatest possible assistance to the UN mediator,

Instructs the UN mediator to make a weekly report to the SC during the cease-fire,

Invites the states members of the Arab League and the Jewish and Arab authorities in Palestine to communicate their acceptance of this resolution to the SC within (a short period to be stated),

Decides that if the present resolution is rejected by either party or by both, the present situation in Palestine will be reconsidered with a view to action under Chapter VII of the Charter.”¹

AUSTIN

¹ For the revised text of the British resolution submitted to the Security Council on May 29, see SC, 3rd yr., *Supplement for May 1948*, p. 102.

501.BB Palestine/5-2748 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)*CONFIDENTIAL US URGENT WASHINGTON, May 28, 1948—11 a. m.
NIACT

337. Your tel 717, May 27. USUN should support the USSR resolution on Palestine if it remains substantially in its present form.¹ If USSR resolution fails, USUN should support UK resolution (your tel 720, May 27) with following changes :

1. Wherever expression "both parties" is used substitute "all parties".

2. In paras. 3 and 4 after Palestine insert "Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Transjordan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Egypt".

3. In para. 7 substitute after the expression "with a view to" the following "carrying out the functions of the UN Mediator as determined by the GA".

In supporting UK resolution you should call attention to the fact that paras. 3 and 4 are taken substantially from the Apr. 17 resolution of the SC.

LOVETT

¹ For Ambassador Austin's statements before the Security Council on May 28, in support of the Soviet resolution, see SC, *3rd yr.*, No. 76, pp. 19, 43.

501.BB Palestine/5-2748 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom*TOP SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, May 28, 1948—4 p. m.
NIACT

1962. For the Ambassador. Most careful consideration has been given your Niact telegrams 2304, 2305, 2311 and 2313 of May 27.¹ You can be assured that we are fully aware of need to work with and not against Britain on Palestine problem. Our mutual task would have been easier, however, had British not been extremely laggard until eleventh hour in dealing with a crisis largely of their own making.

Foregoing for your personal info only. You may say to Bevin that this Govt will not lift arms embargo except in conjunction with SC action or inaction.

The President yesterday approved following policy :

a. The US will continue to urge that SC act immediately to bring about a cease-fire in Palestine. If this can be done under Chapter 6 of UN Charter as British urge, well and good ; if not, SC should act under Chapter 7.

¹ Nos. 2304, 2305, and 2313 not printed ; regarding Nos. 2304 and 2313, see footnote 2, p. 1050, and the first footnote 1, p. 1067.

b. If SC issues cease-fire order under Articles 39 and 40 of Charter or calls upon parties under Chapter 6 to effect cease-fire for all of Palestine and there is failure to comply, US will be prepared to adjust its arms embargo policy to support action of SC.

c. US will support action by SC under Article 41 to order all govts. to refrain from shipment of weapons and war materials and rendering of other military assistance to govts and authorities now participating in hostilities in Palestine. If Council succeeds in bringing about a cease-fire and placing an effective general arms embargo, US will retain its present arms embargo on entire Near East until such time as there is no longer any danger of hostilities.

d. If SC is unable to take effective action to bring about cease-fire or to impose general arms embargo, US will inform SC that we shall resume our freedom of action with respect to licensing of arms shipments.

In light of foregoing policy US is prepared to support UK cease-fire resolution introduced yesterday in SC (your tel 2313, May 27). We shall, however, first vote affirmatively on USSR resolution which calls for a cease-fire in Palestine within 36 hours because it is almost identical with our own resolution submitted to SC on May 17 and which failed of acceptance for lack of necessary seven affirmative votes. If USSR resolution of May 27 fails to pass UK resolution will then come up for vote. We are instructing USUN in such event to support UK resolution with following changes:

[Here follow changes called for in telegram 337, May 28, to New York, and a summary of the last paragraph of that message.]

We regard Bevin's assurances to you as reported your tel 2311, to effect that if British resolution is adopted during four weeks' cease-fire period Britain will even suspend small arms deliveries HMG is still making under existing treaties to Egypt, Transjordan, and Iraq, as of first importance. Likewise we welcome British announcement of withdrawal of officers from Arab Legion and indication that Legion subsidy will not be paid in July unless in accord with UN decisions.

On question of immigration we take it that if UK resolution is adopted British will be prepared to retain on Cyprus the approximately 25,000 Jews which we understand from British Embassy here it had been intended to transfer to Jewish area of Palestine by Aug. 1. Since most of the Cypriote Jews are apparently of military age such action by UK would appear essential.

Info from Jewish Agency Representatives at Lake Success indicates Jews will balk at UK resolution, objecting particularly to paras 3, 4, 7, and final para.² However, our suggested amendments to paras 3 and 4 would seem to go far to remove Jewish objection that standstill bears more injuriously upon them than upon Arab States.

² As reported by New York in telegram 721, May 28, 12:30 a.m., not printed (501.BB Palestine/5-2848).

You may inform Bevin fully of foregoing and add that while we do not at all agree with his tacit conclusion that UK will be responsible for Arabs while US will assume similar responsibility for Jews, we are nevertheless prepared officially to suggest to Provisional Government of Israel wisdom at this juncture of accepting cease-fire along terms of UK resolution.³

Repeated for info only to Paris as 1851, Brussels as 813, USUN as 341.

LOVETT

³ Ambassador Douglas, on May 29, advised that "Dept's 1962, May 28 is best news I have received in many weary weeks. When I saw Bevin this morning he said that he was glad US and UK relations are back on track again." The Ambassador noted also that Mr. Bevin agreed with all the United States amendments and that the British Government would have to retain the Jews on Cyprus if the Security Council accepted the British resolution (telegram 2349 from London, 501.BB Palestine/5-2948).

867N.01/5-2848 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

SECRET

WASHINGTON, May 28, 1948—6 p. m.

1978. For Douglas for info. Ref Embtel 2273, May 26.¹ Following account White House press conference May 27 re Palestine: ²

"Q. Mr. President, Dr. Weizmann said the other day that you gave him hope for lifting the arms embargo. Can you give us any more detail?

A. The President said that the arms embargo is under consideration by the United Nations; that he had no comment on it.

Q. Mr. President, that is the United States embargo, and not the United Nations embargo?

A. The President said that the embargo by the United States was made by the Security Council of the United Nations; that it was still pending in the United Nations.

Q. Mr. President, your Ambassador in England has been in conference repeatedly with the Foreign Office spokesman and representatives of Britain during the past few days. Can you say anything about relations between America and Britain, and relations between America and Palestine,—the difference between the two?

A. The President said that he could not.

¹ Not printed: it stated that "Because of great jeopardy to possibility [of] securing Arab-Jewish cease-fire which seems to have resulted from Weizmann's reported press conference May 25... it would be extremely helpful for me [i.e., Ambassador Douglas] to know as soon as possible exactly what President did say to Weizmann." (867N.01/5-2648)

² The official text differs somewhat from that given in telegram 1978: for the former, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1948*, p. 278.

Q. Mr. President, can you tell us anything about the status of the request for the Jewish State of Palestine for a loan of \$90-million to \$100-million?

A. The President said that as far as he knew, none had been made; that if one was made, it would be handled in the usual manner, as all those things are.

Q. Mr. President, did Dr. Weizmann suggest a loan?

A. The President said that he did suggest a loan; that he said Israel would like to have a loan, like any other country. The President added that if the correspondent knew of any other country that would not like to have a loan, he wished the correspondent would tell him.

Q. Mr. President, is there any way in which financial aid could be extended to the Jews, say at this time, by special act of the Congress, or are there any funds or appropriations that you could use without consulting the Congress?

A. The President said that there is the Export-Import Bank, and there is the World Bank, that make loans of that kind.

Q. Mr. President, Dr. Weizmann said he wanted part of that loan to be used for tank and anti-tank guns?

A. The President said that Dr. Weizmann did not discuss the details with him; that all he knew was what he had seen in the papers.

Q. Mr. President, that obviously would not come under the Export-Import Bank?

A. The President said that he could not answer that question.

Q. Mr. President, did Dr. Weizmann state what he wanted the loan for?

A. The President said that he did not; that he said he wanted a loan, period.

Q. Mr. President, and what did you say?

A. The President said that if the State of Israel needs a loan after it is in existence, it would have to go through the usual channels that such things go through.

Q. Mr. President, regarding arms embargo shipments to Israel, the British as I understand it, are shipping arms to the Arabs. What is the difference between the position of the British and our position?

A. The President said that he was not sure there should be any difference.

Q. Mr. President, has the United Nations asked for the embargo on shipping arms?

A. The President said that the United Nations Council requested the arms embargo several months ago and that we complied with it to prevent bloodshed, and that that request still stands.

Q. Mr. President, did they also ask the British to stop shipping arms?

A. The President said that he did not know.

Q. Mr. President, well, it is a parallel case?

A. The President said that he did not think so; that he thought we were in a much better position to ship arms than any other country in the world.

Q. Mr. President, do you expect the United States to initiate any action on it in the United Nations?

A. The President said let us wait and see what our representative in the United Nations decides to do; that whatever he did, would have his backing.

Q. Mr. President, is there any indication of how soon some action will be taken?

A. The President said that there was not.

Q. Mr. President, would you care to comment on the exchange of diplomats between the United States and the State of Israel?

A. The President said that he did not; that he thought Secretary Marshall commented on that yesterday very well."

LOVETT

701.67N11/5-1948

The Acting Secretary of State to Mr. Eliahu Epstein, at Washington

WASHINGTON, May 29, 1948.

DEAR MR. EPSTEIN: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of a telegram dated May 19, 1948, addressed to the Secretary of State, from Moshe Shertok, Foreign Secretary in the Provisional Government of the State of Israel, with regard to the exchange of Missions and Representatives.

It will be appreciated if you will inform Mr. Shertok that the United States Government is giving careful consideration to the exchange of legations and envoys extraordinary and ministers plenipotentiary between the United States and Israel and will communicate later with the Provisional Government of Israel on this subject.

In the meantime, the Government of the United States would welcome the establishment in this country of a Mission from Israel headed by Mr. Epstein as Special Representative of the Provisional Government of Israel and is prepared, if agreeable to the Provisional Government, to establish in Israel a Mission headed by a Special Representative of the Government of the United States.¹

Sincerely yours,

ROBERT A. LOVETT

¹ Mr. Epstein acknowledged Mr. Lovett's communication in a letter of June 7 to the Secretary of State, stating that his Government accepted the proposed arrangement, with the expectation that there would be no undue delay in an exchange of legations and envoys extraordinary and ministers plenipotentiary (701.67N11/6-748).

867N.01/5-2948 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, May 29, 1948.

1015. *Pravda* May 29 carries rare front page editorial "on events in Palestine", expressing full support for Israel and condemning Arab aggression. Reviewing adoption UN partition resolution, editorial describes it as assuring "liberation of Palestine from foreign dependence, satisfaction of national aspirations Jewish and Arab peoples, creation of possibility for both Jew and Arab populations of Palestine be masters own land, independent of foreign imperialist influences". Though decision "should have been welcomed by all peoples of Near East", military conflict has broken out as result British and American policy and fact that "rulers of certain Arab states are carrying out policy which in no way corresponds to interests Arab people, but is subordinated to foreign interests and influences". After contrasting British and American efforts upset partition with clear consistent position Soviet Government, editorial concludes: "Soviet Union has defended and continues defend independence Arab states and peoples. Must be clear, however, that waging war against young Jewish state, Arabs are by no means fighting for own national interests, own independence. . . .¹ Despite its sympathy for national liberation movement Arab peoples, Soviet public opinion cannot but condemn aggression of Arab states against state of Israel and right Jewish people to establish own state in accord decision UNGA".

SMITH

¹ Omission indicated in the source text.

867N.01/5-2948 : Telegram

The Vice Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED

JERUSALEM, May 29, 1948—9 a. m.

783. Terms surrender of Jews in Old City are:

1. Approximately 2000 women, children, old and religious people to be evacuated to Jewish quarters new Jerusalem under supervision International Red Cross.

2. Three hundred men of military age to be taken prisoners of war to Amman.

3. Of 150 wounded, slightly wounded to be taken prisoners of war, seriously wounded to be turned over to IRC.¹

¹ According to the telegram sent by the Truce Commission to the President of the Security Council on May 29, the unconditional surrender of the Jewish quarter of the Old City of Jerusalem took place at 6 p. m. (Palestine time) on May 28; for text, see SC, 3rd yr., No. 77, p. 16.

At 2310 hours local last night, Major Abdullah el-Tel, Arab Legion Commander Old City, telephoned Consulate General that Jews were attacking Zion, Jaffa, New, and Damascus Gates while evacuation of Jews from Zion Gate was still proceeding. Approximately 900 Jews including wounded still proceeding Old City and if attack continued, he said he could not vouch much longer for their safety. He requested Consulate General intercede with JA for immediate cease-fire Old City area. Consulate General called JA at once. JA stated it had been informed one hour previously that evacuation had been completed. Regarding firing, JA official stated that Arab irregulars on Old City walls had opened fire on Jewish armored buses bringing evacuees from Zion Gate and that Jews had been obliged return fire. Around midnight firing ceased.

Azcarate of United Nations who was in Old City at time told Consulate General that Arab Legion had carried out evacuation efficiently and according surrender agreement. Major el-Tel informed Consulate General this morning that evacuation except for wounded had been completed without further incident. JA official stated this morning that Arab Legion had launched attack last night against Jewish position in Sheikh Jarrah quarter while evacuation being carried out. Added that certain Jewish prisoners might be exchanged for Arab prisoners taken at Acre.

BURDETT

501.BB Palestine/5-2948 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Secretary
of State*

TOP SECRET US URGENT
NIACT

LONDON, May 29, 1948—noon.

2348. For the Secretary and Lovett from Douglas.

1. Relative to our telephonic conversation yesterday in regard to Palestine and the news in the London *Times* that the US delegate is announcing his support for the Soviet proposal without making any reference to the British proposal, I cannot too strongly urge that if the Soviet proposal is defeated US delegate in supporting the British proposal will express some courteous acknowledgment of the long step forward which Britain has taken.

2. I do not urge this out of any sentimental considerations or because I agree with British behavior prior to the relinquishment of the mandate but because I can assure you that after the sincere and strenuous effort that HMG has made, a cavalier treatment by US of Britain would aggravate an already strained situation between US and the only natural ally we have on earth.

3. I gather from the British press that Jewish elements are determined to defeat the British proposal and are using the argument that it has an Arab cast because, they assert, it fails to prohibit a shipment of arms from source other than the United Kingdom to the Arab states.

HMG has told Cadogan that this was not the intention of British proposal and has instructed him to offer an amendment which will unmistakably remove this alleged infirmity.

4. It may be that the British proposal will not muster enough support to carry it. In this event, the French proposal in regard to recovering Jerusalem alone would be before the Security Council, so I understand, for consideration. The British feel that however desirable may be action in regard to Jerusalem, it is lamentably defective if it does not deal with Palestine as a whole. This has not been finally cleared. The British will, in all reasonable expectancy, propose that the sense of the French resolution be incorporated with the British proposition.

HMG hopes that the consolidation of the French resolution with the British resolution as amended along the lines indicated above will receive our support and sufficient strength for its adoption. I share fully this hope.

DOUGLAS

Resolution 50 (1948) Adopted by the Security Council on May 29, 1948¹

The Security Council,

Desiring to bring about a cessation of hostilities in Palestine without prejudice to the rights, claims and position of either Arabs or Jews,

1. *Calls upon* all Governments and authorities concerned to order a cessation of all acts of armed force for a period of four weeks;

2. *Calls upon* all Governments and authorities concerned to undertake that they will not introduce fighting personnel into Palestine, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Transjordan and Yemen during the cease-fire;

3. *Calls upon* all Governments and authorities concerned, should men of military age be introduced into countries or territories under their control, to undertake not to mobilize or submit them to military training during the cease-fire;

¹ Reprinted from SC, *3rd yr., Resolutions*, p. 20. The Security Council voted on the Soviet draft resolution on a paragraph-by-paragraph basis on May 29. None of the paragraphs received the affirmative votes of the required seven members; see SC, *3rd yr., No. 77*, pp. 35-37. The Council then turned its attention to the British draft resolution, which was adopted in paragraph-by-paragraph votes. No vote was taken on the text as a whole; for the discussion and balloting, see *ibid.*, pp. 38-63.

4. *Calls upon* all Governments and authorities concerned to refrain from importing or exporting war material into or to Palestine, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Transjordan or Yemen during the cease-fire;

5. *Urges* all Governments and authorities concerned to take every possible precaution for the protection of the Holy Places and of the City of Jerusalem, including access to all shrines and sanctuaries for the purpose of worship by those who have an established right to visit and worship at them;

6. *Instructs* the United Nations Mediator in Palestine, in concert with the Truce Commission, to supervise the observance of the above provisions, and decides that they shall be provided with a sufficient number of military observers;

7. *Instructs* the United Nations Mediator to make contact with all parties as soon as the cease-fire is in force with a view to carrying out his functions as determined by the General Assembly;

8. *Calls upon* all concerned to give the greatest possible assistance to the United Nations Mediator;

9. *Instructs* the United Nations Mediator to make a weekly report to the Security Council during the cease-fire;

10. *Invites* the States members of the Arab League and the Jewish and Arab authorities in Palestine to communicate their acceptance of this resolution to the Security Council not later than 6 p. m. New York standard time on 1 June 1948;

11. *Decides* that if the present resolution is rejected by either party or by both, or if, having been accepted, it is subsequently repudiated or violated, the situation in Palestine will be reconsidered with a view to action under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations;

12. *Calls upon* all Governments to take all possible steps to assist in the implementation of this resolution.

501.BB Palestine/5-3148: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, May 31, 1948—1 p. m.

2367. For the Secretary and Lovett from Douglas.

1. At a meeting with Bevin this morning, he told me that Egypt's Ambassador had just called on him to tell him that Egypt is considering response it will make to SC resolution. In this connection Egypt Government is disturbed in relation to their amendment by information to effect that there are ships at Costanza about to depart with emigrants for Palestine. Egypt Government is also worried lest some Jews known to be in Italy, and who have received military training

there, might also be transported to Palestine. Egypt Ambassador made point that it would be very hard to check whether Jewish men of military age after reaching Palestine are mobilized or given military training during cease-fire.

2. Bevin assured Egypt Ambassador that UK would hold Jews on Cyprus, and that he would make representations to the Italian Government, and to any other governments which might be concerned, with regard to carrying out the SC resolution. Bevin expressed hope that US Government will take parallel action with the Italian and any other governments involved. Bevin believes this action by HMG and US Government might importantly influence the decision of the Egypt Government.

Sent Department 2367, repeated Rome 140, US Mission Bucharest 23, Cairo 68.

DOUGLAS

501.BB Palestine/5-3148 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate at Haifa

SECRET US URGENT
NIACT

WASHINGTON, May 31, 1948—1 p. m.

90. Cairo's 3, May 30 sent Dept as 640.¹ Please inform UN Mediator Count Bernadotte that this govt is giving active consideration as member Truce Commission to his suggestion that military observers be made available to supervise observance of SC resolution of May 29. Please stress that owing to holiday we have not been able to make final arrangements and that we could only participate provided other governments' members of Truce Commission join in sending military observers.

Subject to foregoing consideration that our policy has not yet received final clearance, you may tell Bernadotte that we believe that, following precedents established in providing military observers to Balkan Commission and to Good Offices Committee in Indonesia, personnel to assist Mediator and Truce Commission should be recruited from the three states members of Commission: Belgium, France and US. Tentatively we would suggest that each Govt send 21 officer

¹ Not printed; it stated in part: "UN Representative Count Folke Bernadotte requested Military Attachés of American, British, and French Embassies to call on him noon May 30 in relation to Security Council's Palestine cease-fire resolution of May 29, inquired as to what military or civilian observers he could expect in enforcing terms of resolution in form of land, sea, and air border patrols of the various states concerned as well as observers sufficient in number to function at principal land, sea, and air ports of entry to Palestine. Count Bernadotte also inquired if in formulating his plans he might count on any air patrols from one or more of the three above mentioned countries. He added that he would prefer to have observers from small countries such as the Scandinavian, but that since time was of the essence, aid must come if at all from those countries having some forces in vicinity Palestine." (501.BB Palestine/5-3048)

observers with necessary subordinate staff and equipment, including airplanes. Our own team would be made up of seven officers from each of the three services.

If field experience demonstrates necessity of larger number of observers we should be prepared to give favorable consideration to request for additional officers if asked for by Mediator and Truce Commission.

It is felt that SC resolution of May 29 is sufficient authority for Mediator and Truce Commission to recruit military observers along lines suggested above, and without further reference SC.

Repeated Paris 1884 and Brussels 824 with request these views be brought to immediate attention of Foreign Office and competent military authorities. Repeated Jerusalem 510; Cairo 680; Damascus 199; Beirut 280; for action in event Bernadotte not first reached by Consul Haifa. Repeated for info to Baghdad 175; Jidda 208; London 2010; USUN 347.²

LOVETT

² At Mr. Lovett's request, Mr. McClintock, on June 1, sent copies of telegrams 640 and 90 to Mr. Clifford for President Truman's information. His transmitting letter concluded with the statement: "It is not possible to determine whether or not we shall in fact be called upon to supply military observers to the United Nations Mediator until replies have been received from the Arab Governments and the Provisional Government of Israel, in response to the request of the Security Council of May 29 that they cease hostilities in Palestine. If all parties do accept the Security Council's resolution, undoubtedly Count Bernadotte will have immediate need of military observers and the Department will then wish to secure the President's approval of our sending our fair share of such officers to assist the United Nations Mediator." (501.BB Palestine/6-148)

The letter bears the following marginal notation by Mr. McClintock: "Mr. Clifford said June 3 that President had given his approval".

501.BB Palestine/5-3148: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

SECRET US URGENT

LONDON, May 31, 1948—2 p. m.

NIACT

2368. 1. Wright raised urgently with Embassy today interpretation to be placed on paragraphs three and four of SC Palestine resolution of May 29. Because this constitutes vital point for Arab states as Egyptian Ambassador pointed out to Bevin (Embassy's 2367, May 31, 1 p. m.).

2. FonOff legal adviser is of opinion that no distinction is intended between "fighting personnel" (paragraph three) and "men of military age" (paragraph four). He believes that intention of paragraph four is that if notwithstanding paragraph three fighting personnel should be introduced they should not be mobilized or given military training. If paragraph three meant armed forces it would have said so. Legal

adviser said that above is consistent with basic concept of British draft that neither side should improve its position during cease-fire by acquiring new recruits.

3. Wright said Arab countries are holding cabinet meetings today re SC resolution and that FonOff regards it as most important that US, UK and France not only agree on interpretation these two paragraphs but communicate this interpretation to all parties since this may affect their decision. FonOff has just telephoned Beeley, UK delegate UN, ascertain US views. FonOff is also telephoning Paris.

4. Please advise urgently Department's interpretation and action Department takes.

Sent Department 2368; Department please repeat to USUN, and also repeat to Palestine, repeated Cairo as 69; Baghdad 55; Beirut 21; Jidda 67; and Damascus 25.

DOUGLAS

867N.01/5-3148: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

Moscow, May 31, 1948—4 p. m.

1016. An Arab colleague tells me that during recent conversation on other matters, Vishinsky insisted, despite his (Arab's) expressed unwillingness, on discussing Palestine. Vishinsky justified Soviet support of partition on familiar lines of right of Palestine Jews to self-determination and independence, and rehearsed Soviet support Arab independence. He then went on to say Soviet Government had always been opposed to Zionism as tool of British imperialism and had not changed this view. However, distinction must be made between Zionism and Jewish population in Palestine. Latter wants and is prepared for real independence and "real democracy." Soviet Government, he indicated, would give no support to Israel which would be in conflict with its opposition to Zionism as such or with its support of national liberation movements in Arab countries.

Department pass London as Moscow's 61.¹

SMITH

¹ London cabled on June 1: "Soviet policy re Palestine described Moscow's 1016, May 31, to Department is partially confirmed by recent report received by Foreign Office from Bucharest quoting 'reliable student Communist source' to effect that first Soviet objective is to get UK forces out of Palestine and neighboring countries. USSR recognized Israel as ME state most likely to offer opportunity for Soviet domination. With same hope USSR would extend recognition promptly to any Palestine Arab state. Once in control either or both states USSR would energetically support both Jewish and Arab states against their reactionary leaders." (Telegram 2383, 867N.01/6-148)

501.BB Palestine/5-3148: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

SECRET US URGENT

WASHINGTON, May 31, 1948—9 p. m.

NIACT

2015. British Embassy has discussed points raised your Niacts 2368 and 2372 May 31¹ with Dept and USUN. Embassy has also read us text of telegram which FO sent UK missions in Near East May 30, urging unconditional acceptance by Arab Govts of SC resolution of May 29. Please call on Bevin and say that we much appreciate his prompt and, we hope, effective action.

As for advice which friendly govts might give Arabs or Jews on moot points in SC resolution, you may tell Bevin and Bidault (repeated to Paris for similar action as 1890) that Jewish Agency has today informally approached USUN with a number of questions of interpretation on which Shertok requests our informal opinion.² JA was referred to President of SC, with advice that this Govt could not unilaterally undertake to interpret SC resolution. For your info only, our preceding telegram repeats gist of JA questions.

Because of attitude taken vis-à-vis JA we do not feel that US should seek to coach Arab govts on interpretation of paragraphs three and four of SC resolution of May 29. We do feel however, and this [*the*] US missions to Arab Govts may state to Foreign Ministers, that essence of May 29 resolution is to secure cessation of hostilities during a four week period in which neither side would be able to build up its military potential. In consequence, to us most commonsense interpretation of paras 3 and 4 of SC resolution is that no men of military age should enter countries mentioned therein during four week period of cease fire. Four weeks are in fact a short time in which to recruit an army. If, however, there were legitimate need to permit immigration of men of military age to take up exclusively civilian pursuits, there should be adequate safeguards to ensure that these men are not to be used for military service.

On the whole, therefore, our interpretation is similar to that set forth in para 2 urtel 2368, which you should repeat to Paris and capitals listed below. We repeat that essence of SC resolution of May 29 is to achieve immediate end of hostilities in Palestine and that

¹ Latter not printed.

² As transmitted in telegram 727, May 31, 12:43 p. m., from New York, not printed (501.BB Palestine/5-3148); for the questions of interpretation as they evolve into assumptions, see footnote 2, p. 1085.

during period of cease fire neither side shall be able to build up its military potential.³

Sent for action to London 2015; Paris 1890; Cairo 682; Beirut 283; Damascus 201; Baghdad 177; Jidda 210; Jerusalem 514. Repeated USUN 348; Haifa 92; Brussels 826; Moscow 616.

LOVETT

³ Ambassador Douglas, on June 1, reported that "When I informed Bevin of contents Department's 2015, May 31, he expressed appreciation for prompt manner in which Department dealt with this problem and welcomed warmly the attitude which Department has adopted. . . . He thought that in Amman, Arab delegates would be quick to note similarity US and UK views." (Telegram 2403, from London, 501.BB Palestine/6-148)

501.BB Palestine/6-148 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

SECRET US URGENT
 NIACT

WASHINGTON, June 1, 1948—6 p. m.

349. There are four principal possibilities confronting SC when it meets tomorrow to receive replies from Arab Govts and the Provisional Govt of Israel responsive to its resolution of May 29:

1. Acceptance by all Govts of SC call to cease hostilities for 4 weeks and otherwise to comply with requirements of SC resolution.
2. Rejection by all Govts of SC res. of May 29.
3. Acceptance of SC res. by Prov. Govt. of Israel and rejection by Arab Govts.
4. Rejection by Prov. Govt. of Israel and acceptance by Arab Govts.

There is also possibility that there may be conditional acceptances by one or both sides which may require further consideration by SC and Dept.

If, as we profoundly hope, both sides accept the resolution, your remarks should be warmly congratulatory of the statesmanship and restraint exhibited by the Govts concerned. You should on behalf of this govt say that we look now to UN Mediator, Count Bernadotte, and to SC Truce Commission in Palestine, not only to supervise compliance with Resolution of May 29 but to use this breathing space of 4 weeks as an opportunity to work out a lasting *modus vivendi* between Arabs and Jews.

You should pledge fullest support of this govt, as member of Truce Commission, to the Mediator in his difficult task, and say that we stand ready to assist him to the utmost.

If contingencies (2), (3) and (4) materialize, penultimate para-

graph of res. of May 29 comes into immediate effect. We feel that for purpose of meeting of June 2 it would be unwise for Council immediately to debate resolutions with a view to action under Chapter 7. We feel that there should be adequate discussion among delegations as to exactly what course such action should take. In this case you should keep in mind but not as yet discuss Deptel 327, May 26,¹ setting forth US policy as approved by the President.

Since action under Chapter 7, consisting merely of an order to the parties to cease fire and end hostilities, has twice been rejected by the Council, first in the form of our res of May 17 and latterly by rejection of the USSR res of May 29, it is to be doubted whether a reiteration of our Chapter 7 res of May 17 would prove effective.

Please discuss possibilities with your colleagues on the Council. We value in particular the British views and should prefer if possible to work in concert with UK del. Naturally the joint participation of such other delegations as the French, Canadians, and Belgians would be most welcome.

Depending upon your report of the attitude of other delegations, Dept will formulate instructions as to the course of action this Govt will be prepared to support if necessary under Chapter 7 at the next meeting of the Council subsequent to June 2.

Repeated to London as 2025, Paris as 1897, Brussels as 832, Moscow as 619.

LOVETT

¹ Not printed, but see footnote 1, p. 1027.

867N.01/6-148

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by Mr. Fraser Wilkins of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] June 1, 1948.

On June 1, 1948 Mr. Epstein informed me that he had received a telegram from Mr. Shertok in Tel Aviv in which the Provisional Government of Israel accepted the Security Council's request for a cease fire of May 29.¹ A copy of the text of this telegram as taken down over the telephone is attached.

Mr. Epstein said that he had been instructed by Mr. Shertok to request the support of the United States Government for Israel's acceptance of the Security Council's cease fire on the basis of the five

¹ For text, see SC, 3rd yr., No. 78, p. 2.

assumptions contained therein.² I told Mr. Epstein that I would communicate with my superior officers and would communicate with him later.

The attached text was subsequently discussed by Mr. Henderson, Mr. Sandifer³ and Mr. McClintock with Mr. Lovett. On instructions from Mr. Henderson, Mr. Sandifer and Mr. McClintock I telephoned Mr. Epstein that the Department regarded Mr. Shertok's telegram of June 1 as an acceptance of the Security Council's resolution of May 29 and that, with regard to the five assumptions contained in that telegram, the Department considered such interpretations for determination by the United Nations through the agency of the UN Mediator, the Security Council Truce Commission or the Security Council itself.

Mr. Epstein asked me if we would support their interpretation of the Security Council's resolution of May 29 in the United Nations. I told him that it seemed to me on the basis of the information I had already given him that this question could not be answered at this moment, as it remained to be seen what action the United Nations would take with regard to the assumptions as stated.

Mr. Epstein told me that two main considerations had dictated Israel's acceptance of the Security Council's resolution of May 29: (1) Israel's desire to act in accord with international public opinion, and (2) Israel's desire to cooperate with the United Nations in its handling of the Palestine question.

² The assumptions as furnished by Mr. Epstein comprised :

"1. That ban on import of arms into territories Arab states enumerated in resolution should apply also to deliveries arms from stocks owned or controlled by foreign powers within these territories.

"2. That during cease fire armed forces of neither side will seek to advance beyond areas controlled by them at commencement of cease fire and that each side will be entitled maintain the positions in its military occupation at that time.

"3. That freedom of access to Jerusalem will be insured for supply of food and other essentials as well as for normal civilian entry and exit.

"4. That any attempt by parties concerned to stop or impede normal transport of goods consigned to Israel and other states concerned will be regarded as an act of armed force.

"5. That while provisional government is ready comply with injunction that persons of military age admitted during cease fire should not be mobilized or submitted to military training, its freedom to admit immigrants regardless of age will not be impaired."

³ Durward V. Sandifer, Deputy Director of the Office of United Nations Affairs.

Editorial Note

The reply of the Arab League, transmitted by the Egyptian Minister for Foreign Affairs in a telegram of June 1 to Secretary-General Lie, accepted the Security Council's request for a four-week cease-fire. The reply asserted that one of the most important of the Mediator's func-

tions was to reach a peaceful and just solution of the Palestine problem. It then stated that "The Governments of the Arab States are confident that the United Nations Mediator and the members of the Truce Commission . . . will realize that any solution which does not ensure political unity for Palestine or respect the will of the majority of the population of that country will not have the least chance of success." The full text of the reply is printed in SC, *3rd yr., No. 78*, page 4.

The President of the Security Council, on June 2, announced to the Council that acceptance of the cease-fire was unconditional and that the comments made by all parties were not to be considered as setting conditions (*ibid.*, page 16).

Sir Alec Kirkbride, British Minister in Transjordan, gave Wells Stabler an account of the meeting of the Political Committee of the Arab League at Amman concerning Arab acceptance of the cease-fire, as furnished to him by the Transjordanian Prime Minister, Tawfik al-Huda. According to this account, Egypt and Transjordan pressed for acceptance and were soon joined by Iraq. Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon were more difficult to convince because of their concern for local public opinion, but they finally voted for acceptance. After adoption of the resolution, the Syrian, Lebanese, and Saudi Arabian delegates proposed an additional resolution stating that all Arab states rejected a Jewish state and that anybody entertaining contrary ideas was a traitor to the Arab cause. The Transjordanian Prime Minister told the three delegates that this matter was entirely outside the scope of the meeting and that the proposed resolution was a direct attack on the Hashemites. He thereupon closed the meeting and walked out (telegram 237, June 3, 1 p. m., from Beirut, 501.BB Palestine/6-348).

501.BB Palestine/6-148 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Representative
at the United Nations (Austin)*

SECRET US URGENT
NIACT

WASHINGTON, June 1, 1948—6 p. m.

350. British Embassy has made oral representation here today soliciting our support of UK interpretation of Articles 3 and 4 of SC resolution of May 29 along lines of paragraph 2, Douglas's telegram 2368, May 31. (Reference Deptel 348, May 31, 9 p. m.¹).

British request that we either support their interpretation in SC or, failing that, do not oppose their interpretation.

You are authorized to state in SC, but only if necessary, our view of meaning of paragraphs 3 and 4 of SC resolution of May 29 in terms

¹ This was a repeat of 2015 to London, p. 1082.

set forth in Deptel 348 (sent London for action as 2015, May 31). However, we should much prefer at this delicate juncture that SC does not get involved in debate as to interpretation. We feel it far preferable that questions of interpretation of SC resolution of May 29 be left to UN Mediator in Palestine, Count Bernadotte, and would prefer that you suggest this course of action if situation should arise.

Repeated Haifa as 94, Jerusalem as 518, Beirut as 285, Damascus as 202, Cairo as 690, with request that Count Bernadotte be apprised of our foregoing views and also interpretation set forth Deptel 348 (Sent London as 2015).² Repeated London for info as 2026, Paris as 1898, Baghdad as 179, Jidda as 212, Brussels as 833, Moscow as 620.

LOVETT

²The question of the interpretation of Articles 3 and 4 continued to agitate the Department. On June 2, Messrs. Sandifer and McClintock discussed the matter further by telephone with Mr. Ross at New York. Mr. McClintock's memorandum of the conversation states: "Although from an ideal point of view we should prefer that no men of military age should enter the countries mentioned during the four-week period of cease-fire, if there were legitimate need to permit the entry of men of military age to take up exclusively civilian pursuits this should be possible provided there were adequate safeguards to ensure that these men were not to be used for military service."

"With the approval of Mr. Lovett, the following language was submitted as making this position more clear:

"Paragraphs 3 and 4 do not preclude the admission of men of military age for exclusively civilian purposes provided this is carried out in good faith in light of the acceptance of the obligations of these paragraphs by the parties, and under supervision of the UN Mediator.'" (501.BB Palestine/6-248)

PPS Files, Lot 64-D 563

*Minutes of the Policy Planning Staff, Wednesday, June 2, 1948,
4 p. m. to 5 p. m.*

SECRET

Present: George Butler Carlton Savage
Bernard Gufler Henry Villard ¹
Willard L. Thorp, E
Loy W. Henderson, NEA
John D. Hickerson, EUR
Carlisle H. Humelsine, S/S
Samuel K. C. Kopper, NEA
Robert M. McClintock, UNA
Gordon P. Merriam, NE
Durward V. Sandifer, UNA
Fraser Wilkins, NE

There was a discussion of the question of placing the Palestine problem before the National Security Council, in accordance with the

¹ Messrs. Butler, Gufler, and Villard were members of the Policy Planning Staff; Mr. Savage, who drafted these minutes, was the Staff's Executive Secretary.

Policy Planning Staff recommendation, approved by the Secretary and Mr. Lovett, that the course which this Government pursues with respect to Palestine should be cleared with the National Security Council. It was agreed that we should begin immediately to develop a paper on Palestine and its overall policy implications, particularly with respect to the Middle East, for submission to the Secretary and Mr. Lovett and eventual clearance through the National Security Council.

501.BB Palestine/6-248

Memorandum by the Deputy United States Representative on the Security Council (Jessup) to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

CONFIDENTIAL

[NEW YORK,] June 2, 1948.

Subject: Final Solution in Palestine

It would seem important immediately for the Department to formulate its views concerning the eventual solution in Palestine toward which the mediator will be working during the cease fire period. Although presumably the mediator will exercise a free hand, it is clear that the views of the United States will exercise a strong if not controlling influence on what is ultimately recommended or accepted.

The first alternative to be considered is the question whether during the four week period there should be an effort to reach a permanent solution or whether a temporary solution should be aimed at. On the one hand, it can be argued that the Arabs may need time for adjustment to the idea of a Jewish State and that some temporary arrangement, say for six months, might pave the way for future long range agreement. On the other hand, there are some indications that since Arab councils are divided, they may wish to be forced and would like a strong recommendation to which they would have to bow. Our best political judgment is needed in regard to this Arab attitude.

With reference to a possible final solution, the following assumptions may be valid:

First Assumption

There will be a State of Israel.

If this is taken as certain, then it could be argued that the best way to get the Arabs to acquiesce in this fact is to secure as many recognitions as possible, particularly the recognition of the United Kingdom. If the United Kingdom admitted this fact and committed itself to it, it might help to put it over in the minds of the Arabs. The more states that recognize, the easier it would be to get Arab acquiescence.

Second Assumption

There must also be an Arab State in Palestine.

The question exists as to whether the Arabs can agree on Abdullah as the head of the Palestinian state regardless of its exact boundaries. If the Arabs were agreed on this, it might be possible to hold out the hope of recognition and support of application for United Nations membership. Attention should also be given to the thought that recognition of a greater kingdom of Abdullah's would solve the problem of recognition of Transjordan.

Third Assumption

There must be close relations between the Jewish and Arab states in Palestine, especially on economic lines.

Here it would be necessary to explore all of the various solutions which have been suggested, including the November 29 plan for economic union and Tsiang's suggestion for some kind of dual commonwealth with a head man or mediator appointed by the United Nations and having charge of foreign relations and finance.

One point which seems to be dominant in Arab minds is the possibility of subsequent Jewish expansion. Consideration might be given to some kind of guarantee of the Arab state which would prevent possible subsequent Jewish expansion. It might be assumed that in regard to immigration, the Arab state would be free to exclude Jewish immigrants since each state presumably would have control of its own immigration policy.

Methods: While it would seem desirable that negotiations should be carried on in New York, in Washington and in the Arab capitals, and in Tel Aviv, it would appear that nothing should be done to stultify the role of the mediator or to weaken his hand, and that the lead should be given to him in the negotiations.

In order to support the mediator, it would seem desirable immediately to strengthen the Truce Commission by appointing to its membership persons of highest ambassadorial rank from Belgium, France and the United States.

Consideration might be given to the appointment during the four week period of a boundary commission which could continue its work after the termination of the cease fire period. The mediator might act as Chairman of such a boundary commission.

It might be desirable to draw up something of a balance sheet showing what advantages or concessions would be given to each side. One might also note what factors would be common to both a temporary and to a permanent solution. Common factors would include separate Jewish and Arab governments, common services and the problem of the City of Jerusalem. In regard to Jerusalem, the alternatives might be either to let the Arabs have it as Abdullah's capital, to make it an

international city as under the November 29 plan, or possibly to find a combination of the two schemes. Perhaps the old city could be made a *corpus separatum* as under the November 29 plan and have a purely religious significance comparable to, but different from that of the Vatican City. Access would, of course, have to be secured.

The boundaries laid down on November 29 would certainly seem to be capable of adjustment and modification. The Arabs would seem to be entitled to a port on the Mediterranean Sea. Further consideration would need to be given to the Negeb.

501.BB Palestine/6-248 : Telegram

The Chargé in Egypt (Patterson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

CAIRO, June 2, 1948—5 p. m.

659. Data supplied by Department's 680, May 31,¹ were conveyed to Count Bernadotte in call which I paid him at his hotel this morning accompanied by Assistant Military Attaché, Colonel Wyman. Bernadotte, who had returned last evening from Amman, stated he had not received Department's message at Haifa. He was much encouraged by its cooperative tenor while realizing that it represented merely tentative and preliminary thinking on part of Department. It was evident however that Bernadotte felt a larger number of officers than that suggested by Department would become necessary if truce observance were to be adequately enforced and that equipment would require ships as well as airplanes; moreover his own duties would not permit of his active supervision of observer teams so that a deputy would become necessary. He inquired if in my belief a Swede or Swedes would be acceptable for this purpose. I replied to effect my personal view was that since apparently Bernadotte himself a Swede had been unanimously accepted by the UN in capacity of mediator it would seem not unreasonable for him to be assisted by other Swedish men. Bernadotte then requested facilities of Embassy for sending a telegram to Truce Commission at Jerusalem to effect that if acceptance of truce proved correct (he had had no word from UN confirming reports in today's Cairo press) his entire time would be taken up with implementing the truce so that it would be well if the Truce Commission could visit Cairo where facilities for communications with the UN were better than other cities such as Amman.

On my pointing out that the US Government believed that the military observers should be taken from nationals of those governments represented on the Truce Commission; namely, Belgium, France, and the US, Count Bernadotte stated that he would communicate with the Belgian Minister in Cairo on the subject. He was evidently inclined

¹ This was a repeat of telegram 90 to Haifa, p. 1079.

to a belief that British advice would still be helpful in setting up teams of observers in view of British experience in Palestine and hoped that interested governments would give their assent to his obtaining aid from British as well as from Belgium, France and US even though observers might be limited to nationals of the three last named countries. Bunche² as well as another member Bernadotte's staff together with Harold Evans were present during our talk on conclusion of which Bernadotte requested Colonel Wyman remain for second meeting of Military Attachés. In view of receipt immediately before my departure for Bernadotte's hotel of Department's 682, May 31³ and 690, June 1,⁴ I took texts along from 682. However I read solely the final sentence relating to Department's belief that SC's resolution of May 29 in effect was a standstill agreement.

On my reading to Bernadotte that portion of 690, paragraph 3, which begins with the word "however" and goes on to mention that the interpretation of the SC's resolution might be left to Bernadotte, the latter gave a wry smile accompanied by an ejaculation.⁵

Sent Department 659, repeated London, Brussels, Paris, Jerusalem; sent Arab capitals by pouch.

PATTERSON

² Ralph J. Bunche, Personal Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations with Count Bernadotte.

³ This was a repeat of telegram 2015 to London, p. 1082.

⁴ This was a repeat of telegram 350 to New York, p. 1086.

⁵ Count Bernadotte, on June 2, sent a cable to Secretary-General Lie in which he proposed that he, the Mediator, be authorized to fix the effective date of the cease-fire and truce; for text, see SC, *3rd yr.*, No. 78, p. 16. In the telephone conversation alluded to in footnote 2, p. 1087, Mr. Ross was informed that the Department concurred with the Mediator's proposal.

The President of the Security Council, at its meeting of June 2, announced that the Council agreed to the Mediator's proposal. The Soviet and the Ukrainian Representatives, however, specifically abstained from approval (SC, *3rd yr.*, No. 78, pp. 23, 24).

501.BB Palestine/6-248 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

LONDON, June 2, 1948—7 p. m.

2419. 1. Department's 2015 of May 31 and 2026, June 1 to London.¹ I am gratified that our interpretation of paragraphs 3 and 4 SC resolution May 29 is in line with that of British Government, and I agree that on future questions of interpretation these should be left so far as possible to Count Bernadotte.

2. There is one problem to which I am sure the Department has already given its attention but which might soon come very much to fore—treatment to be accorded Jewish DP's in American zone Ger-

¹ The latter was a repeat of telegram 350 to New York, p. 1086.

many with regard to emigration to Palestine during cease-fire Bevin, although British interest would be served by getting rid of them, took note of query Department's 1962, May 28, and agreed unconditionally to retain Jews in Cyprus (see Embassy's 2349, May 29,² paragraph 4) during cease-fire period and has so advised Arab states. This action may have gone far to achieve Arab acceptance cease-fire.

3. Jews in DP camps in American zone Germany are in position analogous to that of Jews in Cyprus. Am I correct in assuming that until there is a definitive SC ruling to contrary, USG in accordance with its own interpretation of paragraphs 3 and 4 will retain male Jews of military age in our DP camps for period of cease-fire? It seems to me that if in this regard we do less than UK with which USG first raised question, it would be inconsistent with our interpretation and we will create thereby an opportunity for the enemies of US and UK to drive fresh wedge between us. Surely introduction of any kind of manpower of military age builds up a country's military potential (Department's 2015, May 31, paragraph 3).

Sent Department 2419; repeated Baghdad 59; Cairo 75; Beirut 25; Damascus 29; Jidda 71; Paris 253; Berlin 167.

DOUGLAS

² Not printed; but see footnote 3, p. 1072.

501.BB Palestine/6-248: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, June 2, 1948—7 p. m.

2420. Following obtained informally from Burrows today regarding Palestine:

1. As British Delegation UN will explain to USUN today Foreign Office feels that while it agrees that other questions of interpretation should be left to Bernadotte, Foreign Office feels regarding paragraphs three and four of SC resolution Bernadotte should have guidance because HMG has already committed itself to Arabs regarding its interpretation. If Bernadotte should take contrary view, Arabs would claim that they had been tricked. Possible alternative, though less satisfactory, line would be Bernadotte ruling that men of military age should not be allowed enter Palestine until there are adequate safeguards to insure that these men are not used for military service (Department's 2015 May 31 and 2026 June 1¹).

2. Foreign Office understands Bernadotte created favorable impres-

¹ The latter was a repeat of telegram 350 to New York, p. 1086.

sion Amman where he pleased Arabs by showing willingness make decisions and accept responsibility for implementation SC resolution.

3. Preliminary Foreign Office guidance comments to UK Delegation regarding Israeli assumptions² as given Radio Bulletin No. 696, June 2 were:

Reference one, UK Delegation should give assurances regarding British stores ME;

Reference two, this seems reasonable;

Reference three, this seems reasonable subject to safeguards as to what constitutes "essentials" and "normal entry";

Reference four, HMG would prefer not to comment without further study;

Reference five, see paragraph one above and previous.

Repeated Baghdad 60, Cairo 76, Beirut 26, Damascus 30, Jidda 72. Department please repeat Palestine.

DOUGLAS

² For the assumptions, see footnote 2, p. 1085.

501.BB Palestine/6-348: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)

SECRET US URGENT

WASHINGTON, June 3, 1948—3 p. m.

NIACT

357. Careful consideration has been given to request of Syrian President of SC for our support of his proposal that supervisors of UN Mediator in Palestine include representatives of Arab and Jewish sides as well as representatives of the three principal religions in Palestine.

You should tell Faris El Khouri that, although we are sympathetic to the motives which prompted his suggestion, we do not feel it would be wise to include in Bernadotte's staff of military and other observers the representatives of the parties at interest. The essence of the Mediator's task and that of the Truce Commission is to be impartial and to carry out the terms of the SC resolution of May 29 without fear or favor to either party.

You may tell Faris Bey, however, that we should have no objection if Count Bernadotte were assisted in his work by liaison officers representing the Jews on one hand and the Arabs on the other. Precedents for such liaison officers are to be found in the case of the Balkan Commission and in the Indonesian Good Offices Committee's work.

We do not feel that it would be useful to interject religious considerations into the Mediator's task under resolution of May 29. Faris, himself, as a Christian, should appreciate that it would be difficult to

decide which Christian sect should represent the Christians of Palestine and he should also be able to appreciate embarrassment which might be caused if representative of the Moslems of Palestine were their titular leader, the Grand Mufti.

As for your own suggestion that our representatives from the three Services should be headed by officers of Flag rank, we are inclined to doubt whether in fact this would achieve the useful purpose you envisage. On the contrary we feel that presence of high-ranking officers might serve to detract from preeminent position of the Mediator who is making an excellent beginning and who we feel is fully capable of exerting all the prestige that is needed in this situation. Our concept of the role of military observers is that they should be a group of fairly young hard-working officers of rank not higher than Army colonel or Navy captain, who would thus be clearly subordinate to UN Mediator and who would be able to rough it in the field.

With respect to your suggestion that representatives be named to Truce Commission of rank and caliber of Ambassador, we feel that this would be injurious to and a reflection on work of present truce commissioners, the Consuls General in Jerusalem. These men, with great devotion and at grave personal risk, have done their utmost to carry out SC terms of reference and their failure to secure a truce was less due to their own personal qualifications than to intransigence of the parties with whom they dealt. Accordingly we are not disposed to suggest that persons of Ambassadorial position now be assigned to Truce Commission. Commission should continue on working level to assist and advise Count Bernadotte but we shall look principally to UN Mediator for top-level decisions on the spot.

Ambassador Austin is authorized to state at SC meeting this morning that this govt as member of Truce Commission will do its utmost to fulfill terms imposed on it by SC resolution of May 29. We are also prepared, if UN Mediator so requests, to furnish him military, naval, and air observers to implement Paragraph 7 of that resolution, provided that other nations are also called upon by Mediator for similar service. You should state that in our opinion most logical formula for fixing which nations should contribute these observers would be to follow precedent established for Balkan and Indonesian cases and to look to governments members of Truce Commission for this service. However, you should make it clear that this is a suggestion and that we will defer to wishes of Count Bernadotte. You may also in your judgment support suggestion as coming from Faris El Khouri that liaison officers of Jewish and Arab parties might do useful work attached to Bernadotte's staff.

For your information President and Defense Secretary Forrestal have indicated their approval of this government contributing its fair

share of military observers if other members of Truce Commission do likewise. Repeated Cairo as 706 for immediate information of Count Bernadotte. Repeated Jerusalem as 528, Haifa as 101, for information of Bernadotte if he has not first been approached by Cairo. Repeated for information to London as 2054, Paris as 1925, Brussels as 842, Beirut as 293, Jidda as 215, Baghdad as 184.

MARSHALL

501.BB Palestine/6-348: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt

SECRET US URGENT

WASHINGTON, June 3, 1948—7 p. m.

712. Please inform Count Bernadotte that we are highly gratified at success which has thus far attended his energetic and conciliatory efforts with Arabs and Jews.

You may likewise inform UN Mediator that President has assented to this Govt contributing its fair share of military observers in conjunction with other Govts, preferably France and Belgium, as the other members of Truce Commission, to implement Paragraph 7, SC resolution May 29.

We feel that before formal action can be taken Bernadotte should make an official request of this Govt for assistance contemplated. You should in terms of strictest confidence inform Count Bernadotte that this Govt would not be pleased to serve if Russians or satellite states were asked also to send military observers.

Re your 659, June 2, we feel that Count Bernadotte should have complete liberty of choice in selecting his deputy and we would have no objection to a Swede in this position nor to whatever additional Swedish staff Bernadotte might require.

Question of payment of military observers has not yet been resolved in UN but this Govt considers that simplest arrangement would be for govts which send military observers to defray their expenses and also to accept charges incidental to furnishing of necessary equipment such as airplanes and land transport. However, if other govts have different views we are prepared to concert our policy with theirs. It might be that for Bernadotte's staff use he could make arrangements with British, who have large supply of military equipment on the spot, to loan him such airplanes and naval or land transport facilities as he may require. This is offered purely as a suggestion.

Sent Cairo as 712 for action. Repeated Haifa as 107 and Jerusalem as 534 for similar action if Bernadotte not first reached by Cairo. Repeated for info to USUN as 359, London as 2069, Paris as 1934, Brussels as 848, Moscow as 628.

MARSHALL

501.BB Palestine/6-448 : Telegram

The Chargé in Egypt (Patterson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET MOST IMMEDIATE

CAIRO, June 4, 1948—7 p. m.

NIACT

675. At 3:30 p. m. today I informed Count Bernadotte content Department's 712 June 3 in course of call at his hotel. He took due note of substance of paragraph one, which I repeated to him, and stated Americans and Belgians having accepted to supply observers with response being now awaited from French, there would be no need to look elsewhere. Bernadotte hoped for some British equipment and interestingly added that Nokrashy Pasha had urged him endeavor obtain British naval vessels to patrol coasts.

Department's assent appointment Swedish deputy and other supervisors of observer corps much appreciated. Bernadotte has been in provisional touch with Stockholm on subject, and finds Swedish Government willing cooperate. Both Bernadotte and Bunche, who had yesterday flown Amman and Haifa but not Beirut, stated immigration men of military age seemed sole serious obstacle in way of Arab and Jewish agreement on truce. They had conferred at Haifa with Moshe Shertok such length as to have been unable visit Beirut. Bernadotte is telegraphing UN on subject desired clarification SC's intent,¹ while Bunche is telegraphing Reedman, UN agent Haifa, to work on Shertok to agree self-limitation immigration men of military age while preserving principle of immigration. Bunche expressed hope Department might use its influence in bringing about reasonable interpretation phrase in dispute.

Bernadotte stated he had overcome Arab objections to provisioning of Jerusalem by pointing out unless supply of city were permitted its position would deteriorate during four weeks truce period, and so not represent maintenance of desired standstill in military potential.

Sent Department 675, repeated London 54, Paris 49, Jerusalem 74, Brussels unnumbered. Pouched Arab capitals.

PATTERSON

¹ His message, dated June 4, stated that the question of immigration into Palestine was the sole obstruction to agreement on an effective truce date. It then raised these questions: "Does resolution envisage that men of military age may be brought in Jewish area Palestine during period truce provided they are not mobilized or submitted to training? Is resolution permissive this regard or does resolution seek exclusion all men military age?"; for full text of message, see SC, 3rd yr., *Supplement for June 1948*, p. 77.

501.BB Palestine/6-448: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, June 4, 1948—8 p. m.

2482. Embassy's 2442, June 3,¹ paragraph 1. Bevin raised with me today question mediator's observers and said that in proposing nationals small neutral states he had in mind as primary objective keeping out USSR. US formula of Nationals Truce Commission member-states assisted possibly by Swedes or other neutrals accomplishes this and hence Bevin is entirely agreeable to our proposals. When I read him Department's 2069, June 3,² Bevin said it was fully in accord with his views.

2. Bevin told me that in difficult period ahead regarding Palestine he hoped the closest four-way cooperation and exchange of information can be worked out between Cadogan, USUN, British Embassy Washington and Department.

3. Bevin told me of June 3 telegram from British Embassy Cairo reporting call from Bernadotte to effect that Prime Minister Nokrashy Pasha is anxious for British Navy and Air Force to assist Bernadotte in securing observance terms truce. Bernadotte told British Ambassador that he had no objection in principle to this and asked Ambassador to put question urgently to Bevin. Later Nokrashy directly approached British Ambassador with same request.

4. Bevin said that although he was willing to think it over his first reaction to use Royal Navy and RAF is negative due to apprehensions that use British Navy and AF might give rise to demands from USSR to be included among military observers or otherwise.

5. I was advised later today by Michael Wright that further consideration in Foreign Office has led to conclusion, which Bevin and Attlee approved this afternoon, that this might turn into first formal request from mediator to HMG and that under terms SC Resolution HMG could not refuse to "give the greatest possible assistance to the United Nations mediator". Consequently Bernadotte will be told that if he makes formal request Bevin would be prepared to recommend to his colleagues that British aircraft and such vessels as might be necessary be put at the disposal of mediator to observe both sea and land frontiers Palestine with view to reporting to mediator any suspicious movements which might be designed to contravene terms truce.

¹ Not printed.

² This was a repeat of telegram 712 to Cairo, p. 1095.

So far as possible British sea and aircraft would carry members mediator's observer staff and in no circumstances would they stop vessels or engage in positive enforcement action. Their function would be to report only.

6. I note that final sentence Department's reftel envisages British aid along these lines to Bernadotte.

Sent Department 2482; repeated Baghdad 64, Cairo 82, Brussels 91, Paris 259, Moscow 93, Beirut 30, Damascus 34, Jidda 77, Jerusalem 80. Department please repeat Haifa and USUN.

DOUGLAS

501.BB Palestine/6-548: Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State

SECRET URGENT

NEW YORK, June 5, 1948—12:33 a. m.

753. The Secretariat, in the late afternoon of June 4, upon receiving the queries of Count Bernadotte regarding need for clarification of the SC May 29 resolution in respect to immigration, initially called a meeting of the SC for June 5. Secretariat officials agreed with El-Khouri's¹ view that neither he nor the SYG were competent to interpret the resolution. However, after some delay, and with the assistance of USUN, telephonic communication was established between Lake Success and Cairo, in which Cordier² expressed to Bunche the SYG's view that an SC meeting to interpret its resolution would lead to confusion rather than clarification.

Bunche reported that Arabs and Jews were not far apart in their position and apparently did not absolutely insist that the SC must define the terms of the resolution in minute detail. However, Bernadotte wished to be sure that he would not later be accused of preempting SC functions if he were to interpret the SC resolution as best he could. He also sought assurance that if he took a strong initiative he would not be accused of exceeding his role.

After consultation with El-Khouri, Cordier, on instructions from

¹ Faris el-Khouri, Syrian Representative at the United Nations and, at this time, President of the Security Council. During the proceedings of the Council on June 3, he announced that "The matter is already in the hands of the Mediator, who has the full confidence of the Security Council to understand and interpret the text of the resolution which he now has, in a way which he may deem to be correct.

"If that interpretation is challenged, the matter will then be submitted to the Security Council for further consideration. Then and only then would such a point as interpretation be discussed."

He concluded that the Mediator "should be given a free hand to act in accordance with the resolutions which he now has before him" (SC, 3rd yr., No. 79, p. 29).

² Andrew W. Cordier, Executive Assistant to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Lie, informed Bunche for Bernadotte that it was the view of the President of the SC and the SYG that the SC resolution basically meant that neither side should improve its military position during the cease fire and, as El-Khoury insisted on adding, the resolution did not prejudice the rights or position of either party. Bernadotte was also assured that it was the intention of the SC that he should have a free hand to bring about an end to the hostilities.

In presenting this opinion, the SYG was reinforced by the strong protest which Parodi had entered against an SC meeting to interpret the resolution.

Cordier informed USUN that Bunche was quite optimistic about the prospects of achieving a cease fire by Monday, June 7.

The Secretariat was informed by Bernadotte during the course of the telephone conversation that the 5 Swedish officers flying to Cairo on June 5 would be considered by him as members of his personal staff to be used in supervising the cease fire order. He expected the French, Belgian and American observers to have a somewhat different status as officers of members of the SCTC. Neither Bunche nor Bernadotte has mentioned the alleged request to the USSR to provide military observers.

Bunche informed Cordier that Bernadotte would probably ask for 3 or 4 naval patrol vessels, preferably neither British nor American, to patrol the Palestine and adjacent coasts.

AUSTIN

501.BB Palestine/6-648

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] June 6, 1948.

Participants:	Mr. Beeley, U.K. Delegation	Mr. McClintock, UNA
	Mr. Allen, British Embassy	Mr. Kopper, NEA
	Mr. Bromley, British Embassy	Mr. Merriam, NE
		Mr. Wilkins, NE
	Mr. Henderson, NEA	Mr. Mattison, NE
	Mr. Satterthwaite, NEA	
	Mr. Villard, S/P	

Mr. Beeley called at his request for the purpose of having an informal and personal exchange of views on the current situation in Palestine and the future possibilities.

Principal points made by Mr. Beeley were:

1) It was considered of highest importance that the British and United States Governments keep "in step" on the Palestine question and avoid giving an appearance of disunity to the outside world.

¹ Drafted by Mr. Mattison.

2) That the cooperation in the last two weeks had been heartening. The British on their side had put extreme pressure on the Arab States to accede to the May 29 resolution. This pressure had been successful largely due to the reservoir of good will which the British had built up with the Arab States because of their attitude vis-à-vis the Palestine question.

3) The British, in obtaining Arab consent had made commitments with regard to their interpretation of the crucial question of immigration, particularly with regard to men of military age on Cyprus. They hoped that we would support them in their interpretation should the question be raised in the Security Council.

4) That as far as an eventual settlement of the Palestine problem went, the British believed that it might be possible to secure Arab acquiescence to the establishment of a Jewish State if there were boundary modifications particularly in the Negeb. This would enable the Arab countries to have a land bridge between their capitals. A Jewish State lying across their lines of communication had been one of the chief causes of concern to the Arab leaders.

5) That the British Government would not easily give up the idea of a Federal State, which they regarded as the most practical solution.

In reply to Mr. Beeley's points, I made the following personal observations:

1) That in my opinion the position of the United States Government was such that it could not support any measure which did not provide for the establishment of a Jewish State substantially along the lines envisaged in the November 29 resolution. The Jews had, in fact, a state, and we had recognized it. We would probably follow a policy of continuing to recognize it unless the Zionists of their own accord merged it into some other entity.

2) If territorial modifications were proposed, such as the Negeb, we might find it necessary to ask for a *quid pro quo* such as the cession of Western Gallilee to the Jewish State. In any event, modifications would have to be acquiesced in by the Jews.

3) That with respect to point 3 which we substantially concurred with the British interpretation of the resolution, we wished to avoid if possible debate on that subject in the Security Council, and preferred to have Count Bernadotte rule on the question.

I also took occasion to raise with Mr. Beeley the question as to the attitude of the British Government in the event that a settlement was reached which gave southern Palestine to the Arabs. Would it be to their strategic advantage to have the Arab territory ceded to Abdullah? Mr. Beeley felt that it would be of definite strategic value, because of the possible port development at Gaza. As things stood at present, the British had no land connection from the sea to Transjordan.

I also asked Mr. Beeley what he thought the British attitude would be in the following circumstances: If warfare should continue in Palestine, it might become necessary for the United States to lift its arms embargo. With immigration and arms it was quite likely that the Jews would win. Extremist elements might push on into Transjordan

(raids have already occurred into Transjordan). What would be the British reaction to such attacks? Mr. Beeley replied that the British Government would have no alternative under its treaty with Transjordan but to repulse such attacks.

501.BB Palestine/6-548 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt

CONFIDENTIAL US URGENT WASHINGTON, June 6, 1948—7 p. m.
NIACT

728. Dept expects final clearance assignment 21 officers (7 each from Army, Air Force and Navy Departments) by Defense Department Monday morning June 7. Officers are expected to depart by air for Cairo on June 7 or June 8. Army and Air Force Officers are being selected in European theatre and will leave from there. Navy officers are being selected in US and will leave from here. Officers will be accompanied by minimum transportation for use in Palestine such as planes and jeeps. Balance of needs will be determined following arrival in Near East and discussion with Count Bernadotte regarding availability from local sources such as British Army Palestine. (Embtel 685 June 5¹)

Dept will telegraph names and rank of all officers as soon as available. Each officer will be supplied as soon as possible with diplomatic passport indicating assignment as "Military Observer attached to the United Nations Mediator for Palestine and the Security Council Truce Commission for Palestine". If time permits Dept will secure Egyptian visas in Washington. If not Dept requests you obtain Egyptian visas in Cairo as well as visas for such other Arab states as may be needed.

Dept is repeating this message to AmEmbassies Brussels and Paris for info FonOff. Dept requests that these missions urge Belgian and French Governments each to contribute 21 officers as requested by Count Bernadotte and point out how important it is to maintain presently existing balance in Truce Commission during this critical period.²

¹ Not printed.

² The Department, on June 8, informed Cairo that the "Naval observer team to assist Count Bernadotte and Security Council Truce Commission, composed of five naval officers and two marine officers, will leave by air today at 1300 hours for Cairo." They were instructed to "report to United Nations Mediator, Count Bernadotte, through intermediary of American Chargé d'Affaires, American Embassy, Cairo. Likewise instructed to report as occasion warrants to US Member of Security Council Truce Commission in Jerusalem or elsewhere; and to American Consulate—Haifa, American Special Representative—Tel Aviv (when established), and American Missions—Beirut, Damascus, Baghdad, Jidda, as occasion warrants." (Telegram 739, 501.BB Palestine/6-848)

Count Bernadotte informed Chargé Patterson, on June 9, that "he had in conversation yesterday with Prime Minister Nokrashy Pasha obtained latter's full assent to entry into Egypt of American, Belgian and French military and naval personnel for purposes of implementing proposed Palestine truce." (Telegram 710 from Cairo, 501.BB Palestine/6-948)

Sent to Cairo, Brussels and Paris for action; repeated to Baghdad, Haifa, Beirut, Damascus, Jerusalem, Jidda and USUN (New York) for info.

MARSHALL

Editorial Note

Count Bernadotte, on June 7, sent a note to the Arab states and to the Provisional Government of Israel in which he gave formal notice that he had fixed June 11, 6 a. m., GMT, as the date and hour for the cessation of all acts of armed force in Palestine for a period of four weeks. He requested that notification of acceptance or rejection of his proposal to be in his hands not later than June 9, noon, GMT. Embodied in paragraph numbered 6 of the note were his nine interpretations of the Security Council resolution. The second of these read as follows: "As regards men of military age, the Mediator shall exercise his discretion during the period of the truce in determining whether men of military age are represented among immigrants in such numbers as to give one side a military advantage if their entry is permitted, and in such event shall refuse them entry. Should men of military age be introduced in numbers necessarily limited by the application of the foregoing principle, they are to be kept in camps during the period of the truce under the surveillance of observers of the Mediator, and shall not be mobilized in the armed forces or given military or paramilitary training during such period."

For the full text of Count Bernadotte's note, see SC, 3rd yr., *Supplement for June 1948*, page 81.

501.BB Palestine/6-748

Memorandum by Mr. Robert M. McClintock to the Chief of the Shipping Division (Saugstad)

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] June 7, 1948.

I attach a copy of the resolution adopted by the United Nations Security Council on May 29, looking toward a cessation of hostilities and a four-weeks' cease-fire in Palestine. You will note that Article 3 of this resolution reads as follows:

"Calls upon all Governments and authorities concerned to undertake that they will not introduce fighting personnel into Palestine, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Transjordan and Yemen during the cease fire."

The adoption of the Security Council's resolution imposes an obligation on this government as a member of the Council and the United Nations for its strict compliance. UNA would appreciate your courtesy in drawing the attention of American shipping companies which trade to Palestine to the provisions of the resolution as cited above, and informally to urge these companies to refrain from carrying any passengers who might be considered as "fighting personnel" from American ports to Palestine during the period of the cease-fire. Although the United Nations Mediator, Count Bernadotte, has not yet given a definition of the term "fighting personnel", it would seem prudent for American shipping companies to regard any male of military age traveling to Palestine as potential fighting personnel unless the person in question can prove conclusively that his journey to Palestine is intended for an exclusively civilian pursuit and that appropriate safeguards will be offered to ensure that he will not become available to increase the military potential of the country to which he is bound.

You will note that the same requirements apply also to persons who might possibly constitute "fighting personnel" destined for the Arab countries of the Near East, and similar precautions should be used by American shipping companies with respect to passengers for Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Transjordan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Yemen.

For purposes of coordination, NE (Mr. Gordon Mattison) will have general supervision over controls of the nature outlined above.

501.BB Palestine/6-748 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt

SECRET US URGENT

WASHINGTON, June 7, 1948—6 p. m.

733. At SC meeting on Palestine this afternoon Gromyko formally indicated willingness of his govt to participate in supplying military observers under Paragraph 7 of SC resolution May 29. Prior to Council meeting Soviet Representative made similar statement to press.

It is obvious that Gromyko cannot secure favorable SC action on his suggestion since a motion to broaden representation of govts supplying military observers would certainly not receive necessary seven affirmative votes.

You are authorized informally to impart foregoing view to Bernadotte and to add that our attitude as to proper composition of military

observer teams remains as set forth in our 712, June 3 and 357, June 3, to USUN, repeated Cairo as 706.

Repeated to USUN as 368, London as 2118, Paris as 1980, Brussels as 872, Moscow as 641.¹

MARSHALL

¹ The Department's views were conveyed orally to Count Bernadotte on June 9. The Mediator commented that "he adhered to view that military observers should be supplied by members of Truce Commission only, namely, Belgium, France and US." (Telegram 712, June 9, 5 p. m., from Cairo, 501.BB Palestine/6-948)

501.BB Palestine/6-248 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 7, 1948—8 p. m.

2122. Question raised urtel 2419 June 2 re emigration Palestine Jewish DP's in US Zone Germany has recently been under discussion by Dept and Army. As result, Am military authorities Germany notified May 28 by State-Army that no action should be taken authorizing emigration until (1) U.S. military authorities Germany have received official notification from provisional govt Israel as to officials designated arrange resettlement Jewish DP's in Israel and (2) current UN Security Council endeavors to arrange cease fire and truce are concluded. Also requested no public statement be made this subj and no action taken until further instructions from Washington.

State-Army now considering question further instructions. Repeated to Baghdad as 194, Cairo as 735, Beirut as 311, Jidda as 223, Paris as 1991, Berlin as 1001, U.S. UN as 369.

MARSHALL

867N.01/6-848 : Telegram

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Provisional Government of Israel (Shertok) to the Secretary of State

TEL AVIV, June 8, 1948.

MH 334. Your undoubted sympathy with constructive resettlement and rehabilitation of Jewish victims of Nazi persecution in State of Israel concurrent with utmost development of Israel's economic resources for future peace and prosperity of Palestine and Middle East encourages us to solicit your favourable consideration of application of provisional government of Israel to Import and Export Bank of

USA for loan of \$100 million.¹ This loan is intended to facilitate productive absorption of large numbers of refugees in Israel and to promote country's agricultural and industrial development as well as to finance housing schemes and alleviation of temporary supply of shortages caused by present emergency conditions. Application is based on sound schemes of investment and economic development and bulk of loan will be self-liquidating.

We believe that record of Jewish development in Palestine in last 25 years in teeth of far-reaching disabilities imposed by outside tutelage is reliable indication of constructive potentialities of independence now gained and consequently of credit-worthiness of our state. We sincerely hope that your favourable consideration will enable us to obtain this measure of assistance for carrying through a programme of reconstruction based on our self-reliant effort and clear undertaking of complete repayment.

Awaiting your reply at your earliest convenience either direct or through our special representative Washington.

MOSHE SHERTOK

¹ In identical letters of May 21 to Senator James E. Murray and Representative Emanuel Celler, the Secretary of State wrote: "During the past three years informal conversations have taken place on several occasions with regard to various types of financial and economic assistance for Palestine and other countries of the Near East. These informal conversations were generally an integral part of parallel conversations with regard to such proposals as the report of the Anglo-American Committee and the discussions of the Cabinet Committee on Palestine. No proposals have thus far been made by the State of Israel with regard to the granting of a loan by the United States." (867N.01/5-1248)

867N.01/6-848 : Telegram

The Vice Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

JERUSALEM, June 8, 1948—1 p. m.

872. From conversations in Amman Consulate General officer gained distinct impression that Transjordan at least desires see end to present hostilities. During interview June 3 King Abdullah indicated it would still be possible for Arabs Jews live together Palestine. Said he did not hate Jews did not wish make war on them and stated that war had been forced on him by Arab League which had placed entire responsibility on him.

After interview Sherif Husein Nasser, King's son-in-law, former Iraqi Consul General in Jerusalem and now on loan from Iraqi Government as Abdullah's Rais El Diwan, asked Consulate General officer remain for further talk. Said he spoke not as official of King's house-

hold but as member King's family. Stated King had never wished to make war on Jews, that it had been forced on him by Arab League and that King would be glad see it come to an end. Abdallah realized strength of Jews and did not wish risk losing his army which would mean end of King's present strong position vis-à-vis other Arab States. Sherif Nasser spoke almost pleadingly as appealing for way to be found out of war which would permit King save face and honor. He indicated that acceptance of SC truce resolution was due in fact to pressure exerted by King.

Further talks with many persons in Amman including Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, Kirkbride, Glubb and others in and out of government circles indicated feeling exists that war has gone on long enough, that it could not possibly end in victory for Arabs and that time works in favor Jews. Various persons pointed to fact that Arab Legion which is admittedly best Arab army in field has not yet attempted any large scale operation against Jews in Jewish territory. Jerusalem operation was relatively small and simple. Operations at Latrun have resulted in no gains by either side although Jerusalem-Tel Aviv road still blocked. British officers Arab Legion appear to be proceeding cautiously to avoid risking any major engagement with Jews.

It also of interest that King has appointed Ibrahim Hashem Pasha as Governor Arab areas occupied by Arab troops. He former Transjordan Prime Minister and supporter of partition of Palestine as proposed by Peel Comm. He still believed be pro-partition.

Another factor which may influence continued course of war is open reappearance of rivalry between Hashemites on one hand and Syria, Saudi Arabia and possibly Lebanon on other. This rivalry was apparent in Arab League political commission meetings in Amman last week (Beirut's 46 June 3, 2 [1] p. m.¹). Former Under Secretary Transjordan Foreign Office Abdel Moneim Rifai, who still close to Transjordan political adviser, told Consulate General officer he believed Arab war effort would be considerably weakened by return of undercurrent of dissension which will make common front on Palestine more difficult. Lack Arab military successes will also serve increase bitter feelings among Arab States.

In summary Consulate General officer found widespread desire among persons who responsible for conduct Transjordanian affairs to see end to war if honorable way out involving no loss prestige could be found for Transjordan.

Department please pass London, Arab Capitals.

BURDETT

¹This was a repeat of telegram 237 from Beirut, not printed, but see editorial note, p. 1085.

501.BB Palestine/6-748 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt*SECRET US URGENT
NIACT

WASHINGTON, June 8, 1948—5 p. m.

740. For your info we are most favorably impressed by note whose text was reproduced in your Niac 692, June 7,¹ and you may tell Bernadotte that we feel his approach to the parties is both statesman-like and firm. Other missions to which this telegram is repeated are authorized if occasion warrants to inform govts and authorities to which accredited of the foregoing view and to add that we very much hope that Count Bernadotte's cease-fire proposal will be unconditionally accepted by noon GMT, June 9.

British Embassy has just informed us that a telegram dated June 6 has been received from British Ambassador, Cairo, indicating that American Chargé d'Affaires at Cairo had stated he had not yet informed Bernadotte of our interpretation of Articles 3 and 4 of SC resolution, May 29. This interpretation was set forth in Deptel 2015, May 31, to London, repeated to Cairo as 682. Although you were authorized by Deptel 690, June 1,² to inform Count Bernadotte of our interpretation of these two articles it would seem now, in light of satisfactory interpretation contained in Bernadotte's note as reported your Niac 692, June 7, that it may not be necessary to give Bernadotte our views on this point. We feel in particular that interpretation set forth in sixth paragraph of his note is reasonable and should be accepted by both sides. In essence his view regarding men of military age accords with our own: namely, that there should be no increase in military potential during period of cease-fire.³

Repeated to London as 2129, Paris as 1997, Brussels as 878, USUN as 371, Jerusalem as 556, Haifa as 120, Beirut as 315, Damascus as 214, Baghdad as 198, Jidda as 225.

MARSHALL

¹ Not printed; it transmitted the text of Count Bernadotte's note of June 7 to the Arab states and the Provisional Government of Israel, with the request that it be passed to the United Nations (501.BB Palestine/6-748). For summary, see editorial note, p. 1102.

² This was a repeat of 350 to New York, June 1, p. 1086.

³ The Department, on June 8, conveyed to the Consulate at Haifa a message from Mr. Eban to Foreign Minister Shertok which stated that "Washington" regarded the Mediator's proposals as reasonable and assumed that he would exercise his discretion fairly and equitably. The message also advised of the hope of the United States that both parties would accept a cease-fire on these bases. Mr. Eban had requested the United States Delegation at the United Nations to use its good offices to see that his message was communicated immediately to Mr. Shertok because of his uncertain communications facilities with Tel Aviv (telegram 123, 501.BB Palestine/6-848).

883.801/6-948 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, June 9, 1948—6 p. m.

759. Reurtels 586 May 22,¹ 637 May 30,² Port Said Consulate A-76 May 17.³ Dept concurs your view Egyptian Govt committed under International Convention of 1888, Suez Canal, to recognize that the Suez Canal "shall always be free and open, in time of war as in time of peace to every vessel of commerce or of war" and that "high contracting parties agree not in any way interfere with the free use of the Canal, in time of war as in time of peace" (Art I). Further Art IV provides that no "act having for its object to obstruct the free navigation of the Canal, shall be permitted in the Canal and its ports of access". Dept's view that provisions of 1888 Convention apply to vessels in ports of access if vessels in process of transit through Canal, and without regard to ultimate destination of goods.

Dept considers that Art X 1888 Convention empowers Egypt to take certain steps in order secure defense of Egypt and maintenance of public order, but that purposes present action have no relation either of these factors. Moreover, although US is not party to 1888 Convention, that instrument by its terms, to which parties thereto have obligated themselves, is applicable to shipping of all nations including US. Emb requested to convey these views informally to Egypt Govt. Keep Brit and French colleagues informed.⁴

MARSHALL

¹Not printed; it stated that Egyptian search of vessels had thus far been confined to coastwise shipping (883.00/5-2248).

²Not printed; it reported that a British freighter transiting the Canal with a British-owned cargo of flour bound for Palestine had been ordered to discharge its cargo by the Egyptian Government. It also conveyed a statement by an Egyptian spokesman that all Palestine-bound cargoes would be confiscated (883.801/5-3048).

³Not printed; it advised that the Egyptian Director of Customs had issued a circular letter requiring the production of manifests covering all goods on vessels arriving at Port Said and that no vessels would be permitted to depart unless the manifests were presented. It also reported press reports that customs authorities would confiscate all cargo destined for Palestine (883.801/5-1748).

⁴This telegram was repeated to London and Paris. The Department, on June 18, instructed Cairo to inform the Egyptian Government that "US Govt adheres to its previous position regarding Egypt Govt's memorandum calling attention to danger to ships of friendly countries in approaching Palestinian coastline. US Govt does not consider as satisfactory or in conformance with international law and usage arguments advanced by Egypt Govt in support of memorandum, and will hold Egypt Govt responsible for any acts attributable to agencies of that Govt which may result in interference with, or injury to, American interests." (Telegram 827, 501.BB Palestine/6-1848) Damascus, the same day, was requested to make similar representations to the Syrian Government. (Telegram 235, 890D.00/6-948)

501.BB Palestine/6-348

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson) to the Director of the Office of Transport and Communications (Radius)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] June 10, 1948.

DEAR MR. RADIUS: We have given careful study to your memorandum of June 3¹ regarding possible effects of the present policy regarding exports of aircraft and components upon U.S. aviation interests in the Middle East.

Unfortunately, we feel that it would be impossible in the present international and domestic situation for us to make exceptions in the application of the arms embargo which would permit the shipment of aircraft or aircraft parts to Egypt or any other Arab country. If we should make exceptions of this kind, the United States might well be charged with violating the resolution of the Security Council on which the present truce is based.

We deeply regret any injury which our policies with regard to Palestine might be having on U.S. aviation interests in the Middle East. As you are aware, our policies are injuring a number of American interests in the Middle East. This fact, however, does not seem to warrant a changing of our policies.

LOY W. HENDERSON

P.S. We have evidence that leads us to hope that the British are going to adopt our definition of arms, ammunition, and implements of war and accordingly include civil aircraft under their embargo.

¹Not printed; it noted Mr. Radius' understanding that "the present policy toward the export of aircraft and aircraft parts . . . involves a refusal to license any export of aviation materiel for use on civil aircraft which might conceivably be employed in operations supporting the present conflict in Palestine." The memorandum then set forth as major objectives of United States aviation policy toward the Middle East the promotion of the sale of American aircraft and equipment and the breaking down "the policy of certain Arab League states, notably Egypt, involving the application of severe restrictions on the way in which international civil aviation operations may be conducted." After citing the applications made by two Middle East airlines for spare parts to keep their aircraft in operation, Mr. Radius recommended that "serious consideration be given to the effects of our present policy upon our aviation interests in the Middle East and that if it is considered desirable . . . the policy be relaxed" (501.BB Palestine/6-348).

For documentation on the efforts by the United States in 1945 to conclude civil air transport agreements with various governments of the Middle East, see *Foreign Relations*, 1945, vol. VIII, pp. 64 ff.

501.BB Palestine/6-1148: Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to All Diplomatic Offices

SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 11, 1948—1 a. m.

[The circular telegram begins with a reference to the resolution of May 29 by the Security Council and a quoting of paragraphs 1 and 4 and a summary of paragraph 6 of that resolution.]

State of Israel and Arab States have accepted cease fire order¹ and time for commencement of truce is June 11, 1948, 6 a. m., GMT.

US has had in effect since November 14, 1947, an embargo on arms shipments to Arab States and Palestine.² US also revoked outstanding export licenses for arms destined to these areas as of that date.

This Govt considers these clauses May 29 Resolution of SC to be binding upon all members of UN and to require that all members take necessary steps to prevent shipments war material to Palestine and Arab States as of effective date of truce. Accordingly US will continue its embargo on arms to all areas referred to in Resolution utilizing existing governmental control machinery over arms, ammunition, and implements of war as defined in President's Proclamation. (See *Federal Register*, March 27, 1948, Vol. 13, No. 61, Page 1623.)

Dept desires to be informed of any preparations made by the Government to which you are accredited for imposition of embargo on war material to affected areas. You should ascertain through informal friendly inquiries or in any manner you consider feasible the measures which Government to which you are accredited takes to prevent shipment war material to areas concerned. In this connection you may call to attention of foreign government procedures adopted by US Govt to implement resolution in this respect and, if in your opinion it would be helpful, furnish list of items contained President's Proclamation.

Dept should be informed of any information concerning foregoing as soon as it becomes available. In addition, Dept should be advised of any shipment war material which appears to be inconsistent with terms of SC Resolution.

With respect to States not members of UN attention is invited to Article 2 (6) of Charter of UN. While no specific steps have been taken by UN to insure that non-members adhere to resolution, Dept is desirous of being advised of extent of adherence of such governments or

¹ Arab and Israeli unconditional acceptances were made on June 9. Egyptian Prime Minister Nokrashy's communication to Count Bernadotte did so on behalf of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Lebanon. Israel, Yemen, Iraq, and Trans-jordan sent their acceptances in individual communications to the Mediator. The texts of the five messages are printed in SC, *3rd yr., Supplement for June 1948*, pp. 85, 88, and 89.

² See telegram Telmar 42, December 6, 1947, to London, *Foreign Relations*, 1947, vol. v, p. 1300.

acts by such governments or persons under their jurisdiction which appear inconsistent with the terms of the SC resolution.

Repeat this telegram or paraphrase thereof to consular offices within your jurisdiction.³

MARSHALL

³ Lancelot Pyman, Assistant Head of the Eastern Department in the British Foreign Office, informed an Embassy officer that the circular telegram of June 11 was a "welcome action". He noted that his Government had begun a partial arms embargo in December 1947, although this action was not made public until February 4. He noted further that the British military had initiated a total arms embargo on May 31 and that the Ministry of Supply and the Board of Trade had done the same the following day through their controls over the sales of surplus property and exports. He advised also that the British Government had been subjected to considerable criticism in the Middle East for these actions and that Iraq and Egypt had objected strongly (telegram 2656, June 16, 7 p. m., from London, 501.BB Palestine/6-1648).

501.BB Palestine/6-1248 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Jerusalem

SECRET US URGENT
 NIACT

WASHINGTON, June 12, 1948—1 p. m.

587. Please obtain urgently from Bernadotte who we understand is now in Jerusalem clarification of use which he would like to make of 3 vessels suitable for coastal patrol service requested in his letter June 10 to US Emb Cairo.¹

Important that we have as much detailed info as he may be able to give re intended use these vessels. In particular we would like to know whether he contemplates that officers and crews will engage in boarding and searching other vessels or whether these vessels are merely to be used by observers as means of transport.² Cairo or Haifa should take action if he should happen to be in one those cities.

Sent Jerusalem as Depts 587 rptd Cairo as Depts 779 Haifa as Depts 139, and USUN New York as Depts 389.

MARSHALL

¹ Summarized by Cairo in telegram 729, June 11, 3 p. m., not printed (501.BB Palestine/6-1148).

² Haifa replied, on June 13, as follows: "Count Bernadotte states that vessels are to be used only for patrol purposes, giving warning of the approach of any shipping. The officers and crew will not engage in boarding and search. The vessels may be used for water transportation of observers." (Telegram 149, 501.BB Palestine/6-1348)

New York, on June 11, transmitted a message from Secretary-General Lie embodying an urgent request from Count Bernadotte for three small planes and crews to carry his personnel quickly to any part of the truce area (telegram 773, 501.BB Palestine/6-1148). Mr. McClintock, in a marginal notation, advised that he had arranged with the Air Force on June 11 to send two C-45's from Germany to Cairo and had spoken with the Navy about the loan of a Navy plane.

501.BB Palestine/6-1348 : Telegram

The Vice Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

US URGENT NIACT

JERUSALEM, June 13, 1948.

908. Following message was communicated at 2100 hours local to-night to Jewish authorities in Jerusalem by Truce Commission and Count Bernadotte's special representative in Jerusalem.

"The Truce Commission and Colonel Brunsson,¹ special representative of Count Bernadotte, have carefully considered the question of Jewish convoys to Jerusalem. They feel such convoys must be checked at Bab el Wad in order to insure effective control. Until further notice the Jewish authorities are requested to stop all vehicles before they reach Bab el Wad. If any vehicles pass Bab el Wad before clearance by representatives of the mediator, the Truce Commission and Colonel Brunsson consider that the Jewish authorities will bear full responsibility for any resulting breach of the cease-fire agreement."²

BURDETT

¹ Nils Brunsson, Personal Representative of Count Bernadotte at Jerusalem and Chief Military Observer in that city.

² The Truce Commission, on June 14, sent a further communication to Dr. Bernard Joseph, the Israeli head of the Jerusalem Emergency Committee, fixing a deadline of 8 p. m. that night for accepting establishment of the check-point. Mr. Burdett reported that "Five minutes before deadline Joseph notified Commission he agreed on own responsibility and in absence instructions from Tel Aviv to establishment Bab El Wad check post. Added he assumed no responsibility for safety observers and that in event his decision countermanded by Tel Aviv, check point would have to be evacuated." (Telegram 918, June 14, from Jerusalem, 501.BB Palestine/6-1448)

501.BB Palestine/6-1448

*Memorandum of Telephone Conversations, by Mr. Robert M.
McClintock*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] June 14, 1948.

In conversation with Dr. Jessup on Friday, June 11, he said that consideration had been given in the Mission to Gromyko's rather plaintive remark to Dr. Jessup on the 10th, that all the USSR wished with regard to participating in the sending of military observers to Palestine was a very small representation on Count Bernadotte's staff of observers.¹ Senator Austin and Dr. Jessup had been turning over in their minds whether it might not in fact be useful for the United States to agree to the Soviet Union sending a few military observers to Palestine and the Near East.

Today Mr. John Ross, Deputy to Senator Austin, inquired what the Department's reaction to this suggestion was.

¹ Mr. Jessup's memorandum covering this conversation is filed under 501.BB Palestine/6-1048.

I told Mr. Ross what I had told Dr. Jessup on Friday. I thought that we could not at all rely upon Mr. Gromyko's promises that the Soviet Representation would be kept to a minimum. One could not exclude the possibility that, if the United States had three patrol vessels off the Palestine coast, the Russians would ask for three destroyers to be sent there also. Furthermore—and this I regarded as very important—we had taken a firm position from the outset on limiting the military observers to be provided from the governments represented on the Truce Commission. We had got Count Bernadotte to accede to this view and had made it stick with Mr. Bevin. I thought, in consequence, that it would be unfortunate for us now to wobble.

I told Mr. Ross that other officers in the Department shared the foregoing views and that, in consequence, I did not feel that we should accede to Gromyko's suggestion.²

² Mr. Gromyko, on June 15, submitted a draft resolution to the Security Council providing that the military observers attached to the Mediator's staff be appointed by Member States of the Security Council, except for Syria; for text, see SC, *3rd yr., No. 84*, p. 8. Only the Soviet Union and the Ukraine voted for the resolution. The remaining nine members abstained and the resolution failed of adoption, *ibid.*, p. 11.

501.BB Palestine/6-1448: Telegram

The Vice Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

JERUSALEM, June 14, 1948—2 p. m.

913. During meeting with Count Bernadotte June 12, Dr. Joseph of Jewish Agency stated Jewish authorities unable assume responsibility for "dissident" elements in Jerusalem. Assured Bernadotte his representatives would receive every possible protection and assistance but with above reservations. At meeting June 13 with Truce Commission Joseph stressed importance of proper permits for observers and advisability their always being accompanied by Haganah officers while within Jewish areas. He again pointed out inability authorities to control Stern and Irgun effectively in Jerusalem.

[Here follows one paragraph dealing with the question of Soviet espionage activities in Palestine and Lebanon.]

BURDETT

501.BB Palestine/6-1548

*Memorandum by the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Kennan)
to the Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] June 15, 1948.

MR. SECRETARY: After further study we have concluded, and Mr. Lovett agrees, that no useful purpose would be served by placing the

Palestine question before the NSC at this juncture for a decision of principle.

For the moment, responsibility for seeking a settlement lies with Bernadotte. Until he reports to the UN (which is hardly likely in less than two weeks) on the results of his efforts to mediate between the parties, the UN Security Council will have no major decision to take, unless the cease-fire should be broken.

Work has been put in hand for a study of the alternative courses we would have before us if the cease-fire should be broken or if Bernadotte is not able to achieve a settlement.

The matter is not on the agenda for this week's meeting of the NSC.¹

G. F. KENNAN

¹ This memorandum was initialed by the Secretary of State.

867N.01/6-1548

The Chargé in Egypt (Patterson) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL
No. 503

CAIRO, June 15, 1948.

SIR: I have the honor to forward herewith as of possible interest a memorandum of a short conversation ¹ between Azzam Pasha, Secretary General of the Arab League, and Secretary Ireland relative to Palestine questions.

It may be observed that Azzam Pasha, in common with many Arab leaders, is probably more optimistic concerning the military achievements of the Arab states than the facts merit and that he, therefore, quite apart from any political motives, stresses beyond reality the military advantages lost by the Arabs in accepting the truce. On the other hand, it would appear that the activities of the Arab Legion, particularly at Jerusalem, and their stout resistance between Latrun and Wadibab, and that the advances made by the Arab troops surprised even the most realistic of the military leaders of the Arabs, to the extent that the various reverses and failures to achieve original objectives as in the north are now forgotten. Nevertheless, according to several independent observers the initial initiative of the Arabs at Jerusalem is not likely to be regained, should fighting be renewed after the truce, so that the Arabs have in reality lost military advantage, which is balanced by the fact that the truce came in time to save the Arab Legion from impending ammunition shortage. It must also

¹ Dated June 14, not printed.

be pointed out that the military communiques, usually couched in extravagant terms, together with eulogistic comments thereon by the press have greatly stimulated the Arab masses to believe in the invincible quality of their troops.

In his conversation Azzam Pasha did not go into detail as to the reason why the Arabs accepted the truce beyond the fear of being labelled aggressors, a reversal of an earlier attitude (Embassy's telegram No. 471, May 5²). It has been reliably learned, however, that in addition to their reason Abdullah's insistence on a truce, supported by Egypt and Iraq, turned the tide against the demands of Lebanon, Syria and Saudi Arabia that fighting continue. Tewfik Abdul Hoda Pasha, Transjordan Prime Minister, is authoritatively related to have silenced the Syrian demands that truce be rejected, with the argument-ending statement "I suppose you Syrians want to fight the war in Palestine to the last Transjordanian". Thus while Transjordanians' desire for a truce, augmented by the shortness of supplies of ammunition calculated on June 10 to exist in seven days supply and by Abdullah's desire not to fritter away his army, his principal defense against his antagonists in the Arab world, it would also appear that the British pressure exerted at Amman and at Cairo also greatly influenced Arab acceptance of the truce.

One interesting detail, which cannot be fitted into the picture of negotiations for the truce as usually reported, is the statement made to Secretary Ireland by Mr. Ralph Bunche, of the staff of Count Folke Bernadotte, that Count Bernadotte had received notes, about June 5 or 6, from the Lebanon, Syrian, Saudi Arabian and Yemeni Governments stating that Egyptian representatives had been authorized to act on behalf of these governments in consultations with him. In view of the role played by the representatives of the individual countries in agreeing to a truce and in subsequent conversations in the Arab League Committee meeting here it would appear that these notes are no longer effective. On the other hand should Mr. Bunche's account of the existence of these notes be accurate it would seem to point to a grouping of Arab states under the egis of Egypt against the Hashimis and to contradict a rumor current in some circles that Saudi Arabia and Egypt have recently been drawing apart in their foreign policy.

Azzam Pasha's expressed pessimism as to final results to be achieved by Count Bernadotte may also be of interest to the Department. His further views as the period of truce progress draws to a close will be reported as they become available.

Respectfully yours,

JEFFERSON PATTERSON

² Not printed, but see footnote 1, p. 916.

501.BB Palestine/6-1148: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 16, 1948—5 p. m.

799. (1) We have no objection to detail by British of a few officers to assist Count Bernadotte in a technical capacity with regard to conditions in Palestine and have so indicated to British Embassy here, which on June 14 gave us information identical to that set forth in your 759, June 14, 6 p. m.¹

(2) Dept will today formally request Secretary of Defense for loan of 3 destroyers for patrol purposes as requested by Bernadotte in your telegram 729, June 11, 3 p. m.² Conditions under which vessels will be made available to Bernadotte form subject of separate telegram.

(3) As indicated Deptel 771, June 11,³ once Bernadotte is established on Rhodes and has direct communication with Lake Success, we will look to Secretary General to be main channel of communications between us and Bernadotte. However, if Col. Bonde⁴ remains in charge of military observer group with headquarters in Cairo we shall expect him to use Embassy, Cairo, as main line of communications with Dept.

[Here follows paragraph numbered 4, which evaluated a member of Count Bernadotte's staff.]

Repeated to USUN as 399, London as 2246.

MARSHALL

¹ Not printed. The message stated that "British detailed to Bernadotte few officers experienced in Palestine to act in a technical capacity in orienting UN observers, most of whom had no Palestine experience. Such technical officers could, for example, advise observers concerning the geography of a given area, the existence or nonexistence of airports, et cetera. They would in no event enter Palestine" (501.BB Palestine/6-1448).

² Not printed; see footnote 1, p. 1111.

³ Not printed.

⁴ Thorde Bonde, a Swedish army officer and Chief of Staff to Count Bernadotte. He informed Chargé Patterson that the Mediator's civilian secretariat would for the most part have its headquarters on Rhodes and would have to do with making peace. Colonel Bonde also informed the Chargé that the Cairo group, headed by himself, would be concerned with implementing the cease-fire and truce agreement and assuring that its provisions were not violated (telegram 759 from Cairo).

501.BB Palestine/6-1648: Telegram

The Chargé in Egypt (Patterson) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

CAIRO, June 16, 1948—11 p. m.

778. Count Bernadotte expressed himself to Ireland tonight as "reasonably encouraged" by progress in talks yesterday and today and at friendly, even conciliatory, attitude of Arab League POL Committee and of liaison subcommittee set up to work with him consisting of Egyptian Prime Minister Nokrashi Pasha, Lebanese Prime Minister

Al Sulh, Transjordan Prime Minister Abdul Hoda and Azzam Pasha. Bernadotte made no propositions but heard Arab complaints at violations truce which Bunche characterized as less violent than expected, and drew out by questions Arab views on future settlement. He has not yet proposed Arab-Jewish conference Rhodes but in response to suggestion that League might designate experts at working level to go Rhodes to supply detailed and technical knowledge for assistance his formulation proposals for settlement. Azzam Pasha named four in League note dated June 16. Those named are Abdul Moniem Mustafa, Egyptian Foreign Office and seconded to POL Section AL, Henri Cattan and Ahmad al Shukeri, lawyers of Palestine, and Abdul Rahman al Falahi, Iraqi Foreign Office.

Bernadotte and party go June 17 to Tel Aviv to hold similar conversations with Israelis.

Mediator reported by Bunche as encouraged by fact for first time since June 11 no violations truce reported today. Question convoys to Jerusalem still resolved [*unresolved?*] but in view necessity to move food and supplies to Jerusalem, UN will be asked tonight to expedite 50 additional guards to accompany convoys and to guard munitions and petrol dumps.

Arab League yesterday set up own report on observance truce consisting Arab consuls Palestine under chairmanship Takhiddin Solh. Arabs leaders here impressed with sincerity and integrity Bernadotte but regard prospects of acceptable solution as slight. It may be observed, however, that membership liaison subcommittee represents most moderate and conciliatory Arab leaders and should guarantee, notwithstanding Azzam's declaration today that solutions involving partition or Jewish State would be rejected, consideration of reasonable compromise proposals.

Paraphrase to Arab capitals.

PATTERSON

Clifford Papers

Memorandum by the President's Special Counsel (Clifford)

[WASHINGTON?,] June 17, 1948.

PALESTINE

Are there any technical obstacles to asking full action rather than temporary, tentative or provisional action such as we have taken to date?

(1) *Exchange of full diplomatic representatives.*

Several weeks ago Loy Henderson proposed to Eliahu Epstein that he ask his Government to request of our government an exchange of full diplomatic representatives; Henderson said that the United

States would undoubtedly take action favorably within ten days after receipt of such a request.¹

About two weeks ago, after receiving the request,² Loy Henderson handed Epstein a letter signed by the Under-secretary, stating that in view of the situation in Palestine, our government would not at present agree to an exchange of full diplomatic representatives. The letter suggested instead that working missions be exchanged—the very proposal that is now being urged on the President.

When Mr. Epstein presented reasons against the State Department's decision, including the consideration that the Arab states would be encouraged to believe that our government was again of two minds and that if the Arab States continued to hold out for better terms than the UN decision of November 29, 1947, they might be able to make a better trade—Mr. Henderson was so disturbed he did not want the letter to be said to be actually delivered.³

Next day Mr. Henderson gave Mr. Epstein a substitute letter, also signed by the Under-secretary, stating that the request for exchange of full diplomatic representatives was under consideration, and suggested that in the meantime working missions be exchanged.

On Mr. Henderson's own representations, it is plain that there is no technical difficulty about exchanging full diplomatic representatives. The reason for the change in attitude seems to be that Mr. Henderson or the British deemed it necessary to conciliate the Arabs.

On the other hand, the failure to arrange the exchange of full diplomatic representatives is an indication to the British and the Arabs that they may make some progress toward securing better terms if they only hold out.

Furthermore, one result may be that full acceptance of the UN decision of November 29, 1947, by the British and the Arabs, may not be accorded at the end of the four weeks cease-fire; that there may be attempts to extend the cease-fire period. So that there may be more bargaining, the situation would continue to hang fire, and the threat of a renewal of hostilities would remain to cloud the situation.

One further consequence of delaying the exchange of full diplomatic representatives may be that the President will not be selecting and sending forthwith a big calibre man of large reputation to represent

¹ Mr. Clifford's memorandum is printed here as an indication of his thinking in June 1948, not as a primary source on Henderson-Epstein conversations in May of which he had no first-hand knowledge. The editors have found no documentation in Department of State files on those conversations, and Mr. Henderson, in an interview with Department historians on January 12, 1976, stated that he had never made to Mr. Epstein the suggestion attributed to him here. Mr. Henderson also had no recollection of substituting one letter for another, as recounted later in Mr. Clifford's memorandum, and he denied the accuracy of the penultimate paragraph of the Clifford memorandum (see p. 1119).

² The request was made in a telegram of May 19 from Mr. Shertok, p. 1012.

³ The only Lovett-Epstein letter found is that dated May 29, p. 1074. On May 27 Mr. Lovett had submitted to President Truman his proposed letter to Mr. Epstein and the President had approved the draft the same day; see pp. 1058-1060.

this country in Israel. Another danger is that a regular career officer, being first sent as a head of a working mission, will be gradually eased into the post of Diplomatic Minister when there is a full exchange.

A third consequence may be that through easing the situation along in this way and thereby having a career man as American Minister to Israel, Mr. Henderson's hand will be strengthened and his hold on the situation will be further entrenched.

(2) *De Jure Recognition*

In the Loy Henderson–Eliahu Epstein conversation, Henderson asked whether the State of Israel would give up some territory in exchange for *De Jure* recognition.⁴

This is some indication that there is no genuine technical obstacle to *De Jure* recognition, but that some person or government is trying to use, for the purpose of trading territory away from Israel, the power and right of the United States Government to act as sound American policy, rather than as some other country's territorial ambitions, may determine.

⁴ See footnote 1, p. 1118.

501.BB Palestine/6-1748 : Telegram

The Vice Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

JERUSALEM, June 17, 1948.

932. Demarcation of "no man's land" to be observed in Jerusalem during truce finished night June 15 and complete agreement reached. Maps showing respective front lines and accompanying protocol signed afternoon June 16 by Arab and Jewish Commanders in presence of Truce Commission and Colonel Brunsson. BURDETT

125.00901/6-1748 : Telegram

The Vice Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

JERUSALEM, June 17, 1948—10 a. m.

933. During present Palestine crisis, Amman has increasingly become center for Arab political and military decisions. We rely on occasional visits to Amman by Consulate General officer and on such material as British choose to make available for information on political and military developments that area. Since it appears likely that influence and strategic importance of Transjordan will increase in Middle East (because of Arab Legion if for no other reason) would Department wish consider informal assignment to Amman of consular officer and one code clerk for political reporting purposes. Cable and

Wireless maintains full radio facilities in Amman for communications with Washington.

If Department approves this plan Consulate General could make informal approach to Transjordan Government through Prime Minister.¹

BURDETT

¹ The Department, in reply on June 22, requested Jerusalem's comments on the feasibility of its tentative thinking that an "officer might proceed to Amman in capacity of liaison officer for Amer member Truce Commission. This would avoid raising question of recognition of Transjordan yet permit officer to report to Jerusalem and to Dept." (Telegram 633, 125.0090i/6-1748)

Vice Consul Burdett, on June 26, advised that the Department's thinking was "entirely feasible" and suggested that the "officer proceed soonest in order purpose his assignment may be clearly established prior end present cease fire." (Telegram 977, June 26, 10 a. m., from Jerusalem, 501.BB Palestine/6-2648)

867N.51/6-1848

Memorandum by Mr. Robert M. McClintock to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Henderson)

[WASHINGTON,] June 18, 1948.

Mr. Havlik of ED telephoned me this morning to say that his division was studying the request of the Provisional Government of Israel, made to the Export-Import Bank, for a \$100 million loan. Mr. Havlik said that Messrs. Ginsberg and Gass of the staff of Mr. Epstein had gone into great detail on the purposes of the loan and indicated that a goodly proportion of the money would be spent on a rather grandiose immigration scheme for the settling of 400,000 Jewish immigrants in Israel. \$25 million of the loan, however, would be used for financing current deficits arising out of the military situation in Palestine, such as petroleum supplies and food imports.

Mr. Havlik said that the initial reaction of the Board of Directors of the Export-Import Bank had been to reject the request of the Provisional Government of Israel. However, the Bank was ready to examine the Israelite application for a loan if the Department of State indicated that it had no objection to a loan being granted, provided that it met with the requirements of the Export-Import Bank.

I told Mr. Havlik that I personally was sympathetic to the idea of a loan for the State of Israel, provided it was based on sound business principles and would be repaid. However, I said it was obvious that the granting or withholding of such a credit provided this government with considerable leverage on the government of Israel. We were now at a very delicate and critical juncture in conversations under the auspices of the UN Mediator, seeking to find a peaceful adjustment of the Palestine problem. I would not, therefore, wish to see this government give its approval to the \$100 million loan until we were sure that

the conversations between the State of Israel and the Arabs were going forward to a successful conclusion. It was quite easy to envision a situation at the end of the four weeks' cease-fire, for example, when we might find it necessary to apply diplomatic pressure both to the Arabs and the Jews in order to continue their truce while a more lasting settlement was being worked out.

I asked Mr. Havlik to let me know before approval was given to the Export-Import Bank for the Israelite loan. Mr. Havlik said that in any case the clearance of NEA would be required. I trust that NEA will consult with UNA before final approval is given.

501.BB Palestine/6-1848 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the
Secretary of State*

SECRET US URGENT

LONDON, June 18, 1948—8 p. m.

2701. For Secretary and Lovett. Bevin sent Michael Wright to see me June 16 and today I continued the discussion directly with Bevin who said that he is most anxious to consolidate and extend beyond truce period the common ground found with USG re Palestine: He wished fervently that we would work together until both sides agreed on final settlement. The following is summary of views and hopes expressed by Bevin (and in Bevin's name by Wright) on these two occasions:

1. British Government has not in the least altered its views re disastrous consequences which would flow from imposition sanctions under Chapter 7 (Embassy's 2267, paragraph 3).¹

2. Any solution upon which Jews and Arabs can agree would be welcome to HMG.

3. Regretfully Bevin is inclined to think that Arabs and Jews may not reach agreement under Bernadotte's auspices without much delay and then probably not without USG and HMG getting involved to some degree as sources of advice. Already Bevin had been asked by Lebanese Prime Minister for British counsel (for Prime Minister's use in Cairo talks) with regard to how far Arab states can push their case without losing sympathy British Government. (See Paragraph 5 below). It is not unlikely, Bevin thinks, that British Government will receive other similar requests to this one and question arises as to what reply if any British Government should make.

¹ Dated May 25, p. 1047. Ambassador Douglas, on June 19, sent a telegram for the special attention of the Secretary of State and Under Secretary Lovett, which stated: "Lest there be any misunderstanding, I must emphasize that nothing in paragraph 1 of Embassy's 2701 is contrary to official UK position with regard to Chapter VII taken in SC (Embassy's 2312, May 27, paragraph 5). Bevin is in full agreement that if present efforts break down it may become necessary to invoke Chapter VII. It is Bevin's earnest hope that by US and UK moving together it will be possible to work out a final settlement without recourse to sanctions." (Telegram 2713 from London, 501.BB Palestine/6-1948)

4. Bevin said British Government could prefer not to get into position of giving advice different from US views. If this happened a new divergence re Palestine would arise between USG and HMG. He thinks it advisable, consequently, for USG, and HMG to agree in so far as possible that when either government is asked for counsel (and he foresees possibility that occasion might arise in which USG and HMG might find it necessary even to volunteer counsel) neither HMG or USG will give advice without either agreeing its substance between themselves or at least informing the other sufficiently in advance as to its character.

5. Bevin said that he has decided not to comply with request of Lebanese Prime Minister for advice. His question was too vague and the mediator should be given a clear field with both sides.

6. Future opportunities might occur, however, when such advice might be crucial to a settlement and he would feel greatly reassured if Department would agree with his thinking in Paragraph 4 above.

7. Bevin said he hoped also that USG and HMG are agreed that it is their common aim, even if first truce does not succeed, that truce itself should be extended and thus avoid recourse to compulsion by SC under Chapter 7.

8. Bevin said that he felt that Foreign Office knows too little of how the mind of Bernadotte is working and suggested that since mediator is hard man to catch, it would be advisable for USG and HMG to pool their information in this regard. Time might come when both governments might be able to help mediator's task considerably if they knew the trend mediator's negotiations.

9. I told Bevin that I thought his idea of cross-clearing advice before it is given in response to requests is a good one, which I would put to Department for consideration with my favorable recommendation. I said that I had little doubt that if this cease-fire failed to result in solution USG would in any case wish to see truce extended. I said that I thought an American-British pooling of information re mediator would be of mutual advantage and that in so far as messages reaching this Embassy are concerned I thought that we are already doing this. I suggested that we might both endeavor to stimulate flow of reports of this character.

10. I feel that the conversations described above constitute an extension of the meeting with Attlee, Bevin, Chiefs of Staff and others, May 25 reported Embassy's reference telegram and as such are to be welcomed as a further British effort to keep US and UK in step re Palestine. I hope the Department will specifically endorse the tentative replies I made to Bevin (Paragraph 9).

11. See my immediately following telegram re Haifa.

DOUGLAS

501.BB Palestine/6-1848: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

SECRET US URGENT

LONDON, June 18, 1948—8 p. m.

2702. For Secretary and Lovett. Bevin said this morning that future of Haifa is a specific problem of great concern to HMG, to the Medi-

ator, to the Jews and to the Arabs, and to European recovery. Matter is urgent because plans British military call for last British troops leave Haifa by June 30. This fact is not as yet known to Arabs,¹ but Mediator is alarmed at possible results British withdrawal before end truce and he is going to discuss matter with GOC Haifa.

2. Jews have asked that refinery should be opened (Embassy's 2700, June 18²) and have stated that in absence sufficient Arab laborers Jewish manpower would be provided.

3. On June 14 Iraqi Defense Minister advised British Ambassador Baghdad that ultimate fate Haifa is most important Palestine problem. He expressed view that if Haifa cannot be in Arab state it must be free port; otherwise pipeline would have to be relaid through Syria and Lebanon because although Iraqi economy is dependent on oil royalties, Iraq "could not tolerate outlet for its oil being in Jewish state". British Ambassador commented to Foreign Office that "it becomes more than ever clear that Haifa is sorest of all Arab points and the evacuation Haifa during cease-fire will be severe shock to Arabs and considered as disturbing in favor Jews present balance.

4. Bevin said he is faced by necessity of deciding on course which HMG should follow. If British troops remain at Haifa after June 30, fresh troops would have to be sent in and HMG is most anxious to avoid this. On other hand, he thought British Government, because of (a) British and Western European interests in refinery, (b) Jewish desire to reopen refinery, and (c) Iraqi approach (paragraph 3 above), would be fully justified in laying these facts before Mediator either with or without British comment. If HMG commented, it would express to Mediator the view that before British troops withdraw Mediator might consider possibility of getting Arabs and Jews to agree on establishment, if only for a period and if only with reservations on both sides, of an international port at Haifa under Mediator's or UN auspices. This port might consist either of whole town or be confined to port area including refinery now occupied by British troops. Such an arrangement would have the advantage of possibly attracting back to Haifa the Arab laborers essential to refinery operations. These laborers are presently unwilling to return to work in Jewish state. If Mediator acted along these lines, it would be important that international regime in Haifa should exclude USSR: Foreign Office has in mind a very small international control element; perhaps only one administrator with small police force and staff.

¹ The British Foreign Office informed the Embassy in the United Kingdom on the morning of June 22 that this fact had been made known to the Arabs (telegram 2751, June 22, 8 p. m., from London 841.2367N/6-2248).

² Not printed.

5. At this point Bevin digressed to say that early action by Mediator to achieve international regime Jerusalem seems highly desirable to Foreign Office although perhaps it would not be as appropriate for HMG to comment with regard to Jerusalem as with regard to Haifa. He thought international regime, both Haifa and Jerusalem, particularly if area Jerusalem is reduced, might go far to stimulate confidence among Arabs.

6. Bevin said there was no compulsion upon him to do so, but in line with his thoughts embodied in paragraph 4, Embassy's 2701, June 18, he is unwilling to raise the pressing problem of Haifa with Mediator without having first consulted US Government. The present was not too early to begin the working arrangement he hoped for with regard to advice. Bevin said he would like to know:

a. Does US Government perceive any impropriety in HMG's advising Mediator of the approaches to it by Jews and Arabs with regard to reopening Haifa?

b. Does US Government believe that it would be appropriate for HMG to lay before Mediator in addition to a its views with regard to the desirability of international regime for port or town of Haifa along lines paragraph 4 above?

c. If HMG takes either action with US concurrence, would US Government be willing to so advise Mediator or at least to let HMG do so?

7. I told Bevin that I understood the urgency of these questions and appreciated the motive which caused him to consult the US before acting. I said that I would ask the Department to reply to his questions within 48 hours. I said that in my view Haifa oil is essential to ERP and if some international regime or control by mediator would result in refinery resuming operations near future, this would not only be contribution to Jewish economy and to Arab economy: it would also be a vital contribution to the economy of Europe.

DOUGLAS

867N.01/6-1948: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, June 19, 1948—2 p. m.

2712. Conviction is growing in all levels FonOff and among English Arab experts outside government that early establishment small compact sovereign Jewish state would be in best interests Arabs (Embassy's 2469, June 4,¹ paragraph 4). This milestone in British think-

¹ Not printed.

ing has its origin in the contrast between the efficiency displayed by Jews in setting up Israel and in defending it, and the Arab counter-performance. Holders of this view believe that Arab population in unitary Palestine state would quickly be dominated by Jews through democratic processes and that Communist element among Jews would thus have a greater opportunity to advance Soviet objectives if infiltrated among larger number Palestine Arabs. This group also believes that only Jews themselves can control Jewish immigration; a unitary state with Arab majority could not hope to enforce its immigration laws in face opposition Jews who would show no concern for economic consequences too many Jewish immigrants. It is believed, however, Jews will take different attitude in own state.

2. In private conversations this view is now being expressed as "personal thoughts" by important British officials to Arabs both here and abroad although it is too early to say that this is the official "line" of HMG. It seems likely, however, that it may become the "official line" to Arab Governments at some later stage (e.g. when Arab Governments seek British advice in mediation talks under Bernadotte).

3. This evolution of British thought to my mind punctuates the importance of the US and UK working together along the lines of my 2701, June 18.

DOUGLAS

501.BB Palestine/6-1948: Telegram

The Chargé in Egypt (Patterson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

CAIRO, June 19, 1948—8 p. m.

805. In conversation today Nokrashy Pasha emphasized to me that Arab group which is accompanying Bernadotte to Rhodes is designed primarily as a group of experts to inform the UN Mediator in response to any requests for information which he may address to the members of the group. They will however act as transmitting agents for any data which Bernadotte may care to forward to the states members of the Arab League. Nokrashy Pasha expected Bernadotte's proposals for the basis of a Palestine truce to reach Cairo on June 25.

The Prime Minister expressed great indignation over alleged Zionist violations of the current truce stating that they had seized a number of villages in the Negev, southern or Egyptian sector of Palestine. These acts had not been irresponsible or isolated occurrences but showed on the map a development of a strategic plan. The Egyptians had been instructed to refrain from endeavoring to regain the lost villages or to take reprisals against the Zionist aggressors.

PATTERSON

501.BB Palestine/6-1648 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Jessup)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 21, 1948—2 p. m.

413. Dept has received telegram signed by Trygve Lie, dated June 16,¹ stating that SC on June 15 at request of UN Mediator decided to ask all States members to report on steps taken to implement Palestine resolution of May 29 and also to request all States members to extend cooperation and assistance to UN Mediator in implementation of his truce proposals.

Please inform SYG and also, for info of SC, President of SC that this Govt has taken following steps to implement resolution of May 29 :

1. Instructions have been sent to appropriate authorities to take necessary steps to prevent departure of "fighting personnel" from the US to countries named in paragraph 3 of resolution.

2. Instructions have been sent to appropriate authorities and also to Chairman of US Maritime Commission drawing attention to statement concerning "men of military age" set forth in Paragraphs VI (2) (3) and (4) of Count Bernadotte's truce proposals.

3. With respect to paragraph 5 of the resolution, the US Govt has since November 14, 1947 applied a rigorous arms embargo covering shipments of all war material from US and its possessions to Palestine and the countries of the Near East.

4. As SYG is aware, this govt has been active in cooperating as a member of SC Truce Commission in Palestine in supplying UN Mediator with military observers, aircraft and communications equipment. Sympathetic consideration is now being given to Mediator's request for 3 naval patrol vessels and for 10 additional military observers.²

In addition to the foregoing this govt has circularized all its diplomatic missions calling particular attention to paragraphs 2 and 5 of SC May 29 resolution and stating its view that all members of UN are obligated to abide by these clauses and consequently to take necessary steps to prevent shipments of war material to Palestine and Arab States as of effective date of truce.

You should conclude your communication to SYG by reaffirming profound hope of this govt that measures thus far adopted by UN Mediator will prove fruitful in leading to successful accomplishment of his broader task under terms of Assembly resolution of May 14, 1948; namely, to "promote a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine".³

MARSHALL

¹ Copy transmitted by New York in an unnumbered telegram, not printed.

² The Department, on June 21, informed New York of Secretary Forrestal's instructions to assign four Army, three Navy, and three Air Force officers to serve as military observers for Count Bernadotte (telegram 416, 501.BB Palestine/6-1548).

³ For the text of the letter sent by Mr. Jessup to the Secretary-General on June 21, see Department of State *Bulletin*, July 4, 1948, p. 11.

501.BB Palestine/6-3048

*Memorandum by Mr. Leonard C. Meeker, Assistant to the Legal Adviser (Gross)*¹

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] June 22, 1948.

The Problem.

To determine the position which the United States should take in the Security Council in the event that (a) the four-week Palestine truce is violated, or (b) hostilities are resumed in Palestine at the expiration of the four-week truce or an extension thereof.

Recommendation.

The United States should initiate or support action in the Security Council under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter if developments there constitute, in the opinion of the United States, a threat to or breach of international peace. Such action would include a finding under Article 39, a cease-fire *order* under Article 40, with appropriate sanctions if necessary.

Discussion.

1. The question of the policy of the United States with respect to fighting in Palestine has already been determined by the President. On May 22, 1948 the Secretary of State presented to the President a memorandum* requesting approval of proposed United States policy on Palestine. The memorandum proposed that the United States continue to urge immediate action by the Security Council to bring about a cease-fire in Palestine. This action was to be an order for a cease-fire under Articles 39 and 40 of the Charter. Such action was described in the memorandum as the basis of the resolution proposed by the United States in the Security Council on May 17, 1948, and it was stated that this would continue to represent United States views so long as the fighting continued in Palestine.

This statement of policy applied not only to the period preceding an effective truce in Palestine, but was applicable to the period following a truce or the violation of truce terms, in conformity with the purpose of the United States to achieve and maintain peace in the Palestine area. The memorandum of proposed United States policy was approved by the President on May 27, 1948.

The United States has consistently, since the ending of the 1948

¹Transmitted as Tab B to Brigadier General Carter by Mr. McClintock in his memorandum of June 30, with the statement that "Mr. Lovett has requested me to forward the attached memoranda concerning our future Palestine policy to the Secretary of State for his comment or approval." Accompanying this memorandum were Mr. McClintock's memorandum of June 23 (see p. 1134) and the "Comments of the Policy Planning Staff", transmitted as Tabs A and C, respectively; Tab C not found attached to the transmitting memorandum.

*A copy of the memorandum for the President, dated May 22, 1948, is attached as an appendix to this paper. [Footnote in the source text.]

special session of the General Assembly, regarded the situation in Palestine as a very serious one, calling for action under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. To this end the United States on May 17, 1948 introduced a truce resolution based on Articles 39 and 40 of the Charter. Ambassador Austin on May 22, 1948 in the Security Council elaborated the position of the United States concerning the necessity for Chapter VII action. Again later, after the Security Council's resolution of May 22, 1948 had failed to bring about a truce in Palestine, the United States supported a resolution under Chapter VII, introduced in the Council by the Soviet representative, which closely resembled the United States resolution of May 17. Both Chapter VII resolutions failed of adoption in the Council, receiving the votes only of the United States, Soviet Union, France, Colombia, and the Ukraine.

In its resolution of May 29 under Chapter VI of the Charter, the Security Council included the following penultimate paragraph, on the motion of the United States:

"The Security Council, . . . Decides that if the present resolution is rejected by either party or by both, or if, having been accepted, it is subsequently repudiated or violated, the situation in Palestine will be considered with a view to action under Chapter VII, . . ."

Thus the Security Council itself decided that it would consider again the Palestine situation with a view to Chapter VII action if the Chapter VI resolution of May 29 proved ineffectual.

2. As pointed out above, the United States has, since May 17, 1948, formally advocated the taking of action by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter if necessary to restore international peace in Palestine. The purpose of United States policy continues to be achievement of peace in that area. In the event that the truce in Palestine under the resolution of May 29 were violated or that hostilities were resumed upon expiration of the truce, the situation in that country would be at least as grave, from the standpoint of international peace and security, as it was before the May 29 resolution was adopted. The United States has been subject to charges of oscillation and unreliability in its Palestine policy. If the United States now altered its stand on Chapter VII action, this Government would probably be subject to renewed and aggravated charges of inconsistency, resulting in embarrassment to the United States, particularly in the forum of the United Nations.

3. According to a telegram received from Ambassador Douglas on June 19,² Foreign Secretary "Bevin is in full agreement that if present efforts break down it may become necessary to invoke Chapter VII."

4. In considering whether or not to press for Chapter VII action

² Telegram 2713, not printed, but see footnote 1, p. 1121.

by the Security Council, the United States would base its approach, as it has in the past, on the determination of whether or not there was such fighting in Palestine as to constitute a threat to or breach of international peace. The approach would not depend merely upon determination that there had occurred an act of aggression, nor would the approach be merely with a view to fixing responsibility for aggression upon any particular government or authority.

890.11/6-2248

*Memorandum by the Acting Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Satterthwaite) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)*¹

[WASHINGTON,] June 22, 1948.

Subject: Departmental Policy with Respect to Travel from the United States to the Arab Countries and Palestine.

Discussion:

You will note from the attached documents that, in accordance with the memorandum of May 21, 1948 (Tab A)² approved by you, we have been observing the following policy with regard to the issuance of passports to American citizens to visit the Arab Countries and Palestine:

"In view of this general situation it is recommended that the Department should continue to refrain from granting passport facilities to American citizens to visit the countries of the Near East (Israel, Palestine, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Yemen), unless it is clearly established that their business is of an important and urgent nature and that they do not intend to participate directly or indirectly in the hostilities in Palestine."

We have as yet formulated no policy with regard to travel from the United States to Palestine and the Arab countries of persons who are not American nationals.

You will also note from Mrs. Shipley's³ memorandum to me of June 14, (Tab B),² that she feels that we should ascertain the views of the Mediator respecting the screening of persons of military age proceeding to the Near East and Palestine. You will also observe from the attached telegram, No. 740 of June 12, 9 a. m., (Tab C), from Cairo,⁴ that Bernadotte has requested the Secretary General of the

¹ Drafted by Mr. Henderson.

² Copy not found attached.

³ Ruth B. Shipley, Chief of the Passport Division.

⁴ Not printed.

United Nations to call paragraph 6 of the truce proposals to the attention of all members of the United Nations from which substantial immigration to Palestine and the Arab countries might emanate. Bernadotte has asked the Secretary General to request the governments concerned to call to the attention of their immigration control authorities "the significance of this provision to the operation of the truce and to advise them to extend cooperation and assistance to such representatives of the Mediator as he might find it possible to send to one or another port in the implementation of the immigration provisions of the truce proposals".

On June 16, 1948 the Secretary General of the United Nations addressed a note to the United States Delegation to the United Nations⁵ calling the attention of this Government to paragraph 6 of the truce resolution of May 29 (Tab D), as requested by Count Bernadotte.

On June 21, 1948 the Department sent a telegram to the United States Delegation to the United Nations⁶ (Tab E), setting forth our reply to the note of the Secretary General of the United Nations and requesting the United States Delegation to inform the Secretary General that "instructions have been sent to the appropriate authorities to take necessary steps to prevent departure 'fighting personnel' from the United States to countries named in paragraph 3 of the resolution."

It would appear that the two following considerations are involved in the determination of what our policy with regard to travel to the Arab countries and the Near East should be:

1. The desirability, until the danger of hostility and of acts of violence against American citizens has abated, that the number of American citizens in Palestine and in the Arab countries should be at a minimum.

2. The importance that the United States fully cooperate with the Mediator in his efforts to discourage violations of the truce.

With regard to the first consideration, it is believed that we should continue to follow our present policy not to issue passports for travel to the Near East and Palestine unless the purpose of the travel is urgent and important and unless it is clearly established that the applicant for passport does not intend to participate directly or indirectly in the hostilities in Palestine. We should, therefore, continue carefully to screen all applicants for passports to the Arab countries and Palestine.

With regard to the second consideration, it is our belief that it would

⁵ Not printed.

⁶ No. 413, p. 1126.

be preferable for such screening as might be necessary to discourage the entry of "fighting personnel" from the United States to Palestine to be performed in the United States by an official of this Government in consultation with a representative of the Mediator. The United States official would do what was proper to discourage the departure from the United States for Palestine and the Arab countries of persons who had been screened in this manner.

In view of the above, we have prepared for your approval the attached telegram to the Mediator.⁷

Recommendation:

It is recommended that you sign the attached telegram to the Mediator.

Concurrences:

PD UNA L

⁷ See telegram of June 25, p. 1147.

867N.01/6-2248

*Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)*¹

[WASHINGTON,] June 22, 1948.

Mr. Clark Clifford called me at 4:25 this afternoon to say that he had just come from the President with instructions to call me and say that the President "directed me to have the papers prepared at once for the appointment of Mr. James Grover McDonald of New York to the Tel Aviv post; that he wanted this handled at once and that he wanted the announcement made this afternoon."

I asked Mr. Clifford who Mr. McDonald was and he said that all he knew about him was that the President said he had been a member of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on Palestine. I stated that I assumed this meant that Mr. McDonald was recognized as a proponent of the Zionist cause and that I queried whether the President had considered the possible effects, if the facts were as I surmised, of such an appointment during the truce period. I pointed out that the tension was considerable, that the situation was delicate enough, and that any precipitate action on our part might have untold consequences.

Clifford replied that he knew none of the background but that the President was positive, had made up his mind, and that there was obviously no room for argument. I asked if the Department could have time to consider the matter and Mr. Clifford replied that the

¹ Initialed by the Secretary of State.

President's directive was positive and that the decision had already been made; that it, therefore, called for no additional consideration.²

ROBERT A. LOVETT

² At 5:15 p. m., June 22, Mr. Satterthwaite telephoned Mr. Epstein and told him that the President would like to appoint Mr. James Grover McDonald as Special Representative and announce his appointment the same day. Mr. Satterthwaite "inquired whether Mr. Epstein was authorized to approve this action. Mr. Epstein replied that this matter had been left to his discretion and that he was authorized by his Government to make the decision. He stated that he was replying now, and that the United States proposal to appoint Mr. McDonald to the post had his approval." (Memorandum of conversation, by Mr. Satterthwaite, 867N.01/6-2248) For President Truman's statement of June 22 on the appointment of Mr. McDonald and on the designation of Mr. Epstein as Special Representative of the Provisional Government of Israel in the United States, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1948*, p. 382; or Department of State *Bulletin*, July 4, 1948, p. 22.

For Mr. McDonald's account of the circumstances of his appointment and his discussions with President Truman and other government officials before his departure for Tel Aviv on July 23, see his *My Mission in Israel, 1948-1951* (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1951), pp. 3-19.

501.BB Palestine/6-1848: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

SECRET

US URGENT

WASHINGTON, June 22, 1948—noon.

2332. We share Bevin's concern, as reported your 2702, June 18, for continued functioning of important oil refinery at Haifa. However, it would seem that since neither Jews nor Arabs can profit by operation of oil refinery without agreement between themselves, since Jews will control refinery and Arabs the crude oil, there exists in the case of Haifa a unique opportunity for mutual accommodation which may serve as a constructive example of how Jews and Arabs can manage to get along peaceably throughout all of Palestine and the Near East.

We do not find it easy to give advice to Mr. Bevin regarding evacuation of Haifa by British forces during period of cease-fire. We feel that person best qualified to give advice on this subject is Count Bernadotte, who is charged with maintaining the truce and cease-fire and who, as Bevin hopes according to Para. 7, your 2701, June 18, we trust will be successful in extending the present truce and cease-fire.

Re specific questions put in your 2702, June 18, para. 6, please see Deptel 2302, June 18.¹ Following are answers seriatim:

a. We see no impropriety in UK informing Mediator of approaches to it by Jews and Arabs re reopening Haifa.

b. We think it would be useful for UK to inform Mediator of its views regarding an arrangement for Haifa along lines of Para. 4 of reference telegram.

c. We shall be glad to inform Bernadotte of our views as set forth

¹ Not printed.

in (a) and (b) above and have no objection if UK likewise informs him of our concurrence.

It would seem from para. 3, urtel 2700, June 18,² that there have been conversations in London between unofficial representative of PGI and UK FonOff regarding Haifa refinery. We are encouraged by Goldmann's reported remark that PGI would not object if representative of Mediator controlled production in Haifa refinery, Arabs receiving a fair share of output.

We believe that Mediator will wish to keep in mind importance of Haifa production going to ERP and to legitimate civilian requirements of Near East, including Israel. In conformity with principles of truce agreement we do not feel that Haifa production should be used to increase military potential of either Israel or Arab States.³

MARSHALL

² Not printed.

³ In telegram 172, June 23, 6 p. m., to Haifa, the Department furnished the text of 2332 "for your info and communication to UN Mediator if he is in your vicinity." No. 172 was repeated for action, if necessary, to Jerusalem and Cairo (501.BB Palestine/6-2348). The following day, the Department authorized Cairo to convey informally the contents of 2332 to the French Ambassador there, stating that "We see no objection to French Govt making representations to UN Mediator with regard to protecting Haifa refinery and securing its rapid resumption of full production in interest not only of Near East economy but of ERP." (Telegram 860, 501.BB Palestine/6-2448)

501.BB Palestine/6-1848: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

SECRET US URGENT

WASHINGTON, June 22, 1948—6 p. m.

2348. You may assure Mr. Bevin and Foreign Office that this government cordially welcomes desire of British government to concert its views with ours in respect of Palestine. We agree with Bevin's suggestion as indicated in Para. 4 urtel 2701, June 18, and hope it will be possible for both UK and US to formulate and recommend a common line of policy.

Your 2701 does not indicate Bevin's thinking as to best practical approach which our two governments might make regarding Palestine if they should judge it wise to give advice to Count Bernadotte or if they should be requested for advice by Arab States or Provisional Government of Israel. We infer, however, that Foreign Office thinking has progressed along lines indicated in your 2712 June 19. It is highly important to know whether Bevin agrees with this trend of thought or whether he has some other solution in mind, as, for example, federation.

Dept is rapidly evolving its line of policy re future settlement of Palestine problem. For your own info and not for use as yet with UK

officials, our thinking—conditioned by fact of recognition of State of Israel—is that best solution for a sensible adjustment of Palestine problem would be to re-draw frontiers of Israel so as to make a compact and homogeneous state; remainder of Palestine to go largely to Transjordan with appropriate transfer of populations where necessary; Jerusalem to remain an international entity with free access to outside world; boundaries of Israel and enlarged Transjordan to be guaranteed mutually between themselves and UN; and economic prosperity of region to be enhanced by a customs union between Israel and Transjordan.

As soon as firm policy has been agreed upon you will receive further instructions.

Re Paragraph 7, your 2701, June 18, we are in entire agreement that even though a final solution is not reached during present 4-weeks' period of cease-fire it is imperative that truce be continued.

You may inform Bevin that our most recent info from SYG Lie, based on telephone conversations and telegrams from Bernadotte, is that UN Mediator is not attempting to work out a final settlement at this time but will concentrate his efforts on Rhodes to extend period of truce and cease-fire and likewise to achieve demilitarization of Jerusalem. Apparently to this latter end Bernadotte has in mind recruiting UN armed guards for Jerusalem but full details of what he intends are not yet available. Foregoing with reference to Paragraph 8, your 2701, was given us as top secret by Lie.

We welcome your 2713, June 19,¹ with its indication that British are willing to face up to responsibilities under Chapter 7 in event that this should become necessary. However, we very much share Bevin's hope that a final settlement can be evolved without recourse to sanctions.

MARSHALL

¹ Not printed, but see footnote 1, p. 1121.

501.BB Palestine/6-3048

*Memorandum by Mr. Robert M. McClintock*¹

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] June 23, 1948.

PEACEFUL ADJUSTMENT OF THE FUTURE SITUATION OF PALESTINE

Reports from Cairo indicate that Count Bernadotte, the United Nations Mediator, operating under the resolution of the General As-

¹ Transmitted to Brigadier General Carter on June 30 (see footnote 1, p. 1127). Mr. McClintock had prepared a first draft on June 18, which he had sent for comment to Messrs. Henderson, Sandifer, and Meeker and to Harding Bancroft, Associate Chief of the Division of International Security Affairs. The first draft was also submitted to Mr. Lovett for information and was read by the Under Secretary (501.BB Palestine/6-1848).

sembly adopted on May 14, 1948, and the resolution of the Security Council of May 29, will shortly convoke a conference on Rhodes between representatives of the Arab League and the Arabs of Palestine on the one hand, and the Jews of Palestine as represented by the Provisional Government of Israel, to discuss, in the language of the resolution of May 14, "a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine".

It is possible that during the course of these conversations the United States may be called upon for advice either by the United Nations Mediator or by the parties to the Palestine dispute. In any event, it would seem necessary for this government to have a clear idea of what "peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine" would most conduce to the national interests of the United States.

The policy of the American Government in this regard has been conditioned since May 14 by the recognition that day of the Provisional Government of the State of Israel as the *de facto* authority in that new republic. Because of the act of recognition, United States policy with relation to the Palestine settlement is postulated upon the continuing existence of the State of Israel. The sovereignty of Israel is a fact so far as the United States is concerned and this government could not agree to any diminution of its sovereignty except with the consent of the Government of Israel.*

The proposed boundaries of the Jewish State as delineated by the resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on November 29, 1947, were predicated on the assumption that there would also be an Arab State in Palestine linked to the Jewish State by economic union. It is now clear in the light of facts and events which have supervened that there will be no separate Arab State and no economic union as envisaged in the General Assembly resolution. In consequence, the boundaries of the State of Israel, if they are regarded as those traced on the map which formed a part of the resolution of November 29, are aptly described by the understatement of a Jewish group recently formed in New York to promote Jewish-Arab cooperation. According to this definition "the borders of the State of Israel and of Arab Palestine, as laid out by the United Nations, bear an unusually high ratio to the area of the land". More bluntly, a delegate to the United Nations Trusteeship Council last autumn likened the map of United Nations partition of Palestine to a portrait by Picasso.

It would seem logical, accordingly, given the postulate of a State

*It is pertinent to quote excerpts from the official Republican Party Platform for 1948, Section VI: "We welcome Israel into the family of nations and take pride in the fact that the Republican Party was the first to call for the establishment of a free and independent Jewish commonwealth. . . . Subject to the letter and spirit of the United Nations Charter, we pledge to Israel full recognition, with its boundaries as sanctioned by the United Nations and aid in developing its economy".

The Democratic Party Platform will undoubtedly include equivalent references to the State of Israel. [Footnote in the source text.]

of Israel, and given the fact that its boundaries in the absence of economic union with an Arab State are fantastic, that there should be a new drawing of the frontier which circumscribes the State of Israel. Study might profitably be made to re-drawing the boundary of Israel along the lines suggested by the Peel Report, in which the Jewish State would have occupied the coastal area from Tel Aviv to Haifa, with a considerable portion of Western Galilee. If such new boundaries should be drawn, the present areas in the Negeb now held by Israel should be given to the neighboring Arab countries, principally Transjordan, and there should be an appropriate exchange of populations so that the State of Israel would contain most of the Jews of Palestine and the Arabs would reside in purely Arab areas.

If the State of Israel were thus redefined geographically it would be a more homogeneous unit possessing an improved economic patrimony. The United States could consent to changes in territory, however, only if they were made with the consent of Israel.

As for the Arab areas of Palestine, it is suggested that Transjordan be permitted to expand, taking over almost all the remainder of the country except for possibly a small transfer of territory in the extreme north to Syria, where the finger salient based on Safad seems to possess little justification. Similarly, in the extreme south the port of Aqaba, now in Transjordan, might be transferred to Saudi Arabia, while in the Negeb territorial adjustments could be made in favor of Egypt as well as Transjordan.

If the boundaries of Israel were re-drawn and the adjustments suggested above agreed to by the Arabs and Jews there should then be an international guarantee by the United Nations, and, if possible, by treaty between Israel and the Arab States, of the territorial settlement. This would be of particular advantage to the Arabs as "freezing" the boundaries of Israel and thus affording protection to the Arab States against the wider pretensions of the Jewish revisionists and such fanatics as those of the Irgun who have pretensions to the conquest of Transjordan.

Other proposed arrangements to promote a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine center largely on federation in one form or another. A representative of the British Foreign Office on June 6 told officers of the Department that the official policy of the British Government would undoubtedly favor a Palestinian federation made up of a Jewish and an Arab canton or state. However, despite this official view of the British Government, the Colonial Secretary, Sir Arthur Creech Jones, has recently indicated his belief, both to American official representatives and to the present Foreign Minister of Israel, that a deal is possible of arrangement between King Abdullah of Transjordan and the State of Israel for a territorial settlement similar to that outlined in the preceding paragraphs.

Another protagonist of federation is Dr. Judah Magnes, the distinguished American President of the Hebrew University. Dr. Magnes favors a "United States of Palestine", in which Arab and Jewish States would retain sovereign jurisdiction in a Palestine federation except for the control of foreign affairs, security, economic cooperation, a supreme court, and a separate regime for Jerusalem.

As a matter of practical politics it is much to be doubted whether the Jews of the State of Israel will agree to relinquish an iota of their sovereignty and that in consequence the foregoing proposals for federation will have slight chance of acceptance.

Should an arrangement be possible of accomplishment for a consolidation of the State of Israel along the coast from Tel Aviv to the border of Lebanon, including a transfer of Western Galilee in return for the cession of the Negeb to Transjordan and Egypt, it would seem useful that the two States principally falling heir to Palestine—Israel and Transjordan—be bound together in a customs union.

With regard to Jerusalem it would seem on balance preferable that this Holy City be administered by the United Nations as a separate international entity. Jerusalem is as much a Jewish city as it is an Arab metropolis and it contains shrines sacred to three of the principal world religions. To permit it to be made the capital of King Abdullah would rouse Jewish passions and irredentism while to allow Jerusalem to be a Jewish capital would incite reciprocal emotions in the Arabs. Should, however, Jerusalem be made an international responsibility, it should be incorporated in the Israel-Transjordan *Zollverein* and guarantees should be given by the States concerned for its unrestricted access to free port facilities at Haifa or Jaffa.

In summary, therefore, a sensible territorial solution for the Palestine problem would be to re-draw the frontiers of Israel so as to make a compact and homogeneous state, the remainder of Palestine to go largely to Transjordan with appropriate transfers of populations where necessary; Jerusalem to remain an international entity with free access to the outside world; the boundaries of the two new states to be guaranteed mutually between themselves and the United Nations; and the economic prosperity of the region to be enhanced by a customs union between Israel and Transjordan.

867N.01/6-2348 : Telegram

The Consul at Haifa (Lippincott) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

HAIFA, June 23, 1948.

173. ReDeptel 164 June 21.¹ Upon inquiring whether it was true Jewish authorities were refusing permission Arabs return Haifa,

¹ This was a repeat of No. 629 to Jerusalem, not printed.

Victor Khayat, Honorary Spanish Vice Consul and an American citizen, told me this afternoon in strictest confidence.

1. All Arabs who remained Haifa being thoroughly screened by Jewish authorities, required obtain identity cards and must swear allegiance to Israel state.

2. Arabs who return Haifa are considered illegals. Of these Jews are permitting only those to remain whom they consider satisfactory after thorough investigation. These also required take oath allegiance Jewish state. Result is remaining Arabs determined leave. Khayat informed that he had recently arranged for departure seven sailing vessels for Lebanon each carrying average 120 persons passage free. One additional vessel scheduled leave twenty-second ending operation. Khayat said departures were arranged with assistance British Commandos now controlling port. Approximately 1500 Arabs now Haifa. Of these some expected infiltrate Nazareth and other towns in nearby Arab controlled areas.

Khayat added that he is issuing "emergency certificates" for purpose entering Syria or Lebanon to "all Arabs applying". He called on me some time after giving the above information inquiring whether Jews could legally object to his issuing visas to Syrians and Lebanese whose interests he represents. I gave him no definite suggestions or advice. When asked what orders Jewish authorities had given with regard refusing Arabs return Haifa Khayat said "word was just passed around."

LIPPINCOTT

501.BB Palestine/6-2348 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Jessup)

SECRET US URGENT

WASHINGTON, June 23, 1948—5 p. m.

419. Dept has given urgent consideration to your telephonic advice that SYG Lie has telegraphed Count Bernadotte regarding latter's suggestion that he hopes to demilitarize Jerusalem and will need an armed UN guard numbering 1,000 men to be available by July 9.¹ You

¹Count Bernadotte, in a message to Secretary-General Lie dated June 20, gave his views that the truce was under control and that both parties would be careful not to break it. Since he felt it impossible to obtain an agreement before July 9, his tactics would involve trying to gain time and to make vague proposals rather than firm ones, lest their rejection result in the ending of the truce. The Mediator advised that he would concentrate on attaining agreement on demilitarizing Jerusalem and the Holy Places, for which he would require at least 1,000 armed guards (telegram 809, June 23, 5:54 p. m., from New York, 501.BB Palestine/6-2348).

report that Lie has suggested that he feels that Bernadotte's request should be submitted to SC for its recommendation and has so informed Bernadotte.

We do not feel that Bernadotte's purpose would be served by SC debate of this question. The Soviet faction would be given an opportunity to make long speeches and to insist that their nationals be recruited as a proportion of the proposed armed guard and this Soviet tactic would very probably result in other members of the Council failing to vote for any recommendation to Bernadotte, thus leaving him in a more negative position than before.

On the contrary we feel that sufficient authority now exists in Para. 6 and 7, SC resolution of May 29, in GA resolution of May 14, and in Section B(a) of the UN budget for 1948, for SYG at Bernadotte's request to recruit and pay for the police forces Bernadotte has in mind.

We feel it is of utmost importance that there be no confusion between UN guard which SYG would like to create ² and concerning which he has had informal discussions with Secretary Marshall, and the police force for Jerusalem desired by Count Bernadotte. You may tell SYG that we are giving sympathetic consideration to his UN guard proposal but would prefer to view it on its own merits and not in light of the complex Palestine problem.

It would be extremely helpful for Dept to have more explicit knowledge of details of Bernadotte's plan. Clearly it would not serve our interest if any considerable number of Soviet or Soviet satellite nationals made up Jerusalem force.

We assume Bernadotte's plan is based on achieving agreement of parties on demilitarization of Jerusalem. If parties could further agree on source and composition of armed guards so much the better. Arabs and Jews might agree, for example, each to supply 500 men to Jerusalem force.

Sent USUN with request foregoing be imparted to SYG and that latter transmit our views for info of UN Mediator on Rhodes with comment that US as member of Truce Commission is naturally concerned in these arrangements and desires to be of utmost help.³

¹ Repeated for info and action if Bernadotte in that vicinity to Jerusalem as 639, Haifa as 167, Cairo as 853.

Repeated to London as 2364, Paris as 2243, Brussels as 959.

MARSHALL

² For documentation on this subject. see vol. I, Part 1, pp. 29 ff.

³ New York reported, on June 25, that action had been taken on 419 and that the United Nations Secretariat had indicated general sympathy for United States views and would communicate them to the Mediator (telegram 821, 501.BB Palestine/6-2548).

867N.01/6-2248

*Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)*¹

[WASHINGTON,] June 24, 1948.

At 2:40 today, in accordance with instructions from the Secretary, I called Clark Clifford at the White House and reverted to the matter of the appointment of the U.S. Special Representative to the State of Israel. I told Clifford that the Secretary had been very much concerned at the procedures followed in the appointment made on June 22, and particularly the precipitate action and failure to give the Department of State an opportunity to put the President in possession of any pertinent facts which might be at its disposal.

I stated that the Secretary's concern had been such that he had written a long-hand letter from Walter Reed Hospital to the President yesterday. The Secretary was persuaded, after discussion this morning at the hospital, not to send the letter in today but he will discuss the matter fully with the President on Monday.

I told Clifford that I wanted him to know the above facts for background and also to give him an indication of the serious view which the Secretary took of the method of procedure, particularly at the present time.

ROBERT A. LOVETT

¹ Initialed by the Secretary of State.

501.BB Palestine/6-1648

*The Secretary of State to the Secretary-General of the United Nations (Lie)*¹

WASHINGTON, June 24, 1948.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor, with reference to your note to the United States Mission to the United Nations of June 15, 1948,² requesting the loan of three naval coastal patrol vessels to the United Nations Mediator, Count Bernadotte, for his use in giving effect to the Security Council's resolution of May 29, 1948 on Palestine, to inform you that the Secretary of National Defense of the United States has made available three destroyers now serving with the United States Mediterranean Fleet.

The Commander of the unit of these three United States Navy

¹ Sent to Ambassador Austin in instruction 147, June 24, for transmittal to Mr. Lie.

² Not printed.

destroyers will report to the United Nations Mediator for Palestine through the United States Chargé d'Affaires at Cairo with the understanding that their employment shall be limited to transportation of persons and material in connection with supervision of the truce together with observation and reporting duties. In carrying out these duties, the commanding officers of the vessels are not authorized to employ force nor to stop or board shipping encountered.

Accept [etc.]

G. C. MARSHALL

867N.01/6-2448 : Telegram

The Vice Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

JERUSALEM, June 24, 1948—1 p. m.

963. During past few days increased activity of Irgun Zvai Leumi and Stern gang in Jerusalem has become extremely apparent. Both groups have succeeded in bringing into city reinforcements, arms and supplies from Tel Aviv and have taken over strategic areas in Jerusalem which are being turned into fortified enclaves. Haganah authorities here admit that IZL and Stern gang do not submit to Haganah discipline and it is known that Haganah has considerable difficulty in dealing with 2 groups. It also appears that IZL and Stern enjoy preferred positions regarding food and wartime restrictions. Since unification agreement signed by IZL and Stern with Haganah are only valid within Israel, former consider themselves free to act as they wish in Jerusalem. Reliable Jewish source indicates that 2 groups are augmenting their forces here to serve as threat and reminder to Israel Government that IZL and Stern will not tolerate any concession on immigration or status of Jerusalem. Regarding latter it is possible that IZL and Stern will reject international status for city believing that Jerusalem should be capital of Jewish State which they regard as ultimately including all of Palestine. Dr. Bernard Joseph, Chairman of Jewish Jerusalem Emergency Committee, has stated to Truce Commission his inability be responsible for acts IZL and Stern in Jerusalem. Moreover as proven in recent failure by Haganah to dislodge Stern members from enclave in Talbieh quarter of Jerusalem, Haganah unable cope with situation. It is also known that Haganah commander in Jerusalem, David Shaltiel, is under severe censure by Stern for what they consider his conciliatory attitude in present truce negotiations.

Reliable Jewish sources believe that in Israel IZL and Stern support in general policy of Israel Government provided that policy does not weaken or change. In particular 2 groups reject any compromise or concessions on immigration. Stern group is reported to mistrust Ben

Gurion and Shertok in this respect. Both IZL and Stern signed agreements to amalgamate with Haganah and to submit to authority of state. Israeli authorities announced several weeks ago that Stern gang had disbanded with[in] Israel and that arms turned over to Israeli Army. Irgun announced June 16 that within Israel it was now political party under name "Jewish Freedom Movement" but that outside Israel it remained military organization. It is reliably reported that while members IZL and Stern have joined Israel Army, they have been formed into separate battalions under their own officers. Operational command is theoretically responsibility Haganah High Command but IZL and Stern are believed to have representatives on High Command. Considerable and important evidence exists (such as that reported in Haifa's 76, May 18 and 172 June 22 both to Department¹) that amalgamation and submission do not in fact exist and that both groups retain independence of action which Israeli authorities will find increasingly difficult to bring under control and suppress.

Various sources indicate that guidance, money and arms were being provided to Stern gang by Russia through Satellites particularly Poland. Polish Consulates in Jerusalem and Tel Aviv are believed to be in close touch with Stern gang and its commanders Nathan Friedman Yellin and deputy Dr. Israel Scheib. It is also believed Russia will make every effort widen this support as effective means of gaining subversive foothold in Israel. While reports have been received that Menachem Beigin, Commander of IZL, has ordered his followers to orient themselves toward Russian recognition of [and?] Russian support of Jewish State, no concrete evidence is available to substantiate report.

Regarding future real possibility exists that IZL and Stern will prove of increasing embarrassment to Israel authorities both in Israel and Jerusalem and that they will attempt thwart any attempt to settle present impasse in reasonable way. Russia can be expected to increase influence in Stern gang and make efforts penetrate.

Sent Department 963, repeated Haifa 76.

Department pass Arab capitals, London and Moscow.

BURDETT

¹Neither printed; the latter message and telegram 174 of the following day reported that the *Altalena*, a vessel controlled by the Irgun Zvai Leumi had attempted to land at Nathanya near Tel Aviv on the morning of June 22 in order to disembark some 600-1,000 armed Jews and possibly arms and munitions. Haganah forces shelled the vessel, causing it to burn, turned over its passengers to United Nations officials, and arrested about 700 IZL members ashore (867N.01/6-2248, 6-2348).

501.BB Palestine/6-2448 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the
Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET

LONDON, June 24, 1948—8 p. m.

2785. 1. I am immensely gratified by contents Department's 2332, June 22, and Department's 2348, June 23, substance of which (except paragraph 3 last reftel) was delivered June 23 to Wright in Bevin's absence.

2. Wright warmly welcomed Department's helpful response to ideas advanced by Bevin (Embassy's 2702, June 18 and 2701, June 18).

3. Re Haifa, Wright said Foreign Office in light Department's 2332 would telegraph at once to Rhodes (repeating to Haifa) substance paragraph 4, Embassy's 2702, June 18. He said Mediator would be told that UK has consulted USG which sees no impropriety in HMG informing Mediator of approaches to it by Jews and Arabs and that USG thinks it would be useful for HMG to inform Mediator of HMG views re an arrangement for Haifa. Wright assumes Department will advise Bernadotte similarly.

4. Wright said he took two Deptreftels to mean that USG and HMG have accepted as common aims the following:

(a) Extension cease-fire and truce (paragraph 5, Department's 2348).

(b) Efforts to concert views (paragraph 1, Department's 2348).

(c) Pooling information re Mediator (penultimate paragraph, Department's 2348).

5. Wright said that he thought above common aims now would probably open way for Foreign Office to put to Department more clearly its thinking re various alternatives with which Mediator may be confronted. In this connection he mentioned possibility, which Mediator himself seems to envisage (paragraph 6, Department's 2348) of temporizing in the event neither side is willing to agree on final settlement near future. (Embassy's 2510, June 7,¹ paragraph 7). Wright wondered whether Department entertains views re most effective channel for communicating Foreign Office thinking. He suggested that this Embassy to Department might be main channel and that Foreign Office to British Embassy Washington might be secondary channel to be kept fully advised with view to British Embassy officers discussing points with the Department. In view of what seems to be close association with British Government on this problem and gradual shift in British position (see paragraph 6 below) as result compulsion

¹ Not printed.

of events reinforced by our efforts, I will be the goat if Department so desires.

6. As to whether Bevin agrees with trend thought described Embassy's 2712, June 19, Wright speaking informally said position HMG (which means, of course, position Bevin) is that no solution (including federal state) is ruled out if it is agreeable to both sides. HMG has always been convinced that any solution which will have to be imposed will not be solution at all. From these basic premises and trend events Wright said (without definitely committing higher authority) that HMG thinking inclines to conclude that early establishment compact and homogeneous sovereign Jewish State within sensible frontiers would be in best interests Arabs if they can be persuaded to accept it. He thinks it possible, however, that if acceptance is to be secured some international action on guarantee of frontiers and probably on settlement of additional number of Jewish displaced persons elsewhere than in Israel might have to be thrown into the balance. Size and shape of Jewish State might differ considerably from boundaries envisaged in Assembly resolution and as part such a settlement, Jerusalem and Haifa might both be placed under international regimes. If, however, Arabs are not at present prepared to accept settlement along these lines (and it might take some time for them to do so) HMG believes that Mediator would do well to temporize (paragraph 5 above) and in the prolonged truce work out regimes for Jerusalem and Haifa. During prolonged truce HMG would hope tensions would ease and time would conspire to make views both sides less intransigent; i.e., although Arabs might not accept existence sovereign Jewish State now they might do so later and Jews after operating within their *de facto* frontiers for some months might come to realize advantages of a compact state.

DOUGLAS

Editorial Note

Chargé Jefferson Patterson, on June 25, reported that he had held informal talks with Arab League officials and representatives of member states, during which "Arab discouragement apparent at lack of arms and at evident intention US to create at all costs Jewish State. Nevertheless determination voiced in private and to press (1) to reject all solutions Palestine whether put forward by Bernadotte or not which envisage partition or creation Jewish State; (2) resume fighting at end of truce even at cost of defeat and overthrow existing govts if alternative acceptable proposals not available."

Ahmed al-Rawi, Director General of the Iraqi Foreign Office, sug-

gested to Mr. Patterson that "US as best friend of Jews might advise Jews accept unitary state since they with their superior knowledge, technique and experience could gain peaceably all they seek through domination such state in 10 years. Al Rawi's suggestion may have been put forward as alternative to Vatican state idea with division of remaining territory among Arab states which is currently rumored having approval various Arab leaders". Mr. Patterson concluded that the "Arabs apparently find themselves in dilemma. If they, by above or any other compromise scheme, accept Jewish state several Arab Govts, probably not Egypt, risk [being] overthrown by resentful masses. On other hand they face similar or greater risk if armies are beaten in field. In latter case they argue, however, blame can be thrown on America for support and assistance to Jews and on Great Britain for its refusal under American pressure to honor treaty commitments to supply arms." (Telegram 841 from Cairo, 501.BB Palestine/6-2548)

867N.01/6-2548 : Telegram

The Vice Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

JERUSALEM, June 25, 1948.

973. Mimeographed circular entitled "Memorandum of the Cease-Fire", dated June 23rd and issued by Stern Gang Jerusalem has just been left at Consulate General gate. Following is résumé:

"Cease-fire is British-Arab ruse to whittle down already shrunken Jewish State. By limitation of immigration during cease-fire, relative proportion between opposing forces altered due fact sea blockade of Israel strictly enforced Bernadotte while comparative freedom land movement enjoyed by Arabs. Sea transportation of arms to Israel blocked while Arabs continue receive arms overland.

Future of Jerusalem depends on stockpiling of food, arms and munitions. Cease-fire prevents this but Arabs continue their encirclement of New Jerusalem in attempt force its surrender as they did that of Jewish quarter Old City.

PGI in agreeing to cease-fire written own indictment.

Fighters for freedom of Israel cannot and do not regard foreign observers as neutral factor. They party to intrigues of British policy. Americans, French, Belgians, Swedes, are all in effect acting as British agents to fulfill a British mission. They constitute a foreign body hostile to us which penetrated into our country under guise of neutrality. USSR and Eastern European countries were not permitted to send observers since such delegates would ensure the impartial application of all the cease-fire terms."

BURDETT

501.BB Palestine/5-2348 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Jessup)

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, June 25, 1948—3 p. m.

429. Re telephone talks of Jessup with Gross and Sandifer (referred to in USUN 807 of June 23 ¹) Dept believes it would be inappropriate and unwise to attempt at this time to carry Lebanon, Syria or Egypt to ICJ concerning measures taken or announced by those states which US Govt has recently protested. In case of Lebanon, no measures in nature of blockade have been announced by that Govt, and *Marine Carp* incident is in process of settlement through diplomatic channels. Measures announced by Syria and Egypt, which are intended to result in blockade of Palestine, have not in fact been applied in any specific case which would give rise to US protest or claim. Apart from these legal considerations affecting US position, it is believed that taking a case against one of Arab countries to ICJ at this time, on a question concerning Palestine, might affect adversely chance of a political solution in Palestine being attained through truce and efforts of UN mediator. If a specific case were to arise, under Syrian or Egyptian measures, which affected US interests, Dept would again weigh at that time question of going to ICJ.

MARSHALL

¹ Not printed; this message, signed by Mr. Jessup, read as follows: "Confirming my phone talks with Gross and Sandifer, we feel it might be generally helpful if USG were to suggest to Egyptian and Syrian Governments that question of attempted blockade of Palestine be submitted to International Court or alternatively to the Court's Chamber of Summary Procedure." (501.BB Palestine/6-2348)

867N.01/6-2548 : Telegram

The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Childs) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

JIDDA, June 25, 1948—3 p. m.

373. Following summary conclusions regarding Palestine from point view SAG :

(1) King has issued orders enjoining strictest compliance by SAG with UN truce Palestine.

(2) There are no signs King can be reconciled Palestine settlement involving Arab acceptance Israel.

(3) Failure our part reply King's inquiry (Legtel 307 May 22 ¹) regarding US-Palestine policy is being interpreted as further indication US is resolved weight scales favor Israel at expense Arabs and is resulting in less friendly and more rigid policy towards US interests Saudi Arabia (Shaikh Yusuf Deputy Foreign Minister has indicated this cooling off toward US Government which formerly enjoyed

¹ Not printed, but see editorial note, p. 1030.

unique position this country will not extend to impairment close personal relations between members government and US Chief Mission).

(4) SAG policy Palestine will continue conform that Arab League and there will hence be no attempt at deviation therefrom nor will there be any pressure exerted in Arab League in favor moderate prudent policy as there was last year in effort to draw line between SAG's economic and political interests. Once US cast die by recognition Israel SAG has cast die in turn with Arab League.

(5) There is only faintest hope anything will come truce. If hostilities renewed and US pursues policy susceptible interpretation as substantial departure from one neutrality as between Israel and Arabs vigorous counteraction may be anticipated by Arab League with which SAG will conform including taking such sanctions as may be available. These may include one or all following or some modification thereof:

(a) Transfer Dhahran air base to British; (b) cancellation Aramco concession; (c) break in diplomatic relations.

It is my considered view we have every reason to be deeply concerned regarding decline in our position in this area of such great strategical economic importance to US. Extent to which our position may be retrieved in part or even our impaired position conserved depends I believe entirely upon policy which US will pursue henceforth. SAG will look however to acts rather than verbal assurances and will be guided exclusively by former.

Sent Department 373; repeated London 110, Dhahran 195, pouched Arab capitals.

CHILDS

501.BB Palestine/6-2548: Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the United Nations Mediator in Palestine (Bernadotte)*¹

SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 25, 1948—6 p. m.

US Govt desires do all that is proper and possible facilitate your efforts discourage violations paragraph 6 peace proposals. At present time it is continuing pursue a policy inaugurated some time ago of refraining grant passport facilities to American citizens to visit Palestine and Arab countries unless it has been clearly established that their business is of an important and urgent nature and that they do not intend participate directly or indirectly in hostilities in or against Palestine.

Since however Mediator rather than US Govt may determine whether entry of American nationals or other persons proceeding from

¹ Sent to the Consulate General at Jerusalem in telegram 654, "For transmission by such means as available to Count Bernadotte".

US to Palestine and Arab countries would be in contravention of truce terms it is difficult for US authorities effectively to screen persons embarking at American ports for such destinations. It would be appreciated if the Mediator would inform the US Govt whether he desires that screening should be done at time vessels arrive in Near Eastern ports or whether he would prefer send an observer to US for consultation with officials of this Govt regarding screening prior embarkation. US Govt assures Mediator of full cooperation in rendering effective any decision which he may make this connection.

Repeated to USUN as 430.

MARSHALL

501.BB Palestine/6-2448: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 25, 1948—6 p. m.

2402. For the Ambassador from Lovett. Assumptions set forth Para. 4 your 2785, June 24, are correct. We hope, now the "entente cordiale" has been reestablished, that both govts will be able to pull in tandem to assist in the constructive working out of this onerous Palestine problem.

Since views on both sides are not yet crystallized in the form of top level policy we suggest that for time being these interchanges of views by telegram be classified "Top Secret".

Re channel of communications in development of our views on Palestine, we concur with Wright's view that you should be principal means of communication to British Govt. Neither Cadogan nor the Embassy here have as direct and as influential access to Bevin as you and, in consequence, while the description set forth of your task in the final sentence of Para. 5 is painfully exact, we shall be glad to look to you as our principal negotiator with the UK.

It will be apparent from summary of our thinking set forth in third para. of Deptel 2348¹ that there is a very large measure of agreement between ourselves and British Foreign Office as to the most sensible arrangement of the Palestine issue, keeping always in mind the requirements on this govt to maintain its recognition of the State of Israel.

We thoroughly agree with British that Mediator's best course, in light of Arab intransigence and the extreme statements which Arab

¹ Dated June 22, p. 1133.

leaders have made, would be to temporize and to spin out the truce. We feel that, once the habit of not shooting at each other becomes more developed, its popularity will increase with both Jews and Arabs. We plan, as members of the Truce Commission, to give this advice to Count Bernadotte.

We are gratified by the energy and skill which you have displayed in treating with Bevin on this problem, which is so surcharged with emotion as well as difficulty, and would welcome your views as to an eventual *modus vivendi* and any comment you may have in mind on our own ideas in this regard. [Lovett.]

MARSHALL

501.BB Palestine/6-748 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt

SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 25, 1948—6 p. m.

876. Reurtels 692 June 7¹ containing text provisions truce Palestine, 740 June 12¹ and USDel NY unnumbered tel June 16¹ transmitting SC request all States Members extend cooperation and assistance to UN Mediator in implementation provisions of truce.

US Army AmZone Germany has requested State-Army for directions re movement DPs to Palestine. Depts Army-State cabling US mil authorities Germany Austria text para VI containing immigration provisions truce and simultaneously authorizing exit AmZones Germany and Austria of Palestine certificate holders specifically excepting fighting personnel. Authorization exit men mil age has been deferred until word recd from Mediator as to (1) whether he desires to send observers AmZones Germany Austria to consult with US mil authorities re exit men mil age and (2) if so, when observers will arrive AmZones Germany Austria. Pursuant SC request June 16 US mil authorities Germany Austria also being requested extend cooperation assistance Mediator. Pls secure Bernadotte's answers foregoing questions and such other observations as he may make for transmission by Dept to US mil authorities.²

MARSHALL

¹Not printed.

²This telegram was repeated to Berlin, London, and Vienna. Count Bernadotte did not reply until August 3, when he advised that he did not intend to send observers to the American zones of Germany and Austria because of the necessity of concentrating them in the Middle East (telegram 1096, August 4, 6 p. m., from Cairo, 501.BB Palestine/8-448).

501.BB Palestine/6-2548: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Jerusalem

SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 25, 1948—7 p. m.

658. For Macdonald.¹ As US member of Truce Commission we feel that you should indicate to Count Bernadotte our profound gratification at success which has thus far attended his efforts in maintaining the truce and cease-fire which are due to end on July 9. At same time, as US member of Truce Commission, you should contrive to make it clear to both Arabs and Jews that we are equally gratified by statesmanship and self-restraint which they have exhibited under conditions where such self-discipline was most difficult to apply.

We do not wish to intervene with unnecessary advice in a situation which is maturing delicately and slowly. However, it seems obvious that it will be necessary to extend truce and cease-fire arrangement for a longer period than the original 4-weeks ordered by the SC. You should prepare as a member of Truce Commission to exert every effort in assisting Mediator should he so desire to extend truce and cease-fire, expressing confident hope of this govt that to refrain from reengaging in hostilities will eventually make it possible for both Arabs and Jews to develop a lasting and peaceful arrangement for mutual accommodation in regard to Palestine.²

Repeated to USUN as 431 with request this message be transmitted for info to Count Bernadotte.

Repeated for info to London as 2415, Paris as 2307, Brussels as 979, Beirut as 375, Cairo as 877, Haifa as 180, Damascus as 252, Baghdad as 225, Jidda as 248.

MARSHALL

¹ John J. Macdonald, the Consul General at Jerusalem. The Department notified New York on June 24 that Mr. Macdonald had been designated United States Representative on the Truce Commission, succeeding the late Mr. Wasson (telegram 423, 501.BB Palestine/6-2448).

² Jerusalem reported, on June 28, that the contents of telegram 658 had been communicated to Count Bernadotte and that the contents of the last paragraph were being conveyed orally to the Arabs and the Jews (telegram 989, 501.BB Palestine/6-2848).

Minister Childs communicated the substance of the same message to Shaikh Yussef, who transmitted it to King Ibn Saud. The latter, having taken counsel with King Abdullah, then visiting the Saudi monarch, directed that a reply be made. The text of the reply, given in telegram 388, July 1, noon, from Jidda, stated that the two monarchs wished to reach a just solution of the Palestine question that would accord the Arabs their rights and that they were hoping for and counting on the justice of the United States Government (501.BB Palestine/7-148).

867N.01/6-2748: Telegram

The Consul General at Jerusalem (Macdonald) to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED

JERUSALEM, June 27, 1948—2 p. m.

988. Representative of Israeli Foreign Office in Jerusalem said that Israeli Foreign Minister Shertok in speech in Tel Aviv on June 15 formally stated position of PGI that there can be no mass return of Palestinian Arabs to Israel until general political settlement and end of war. Shertok speech also stated that Arabs could not return except as full citizens Jewish state acknowledging its authority and sovereignty. Reference was also made to screening. Israeli Foreign Office representative Jerusalem indicated this speech does represent stated policy of PGI and as such is shift from previous policy.

Consulate General believes that majority of Arabs now refugees from areas within Israel will never return under conditions and that their bitterness, already deep rooted, will only be increased by PGI statement. So far, however, Palestinian Arabs with whom Consulate General officials have talked have not commented on Shertok's statement.

MACDONALD

867N.01/6-2848

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] June 28, 1948.

Participants: Mr. James Grover McDonald, U.S. Special Representative to Israel

Mr. Lovett—U

Mr. Satterthwaite—NEA

Mr. Mattison—NEA

Mr. McClintock—UNA

Mr. McDonald called by appointment at 3 p. m., June 25. He had seen the President earlier in the day and had had a general conversation in which the President stressed his desire to have his own independent means of communication and of information to and from the State of Israel. The President had not indicated when he thought Mr. McDonald should proceed to his post. It was agreed that the Foreign

¹ Drafted by Mr. McClintock.

Service personnel for Tel Aviv should precede Mr. McDonald and establish the Mission in working order before he, himself, went to Israel.

[Here follows a discussion of Mr. McDonald's travel orders and of his salary and allowances.]

There was a general discussion of the background of the Palestine question, during which Mr. McDonald emphatically indicated his "curbstone opinion" that the Department's policy, as enunciated by Ambassador Austin on February 24, was wrong.

[Here follow personal observations by Mr. McDonald concerning Ambassadors Wadsworth and Tuck.]

I remarked that we were fortunate in having so able and distinguished an American as Ambassador Stanton Griffis as our next Ambassador in Cairo. I said it was a relief to have a man in such a post who was not either pro-Arab or pro-Zion or pro-anything, but just plain pro-American. Mr. McDonald seemed to be not unresponsive to this observation, since he reverted to it and said he wondered how my Foreign Service advisers would take such a crack. My Foreign Service advisers said that they knew perfectly what I had in mind.

*Text of Suggestions Presented by Count Bernadotte, at Rhodes, to the Two Parties on June 28, 1948*¹

[Here follows Part I, the introductory statement, in which the Mediator interpreted his role "not as one involving the handing down of decisions on the future situation in Palestine, but as one of offering suggestions on the basis of which further discussions might take place and possibly counter-suggestions be put forth looking toward a peaceful settlement of this difficult problem. My suggestions at this stage, then, must clearly be of such nature as to provide a reasonable framework of reference within which the two parties may find it possible to continue their consultations with me toward the end of a peaceful adjustment."]

PART II. SUGGESTIONS PRESENTED BY THE MEDIATOR ON PALESTINE

The Mediator advanced the following suggestions as a possible basis for discussion :

1. That, subject to the willingness of the directly interested parties to consider such an arrangement, Palestine, as defined in the original Mandate entrusted to the United Kingdom in 1922, that is including

¹ Reprinted from SC, 3rd yr., *Supplement for July 1948*, pp. 18-21. The text was released by the United Nations on July 4.

Transjordan, might form a Union comprising two members, one Arab and one Jewish.

2. That the boundaries of the two members be determined in the first instance by negotiation with the assistance of the Mediator and on the basis of suggestions to be made by him. When agreement is reached on the main outlines of the boundaries they will be definitively fixed by a Boundaries Commission.

3. That the purposes and function of the Union should be to promote common economic interests, to operate and maintain common services, including customs and excise, to undertake development projects and to co-ordinate foreign policy and measures for common defence.

4. That the functions and authority of the Union might be exercised through a central council and such other organs as the members of the Union may determine.

5. That, subject to the provision of the Instrument of Union, each member of the Union may exercise full control over its own affairs including its foreign relations.

6. Immigration within its own borders should be within the competence of each member, provided that following a period of two years from the establishment of the Union, either member would be entitled to request the Council of the Union to review the immigration policy of the other member and to render a ruling thereon in terms of the common interests of the Union. In the event of the inability of the Council to reach a decision on the matter, the issue could be referred by either member to the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations whose decision, taking into account the principle of economic absorptive capacity, would be binding on the member whose policy is at issue.

7. That religious and minority rights be fully protected by each member of the Union and guaranteed by the United Nations.

8. That Holy Places, religious buildings and sites be preserved and that existing rights in respect of the same be fully guaranteed by each member of the Union.

9. That recognition be accorded to the right of residents of Palestine who, because of conditions created by the conflict there have left their normal places of abode, to return to their homes without restriction and to regain possession of their property.

PART III. ANNEX TO THE SUGGESTIONS: TERRITORIAL MATTERS

With regard to paragraph 2 of the suggestions, it is considered that certain territorial arrangements might be worthy of consideration. These might be along the following lines:

1. Inclusion of the whole or part of the Negeb in Arab territory.
2. Inclusion of the whole or part of Western Galilee in Jewish territory.

3. Inclusion of the City of Jerusalem in Arab territory, with municipal autonomy for the Jewish community and special arrangements for the protection of the Holy Places.

4. Consideration of the status of Jaffa.

5. Establishment of a free port at Haifa, the area of the free port to include the refineries and terminals.

6. Establishment of a free airport at Lydda.²

COUNT FOLKE BERNADOTTE
United Nations Mediator on Palestine

²In a cablegram of June 30 to Secretary-General Lie, Count Bernadotte reported on his invitations to Arab and Jewish representatives to discuss his suggestions with him at Rhodes or to make counter-suggestions. If not feasible, he informed them of his willingness to meet each side at places of their choosing. The cablegram noted that the Mediator had not sought a joint meeting of Arabs and Jews at Rhodes or a round-table conference; for text, see SC, *3rd yr., Supplement for July 1948*, p. 12.

867N.01/6-2548

*Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to the President's
Special Counsel (Clifford)*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, June 28, 1948.

Subject: Activities of the Irgun Zvai Leumi and Stern Gang in Palestine

I wish to draw your especial attention to the two attached telegrams from Jerusalem (963 of June 24 and 973 of June 25).

As you know, we have been working on a plan for the internationalization of Jerusalem and have had some indication that the International Red Cross would be willing to cooperate in such a venture. Before the present truce they had succeeded in establishing three security zones in Jerusalem where non-combatants could take refuge, and it has been our hope that the idea of a security zone could be spread to include all of Jerusalem.

While there have been minor violations of the truce, it has to date been reasonably well observed by both the Jews and the Arabs. However, telegram no. 963 presents a rather alarming picture of the activities of the Irgun and Stern Gang. It appears that both groups have succeeded in bringing reinforcements into the city during the truce period and are now fortifying the strategic positions within the city. Dr. Joseph, Chairman of the Jewish Jerusalem Emergency Committee, has informed the Truce Commission that he is unable to be responsible for the acts of the Irgun and Stern Gang in Jerusalem. Telegram no. 973 of June 25 summarizes a circular of the Stern Gang which constitutes a veiled threat against the American, French, Belgian and Swedish observers now in Palestine. They characterize these observers as a "foreign body hostile to us which penetrated into our country under guise of neutrality".

Further difficulties which the Provisional Government of Israel is facing are illustrated by the incident at Tel Aviv in which an Irgun

ship operated by the Peter Bergson group engaged in open conflict with Hagannah.¹

I fear that the situation in Jerusalem may become increasingly serious and threaten the whole structure of the present truce. For this reason I suggest that you show the President the two telegrams attached.

ROBERT A. LOVETT

¹ See footnote 1, p. 1142.

867N.01/6-2848: Telegram

The Chargé in Egypt (Patterson) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

CAIRO, June 28, 1948—9 a. m.

857. Embassy unable to verify as correct report Israel would bar 300,000 Arab refugees from Jewish state (Deptel 843, June 21, 1948¹). It is suggested that while such action can no doubt be justified by Israel as necessary security measure for new state, its application probably would (1) confirm current Arab view that no peace or security exists for Arabs if Jewish state is permitted and that statements by Zionists that they seek Arab friendship have no basis in fact; (2) convince Arabs that real intention of Jews is to dispossess refugee Arabs of property and enterprises in Israel in order to provide space and economic opportunities for Jewish immigrants.

Action would, therefore, probably intensify Arab bitterness towards Jews everywhere and possibly lead to recriminatory action against Jews in Arab section Palestine and in Arab states including eviction and confiscation of property.

Sent Department 857, paraphrase to Arab capitals.

PATTERSON

¹ This was a repeat of telegram 629 to Jerusalem; not printed.

501.BB Palestine/6-2848: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Jessup)

TOP SECRET

US URGENT

WASHINGTON, June 28, 1948—6 p. m.

436. With reference to Lie's note of June 25¹ requesting that the Belgian, French and US Govts supply contingents in equal numbers to make up the 1,000 man UN guard for Jerusalem to be at the disposal of the UN Mediator, please make the following reply to SYG Lie:

As members of the SC Truce Commission we agree to the formula

¹ Incorporated in telegram 817 from New York of the same date, not printed.

he has suggested, that members of the Jerusalem guard be recruited from nationals of the govts which compose the Truce Commission; i.e., Belgium, France and the US.

However, we are not in a position to second American forces for UN guard duty, nor are we able to recruit American citizens for such duty.

Please inform SYG Lie that we believe the most efficacious manner of handling this question would be for himself, as Secretary General, to employ 333 American citizens for UN guard duty in Jerusalem, and that he send representatives to France and Belgium to gather similar contingents in those countries. We prefer and think it wise that this be a UN effort under the responsibility and powers of the SYG. As indicated Deptel 419, June 23, we believe that Jerusalem guard should be entirely distinct from Lie's projected UN guard.

Repeated to Paris as 2344, Brussels as 990, London as 2435, Jerusalem 665.

MARSHALL

501.BB Palestine/6-2948 : Telegram

The Chargé in Egypt (Patterson) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

CAIRO, June 29, 1948—4 p. m.

875. Conversations Arab League officials and representatives Arab states since my telegram 778, June 16, suggest Bernadotte personally, and his mission, have lost influence with many leading Arabs. Failure to take vigorous action in alleged Jewish violations of truce as in *Altalena* incident at Tel Aviv and by Irgun and Stern at Jerusalem has raised concern as to ability or willingness to redress balance as announced. Bunche's connection with Anglo-American commission which recommended partition has also raised doubt his disinterestedness. Current opinion inclined to regard every US action as calculated not to produce lasting peace, but to hamper Arabs and assist Jews. Consequently, Bernadotte's mission held merely another UN instrument forged by US to support Jewish state. Press also points to US Jews among military observers as indicative America's lack of neutrality. Foreign Office official informally expressed view to me today that US exchange diplomatic representative with Israel was regarded by Arabs as violation truce since it violated *status quo* through implication that US supported Jewish state.¹

¹ The Syrian Foreign Office sent a note to the American Legation, received June 29, which accused the United States of violating the truce by accrediting a Minister Plenipotentiary at Tel Aviv. This action, according to the Syrian note, ruptured the *status quo* called for by the truce (telegram 406, June 29, from Damascus, 501.BB Palestine/6-2948).

According to Military Attaché here, Egyptian military authorities have stated that US military observers in Palestine imply that full information concerning Arab positions will eventually fall into Jewish hands and that Military Attaché can no longer count cooperation Egyptian military authorities with his office.

Local attitude remains antagonistic to US. Sentiment stimulated by unilateral British action in Sudan also running high against British for refusal arms contrary to treaties, although American pressure on Great Britain is generally held to be responsible. Arab circles already suggesting that Britain can hardly break treaties at will, at same time it insists on strict treaty observance by Arabs.

PATTERSON

501.BB Palestine/6-1848 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

SECRET US URGENT

WASHINGTON, June 29, 1948—6 p. m.

2463. For Douglas from Lovett. British Embassy yesterday handed us text of telegram from UK FonOff to Count Bernadotte at Rhodes, regarding reopening of Haifa oil refinery. Cf. urtel 2702, June 18 and Deptel 2332, June 22.

Bevin's approach to Bernadotte seems to go somewhat further than originally contemplated in 4th para. your 2702. We had impression from that telegram that his suggestion for an international administration at Haifa to cover oil port under Mediator's auspices would be for a limited period and noted in particular that FonOff had in mind a very small international control element consisting possibly of one administrator with a small staff and police force. However, Mr. Bevin in his telegram to Bernadotte discusses establishment of an international administration over port area, including oil docks and refinery, or possibly an international regime covering entire city. He says that an additional argument in favor of establishing a free port in Haifa under international control is that this would guarantee freedom of transit to Arab ports of Palestine and to Transjordan, for which Haifa is normal port of entry.

This govt in assenting to Mr. Bevin's earlier views on Haifa had in mind that Mediator could assist both Jews and Arabs to maintain their normal civil economy by lending his good offices to reopening of Haifa refinery and to ensuring that use of refinery would not increase military potential of either side. Although a permanent international

regime for city of Haifa, which is an integral part of State of Israel which this Govt has formally recognized, might offer several advantages to both sides, we could not support such a regime unless it were freely consented to by PGI, without any pressure from US. We are, however, prepared to concur in a temporary international regime for petroleum facilities of Haifa and the oil port under Bernadotte's auspices so long as he is operating under terms of SC resolution of May 29 and GA resolution of May 14.

Kindly make our views known to Mr. Bevin and explain that we regret if there has been any misunderstanding on this score. You should add that this telegram is being repeated to Count Bernadotte for his info.

Repeated USUN as 437 with request that SYG transmit this telegram to Bernadotte for his info.

Repeated Haifa as 185, Jerusalem as 670, Cairo as 892, Paris as 2375, Brussels as 999. [Lovett.]

MARSHALL

501.BB Palestine/6-3048 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Jerusalem (Macdonald) to the
Secretary of State*

SECRET

JERUSALEM, June 30, 1948—4 p. m.

1009. During official call today on Commander Shaltiel, Jewish military commander Jerusalem, possibility of extending truce was mentioned. He said Israel does not desire extension for political and military reasons. He accused Arabs of constant violations truce stressing chiefly their refusal supply water Jerusalem. He also stated HMG is advising Transjordan ruler not to agree to renewal of truce and encouraging Arab Legion to resume hostilities.

Bernard Joseph, chairman Jewish Jerusalem Emergency Command liaison officer Truce Commission, claims Jews should not have agreed to truce as they were on verge of military victory. He does not think truce will be extended and judging from his remarks he is not in favor of extension.

Consensus Jews Jerusalem is that truce will not be extended. Jewish leaders give impression of feeling confident of military victory. If truce not extended they will undoubtedly try place entire blame on Arabs in hope of increasing pro-Jewish sympathy in US and repeal of arms embargo.

Arab attitude re truce extension will be reported after calls on Arab leaders tomorrow.

MACDONALD

501.BB Palestine/6-3048: Telegram

The Chargé in Egypt (Patterson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

CAIRO. June 30, 1948—4 p. m.

SS1. Amir Faisal today gave Ireland further details Bernadotte's suggestions which were confirmed by Syrian Prime Minister Mardam Bey. Suggestions advocate two states Jewish and Arab with common functions including economics. Jewish state to be established within boundaries set up by UN with relinquishment of Negeb in exchange for certain areas including western Galilee. Immigration to be unlimited. Arab state to be Transjordan plus Arab section Palestine. Future of Jaffa to be settled by negotiation.

Amir Faisal and Mardam while acknowledging Bernadotte had couched suggestions in conciliatory language and had requested they not be rejected out of hand made it clear that suggestions were unacceptable. Faisal declared suggestions denied everything Arabs sought and gave Jews everything they were seeking. Mardam declared suggestions worse than partition since if accepted would make Transjordan a Jewish colony through joint economic functions and constitute even greater menace to Arab world. Both clearly indicated opposition to aggrandizement Abdullah.

Amir Faisal declared that unless better suggestions forthcoming Arabs would have no choice but resume fighting July 9 notwithstanding consequences to Arabs through inability secure arms and possible UN sanctions including lifting arms embargo by US. Declared recent events showed Jews getting arms from US and hence lifting embargo would not greatly alter their situation. US must also be aware that Arabs could impose sanctions including cancellation oil concessions. He said withdrawal concessions did not mean Arabia would not reoffer them as to Belgium Italy or even Russia. Latter might lead to unfortunate results but cited Arab proverb "drowning man will grasp even a serpent."

Ireland gained unmistakable impression that weight of both Faisal and Mardam Bey would be thrown against acceptance Bernadotte's present suggestions or any proposal to extend truce. Both declared they had opposed acceptance truce and that events had shown their arguments justified.

Sent Department as SS1; repeated London as 66; paraphrase by pouch to Arab capitals.

PATTERSON

501.BB Palestine/6-2548 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Acting United States Representative at
the United Nations (Jessup)*

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, June 30, 1948—8 p. m.

438. Line you took as expressed in first para. your 819, June 25,¹ seems adequately to cover problem raised by Eban with regard to seating Representative of PGI in SC, if in fact, JA has ceased to exist as political body.

You may tell Eban that your line of response to him has been approved by this govt. As a matter of friendly counsel you may wish to suggest to him that it might do his cause more harm than good if question were made too much of an issue in Council at this time. We have in mind that from July 1 Manuilsky of the Ukraine will be Council Chairman and that he might be delighted to magnify this matter out of all proportion to suit ulterior motives of USSR.

You may tell Eban that, if issue comes to vote before Council, as govt which has recognized *de facto* authority of PGI, we will vote in favor of seating representative of PGI in SC in lieu of former representative of JA. However, if it seems evident that motion to this end will not receive necessary 7 affirmative votes, Eban will wish to consider whether some compromise language might not be preferable. We have in mind in this connection language taken from GA resolution of May 14 which speaks of "local and community authorities in Palestine". It might be possible for SC to seat Eban as "representative of Jewish authorities in Palestine" and he would still be free to style himself as representative of PGI. This is, however, merely a suggestion for his own consideration.

Although Eban states that JA has ceased to exist as political body we note that in Jerusalem JA is spokesman of Jewish interests there. It seems desirable for this situation to continue, since Jerusalem is not within state of Israel. Accordingly, Council should not take such action as might exclude possibility of hearing a representative of JA when matters concerning city of Jerusalem are under consideration.

MARSHALL

¹ Not printed; the first paragraph reported that Mr. Eban had sought the views of the United States concerning the instructions of his government to raise in the Security Council the question of his status as representative of the Provisional Government of Israel rather than of the Jewish Agency. "We told him we had anticipated this question might arise when SC commenced reconsideration of Palestine question immediately following close of special GA. At that time our view was there would be no reason to make an issue of this matter and that on basis precedent of Indonesian Republic, it seemed reasonable for us to agree to changing status of JA representative. The seating of a representative of the PGI of course had nothing whatever to do with the question of recognition of Israel. The question of recognition was one which individual governments, members of SC would have to decide for themselves." (501.BB Palestine/6-2548)

501.BB Palestine/6-3048 : Telegram

*The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations
(Jessup) to the Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET URGENT

NEW YORK, June 30, 1948—8:30 p. m.

831. Department may find following comments, which are framed largely in light of accumulation of data acquired by USUN in conversations here over several months, helpful in formulating our policy with regard to the "peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine."

A. PROBABLE EFFECTIVENESS OF BERNADOTTE

1. Latest information from Bernadotte, in particular his personal telegram to Lie of June 20 (reported to Department orally June 21; text sent to Department as USUN 809¹) indicates that Bernadotte's tactics will be to try to gain time and to make rather vague proposals instead of precise and firm proposals during remainder of first four-week truce period.

2. Paragraph 3 of London's 2701² indicates that Bevin is inclined to think that Arabs and Jews may not reach agreement under Bernadotte's auspices without much delay, and then probably not without USG and HMG getting involved to some degree as sources of advice.

3. Opinion here, based on recent conversations with Beeley, McNaughton, Parodi, Asil, Eban, Lie and others, would go somewhat further than Bevin's somewhat modest comment. General view here is that sooner or later Bernadotte will be confronted with basically extreme and apparent irreconcilable Jewish and Arab positions and that at this point influence of US and UK will be essential to persuade parties to come to terms.

4. We are glad to note Department's agreement (2348 from Washington to London³) with Bevin's suggestion concerning the development of a common policy with UK in regard to Palestine as reported in paragraph 4 of London's 2701. It is our view that this is essential not only to facilitate Bernadotte's task but also for the broader reasons dealt with in earlier discussions with the British in London, Washington, and New York. Friendly delegations here have freely expressed to us view that US-UK cooperation re Palestine essential to prevent growth of Soviet influence in area.

5. We feel that Bernadotte should be given as free a hand as possible. Also, with a single reservation, we consider it axiomatic that any solution upon which Bernadotte can get the two parties to agree should be acceptable to US and UK (reference paragraph 2, London's

¹ Dated June 23, not printed; but see footnote 1, p. 1138.

² Dated June 18, p. 1121.

³ Dated June 22, p. 1133.

2701 and paragraph 6, London's 2785 ⁴). Reservation is that although perhaps very unlikely it is conceivable that such solution in some particular aspect might be contrary to our interests. We feel we should avoid giving to Bernadotte any impression that so far as we are concerned he has a completely blank check. To avoid such impression we suggest we inform Bernadotte discreetly that we are definitely interested in any proposed solution. This might best be done by letting Bernadotte know very informally through UN Secretariat here that USG would be very glad to give him its comments on any suggests or proposals he may make from time to time to the parties. This procedure would also serve dual purpose of keeping us fully informed concerning Secretariat views. We consider this very important since Secretariat influence is probably predominant in light of Lie-Bernadotte friendship, fact that strong Secretariat personnel is attached to Lie, and fact that US-UK have very little direct contact with Bernadotte.

B. EXTENSION OF TRUCE

1. Representative of PGI here has reiterated that truce is definitely to advantage of Israel. Obvious advantages are PGI is provided by truce with opportunity to consolidate its position; this includes putting down such revolts as recent Irgun affair at Tel-Aviv. Also opinion in Arab states as well as world public opinion would more readily get accustomed to idea of State of Israel under peaceful conditions. An opportunity would be provided for more diplomatic recognitions and exchange of representatives.

2. Parenthetically, it is obviously important from the viewpoint of our relations with Israel and other governments and in dealing with this question in UN to know whether or not PGI will continue to be able in fact to deal effectively not only with the Irgun but also with the Sternists and other dissident elements, particularly those susceptible to Communist influence. This is a particularly difficult problem with respect to Jerusalem (Jerusalem's 963 ⁵). As we see it, problem here to which we suggest Department give urgent attention is whether Mediator should be expected to deal with this aspect of problem in Jerusalem, bearing in mind possible complications with respect to use of proposed armed guards or whether PGI should be expected to deal with problem and if so how they might be assisted in doing so, bearing in mind Israel does not have nor does it claim any legal or *de facto* control in Jerusalem.

3. Arabs, of course, might object initially to extension of truce because of advantages derived therefrom by Israel. On other hand, evidence indicates that Arabs for most part are tired of fighting and

⁴ Dated June 24, p. 1143.

⁵ Dated June 24, p. 1141.

have been shown up as poorly organized and equipped from military viewpoint. It seems clear that only Transjordan has a respectable fighting force but stands more to gain by a negotiated settlement.

4. Extension of truce would provide opportunity to de-emphasize, to some extent at least, political aspects of the future settlement and in turn to begin emphasizing those aspects, particularly economic, with regard to which it might be considerably easier to find a common ground for agreement, thus facilitating the political settlement.

5. Having indicated in a general way to UK and to Bernadotte (Department's 658 to Jerusalem⁶) that we favor extension of truce, we suggest that Department now give urgent consideration to question whether truce should be extended only for additional four-weeks period or for a longer period, say a minimum of eight weeks or a maximum of six months. Advantages of six months extension, if feasible, would be (*a*) more time for passions to cool off; (*b*) more time and better atmosphere for Bernadotte to work out extremely complex and difficult negotiations; (*c*) more time to work out details of concerted policy with British; (*d*) more time for developing our relations with Israel and Arab states towards the desired ends; (*e*) minimizing risk of breakdown of mediation efforts because question extension of truce not coming up every few weeks; (*f*) minimizing of exploitation of issues in public discussion periodically in SC; (*g*) minimizing of opportunity for exploitation and possible reopening of whole question in Paris GA; (*h*) while we would not, of course, wish in any sense to delay peaceful settlement, Department might consider it preferable if recurrent issues and crisis of final stage of negotiations could be avoided before end of year or first of next year.

C. MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS FOR PEACEFUL ADJUSTMENT

1. Full sovereignty for Israel. We feel (*a*) that PGI will never accept any compromise with full sovereignty for Israel; (*b*) that opinion this country will not permit any deviation from this objective so far as USG is concerned; and (*c*) that Soviets, satellite and probably other governments will support Israeli view. Eban, PGI representative here, has recently made view his government on this point very clear to us. While current British thinking seems leaning direction basing future settlement on recognition Israel, it seems essential to us to clarify earliest with British and at appropriate time to make clear to Arabs, Bernadotte and others concerned exactly what "recognition of Israel" means. Even very moderate Arab opinion reflected in Asil-Ross conversation indicates Arabs would hold out for "compromising" Israeli sovereignty re (*a*) conduct foreign relations, (*b*) defense, (*c*) finance, and (*d*) immigration. Regarding (*d*), in our

⁶ Dated June 25, p. 1150.

opinion PGI must be given full freedom to control immigration but we would not exclude possibility PGI might adopt and announce in advance of settlement its own immigration limitation based upon capacity to support and absorb immigrants. Regarding (a), (b) and (c) we see no insuperable obstacle to agreement between PGI and Abdullah on some treaty formulation of common action perhaps by analogy to frequently mentioned Austro-Hungarian precedent. Viewpoint other Arabs, particularly Syria, as reflected recent conversations here with Khouri and cables from Damascus, indicates more extreme view. If Bevin, reported by Beeley two weeks ago still to be leaning in direction federated state, should feel impelled to support even moderate Arab viewpoint, result might well be another serious split on this fundamental point in US-UK understanding.

2. Support of Israel's application for membership in UN. While not necessarily a condition of the future settlement it is clear that Israel attaches considerable importance to support for its application for membership. It seems axiomatic that such assurances would be forthcoming from the US and the UK; at the proper time we might appropriately express to the Arab Governments the hope that if they could not fully support Israel's application they would at least refrain from opposing it.

3. Status of Abdullah. The process of peaceful adjustment is greatly complicated by relations among the Arab states and the AHC. Our evidence here, which is confirmed by cables from the area, indicates that the Arab [Higher] Committee and the Mufti are no longer a factor of any importance. The influence of Azzam, SYG of the Arab League, and the solidarity of the League with regard to Palestine also seem to be considerably lessened. This impression is strengthened by current reports of Abdullah's visits to Farouk and Ibn Saud. Although from political viewpoint the influence of certain Arab League governments may still be great, it seems clear that Abdullah is the only one who has any very substantial material bargaining power. Abdullah's influence is based principally on his army and UK backing. The evidence seems clear that none of the other Arab states have armed forces available which can even begin to compare in organization, efficiency, and numbers with the Haganah. On the basis of earlier conversations with Shertok when he was here and more recently with Eban it seems wholly clear that Abdullah is probably the only Arab with whom the Jews might successfully, from their viewpoint, undertake definitive negotiations. Same source (Eban) discounts importance and influence other Arab states, particularly Syria. It also seems clear as indicated above that Abdullah has far more to gain from a negotiated settlement than from continuing to fight. Moreover, it seems clear that in this affair Abdullah is more susceptible to UK influence and control than any of the other Arab states. These thoughts lead us to

the conclusion that we should reach an early understanding with the British on the point that Abdullah is the principal bargaining factor on the Arab side. This does not, of course, imply that we would in any way neglect the interests of the other Arab states or the importance of maintaining the friendliest of relations with them.

4. Recognition of Transjordan by the US. We are not familiar with reasons why US has not hitherto recognized Transjordan although we have supported her application for membership in UN. In any event, we feel that recognition of Transjordan, exchange of diplomatic representatives, and continued support of its application for membership in UN would be important ingredients in the overall solution.

5. Boundary adjustments. In return for unequivocal recognition of the full sovereignty of Israel it seems reasonable to us to envisage a readjustment of the boundaries of Israel. From the Israeli viewpoint the territorial case for Israel is based on the November 29 resolution and on *de facto* military control. We have expressed the personal view to Eban here that Israel's legal case under the November 29 resolution with respect to boundaries is relatively weak. Also personally, Eban has in effect admitted this and indicated they consider their *de facto* position resulting from military operations much stronger. On the latter point Eban claims that Israel is in *de facto* control not only of the November 29 territory but also of western Galilee. In recent conversations with Eban he has expressed in a general way the hope that the US would support the "territorial integrity" of Israel. On the other hand, he has specifically said that if there were any Arab (implying Abdullah) with whom Israel could negotiate on the basis of full recognition of Israel's sovereignty, they would be prepared to consider boundary adjustments. This comment was, of course, wholly personal and may have been meant to imply only minor boundary rectifications rather than any more substantial territorial changes. A more extreme Jewish viewpoint is represented by Rabbi Silver's recent statement attacking the British for desiring to impair the territorial integrity of Israel. Department has probably also noted Eichelberger's June 16 memorandum to AAUN chapters and affiliated organizations attacking the concept of territorial change, and Sumner Welles' column, June 29. It is our estimate that the PGI attaches far more importance to the question of sovereignty than to the question of the November 29 or present *de facto* boundaries and might be willing, therefore, to consider reasonable and balanced territorial adjustments.

6. Arab areas of Palestine. On the Arab side we should make up our mind whether we favor establishment of a Palestinian Arab state or extension of the boundaries of Transjordan to take in the Arab areas

of Palestine as those areas may be determined. We favor the latter course for the following reasons:

a. The British, as indicated recently by Beeley, would favor this course.

b. The Jews, as indicated by Eban, would favor this.

c. With the decline of the Mufti and the AHC there is no apparent leadership among the Palestinian Arabs around whom could be built the nucleus of a Palestinian state.

d. Presumably Abdullah would prefer this arrangement.

7. Specific territorial proposals. Assuming that Israel, having established the principle of full sovereignty as a basis of negotiation and settlement, would be willing to negotiate for territorial changes, such changes along the lines in part suggested very privately and personally by Beeley in conversation here and Washington, namely as follows, might seem reasonable:

a. Transfer of the Negeb to Transjordan.

b. Transfer of western Galilee to Israel.

c. Transfer of Jaffa to Israel.

d. Transfer to Israel of subdistricts marked Jenin and Tulkarm on November 29 GA map.

e. Rectification of eastern boundary of Israel to provide that coastal railway (Haifa, Tulkarm, Lydda, Gazza, etc.) lies within said boundaries rather than criss-crossing the boundary.

f. Internationalization of Jerusalem.

8. Comments on specific territorial proposals.

(*a*) The transfer of the Negeb to Transjordan would provide an outlet to the sea for Transjordan and according to Beeley, in lieu of Jaffa a port could more or less readily be constructed along the Arab coastline. As Beeley has pointed out, principal communication routes between the Arab hinterland, on the one hand and the Arab coastal area and Egypt, on the other, run through the northern part of the Negeb. From the Jewish point of view there is some evidence that their interest in the Negeb may have been primarily for its bargaining value. There is also some hint, however, that there is a possibility of oil deposits in the area. On the latter point consideration might be given as a makeweight in the concession by Israel of the Negeb to arrangements for the joint and equitable economic development of the area, thus protecting the economic interests of Israel in the event that at some future time substantial oil deposits should be discovered. Such economic arrangements might also provide for Jewish participation in irrigation and colonization prospects.

(*b*) The transfer of western Galilee to Israel would be part of the makeweight in return for concession of the Negeb by Israel. It is our understanding that this area is a richer one although very considerably smaller than the Negeb. Moreover, from the point of view of Israel, its transfer would create a more compact and defensible state. Although the population of this area is understood to be predominantly Arab, there is no reason to believe that this Arab population, in the event of a peaceful settlement, would suffer any disabilities. On the

contrary there is every reason to believe that their inclusion within the boundaries of Israel might well lead to a substantial improvement in their material welfare and guarantees of their minority rights would be provided for.

In general, particularly in light recent reports re Jewish restriction on return of Arabs to Jewish territory, minority regime, perhaps under UN guarantee on basis comparable to League of Nations Upper Silesian plan should be explored. It would, of course, be understood that Arabs could control or prohibit future immigration of Jews into Arab territory.

(c) Although Jaffa was set aside in the November 29 partition plan as part of the Arab state, we do not believe that it would be sound to perpetuate this enclave within Israel and next door to Tel-Aviv. Quite aside from the fact that the Jews are in *de facto* control of Jaffa, perpetuation of its status as an Arab conclave could only lead as we see it to perpetuation of the risk of conflict between Arabs and Jews.

(d) With reference to the Jenin-Tulkarm areas, in discussing the territorial aspects of the peaceful adjustment with Beeley, we raised with him the possibility of transferring the entire northern half above Jerusalem of the central Arab area under the November 29 plan to Israel, together with western Galilee. Our thought was that the transfer of this area to Israel would more nearly balance the transfer of the Negeb. Beeley felt that the transfer of the northern half of the central Arab area would be unwise since it was almost exclusively populated by Arabs, while an insignificant number of Jews would be involved in the transfer of the Negeb. We are not convinced, however, that this transfer would be unwise. As a minimum we feel that consideration should be given to the transfer of the above-mentioned Jenin-Tulkarm areas to Israel.

(e) The proposal that the eastern frontier of Israel be rectified to include the coastal railway was made by McNaughton in private conversation and not dissented from by Beeley. It seems to us obvious that if the frontier is not rectified as indicated, there might be innumerable petty administrative difficulties. On the other hand we have no evidence that such boundary rectification would be a substantial concession to the Jews.

(f) It is our belief that the Jews would be very strongly opposed to transferring Jerusalem to Transjordan. Also, for the reasons set forth in USUN's 808⁷ on armed guards for Jerusalem, the Jewish point of view is very likely to be strongly supported by public opinion generally in this country and elsewhere. Although Beeley personally opposed the internationalization of Jerusalem and favored its inclusion in a greater Transjordan as Abdullah's capital, Douglas' 2785 indicated the British might be willing to agree to internationalization. If Jerusalem were to be internationalized we feel that the international area should be reduced from the November 29 plan to include the city alone. If the mediator is successful in his current effort to obtain Arab-Jewish agreement for the demilitarization of Jerusalem and for the establishment of a UN armed guard, the first and most important steps will have been taken towards the internationalization of the city. This *de facto* arrangement might continue until such time as definitive arrangements can be worked out by the TC, should this

⁷ Dated June 23, not printed.

be necessary or by relying on Lie's power to appoint a successor to Evans which we understand Lie has under British municipal ordinance establishing this post.

9. Status of Haifa. We have noted recent telegrams concerning the status of Haifa and particularly the British view expressed in Douglas' 2785 that this city might also be internationalized. We would be inclined to oppose this, at least as part of a permanent settlement, for the following reasons: Haifa was included within the November. 29 boundaries of the Jewish state; the Jews are in *de facto* control of the city; there would be far less support publicly for the internationalization of Haifa than in the case of Jerusalem; the responsibilities of international administration under circumstances we cannot now foresee would be greater in terms of the economic and strategic importance of the pipeline than we might be willing in advance to turn over to the UN Secretariat or a group of powers. Such considerations do not apply to Jerusalem which is now in the process of demilitarization and *de facto* international control. On the other hand, it would seem to us that an economic arrangement for Haifa would avoid many of the political problems and would be therefore more workable in view of the interest which both Israel and Iraq have in the oil supply. Such arrangement might provide for a free port at Haifa including the port and refinery area.

10. Territorial guarantees. Assuming that it may be possible to work out territorial adjustments that both Jews and Arabs can agree to, it seems clear that both parties would wish to have territorial guarantees. It has obviously been one of the greatest Arab fears that Jews, once obtaining a foothold in Palestine, would use this as a basis for territorial expansion not only throughout Palestine but into the neighboring Arab states. On the other hand, from our conversations with the Jews here, we have some indications that they are fearful Abdullah might be bent on conquest and therefore not long content with territorial adjustments worked out in dealing with the current phase of the problem. For reasons indicated to Beeley in recent conversations with him, UK treaty relations with Abdullah do not seem to us to meet fully what is required. A joint US-UK guarantee to both parties would not seem to be practical politics. It is difficult to anticipate any special territorial guarantee by the UN; in any event, it may be anticipated that neither party would feel entirely confident in the ability of the UN at this stage of its development to guarantee its frontiers. A combination of measures may be necessary in this situation.

11. Specific proposal for territorial guarantees. The most direct and simple approach would be arrangements including nonaggression and mutual defense pacts between Israel and greater Transjordan. Non-aggression and mutual defense pacts might also be concluded

between Israel and Syria and Lebanon. This might seem paradoxical in the case of Israel because of the present extreme anti-Israel views of the Syrian Government. It might be argued, however, that the real reason for present Syrian extremism is not so much fear of Israel as fear of the expansion of Transjordan and increase in Abdullah's prestige in the light of his former Greater Syrian ideas.⁸ In other words, a fear that a settlement based on arrangements between Israel and Abdullah would be only a stepping stone for the latter, his next step being attempted expansion into Syria. In view of the fact that from all accounts the Syrian Army is nothing to boast about it might be thought reasonable to assume that the Syrian Government would more than welcome non-aggression and mutual defense pacts with Israel. Such arrangements between Israel, on the one hand, and her immediate neighbors on the other might lead in turn to the transformation of the present Arab League, which is based on racial, religious and nationalist lines, into a politically mature organization along the lines of the Western European Union and our own arrangements in the Western Hemisphere. Such an organization might be expanded to include Turkey, Iran and possibly Afghanistan and in this sense provide a bulwark against Soviet aggression. It would be a regional organization within the purview of the UN Charter providing for guarantees of territorial integrity and procedures for consultation and action in the settlement of disputes.

12. Economic arrangements. It is our view that a settlement based on political and territorial factors alone would not be so easily attainable nor would it be viable unless substantial arrangements of an economic and related character were provided for. The prospect of finding common areas of agreement between Israel, on the one hand, and Arab states, on the other, might be greater in the economic field than in the political. Moreover, with the exception of Transjordan the Arab states initially at least are likely to assess at considerably less than their real value the advantages of restoring peace and stability in Palestine through a settlement based upon recognition of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Israel as that territory may be determined by agreement. Economic advantages offered in connection with, if not actually as a part of the future settlement would be a powerful inducement, as we see it, to acceptance by the other Arab states of a reasonable solution of the Palestine problem. Such assistance would also have the advantage of contributing to the stability of the governments concerned, thus permitting a more orderly and progressive economic and political development and minimizing the risk of an increase in Communist influence. Of the Arab representatives here, those of Iraq and Egypt in particular have frequently discussed the

⁸ For previous documentation on the efforts by Transjordan for a Greater Syria, see *Foreign Relations*, 1947, vol. v, pp. 738 ff.

question of economic assistance with US. The PGI representative here has indicated his belief in the importance of economic cooperation in Palestine. The PGI has also, we understand, formally requested from this government financial assistance in the form of a loan. The pressure to grant such a loan will presumably be very great and if granted we can hardly expect that our relations with the Arab states would be improved unless we grant comparable economic assistance to them. In any event, in the absence of an overall program of economic assistance and development for the area and taking into account the superior organizing ability, efficiency and resources, both human and financial, of Israel as compared with the Arab states, the economic development of Israel is likely to outstrip that of the surrounding Arabs, leading to expansionist pressures in Israel and jealousy and resentment among the Arabs.

13. Economic self-help. Section D of the November 29 partition plan concerning economic union provides a basis for the beginnings of an economic program, although perhaps not applicable in all particulars to the newly envisaged relationships between Israel and Transjordan. We envisage that an essential part of the settlement would have to be a minimum of economic arrangements between Israel and Transjordan. These might include as contemplated in the November 29 plan (a) a customs union; (b) a joint currencies system; (c) operation of railways, highways, ports, etc.; (d) joint economic development, and (e) access to water and power facilities. Specific projects might include a Jordan Valley authority and agreement, as indicated above, for the joint development of irrigation and colonization projects in the Negeb. Paralleling the development of political cooperation (paragraphs 10 and 11 above) economic arrangement between Transjordan and Israel might be extended to Lebanon and Syria and in turn the area as a whole. In this connection it should be envisaged that at an early date Israel would become a full-fledged member of the newly proposed Middle Eastern Economic Commission. It is unthinkable that Israel would be excluded from full partnership in this commission. As we see it, the advantages to the Arabs of full membership for Israel are obvious. We assume that the Department has these factors in mind in preparing for the forthcoming ECOSOC meeting at Geneva at which we understand the question of the ECME will be considered, although we do not anticipate time is yet ripe for forcing issue.

14. International assistance. We refer in this connection to the sections in Ambassador Austin's statement in Committee One of the recent special session concerning the economic development of Palestine and the role of UN agencies therein. Specialized agencies such as the FAO, the Bank, the Fund, the WHO and UNESCO might undertake at the request of the mediator with the concurrence of Israel

and Abdullah comprehensive studies of the needs of Palestine. Such studies might at a later stage be broadened to include other countries in the area, possibly in connection with the program of the ECME. The International Bank might be in a position to grant development loans to assist in the carrying out of joint Israeli-Transjordan projects and the Stabilization Fund might be of assistance in any currency arrangements. Because of special position of holy places in Palestine outside Jerusalem, Magnes plan for UNESCO Commission for this protection is worth consideration.

15. Assistance by US. It is our view that a program of economic assistance and development should be worked out to the fullest extent possible on an international (UN) basis. We should satisfy ourselves in considering any specific proposals that the project in question cannot be effectively dealt with by international means. Furthermore, we should assure ourselves that to the fullest extent possible any projects for which we grant loans or other assistance should be of a self-liquidating character. Instead of attempting to deal with the problem of US assistance on a piecemeal basis, we would suggest that Department formulate a comprehensive program of US aid to the Middle Eastern countries, including Israel, for presentation to the new Congress in January if possible. We suggest that such a program be developed on the basis of ERP principles and in consistency with the work of the UN specialized agencies, of the ECME, and in close collaboration with the UK. In developing such a program we should bear in mind the desirability of shifting the major portion of the load to private investment as soon as peaceful conditions permit.⁹

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⁹ For continuation of this communication, see telegram S37, July 1, p. 1180.

501.BB Palestine/7-148

Memorandum by Mr. Robert M. McClintock to the Director of the Office of United Nations Affairs (Rusk)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] July 1, 1948.

Subject: Check List on Palestine ¹

[Here follow first two paragraphs containing personal observations.]

1. POLICY

A. LONG RANGE: A PEACEFUL ADJUSTMENT

Of the many facets of this question with which we have been endeavoring to deal during your absence, the most important is that of

¹ Mr. McClintock furnished copies of this check list to Messrs. Lovett, Satterthwaite, and Ross and to William Sanders of the Office of United Nations Affairs (his memorandum of July 2 to Mr. Rusk).

overall policy. In an explicit sense, recent United States action in the Security Council regarding Palestine was covered by the policy position paper of May 22 approved by the President on May 27. However, Mr. Lovett, about the time when we introduced our Chapter VII resolution in the Security Council on May 17, had requested George Kennan on the Policy Planning Staff to submit to the National Security Council a paper which would, it was hoped, elicit from the Council renewed advice as to future United States policy regarding Palestine.

When I was shown the first draft of the Policy Planning Staff's paper I was able to demonstrate to Mr. Kennan and Mr. Villard that it was subject to criticism from the UNA point of view. The upshot was that UNA was requested by Mr. Kennan to prepare two papers:

(1) on US policy in the Security Council in the event that the present truce in Palestine were breached,

(2) on a long-range possible *modus vivendi* for the peaceful adjustment of the situation in Palestine.²

The former paper was prepared by Messrs. Bancroft and Meeker and suggests that if war resumes in the Near East this government should be prepared to move into action under Chapter VII of the Charter. The paper of Messrs. Bancroft and Meeker has my approval. The second paper on the long range possible *modus vivendi* was written by myself and can be summarized in its concluding paragraph:

"In summary, therefore, a sensible territorial solution for the Palestine problem would be to re-draw the frontiers of Israel so as to make a compact and homogeneous state, the remainder of Palestine to go largely to Transjordan with appropriate transfers of populations where necessary; Jerusalem to remain an international entity with free access to the outside world; the boundaries of the two new states to be guaranteed mutually between themselves and the United Nations; and the economic prosperity of the region to be enhanced by a customs union between Israel and Transjordan."*

Both these papers were on June 29 submitted by Mr. Kennan without comment to Mr. Lovett for his criticism or approval. Mr. Lovett on June 30 requested me to send the memoranda to Secretary Marshall at Walter Reed [Hospital]. This was done today. I am told by the Policy Planning Staff that the papers have assisted their thinking, but that they do not at present intend to submit any paper to the National Security Council.

² See Mr. Meeker's memorandum of June 22 and Mr. McClintock's memorandum of the following day, pp. 1127 and 1134.

*It is interesting that there are a number of points of similarity between this suggested solution and the proposals made to Arabs and Jews by Count Bernadotte this week. I attach a copy of these proposals. I feel that Bernadotte has been statesmanlike and that his suggestions may contain the kernel of common agreement. [Footnote in the source text.]

B. SHORT RANGE: ACTION UNDER CHAPTER VII

I should like to add one word with respect to United States advocacy of action under Chapter VII. While I think that we should be resolute and live up to our responsibilities under the Charter, I do feel that as a matter of diplomacy we should not put ourselves in the position of becoming the self-appointed scapegoat for the Arab States. Recent telegrams from Cairo, Jidda, and Damascus indicate that the Arab Governments feel the necessity, under pressure of their public opinion, to resume hostilities after the end of the present cease-fire. I am convinced that these Arab Governments are looking for a way out of their present difficulty, since at least their commanding military officers know that they do not have the wherewithal to conduct a successful war against Israel. They will undoubtedly seek to claim vis-à-vis their own people that action by the United States (and this could easily be United States leadership in the Security Council under Chapter VII) was the reason why they have had to bow to superior force and have yielded a point vehemently desired by their own public opinion. In other words, they will seek to place the blame for their own bad judgments and emotion (which in statecraft amounts to bad judgment) on the United States.

As for the emotion of the Arabs, I do not care a dried camel's hump. It is, however, important to the interests of this country that these fanatical and over-wrought people do not injure our strategic interests through reprisals against our oil investments and through the recision of our air base rights in that area. Accordingly, while there will be counsels on your staff for immediate and dramatic action by the United States under Chapter VII, I would suggest that we fulfill our responsibilities but without being in the driver's seat.

(1) *Sanctions.*

In connection with possible action under Chapter VII, a series of meetings have been held, originally under my auspices and later under those of John Elliott in UNS, to explore the scope of economic sanctions should the Council decide to move in that direction under Chapter VII. The gist of very painstaking investigation on the part of the economic side of the Department is that, while Israel could be almost fatally injured by the application of economic sanctions, the Arab States would be hurt, but not vitally so, and would not, solely on account of such sanctions, be put out of the fight. Meanwhile it is generally assumed that application of economic sanctions by the United States, even in a universal framework of Security Council action, would result in reprisals with respect to petroleum and strategic bases.

(2) *Binding Effect of Resolution of May 29.*

An ancillary issue has been a debate within the Department as to the possible binding effect of the resolution of May 29. Messrs. Bancroft

and Meeker strongly believe that this resolution, although adopted under Chapter VI of the Charter, is legally binding upon all members of the United Nations. Other officers of the Department, including Mr. Hayden Raynor,³ feel that such is not the case and that it would be unwise for the Department to crystallize a position in favor of the thesis that Chapter VI resolutions are binding on all members. Mr. Sandifer, in light of these doubts, has not yet submitted a final memorandum on the point to Mr. Lovett. On the whole, I am inclined to think that, in light of our publicly announced willingness to forego the veto under Chapter VI, we would be wise not to firm up a policy that all resolutions adopted by the Council under Chapter VI were legally binding upon States members.

2. POLICY WITH REGARD TO EXTENSION OF TRUCE AND CEASE-FIRE

We have for sometime felt that Bernadotte would be wise not to attempt to get a black-and-white solution for the Palestine problem before the termination of the present cease-fire which ends on July 9. Various governments and people have not succeeded in four decades in finding a compromise on the basic issues between Arabs and Jews and it is hardly to be expected that Count Bernadotte will be able to achieve this miracle in four weeks. Rather, we have indicated to the British, the Secretary-General and to Bernadotte, himself, our feeling that he should content himself at this moment with an extension of the truce and cease-fire. We hope that the agreeable habit of refraining from mayhem and murder will become increasingly popular, and that both sides can be persuaded to extend the truce for, if not for an indefinite, at least a more prolonged, period than the present four weeks. Whether Bernadotte will succeed in this effort is problematic. The Jews apparently desire an extension of the truce, which involves automatic Arab suspicion as to whether continuation of the cease-fire is in their interest. If the truce could be spun out until the end of the year there might be good reason to hope that pressure of economic interest, to say nothing of other factors, would lead the way to some arrangement between the Jews on one hand, and certain Arab leaders, such as Abdullah on the other, along the lines of the paragraph quoted above. Bernadotte's proposals, attached, might lead to such a result, despite initial refusals on both sides. However, there has been too much public talk; the auspices are bad, and I am not optimistic.

3. JERUSALEM

A. DEMILITARIZATION

The fate of Jerusalem is a special case. On the whole, so far as a long-range settlement is concerned, thinking in the Department, in

³ G. Hayden Raynor, Special Assistant to the Director of the Office of European Affairs.

the Foreign Office at London, and also apparently at Lake Success, is in favor of an international regime for the Holy City under the United Nations. This, however, would necessarily be part of the long-range solution. From the aspect of immediate interest, Count Bernadotte has in mind securing the agreement of the Arabs and Jews to the demilitarization of the city by July 9. Presumably this would mean that the forces of the Hagannah and the Arab Legion would retire from Jerusalem, as well as—and this is of great importance—the irregular forces on both sides, including the Stern and the Irgun.

B. A UNITED NATIONS ARMED GUARD

Bernadotte then proposes to fill the vacuum by a 1,000 man United Nations armed guard. He has formally requested through Secretary-General Lie that the governments of the three members of the Truce Commission, Belgium, United States, and France, furnish equal contingents of this guard. We have told Mr. Lie that as a government we are not prepared to order regular forces of the military establishment to such duty but that we have no objection if Lie, employing his powers as Secretary-General, employs $333\frac{1}{3}$ American citizens for such purpose. The French Government, in a telegram received June 30, has indicated its readiness to make available 335 *Gardes Republicaines* for the Jerusalem duty, but have agreed to our formula for recruitment. No reply has yet been received from the Belgians.

We have twice officially stressed to Mr. Lie that there should be no confusion between the special armed guard for Jerusalem and Lie's project for a United Nations palace guard. I am personally convinced that the Secretariat, under the urging of Abraham Feller, has been promoting the Jerusalem guard idea, using Bernadotte's name as cover, with the dual intent first of improving the position of the Jews in Jerusalem and, second, of forwarding Lie's pet project for a United Nations guard. I am certain that the latter idea requires careful, if sympathetic, study, and that it should not be developed in connection with the infinitely embroiled Palestine problem.

Certain division chiefs of your staff have approached me with a draft telegram to New York to the effect that, if Lie has difficulty in recruiting the American contingent for the Jerusalem police, this government will "assign" 350 men to Lie's force for Bernadotte's use. I told them that I could not assent to such a telegram since I felt it was unwise policy for this government to order men of its armed forces to serve in Jerusalem as members of a United Nations guard; and that from the public relations point of view it would be highly unwise for this government to order American troops for duty in Palestine. If any of these men were killed the public reaction might not be favorable, whereas no one could object if free American citizens volunteered

for such hazardous duty as private citizens. I mention this merely because I shall not be here next month and the idea may recur.

C. JERUSALEM AND THE RED CROSS

Continuing with respect to Jerusalem, I should note the fact that the International Red Cross has two successfully operating zones of refuge in the city and has informally requested our support for a project to create a third zone on Mt. Scopus, taking in the Hadassah Hospital and the Hebrew University, both of which are American-endowed organizations. I told the President of the International Red Cross, Mr. Ruegger, who called on me, that we favored this idea but suggested that he make his own arrangements with Hadassah and Dr. Magnes in New York City.

The International Red Cross has refused Bernadotte's request to supervise the entry of food convoys into Jerusalem and to this extent has not acted as was contemplated by the Assembly's resolution of May 14. There has been some initial ill-feeling between Bernadotte and the Red Cross, due more to domestic politics inside the International Red Cross than to the Palestine situation. These difficulties, I am happy to report, have now been ironed out.

D. THE TRUCE COMMISSION

The Truce Commission continues to function in Jerusalem and will assume a very important role there if Bernadotte succeeds in demilitarizing the city. Although I have not seen any direct statement to this effect, the telegrams from Jerusalem have left the distinct impression in my mind that the Belgian and French members of the Truce Commission are timorous and indecisive, while young Burdett, during the time he acted as our Representative, was much more forthright and courageous. Burdett has now been replaced by a superior in the person of an experienced Foreign Service Officer, John Macdonald, our new Consul General in Jerusalem. Macdonald, who was recently our Consul in Bombay, was given a thorough briefing in the Department before he went to Palestine.

4. HAIFA OIL REFINERY

The British, Jews, Arabs and French have all evidenced a decided interest in getting the Haifa oil refinery going again. We supported a *démarche* by Mr. Bevin to Bernadotte, suggesting that if both the Arabs and Jews agree it might be useful to place the oil refinery under the Mediator's auspices for the time being. We have stressed, however, that since Haifa is an integral part of the state of Israel Bevin's other idea for an international regime over the city could only be contemplated if there were advance agreement by the Government of Israel. We feel, on the whole, that it would be unwise to establish another

international city at Haifa. We likewise indicated our view that the production of Haifa should not be used to increase the military potential of either side. Haifa, in my opinion, offers a unique opportunity for practical cooperation between the Arabs and Jews, since one side controls the crude oil and the other the refining capacity, while both sides need the final product. If an agreement can be found on Haifa the habit might spread to other areas.

5. EXPORT OF WAR MATERIAL

The Department has given strict compliance to the terms of the resolution of May 29 so far as sending war material to the Near East is concerned. On June 11, in a circular telegram to all Missions, we called the attention of all governments with which we have diplomatic relations to the need for strict compliance with the arms embargo imposed by the Council's resolution. We have had close liaison with the British on this subject and have even got the Foreign Office to agree not to send civil aircraft and spare parts to the Near East for the initial period of the truce. After July 9, if either government feels that it is necessary to send spare parts for civil aircraft to that area we feel that such exports can be accomplished, provided there are adequate safeguards that the spare parts will not be used for military purposes and that the Mediator has been informed of the contemplated shipment.

A more difficult problem has been to prevent renegade Americans from flying American aircraft to Israel, in some cases purchased by the Irgun or Stern gangs, and in others, by the Provisional Government. This is a complicated subject but the details may be had from John Elliott and Mr. Hamilton of MD, whom I have asked to follow this subject.

The Czech Government, despite its obligations to comply with the resolution of May 29, has actively conspired in gun running by air from Prague to Palestine. It is regrettable to report that the aircraft used in the operation apparently are American. Thus far it does not seem apparent that Mr. Steinhardt, our Ambassador to Prague, has been successful in doing anything to suppress this traffic.

6. IMMIGRATION

On Memorial Day we received an urgent request from Mr. Bevin to give him our definition of "fighting personnel" and whether or not this included men of military age. Our Niacet 2015 to London of May 31, which I drafted under Mr. Lovett's direction, provided a definition which was successful in assisting the British to swing the Arab Governments to accept the truce. The essence of our definition—and this applies to the entire truce, and not merely to the question of immigration—is that during the period of the truce neither side shall

increase its military potential. Subsequently, on June 7, Count Bernadotte, in a note to the parties, defined his common-sense interpretation of "fighting personnel" and the problem of the immigration of men of military age. We have accepted his definition and have instructed our shipping and passport authorities to see that it becomes our rule of thumb with regard to the travel of American citizens to the Near East and the travel of aliens from this country to that area.

7. THE LOAN OF UNITED STATES OBSERVERS AND EQUIPMENT TO THE UNITED NATIONS MEDIATOR

At Count Bernadotte's request we promptly sent twenty-one military observers to be attached to his staff to implement Article seven of the truce resolution. So far as the American observers were concerned they were divided equally between Navy, Army and Air Force. Subsequently, at Bernadotte's request, we sent 10 more officers. The French and Belgian Governments have matched our contingent. In addition, Count Bernadotte has a staff of five hand-picked Swedish officers. His Chief-of-Staff and leader of the military observers is Colonel Bonde, with headquarters at Haifa. Bernadotte's representative in Jerusalem is Colonel Brunsson.

In addition to the military observers we have provided Count Bernadotte with four airplanes, three destroyers for naval patrol, and a complete installation on Rhodes of wireless communications equipment. Likewise, three Navy doctors have been assigned to Bernadotte's staff.

8. COOPERATION WITH UNITED KINGDOM

Thanks to the efforts of Ambassador Douglas and to a considerable change in position by Foreign Secretary Bevin, plus a certain amount of missionary work at home, a new "entente cordiale" has been established with Great Britain in respect of the Palestine problem. It is important that these cordial and intimate working relations be continued. We have officially concurred with Ambassador Douglas's suggestion, derived from the British Foreign Office, that he be the main line of communication with the United Kingdom; secondary channels being maintained with the British Embassy here (Denis Allen and Bromley), and the United Kingdom Delegation in New York. There is a good working arrangement to pool news and views on Palestine.

9. RELATIONS WITH THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL

At the President's request, Mr. James Grover McDonald has been appointed his Special Representative to the Provisional Government of Israel. He will sail for England on July 14 but the Foreign Service Staff, headed by Charles Knox, will fly to Tel Aviv this Sunday. They are scheduled to reach the Jewish capital on July 8. Mr. McDonald,

as you probably know, is a professional Zionist. He plans to take with him a personal assistant, not yet named, of whose devotion to the Zionist cause there can be little doubt.

The Provisional Government of Israel is keenly anxious that its representative in New York, Major Eban, be seated by the Security Council not as the Representative of the Jewish Agency but of the Provisional Government of Israel. Since we have recognized Israel we must agree with this view, but have pointed out to New York that the spokesman for the Jews of Jerusalem should not be the Provisional Government of Israel and that, accordingly, the Jewish Agency may still be a useful organization to be heard. Our policy in this problem is set forth in Department's telegram to New York #438, of June 30.

[Here follows paragraph numbered 10, consisting of personal observations.]

501.BB Palestine/7-148 : Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, July 1, 1948—4 p. m.

Re Depcirtel June 11 covering UNSC Resolution May 29. Three B-17 Flying Fortresses recently left Miami reported destination Israel. Believed here these planes intend engage in transport munitions or troops to Middle East or as bombers. This is inconsistent with intent UN Security Council Resolution regarding Palestine Truce. Moreover, planes left U.S. in violation export laws and without proper clearance to land in foreign country. Various other cases have also been reported involving illegal export from U.S. of aircraft and use of American planes by American citizens in transporting arms between points outside U.S. Department desires all appropriate measures be taken prevent such traffic. Accordingly, you instructed request appropriate foreign authorities, unless you deem inadvisable, that any information concerning such clandestine activities be reported to this government. Particular attention should be given to activities of non-certificated irregular air carriers (tramp airlines) operating on non-scheduled basis, as some of these are known to be engaged in gun running.

Advise Department promptly of reaction foreign government as well as any information obtained.

Repeat to interested consular officers your jurisdiction.

For action to Ankara, Athens, Belgrade, Bern, Brussels, Caracas, Ciudad Trujillo, Copenhagen, Dublin, The Hague, Havana, Lisbon, London, Madrid, Mexico City, Oslo, Ottawa, Panama, Paris, Port au Prince, Praha, Reykjavik, Rio, Rome, Stockholm and Vienna.

For info to Beirut, Baghdad, Cairo, Damascus, Jerusalem and Jidda.
Repeated USUN New York for Jessup to be transmitted to UNSYG
for info of UN Mediator.

MARSHALL

501.BB Palestine/7-148 : Telegram

*The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations
(Jessup) to the Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET

PRIORITY

NEW YORK, July 1, 1948—4:16 p. m.

837. Following supplements and continues our 831, June 29 [30],
on the peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine.

D. BASIC FACTORS

1. In evaluating the mission's views as set forth in No. 831, the Department may find useful the following analysis of the basic factors we have had in mind, in formulating those views.

2. Considering Palestine alone as a single factor, the prevention of further fighting and establishment and maintenance of peace in that country are first of all essential to the maintenance of peace in an area including not only the Near and Middle East but the Moslem world of North Africa and Southern Asia. Second, the establishment and maintenance of peace in Palestine could be the key to the progressive political and economic evolution of Palestine and the Near East. Third, the UN is deeply involved in the Palestine issue. While we do not agree with the prophets of doom who hold that failure of the UN to settle the Palestine question would ruin the organization, there is no question in our minds that such failure would deal a very heavy blow to the prestige and effectiveness of the UN. Conversely, a settlement of the Palestine question under UN auspices would greatly enhance the prestige and effectiveness of the organization.

3. The Palestine question cannot, however, be considered realistically as an isolated problem but from every point of view (political, strategic, and economic) the vital importance of the many complex ramifications of this question must be borne in mind in considering the future settlement. The most immediate and direct influences concern, as noted above, the Near and Middle East and the entire Moslem world.

4. US interests. Although the various interests of the US involved in the peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine may seem obvious, it seems wise to review them briefly as we understand them.

(a) Since the attainment of our other objectives in Palestine and the Middle East depend upon the establishment and maintenance of

peace and stability in Palestine these are the most immediate and vital of our interests. For this reason it is to our advantage to support the efforts of the UN fully. In a broader sense it is to our interest to support the prestige and effectiveness of the UN.

(b) From the political viewpoint it is to our advantage to minimize to the greatest possible extent Russian infiltration and influence in Palestine and the Middle East. This point is dealt with in somewhat more detail in paragraph 6 below.

(c) From the strategic viewpoint we assume that Palestine, together with the neighboring countries is a major factor presumably in any future major conflict this region would be of vital importance to US as a potential base area and with respect to our lines of communication. Presumably also the oil resources of the area are considered vital. It is our feeling that this last point may not perhaps have been dealt with adequately and frankly enough in official and public discussion of the Palestine question.

(d) From the economic viewpoint it is probable that with the exception of oil our trade and other economic relations with Palestine and the other Near East countries are not directly of any substantial importance. Indirectly, however, the economic stability and developing prosperity of Palestine and the Middle East area under peaceful conditions could make a very substantial contribution to the economic recovery of the world generally and thus contribute to the economic welfare of the US. With respect to oil, we recognize that the oil supply from the area is of great importance in the European recovery program. Were it not for this factor, however, and the strategic importance of oil, we should probably not allow the economic importance of this commodity to condition our judgment substantially with regard to Palestine.

5. UK interests. The basic factors influencing UK policy towards Palestine are similar if not wholly identical with ours. For this reason it is essential that both governments maintain the closest possible relations in developing a concerted policy with regard to Palestine and a common front in dealing with this matter diplomatically and in particular in the UN. In doing so, however, we must recognize the necessity of planning our policy on a very long-range basis since it is obvious that our interests in the area will continue for an indefinite period and since it is equally obvious that it will take a long time before real stability can be achieved. For this reason we feel that although no risk is involved in the foreseeable future the US must envisage the eventual possibility of changes in the British Government or even in the British political structure which might make it difficult for us to maintain a common policy with them and at the same time fully protect our national interests. Moreover, although the British position with the Arab states is at the moment stronger than ours, it is obvious that the UK is basically, perhaps regrettably so, not in a position to exercise as much long-range influence and leadership with regard to Palestine and the Near East as the US. This factor, we feel, may become more important even in the near future

and the demand by other governments for US leadership in the area which is already substantial, as we see it here, will increase. Meanwhile, the British are probably better informed and have a better "feel" for the Palestine problem than we do, despite traditional long-range Arab-world thinking of permanent FO staff. For all of these reasons and because of the complexities of the problem and our vital interest in its peaceful solution, the Department probably has in mind the necessity of developing at the earliest a long-term, comprehensive (political, strategic, economic, cultural), program for Palestine and the Middle East.

6. USSR interests.

(a) It is our impression that the influence of the USSR in Palestine and the Near East is not at present very substantial. It is certain that they have virtually no influence within the Arab Government, not only because of the fear of those governments of communism, but also because of the attitude of the USSR towards partition and the state of Israel. Moreover, as indicated in conversations here with Asil and Fawzi, although there are some individuals in the Arab countries inclined towards communism, for religious reasons, as well as because of the low economic and cultural level of the masses of the population of the Arab countries, it is not apparent that communism has any substantial following among the masses. On the other hand, there are apparently a substantial number of Communists in the Irgun, the Stern Gang and other dissident groups. Beyond that the Soviet Union, through its support of partition and prompt recognition of Israel, must be considered as having a substantial influence with the PGI. The Communist influence is, of course, capable of substantial expansion through whatever diplomatic and other missions the Soviet Government may establish in Israel.

(b) It would seem to us that the Soviet Union would have two main objectives; first, to counteract so far as possible the political, strategic, and economic advantages of the US, UK and other western powers in the area; second, to establish the influence of the Soviet Union to the greatest possible extent. A very important factor in our minds is that the decline of US influence and the growth of Soviet influence in Palestine and the states of the Arab League would undermine our policy of supporting Greece, Turkey, and Iran against Soviet aggression.

(c) There are three methods whereby the USSR might extend its influence. First by hindering or, should the occasion arise, preventing by veto the peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine; fighting between Jews and Arabs might be resumed with resultant chaos, and benefit to the USSR. Second, through its consistent support of the partition plan and its early recognition of Israel, the USSR is in a position to extend its influence through that state. This could be a very serious factor if the PGI should at any time feel that its vital interests were threatened by the mediator's proposals or by inadequate or inconsistent support by the US. As a corollary the Soviet Union may, of course, be expected to continue efforts to extend its influence through dissident groups in a position to take advantage of any sign of "weakness" on the part of the PGI. For the moment it is somewhat difficult to see how the Soviet Union might extend its in-

fluence further through the Arab states. On the other hand, it is perhaps not at all unlikely that in certain of these states the success of Communist agents or fellow travelers might increase substantially if existing governments are overthrown as a result of developments in the Palestine situation wholly unacceptable to those countries.

7. Israel. In our view a fundamental factor to bear constantly in mind is that we are no longer dealing with a political movement spear-headed by the Jewish Agency but rather with a new state established after a long struggle and despite great difficulties. This is no longer a speculative proposition but a hard political reality that neither we, nor the British, nor the Arabs, nor anyone else could escape even if they wanted to.

(a) The new state of Israel is in very strong political position. Externally it has been recognized not only by US but also by USSR. New state is also externally in strong political position in UN. Not only was partition plan approved last November, but [by?] a two-thirds vote, but this plan has not been superseded and it is at least extremely doubtful whether UN could take any action which would impair status of Israel. Internally PGI appears to be in very strong, well-organized position. It has dealt very effectively with recent Irgun affair at Tel Aviv. More important than this single affair is indication that PGI has courage and will to deal firmly with Irgun and other dissident elements.

(b) Israel is also in strong military position, perhaps stronger than they thought they might be. From point of view of numbers, organization, discipline and efficiency they are more than a match for most of Arab states put together. Abdallah has only very effective force on Arab side and effectiveness of this force is almost undoubtedly due to British elements. Israel has been successful in holding its own positions and beyond this has established effective control of western Galilee.

(c) Evidence available to us indicates that PGI fully recognizes responsibilities which go along with statehood. It is our impression that they desire to live as a good neighbor with surrounding Arab states and that they are willing and able to discharge their role as a responsible member of international community and in due course of UN. In contrast on whole with Arab representation they have shown dignity and strength in UN. There is no reason to believe they will not be willing to make concessions, even substantial ones, in interest of a peaceful adjustment of future situation of Palestine.

(d) If in process of negotiation PGI is pushed too hard to accept arrangements, intolerable from their point of view, [it] seems clear that this will increase its difficulties in dealing with Communist-inspired dissident elements and will also force it to rely more extensively on Russian support. From our conversations here we judge that PGI is aware of disadvantages to it of too close an association with Soviet Union and of risk of coming under Communist domination through a combination of internal and external pressures, thereby losing in fact if not in name, the independence which Jews have long struggled for and finally attained.

(e) On other hand, we feel it is reasonable to assume that PGI recognizes that greater advantages would be gained from a closer association with US and other western powers, principal advantages in this case being maintenance of real independence and opportunity to continue its political and economic evolution under peaceful circumstances and continued financial assistance from US.

(f) If in effect Israel is thrown into arms of Soviet Union it could become a force operating to very great disadvantage to US, UK and other western powers, and to Arabs.

(g) On other hand, Israel, if fairly treated, could become a force operating to our own advantage and to advantage of Arab countries.

8. Arab states.

(a) Arab countries are also relatively new states participating in international affairs on their own responsibility for a very short period. From a political viewpoint, both domestic and international, they are relatively immature. From economic and cultural viewpoints they are relatively underdeveloped.

(b) The immaturity of Arabs is revealed in blindspot which prevents even more moderate Arabs from recognizing existence of Israel as a political fact. Because of this blindspot the more extreme Arabs seem determined to continue their efforts to eliminate the Jewish state. While admitting that Arabs might continue a form of guerrilla warfare for many years against the Jews, it seems axiomatic to us that Arabs could never eliminate Jewish state which, failing support from US and other western countries, could get support from Soviet Union, and the eastern European countries. Moreover, even more moderate Arabs who consider themselves "realistic" and are therefore prepared to recognize existence of Israel are nevertheless apparently holding to lie that Jews might be brought to agree (if there were sufficient pressure by US) to a drastically reduced territory and impaired sovereignty. We consider that even this moderate Arab viewpoint is unrealistic because we do not feel that Jews will accept any substantial reduction of territory without compensation, nor any impairment of their sovereignty. Furthermore, we doubt whether US would be likely to bring any pressure at all to bear upon them to these ends.

(c) It is clear from Arabs we have talked to here that they recognize threat of Communist infiltration and growth of Soviet influence. We do not feel, however, that they have an adequate appreciation of this risk in terms of a possible open door through Israel if because of Arab intransigence it is impossible to work out a fair and equitable peaceful adjustment acceptable to Israel.

(d) More moderate Arabs we have talked to here recognize the intelligence and ability of Jews but on whole Arabs have been accustomed for so long to look upon Jews as root of all evil that it is difficult for them to see contributions for good that Jews might make politically, economically, and culturally to welfare of Arabs. This is, of course, a very difficult and complex psychological problem, but worth emphasizing, we feel, since prospects of a peaceful settlement would be substantially advanced if even a small number of Arab leaders could be convinced of desirability from their own viewpoint of adopting a positive rather than a negative attitude towards Israel.

9. Other states. A large number of other states have a very substantial interest in Palestine problem. Greece, Turkey, Iran and even Afghanistan on basis of conversations with their representatives here, while taking on whole a pro-Arab view, are concerned lest failure to settle Palestine issue, impair their position vis-à-vis Soviet Union. As a Moslem country Pakistan has strongly supported Arabs. As Asiatic rather than Moslem countries India and China tend to support Arabs. Among western powers France has a particular interest because of large Moslem populations under French sovereignty; on other hand, as reflected by their representatives here, course pursued by French Government is one of moderation and objectivity with a rather strong humanitarian flavor. Western powers generally feel that US-UK cooperation is essential in peaceful adjustment of Palestine situation but on whole the policy and influence of US is most important factor. Western powers are keenly aware, as reflected by their representatives here, of risk of Communist infiltration. This is particularly true of Canadians who on whole follow British line, consider our influence probably greater but that most essential factor is US-UK cooperation.

10. United Nations. As indicated paragraph 2 above, the prestige and effectiveness of UN are deeply involved in Palestine question. UN thus constitutes a factor somewhat apart from individual and group interests of member states. Various aspects of UN factor are discussed below.

(a) On debit side, UN was first invited to deal with Palestine question in winter of 1947. Despite effort devoted to question for more than a year in a special session of Assembly, through a special commission, in 1947 regular session of GA, in another commission, in SC, and finally in another special session of GA, the UN failed to devise a peaceful settlement of issues acceptable to the parties, or, alternatively, an enforceable solution. Result of this failure was withdrawal of mandatory on May 14 leaving a political vacuum. This vacuum was partially filled by proclamation of Israel, which might be described as an extra-legal act, and by outbreak of violence and hostilities on a serious scale.

(b) On credit side, SC established a Truce Commission and laid down basis for a truce, and recent special session of GA arranged for appointment of a mediator who has been able to bring about cessation of hostilities and to organize apparently effective machinery for supervising truce. Finally, mediator has initiated discussions looking towards "peaceful adjustment of the future situation."

(c) Prospects of a peaceful settlement could be seriously impaired if UN is resorted to as a propaganda forum by Russians, Arabs or anyone else bent on preventing settlement. For this reason we are inclined to feel that it would be desirable, so far as possible, to deal with question of peaceful settlement through mediator and diplomatic channels.

(d) On other hand, question of demilitarization of Jerusalem and extending truce will presumably have to be dealt with in SC in immediate future and in this connection it may be difficult with

Manuilsky in chair to avoid dealing with substantive issues involved in future settlement.

(e) We must also envisage that unless substantial progress is made towards future settlement between now and September, whole Palestine question may be projected into Paris GA with resultant confusion if not complete breakdown of mediation effort. On the other hand, if the mediator is successful before September in getting the principal parties to agree on future settlement, possibly in form of treaty between Israel and Transjordan, he would presumably report this agreement to GA at Paris. It is difficult to see how any serious objection could be raised to such an agreement and GA might well put its stamp of approval on it, rescind the November 29, 1947 resolution, and approve admission of principal parties, Israel and Transjordan, to membership in UN. Parenthetically, this procedure might be helpful to those Arab Governments, if any, which could not "agree" to settlement envisaged in advance but might "acquiesce" in such settlement if approved by GA. Procedure envisaged in this paragraph would, of course, be ideal culmination of UN's efforts to deal with Palestine problem. Although agreement between two parties between now and early September may seem unlikely, the objective is clearly worthwhile enough to warrant every effort to attain it. In our view it could be attained if US Government is prepared to assume rather more leadership than at present and if we formulate promptly a comprehensive, although tentative plan, as a basis for discussion and agreement with UK. We might then take up with the secretariat question of communicating to mediator basic elements of such plan which would influence joint support by our two governments with parties of ultimate proposals.

JESSUP

501.BB Palestine/7-348 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 3, 1948—1 p. m.

2552. Please call on Bevin and say that our first impression of Bernadotte's "suggestions" to Jews and Arabs for peaceful adjustment of Palestine situation is favorable. We think his suggestions are statesmanlike and clearly designed to establish bargaining positions which will enable both sides to come closer to eventual agreement. Pending further study, however, we are not prepared to express a considered evaluation of Mediator's proposals.

As Bevin and you have agreed, we feel that matter of most immediate importance and urgency is extension of truce beyond July 9. Of secondary but still very great importance is Bernadotte's contemplated proposal that both Arabs and Jews agree to demilitarize Jerusalem.

We are considering instructing US Missions in Arab capitals and US officials available to Prov. Govt. of Israel to express in strongest possible terms hope of this govt as a friend of both Arabs and Jews,

as member of SC Truce Commission, and as a govt keenly desirous to see that international problems are settled only by peaceful means, to urge on Arab and Jewish Govts paramount necessity of extending present truce and cease-fire and if possible acceding to Bernadotte's suggestion for demilitarization of Jerusalem.

We would appreciate information as to whether Mr. Bevin feels that British could make similar approach, and any comments which he may care to offer.

Foregoing was drafted before receipt of your 2945 July 2,¹ and represents the most that can be said until receipt of official text of Bernadotte's proposals and their detailed consideration by Dept.

MARSHALL

¹ Not printed; it conveyed the query of the British Foreign Office as to whether United States views on Palestine could be made known to the British Government (501.BB Palestine/7-248).

501.BB Palestine/6-2948 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 3, 1948—1 p. m.

924. Attitude of Arab League officials and representatives Arab States, as well as local Egyptian authorities, as reported your 875, June 29, is distinctly not encouraging. Expressions of opinion you record are based largely on ignorance of, or disregard of facts. It will be disastrous for Arab States if they formulate policy on basis of stories reported in your reference telegram.

Taking certain points in your 875 seriatim, we note that you report Arab officials regard asserted "failure to take vigorous action in alleged Jewish violations of truce as in *Altalena* incident at Tel Aviv" as indicating that UN Mediator has not been impartial.

You are authorized on strictly informal and confidential basis to inform your Arab contacts that actually the Foreign Minister of Israel protested prompt and critical action of Mediator's Representative in Tel Aviv regarding *Altalena* incident and in official telegram from Shertok to his NY Representative, Foreign Minister said that Govt of Israel "has full right to resent strictures contained in Mr. Cremona's letter." So much for alleged pro-Jewish attitude of Bernadotte.

As for reported current opinion among Arabs regarding every US action as calculated to produce not a lasting peace but to hamper Arabs and assist Jews, it should be apparent to any serious Arab statesman that this govt, which has been subject to immense minority pressure, for example, to lift arms embargo in favor of Israel, has

been stalwart in attempting to find a peaceful, impartial and lasting solution of Palestine problem within a UN framework.

You say that a Foreign Office official told you that US exchange of diplomatic representatives with Israel was regarded by Arabs as violation of truce, since it violated *status quo* through implication that US supported Jewish State. You should point out that at the time the US extended *de facto* recognition to the Provisional Government of Israel it was contemplated that there would be an exchange of representatives and that agreement for the exchange of representatives was reached on June 7, prior to the start of the truce. There is therefore absolutely no ground for the claim that the US action was a violation of the truce.¹

You cite your Military Attaché as saying that Egyptian Military Authorities have stated that US military observers in Palestine "implied" that full info re Arab positions will eventually fall into Jewish hands and that MA can no longer count on cooperation of Egyptian Military Authorities with his office. You should request the MA to take every occasion to refute such charges, and to impress on Egyptian military officials that you are confident that US observers working on behalf of UN will in no way reveal any information of military value which may come to them from either side.

Your attitude toward Egyptians and other Arab officials should be that this Govt is trying, with other govts who are sincerely anxious to preserve peace, to see that hostilities do not again break forth in Near East. We desire friendship of Arab world and friendship of all peace-loving peoples but do not intend to let gossip of the type reported be developed into a pretext to blame US for ill results of Arab Govts erroneous decisions. Same policy applies equally to Jews.

Please repeat your reference telegram to Arab capitals and London to which this telegram is likewise sent for info and appropriate action.

Sent Cairo; rptd London as 2550, Baghdad as 232, Jidda as 257, Damascus as 264, Beirut as 393, Jerusalem as 690,² Haifa as 202.

MARSHALL

¹ The Department, on July 7, requested Damascus to reject as without foundation the allegations made by the Syrian Government in its note of June 29 (see footnote 1, p. 1156). The reply to the Syrian note was to be made along the lines of this paragraph, noting additionally that Mr. McDonald had been appointed Special Representative, not Minister Plenipotentiary. (Telegram 269, 501.BB Palestine/6-2948)

² Jerusalem, on July 5, expressed an opinion that the substance of telegram 690, particularly paragraphs four, five, and seven, should be communicated to the Transjordanian Government. It requested the Department to consider a suggestion that a representative of the Consulate General proceed to Amman and present these views to Transjordanian authorities (telegram 1024).

The Department, in reply on July 7, concurred in Jerusalem's views and concluded that "As soon as Stabler has proceeded Amman he is authorized discuss matter ref tel with Govt Transjordan". (Telegram 703; both telegrams are filed under 501.BB Palestine/7-548).

501.BB Palestine/7-348 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State*TOP SECRET US URGENT
NIACT

LONDON, July 3, 1948—2 p. m.

2964. Wright said July 3 Foreign Office submits for Department's consideration and comments following as suitable advice for HMG to give Abdullah of Transjordan in response to his request (Embassy's 2959, July 2¹).

2. Abdullah should realize that he must acquiesce to the existence of a sovereign Jewish state as a permanent entity in Palestine. He should realize that it is impossible to get rid of this state by fighting and that resumption of conflict as far as Arabs are concerned is likely to weaken the negotiating position which Arabs now enjoy.

3. Abdullah should realize also that if the Jews agree to continue negotiations with Mediator and Arabs do not, the Arabs will lay themselves open to sanctions under Chapter 7.

4. In view of circumstances described in paragraphs two and three above, HMG strongly recommends that Abdullah use his influence in Arab League to continue both the negotiations and the truce. The King would be given discretion to quote HMG if he so desired.

5. Foreign Office suggests that this advice should stand without specific reference to the nature of the Mediator's proposals of which HMG has not seen full text, and upon which, consequently, cannot comment.

6. Wright said HMG is most anxious to keep USG fully informed and to receive US comments but he realizes the Monday is a holiday US. Since USG and HMG are already agreed (Department's 2348, June 22) that it is imperative that truce should be continued Wright said he thought HMG would be safe in conveying foregoing advice to Abdullah solely as that of HMG even in advance of receiving US comments. He wishes, however, to give Department an opportunity of commenting and unless events make earlier action necessary, Foreign Office will not telegraph Amman before Monday July 5.

7. Wright said he wished to place before the Department another question of equal urgency: so far as HMG knows, Mediator is still awaiting replies from parties and has not specifically proposed extension of truce. There is no way of knowing when Mediator will report to SC, as it is possible that this might be done so late that

¹ Not printed; it reported a conversation between King Abdullah and Sir William Mack, British Ambassador in Iraq, in which the former made known his views that the Mediator's proposals were totally unacceptable to Transjordan since they involved diminution of her sovereignty. The Ambassador urged the King not to make a hasty decision. The King agreed, expressing the hope that the British Government would furnish him with good advice (501.BB Palestine/7-348).

truce would end without time for SC action re extension if that should be necessary. Consequently, Wright urgently desires views USG (which will also be sought through Cadogan) re convening SC on July 6 or 7 with a view to taking any steps necessary to assure continuance of truce in the event Mediator (a) fails to secure agreement to his proposals and (b) fails himself to secure an extension of the truce by agreement. Wright visualizes several ways which this could be done: One might be SC sending instructions to Mediator for use in eventualities named above, to call formally upon both Arabs and Jews in the name of SC to extend the truce for one month irrespective status Mediator's proposals and prospects for negotiations.

8. Please advise Department's views urgently.²

DOUGLAS

² The Department, in reply on July 4, stated that "action by HMG along lines paras 2-6 urtel 2964 July 3 would be most helpful. Regarding para 7, Dept is anxious to obtain extension of truce (Deptel 2552) and tentatively believes SC extension of May 29 resolution will be required." (Telegram 2557, 501.BB Palestine/7-348) For No. 2552, July 3, see p. 1186.

*The United Nations Mediator in Palestine (Bernadotte) to the Secretary-General of the United Nations (Lie)*¹

[RHODES?] 5 July 1948.

For the President of the Security Council:

The following proposals have been submitted to the parties on 3 and 5 July 1948:

During that very short period, a first effort has been made to explore the possibilities for effective mediation of the Palestine dispute. It could have been expected that in these four weeks a peaceful adjustment of the future situation in Palestine could have been achieved on the basis of agreement between the parties.

On the whole, the truce has worked well. There have been complaints from both sides as to the alleged violations of the terms of Truce Agreement. There have been instances of violation, but all fighting on a major scale has been stopped, and it can be said quite confidently that the truce has worked well, and by 9 July 1948, neither State will have gained any significant military advantage from its application. In the meantime, through the operation of the truce, much bloodshed and destruction have been avoided and many lives spared.

The expiration of the date of the truce on 9 July is now imminent. The parties to the truce must answer the question whether, in the absence of agreement on the procedure and substance of mediation, they will again resort to armed conflict.

¹ This telegram reprinted from SC, 3rd yr., *Supplement for July 1948*, p. 24.

There can be little doubt that a decision to resume fighting in Palestine will be universally condemned and that the party or parties taking such a decision will be assuming a responsibility which will be viewed by the world with the utmost gravity.

The truce, in effect, is based on the resolution of the Security Council of 29 May 1948. It was the fighting in Palestine which induced it to adopt that resolution. Unless the parties themselves agree to extend the truce beyond 9 July, it may be assumed that the Security Council will again consider the matter and take such action as circumstances may demand.

In order that the efforts toward mediation of the dispute may continue, and in the interest of a peaceful settlement of the problem by means of patient and tolerant effort and reciprocal good will, I ask the United Nations, as the United Nations Mediator on Palestine, to urgently appeal to the interested parties to accept in principle the prolongation of the truce for such period as may be decided upon in consultation with the Mediator.

501.BB Palestine/7-648 : Telegram

*The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations
(Jessup) to the Secretary of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

NEW YORK, July 6, 1948—11:25 a. m.

845. From Ross. Following are highlights of conversation with Eban late Friday afternoon based on telegrams he had received from Shertok re Bernadotte suggestions: ¹

1. Suggestion concerning Jerusalem is unacceptable. PGI could never consent to turning over to Arabs the hundred thousand Jews in Jerusalem.

2. Suggestion concerning review of immigration at end of two years by proposed joint council is unacceptable since it would be a clear impairment of Israeli sovereignty.

3. Idea of a concerted policy with Transjordan with regard to foreign affairs and defense is unacceptable as part of a settlement. Such a concerted policy might evolve naturally provided Abdullah's intentions were satisfactory to Israel.

4. Eban had received no comment from Shertok on territorial suggestions re the Negeb and western Galilee. Eban said this did not mean that Israel was prepared to accept these suggestions. Tone of Eban's comment confirmed impression we have had that question of unimpaired sovereignty including control of immigration is much more important to PGI than question of territorial changes. This by no means indicates that territorial question viewed as unimportant. Both questions very important but sovereignty question not negotiable while territorial question might be.

¹ See p. 1152.

Clearly indicated that PGI favors extension of truce and probably also demilitarization of Jerusalem provided latter could be accomplished without impairment welfare Jews that city and without impairment relative military position Israeli army.

Following is text of informal and confidential memorandum subsequently sent to me by Eban on PGI position in Jerusalem:

[Here follows text of memorandum.]

[Ross]

JESSUP

Editorial Note

Israeli Foreign Minister Shertok's formal reply to Count Bernadotte, dated July 5, was in the form of observations on the latter's suggestions. The observations were negative in character. Mr. Shertok concluded his message with an expression of hope that Count Bernadotte, after examining his observations, would reconsider his whole approach to the problem; for text of the reply and Major Eban's transmitting letter of July 7 to the Secretary-General, see SC, *3rd yr., Supplement for July 1948*, page 27.

The Arab reply to Count Bernadotte was made by Azzam Pasha under cover of a letter of July 3. The reply adversely criticized the Mediator's suggestions and offered various counter-proposals. Some of these called for Palestine to be a unitary, sovereign, and democratic state, with guarantees of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and of the sanctity of the holy places. A provisional government was to be established, representative of all important sections of the citizenry in proportion to their numerical strength (telegram 920, July 6, 6 p. m. from Cairo, 501.BB Palestine/7-648). The text is printed in United Nations, *Official Records of the Third Session of the General Assembly, Supplement No. 11 (A/648)*, page 19.

501.BB Palestine/7-648 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET US URGENT

LONDON, July 6, 1948—4 p. m.

2989. Bevin has been so preoccupied by Germany that most effective channel for dealing with Department's 2552, July 3 and 2557, July 4¹ has been through Wright who got to Bevin last night with following results:

1. HMG believes it would be most helpful for USG to urge upon Arab and Jewish Governments paramount necessity of extending

¹ Latter not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 1190.

cease fire and truce and acceding to Bernadotte suggestion for demilitarization of Jerusalem. (para three Department's 2552). HMG agrees that it should make similar approach re truce and this was done today in FonOff telegram sent Arab capitals. This telegram does not mention demilitarization because FonOff has no official info as to what Bernadotte has in mind. Wright pointed out that FonOff could send another telegram re demilitarization as soon as it knew more about it. He hoped Department would supply info this subject. Wright said HMG for obvious reasons would not approach PGI.

2. Telegram containing reply to Abdullah's request for advice (Department's 2557) was cleared by Bevin last night and despatched to Amman today with repeats to Arab capitals. Since Mediator's proposals are now available, HMG enumerated to Abdullah as arguments for Arabs continuing negotiations and truce those features of proposals more favorable to Arabs' cause than November 29 resolution. In another telegram sent to Arab capitals HMG has embodied its preliminary comments re Mediator's proposals with particular reference to features proposals which might further in Arab eyes our common aim of maintaining truce.

3. Re SC action (final sentence, Department's 2557), Wright said that Cadogan has been advised that HMG believes it preferable for SC action, if it should be necessary, to be based upon recommendation from Mediator since this might lessen controversy. However, Cadogan has been given discretion to raise in SC as British proposal question truce extension.

4. I hope to telegraph later today summaries British telegrams mentioned above.

DOUGLAS

501.BB Palestine/7-648: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET US URGENT

LONDON, July 6, 1948—8 p. m.

3002. 1. Bevin sent Wright to me this afternoon with two "disturbing" telegrams just received by Foreign Office. First is telegram from Amman dated today to effect that Arab Legion command in Palestine has been informed by Colonel Bonde that UN observers will cease to operate in Palestine as of tomorrow (July 7). Kirkbride commented that he has no clue as to reason for this decision but that in circumstances prospects survival truce seem remote.

2. Other telegram is from Troutbeck BMEO Cairo (Embassy's 2965, July 3¹) also dated today in which recommendation is made that

¹ Not printed.

Arabs should be made aware British views re resumption arms deliveries, British attitude towards Jewish state, and whether HMG believes Arabs should acquiesce to Mediator's proposals as basis for negotiations. Troutbeck opined that both Jews and Arabs are poised ready to fight.

3. Wright said HMG is deeply conscious only three days of truce remain and that Bevin wishes to leave no stone unturned in British efforts to extend truce. Consequently, Wright asked me to give on the spot clearance to another "most immediate" telegram to Arab capitals (see paragraph 4 below for summary of this message). Reinforcing points in telegrams described Embassy's 2989 July 6. Wright stressed Bevin's anxiety to keep in step with Department and pointed out new element in latest telegram is British advice to Arabs to accept Mediator's proposals as basis for discussion. Although Foreign Office does not know Department's considered views re Mediator's proposals, on basis paragraph 1 Department's 2552, July 3, Foreign Office assumes that Department is favorably inclined towards them. Time being of essence Wright hoped I would in this instance signify US acquiescence to the despatch of this telegram which in essence is an urgent and further effort HMG to extend truce.

4. Following is summary British telegram: First essence is that truce and cease-fire should be extended. If fighting is resumed on the responsibility of Arab Governments, SC will undoubtedly condemn them and it will be impossible for HMG, which is bound by its obligation to UN, to resume deliveries of arms to the Arabs. A Jewish state is already in effect and has come to stay in some form. Proposals of Mediator offer an opportunity for a solution on lines much more favorable to the Arab Governments than before. If Arabs were to receive added safeguard of guarantees against expansion of frontiers of Jewish state, they would be in better position than under any alternative now possible. HMG therefore considers it is in interests of Arab Governments to acquiesce in Mediator's proposals as basis for discussion. Governments can suggest modifications if necessary. If Arab Governments disregard these considerations and make themselves responsible for resumption of hostilities all indications are that victory in the field is impossible for them. Indeed possibility of serious military reversals must be taken into account.

5. Since in my view foregoing is clearly in line with our common aim to extend truce, and since I doubt that general character Department's first impressions of Mediator's proposals unlikely to alter greatly, I told Wright that I saw no objection to HMG sending above telegram. Foreign Office will despatch this telegram within the hour.

6. It occurs to me that there may be similar occasions in future when

time is vital and when HMG may consult me as above. Since framework of our common ideas re extension truce is now pretty well established, I believe that Department would wish me to act as I have done in above instance so long as HMG sticks to the generally established line. Am I correct in this? ²

DOUGLAS

² The Department, on July 7, informed London as follows: "Dept. agrees with action described urtel 3002 and answers question your para. 6 affirmatively." (Telegram 2586, 501.BB Palestine/7-648)

Editorial Note

The Arab and Israeli Military Commanders in the Jerusalem area signed an agreement on July 7, 1948, for the demilitarization of Mount Scopus. Two officials of the United Nations were also signatories; for the text of the agreement, see SC, *8th yr., Suppl. for April, May and June 1953*, page 30.

501.BB Palestine/7-748 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt

SECRET US URGENT
NIACT

WASHINGTON, July 7, 1948—noon.

933. Please make representations strongest possible terms to FonOff at earliest opportunity regarding great importance US attaches to prolongation Palestine truce proposed by Bernadotte. As friend of both Arabs and Jews, as member UN Truce Commission and as nation prepared to support in every practicable way settlement of international disputes by peaceful means, US urges upon governments concerned overriding necessity for further period of truce and negotiation as only avenue to lasting settlement and to protection of vital interests of governments and peoples involved. Resumption of fighting under present circumstances could lead to no tangible benefit to either side and would create bitterness and resentment against the parties which would greatly outweigh the speculative benefits of armed action. Security Council meets Wednesday morning on Palestine and may call upon parties for truce extension.¹

MARSHALL

¹ This telegram was repeated for action to Baghdad, Jidda, Damascus, Beirut, Jerusalem, and Haifa and for information to London. The Department, on July 7, directed Jerusalem to inform the Provisional Government of Israel that "Stabler authorized bring contents reftel attention Govt 'Transjordan". (Telegram 704, 501.BB Palestine/7-748).

501.BB Palestine/7-748 : Telegram

*The Chargé in Egypt (Patterson) to the Secretary of State*SECRET MOST IMMEDIATE
NIACT

CAIRO, July 7, 1948—2 p. m.

922. On informing Count Bernadotte at 9:30 this morning of content Deptel 929, July 6,¹ he stated that Arab League had not rejected his proposals for continuation of truce. Bernadotte, however, apparently expected truce to lapse. He viewed Arab counter-proposals (Embtel 920, July 6²) as hardly more than repetition of year-old arguments for unitary state. He could not, accordingly, consider them as bases for discussion. The Jews had made no counter-proposals whatever. Bernadotte was hopeful that Arabs would accept demilitarization of Jerusalem as proposed by him. He fancied, however, that they would not assent to demilitarization of Haifa.

Accordingly, he had proposed and was hopeful that both Arabs and Jews would at least concede a request which he had just made for a three-day prolongation of the truce which would enable observers and other personnel and materiel to be evacuated to ports. Colonel Bonde had already elaborated a plan whereby observers and other Mediator personnel would be evacuated to Haifa, Amman, and Cairo with eventual concentration at Beirut for transportation to Athens.³

Bernadotte felt neither side would care to reject this modest extension of truce and that indeed each would be reluctant to assume responsibility for resumption of hostilities, truce or no truce. He felt that the four-weeks truce had entered into effect too soon since the Arabs, at least, were still "feeling their oats" and had not, through continuation of hostilities, had enough of the fight knocked out of them.

Sent Department 922, repeated Jerusalem 107, Haifa 74.

PATTERSON

¹Not printed; it requested that Count Bernadotte be apprised of press and other reports concerning termination of the truce in Palestine and of the United States "hope that he will issue necessary orders to assure safe withdrawal of observers and equipment to ports where they may be safely embarked if and when he is convinced such action should be taken." (501.BB Palestine/7-648)

²Not printed, but see editorial note, p. 1192.

³The Department, on July 7, told Jerusalem that Count Bernadotte had formally requested removal of UN personnel and equipment from the Near East by the United States Navy (telegram 710, 501.BB Palestine/7-748). In a letter of July 9, to Secretary Forrestal, Acting Secretary Lovett requested that the evacuated personnel and equipment remain in the immediate vicinity until it became certain that the truce would not be extended (501.BB Palestine/7-948).

501.BB Palestine/7-748 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt

RESTRICTED

US URGENT

WASHINGTON, July 7, 1948—11 p. m.

NIAC

942. The Security Council adopted today by a vote of eight to zero (USSR, Ukraine, and Syria abstaining) the following resolution on Palestine.

“The Security Council, taking into consideration the telegram from the UN Mediator dated 5 July 1948 addresses an urgent appeal to the interested parties to accept in principle the prolongation of the truce for such period as may be decided upon in consultation with the Mediator.”¹

MARSHALL

¹ This message was repeated to Beirut, Jidda, Damascus, Baghdad, Haifa, and Jerusalem. The resolution was submitted by British Representative Cadogan and received the warm support of Mr. Jessup; see SC, *3rd yr.*, No. 93, pp. 11, 12.

Editorial Note

Mr. Jessup reported that at a dinner in New York given for Ambassador Gromyko by Secretary-General Lie on the evening of July 8, he had been asked by Gromyko “whether we would be prepared to introduce a resolution at the next meeting of the Security Council. I said that it seemed to me that it would be clearly necessary for the Security Council to act if the current reports were confirmed. I asked him what his view was. He said that I would recall that they had generally voted with us on this question and indicated that they would be prepared to vote for a resolution under Chapter VII.” (Memorandum of conversation, July 9, by Mr. Jessup, 501.BB Palestine/7-948)

501.BB Palestine/7-848

*Draft Resolution Prepared by the United States Delegation at the United Nations*¹

The Security Council,

Taking into consideration that certain governments have rejected the appeal of the United Nations Mediator for prolongation of the truce in Palestine;

Determines that the situation in Palestine constitutes a threat to the peace within the meaning of Article 39 of the Charter;

Orders all governments and authorities which have not already done so to accept immediately the prolongation of the truce for such period as may be decided by the Mediator;

¹ As telephoned from New York to Mr. Rusk on July 8.

Requests the Mediator to continue negotiations with the parties concerned relative to the terms and conditions applicable to the continued period of the truce.²

² Marginal notation of July 9 by William I. Cargo, Acting Assistant Chief of the Division of Dependent Area Affairs: "Above text suggested by USUN for introduction into SC on 7/8/48. Indicated that UK would support. In meeting in Mr. Lovett's office (Mr. Lovett, Mr. Rusk, Mr. Satterthwaite, and Mr. Cargo present) decision taken not to introduce resolution. Decision taken in view of continuing strong UK diplomatic pressure on Arabs and desire to allow this initiative to continue, fact of Bernadotte's forthcoming visit to Amman, and possibility of Abdullah accepting and urging a prolongation of truce. Decided that USSRDel should speak strongly in SC emergency meeting for extension of truce pointing out that a resumption of hostilities would be a breach of the peace under Chapter VII and that US would support, in such a contingency, appropriate SC action pursuant to the Charter. Mr. Rusk informed USUN in this sense."

501.BB Palestine/7-848

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Lovett)*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] July 8, 1948.

Participants: Mr. Lovett

Mr. Epstein, Special Representative of the Provisional
Government of Israel

Mr. Mattison (NE)

Mr. Epstein stated that he had requested an urgent appointment in order to acquaint the Department with certain facts regarding the truce in Palestine.

He stated that the Israeli Government had accepted Count Bernadotte's proposals for an extension of the truce, without condition.² Unfortunately, he had received word that the Arabs were not willing to accept the extension of the truce, and that Egyptian forces had, in fact, attacked Israeli positions south of Tel Aviv before the end of the truce.

Mr. Epstein expressed the hope that the U.S. Government would take action in the Security Council of the United Nations to put a stop to the conflict in Palestine. He pointed out that Israel needed peace in order to proceed with the development of the country and to put its own house in order. He indicated that the strong measures taken by the Israeli Government against the Irgun when the Irgun had attempted to break the truce by landing men and weapons at Tel Aviv had been successful. He implied that a renewal of the fighting with the Arabs might make it more difficult to control the Irgun.

¹ Drafted by Mr. Mattison.

² Mr. Epstein, in note 322 of July 9 to Mr. Lovett, transmitted a message of July 8 from Mr. Shertok stating that the Provisional Government of Israel had decided on July 6 to accept extension of the truce and had so advised Count Bernadotte the following day (501.BB Palestine/7-948). For the formal notification of these developments by Mr. Shertok to the President of the Security Council in a cablegram of July 9, see SC, 3rd yr., *Supplement for July 1948*, p. 37.

I told Mr. Epstein that we were following the situation with the closest attention, that we earnestly desired a return to peace in the area, and that we were striving through the UN to achieve this objective.

Mr. Epstein mentioned that he had received "reports" that the British were encouraging King Abdullah to continue hostilities. I informed Mr. Epstein that we had documentary evidence to the contrary, and that to our knowledge the British were cooperating fully and were putting extremely heavy pressure on Abdullah and the other Arab States to accept the extension of the truce. Mr. Epstein stated that he was glad to have this news, and to learn that his reports were unfounded.

The conversations then turned to the question of recognition of the State of Israel. I took pains to explain our position in the matter. I pointed out that our recognition of the State of Israel was unqualified. We recognized that the State existed, and that recognition was not qualified in any way. The only qualification which existed was that we recognized the Provisional Government of Israel as the *de facto* Government of the State. The reason for this qualification was that the Government had come into being without the people of the State having had a chance to participate in the election of the Government. When it was possible for the people to elect a government by constitutional processes it would follow that *de jure* recognition would be granted. Mr. Epstein commented that their legal advisers had told him much the same thing and that he was endeavoring to explain this situation to his "American friends" who felt that *de jure* recognition should be extended.

In conclusion, I took occasion to remind Mr. Epstein of the friendly warning which I had given him and Mr. Shertok last fall of the possibility that the Iron-Curtain countries might seek to penetrate the dissident groups in Israel, and told him that our intelligence reports indicated that such penetration might be occurring. Mr. Epstein said that he was fully aware of the dangers involved, and that he felt that it would now be possible to do more towards controlling this danger. Last fall there had been no Israeli Government and the situation was more difficult to control. He then inquired whether it would be possible to have access to, and exchange views regarding the subject matter of the intelligence reports. I explained that many of the reports were of such high classification that it would be impossible to make such an arrangement. I suggested that undoubtedly his Government monitored the broadcasts of the dissident groups, and that these broadcasts alone were sufficient to give an indication of the thinking of those groups and their orientation.

Mr. Epstein concluded by saying that there were a number of other pending subjects which he hoped to take up with me at a later date.

L[OVETT]

CIA Files

*Memorandum by the Director of Central Intelligence (Hillenkoetter)
to President Truman*¹

SECRET
IM-48

[WASHINGTON,] 8 July 1948.

Since 15 May 1948 when the UK abandoned its mandate over Palestine, the Arabs and Jews have experienced four weeks of bitter hostilities and four weeks of uneasy truce. Neither war nor peace, however, has in any way weakened the determination of the Jews to establish a sovereign state of Israel or the determination of the Arabs to prevent the establishment of such a state. The period of hostilities led to a military stalemate; the truce has favored the Jews.

Count Bernadotte's proposal that the Palestine truce be extended beyond 9 July has been accepted by Israel. The Arab states, on the other hand, have rejected it in view of Bernadotte's refusal to adopt the Arab proposals (a unified Palestine with restricted Jewish immigration) as the only basis for further negotiations.*

In the resumption of full-scale hostilities, the Jewish forces will probably attempt to consolidate their positions in the coastal area and Galilee and to gain control of Jerusalem. The Arabs will probably try to break the military stalemate which had developed prior to the truce. They will attempt to reimpose their blockade of Jerusalem by cutting the Tel Aviv supply route and will try to isolate Tel Aviv from the hinterland by making concerted advances with the Egyptian, Transjordan, and Iraqi Armies. The Syrian Army will probably launch a limited offensive in northeastern Galilee.

The success of the Arab campaign is doubtful in view of acute ammunition shortages. Unless the Arabs can force political concessions from Israel within the next two months, they will probably be compelled by logistic difficulties to withdraw most of their army units from Palestine. However, they can be expected to support guerrilla activities indefinitely. Arab guerrilla incursions, political non-recognition, and economic sanctions will completely isolate Israel from the rest of the Near East. Under such circumstances, its security will be continuously threatened, its economy stifled, and its future existence consequently will be entirely dependent on the continuing good will of some outside power or powers.

R. H. HILLENKOETTER

¹ Attached to the source text is a CIA map entitled "Military Situation—11 June 1948", which is reproduced facing this page.

* Despite the resumption of hostilities, Arabs and Jews are expected to cooperate with the Mediator in the evacuation of UN personnel. [Footnote in the source text.]

501.BB Palestine/7-848: Telegram

The Consul General at Jerusalem (Macdonald) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

JERUSALEM, July 8, 1948—5 p. m.

1041. Truce has improved military potential PGI considerably while no information is available that would indicate Arabs have benefitted appreciably. Depcirtel July 7.¹ Jewish officials openly state they have more and better equipment than when truce began. This has been mentioned to me by Shaltiel, commanding officer of Jerusalem district and Bernard Joseph. Also see my telegram July 6 Number 1028.¹

New road which has been constructed by PGI to by-pass section on Tel Aviv, Jerusalem road between Latrun and Babelwad which is held by Arabs, has been improved during truce and is completely in Jew hands giving them supply route from Haifa to Jerusalem via Tel Aviv.

Arab refusal allow Jerusalem water has been greatest advantage to them during truce. Food position Jerusalem is definitely better now than at beginning of truce.

There has been no attempt to conceal improvements of minor fortifications in Jerusalem and erection of new ones although such construction visible to civilians has been on comparatively small scale. New troops have been recruited and trained.²

MACDONALD

¹ Not printed.

² Haifa reported, on July 13, that the Jews during the truce had brought in quantities of heavy equipment, especially in guns, and at least 2,000 trained men of military age and had built fortifications and gun emplacements in the coastal area. Consul Lippincott concluded that the Jews had profited from the truce period and were in a much better position to fight than before the truce (telegram 245 501.BB Palestine/7-1348).

Editorial Note

In a cablegram of July 9 to Secretary-General Lie, the Mediator transmitted the Arab reply to his proposals for a prolongation of the truce. The reply noted the "impossibility of persuading Jewish minority to abandon political ambitions . . . and its determination to impose its will by force and terrorism on the overwhelming majority of inhabitants of country . . . coupled with its violations of conditions of truce and utilization of interval as means for intensification of aggression against Arabs and for over-flooding country with continuous flow of immigrants, all these factors make it imperative for Arab States not to agree to prolongation of truce under present conditions and to take all measures necessary to bring these conditions to end. This, however, should not shut door in face of further efforts by Mediator, nor should it preclude whatever proposals His Excellency may put forth in that capacity." The full text of the cablegram is

printed in SC, 3rd yr., *Supplement for July 1948*, page 31.

The Mediator sent a second cable to Mr. Lie on July 9, which contained his appeal to all interested parties for acceptance of an unconditional ceasefire in Palestine for a ten-day period; for text, see *ibid.*, page 33.

501.BB Palestine/7-948 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET US URGENT

LONDON, July 9, 1948—4 p. m.

3081. On Bevin's personal instructions further telegram along following lines will be despatched by Foreign Office this afternoon to all Arab capitals including Amman. *Begin summary:*

1. You should again impress on government to which you are accredited grave danger to Arabs if they persist in refusing SC appeals for extension truce, particularly in view of the fact Jews have accepted extension. In circumstances SC bound consider action under Chapter 7 Charter against Arab states and in that even HMG can do little or nothing for Arabs.

2. Fact that decision Arab League political committee was taken before July 7 SC resolution was available makes latter bridge over which Arab leaders should be able to retreat without loss prestige.

3. HMG is prepared to make further effort to facilitate withdrawal Arab League from dangerous position in which it has placed itself. HMG has noted that Arabs have based themselves on benefits truce to Jewish military potential. Consequently HMG has instructed UKUN to try to get SC to resolve upon truce extension in order to give time for Mediator to report on truce operations and accusations made by both sides. Thus if Arabs would agree to brief extension they would have chance to explain to SC their grounds for believing truce one-sided in its effects and propose if they so desire modification truce terms.

4. HMG does not know at what stage UKUN can do this, but action in SC must necessarily depend to some extent on readiness Arab governments to cooperate with efforts HMG is making to save them from consequences of their own hasty decision. *End summary.*

DOUGLAS

501.BB Palestine/7-948 : Telegram

The Chargé in Egypt (Patterson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET US URGENT
NIACT

CAIRO, July 9, 1948—5 p. m.

957. Following from Stabler¹ now in Amman. Count Bernadotte accompanied by Bunche and Mohn arrived this morning at invitation

¹ Wells Stabler, the Vice Consul at Jerusalem; detailed to Amman.

of King Abdullah. Bunche on behalf of Bernadotte requested that following message be transmitted to Department:

"Bernadotte feels that Security Council should take immediate and strong action to bring Arab states to their senses. Now that Arab League has made decision rejecting truce, some formula must be found immediately to permit Arab states to change their decision without loss of face. Bernadotte believes that if Security Council should adopt resolution threatening use of all provisions of charter including armed intervention, Arab states would back down. Bunche said that Arab officials have privately intimated to Bernadotte that such resolution would give them a way out without incurring risk of internal dissension. It would permit Arabs to say in effect we are unable to fight the world; therefore, we must bow to the UN.

Bunche indicated that Bernadotte might suggest to Security Council some aerial or naval demonstrations as example UN's determination to stop hostilities in Palestine.

Bernadotte will leave Amman at noon for Haifa and then return to Rhodes to see whether Arabs will discuss further demilitarization of Jerusalem; if so, he will proceed Cairo tomorrow."

[Stabler]
PATTERSON

501.BB Palestine/7-948 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

LONDON, July 9, 1948—7 p. m.

3096. Bevin assembled this morning his top Foreign Office advisors to consider road ahead Palestine. Following is report views expressed and my interpretation of them since I was present:

1. Bernadotte's visit to Amman today is most hopeful event on horizon particularly if Abdullah, as he told British Minister Kirkbride yesterday he might do, takes bold step of accepting unilaterally Mediator's truce proposals. Pros and cons of such action by Abdullah were discussed. There was one school of thought (Embassy's 3055, July 6¹) which felt that Abdullah should be urged by His Majesty's Government to take onus of going against decision of political committee Arab League and to accept unilaterally extension truce. Against this another school advanced view that if Abdullah takes this step as result British advice, and if Arab States turn against him, or if Jews as a consequence Arab Legion inactivity greatly expanded Israel by force of arms, consider a moral responsibility would rest on His Majesty's Government for worsening Abdullah's material and moral position. Bevin and McNeil opined that Abdullah is still only Arab

¹ Not printed.

leader capable of retrieving situation (Embassy's 3056, July 8,² paragraph one) and that it was to be considered whether important asset of Abdullah's tractability should be risked at this juncture without further appeal to Arab Governments to retreat over bridge which may be laid if British resolution passes SC (Embassy's 3081, July 9, paragraph two). No final decision was reached this morning as to whether Abdullah should be given more His Majesty's Government advice but later Bevin sent message given in my 3085, July 9.³

2. Bevin made following comments re Mediator's proposals as basis for discussion if truce continued or if further UN action on them seems desirable:

a) In Bevin's view it would be in interests of Arabs for Jerusalem to be under international regime policed by international force drawn from Belgium, France, US, et cetera; (I interjected in this regard that to my mind it is highly important that future regime for Jerusalem should not be fixed as Arab, but at least should be open for discussion in order that Jerusalem could be made international city. Bevin expressed agreement).

b) Frontiers Israel drawn under November 29 resolution are unsatisfactory: How much better are frontiers indicated by Mediator is question for examination;

c) It would be better, contrary to what may have been in Mediator's mind, to have clearly defined Jewish state unconnected with Arab areas.

3. Bevin advanced thought that Arab leaders may be so committed to their unequivocal opposition to Jewish state that UN decision which would force state upon them might be welcomed to some degree by leaders.

4. Bevin raised question as to whether UNGA alone can change UNGA November 29 resolution unless the parties agree to a change under auspices Mediator (Paragraph five, Embassy's 3080, July 9⁴).

² Not printed.

³ Not printed; the message stated that the Arab Legion had borne the brunt of the fighting and that the recent Arab League decision meant that the governments which had made little contribution to the Arab war effort were dictating that the Arab Legion should again engage in hostilities. Under these circumstances, Abdullah might point out that the Legion had only a few days supply of ammunition and that, if the Arabs took the initiative in breaking the truce, it could not expect further supplies from the United Kingdom. Therefore, Abdullah should order his forces to stand on their present positions, not taking the offensive but resisting attack if necessary (501.BB Palestine/7-948).

⁴ Not printed; paragraph 5 read: "It will be clear no doubt to SC that under resolution Mediator would be recalled to report re operation truce and possible continuance truce and not on his proposals for resolution Palestine problem. In this connection SC is not empowered to change November 29 resolution UNGA which can be changed only (a) By agreement parties through good offices Mediator, or (b) By new UNGA decision.

"Bevin states it may be necessary to ask SC refer this question back to UNGA and Foreign Office is examining possibility action to this effect. For time being, however, Cadogan should use all his influence to persuade SC to extend truce and to avoid any precipitate action which might make this more difficult." (501.BB Palestine/7-948)

He has asked UN Department Foreign Office to make special study of this question.

5. If foregoing is not very coherent it is because conclusions of gathering itself did not have this quality. Clearly His Majesty's Government has as yet not decided when to risk their trump card of Abdullah in an effort to persuade Arab states to accept a Jewish state as permanent feature Middle Eastern landscape (see Paragraph one above). My telegrams 3080, 3081 and 3085 show the results of meeting as sorted out by Foreign Office officials later.

6. If Abdullah would himself take decision to break, or to threaten to break with Arab League countries, thus freeing His Majesty's Government from moral responsibility for consequences of this act, British Government would, I am sure, welcome this development.

7. Throughout this meeting the provisions of Chapter 7 were mentioned as the sword of Damocles hanging over Arabs: I detected no hint of any desire on part of those present to flinch from a fair share in imposition sanctions in unhappy event that this should be necessary. We need have no worries, I think, on this score.

DOUGLAS

501.BB Palestine/7-1048: Telegram

*The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations
(Jessup) to the Secretary of State*

SECRET NIACT

NEW YORK, July 10, 1948—1:19 p. m.

870. Following are our analyses of present situation re Palestine and recommendations for action based on hypothesis that latest ten-day truce extension proposed by mediator will be rejected by Arabs. Just informed Israel has accepted ten-day truce. If Arabs accept ten-day truce, following suggestions on tactics would require substantial change but basic policy considerations would still be pertinent:

1. The documented evidence is incontrovertible that states of Arab League have created a threat to the peace by refusing to extend truce.

2. The circumstantial evidence is equally clear that military action by Egypt at least, probably also by Iraq and Syria, constitutes a breach of the peace and an act of aggression.

3. It is unfortunate that for the moment it will probably be difficult to verify any breach of the peace or act of aggression in view of the fact that Mediator has, mistakenly, in our opinion, withdrawn the UN observers and other UN personnel from Palestine. (Compare conflicting reports in No. 3086 from London¹ and unnumbered from

¹ Dated July 9; it reported an Egyptian denial that Egyptian troops had made attacks in southern Palestine (501.BB Palestine/7-948).

Navy July 8, 2:12 p. m. [7:12 a. m.?].²) However, while avoiding basing action on controversial facts, it would be sheer quibbling and grossly inexpedient politically to delay action on this account.

4. In view of fact that Israel has accepted extension of truce unconditionally on terms proposed by Mediator, military action by Israel cannot possibly be considered to be a breach of the peace or act of aggression. Such action on the contrary must be considered as defensive action as contemplated by Art. 51 of the charter pending appropriate action by SC. Fact that Israel is not a member of UN does not alter principle involved.

5. It is possible that UK and certainly Arab line will be that Arab failure to extend truce and resumption of hostilities by Arabs result from Jewish breaches of truce while it was operative; hence there should be no finding or action under chapter VII of charter pending further investigation. This is wholly specious constituting no excuse for Arabs and no reason for delay. Questions of breaches of truce should be dealt with while it is in effect by peaceful means through machinery available and created by UN for purpose, namely, Mediator and SC. We must obviously also oppose Arab argument that they are still acting to defend Palestine against "Zionist invaders".

6. The fact that Mediator has decided to come to Lake Success to report (it is now anticipated that he will not arrive until late Monday) and that he has made a new appeal to parties for ten-day truce extension should not be occasion for any further delay in SC consideration and action. Every hour that passes is likely to intensify fighting and renders more and more difficult restoration of peace and maintenance of conditions necessary to working out of peaceful adjustment of future situation. Prolongation of truce should still be our first objective, but meanwhile events are outstripping our policy.

7. Delay will reflect very adversely on prestige and effectiveness of SC.

8. Delay will increase risk of new dissension between US and UK.

9. Delay will increase risk of serious breach in our bipartisan foreign policy and of hindering thereby a settlement, in view of fact that both our parties are wholly committed to support of Israel and that in present political circumstances one or other party may feel impelled to take some precipitate action.

10. Arabs are living in a dream world where the political fact of existence of Israel (supported by USSR and US—in the US strongly by both political parties) is denied and where it is imagined that even the ghost of this fact may be laid by resort to arms. It is wholly contrary to our political and strategic interests and our oft repeated

² Not printed; it reported information from Israeli sources that Egyptian forces were attacking Isdud (867N.01/7-848).

professions of friendship for Arabs to allow them to continue to delude themselves in this manner.

11. While we must so far as possible try to maintain maximum possible friendly relations Arab states, we cannot ignore our relations with Israel. Failure to support Israel in SC would almost certainly induce pressures which might be irresistible and because not planned by us, far less satisfactory than a well-considered policy of strong public support.

12. Delay, weakness or equivocation in our policy will unquestionably give Russians strong propaganda advantage not only in SC and in Israel but also among world Jewry.

In light of foregoing we propose following specific actions:

1. That we formally request an SC meeting to be called at earliest possible, preferably no later than Monday.

2. That preferably over weekend but in any case no later than Monday the President issue a statement from White House as follows:

a. We have hoped that parties would agree to prolongation of truce and we have exerted every effort at our command to this end. Prolongation of truce is still our primary objective.

b. To our great regret, however, states of Arab League have rejected three appeals for prolongation of truce and certain of them have resorted to armed force in Palestine in a manner wholly inconsistent with purposes and principles of UN charter.

c. Present situation in Palestine clearly constitutes at very least a "threat to the peace" within meaning of Art. 39 of charter requiring immediate action by SC.

d. Accordingly he is instructing the acting US representative to introduce a resolution in SC at earliest possible moment (along lines of draft resolution sent Department in USUN 863.³)

e. During four weeks period of truce under SC resolution of May 29, US has followed a course of strict neutrality and impartiality between the parties, and has lived up faithfully to all of its obligations under that resolution. Furthermore, as a member of Truce Commission, US has assisted UN Mediator in many different ways at his request in carrying out his responsibilities.

f. So long as there is prospect of immediate resumption of truce, US will continue to act on basis SC resolution of May 29.

g. However, May 29 resolution would no longer be applicable if Arab states have finally repudiated truce and full-scale fighting is resumed. Under such circumstances, US would consider itself under obligation to maintain measures designed to prevent military aid

³ Dated July 9, not printed; the draft resolution provided that the Security Council order those governments which had resumed hostilities to cease and desist from further hostile military action (paragraph 3), that the Council order all other governments which had refused to accept prolongation of the truce to refrain from any threat or use of force (paragraph 4), and that the Council order all governments to which paragraphs 3 and 4 applied to accept immediately the prolongation of the truce. Failure to do so would be evidence of a breach of the peace and an act of aggression within the meaning of Article 39 and would require further immediate action under Chapter 7 (501.BB Palestine/7-948).

reaching Arab states which were illegally waging war in violation of charter.

h. At same time US would remove restrictions on aid to Israel on ground that having been attacked after agreeing to truce, it was acting in self-defense. US policy will continue to be based on Charter and our responsibilities as member of UN to assist in restoring and maintaining peace in Palestine.

i. Meanwhile, he is having instructions issued to all US personnel loaned to UN as observers and in other capacities to stand by for further assistance to Mediator as may be required.

3. That without delaying action here, our line as outlined above be communicated immediately to UK through US Embassy London and simultaneously through UK Del here. We believe we must not yield too much to UK desire to stall action and Presidential statement could be used as leverage in our representations in London and New York.

4. That in connection with above we, jointly with UK, make clear in strongest terms and without equivocation to all Arab capitals (as UK has already done in Amman—see London's 2964 and 2989 ⁴), our judgement that sovereign state of Israel is here to stay, that no amount of fighting or other action by Arabs can possibly alter this situation in either short or long run, and that this simple fact of political life must be taken as basis for continued truce and efforts to work out peaceful adjustment of future situation. Our representatives should point out that apparent Arab reliance on theory that US support for Israel is inspired by local political considerations is specious: both major political parties emphatically taking same position: no change in this bipartisan position is conceivable. We fully recognize that this action requires a great deal of courage in light of probable shock to Arabs and resultant risks of Arab action re oil concessions, air base facilities, etc. On other hand, this action in view of strong bipartisan support of Israel in this country will have to be faced up to sooner or later and we are not at all convinced that risk of Arab retaliation is nearly as great as they would have us believe, particularly from long run viewpoint. We believe that Bernadotte is right in theory Arabs would be relieved to have to yield to strong UN pressure. (See Niac 957 from Cairo, July 9.)

5. That we proceed immediately without further delay to determine at least main outlines of tentative plan we could support for peaceful adjustment of future situation in Palestine (see our tels S31 and S37 ⁵) and that we discuss this plan immediately and simultaneously with UK and Israel. In case of UK we suggest discussion through three channels. London, Washington and New York. In case of Israel we suggest discussion initially in New York where because our personal

⁴ Dated July 3 and July 6, respectively, pp. 1189 and 1192.

⁵ Dated June 30 and July 1, respectively, pp. 1161 and 1180.

relations with Eban plan can be discussed entirely unofficial, personal, trial-balloon basis.

6. That following discussion with UK and Israel we then take the plan up, as it may be revised in light of said discussions, with Mediator for his guidance in further negotiations, and at same time jointly with UK communicate our views to Arab states as well as to Israel.⁶

JESSUP

⁶ A marginal notation indicates that no action was taken on this telegram.

501.BB Palestine/7-1048: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Jessup), at New York

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 10, 1948—2 p. m.

456. For Jessup from Rusk. Following is entirely unofficial and furnished for your consideration during weekend conversations with Cadogan. Bernadotte's personal report may suggest major alterations. Dept. would wish to have your comments before issuing specific instructions.

Overriding US objectives in present Palestine situation are (1) extension of the truce, (2) negotiated final settlement, and (3) continuance concerted action with UK to maximum extent consistent with US policy. Regarding last point, Dept. welcomes vigorous steps being taken by UK to bring about extension of truce and to impress upon Arabs fact that Jewish State in Palestine is here to stay. Every possible opportunity should be given UK to maintain this initiative as important element toward final settlement. It would be most desirable from US point of view if UK would introduce necessary resolutions in SC; US should be prepared to make concessions on details in order to support UK resolutions directed toward broad joint objectives.

US can support in SC at this time resolution along lines of SC resolution of May 29. Such resolution might afford Arab Govts. opportunity to explain to Arab public opinion necessity for extending truce. Our preference, however, is for a resolution under Chap. VII clearly ordering parties to accept truce since there is some indication action of this nature will be required to force Arab reconsideration.

If such stronger resolution is required, general line your 863 appears preferable to your 859.¹ However, it would seem that precise

¹ Dated July 9 and 8, respectively, neither printed; they presented for Department consideration the texts of alternative draft resolutions for possible submission to the Security Council by Mr. Jessup (501.BB Palestine/7-948, /7-848). Regarding No. 863, see footnote 3, p. 1207.

allocation of responsibility as between Jews and Arabs should be based upon clear refusal to accept a renewed order by the SC to cease hostilities, not merely on public announcements of their respective attitudes toward accepting truce. We see no special advantage in going beyond concept of threat to peace at this stage, connected with a provisional measure to extend the truce, without drawing sharp distinctions among govts. in the operative part of the resolution. Fundamentally, of course, US position remains that set forth in Deptels 327² and 331³ which were basis for US position before SC passage of May 29 resolution. In any new resolution, SC might apply resolution generally to all parties and then specifically to those which have refused to accept a truce in order to bring all parties within the resolution but at the same time specify those who are now recalcitrant. [Rusk.]

MARSHALL

² Dated May 26, not printed, but see footnote 1, p. 1027.

³ Dated May 27, p. 1062.

501.BB Palestine/7-1148 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

LONDON, July 11, 1948—noon.

3111. Embtel 3096, July 9.

1. Bevin asked me to meet again with him and his top advisers on Palestine late yesterday. Lewis Jones accompanied me.

2. Bevin, speaking from brief based on telegrams summarized my 3110, July 10¹ (full texts are obtainable from British Embassy Washington), established the facts as HMG understands them, most crucial of which is that both King Abdullah and intermediary King of Egypt have expressed desire that SC should threaten Arabs with sanctions. He sketched following as HMG's suggestions with regard to the road ahead re Palestine along which he hoped devoutly US and UK could proceed together.

3. Present aims British policy re Palestine as sketched to me by Bevin and telegraphed last night to Cadogan for his private guidance are :

(a) To avoid resumption hostilities;

(b) There being no good purpose in declining accept Jewish state, HMG hopes to arrive by peaceful means at settlement approximating that indicated by Mediator but thinks it fatal to acceptance of this by Arabs if Mediator and UN insist upon political union between Arab and Jewish states.

¹ Not printed.

4. To accomplish three (b) above Foreign Office thinks it would be better for UN to settle frontiers Jewish state and demilitarization Jerusalem, leaving future remainder Palestine to be determined by Arabs, probably by incorporating it in Transjordan. Thus UN would fix Jewish state frontiers and violation of these by either party would be aggression. This would give Arabs feeling of security and help bring about their acquiescence.

5. British view is that final political settlement must be arrived at either by agreement between parties under auspices Mediator or by action UNGA (paragraph five my 3080, July 9²). SC would have no right to interfere with authority UNGA by itself attempting to modify in some radical manner basis plan of November 29 resolution. It should, however, be British aim to ensure SC acts in way consistent with ultimate objective defined paragraph three (b) above.

6. Immediate British aim is to end fighting on conditions ensuring so far as possible that it will not be resumed. Because of facts paragraph two above, Foreign Office sees advantage in adoption by SC of resolution containing threat of sanctions against Arabs but considers it essential this should be presented in such way as to diminish as little as possible British influence over Arab governments. It should therefore contain reference to accusations made re truce breaches and to machinery for dealing with future breaches. Cadogan should vote for such a resolution if it fulfills British requirements. Otherwise, he should seek further instructions.

7. Above covers general British future policy as now conceived. Bevin emphasized British view that as first step before considering any resolution SC should hear Mediator's report on his activities under original truce resolution. This is important because if political committee of Arab League meets Beirut as press indicates there is chance situation may be entirely changed by Arab decision to comply after all with proposals for extending truce.

8. If, however, truce has not been renewed, Cadogan has been instructed to urge in SC a hearing of complaints of both sides re application of truce. Foreign Office believes SC should examine carefully whether Arabs alone are at fault.

9. British thinking re text of resolution which may be required is well advanced and has been based on US draft. Most important amendments which Foreign Office has instructed UKUN to discuss with USUN are that resolution:

(a) Should specify that hostilities are not to be resumed pending definitive political settlement;

(b) Should instruct Mediator to establish machinery (see paragraph eleven below) for examining alleged breaches of the truce in order that he may take appropriate action without delay;

² Not printed, but see footnote 4, p. 1204.

(c) Should make no reference at this stage to an act of aggression within meaning of Article 39 of Charter.

10. Foreign Office draft resolution incorporating ideas paragraph nine above was sent Cadogan last night with instruction to discuss it today with USUN.

11. Re machinery for examination past and future breaches of peace (paragraph nine (b) above) Bevin referred repeatedly to investigation "tribunals" made up of observers of three different nationalities.

12. Bevin expressed belief that Arabs will accept truce extension on basis SC resolution drafted along lines suggested by Foreign Office (paragraph ten above).

13. In advising me of foregoing views which have been worked out here with utmost thought and care since long term British relations with Arab world are at stake, Bevin said he was laying all of his cards on the table and he hoped that the logic underlying the steps he proposed would commend itself to the Department and so result in a parallel course of action on our part.

14. Having in mind the step-by-step evolution during past weeks of British policy, ever closer to our own policy as I understand it, and the nature of the ideas set forth above, it seems to me that the latter stand on their own merits and that comment by me is superfluous.

DOUGLAS

501.BB Palestine/7-1148: Telegram

The Consul General at Jerusalem (Macdonald) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

JERUSALEM, July 11, 1948—4 p. m.

1061. Cynical attitude towards United Nations and increasing demand for incorporation new Jerusalem within state of Israel now apparent here. Immediately following May 14 projected international status for Jerusalem was accepted by Jewish officials and people but prior beginning truce and during cease-fire noticeable shift in attitude occurred which will probably be accentuated with resumption fighting.

In addition to private conversations, following public statements illustrate trend: Decision by Jerusalem community council's committee for municipal affairs request Israel Government press for inclusion Jerusalem Jewish state; statement in Tel Aviv by Mayor Jerusalem that since city neglected by United Nations no choice remains but ask Israel take over authority; speech by Haganah Jerusalem commander stating "we shall fight to last man among us for our survival and our capital city"; warning by Stern gang to US, France and Belgium that it will fight any forces sent to internationalize city.

Jews justify claim to Jerusalem by pointing to failure United

Nations take effective action protect city or establish government. Maintain Israel forces only ones which have defended city from Moslems and now in fact occupy most of city.

Accompanying above attitude is feeling among local Jews that they must depend entirely on selves and readiness to adopt whatever measures necessary achieve victory. Apparent Christian indifference to plight of holy city often mentioned and authorities appear willing take any military action necessary regardless possible destruction old city.

Consul General feels official demand for inclusion new Jerusalem in Jew state may soon be made and that possibility all out attack on old city in near future should not be discounted.

MACDONALD

Editorial Note

The Minutes of Policy Planning Staff meeting of July 12 state that Mr. Kennan "had said that short-term developments now occurring so rapidly left no basis on which to attempt at this time to develop a long-term policy paper on Palestine. No Policy Planning Staff paper on Palestine is contemplated for the present." (PPS Files, Lot 64 D 563)

*Report of the United Nations Mediator in Palestine (Bernadotte) to the Security Council, July 12, 1948*¹

[Extract]

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35. A first essential in Palestine today is an immediate cessation of hostilities. But that is only a first step. For the question must be answered, at some stage, whether the international community is willing to tolerate resort to armed force as the means for settlement of the Palestine issue. Willingness to do this could well involve many risks for the peace of the entire Near East, if not for the larger world. In this regard a distinction may properly be drawn between forbidding the use of force in Palestine and making it unprofitable to use force, on the one hand, and enforcing a political settlement, on the other. Ending the use of force in Palestine will, in fact, make possible an eventual peaceful settlement.

36. For many and compelling reasons, the international community has a vested interest in a peaceful settlement of the Palestine problem. Viewed realistically, the situation is as follows. If armed force is forbidden in the settlement of the problem and it is made prohibitively

¹ Reprinted from SC, 3rd yr., *Supplement for July 1948*, p. 47.

unprofitable for the Arab States to employ it, there will be in Palestine a Jewish community with a separate cultural and political existence, a Jewish State, whose strength and prosperity and capacity for economic and social development, by the admission of its own leaders, must largely depend on its ability to cultivate friendly relations with its Arab neighbours. If the employment of armed force is not forbidden, the issue of the Jewish State in Palestine will be settled on the field of battle. The decision which may be taken with regard to the resort to armed force in Palestine will determine the immediate prospects for further effective mediation over the settlement. In this vital regard, the decisions of the Security Council on the matter will be controlling.

501.BB Palestine/7-1248 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the
Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET US URGENT
NIACT

LONDON, July 12, 1948.

3138. For Lovett.

1. Bevin has just spoken with me to give me information that while we [*they?*] agree to support substance of US resolution on Palestine with UK amendments, we [*they?*] are not prepared ourselves [*themselves?*] to introduce amended resolution for reason that it does not go far enough.

2. Bevin while instructing Cadogan to support resolution is unwilling to instruct him to introduce it on behalf of UK for fear that such action by UK will destroy remaining influence UK possesses with Arabs, particularly Abdullah, so necessary to maintain if truce is to be reinstituted.

3. Situation appears to be, therefore, we are apprehensive lest by introducing resolution we will impair our influence with Israeli followers while UK is apprehensive lest by introducing resolution she will destroy her residual influence with Arabs, especially Abdullah.

4. To break this impasse of legitimate apprehensions, representatives of some other country may be persuaded to introduce resolution. UK is approaching Canadian and Belgian representatives and possibly also Argentinians.

5. Suggest we remain in closest association with Cadogan and attempt to reinforce UK efforts to persuade the representatives of any one of the three referred to above or some other power to introduce resolution, thus avoiding for US and UK respectively the dangers implicit in proposing the resolution by either.

6. Lurking in the background is the menace of Soviet behavior and the consequences thereof if our side allows the matter to go by default.

7. If this appears to be rushing the gate, it is due to Bevin's pre-occupation with persuading the Arabs to acquiesce in a settlement based on an independent Israel.

Department please repeat Niact USUN.

DOUGLAS

Editorial Note

Count Bernadotte, in an address before the Security Council on the morning of July 13, amplified his written report; for text, see SC, 3rd yr., No. 95. In the afternoon session the same day, Mr. Jessup paid tribute to the Mediator and then stated that "Fighting is now going on in Palestine. It is going on because one party has not agreed to any suggestion or appeal to avoid fighting, although the other party, the Provisional Government of Israel, declared its readiness to accept each and every suggestion and appeal.

"The Security Council must accept its responsibility.

"The general, the practically universal opinion, is that there is a threat to the peace in Palestine within the meaning of Article 39 of the Charter. . . ."

Later in his statement, Mr. Jessup suggested that "The Security Council should call attention to the consequences of a failure to stop fighting. Such a warning would clearly have particular meaning for that party which has so far rejected all appeals." (*Ibid.*, page 39.) He then submitted a United States draft resolution, the text of which is printed *ibid.*, page 40.

The Syrian Representative sharply criticized the United States proposal (*ibid.*, page 41) and submitted a draft resolution requesting the International Court of Justice to give an advisory legal opinion as to the international status of Palestine after the termination of the British mandate (*ibid.*, page 52).

501.BB Palestine/7-1348 : Telegram

*The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations
(Jessup) to the Secretary of State*

RESTRICTED

NEW YORK, July 13, 1948—11:49 a. m.

880. Reference Deptel 274 to Damascus, July 10,¹ it is our understanding that US recognition of State of Israel is unqualified, that is,

¹ Not printed; this message was the same as telegram 269, July 7, and seems to have been sent in error. Regarding No. 269, see footnote 1, p. 1188.

de jure, while our recognition of PGI was a *de facto* recognition of government that state. Is this interpretation correct? ²

JESSUP

² The Department, on July 15, stated its agreement with New York's understanding and set forth its belief that "in cases of recognition of new states as distinguished from new govts no question of *de facto* as against *de jure* recognition is involved." (Telegram 465, 501.BB Palestine/7-1348)

501.BB Palestine/7-1348 : Telegram

The Minister in Saudi Arabia (Childs) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

JIDDA, July 13, 1948—1 p. m.

412. Legtel 406, 12th.¹ British Ambassador states he received yesterday from FO verbal reply to his representations in behalf SA acceptance prolongation truce. Reply characterized Bernadotte proposals as being worse than *status quo ante* but said SAG would support with Arab states acceptable prolongation. Trott said he had been authorized to make strong representations including reminder that if Arabs rejected truce and UN applied sanctions HMG would be unable to fulfill its arms commitments to Arab states.²

Pouched Arab capitals.

Sent Department 412, repeated London 124.

CHILDS

¹ Not printed.

² Damascus, on July 12, reported a conversation with the Syrian Acting Foreign Minister in which the latter insisted that Count Bernadotte had proved himself pro-Zionist and that Syria would never consent to an extension of the truce until the Mediator's absurd proposals had been scrapped. (Telegram 439, 501.BB Palestine/7-1248)

867N.01/6-2948 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Belgium

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 13, 1948—4 p. m.

1068. Dept believes request for material referred urtel 1328, June 29,¹ should be denied as being inconsistent with SC Resolution of May 29. These items not on US arms list but US Govt studying possibility control such items under general export control authority.

MARSHALL

¹ Not printed; it reported that the Israelis wished to purchase military radios, field telephones, field switchboards, and field wire and that the Egyptians wished to purchase 436 surplus Army trucks (867N.01/6-2948).

867N.113/7-1448

Memorandum by the Acting Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Satterthwaite¹) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON, undated.²]

Subject: Possible or Probable Results if US Arms Export Policy is modified unilaterally to permit Arms Shipments to the State of Israel

SUMMARY

In the considered judgment of this office, American strategic interests and international security would be seriously prejudiced if the arms embargo were raised unilaterally in favor of the State of Israel. The military setbacks which the Arabs could be expected to suffer would probably result in the overthrow of some of their governments. The attendant chaos would provide a breeding ground for communism, or a series of dictatorships might arise on a wave of anti-American and anti-British sentiment. Governments hostile to the Western powers would mean the loss of vital strategic facilities in the Near East coveted by the Soviet Union. The intensification of the disturbances might undermine our strategic position in Greece, Turkey, and Iran as well.

The unilateral raising of the arms embargo might well result in the imposition of oil sanctions by the Arab states, or even in the cancellation of American concessions. Such action would result in further depletion of our domestic oil reserves and would in all likelihood prevent the use of Near Eastern petroleum in support of the European Recovery Program. Our action might also result in a Saudi Arab request that we evacuate Dhahran air base, the loss of which would disrupt our strategic air communications network.

If the United States were to lift the embargo unilaterally in favor of the State of Israel, Great Britain might take similar action in behalf of the Arabs, which would certainly result in a dangerous Anglo-American rift and might well jeopardize the entire basis of US policy in Europe.

The raising of the embargo would immediately place the lives of

¹ Joseph C. Satterthwaite became Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs on July 16, succeeding Loy W. Henderson, who, two days before, had been designated Ambassador to India.

² A copy of this memorandum was received in the Office of United Nations Affairs on July 14.

most American citizens and official representatives in the Arab states in serious jeopardy, necessitating their repatriation under difficult and dangerous circumstances. It is probable that American property, investments, and philanthropic enterprises would be singled out for molestation, destruction, or seizure as a result of popular reaction.

The governments of the Arab states would probably be incapable of controlling mob action arising from the unilateral repeal of the embargo, and mob attacks against some of the 700,000 Jews residing in Arab countries could be expected. Such attacks might turn into anti-foreign or anti-Christian demonstrations as well.

The Arab governments and peoples would regard our action as a virtual American declaration of war against them, and popular feeling against us would be intense and lasting. It is not unlikely that the Arab League states would take concerted action in breaking diplomatic relations with the United States. Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen might even withdraw from the United Nations.

Conclusion: Unilateral action to repeal the arms embargo outside the framework of the United Nations would in effect constitute independent punitive action by the United States against the Arab states.

In the event that the Security Council continues the arms embargo, provided for in the Security Council resolution of May 29, 1947, unilateral action by the United States lifting the embargo as it affects either side would not only be inconsistent with the United Nations action, but would violate our obligations under the Charter to support United Nations action.³

³ Attached to this document is an undated memorandum of virtually identical title, going into greater detail concerning the matters discussed in the summary.

501.BB Palestine/7-1448

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Chairman of the Civil
Aeronautics Board (O'Connell)*

WASHINGTON, July 14, 1948.

MY DEAR MR. O'CONNELL: AS you are aware all aircraft are considered implements of war by virtue of Presidential Proclamation 2776 of March 26, 1948. As such, exports of aircraft are subject to licensing controls exercised by the Department of State. In accordance with Departmental policy licenses to export arms, ammunition and implements of war, including aircraft and components, to countries of the Middle East are being denied.

Moreover, it is the announced foreign policy of this Government

that it shall not aid or abet either faction to the strife in the Middle East and it has called upon United States authorities to take all possible steps to assist in the implementation of this policy. This Government is on record before the UN Security Council that it may be necessary to request the Council to declare the Holy Land situation a formal threat to peace. The specific countries to which this neutrality applies are Palestine, Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Saudi-Arabia, Transjordan and Yemen.

It has come to the Department's attention that several non-certificated irregular air carriers operating under Letters of Registration issued by the Civil Aeronautics Board are allegedly engaged in transporting munitions into the Middle East area. Actions of this nature by American citizens are regarded as inconsistent with the established policy and security safeguards of the U.S. and as such are contrary to the public interest.

In addition, Letters of Registration frequently provide the basis for obtaining customs clearance at the time of departures from the U.S. of aircraft purported to be leaving on temporary sojourns abroad. In this connection, attention is invited to Section 201.34 and 201.35 of Title 22, Code of Fed. Regs. The sale abroad of such aircraft or components thereof constitutes a violation of the export control laws.

It is my understanding that approximately 100 Letters of Registration have been issued for aircraft weighing over 10,000 pounds gross take-off weight. Many of these engage in overseas operations.

In view of the foregoing, it is suggested that consideration be given to advising all holders of CAB Letters of Registration for "large irregular carriers," that during the period of the Palestine disturbance and throughout the existence of the arms embargo to the Middle East, this Government looks with disfavor upon the transportation by U.S. air carriers of war material or fighting personnel into the countries mentioned herein, from any point in the world. In addition, it may be well to advise these carriers that departures from the U.S. of aircraft destined for the Middle East must be disclosed to Customs officials at the time of customs clearance. This would enable the Department to observe, through its Missions abroad, the nature of the cargoes of such aircraft for possible discovery of contraband.

If appropriate, these air carriers should be warned that in cases of non-compliance with the foregoing requirements or upon receipt of proof of their participation in activities of a nature inconsistent with the established foreign policy of this Government, remedial action with respect to their Letters of Registration will be taken. It is assumed that the Board will find that such corrective measures are required in the public interest.

Sincerely yours,

ROBERT A. LOVETT

501.BB Palestine/7-1448: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the
Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET

LONDON, July 14, 1948—7 p. m.

3188. Bevin sent me word this afternoon re remarks which Cadogan was instructed by Foreign Office telegram noon today to make in SC before he cast British vote for our resolution. Bevin thought it would be clear to Department that Cadogan's remarks in no way receded from official British position of yesterday and that they constitute amplifications of some of points made by Cadogan which, in Bevin's view, have been dangerously misinterpreted in today's press (see my 3173 ¹ for strong Arab office statement).

2. As Bevin sees situation, there is grave danger that hands of Azzam Pasha and other Arab extremists will be strengthened against more moderate group led by King Abdullah if idea is spread that HMG has lost all sympathy for Arabs and that UN is a British-Zionist body from which Arabs can expect nothing resembling justice. (Foreign Office understands Azzam now at Amman doing his best to persuade Arab states to continue hopeless war of desperation.)

3. To rectify the somewhat unbalanced picture of British position as presented by press today, which has caused number of MP's to express alarm lest HMG "let the Arabs down", and to persuade the Arabs, insofar as this is possible, that SC dice are not loaded against them, Bevin instructed Cadogan to amplify his remarks.

4. The danger of Arabs losing faith in HMG, Bevin advised me, [was] consensus opinion of British ME missions was [*and?*] that White [*while?*] resolution such as ours might be successful in causing Arabs to end hostilities, and consequently should be objective of UKUN it would cause most unfortunate anti-British local impression in Arab states if UKUN voted for it. British missions suggested UKUN should abstain. Bevin debated a long time between voting and abstaining and decided in favor of voting for resolution partly because of his desire to keep in step with us, but most of all because "I think it is right".

5. In my view it would be calamity for American, British, European and PGI interests in the Middle East were Britain to lose such vestiges of influence as she still possesses with the Arab Governments. The game being played by HMG is one requiring courage and it may be lost if remaining British influence among Arabs vanished from the

¹ Dated July 14, not printed.

Middle East. There is little doubt that Soviet is ready take Britain's place. (Embassy's 3175, July 14²) DOUGLAS

² Not printed; it gave the text of a letter sent to the British Foreign Office by the British Representative on the Trusteeship Council. The letter recounted that Semyon K. Tsarapkin, Soviet Representative on the Council, had complained to the Iraqi Representative on the same body concerning the latter's support of the administering powers. After the Iraqi Representative had stated to Mr. Tsarapkin that he was not on either side but voted as he thought best on each occasion, Mr. Tsarapkin replied that he was making a mistake; that Britain was deserting the Arabs; that the time was coming when the Arab world would need a friend; and that the Soviet Union was that friend. He then proceeded to warn that the Soviet Union would not help the Iraqis in time of need if they continued to support the British position in the Trusteeship Council (501.BB Palestine/7-1448).

PPS Files, Lot 64 D 563, Near and Middle East, 1947-1949

Memorandum by Mr. Gordon P. Merriam, Member of the Policy Planning Staff, to Staff Members

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] July 15, 1948.

For your information, there are attached certain UNA papers relating to the Palestine question.¹

You will note that the basic paper is the Appendix to the Position Paper of June 22, 1948. This Appendix is a memorandum to the President dated May 22, which the President approved. S/P's views on this memorandum were not requested. The Position Paper is in the nature of an application of the policy approved by the President to the situation which would result if the truce were broken or not extended. It has been approved by the Secretary.

Present United States action with respect to Palestine is apparently taking place in pursuance of the policy laid down in the two papers above-mentioned.

However, the Democratic platform adopted on July 14 contains the following splinter in the Palestine plank:

"We favor the revision of the arms embargo to accord the State of Israel the right of self-defense. We pledge ourselves to work for the modification of any resolution of the United Nations to the extent that it may prevent any such revision."

This passage appears to be inconsistent with paragraphs (c) and (d) of the memorandum approved by the President.

I am informed by NE that as of 10:30 this morning no directive had been received which would alter our present policy. Accordingly, we

¹ The reference is to a memorandum of June 23 from Mr. McClintock to Mr. Kennan and to Harry S. Villard, a Member of the Policy Planning Staff. The memorandum transmitted copies of Mr. Meeker's memorandum of June 22: its appendix, the memorandum of May 22 to President Truman; and Mr. McClintock's memorandum of June 23. The three papers are printed on pp. 1127, 1027, and 1134, respectively.

are persisting in trying to get a SC resolution which, among other things, would continue the arms embargo to the whole Near East.

The UNA paper dated June 23 on a territorial settlement is interesting, but this is not a pressing matter at the moment.

Before joining S/P, I had some knowledge of S/P's difficulties in dealing with the Palestine problem. Since joining, my impression has deepened that S/P's difficulty is essentially no different from that of the operating divisions, the crux of the matter being, as I understand it, that we have no long-term Palestine policy. We do have a short-term, open-ended policy which is set from time to time by White House directives.

In S/P, I have sensed a feeling that in some way we should be on record, at least, with respect to a positive Palestine policy, in addition to being on record as "viewing with alarm". We have been asked to contribute, but thus far we have not found a good formula.

I am wondering whether the formula might not be a NSC paper on: "The United States Position with respect to Israel". Israel does exist, and nothing that anyone can definitely foresee is going to overthrow it. Our long-term policy with respect to it has not been worked out.

The preparation and submittal of such a paper would involve obvious difficulties and dangers. On the other hand, this is an important question on which neither S/P nor NSC has taken a positive long-range position, and in the absence of a long-range policy we are unable to put our shoulders behind a constructive and comprehensible Middle East policy; and we lack a sound foundation on which to build a long-term policy for two of the three members of the Middle Eastern "security arch", i.e. Turkey and Iran.²

GORDON P. MERRIAM

² The Policy Planning Staff prepared a report, dated August 18, whose purpose it was "To assess and appraise the position of the United States with respect to Israel and related problems". Attached to the report is a memorandum of August 19 from Mr. Kennan to Mr. Savage which states "I had this ready for delivery to the Secretary this morning; but after hearing, by chance, the briefing given him orally by Rusk on this subject, decided not to use it." The report and Mr. Kennan's memorandum (neither printed) are filed in the PPS Files, Lot 64 D 563, Near and Middle East, 1947-1948.

501.BB Palestine/7-1548

*Memorandum by the Director of the Office of United Nations Affairs
(Rusk) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)*

[WASHINGTON,¹] July 15, 1948.

There is less support for the Syrian resolution² in the Security Council than we first supposed. Syria, China, Belgium and Colombia

¹ A marginal notation indicates that this memorandum was telephoned from New York at 8:50 a. m., July 15.

² Regarding this draft resolution, see editorial note, p. 1215.

will probably vote for it. Canada, France, Argentina, U.S.S.R., and the Ukraine are expected to abstain. The United Kingdom is definitely cool toward the resolution; the United Kingdom Foreign Office had given the UK Delegation preliminary permission to vote for the motion, but now is thinking it over again. USUN estimate is that if the United States not only votes for the motion but strongly supports it in debate, it might pass. United States abstention would let motion die with four or five votes.

Jessup, Ross and I have gone over various alternatives at some length. We agree that it would be unfortunate to allow this issue to become magnified beyond its real merits. Israel Representatives are bitterly opposed on grounds there is nothing to adjudicate and Israel has no guarantee that it can even be heard at present as a party before the Court under the proposed action. Further, Israel believes that if matter goes to Court, this fact would be used by the Arabs to postpone settlement and by other states to delay recognition. Another factor is general view among Security Council delegations that this motion is diversionary in intent and cannot be considered as a bonafide effort to use the Court to move closer to a final settlement.

Jessup and I are concerned about denying a party to a dispute its proper day in Court. Nevertheless, the Court statute provides ways and means for parties to adjudicate certain types of questions. In this case, the Arabs have shown no inclination to settle the Palestine question by adjudication. In any event, direct issue between the parties goes to Court on basis of consent of parties, lacking in this instance. We have no assurance Arab League would accept opinion of Court if it favored Israel.

In present situation Security Council is dealing with threat to peace and is seeking to bring an end to present hostilities. Answer to question posed by Syrian motion is not required for that purpose. That question concerns the substance of the political issues which were before the General Assembly. The General Assembly chose to try to deal with such issues through recommendation and mediation. Our position might be, therefore, that the Security Council should not interfere with approach decided by the General Assembly unless it should become necessary to maintain international peace, which is not the case at this time.

I recommend that we abstain, either with no statement at all or with very short statement based on above line. If the United Kingdom decides to support motion, we may have to reconsider in light of need to maintain common US-UK line. Neither Jessup nor I is entirely satisfied with recommended position but we are unable to propose a more satisfactory course in light of all the factors.³

³ Marginal notation by Mr. Lovett: "Talked with Clifford 10 a. m. 7/15. He agrees abstain. We should *not* support motion under any circumstances since

Footnote continued on following page.

*Resolution 54 (1948) Adopted by the Security Council on
July 15, 1948¹*

The Security Council.

Taking into consideration that the Provisional Government of Israel has indicated its acceptance in principle of a prolongation of the truce in Palestine; that the States members of the Arab League have rejected successive appeals of the United Nations Mediator, and of the Security Council in its resolution 53 (1948) of 7 July 1948, for the prolongation of the truce in Palestine; and that there has consequently developed a renewal of hostilities in Palestine,

1. *Determines* that the situation in Palestine constitutes a threat to the peace within the meaning of Article 39 of the Charter of the United Nations;

2. *Orders* the Governments and authorities concerned, pursuant to Article 40 of the Charter, to desist from further military action and to this end to issue cease-fire orders to their military and paramilitary forces, to take effect at a time to be determined by the Mediator, but in any event not later than three days from the date of the adoption of this resolution;

3. *Declares* that failure by any of the Governments or authorities concerned to comply with the preceding paragraph of this resolution would demonstrate the existence of a breach of the peace within the meaning of Article 39 of the Charter requiring immediate consideration by the Security Council with a view to such further action under Chapter VII of the Charter as may be decided upon by the Council;

4. *Calls upon* all Governments and authorities concerned to continue to co-operate with the Mediator with a view to the maintenance of peace in Palestine in conformity with resolution 50 (1948) adopted by the Security Council on 29 May 1948;

5. *Orders* as a matter of special and urgent necessity an immediate and unconditional cease-fire in the City of Jerusalem to take effect twenty-four hours from the time of the adoption of this resolution,

Footnote continued from preceding page.

'he feels it is a device and a tricky one at that.' Do *not* use veto as this involves 'pacific settlement'."

The amended Syrian draft resolution (see SC, *3rd yr.*, No. 98, p. 33) came to a vote of the Security Council on July 27. The United Kingdom and five others voted for the measure; the United States, the Soviet Union, and two others abstained; and the Ukraine was recorded in opposition. The resolution was not adopted, having failed to attain the required seven affirmative votes (*ibid.*, p. 34).

¹ Reprinted from SC, *3rd yr.*, *Resolutions*, p. 22. The resolution was adopted in paragraph-by-paragraph votes and was also adopted as a whole by seven votes in favor, with Syria opposed and Argentina, the Soviet Union, and the Ukraine abstaining (SC, *3rd yr.*, No. 97, p. 66).

Mr. Shertok, in a cablegram of July 16 to Secretary-General Lie, transmitted the decision of the Provisional Government of Israel to comply with the Security Council's request for a resumption of the truce in Palestine and for immediate cease-fire in Jerusalem; for text, see SC, *3rd yr.*, *Supplement for July 1948*, p. 77.

and instructs the Truce Commission to take any necessary steps to make this cease-fire effective;

6. *Instructs* the Mediator to continue his efforts to bring about the demilitarization of the City of Jerusalem, without prejudice to the future political status of Jerusalem, and to assure the protection of and access to the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites in Palestine;

7. *Instructs* the Mediator to supervise the observance of the truce and to establish procedures for examining alleged breaches of the truce since 11 June 1948, authorizes him to deal with breaches so far as it is within his capacity to do so by appropriate local action, and requests him to keep the Security Council currently informed concerning the operation of the truce and when necessary to take appropriate action;

8. *Decides* that, subject to further decision by the Security Council or the General Assembly, the truce shall remain in force, in accordance with the present resolution and with resolution 50 (1948) of 29 May 1948, until a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine is reached;

9. *Reiterates* the appeal to the parties contained in the last paragraph of its resolution 49 (1948) of 22 May 1948 and urges upon the parties that they continue conversations with the Mediator in a spirit of conciliation and mutual concession in order that all points under dispute may be settled peacefully;

10. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide the Mediator with the necessary staff and facilities to assist in carrying out the functions assigned to him under General Assembly resolution 186 (S-2) of 14 May 1948 and under this resolution;

11. *Requests* that the Secretary-General make appropriate arrangements to provide necessary funds to meet the obligations arising from this resolution.

501.BB Palestine/7-1548 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET US URGENT
NIACT

LONDON, July 15, 1948—5 p. m.

3205. FonOff was disturbed to learn from telegram from Cadogan sent July 14 that USUN is considering possibility of permitting Soviet observers in Palestine as a means of bringing USSR into line re US resolution.

2. FonOff has just learned by telephone from NY that USUN is not prepared to accept Chinese amendment to effect that both parties

be called on to secure a political solution in consultation with Mediator and that so far as Cadogan can judge USUN is discussing with Soviet delegation question observers.

3. FonOff feels impelled to take adamant stand against Soviet observers whose presence would confirm Arabs views re sinister character UN so far as Arabs are concerned and possibly strengthen pro-Soviet minority in Israel. FonOff believes that between Chinese suggestion and wooing USSR first alternative offers the sounder course of action.

4. It seems to me that having stood out against Soviet observers in past, if US accepts them at this moment when gravity of Berlin problem can not be exaggerated, US retreat re Soviet observers might be interpreted by USSR as forerunner of further concessions by US to Soviet demands.

Sent Dept 3205, repeat USUN.

DOUGLAS

*Cablegram Dated 16 July 1948 From the United Nations Mediator (Bernadotte) to the Arab States and to the Provisional Government of Israel Concerning the Security Council Resolution of 15 July*¹

Third paragraph of the resolution on the cease-fire and truce in Palestine adopted by the Security Council on 15 July at its 338th meeting provides that the cease-fire is "to take effect at a time to be determined by the Mediator, but in any event not later than three days from the date of the adoption of this resolution".

In pursuance of this provision of the resolution and following consultations at Lake Success, I wish to notify you that the date and hour on which the cease-fire is to be effective is 3 p. m. GMT, Sunday, 18 July 1948. In order that each party may be informed of the intentions of the other, will you be so kind as to confirm to me this issuance of the cease-fire orders in accordance with the decision above noted at my Rhodes headquarters at the earliest possible moment.

Eighth paragraph of the resolution "instructs the Mediator to supervise the observance of the truce".

In order that there shall be no misunderstanding regarding the discharge of my responsibilities in the supervision of the truce, I take this opportunity to inform you that, although I will do my utmost to establish and put into operation a system of observers as quickly as possible, I cannot ensure that the functioning of this system, in view of the short time available, will coincide with the effective date of the truce. It is my earnest hope that both parties will undertake to observe scrupulously both the letter and the spirit of the truce. I will, of course, give advance notice and at the earliest possible moment, of

¹ Reprinted from SC, 3rd yr., Supplement for July 1948, p. 80.

the institution of the system of supervision, and of the arrival of the observers and their equipment at the observation posts.

501.BB Palestine/7-648 : Telegram

*The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations
(Jessup) to the Secretary of State*

SECRET US URGENT
NIACT

NEW YORK, July 16, 1948—4:40 p. m.

907. Remytel 900, July 16.¹ Note dated 17 July from SYG to Acting US Representative to [re] SC Palestine resolution of July 15 states the following:

“The SYG has the honor to inform the Acting Representative that the UN mediator, in carrying out the instructions of the SC, has notified him that, in the light of the mediator’s experience, he will require 300 military observers to assist him in the supervision of the truce provided for in that resolution. The mediator has accordingly asked the SYG to request the US Government to place at his disposition 125 military observers of appropriate seniority and experience to assist him in the supervision of the truce. He has indicated that he would need the services of these observers at his headquarters on the island of Rhodes beginning Sunday morning, 18 July 1948. He has also indicated that after further examination of the situation he may inform the SYG of requirements of non-officer personnel to assist the observers.”

We would appreciate Department’s earliest instructions regarding reply.

JESSUP

¹ Not printed; it summarized Mr. Jessup’s discussions with Count Bernadotte, the French and Belgian Representatives at the United Nations, and other United Nations officials concerning the Mediator’s needs in carrying out the truce in Palestine (501.BB Palestine/7-1648). New York, at 11:51 p. m., July 16, transmitted the pertinent sections of a *note verbale* from Secretary-General Lie making known the Mediator’s requirements of equipment and technical personnel (telegram 904, 501.BB Palestine/7-1648).

501.BB Palestine/7-1748 : Telegram

*The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations
(Jessup) to the Secretary of State*

SECRET URGENT

NEW YORK, July 17, 1948—12:08 a. m.

905. Remytel No. 900, July 16.¹ Count Bernadotte phoned me this evening to advance suggestion which he had previously made to Rusk, that the US provide approximately 100 non-coms and enlisted men

¹ Not printed; but see footnote 1, *supra*.

to assist officer observers already requested for supervision of truce. Bernadotte explained that in his opinion a group assigned on this basis would not form a military unit and from a legal point of view would not be on military duty. He emphasized that the type of service contemplated in no way involved combat, but would be confined to duty as drivers, guards, communications operators, et cetera.

I assured Bernadotte that while we were in no position at present to commit our military establishment along these lines, prompt and serious consideration would be given to his proposal. He stressed that time was valuable and that a prompt decision could make all the difference in the next few days. He concluded with the remark that having just received word of Arab assurance of the cease-fire for Jerusalem,² he was taking off for the Middle East with high hopes and his "flag at the top".

In our opinion Arab acceptance of Jerusalem cease-fire gives the Mediator's suggestion a sound foundation which will doubtless be enlarged and strengthened if and when the cease-fire becomes effective for the whole of Palestine. In line with our general recommendations made in previous telegrams, we urge that earnest consideration be given this proposal as a practical way to assist the Mediator in his difficult and important task.

JESSUP

² Secretary-General Azzam, in a telegram of July 17 to Secretary-General Lie, announced the Arab States' acceptance of that part of the Security Council's resolution of July 15 dealing with the cease-fire in Jerusalem; for text, see SC, 3rd yr., *Supplement for July 1948*, p. 79.

501.BB Palestine/7-1748: Telegram

The Chargé in Egypt (Patterson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

CAIRO, July 17, 1948—4 p. m.

1005. Mytel 957, July 9. In connection with Bernadotte's advice that SC should adopt resolution threatening use all provisions of Charter including armed intervention in order to bring Arabs to their senses. Department may find comments of this Embassy of pertinence in view of July 15 action SC in ordering cease-fire.

In regard to Bernadotte's statement under reference Embassy convinced that necessity exists to provide Arabs with face-saving formula but Department may wish to consider whether application of sanctions as proposed will produce effect envisaged by Bernadotte either by (a) Bringing Arabs to their senses or (b) Constituting a face-saving formula enabling Arab leaders to reverse present policy. It may be suggested that effect may possibly be to contrary. Aerial and naval demonstrations as suggested by Bunche might well prove contra productive.

Arabs have been already cognizant possibility application of sanctions so Bernadotte's proposals were apparently rejected in realization of consequences. Application and effect therefore already discounted. Further threat of their actual application by UN (UN[*in?*] which US will be regarded as taking leading part) may thereby fail to bring them to their senses as predicted. Consequently in present fatalistic mood of Arabs contrary effect may be produced. Such view also held by British Ministers Clayton and Troutbeck here the latter having changed his views as reported by London telegram to Department No. 2965 July 4, 1948.¹

This Embassy unaware of Arab officials to whom Bernadotte refers as seeking UN application of sanctions in order to provide way out. Such, no doubt, exist among those who seek resolution of conflict but as Department aware most Arab leaders have committed themselves so strongly and raised hopes of masses so high through press and other media as to incur considerable personal risk by withdrawal from current Palestine policy at least without period of preparation of public opinion. Current and continuing statements along these lines as by Iraqi Prime Minister and Nokrashy (Embtel 993 July 15¹) and critical press comments suggest that such dangers are present. It is felt by observers here that even should Arab leaders accept truce on ground that application of sanctions implies that world is against Arabs, the masses which now more intensely interested in Palestine than are leaders, might not concur in such action. Indignant reaction among masses can be reasonably foreshadowed with conceivable overthrow administrations with consequent disorders and increased resentment against west highly detrimental to personal safety of American citizens and their commercial interests including oil concessions and aviation throughout Arab world.

Collapse of Arab League and disappearance of Azzam Pasha who in all issues except Palestine have exerted moderating influence on Arab world would also seem to be a sequel.

Department has no doubt considered possibility action would be followed by withdrawal Arab States from UN.

For possible consideration in ameliorating situation Embassy suggests regarding truce extension that prospect for possible face saving formula lies in Azzam Pasha's letter to UN Secretary General Lie pointing out that Arabs in rejecting Bernadotte's request for truce extension were not adverse to truce as such but only to truce of previous four weeks which Arabs are firmly convinced gave Jews opportunity to expand strategic and political positions with no approach to meet-

¹ Not printed.

ing of minds of two parties and which held out no prospect of final solution at its termination.² However, in this connection Department should be aware that antagonism to America and loss of confidence in it has reached such point here that future representations will have little effect unless concrete evidence is available that similar pressures are being exerted on Zionist leaders and on PGI.

As for possible formula for future settlement Azzam's public pronouncement through AP interview for Jewish "Vatican State" might be studied. Represents first public break in Arab front.

PATTERSON

² Secretary-General Azzam, in a telegram of July 18 to Secretary-General Lie, announced the Arab States' acceptance of that part of the Security Council's resolution of July 15 dealing with a cessation of hostilities in Palestine. The communication set forth the view that the new truce would not achieve its purpose unless various deficiencies in the four-weeks' truce were remedied. Thus he requested that all Jewish immigration into Palestine be stopped during the truce and that the 300,000 Arab refugees be returned home with guarantees of their lives and property. He requested also that the new truce not be indefinite, but with a fixed duration to permit at least effort to reach a peaceful solution; for text, see SC, *3rd yr., Supplement for July 1948*, p. 82. Egypt, Trans-jordan, Israel, Syria, and Lebanon also accepted the cease-fire arrangements in Palestine, and Iraq and Saudi Arabia made interim reply; for the texts of their communications to Count Bernadotte, see *ibid.*, pp. 80, 81.

501.BB Palestine/7-1948: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United Nations Mediator in Palestine (Bernadotte), at Rhodes

WASHINGTON, July 19, 1948—8 p. m.

Please be assured that the United States will assist you in every practicable way in the execution of your heavy responsibilities.¹ Orders have already been issued to place immediately at your disposal the assistance furnished by us during the earlier cease-fire in June. Our observer personnel should now be arriving in Rhodes. We are giving urgent attention to the possibility of sending additional observers and equipment and will communicate with you shortly on this point. We wish you success in the performance of your most difficult and important task.

GEORGE C. MARSHALL

¹ This telegram was in response to an undated telegram from Rhodes, in which Count Bernadotte had made an urgent appeal to Secretary Marshall for 125 observers and needed equipment. The telegram was received in the Department on July 19 (501.BB Palestine/7-1948).

501.BB Palestine/7-2048 : Telegram

*The United Nations Mediator in Palestine (Bernadotte) to the
Secretary of State*¹

SECRET PRIORITY

[RHODES?,] July 20, 1948.

Unnumbered. I am deeply appreciative of assurance of your support conveyed in your cable of 20 [19] July.

I am greatly concerned about the situation in Jerusalem. As you know an agreement between the Arabs and Jews in Jerusalem for the neutralization of Mount Scopus and Victoria Augusta Hospital had been negotiated during the four week truce on condition that the United Nations as a bulk provide guards for these places. At present I am able to dispose of one Swedish colonel, one senior member of the UN secretariat and eight untrained and unarmed UN guards for this purpose. I have most urgent and immediate need of 250 armed guards for this purpose. The function of these guards does not involve any risk of engagement with regular Arab or Jewish forces. Their function is a police function consisting primarily of protecting these areas against possible activities of irresponsible irregular elements from both sides.

My understanding is that the French Government is willing to provide 80 armed guards from their armed forces immediately if the USA and Belgium each would make a similar number available. These guards from the three states, members of the Truce Commission, would be required only until such time as the United Nations would be able to recruit and make available an internationally recruited guard force.

I understand that there is one reinforced US Marine engineer battalion combat loaded aboard the *Marquette* now in Rhodes harbor. Since the hoped for demilitarization of Jerusalem and permanent peace in Palestine generally depend largely upon the United Nations demonstrating its ability to discharge its obligations with regard to Mount Scopus and Victoria Augusta Hospital, I appeal to you urgently to permit the temporary assignment of this Marine unit to the United Nations for employment on the above mission until they are relieved by the 80 man contingents from the three states members of the Truce Commission.

If this unit can be made available as I earnestly hope, it would, of course, be with the understanding that it could be immediately withdrawn by your government without prior notice should any emergency require its deployment elsewhere.

COUNT FOLKE BERNADOTTE

¹ Transmitted by the Department of the Navy as CTF 167.

501.BB Palestine/7-2148

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State
(Lovett)*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] July 21, 1948.

Participants: Mr. James G. McDonald—Special Representative of
the United States of America
Mr. Lovett—U
Mr. Wilkins—NE

Mr. McDonald called on me this afternoon prior to his departure from New York on July 23 for London on his way to Tel Aviv.

Mr. McDonald said that he had called on General Bradley,² Secretary Forrestal, Mr. Royall,³ Mr. Symington,⁴ Mr. Clifford and the President this morning to pay his respects and to say goodbye.

Mr. McDonald said that Secretary Forrestal had instructed the Secretaries of Navy, Army and Air Force to take immediate action on his request for service attachés for Tel Aviv. Mr. McDonald said he wanted good men to report on military matters in Israel as he himself was a novice at such affairs.

Mr. McDonald said that he had not discussed the question of *de jure* recognition with the President but that the President's advisers seemed to be of the opinion that the United States could give *de jure* recognition to the *de facto* Government of Israel. Mr. McDonald explained that he had not studied this question of international law since his early days as a student and that, as a result, he was somewhat confused.

I replied that the United States had recognized the Provisional Government of Israel as the *de facto* authority of the new State of Israel. I pointed out that this action constituted recognition of the State completely and fully and *de facto* recognition of the Provisional Government. I added that *de jure* recognition of a government of Israel as opposed to a provisional government of Israel could normally be expected to follow the holding of elections for such government. Any other course might result in a demand for immediate recognition by any junta or group seizing power by force or by some other unconstitutional means. I also referred to the present character of the Provisional Government of Israel and pointed out Ben Gurion's presently successful efforts to maintain control. I noted, however, that the

¹ Drafted by Mr. Wilkins.

² Gen. Omar N. Bradley, Chief of Staff, United States Army.

³ Kenneth C. Royall, Secretary of the Army.

⁴ W. Stuart Symington, Secretary of the Air Force.

Irgun and the Stern gang were still active in Palestine and stressed the fact that premature *de jure* recognition of the Provisional Government of Israel might, unless we were satisfied as to its stability, place the United States Government in the position of having relations with a government under Soviet influence.

I informed Mr. McDonald that although we were unable to obtain Marine guards for Tel Aviv we had been able to obtain a group of highly qualified consular guards from other Departments of the Government such as ex-servicemen, ex-FBI men and CIA men. Mr. McDonald said he appreciated our arranging for a guard and, in this connection, expressed concern for the safety of Mr. Stanton Griffis, the new American Ambassador to Egypt, and for the safety of the personnel at the American Embassy in Cairo. I asked Mr. Wilkins to inquire what action the Department was taking in this respect and to follow through on it.

Mr. McDonald showed me a copy of the President's letter of July 21, 1948 to him which read as follows:

"In wishing you Godspeed in your important mission I am well aware of the difficulties in making effective our policy aimed at the peaceful settlement of differences among the nations of the Near East and cooperation among them.

"Success of your efforts will depend largely on teamwork and alertness of all persons concerned with this problem both here and abroad and upon hearty collaboration with you. In addition to your regular reports to the Department of State, I shall expect you to keep me personally informed on such matters as relate to the arms embargo, the appropriate time for full recognition, and the types of assistance as may be required by and can properly be granted to the new state.

"Let me assure you that you have my fullest confidence and support."

Mr. McDonald referred to Count Bernadotte's recent mediation proposals in which it had been suggested that the City of Jerusalem and its environs be placed under Arab control. Mr. McDonald asked me what the Department's policy was in this respect. I told him that it was possible that Count Bernadotte had made this suggestion for bargaining purposes and that, in any event, the United States had consistently supported the internationalization of Jerusalem as was evidenced by our stand in the General Assembly in the fall of 1947, by our position as expressed during the Special Session in the Spring of 1947 and by the attitude which we had adopted on the French proposals in the Security Council in the Spring of 1948. I asked Mr. Wilkins to supply Mr. McDonald with the various papers in this respect.

I told Mr. McDonald that I had no specific instructions to give him at this time with regard to American policy toward Palestine but that we would inform him of developments as they took place in the future. I added, however, that I would appreciate his informing the Department of the manner in which the United States Military Observers attached to Count Bernadotte performed their functions. I told Mr. McDonald that it appeared that the activities of the American-French-Belgian Military Observers during the four-week truce under the Resolution of May 29 appeared to have been somewhat disorganized but expressed the hope that the Military Observers under the new truce would be able to function more effectively than they had on the previous occasion.⁵

⁵ For Mr. McDonald's account of his conversation with Secretary Marshall on July 21, see his *My Mission in Israel, 1948-1951* (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1951), p. 7.

501.BB Palestine/7-2148: Telegram

The Consul General at Jerusalem (Macdonald) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

JERUSALEM, July 21, 1948—5 p. m.

1108. Protocol regarding truce and defining lines of Arab and Jewish positions was signed at noon by commander of Arab and Jewish forces in Jerusalem in presence of Truce Commission. Both commanders appeared satisfied with general outline of demarcation no man's land presented by UN observer and general attitude of meeting was friendly.

Jewish commander told me he considered a Palestine war over and said he now feels matter can be settled by peaceful negotiations. Arab commander also mentioned to me that he hoped this would lead to peace but reiterated it would have to be a just and honorable peace. Although he was in a better frame of mind than he was on July 17 (mytel 1097, July 19¹) it is my impression that he is still skeptical regarding the sincerity of the UN and particularly the US in its efforts of find a fair solution to the Palestine problem.

MACDONALD

¹ Not printed; it stated that Commander Abdullah el-Tel "expressed considerable distrust of US intentions and displeasure over renewal truce. He feels that US through SC forced Arabs accept truce in order to allow Jews time and opportunity to improve their military position as they did during last truce. There is no doubt now whatsoever that Jews gained materially in military strength during former truce period." (501.BB Palestine/7-1948)

501.BB Palestine/7-2148 : Telegram

*The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations
(Jessup) to the Secretary of State*

SECRET US URGENT

NEW YORK, July 21, 1948—6:50 p. m.

932. Reference unnumbered from Navy Department dated July 20 (CTF 167 to SecState¹) transmitting text of message to Secretary from Bernadotte requesting temporary assignment of Marines for duty in Jerusalem. We suggest Department consider following points in preparing reply:

1. We consider public opinion reaction in US would be adverse to assignment our service personnel for guard duty in Palestine.

2. Adverse public opinion reaction would be strengthened if any of this personnel were injured or killed.

3. We consider psychological reaction of Arabs in their present attitude towards US would be adverse.

4. Proposed action would strengthen Soviet propaganda case against US participation in truce supervision.

5. We have repeatedly pointed out orally to Secretariat officers at all levels, and formally in our letter of June 29 (to Lie) (Ref. Deptel 436, June 28) (copy sent McClintock June 29) that US is not in a position to second American forces for UN guard duty nor to recruit American citizens for such duty. In same formal communication and orally before and since that date, we have urged Secretariat to do their own recruiting for UN guard force in Palestine. I took specifically same line with Bernadotte at lunch last Friday.

6. Persistence of idea that US armed forces be supplied suggests that Bernadotte or members his staff may be persisting in idea that show of force is necessary to impress Arabs and Jews and that such show of force would be more effective if carried out by armed personnel of major powers. Department will recall Bunche's repeated urging of a naval demonstration. Show of force idea has been a recurrent one for long time past.

7. Perhaps a minor point is apparent desire of Bernadotte to develop new channel of communication direct with Secretary. This is presumably not likely to result in any real confusion within US Government, although we should be careful that Bernadotte does not get impression that he can get more favorable attention this way. On other hand, confusion may well result if we are getting some requests direct from Bernadotte and others through Secretariat. In our view there should be single channel of communication and it may well be that most effective cooperation could be brought about by direct communica-

¹ See footnote 1, p. 1231.

tion between Bernadotte's headquarters and Washington if communications facilities are now adequate for this purpose.

JESSUP

501.BB Palestine/7-2348

*Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Director of the
Office of United Nations Affairs (Rusk)*

[WASHINGTON,] July 23, 1948.

Mr. Ohly¹ called and said that the War Council (Secretary of Defense and Secretaries of the Army, Navy and Air Force) had been briefed by Mr. Bohlen on the Palestine situation and had come to the following conclusion, subject to the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

1. That the maintenance of the truce in Palestine was of vital interest to the security of the United States;

2. That the United States should do everything we properly can to help Count Bernadotte implement the truce;

3. That instructions should be issued to Admiral Sherman to see Count Bernadotte immediately to work out an observation plan and a program of United States assistance;

4. That consideration should be given as to whether the whole job of assistance should be turned over to a single service or should be continued on an inter-service basis.

¹ John H. Ohly, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense.

501.BB Palestine/7-2348: Telegram

*The Consul General at Jerusalem (Macdonald) to the Secretary
of State*

SECRET

JERUSALEM, July 23, 1948—2 p. m.

1113. Yesterday and last night Chairman Truce Commission and I visited forward positions Arab Legion with Legion Commander Arabs Jerusalem and several Legion officers of both British and Arab nationality. Arab Legion officers including Jerusalem Commander are very worried about Jewish troop movements in vulnerable forward areas and feel Jews are improving positions in an attempt to cut off various Arab units. They have no confidence in Jewish forces observing truce and expect an attack any time. Intelligence officer said they have reports that Stern Gang and IZL plan to attack Old City. Brigadier Lash, Commander of Arab Legion Forces in Palestine, said last night that he is concerned about observance of truce and fears that minor incidents and rumors which are rife will lead to collapse of cease-fire. A feeling of tenseness and expectation of sudden attack is obvious at all Arab Legion posts visited. On other hand there is

evidence that Legion Officers are making every effort and taking precautions for observing truce.

From observation point at Nilin we could see Jews who had moved forward from their positions at time of cease-fire to within rifle range of Arab lines. Similar actions are reported on other fronts and although Arab lines have not been crossed it is such movements and infiltrations that is causing Arabs worry and mistrust of Jewish intentions. Truce commission will request UN observers due arrive today to investigate this matter.

MACDONALD

501.BB Palestine/7-2048 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Jessup)

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, July 24, 1948—9 a. m.

477. Re urtel 926, July 20¹ quoting note from Acting SYG. Dept believes it would be inappropriate for U.S. and other individual govts to designate national members to tribunal envisaged by UN Mediator for examining alleged breaches of truce. Under SC resolution of July 15 this responsibility devolves on Mediator rather than on any body of examiners to be constituted of representatives of states (such as those states represented on Truce Commission). Indeed note of Acting SYG states that function of examining alleged breaches would be "on behalf of the mediator." Dept believes it would be appropriate for Mediator to designate members of his international staff to examine alleged breaches. If Mediator prefers to retain services of examiners selected specifically for this work, Dept would be glad to suggest names of qualified individuals. Request you reply to note of Acting SYG in sense of above. For your info, Dept wishes to avoid tribunal composed of national representatives with consequent likelihood of charges by Arab states or Israel, in particular cases, attacking on a national basis the operations or findings of examiners.

MARSHALL

¹ Not printed; the note, dated July 19, transmitted the Mediator's request to the United States Government for one legal assistant with the status of judge, or similar legal status, to examine on behalf of the Mediator allegations of truce violations in Palestine (501.BB Palestine/7-2048).

501.BB Palestine/7-2548 : Telegram

Mr. Wells Stabler to the Secretary of State

SECRET

AMMAN, July 25, 1948—4 p. m.

20. During conversation with King this morning he said he thought any final settlement Palestine problem would have be imposed on

both parties by Security Council. Asked whether he believed Arabs would accept such settlement he replied emphatically in affirmative. He did not feel actual force would be required as adequate number observers with planes and ships at their disposal could carry out task.

He said Transjordan ready proceed with demilitarization of Jerusalem [and] to withdraw Arab Legion.

Re territorial readjustments in Palestine settlement, King commented that Arabs and Jews could not share Palestine and it would be necessary have separate Jewish and Arab areas. Arab areas of Palestine should be attached to Transjordan (mytel 6, July 13¹) and these areas should also include Negeb, Jaffa and parts of Western Galilee. Felt that shifts of population should take place to eliminate minority problems. Asked whether Egypt and Saudi Arabia would agree such territorial changes King said former would raise no objection while in case of latter he and Ibn Saud in complete harmony. Re other Arab states indicated that Hashemite Federation could overcome any objections.

Re reports that Iraq had announced it would continue fight King said Transjordan and all Arab states wished continue war. However, he realized that for various reasons Arabs could not afford continue war and had persuaded other Arab states agree to truce.

King made usual uncomplimentary remarks about Arab League and also referred to his Greater Syria scheme² as the one hope of Arabs. He seemed in very good spirits and it is believed present cessation of hostilities in addition to possible prospect of large kingdom agree with him.

Department please pass Jerusalem as 12.

STABLER

¹ Not printed.

² For previous documentation on this subject, see *Foreign Relations*, 1947, vol. v, pp. 738 ff.

867N.01/7-2648

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs (Mattison)

[WASHINGTON,] July 26, 1948.

Mr. Bromley¹ called to state that he had been requested to inform the Department that the British Government intended to resume the subsidy payments to Transjordan which had been held up because of the "obscure" situation in Palestine. The British Government felt that inasmuch as Transjordan had accepted the truce, and had proved to be cooperative, they could no longer suspend the subsidy payments.

¹ T. E. Bromley, First Secretary of British Embassy.

Mr. Bromley said that his Government wished to inform the Department in advance of its intention, before it became a matter of public knowledge.

501.BB Palestine/7-2648 : Circular telegram

The Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 26, 1948—1 a. m.

Reference SC Resolution Jul 15 regarding renewal truce in Palestine and Israel Dept considers acceptance by Israel and various Arab states as unconditional. Dept considers differing views of Arabs and Israelis re immigration and other matters are subjects for consideration by Mediator and do not in any way invalidate truce.

Sent to Baghdad, Cairo, Damascus, Beirut, Jidda, Amman, Jerusalem, Tel Aviv.

Rptd to London for communication to FonOff.

MARSHALL

501.BB Palestine/7-2648 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, July 26, 1948—8 p. m.

3385. According to Wright July 24 Bevin's mind is still working along same lines Paragraph 1 Embassy 3252 July 17¹ regarding Palestine. He is gratified by larger staff of observers and feels that it would be desirable for Mediator to remain as close as possible to the two parties and in this connection thinks it would be advantageous move for Mediator to transfer his headquarters from Rhodes to Jerusalem. However, when this idea was advanced to Mediator by British Consulate Rhodes (it had earlier been put forward to Mediator by Sir Hugh Dow on his own initiative) Mediator stated July 20 that he hoped representatives both Jews and Arabs would come to Rhodes shortly. Mediator stated that according to his representative Jerusalem would not be suitable for such meeting until demilitarization

¹Not printed; this paragraph stated that "Bevin spent hour this morning discussing Palestine with his top advisors. Wright has reported to me that Bevin is encouraged by news that cease-fire has already begun Jerusalem and believes utmost use should be made of this development. Bevin through Wright expressed hope US Government and other Truce Commission powers will give highest priority to supplying Bernadotte with his requirements in men and equipment so that start can be made at once in setting up new regime in Jerusalem. If Jerusalem is demilitarized and set up as working entity Bevin believes it may set example for similar developments elsewhere. Bevin thinks also that it would have beneficial effect if Bernadotte would transfer his headquarters from Rhodes to Jerusalem." (501.BB Palestine/7-1748)

takes place² and international police force is established. There are no accommodations in Jerusalem and in present circumstances it would not be safe for leaders of either side to go there. Chief observer has reported that in Jerusalem there is "complete disregard of UN representatives." More recent information, said Wright, indicates that Mediator may now view move to Jerusalem somewhat more favorably than of July 20. Azcarate³ is urging move.

Wright said it was hard to analyze present situation in Middle East and to decide whether relative to Guillion⁴ in Arab states represents acquiescence accompanied by embitterment against West and UN or whether it is lull before storm while extremists lay their plan.

DOUGLAS

² Count Bernadotte's draft proposal for the demilitarization of Jerusalem was transmitted by the Consulate General at Jerusalem in telegram 1122, July 26, 11 a. m., not printed (501.BB Palestine/7-2648).

³ Pablo de Azcarate, Deputy Chief of the Secretariat of the Truce Commission in Palestine.

⁴ The words "to Guillion" are rendered as "tranquillity" in the London Embassy copy of telegram 3385.

CIA Files

*Report by the Central Intelligence Agency*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] July 27, 1948.

ORE 38-48

POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS FROM THE PALESTINE TRUCE²

1. In response to a request from the Office of the Secretary of Defense regarding the probable duration of the 18 July truce in Palestine and developments that may arise as a result of it, CIA presents the following estimates:

a. The current continuation of the truce is for the most part nominal, and sporadic fighting continues. Israel benefited greatly from the previous truce period in improving its military potential. A continuation of the truce on the conditions of the previous one would be to Israel's advantage, and the Arabs probably would not long respect it. On the other hand, a really effective and adequately enforced truce would have a reasonable chance of being prolonged. Therefore, the Mediator's success in prolonging the truce is in direct proportion to the support he is given in establishing effective means of enforcement.

b. It is unlikely that the Mediator himself will be able to effect a settlement of the basic controversy. Provided, however, that effective means of observation and enforcement are made available and utilized,

¹ Included in the source text is a copy of the CIA map entitled "Military Situation—18 July 1948", reproduced facing this page.

² According to a note on the source text: "The information in this report is as of July 21. The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and the Air Force have concurred in this report."

it is probable than an unstable truce can be maintained until the problem can be referred back to the United Nations General Assembly in September or to the International Court of Justice.

c. The present intentions of the USSR are to promote instability and insecurity throughout the Middle East and to undermine the positions of the US and the UK therein. To do so the USSR has given, and presumably will continue to give, support in varying degrees to both Israel and the Arab countries. The collapse of the truce and the intensification of hostilities would afford the USSR increased opportunities to pursue its aims. Conversely, any measures which might prolong the truce would be detrimental to Soviet aims.

d. A critical factor in the continuance of the truce will be the ability of the Israeli government to control the activities of its extremist elements (Irgun Zvai Leumi and the Stern Gang) and of the Arab governments to control popular outbreaks directed against the maintenance of the truce. It is not believed that complete control by their governments of either Jewish or Arab extremists will be possible, but the conditions for such control will be much more favorable under a fair truce, rigorously enforced, than under an inadequate truce, half-heartedly supported.

2. Further discussion concerning the possible outcome of the truce is in Enclosure A; of the current military situation in Palestine in Enclosure B; of Soviet intentions in the area in Enclosure C.

Enclosure A

POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS FROM THE PALESTINE TRUCE

1. GENERAL

The UN mediator has two objectives: an effective truce of indefinite duration; and a final compromise solution, between Jews and Arabs, of the Palestine problem. The present truce was agreed to on 18 July and has been violated repeatedly by both Arabs and Jews. The violations have resulted from the absence in Palestine of UN observers and machinery for preventing infractions, and from the determination of various Arab and Jewish groups to gain last-minute advantages which they feel to be of vital importance. The Mediator's success in establishing an effective truce will depend on the effectiveness of the machinery which is given him, the ability of Israel to control its extremist groups (the Irgun Zvai Leumi and the Stern Gang), and the reaction of the Arab peoples against the acceptance of the truce by their leaders.

2. POSSIBILITY OF AN EFFECTIVE TRUCE

a. *Observer Teams.*

Current efforts to organize UN observer teams include plans for 300 observers—three times as many as were sent to Palestine during the previous truce. The effectiveness of the current truce will depend largely on the incisiveness with which these observers carry out their

duties and the forcefulness with which the Mediator deals with violations. If violations are ignored to the same extent as during the previous truce, the success of the current truce will be doubtful. The Jews will, as before, bring in men, aircraft, and heavy military equipment; present Arab opposition to the truce will then become intensified, and the Arabs will probably reopen hostilities.

b. Israeli Extremists.

It is probable that any concessions that the PGI might make to obtain Arab agreement to permanent peace would be met by open and violent action by the Jerusalem extremists. If, however, the Mediator attempts to establish a special UN regime over Jerusalem before a final settlement is achieved or to revise the territorial boundaries to what they consider detrimental to Israel, the extremist groups will almost certainly resume fighting. At the present time it is believed that the PGI can control extremist elements within the partition boundaries, but it may not be able to control them in other parts of Palestine, especially in Jerusalem.

c. Reaction of Arab Peoples.

The Arab people were confident of victory and were assured by their leaders that the truce would not be extended. Their bitterness may well erupt into violence against their governments or the Western powers or both. If their wrath is turned against their leaders, some of the Arab governments in an attempt to survive may well resume the Palestine war. Arab leaders, however, will first make every effort to turn the anger of their people against the UN, the US, and the UK, or even against one another.

The timing of such developments cannot be predicted because they depend partly on spontaneous eruptions of popular feelings, which are subject to violent change, and partly on organized agitation. Rioting, however, has already developed in Cairo. Serious Jewish violations of the truce (particularly the bombing of Arab cities) would further inflame Arab public opinion and would make it more difficult for the Arab governments to continue the truce. Communist agents in the Arab countries will probably exert themselves to stir up the people against their governments in order to bring about the downfall of the present regime as well as to destroy the truce. The rapidity with which the observer teams are mobilized and their effectiveness will obviously have great bearing on this problem.

3. POSSIBILITY OF A COMPROMISE SOLUTION BETWEEN ARABS AND JEWS

It is extremely unlikely that the Mediator himself will be able to persuade Arabs and Jews to agree to a compromise solution for Palestine. The Jews, with a *de facto* government and because of their mili-

tary strength and the political support of the US and the USSR, are in an extremely strong position. The provisions of the UN partition scheme constitute for the moment their minimum demands. The Arabs, in spite of their weakness, have given no official indication that they are prepared to recognize Israel as defined in the UN partition plan. At the present time no Arab government feels it could survive if it consented to negotiate with Israeli representatives. Israel and the Arab governments might accept some sort of international status for Jerusalem or its de-militarization, but such a development might well be resisted by the Israeli extremist groups.

If, after repeated attempts, the Mediator is unable to make any progress toward a solution, he may recommend some further course of action to the Security Council. Should the truce prove reasonably effective, he might as an alternate move recommend the advisability of securing an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice. If, on the other hand, the truce collapses, he undoubtedly will recommend sanctions against Arabs, or Jews, or both. One difficulty in the way of getting negotiations started is the firm statement of the Arabs, frequently repeated, that under no circumstances will they recognize an Israeli state, which they would appear to do if they sat at a council table with Israeli delegates. Encouragement must therefore be given to the present Arab governments as well as an excuse furnished to them to give to their own people. This might well be secured through an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice; e.g. as to whether a government of Israel exists with which the Arabs can negotiate.

4. CONCLUSIONS

Unless strongly backed by the Security Council and efficiently enforced, it is unlikely that the truce will be effective. Even with an effective truce it is unlikely that a compromise agreement will be reached between Arabs and Jews for a considerable period of time. Judging from present events in Palestine and should the effectiveness of the observer machinery be no better than during the first truce, it is probable that sporadic fighting will continue and that the Jews will greatly increase their military potential under the cloak of the truce. Thus the state of Israel would be further consolidated, and the Arabs would be further weakened and isolated. If, however, the truce is effectively enforced and the present comparatively moderate Arab governments can stay in power, the truce may be prolonged by the Arabs in the hope that a revision of the UN partition resolution may be secured at the September meeting of the General Assembly or that the issue will be submitted to the International Court of Justice. If, on the other hand, these governments are overthrown, the Arabs will resume the fight, be seriously defeated, break all contact with the US and the UK,

and almost certainly (in one way or another) eventually find themselves open to Soviet exploitation.*

Enclosure B

THE MILITARY SITUATION IN PALESTINE AT THE BEGINNING OF THE
SECOND TRUCE—18 JULY 1948

The military situation on 18 July, the beginning of the second truce in Palestine, shows that the Jews have made substantial gains during the nine-day period of fighting between 9 July and 18 July. (See map.) During that period the Jews captured Lydda, Ramle, and Ras el Zin, thereby removing the danger of an Arab thrust on Tel-Aviv. In the north they took the strategic Arab-Christian town of Nazareth and consolidated their positions along the Lebanese border into which units had been moved during the truce. In the south the Jews thrust southeast into the Egyptian-occupied area near Isdud and widened and strengthened the strip of Jewish-controlled territory along the roads between Jerusalem and Tel-Aviv. The only successful Arab action during that period, the Iraqi advance north from Jenin toward Afule, was halted by the truce before any significant gain was made.

During the period of the truce the Jews gained considerably from a military point of view. They strengthened and improved their existing fortifications and built new ones in the areas recently taken over from the Arabs. They improved the by-pass road to Jerusalem, which skirts Arab-held Latrun and Bab el Wad on the main road from Jerusalem to Tel-Aviv. They recruited and trained troops both abroad and in Palestine, and reinforcements were flown in from abroad. They increased their supply of tanks, aeroplanes, and artillery. The Jews brought heavy artillery into the Jerusalem area and are reported to have acquired at least 13 German ME-109 fighter planes—which can be converted into light bombers—and 3 B-17's. (They are now reported to possess a total of 60 ME-109's, of which 24 are operational.) The food situation in Jerusalem was greatly improved during the truce.

The Arabs made certain gains during the truce, but these were insignificant compared to the Jewish gains. The Arabs received some Italian and Belgian arms and brought more arms and ammunition to the front.

The truce resulted in so great an improvement in the Jewish capabilities that the Jews may now be strong enough to launch a full-scale offensive and drive the Arab forces out of Palestine. Events during the

*If, however, a settlement is imposed upon the Arabs by force, it should be pointed out that guerrilla warfare may be expected to continue for an indefinite period. Furthermore, resistance to authority through well proved nuisance techniques, boycotts, and other political devices may defeat ultimately the goal of permanent peace and security in Palestine and the Middle East. [Footnote in the source text.]

truce, and the enormous increase in Jewish strength resulting from them, considerably change the previously held estimate of the probable course of the war in Palestine. The Arabs' logistical position generally is very bad and their ammunition supply is exceedingly low. It is estimated that they could not continue to fight, even on the previous moderate scale, for more than two to three months.

The Military Forces involved are estimated as:

Arab Forces in or near Palestine

Army	In Palestine	Near Palestine	Total
Transjordan	6, 000	4, 000	10, 000
Iraq	9, 000	1, 000	10, 000
Egypt	5, 000	8, 000	13, 000
Syria	1, 000	1, 500	2, 500
Lebanon		1, 800	1, 800
Saudi Arabia	3, 000 (?)		3, 000
Irregulars	3, 000 (?)	3, 500	6, 500
Totals	27, 000	19, 800	46, 800

ISRAELI FORCES

Haganah

Mobile Striking Force	17, 000
Semi-Mobile (Local operation)	18, 000
Garrison or Defense (settlers-urban militia)	50, 000

Irgun Zvai Leumi

The Irgun has gradually increased from 7,000 to 12,000 during the past 4 to 6 months.

Stern Gang

A similar rise in Stern Gang numbers from 400-800 has been recently confirmed.

Total

97, 800

Enclosure C

SOVIET POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST

1. SOVIET OBJECTIVES

a. The ultimate objective of Soviet policy vis-à-vis the Middle East is the assumption of the dominant role in the area.

b. To implement this main objective, Soviet policy is directed toward the accomplishment of four secondary objectives:

- (1) Instability in the Arab world.
- (2) A complete break between the US and the Arab states.
- (3) Strained relations between the US and the UK concerning Middle East policy.
- (4) A complete break between the UK and the Arab states.

2. APPLICATION AND RESULTS OF SOVIET POLICY (29 NOVEMBER 1947-
18 JULY 1948)

With the above objectives in mind, the USSR voted for the UN partition of Palestine. From November to May it consistently supported partition but took no initiative in urging effective action to implement partition. Officially the Soviet position was unimpeachable; unofficially, the Kremlin was content to sit back and watch matters go from bad to worse in Palestine. The Soviet delegation loudly denounced and obstructed the US proposals for a temporary trusteeship over Palestine, the *one* possibility which might have prevented an Arab-Jewish war after 15 May. Since 15 May the delegation has been lukewarm on truce attempts and has obstructed mediation efforts. On 7 July it abstained in the Security Council from voting on the resolution to extend the four weeks' truce. Although it voted for the resolution on 15 July ordering the belligerents to cease hostilities, it abstained from voting on the proposal to give the UN Mediator authority to negotiate a settlement between Jews and Arabs.

By pursuing the tactics outlined in the preceding paragraph, the USSR has increased its prestige among Zionist groups throughout the world. Moreover, its support of partition has done little to impair Soviet-Arab relations, which could hardly have been made worse in any case. (The retaliatory outlawing of the Communist parties in Syria and Lebanon merely sent the Communists underground and, in view of the ineffectiveness of Arab police and security measures, did not greatly impair the capabilities of the Communists in these countries.) Soviet tactics in the UN have also contributed directly to instability in the Middle East, the first secondary objective of Soviet policy.

The inability of the UN to formulate a compromise solution of the Palestine problem has contributed directly to the other three Soviet secondary objectives. US support of partition immediately drove a wedge into US-Arab relations. This breach in relations could never be mended unless a compromise was reached between Arabs and Jews. By opposing a compromise solution, the USSR contributed directly to increasingly strained relations between Arabs and the US, its second objective. As the UK was compelled for strategic and economic reasons to support the Arabs, strained relations between the US and the UK, the third Soviet objective, inevitably followed. The Kremlin doubtless reasoned that UK dependence on ERP would compel the UK to bow to US pressure. This would in turn lead to the fourth Soviet objective, the rupture of UK-Arab relations. While the USSR was doubtless prepared to take positive steps toward the attainment of its objectives, it has been unnecessary for it to do anything beyond obstructing the possibility of a compromise solution between Arabs and Jews. US support of partition, UK support of the Arabs, and UK economic dependence on the US have combined to produce a situa-

tion favorable to the USSR and one which they can be expected to exploit in the future.

3. FUTURE POLICY (AFTER 18 JULY 1948)

The future policy of the USSR vis-à-vis Palestine will aim at consolidating the objectives already partially attained. It will continue to be the Soviet plan to follow a line of opportunism and readiness to exploit what the USSR considers US and UK mistakes. While continuing to support the partition scheme, the USSR may be expected to abstain on or to block any UN action which is likely to bring Jewish-Arab hostilities to a permanent end. This trend is forecast by the USSR abstention on the 7 July Security Council resolution calling on both parties to agree to an extension of the four weeks' truce, and subsequently on the question of granting Bernadotte powers to mediate.

It may come about that the UK, as a result of US and UN pressure, would find it difficult to maintain all its ties with the Arab states, which would contribute to the fourth major objective of the USSR. In such an event it may be expected that the USSR will shift the emphasis of its propaganda from "Jewish independence" to "US imperialism in Israel" and under the latter slogan will woo the Arab governments with promises of military advisers and supplies. It can be expected to "encourage" its own candidates in the political turmoil which will follow Arab military defeats. By such methods it will continue its drive toward the attainment of its basic objective, the assumption of the dominant role in the Middle East.

4. SOVIET ARMS POLICY ON PALESTINE ISSUE

There is a large body of evidence which indicates that arms shipments from the Communist-dominated countries have been made both to the Arab states and to Israel. The Israeli have received the bulk of these arms, which have included ammunition, small arms, automatic weapons, artillery and military planes.†

The major source of arms supply for Israel has been Czechoslovakia. Other countries which have supplied arms are Yugoslavia and Poland, and possibly the USSR. The governments of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia have actively cooperated in these shipments by furnishing protection, maintaining secrecy, or supplying government facilities, including airfields in the case of Czechoslovakia. Ports in Albania and Italy have been utilized for transshipment purposes to provide additional secrecy as to the countries of origin of these military supplies.

Some of the Arab League countries have purchased arms from

†There is no indication that any B-29 type aircraft are being used by either Arabs or Jews. [Footnote in the source text.]

Czechoslovakia; the largest shipments to the Arabs from that country have gone to Syria and Lebanon. Small shipments from the USSR or Balkan ports are also reported to have been landed on the Syrian and Lebanese coasts; also, petroleum products are now being shipped to Lebanon by Rumania.

501.BB Palestine/7-2748: Telegram

*The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations
(Jessup) to the Secretary of State*

RESTRICTED

NEW YORK, July 27, 1948—1:55 p. m.

957. Following is text of letter received from Comay (PGI) on subject Arab refugees. We have acknowledged this, requesting we be advised any additional information which PGI representatives here obtain.

“A few days ago, Mr. Reed of your delegation discussed with me the question of Arab refugees. In the light of further information, which has now come to hand from the PGI, its general attitude can be noted as follows:

(a) The Government of Israel must disclaim any responsibility for the creation of this problem. The charge that these Arabs were forcibly driven out by Israel authorities is wholly false; on the contrary, everything possible was done to prevent an exodus which was a direct result of the folly of the Arab states in organizing and launching a war of aggression against Israel. The impulse of the Arab civilian population to migrate from war areas, in order to avoid being involved in the hostilities, was deliberately fostered by Arab leaders for political motives. They did not wish the Arab population to continue to lead a peaceful existence in Jewish areas, and they wished to exploit the exodus as a propaganda weapon in surrounding Arab countries and in the outside world. This inhuman policy has now faced the governments concerned with practical problems for which they must assume full responsibility.

(b) The question of the return of Arab refugees cannot be divorced from its military context. While a state of war continues to exist between Israel and the surrounding Arab states, it would gravely prejudice the security and defense of Israel if its borders were flung open to an unrestricted influx of Arabs from those states, who would be a disruptive element in the maintenance of internal law and order, and a formidable fifth column for external enemies. It must be appreciated that a truce is not peace, but merely an interruption of active warfare, and that the governments which are now pressing for the return of these refugees, in order to relieve themselves of a problem they have created, are in the same breath making it clear that they have not relinquished their bellicose intentions.

(c) While permission to return is at present being granted in individual cases on special compassionate grounds, and subject

to security screening, the general question can only be considered as part of a permanent peace settlement with the Arab states.

(d) Such future consideration will take into account the position and treatment of Jewish minorities in the Arab countries.

(e) The Arabs remaining in Israel are assured of equal status, full protection, and due care by the state as regards their social services".¹

JESSUP

¹ For the letter of July 30 from Foreign Minister Shertok to Count Bernadotte expressing Israeli inability to agree to the readmission of Arab refugees to Israeli-controlled areas, see SC, 3rd yr., *Supplement for August 1948*, p. 106.

501.BB Palestine/7-2748: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

LONDON, July 27, 1948—8 p. m.

3413. Embassy's 2785, June 24, paragraph 6.

1. I was informed by Wright today that in extension of ideas mentioned by him earlier Bevin is sending instructions to Cadogan to initiate this week discussion in SC of the bearing upon the political future of Palestine of (a) international refugee problem in general, and (b) problem Arab refugees.

2. In telegram sent Cadogan today, as basis for his remarks it is pointed out that Nazi persecution Jews was new factor in Palestine situation which destroyed British hopes of carrying out mandate and led to Arab fears of influx all Jews in Europe. While 200,000 Jewish DP's plus unknown number Jews now living in Europe are now anxious to go to Palestine, British Govt is inclined to believe that total number might be somewhat reduced if there were "real opportunity for Jews to settle elsewhere". Consequently His Majesty's Govt believes there would [should?] be serious effort on international scale to dispose of all European DP's, Jews and non-Jews and that this would "diminish inter European fears re Palestine and would remove feeling that world is trying to solve problem, which Arabs had no part in creating, at expense of Arabs alone." Cadogan is to say while SC cannot take practical steps itself, it can call matter to attention ECOSOC in present session.

3. Re Arab refugees (see 1b above and Embassy's 3293, July 20¹) Cadogan has been instructed to invite SC to consider situation Palestine Arab refugees in Europe² [who?] number not less than 250,000 compared to 200,000 Jewish DP's in Europe and to inform His Majesty's Govt that "since position Jewish refugees was

¹ Not printed.

² The words "in Europe" appear to be superfluous.

major factor in UNGA deliberations last autumn it is only logical contention that larger problem of the position of Arab refugees should be regarded as major factor in Palestine problem as it now presents itself". Consequently UKUN will suggest that SC should ask Mediator to investigate problem Arab DP's and to make proposals for dealing with it. In particular His Majesty's Govt believes Mediator should be asked to ascertain whether refugees will be able to return to their homes.

4. Wright said UKUN has been instructed to discuss its instructions summarized above with USUN assurance of taking action and to report US views.

Sent Department 3413, Department pass USUN.

DOUGLAS

867N.01/7-2848 : Telegram

The Consul General at Jerusalem (Macdonald) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

JERUSALEM, July 28, 1948—3 p. m.

1132. Delay in demilitarizing Jerusalem is leading to critical situation and unless positive action taken within few days demilitarization may be impossible.

Although Jews express willingness demilitarize they actually resent it for fear it will lead to internationalization. From private conversations during last few days increasing opposition by Jews to demilitarization is very evident and excuse given is alleged refusal of Arabs to agree but press reports state Arabs have agreed.

It is reported a military governor will be appointed for Jerusalem. If true it will complicate question demilitarization and will encourage Jews considerably in their demands to include Jerusalem as part of Israel. Yesterday newly-appointed district attorney Jerusalem and group prominent Jews gave me long argument that inasmuch as Jerusalem captured by Jewish forces it should be part of Israel.

Current reports of expected trouble between Haganah and IZL forces presents gravest threat to demilitarization Jerusalem (see mytel 1125, July 26¹).

If hostilities between these two forces break out Government Israel will insist remaining Jerusalem on grounds protecting it from dissident forces who they will allege oppose Israel's efforts cooperate with UN. In such eventuality Jewish state would likely proclaim Jerusalem part Israel and it is unlikely such claim would be relinquished.

Should this unfortunate delay result in failure demilitarize Jerusalem and encourage Israel Government issue official statement claim-

¹Not printed.

ing Jerusalem part Israel, Arabs will be given just cause to accuse UN of assisting Jews through truce (see mytel 1097, July 19²).

In my opinion Bernadotte made serious error by not visiting Jerusalem on recent trip. Truce Commission has had no communication or instructions from Bernadotte or Security Council except outline for demilitarization Jerusalem since truce went into effect.

MACDONALD

² Not printed ; but see footnote 1, p. 1234.

501.BB Palestine/7-2848 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Jerusalem

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 28, 1948—7 p. m.

778. You are instructed immediately to approach Count Bernadotte in person and to discuss with him his request for the assignment of a battalion of the US Marine Corps as a guard force for the policing of the Mt. Scopus area of Jerusalem.¹ It is hoped that you will be able to arrange a meeting with Count Bernadotte in Jerusalem or elsewhere in Palestine. If Count Bernadotte has returned to Rhodes and does not plan to visit Palestine for several days, cable Dept. in advance and authorization will be given you to proceed to Rhodes.

You are instructed to discuss question of Marine Corps guard force along following lines:

"We have given most careful consideration to your telegram July 20 and to recent reports from Admiral Sherman² of his subsequent conversations with you on July 23 with regard to your request for the temporary assignment of a battalion of the US Marine Corps as a guard force for the policing of the Mt. Scopus area of Jerusalem.

We regret that we are unable to accept a military commitment of this nature in Jerusalem. We are compelled to adhere to the position which we took with the Secretary-General on this point and which Dr. Jessup discussed with you prior to your recent departure from Lake Success.

We suggest for your earnest consideration the possibility of a plan for policing Jerusalem which would enlist the active cooperation and participation of Arab and Jewish authorities and armed forces. Responsibility for carrying out the SC resolution of July 15 rests primarily upon the Arabs and Jews who should be able to undertake the policing of the City without employing the services of UN personnel in other than an observing capacity. Although we have not consulted either the Arabs or the Jews on this point, there is some reason to believe that arrangements could be found which would be acceptable to Jewish authorities. You are, of course, in a better position to ascertain whether that is the case."

¹ See unnumbered telegram of July 20, p. 1231.

² Vice Adm. Forrest P. Sherman, Commander of the Sixth Task Fleet of the United States Navy, operating in the Mediterranean area.

In discussing foregoing with Count Bernadotte you might point out that Arab-Jewish cooperation in policing of Jerusalem might be effected through employment of former Arab and Jewish units of civilian police or, if such units are dispersed and cannot quickly be collected, through employment of well-disciplined units of Israeli and Arab forces serving as military police pending the establishment and expansion of civilian units.³

MARSHALL

³ This telegram was repeated to London and New York. Consul General Macdonald, on July 29, advised the Department that at Count Bernadotte's invitation, he was proceeding to Rhodes the following day on a United Nations plane to discuss the matter (telegram 1139 from Jerusalem, 501.BB Palestine/7-2948).

501.BB Palestine/7-2848 : Telegram

*The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations
(Jessup) to the Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET

US URGENT

NEW YORK, July 28, 1948—7:15 p. m.

963. Cadogan called this morning and showed us his instructions to bring up in SC question of Jewish DP's and Arab refugees. Substance as reported by Douglas in London's 3413, July 27. Cadogan was instructed to request special meeting SC, if necessary, for early consideration these subjects. Although instructed consult USUN, he also on no account is to defer action unless specifically instructed to contrary. He said he would, however, take no action before tomorrow (Thursday) morning in order give us opportunity consult Department, but his present view is he must then request meeting for Friday.

We urge Department cable Douglas immediately asking him to request Bevin instruct Cadogan to defer action at least over weekend, pending fuller opportunity exchange views.¹

For reasons given in our comments below, we are strongly inclined to view that proposed British action is not advisable. This morning we told Cadogan we had no comments from Department. I said we were puzzled to know how UK Government thought proposed action would contribute to smoothing of situation in Palestine during next few weeks and months. Continuing in a general and personal way, we raised some of questions implied in following comments:

1. International refugee problem.

(a) The proposed British action may be confusing and possibly prejudicial to President's request made in special session yesterday that our DP legislation be liberalized.

¹ The Department did so the same day, in telegram 2988 to London, 501.BB Palestine/7-2748. At Ambassador Douglas' urgent request, Mr. Bevin authorized the British Delegation at New York to postpone action on the refugee problems until Monday, August 2 (telegram 3448, July 29, 6 p. m., from London, 501.BB Palestine/7-2948).

(b) Some members of Congress, hostile to liberalizing our DP legislation, might take line that British were attempting to dump European DP's in our laps. Other hostile members of Congress might take line that since SC is dealing with this matter there is no need for further legislation.

(c) PGI would probably feel obliged to state that most of European DP's want to go to Jewish homeland in Palestine. This would be provocative to Arabs (thereby having effect contrary to that contemplated by UK), and might also diminish prospects for liberalization DP legislation.

(d) Although they might not do so publicly, it is likely that PGI through propaganda channels would spread word, whether justified or not, that this action was hidden effort by UK Government to impair Jewish sovereignty in matters of immigration.

2. Arab refugees.

(a) PGI views on this problem set forth in USUN 957, July 27. Raising of this question by UK in SC would create at least some embarrassment for PGI and in turn for US Government, risking impairment our solidarity with British in Palestine matters because, in effect, we would be public advocate PGI position while UK would be public advocate Arab position.

(b) Public declaration by Bernadotte July 25 dealt specifically with his plans for dealing with question Arab refugees (Beirut's 386, July 26,² numbered paragraph 3). Bernadotte, having commendably taken initiative this regard, it would be gratuitous and tend to undermine his prestige for SC to take matter up and ask Mediator to do what he is already doing.

3. Proposed British action would encourage Arab extremists in their attempt to lay down conditions for maintenance present truce. Department will recall that telegram of July 18 from SYG Arab League to SYG UN (S/908, 19 July)³ in reply to SC July 15 resolution attempted to lay down three conditions for maintenance truce, two of three being complete cessation Jewish immigration and return of Arab refugees to their homes during truce. SYG Arab League reiterated this view in communiqué issued following recent conference with Bernadotte (Beirut's 387, July 26²). In this connection please refer to USUN 930, July 21² and Department's circular, July 26, 2 [1] a. m., stating Department considers acceptance of truce as unconditional and differing views re immigration and other matters are subjects for consideration by Mediator.

4. We feel that proposed British action reflects confusion in their minds concerning proper functions of SC with regard to Palestine. While related to maintenance of truce we feel that question of European DP's and immigration into Palestine, on one hand, and fate of Arab refugees, on other hand, are predominantly matters which must

² Not printed.

³ See footnote 2, p. 1230.

be dealt with in connection with "peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine." For obvious reasons the Soviet and Ukrainian representatives in SC have missed no opportunity to discuss future settlement in Council; the proposed British action would give them still another opportunity. Future settlement, we feel strongly, is a matter which concerns GA and Mediator under Assembly's resolution May 14, and not the SC which is concerned primarily with maintenance of peace in Palestine.

5. Our estimate of British motives in proposing this action is as follows:

(a) They are undoubtedly sincere in wishing to alleviate problems presented by unfortunate status of Jewish DP's in Europe and Arab refugees.

(b) They wish to minimize Jewish immigration and Arab refugee problem as factors which might impair prospects of future settlement.

(c) They probably feel that proposed action might help mend their fences with Arabs.

6. While we do not question sincerity of these probable motives we do feel that British are misleading themselves because it is our estimate that effects of their proposed action would be directly contrary to hoped for results. It is our view that public discussion of these problems in SC at this time would exacerbate rather than relieve problems, and stiffen both Jewish and Arab positions and impair rather than minimize risk of impairing prospects of future settlement, and by misleading Arabs would worsen rather than improve US-UK relations with Arabs.

7. On last point, while we agree with view expressed by Douglas in paragraph 5, London's 3188, July 14, it is our impression that evidences of lowering of British prestige in Near East resulting from their commendable attitude towards July 15 resolution, has caused them to become somewhat squeamish, and as a result to consider taking hasty and ill-advised action. British have certainly not lost nearly as much influence in Arab countries as we have. While Bevin's stand and British courage in recent dealings with Arabs have been wholly admirable, it is our view we should spare no effort to encourage them to stand firm with us in inducing Arabs to take the bitter pill which sooner or later they must swallow, given the circumstances with which we have to deal.

8. Although we have received very little first-hand information concerning situation of Arab refugees, what little information we do have indicates these people will be in serious condition unless steps are taken promptly to assist them. We would suggest following alternatives, therefore, separately or in combination, to British proposals for dealing with these particular problems in SC. These alternatives should,

of course, be coordinated with President's legislative program concerning DP's.

(a) US and UK might jointly take action in ECOSOC and, if feasible, directly with IRO (paragraph 3, London's 3362⁴).

(b) US and UK might jointly suggest to Mediator that he request ECOSOC and IRO for advice and assistance in dealing with these problems. The Mediator clearly would have authority to do so under paragraph 1(c) of GA resolution of May 14 and this action would be consistent with his statement of July 25 (Beirut's 386).

(c) US and UK might jointly encourage philanthropic organizations in respective countries (Amman's 23, July 26⁴) to organize large-scale joint program Near East relief, corresponding so far as US is concerned with large-scale Jewish relief projects.

9. In a broader sense we feel that most effective way for us to mend our fences with Arabs and deal with such specific problems as Jewish immigration and Arab refugees is to get together promptly as possible with UK on details of plan of settlement along lines set forth USUN 831, June 29 [30]; 837, July 1; and paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of 870, July 10. In this connection please note particularly paragraph 4, Amman's 18, July 22,⁴ indicating Transjordan Prime Minister's view that US and UK should decide between themselves what plan should be adopted. In particular most effective steps we feel might be taken to improve US-UK relations with Arab states and would be active development of plans for recognition Transjordan and economic assistance as recommended in paragraphs 4 and 12 USUN 831. Amman's 17, July 20 and Jerusalem's 1118, July 24,⁵ are pertinent to question recognition Transjordan. A program of economic assistance would be particularly important in case of Iraq which, together with Syria, reflects the most extreme Arab position involving greatest risk of political instability.

JESSUP

⁴ Not printed.

⁵ The latter conveyed Special Representative McDonald's strong recommendation that the Department consider extending recognition to Transjordan at this time (890i.01/7-2448). Mr. Jessup, on July 29, supported Mr. McDonald's recommendation (telegram 970 from New York, 890i.01/7-2948).

501.BB Palestine/7-2948: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United Nations Mediator in Palestine (Bernadotte), at Rhodes

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, July 29, 1948—2 p. m.

Before your recent departure from United States Philip Jessup of US Mission to UN presented to you the following questions con-

cerning implementation UNSC ban on war materiel to Arab States and Palestine :

"1. The UK has adopted the position that transfer of parts, accessories, and aircraft replacements for maintenance of existing non-British civil airlines in the Middle East would not be contrary to the ban on war material prescribed by the SC resolution of May 29. On the other hand, the US has followed the practice of refusing to license such shipments to non-American airlines in this area. Having in mind the desirability of having the US and UK, the two principal suppliers of aircraft, follow a uniform policy, what is the view of the Mediator on this question ?

"2. The US has furnished to the Mediator the list of items controlled by this government as arms, ammunition, and implements of war with which the Mediator has expressed satisfaction. This list does not include borderline items such as motor vehicles (non-military), uniforms, military communications equipment, and other items of military significance. Does the Mediator wish the items mentioned above to be brought under control and their export prohibited unless his consent is obtained ? In any event, does the Mediator wish this government to continue to consult him regarding items not included on the list furnished him, and, if so, will his office find it possible to give prompt replies ?

"3. Are there any further steps contemplated by the Mediator to make the ban on war material more effective ?

"4. The US has received numerous reports on alleged violation of the ban on war material. Where such reports are believed by this government to be reliable, does the Mediator wish to be informed of the details ?"

Bunche promised Jessup reply from Rhodes at earliest possible moment. Can you now give your views on these questions ? US Govt urgently desires your advice on questions one and two.¹

MARSHALL

¹ This telegram was repeated to New York as No. 485.

501.BB Palestine/7-2948 : Telegram

*The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations
(Jessup) to the Secretary of State*

CONFIDENTIAL US URGENT NEW YORK, July 29, 1948—5 : 35 p. m.

968. From Ross. Following is text of letter from Eban concerning attitude of PGI re its legal status in Jerusalem :

"As you know, the obscure legal position in Jerusalem gives rise to many difficulties, not least of which is the difficulty of the Provisional Government of Israel in asserting its authority over dissident elements.

["I have now ascertained from Mr. Shertok that the view of the Provisional Government of Israel is that the parts of Jerusalem occupied by Jewish forces are, in the legal sense, occupied territory

whose political future is still undecided. The Provisional Government of Israel proposes to make a statement very shortly declaring the status of that area to be that of occupied territory, without prejudice to its future political status.

[“]In his cable to me, Mr. Shertok points out that this proclamation will ensure the legality of measures taken by the Jewish military command and also enable it to tighten its control over dissidents.”

[Ross]

JESSUP

501.BB Palestine/7-2948 : Telegram

*The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations
(Jessup) to the Secretary of State*

CONFIDENTIAL US URGENT NEW YORK, July 29, 1948—5:35 p. m.

969. Following is text of two letters and enclosures received from Eban concerning demilitarization of Jerusalem: Text of letter dated July 26:

“Your delegation will be aware that negotiations are now proceeding on the question of the demilitarization of Jerusalem, in accordance with the Security Council resolution adopted on 16 [15] July, paragraph 7 [6]. I enclose for your information the text of the first draft proposals presented by the Mediator to the parties, and also the text of a telegraphic agency message which correctly reflects the government of Israel’s reaction to them.

In accepting the principle of a demilitarized Jerusalem, the Government of Israel never imagined that a ring of steel would be put around the city, barring access or residence to all but the aged and the infirm. These negotiations are now faced with considerable difficulty owing to the conditions of access, enumerated in Articles 13, 14 and 16.¹ In a conversation with representatives of the Provisional Government of Israel on July 26, the Mediator showed some understanding of these objections and the negotiations are presumably proceeding further.”

First enclosure to letter of July 26:

[Here follow the Mediator’s draft suggestions for the demilitarization of Jerusalem.]

Second enclosure to letter of July 26:

“Tel Aviv, July 25, (JTA) (daily news bulletin of July 26).—Count Bernadotte’s plan for the demilitarization of Jerusalem which he formally submitted to the Arab League Political Committee in Beirut yesterday, was received with incredulous astonishment in Israeli

¹ The three articles as set forth below were as follows: “Men of military age not normally residing in the demilitarized area would be admissible only upon special permission of the Truce Commission.” (Article 13); “Men of military age normally residing in the demilitarized area, who had at any time been enrolled in military or defense forces of either party, would be admissible only upon special permission of the Truce Commission.” (Article 14); “Men of nonmilitary age and women and children not normally residing in the demilitarized area would be admissible only upon special permission.” (Article 16).

Government circles here. His latest proposal stipulates that every male who was a member of Haganah should be compelled to leave Jerusalem, according to reports here. This means, in effect, that 20,000 Jews would be compelled to quit Jerusalem, leaving their families and virtually destroying the economic life of the city. It appears that Israel will not even consent to discuss this plan, which government circles suggest is so fantastic as to cast doubts on Bernadotte's capacity to mediate."

Text of letter dated July 29:

"With reference to my letter to you yesterday about the demilitarization of Jerusalem, I have now received a further cablegram from Mr. Shertok.

As I anticipated, the plan submitted by the Mediator proved to be unacceptable, chiefly because of the tight control of access which would have made it difficult for any but the aged or infirm to secure entry or residence in Jerusalem.

You will notice that in the third paragraph of the enclosed cable, the Provisional Government of Israel reaffirms its readiness to approve the principle of demilitarization, so that if a scheme with more liberal provisions of access were devised, it is quite likely to be favorably received."

Enclosure to letter of July 29:

"To Eban, Memisrael,* New York. Communicated Mediator today following decision: 1. Memisrael reaffirms rejection Mediator's plan demilitarization Jerusalem communicated us July 22. Memisrael assumes this particular scheme no longer stands.

2. Attitude Memisrael to any plan demilitarization emanating from Mediator cannot but be influenced by fact Mediator proposed place Jerusalem ultimately under Arab rule and not withdrawn that proposal.

3. Memisrael ready as before examine any scheme which without prejudicing ultimate settlement problem Jerusalem or prejudicing vital interests Jewish people in Holy City would protect it from further destruction in event hostilities, being resumed other parts Palestine. Signed Shertok."

JESSUP

*Memisrael is code name for Government of Israel. [Footnote in the source text.]

501.BB Palestine/7-2848: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Jerusalem

SECRET

WASHINGTON, July 29, 1948—6 p. m.

781. Dept concerned re developments outlined in Contel 1132 July 28 re demilitarization Jerusalem.

SC Resolution July 15 ordered as matter of special and urgent necessity immediate and unconditional cease-fire in city Jerusalem

(which both the Arabs and Jews accepted) to take effect twenty-four hours from time of adoption resolution and instructed Truce Commission take any necessary steps to make cease-fire effected [*effective?*]. Instructed Mediator to continue his efforts bring about demilitarization city Jerusalem without prejudice to future political status Jerusalem and to assure protection of and access to Holy Places, religious buildings and sites in Palestine.

Dept suggest you discuss this matter with your French and Belgian colleagues on Truce Commission and thereafter communicate your conclusions in name of Truce Commission to UN Mediator informing him of such action as Commission may agree to take and requesting instructions from Mediator as to such further action as he may desire.¹

MARSHALL

¹ This telegram was repeated to Arab capitals, Tel Aviv, New York, and London.

501.AA/7-2248: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Jessup)

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, July 29, 1948—7 p. m.

489. You may answer inquiries (reurtel 939 July 22¹) by saying we would support an application by Israel. There is, however, no effective deadline for SC approval of applications for GA action this autumn, except end of session of GA itself. Thus in 1946, Siamese application was, at Siamese request, considered and approved by SC on December 12 and approved by GA on December 15, last day of session.

Our position re Israeli qualifications (Art. 4) is that Israel is a peace-loving State that accepts and is able and willing to carry out obligations of Charter. We assume that Israeli application, when submitted, will contain formal undertaking to that effect in accordance with SC Rule 58 and GA Rule 123. In our opinion, Part I, F, of Partition Resolution of 29 November 1947 would not preclude present admission of Israel.

MARSHALL

¹ Not printed; it stated that Mr. Eban was sounding out the attitude of the United States and other members of the Security Council to an Israeli application for membership in the United Nations. The telegram noted that if Israel decided to file such an application, it would have to be done soon to meet the deadline of August 21 when the Security Council would recess. (501.AA/7-2248)

Mr. Ross read telegram 489 to Mr. Eban on July 30 and "emphasized that we were not going to take the initiative in pressing these views on other delegations; if, however, other delegations sought our views, we would give them along the lines indicated." (Telegram 974, July 30, 8:04 p. m., from New York, 501.BB Palestine/7-3048)

501.BB Palestine/7-2948 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Acting United States Representative at
the United Nations (Jessup)*

RESTRICTED

WASHINGTON, July 29, 1948—7 p. m.

491. Reference Navy telegram NCR 9608 and note from Acting SYG on equipment and personnel required by UN Mediator:

1. Dept. has requested Secy. of Defense¹ to supply following items: 95 observers (including four naval communications officers); 2 medical officers with supplies; 6 radio operators for SCR 399; 10 radio operators for SCR 193; 4 radio technicians; 2 radio trucks SCR 399; 5 radios SCR 193 or equivalent, jeep mounted; 6 ultra high frequency radio transmitters; 4,000 field rations.

2. We believe UN should arrange through commercial channels, UK, French or other governments having installations in Mediterranean area for jeeps, jeep trailers, jeep drivers, aircraft and crews, and truck drivers. We believe that US, UK, France and Belgium should each furnish two medical officers with supplies.

3. If National Military Establishment unable to provide communications equipment or adequate substitutes therefor, it may be necessary for us to refer one or more items to UK and France.

Please discuss above informally with top UN Secretariat officials and emphasize we consider they must assume primary responsibility for mobilizing the resources required by Bernadotte. We have made miscellaneous personnel and equipment available from our Mediterranean and European resources despite most critical shortages in all categories. We shall make every effort to take our full share in the requirements listed by Acting SYG's note but we must emphasize that the US cannot be considered a residual source of all UN requirements not readily available elsewhere. The UN itself must gear its operations to meeting needs of this sort. We recognize UN budgetary difficulties and believe that the budgetary aspects of political action need further consideration by the Assembly.² Copy of Secy. of State's letter to Secy. of Defense being forwarded by pouch.

MARSHALL

¹ In a letter of July 28, not printed.

² Mr. Jessup, on August 5, reported that the United States Mission at the United Nations had discussed telegram 491 with UN Secretariat officials. He concluded his telegram 989 with the following paragraph: "USUN had the distinct impression that senior American UN officials, with whom we met informally after the conference with Sobolev, have given serious and sober thought to a solution of the Mediator's problem, taking into consideration their conception of the interests of the US Government as well as those of UN. As interested American citizens as well as UN officials, they are satisfied that they have nearly exhausted all practical possibilities of meeting the Mediator's needs from UN resources. They fear the Soviets will volunteer in the SC to supply what the Truce Commission powers, the UK and UN are apparently unwilling or unable to make

867N.5151/7-3048

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Satterthwaite) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] July 30, 1948.

Subject: Israeli Loan Request ¹

I am attaching (Tab A) Mr. Epstein's letter of July 19 ² requesting affirmative action at this time by the Export-Import Bank and the Economic Officers of the Department on Israel's loan application. Mr. Epstein also requests an interview with you to discuss the larger objectives of Israel's loan application.

Following the receipt of this letter, OFD was requested for an opinion regarding this matter. Mr. Knapp's memorandum of July 30 (Tab B) ³ is attached. It is clear from this memorandum that a loan to Israel at this time would be difficult to justify on strictly banking grounds.

In considering the political factors, to which reference is also made in OFD's memorandum, consideration should also be given to the effect which the extension of the Export-Import Bank loan at this time would have on our relations with the Arab States and on the UN handling of the general Palestine problem.

The immediate extension of a loan would undoubtedly be considered by the Arab States as a unilateral action by the United States in violation of the present truce. The extension of a loan might prejudice the mediation efforts of Count Bernadotte.

available. They will try to do more, but they have made a most earnest plea that the US bring to bear the maximum material and personnel that can be spared. They are convinced that this is the only way to avoid larger and more serious involvement, since otherwise the prestige of the Mediator and UN will decline and the situation in Palestine will inevitably deteriorate to a point where only a major force can preserve order in the Near East." (501.BB Palestine/8-548) Arkady Alexandrovitch Sobolev participated in the discussions with the United States Mission as Acting Secretary-General of the United Nations.

¹ For information on the request of the Jewish Agency for Palestine for an Export-Import Bank credit of \$75,000,000, made on December 22, 1947, see editorial note, *Foreign Relations*, 1947, vol. v, p. 1317. The request was not granted. On June 2, 1948, the Provisional Government of Israel made application to the Export-Import Bank for a credit of \$100,000,000, to be utilized primarily to facilitate accomplishment of Israel's Four-Year Plan for resettlement and development (letter and accompanying memorandum, also dated June 2, 1948, from Oscar Gass, Economic Adviser in the United States to the Provisional Government of Israel, to William McChesney Martin, Chairman of the Export-Import Bank, 867N.5151/6-248).

² Not printed; it requested Mr. Martin to give most urgent consideration to the Israeli application for the \$100,000,000 credit, now that the fighting in Palestine had come to an end. In reply, on July 26, Mr. Martin expressed his regrets that "reports reaching me do not appear to warrant at this time active consideration of the credit application filed with the Bank by the Jewish Agency for Palestine." This exchange of correspondence is filed under 867N.5151/7-1948.

³ Not printed.

It is accordingly believed, as suggested in OFD's memorandum, that a decision on the extension of an Export-Import Bank loan should await developments with regard to the present truce in Palestine and with regard to Count Bernadotte's mediation efforts. It seems logical to believe that a settlement of the Palestine question through the United Nations would stabilize the economies not only of Israel but of the Arab States as well and would provide a more stable base for the extension of an Export-Import Bank loan at a later date.

Recommendation:

It is recommended that you discuss this matter with Mr. Epstein and inform him of our views as outlined above.

Concurrences: NEA, UNA, ED, OFD

501.BB Palestine/7-3048 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

SECRET US URGENT
NIACT

WASHINGTON, July 30, 1948—12 noon.

3011. For the Ambassador. Dept has decided to try to get Cadogan to ask for instructions permitting him to restrict discussion of refugee problem in SC initially to Arab refugee problem.¹ Principal ground we will use is that prospects of Congressional action on DP legislation make general discussions of world refugee problem in SC undesirable. No action by Embassy is indicated at the present time.

MARSHALL

¹ London, on August 3, reported information from the British Foreign Office that the instructions to Cadogan were being considerably toned down in deference to United States views and that the British Treasury had set aside £100,000 for Arab refugees (telegram 3505, 501.BB Palestine/8-348).

Cadogan actually addressed the Security Council on the refugee question on August 2, discussing both the Jewish and Arab refugee problems; for the text of his statement, see SC, *3rd yr.*, No. 100, p. 4.

501.BB Palestine/7-2848 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Jessup)

SECRET US URGENT

WASHINGTON, July 30, 1948—4 p. m.

493. Dept concurs in views expressed urtel 963 July 28 except for para 9 as to which no opinion is expressed at this time.

Dept has following additional comments:

1. Dept underscores your para 1 (a) and (b). We are now hopeful of change in US Displaced Persons Act during special session to

eliminate discrimination against Jewish DPs. Two bills already introduced in each House Congress to this effect. Proposed UK action might be seriously prejudicial.

2. Security Council consideration of general refugee-displaced persons problem would give Soviet and Ukrainian delegations excellent opportunity not previously presented Security Council to exploit this subject and should be avoided if at all possible.

3. As to alternatives in your para 8 Dept strongly prefers (b) with understanding that such approach made without prejudice to Mediator's freedom of action to take such other measures as he deems desirable. Dept also underscores reasons expressed your para 2 (b). Course proposed para 8 (c) also should be pursued. Depts Advisory Committee Vol Foreign Aid already negotiating with appropriate US organizations but viewed realistically it appears that no prospects of large scale relief exist. Alternative (a) would be preferable to Security Council action but should not be undertaken unless alternative (b) proves unfeasible.¹

MARSHALL

¹ This telegram was repeated to London as 3015.

501.BB Palestine/7-3148 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Jerusalem (Macdonald) to the
Secretary of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY

JERUSALEM, July 31, 1948—4 p. m.

1142. Appointment Dayan to replace Shaltiel as Commander Sixth Brigade widely viewed indication Jews anticipate renewal fighting Jerusalem. Dayan described as "fighter" while Shaltiel considered "administrator and politician". Above opinion shared by UN observers attached to HQ Jewish Forces here and Belgian and French members Truce Commission. Shaltiel will resume position as Chief Intelligence Israel Army held before assignment Jerusalem command.

Diminishing confidence permanence present truce noted throughout Jerusalem. Firing including rifle automatic and occasionally mortars has increased considerably last three days. Persons exposing selves in view enemy lines now fired on regularly. Officer Consulate General yesterday observed Arab Legion convoy with fresh troops entering Old City. Truce Commission has received reliable reports Jews are tunneling under Old City walls vicinity Jaffa gate. This activity continuing up to present.

Consulate General feels appointment Dayan serves two-fold purpose: Providing Jerusalem with Commander capable launching strong attack on Arabs in Old City and man able direct any punitive measures considered necessary against IZL and Stern.

MACDONALD

501.BB Palestine/8-148 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Jerusalem (Macdonald) to the
Secretary of State*

SECRET
NIACT

US URGENT

JERUSALEM, August 1, 1948—5 p. m.

1146. Subject Deptel 778, July 28, discussed at length with Bernadotte July 30. He cannot understand why US objects lending Marines to UN for special guard duties in view of fact we have no objection supplying observers from both Army and Navy. He is under impression State Department has misunderstood his original request and asked me to endeavor clarify position as follows:

Two hundred fifty Marines are needed to guard Hadassah Hospital Hebrew University and Augusta Victoria. All of these properties have been demilitarized and put under UN supervision. Marines will replace Jewish and Arab police now there. They will wear UN armbands and be considered a UN force and not United States. A few of these Marines will guard the Latrun water pumping station which is also under United Nations. The Marine unit will be required only until it can be replaced by UN international force which Bernadotte has been told cannot be recruited and sent here for at least 60 to 90 days. Mediator feels it is imperative to have a regular military force under UN arrive immediately to guard these demilitarized areas now controlled by UN before complete demilitarization of Jerusalem can be implemented. Furthermore, according to agreement for demilitarization Mount Scopus UN promised provide guards. If US will supply Marine guard Bernadotte says France has agreed to do likewise and he believes Belgium will follow suit.

After discussing this matter carefully with Mediator, I see no objection to granting his request under the above mentioned conditions except for political implications of which I may not be aware.

Department's suggestion regarding possibility of enlisting active cooperation and participation of Arab and Jewish authorities and armed forces for policing Jerusalem absolutely impossible due to mistrust and deeply rooted hatred each other at this time.

Employment of former Arab and Jewish units of civilian police cannot be used since Palestine police during mandate was target for both sides and bitter hatred still exists for anyone who was connected with it. Recalling members of this force would invite immediate bloodshed.

Last suggestion of appointing well disciplined units Israeli and Arab forces not practicable due to very small number of military police and furthermore no Arab and Jewish forces will cooperate at this time.

Unless an international military or police force is brought to Jeru-

Jerusalem quickly, there is no hope of demilitarization of the city. Necessity for immediate action in this matter cannot be stressed too strongly. That is principal reason why Bernadotte is so anxious to get US Marines for Mount Scopus as they will be looked upon as first unit of international force to guard areas already demilitarized and under United Nations supervision.

Telegram follows re other conversation with Bernadotte.

MACDONALD

501.BB Palestine/8-148 : Telegram

The Consul General at Jerusalem (Macdonald) to the Secretary of State

SECRET US URGENT
 NIACT

JERUSALEM, August 1, 1948—6 p. m.

1147. For personal attention Secretary Marshall. Before mentioning or discussing subject Deptel 778, July 28, see my telegram 1146, August 1.

Bernadotte reviewed Palestine situation in general and was very frank in admitting his discouragement and disappointment with the present state of affairs. The Mediator then said "I hope you do not mind if I speak quite frankly to you and I would say the same things to Secretary of State Marshall if he were here, so will you please convey the following for his personal attention. I am very disappointed and discouraged with the lack of support from the United Nations and particularly with the apparent noncooperative attitude of the United States in providing me with the necessary material support in carrying out my mission as Mediator. It is impossible for me to supervise the observance of the truce without sufficient staff and equipment. I regret therefore to request you to inform Secretary Marshall that I am not prepared to continue under such conditions and unless the required personnel and equipment are forthcoming at once I shall feel forced to resign as Mediator."

It is perfectly true that Count Bernadotte cannot hope to accomplish his mission with the small force he now has. Two weeks have elapsed since the truce went into effect during which time the Mediator has been powerless to carry out properly its supervision which has resulted in the UN rapidly losing prestige on both sides. Consequently, the situation has deteriorated steadily, making it more difficult and probably impossible to demilitarize Jerusalem. To date Mediator's staff consists of 30 American observers, 50 French, 47 Belgians, and 10 Swedes, most of whom have arrived during the past five days.

In my opinion the resignation of Bernadotte at this time over the above issue would preclude any possibility of the United Nations

finding a solution to the Palestine problem. The US, I feel, would be blamed also by both sides for unfortunate unforeseen consequences on the grounds that it supported the UN on the Palestine issue. Therefore, every possible support should be given Bernadotte in his effort to solve this problem.

Bernadotte will be in Jerusalem August 3 for short time if Department should care for me to deliver any message to him.

MACDONALD

501.BB Palestine/8-248 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

LONDON, August 2, 1948—2 p. m.

3484. 1. Bevin and Wright have mentioned to me several times recently that British views re road ahead on Palestine in best interests world peace and future UN were being developed in Foreign Office for early discussion with USG through this particular telegraphic channel. They indicated their hope that by clearing ideas beforehand, US and UK will be able to work together in bringing about a definite and lasting solution of Palestine problem.

2. The broad outlines of British thinking have now been conveyed to me personally and at my suggestion, with which Bevin agreed, the details have been filled in at the operating level. Lest there be distortions through reporting errors, this message through paragraph 14, has been cleared textually by Wright who asserts that it is an accurate presentation of provisional thoughts of HMG as developed by Bevin and Foreign Office.

3. Notwithstanding the passions aroused in Palestine the presence there of the British gave Palestine problem a comparatively static quality on world scene. Last November the UNGA delegates were confronted by a single entity known as Palestine. After May 15 however, Palestine entered the dynamic phase of Arab-Jewish fighting at end of which Palestine picture has altered radically in that

(a). UNGA resolution of May 14 relieved UN commission of its task of implementing November 29 resolution and appointed a Mediator to seek a peaceful solution without laying down on what lines he should act;

(b). The Jewish state is well-established behind its line-of-force frontier;

(c). The Arabs are establishing authorities on their side of line;

(d). Jewish immigration has taken place on a considerable scale;

(e). Jewish forces have convinced Arabs that Jews cannot be driven into the sea;

(f). Establishment of Jewish state has resulted in about 250,000 Arabs fleeing from their homes in Jewish territory;

(g). Oil resources of Europe are threatened gravely by stoppage Haifa refinery;

(h). SC and UK are confronted with bitter Arab resentment against the West heightened by circumstances in which SC imposed present truce;

(i). Jewish military successes have increased in Arab eyes likelihood that Jews will not respect any frontier laid down for Jewish state.

4. Uneasy as present truce may be, present Arab-Jewish frontier has dramatic reality in that neither side can be dislodged from its present position without fighting. The British at one time entertained ideas of a Jewish national home very different from the functioning state of Israel, and we, too, have entertained at different times different ideas. However, in British view new facts (paragraph 3 above) must be faced as facts and taken into account in formulating a realistic new approach by all parties concerned: the Arabs, the Jews, the US, and UK and especially UN. Provisional British thinking re this new realistic approach, on which they hope for an early expression of US views, is as follows:

5. HMG believes best solution Palestine problem in circumstances would be one along lines Mediator's previous proposals minus idea of union between two states (see paragraph 16 below) and including some form international responsibility for Jerusalem by which Jerusalem possibly, but not necessarily, might be placed under Arab sovereignty. As British see it, such a solution would mean an independent sovereign state of Israel, providing most, if not all, of Galilee and an Arab territory (including Negev), the political future of which would be left to the Arabs. Haifa would be either a free port or under some form of international responsibility. Future of Jaffa would have to be determined. Arab-Jewish frontier would be subject to some form of international guarantee to reassure both sides. (In this specific connection British think best course would be for Mediator to recommend that UN should lay down that frontier could only be changed by UN and that any attempt to do so otherwise would be a breach of the peace.) Among other factors which British think might be involved are:

(a). Solution of problem Jewish DP's in Europe and Arab DP's in ME;

(b). Some equation of outside economic help so that neighboring Arab states will not become depressed areas dangerous both from point of view of Communism and economic well-being of Israel.

6. HMG gravely doubts that either Arabs or Jews will accept for some time to come a settlement on these lines and believes it would be more rational for US and UK to work in the immediate future, as they did in case of truce, on problem of securing Arab and Jewish acquiescence to such a settlement: If need be, this settlement might have to be enforced, as truce was by UN.

7. If Mediator is successful in securing agreement both sides to any set of proposals no problem will, of course, exist, but HMG does not believe this will happen and that when Mediator, towards end of August, presents to Arabs and Jews a set of modified proposals, the second set will likewise be rejected. When this happens, HMG believes that Mediator will find it necessary to refer matter to UN (either UNGA or SC).

8. Foreign Office has given much thought to character of resolution upon which UN might act. Resolution might be either positive (thus attempting to settle question once for all), or provisional, designed to smooth way for a more positive resolution later upon which UN body might act at some future time. Embassy's immediately following telegram contains outline working paper prepared by Foreign Office to clarify its own thinking re possible provisional resolution.

9. Advantages of positive resolution are:

(a). It would remove possibility of further dispute over location frontier;

(b). UN guarantees of frontier could come into force at once;

(c). It would obviate either side jockeying to improve its position.

Disadvantage of positive resolution is that Arab leaders would find it extremely hard in face Arab public opinion to give explicit recognition now in existence of Jewish state. Leaders would probably be unwilling to risk recommending this, and the result might be renewal of fighting by Arabs or at least serious internal instability in Arab countries. A provisional resolution, on other hand, would face dangers for Arabs but Arab leaders might prefer it for internal reasons. If so, their choice re form of ¹ resolution should probably be adopted (see paragraph 14 below).

10. British Government is most anxious to keep in step with US on this question and visualizes that optimum US-UK cooperation in achieving final settlement along above lines might embrace the following:

(a). Once US and UK can agree that new hand has been dealt in Palestine and that cards now available must be played to secure lasting settlement, US and UK might make clear to Mediator either in ME or during his Swedish visit the similarity of their view re settlement along line his earlier proposals (see paragraph 5). This information might be extremely useful when he begins serious work with two parties again.

(b). US and UK at same time could urge Mediator to produce map showing clearly the line-of-force which existed at the time [end of fighting?] because this line, with such minor modifications as might be agreed by parties, would be that which both sides must continue to respect. In case of positive resolution line would be frontier between Jewish state and Arab area.

¹ The source text indicates a garbled group of letters at this point.

(c). US and UK could attend UN with an agreed view as to the resolution which should go before UN on basis Mediator's new report and new proposals. If US and UK could agree to work together re resolution HMG believes there would be so much support forthcoming for a Palestine settlement endorsed by both US and UK and which at same time would reinforce prestige UN that agreed resolution (either in positive or provisional form—see paragraph 5) would pass with ease.

11. Above represents [Foreign Office?] views re optimum US-UK cooperations. Foreign Office is aware of special difficulties with which USG may be faced in next few months and if US cannot for various reasons undertake to advocate openly the imposition by UN of the "lines-of-force" in Palestine as the basis for a reasonable and workable settlement, at [least?] British would hope that USR [USG?] would not oppose a British resolution to this effect and above all that USR [USG?] would not stimulate opposition of other states to such a resolution.

12. Essence of problem is that British believe that neither US nor UK can ignore developments in Palestine since November 29 and they would like us to join with them in efforts to get UN to finalize as a reasonable and workable solution the *de facto* frontier in Palestine which has emerged out of fighting. British feel US-UK cooperation is vital to the success of such an effort not only for purpose of effective UN action but also because a divergence between US and UK at this juncture before a UN forum would intensify the essence of Palestine problem itself. They believe that if USG should elect to stand firmly upon November 29 partition plan (upon acceptability of which [there?] is vast doubt) and if USG should ignore actual partition which has taken place in Palestine, this would encourage Jews to make territorial demands beyond areas which are under their control at present and which in circumstances can be enlarged only by renewed fighting. By same token, divergence between US and UK would encourage Arabs to believe that by being more intransigent they can induce UK to secure for them a more favorable territorial settlement by getting UN to eject Jews from at least part of territory now under PGI control. British desire that US and UK should attend UN not as champions of either Jews or Arabs; they would like to see us appear as great states whose joint interest is achievement of a workable and permanent settlement of Palestine problem. HMG cold-shouldered Arabs in order to secure their acquiescence to truce and HMG is prepared to this again to secure Arab acquiescence to *de facto* situation in Palestine (see paragraph 13) provided USG for its part is willing to base its own policy in UN on realities and if necessary, cold-shoulder the Jews.

13. Task of HMG is bringing about Arab acquiescence is delicate

and difficult now because Arab bitterness against West is already deep and imposition upon Arabs of Jewish state, which they have committed themselves never to accept, will intensify this bitterness. In British view this feeling can be minimized only by giving Arabs at same time some concrete evidence of western understanding of their position by such measures as UN aid in solving Arab DP problem; special guarantee that Jews will not be allowed within a few years to enlarge their state or Arabs enlarge their state, economic aid for Arabs, etc. In absence such steps British consider that revulsion Arab feeling against West would facilitate spread Soviet influence and at very least would mean that US and UK could not count on Arab co-operation in connection with their strategic requirements.

14. Evidence of British preoccupation with ways and means to achieve Arab acquiescence to Jewish state without risk internal disorders in Arab states, loss British military facilities and loss for indefinite period of some if not all ME oil, in fact that in connection with resolution (paragraph 8 above) British Government would wish to take Arab leaders into their confidence at an early stage and privately consult them as to whether Arabs would acquiesce more readily to a positive or to a provisional resolution.

15. [garble] with proposals [omission] that only recommendation which I feel qualified to make at present is that proposals, which are logical development of my meeting with the British Defence Council reported my 2267, May 25, deserve most thoughtful consideration of our government.

16. I feel, however, that I should supply the following footnotes:

(a). Re paragraph 5 suggest[ion] that union should be dropped from [Bernadotte?] proposals [garble] made by Foreign Office with the object of making these proposals more acceptable in the immediate future. Foreign Office does not intend thereby that possibility future cooperation should be excluded. On contrary, Foreign Office shares my views that there will have to be close economic relations between all parts Palestine in interest of their economic survival.

(b). Re idea of exchanging western Galilee for Negev it seems to me that compulsion sometimes offers a firmer basis for a workable peaceful settlement than theoretical plans.

(c). If we accept British proposals we should be prepared in the immediate future to witness a number of pro-Arab British gestures designed to raise almost non-existent stock of British influence with Arabs so that when time comes [apparent omission] pressure to be applied again to Arabs [garble] resolution HMG will have some measure of Arab confidence to work upon.

17. It is only stating the problem when I say that [garble] is the maintenance of UN as an organism equipped to cope with realities;

the tranquillity of ME so deeply involved in US-UK strategic requirements (including oil), and the US desire to see Israel, untainted by the corrosive poison of irredentism which has destroyed so many [garble] states flourish at peace with its neighbors as a responsible member of community of nations.

DOUGLAS

501.BB Palestine/8-248 : Telegram

*The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations
(Jessup) to the Secretary of State*

RESTRICTED

NEW YORK, August 2, 1948—6:56 p. m.

981. Urtel 485, July 29¹: UN received today from Rhodes following answers to questions presented by Jessup to Mediator July 16.

1. Mediator has been informed by UK that there is no embargo on "spare parts of British aircraft already serving civil airlines in Middle East, when British Government is satisfied that spare parts are genuinely required in order to keep an existing fleet in the air." Mediator thinks it would be more satisfactory if such transfer of parts and accessories were limited to non-Arab and non-Israeli civil airlines and subject to prior consent of the Mediator. The same should apply to aircraft replacements.

2. The question of borderline items is very delicate; according to UK "lorries and jeeps are essential to maintenance of civil communications in Middle East and have no direct military value." The last part of this statement is not shared by all military experts and Mediator thinks only export of passenger cars should be permitted without obtaining his prior consent. He is now equipped to answer promptly if consulted regarding items not included in the list furnished him.

3. Supervision of imports of war material contrary to SC resolution will be more effective in view of greater number of observers and observation means to be put at Mediator's disposal. As regards ban imposed by exporting countries, Mediator would appreciate if from time to time conversations between countries principally concerned resulted in agreed revised lists of war material. Mediator if desired could furnish information at his disposal and even be represented in conversations.

4. The Mediator would greatly appreciate being informed of the details of such reports as the US believes reliable.

JESSUP

¹This was a repeat of the telegram from the Secretary of State to Count Bernadotte, p. 1255.

501.BB Palestine/8-348

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State*¹

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] August 3, 1948.

Participants: The Secretary

Dr. Naji al-Asil, Iraqi Representative to the UN

Mr. Ahmed Mohammed, Chargé d'Affaires of Iraq

Mr. Satterthwaite, Director of NEA

After a preliminary exchange of courtesies concerning Dr. Asil's pending departure for Baghdad, and some conversation on other subjects, the question of Iraq's continued active participation in the United Nations and its support of Count Bernadotte in both his mediation and truce efforts were discussed. Mr. Satterthwaite remarked that he had already expressed to Dr. Asil the earnest hope that Iraq would not fail to continue to play an active role in the United Nations, since, however bitterly it might feel about Palestine, Iraq had many other interests in which the UN could be helpful to it. He also hoped that Iraq, in the interest of the peace and security of the Near East, would strongly support Count Bernadotte. He had also assured Dr. Asil of the continuing interest of the United States in the welfare of Iraq.

I said that I wished, in supplementing Mr. Satterthwaite's remarks, to emphasize the great importance which the United States attaches to the UN. The UN was the only real hope we had of maintaining peace in the world. If it failed the world would be faced with an indescribably difficult situation. The UN had as yet not had a fair chance to get started. In my opinion it might be as long as 25 years before it had really developed its greatest usefulness. In spite of reports to the contrary, the United States had never failed to refer to the UN any problem which it was capable of handling.

While recognizing the deep and even bitter feeling felt by the Arab States over the situation in Palestine and the extremely complicated and perhaps insoluble nature of that problem, I asked Dr. Asil to consider the many other important problems confronting the UN in addition to the over-riding one of the conflict between the East and the West as exemplified by recent developments in Berlin. If this latter conflict were not solved, the problem of Palestine for the Arab States would become relatively insignificant.

I also mentioned the immense burdens imposed on the United States which no other nation seemed either willing or to be expected to bear. It was, to take a single example, costing us one billion dollars a year to try to get Japan back on its feet. I nevertheless hoped that the United States could be of assistance to Iraq and the Near Eastern

¹ Drafted by Mr. Satterthwaite.

countries in the development of such government projects as that of the Tigris Valley, which we discussed at some length. I also expressed the belief that Congress, possibly in this session, but more probably in the next, would so amend the Act permitting the entrance into the United States of displaced persons that some of the pressure for immigration into Palestine would be removed.

Dr. Asil said that he was in full agreement concerning the importance that should be attached to making a success of the UN. He also felt very strongly that Iraq should give the UN its full support and would so inform his Government.

Referring to the Palestine problem, Dr. Asil discussed various phases of its development since the first World War. By inference, he criticized the Arab States for having on two occasions failed to reach a satisfactory solution, the first time because the Arabs of Palestine refused to accept a proposal made by King Faisal a few years after the first World War and the second time over a question of sixty or seventy-five thousand immigrants at the Round Table Conference of 1939. Dr. Asil said, however, that the Arab States felt very strongly that at some point the Jews must be told by the United States or the United Nations that, with respect to Palestine, they could go so far and no further. It would otherwise be impossible for them ever to reach an agreement. He had the feeling that so far only the Arabs had been told that they could go so far and no further.

I told Dr. al-Asil that we would carefully analyze the points that he had made and see if we might be able to comply with his suggestion. The interview, which was exceptionally cordial considering the nature of the main topic of conversation, lasted fifty-five minutes.

867N.01/8-348: Telegram

*The Acting Special Representative of the United States in Israel
(Knox) to the Secretary of State*

TEL AVIV, August 3, 1948.

37. Proclamation issued under date August 2 signed Ben Gurion establishes Israeli military rule Jerusalem occupied area which is defined as area under control Israeli Army, comprising major part city Jerusalem, part of its environs and western approaches and roads connecting Jerusalem with coastal plane. The law of State Israel applies occupied area and residents required observe same; persons breaching law may be brought before military court or civilian, as circumstances warrant. Proclamation declared retroactive in application as from midnight Friday 14 May. In respect those parts occupied

area which come under occupation Israeli Army at subsequent date this proclamation shall be deemed to have come into force on that date.¹

KNOX

¹ The proclamation was signed by Mr. Ben-Gurion in his capacity as Minister of Defense. The text of Decree Law No. 12 proclaiming "Israeli Military Rule in Jerusalem" was transmitted to the Department by Tel Aviv in despatch 27, August 9 (867N.01/8-948).

501.BB Palestine/7-3148 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

SECRET US URGENT

WASHINGTON, August 3, 1948—11 a. m.

NIACT

3049. During past month Bernadotte has continued to press his request for battalion of US Marines to serve as temporary UN guard-force for purpose of policing in Jerusalem. On July 30 Consul General Macdonald in Jerusalem flew to Rhodes to discuss the matter with Bernadotte at which time we suggested that Bernadotte's policing efforts in Jerusalem might be met through the cooperation of Arabs and Jews in supplying well-disciplined units for this purpose. Bernadotte has reacted strongly to this approach as may be noted in Contels 1146 and 1147 Aug. 1, to which we are replying today. Copy each message repeated to you.

We note (Embtel 3479 July 31)¹ that Bevin attaches importance to Mediator establishing himself in Jerusalem and to Mediator's securing necessary security force from UN. We concur in first objective but disagree with regard to second for reasons stated in our reply to Contels 1146 and 1147.²

Please discuss this matter with Bevin or Wright at which time you might recall that we have consistently taken the position that US would not assume unilateral military commitment in Palestine, that SC has not thus far given consideration to question of UN forces for Jerusalem or Palestine and that we believe successful solution to Palestine problem rests on cooperation between Arabs and Jews.

It would be helpful if British Govt would support us in these views and would instruct their representatives in the Near East to take the same line in discussion with Bernadotte.³

MARSHALL

¹ Not printed.

² See telegram 793 to Jerusalem, *infra*.

³ This telegram was repeated to Jerusalem and New York.

501.BB Palestine/8-148 : Telegram

*The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Jerusalem*SECRET US URGENT
NIACT

WASHINGTON, August 3, 1948—3 p. m.

793. Please inform Count Bernadotte of following re urtels 1146 and 1147.¹

1. We are forwarding to Count Bernadotte as rapidly as possible the additional observers and signal equipment and personnel which he has requested. Brig. Gen. W. E. Riley, US Marine Corps, has been appointed Chief of US Observers and will depart Washington for Rhodes on Tuesday. Remaining observers will be staged in by air transport within next few days. The list of equipment and personnel was received from UN July 28. We had previously been working on list of requirements which resulted from Count Bernadotte's discussion with Admiral Sherman on July 23 as complete statement of his planned needs, and had provided such portions of equipment and personnel as immediately available in Mediterranean. The US does not have military installations or unlimited quantities of personnel and equipment in Mediterranean.

2. Regarding nature of commitment which use of Marines would involve, wearing of UN arm band does not relieve US of basic responsibility for guaranteeing security of its military formations. There is no assurance that such units would not be subjected to attack by well-armed groups such as the Irgun or Stern gang. We could not commit armed units to that situation without being prepared to reinforce them with whatever is required to guarantee their safety. Location of Jerusalem with respect to Jewish and Arab forces and with respect to lines of communication makes this basic security requirement a far heavier commitment than may be realized.

3. SC, in addition, has not thus far taken action to provide international forces to enforce truce in Jerusalem. Nor has SC arranged with member govts. for providing such forces. There is fundamental difference between observers who are not authorized to use force in any way, and armed contingents which are expected to suppress disorder and violence.

4. There seems to be some misunderstanding as to attitude of French with respect to Marine guards. French have informed us that they consider Count Bernadotte's request as entirely new subject which would have to be discussed and acted upon by SC.

5. We are prepared to make strong representations to Israel and

¹ Both dated August 1, pp. 1264 and 1265.

to Transjordan that they must cooperate to maximum with Count Bernadotte in demilitarization of Jerusalem, including provision of well-disciplined police forces to keep lawless and dissident elements under control. We are unwilling to accept as final the view that use of Arab and Jewish police in Jerusalem is impossible due to mistrust and deeply rooted hatred which they have for each other. Jerusalem is city inhabited by Arabs and Jews. Rest of world has right to insist that they put aside their mistrust and hatred at least for minimum purpose of providing local police forces under international observance to maintain rudiments of law and order. It may be recalled that SC has ordered parties to accept, and that they have accepted, cease-fire and truce, essential ingredient of which is willingness to live side by side without resort to arms. We believe that strenuous efforts to bring about joint Arab-Jewish regime in Jerusalem under UN observation might be successful; in any event we believe it imperative that every possible effort be made in this direction.

6. We regret any feeling on Count Bernadotte's part that the US is not being cooperative in supporting him in carrying out his mission as Mediator. The record would not bear out any such conclusions. We are fully aware of the enormous difficulties with which he is confronted and believe that he has made remarkable progress toward a solution by peaceful means of the situation in Palestine. We are ready to discuss at any time the nature of our assistance and to work out with Count Bernadotte and the UN Secretariat a plan for furnishing his essential requirements.²

MARSHALL

² This telegram was repeated to London as No. 3055 and to New York as No. 502.

501.BB Palestine/8-448 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Jerusalem (Macdonald) to the
Secretary of State*

SECRET

JERUSALEM, August 4, 1948—2 p. m.

1156. Re Amman's telegram 32¹ relayed by Department to Jerusalem as 24. Bernadotte arrived Jerusalem August 2 and held meeting Old Jerusalem that afternoon with Truce Commission, his representatives here, Glubb Pasha Chief of Staff Arab Legion, Military Commander Arab Legion Jerusalem and other prominent Arabs. Discussions devoted principally to demilitarization Jerusalem, to which Arabs expressed approval and agreed to Mediator's suggestion

¹ Dated August 2, not printed; it reported that Count Bernadotte on August 1 had a long conference with the Prime Minister and Defense Minister of Transjordan, discussing the demilitarization of Jerusalem, the Arab refugee problem, and a general settlement of the Palestine question (501.BB Palestine/8-248).

that exploratory talks be started soonest between Arab leaders Jerusalem, Truce Commission and Mediator's representatives in endeavor formulate plan demilitarization.

Meeting with Arabs, who showed friendly and very cooperative attitude, was most satisfactory. Other matters such as sniping, water supply for Jewish Jerusalem and refugees discussed in general terms. Bernadotte was very insistent both military commanders put an end to sniping. Arab Commander assured Mediator he has issued strict orders to Arab Legion and also to irregulars whom he claims he now can control, not to return fire unless ordered to do so.

Mediator, his staff and Truce Commission met Bernard Joseph, Military Governor Jewish Jerusalem August 3. Joseph's attitude was unfriendly, uncooperative and defiant. Same matters brought up for discussion as on previous day with Arabs. Joseph said he knew nothing about his government's attitude regarding demilitarization and refused to commit Israel Government on this point. He questioned political implications involved and insinuated that UN would try to force internationalization of Jerusalem on Jews after demilitarization. Mediator referred him to SC resolution of July 15 stating demilitarization shall not prejudice future political status Jerusalem. Following a vitriolic attack on the UN by Joseph, during which he said the Jews have no confidence in the UN and referred to it as a laughing stock, he finally said he would agree pending the approval of his government to meet Truce Commission and Mediator's representatives to discuss a plan for demilitarization or appoint someone to represent him.

Unless Joseph is instructed by Israel Government not to start discussions on demilitarization, Truce Commission plans several meetings this week with Jews and Arabs separately in order prepare report for Mediator upon his return Jerusalem August 9.²

MACDONALD

² Jerusalem reported, on August 4, that Mr. Shertok had advised the Military Governor of Jewish Jerusalem that "Israel has not yet agreed in principle that Jerusalem should be demilitarized. Therefore Military Governor states he cannot enter into discussions as suggested by Mediator regarding demilitarization Jerusalem." (Telegram 1158, 501.BB Palestine/8-448)

501.BB Palestine/8-448 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Jerusalem (Macdonald) to the
Secretary of State*

SECRET URGENT

JERUSALEM, August 4, 1948—3 p. m.

1157. Consul General most desirous information on current thinking in Department re future Jerusalem. It has worked on assumption Department envisages eventual internationalization Jerusalem as pro-

vided for in November 29 resolution both to facilitate over-all permanent solution Palestine problem and to preserve city sacred to Christians, Jews and Moslems. Consul General feels even at this late stage acquiescence both sides in internationalization can be obtained provided definite policy announced by United Nations (strongly backed by United States) and concrete energetic action taken.

Provided internationalization remains objective, first step (see Contel 1156, August 4) should be demilitarization Jerusalem. Demilitarization is also best insurance against renewal fighting here. As reported Contels 1132 July 28 and 1146, August 1, forcible action in this direction and visible evidence such action imperative immediately. Essential requisite is force of such strength and with such equipment as to command respect both parties. Mutual distrust preclude use Arab and Jewish police which would have further disadvantage demarcating city into two sealed camps. Time not available to permit recruitment international force and efficiency such force open to question. Possibility conflict with IZL and Stern groups during initial stage demilitarization must be anticipated. Prestige United Nations will have deteriorated and Jewish determination annex Jerusalem will have crystalized to such extent by time international force recruited that demilitarization would be virtually impossible. Single alternative is use regular troops three countries members Truce Commission—US, France, Belgium—immediately and in strong force. Of course, impossible say from Jerusalem whether over-all political considerations permit this. Such action would prove determination United Nations, make it easier for both sides to agree against contrary public demands and tend eliminate fear treachery on part other. Tension would relax and details international status Jerusalem with international force could be worked out.

If essential force is unavailable immediately Consul General feels demilitarization project should be abandoned. Attempt to obtain demilitarization without force would probably be rejected outright by both sides and almost certainly would not work in practice. Efforts then should be directed towards maintaining *status quo* pending final political settlement. To prevent resumption fighting reliance would have to be placed on employment sufficient number observers together with threat Security Council action versus violators truce. Whether such measures would suffice definitely questionable. However, danger period is now and by time international force recruited it will have passed its peak. Resultant political settlement might be expected to provide for division city along present lines with Jewish corridor to coast. Arabs would deeply resent such outcome and would probably seize first favorable opportunity in future to resume hostilities.

Prestige United Nations would fall in eyes both Arabs and Jews. Nevertheless Consul General feels this more realistic and preferable approach than attempt at demilitarization without adequate force.

Department's comments on above would be appreciated.

Pouched to Tel Aviv as Unnumbered. Department please pass London as 25.

MACDONALD

CIA Files

*Report by the Central Intelligence Agency*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] August 5, 1948.

ORE 48-48

PROBABLE EFFECTS ON ISRAEL AND THE ARAB STATES OF A
UN ARMS EMBARGO²

SUMMARY

1. Neither Israel nor the Arab states now have sufficient stocks of arms and equipment to carry out prolonged, full-scale hostilities following the end of the four-week truce which began 11 June. Israel is weak in heavy equipment, although it has adequate stocks of small arms and ammunition, and is believed capable of supporting guerrilla warfare operations with its own armament industry. The Arab states, although superior in artillery, armored vehicles, and aircraft, have only limited stocks of ammunition and replacement equipment and possess insufficient facilities for producing armament.

2. Both sides are negotiating to obtain matériel from outside sources. Zionist agents abroad have been able to stockpile light weapons and ammunition from Czechoslovakia and other Eastern European countries for eventual shipment to Palestine, and the Jews undoubtedly hope to acquire additional heavy equipment from the US. The Arabs look, as in the past, to the UK as a principal source of arms but are exploring additional sources. Arab financial resources for such transactions, however, are not extensive.

3. The application of an effective UN arms embargo against both Israel and the Arab states would limit the scale of the fighting and would probably result in a military stalemate, leading eventually to a compromise. The Arabs would find themselves incapable of prosecuting a large-scale offensive. The Jews would also be unable to wage

¹ The source text includes the CIA map entitled "Military Situation—11 June 1948", reproduced facing p. 1200.

² According to a note on the source text: "The information in this report is as of 1 July 1948. The intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Army, Navy, and the Air Force have concurred in this report. This report was prepared in collaboration with the Departments of the Army, Navy, and the Air Force, and at the request of the State Department."

offensive war, but would probably be able to maintain their present positions along the coast and possibly in Galilee. Jewish extremists would resist any attempts at compromise, and the Provisional Government of Israel itself would probably make every effort to have the embargo modified before entering into negotiations with the Arabs. The Arabs would also be loath to make concessions. In the end, however, both Israel and the Arab states (or at least Transjordan) might feel constrained to accept a Jewish state exclusive of the Negeb. •

4. Inadequate enforcement of the embargo could also be expected to result ultimately in a virtual stalemate. Israel, possessing better facilities for obtaining illegal arms than the Arabs, would be able to defend more territory than under an effective embargo but could not win a decisive victory. The Arabs would probably obtain measured assistance from the UK, which favors a stalemate. Since some support for Israel would come from the US, anti-US feeling in the Arab states would rise following any Jewish successes. The USSR would probably supply arms to both belligerents in an effort to promote continued unrest in the Middle East. (See ORE 38-48³ for an evaluation of Soviet Policy in the Middle East.)

5. A UN embargo against the Jews alone would lead to eventual Arab victory, and would increase US prestige with the Arabs. In Israel a struggle for power between pro-Soviet, extremist groups and the moderates would ensue, with the moderates probably attempting to find a *modus vivendi* with the Arabs. The amount of support provided by the Soviet bloc, on one hand, and the nature of the terms provided by the Arabs, on the other, would determine the outcome.

6. A UN embargo against the Arab states alone would permit the Jews to obtain sufficient military supplies to take the offensive and force Arab acceptance of a Jewish state and the withdrawal of Arab armed forces from Palestine. Under such circumstances, the Arab states would probably see no significant loss involved in leaving the UN and severing relations with the nations responsible for the embargo. They might also be willing to risk the economic dislocation entailed in cancellation of economic concessions; these concessions might eventually be reassigned to more friendly powers. Political upheavals would probably ensue in the Arab states, facilitating Soviet exploitation.

7. If the UN takes no positive action following the end of the truce, military developments will in large measure depend on the great powers. If the present US and UK embargoes are maintained, fighting would continue on a greater scale but neither side would obtain decisive victory. The UK would probably attempt to redress the balance if Soviet aid or other factors appeared to make Jewish success

³ Dated July 27, p. 1240.

imminent. The Zionists would then increase the pressure on the US to end its embargo. If the US did so, the Palestine battle would become bloodier, and US-UK relations would be further strained. A cessation of British aid to the Arabs at this point, in order to avoid a break with the US, would result in significant Soviet military aid to the Arabs, accompanied by intensified efforts to extend Soviet influence into the Arab countries.

PROBABLE EFFECTS ON ISRAEL AND THE ARAB STATES OF A UN ARMS EMBARGO

1. *Current Situation.*

When the United Nations Palestine truce became effective on 11 June, the fighting between the Arabs and the Jews was tending toward a stalemate, in which both sides were experiencing difficulties in marshalling effective military strength. Nevertheless, neither Israel nor the Arab League bloc was willing to retreat publicly from its basic position. The Zionists insisted on the maintenance of a fully independent state within the territories allocated them under the UN partition plan. The Arabs, although they showed some signs of willingness to compromise, were committed to opposing both sovereignty for Israel and unlimited Jewish immigration into it.

At present under the truce, Arab regular and irregular forces within Palestine or near its borders total approximately 50,000, about 25,000 of whom have been actually committed inside Palestine. The strength of the Israeli forces totals some 90,000. About 35,000 of the Israeli troops have been used for active operations, half of this figure being employed as a striking force, and half for local, mobile defense.

The Arabs have approximately 250 light aircraft and transports, while Israel possesses an estimated 45 light aircraft, an unknown number of transports, and possibly several heavy bombers. The sea power of both Arabs and Jews is relatively slight. The Arab Armies have a wide variety of small arms and are stronger than Israel in artillery and tanks. However, their stocks of ammunition and replacement matériel are limited, and the Arab states have insufficient facilities and raw materials for the production of armament. Present Israeli stocks of small arms are adequate to arm all combatant members of the Israel forces. Israel's industrial capacity is restricted by the shortage of raw materials but is believed capable of keeping present weapons and equipment in condition and of supplying replacements and ammunition for guerrilla warfare.

The arms and equipment of neither Jews nor Arabs are sufficient for prolonged, full-scale hostilities, and both sides are involved in negotiations for obtaining matériel from various outside sources. The Jews have managed in various ways surreptitiously to acquire large amounts of arms and equipment from British Army stocks in Pales-

tine. The efforts of Zionist agents abroad have resulted in the stockpiling of quantities of small arms, automatic weapons, and ammunition in various eastern European countries for eventual shipment to Palestine. Most of these stocks come from Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and possibly from Poland and the USSR. Jewish acquisitions from the US consist mainly of machinery, motor vehicles, and air transport. The Israeli forces are much more concerned with obtaining such heavier equipment than in acquiring small arms.

The Arab states look to the UK (subject to its UN commitments) as their principal source of arms supply and will continue to do so. However, such alternate sources as France, Belgium, Switzerland, Sweden, and Czechoslovakia are now being explored, and Spain and Argentina are also possibilities. It is expected, however, that financial limitations will prevent large purchases from these sources.

There is no evidence that either Arabs or Jews have smuggled any substantial supplies of arms into Palestine since the truce went into effect.

2. Implications of a UN Arms Embargo Against Jews and Arabs.

If the efforts of the UN Mediator fail and hostilities are resumed, it is possible that the UN will impose an arms embargo on Israel and the Arab states. If effectively enforced, such a step would: (1) deny arms to both sides, and thus keep the war on a small scale and of a more or less local nature; (2) make it difficult for the belligerents to negotiate blackmarket arms purchases and even more difficult to effect delivery; and (3) probably create a military stalemate leading eventually to a political compromise between the Jews and Arabs.

If the Provisional Government of Israel (PGI) is unable to obtain the heavy equipment which it needs to conduct a successful campaign against the Arab states, it will be forced to reappraise its position in the light of these changed conditions. Policy hitherto has been based on the assumption that the Zionist organization throughout the world, and particularly in the US, would be successful in enlisting sufficient great-power support to assure the establishment and continued existence of the Jewish state. Faced with the realization that their present military resources would not be sufficient to force a solution to the Palestine problem in accordance with the terms of the General Assembly partition plan, it seems inevitable that the more moderate Jewish elements would be obliged to consider some retreat from their present attitude.

While Arab outside sources of supply would also be cut off, this loss would be compensated for by the shutting off of Jewish supplies. Thus a stalemate would ensue. The Jewish forces, though incapable of waging offensive war, could probably maintain their present positions along the coast and possibly in Galilee. Under these circumstances,

both the PGI and the Arab states, or at least Transjordan, might be willing to accept a Jewish state exclusive of the Negeb (assigned by the UN plan to the Jews but now cut off by Arab forces).

No such willingness to consider compromise could be expected from the Jewish extremists. Both the Stern Gang and the Irgun Zvai Leumi have already rejected the authority of the PGI, and they have been working with the government only for reasons of expediency. Both groups would reaffirm their claim to all of Palestine and Transjordan, disassociate themselves from the decisions of the PGI, and resume their terrorist activities. This schism would further weaken the Jewish political position, and produce increased dissension in Jewish ranks. Attempts by the Irgun to import arms during the truce have already resulted in a bloody engagement with the Israeli Army.

Before seeking a compromise with the Arabs, the Jews would make every effort to bring about modifications in the embargo. To this end, they would probably be willing to undertake a political alignment with any country which evinced a disposition to consider their pleas.

Even if the embargo were inadequately enforced, a military stalemate would probably eventuate. Jewish facilities for obtaining illicit arms would be greater than those of the Arabs, although the Arabs could probably obtain sufficient quantities to prevent an Arab defeat but not to permit a decisive victory. The Jews could consolidate the areas of Palestine which they now hold and perhaps also force the Arabs to relinquish the Negeb.

An active, well financed Zionist organization throughout Europe and the US would be able to run arms ships as formerly it ran ships of illegal immigrants. Principal sources for small arms, automatic and semiautomatic weapons, ammunition, explosives, mortars, and light artillery would continue to be Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, with delivery accomplished by transshipment through Albania, Bulgaria, and Italy. This arrangement would entail minimum jeopardy to the UN status of the countries of origin. Any air or ground transport, self-propelled units, or heavy ordnance supplied by these countries would probably be of German or US manufacture, thereby making determination of the immediate source more difficult.

The British apparently favor the development of a military stalemate, which would force a compromise solution. For this reason, it is likely that British arms in sufficient quantity to bring about such a situation and to prevent an Arab defeat would find their way into Arab hands. Czechoslovakia would accept arms-purchase contracts on a dollar basis, and private sources in Italy could furnish arms on the same basis. The dollar shortage of the Arab states, however, would limit the quantities thus procured to a very small percentage of what the Jewish forces could obtain.

The US would probably be deeply involved in the illicit Jewish

arms traffic. Financial support would certainly stem mainly from this country, and a considerable portion of the actual war matériel would likely originate here. Consequently, violent anti-US reaction could be expected throughout the Arab world in the wake of any Jewish military successes. There is also the probability that under such circumstances similar resentment would be directed against the UN and against those nations voting for the embargo. Meanwhile, the USSR could be expected to exploit the inadequacies of the embargo in order to play both ends against the middle.

3. *Implications of a UN Arms Embargo Against One Belligerent.*

a. Against the Jews.

An effective UN arms embargo against the Jews alone would obviously mean military victory for the Arab forces. In a relatively short time the Arabs would be in a position to establish some form of unitary state in Palestine, wherein the present Arab majority would be able to control the Jewish minority. US prestige in the Middle East would be improved since Arab leaders would probably credit the US with having permitted this pro-Arab measure.

The repercussions in Israel of an embargo against the Jews would be violent. The Jews would look on the embargo as a betrayal by the West, and the Stern Gang and other pro-Soviet elements would gain in influence and would attempt to wrest control from the pro-West or moderate elements. To circumvent the schemes of the extremists, the moderate elements might try to bargain with the Arab leaders in the hope of finding a *modus vivendi* for the Jews under some form of confederation. Deciding factors in the extremist-moderate struggle for power would be the amount of support given by the USSR to the extremists and the nature of the political terms the Arabs would be willing to grant the moderates.

b. Against the Arabs.

An effective UN arms embargo against the Arabs alone would mean military victory for the Jews. While the Arabs would be denied outside help, the Jews would be able to buy arms in various parts of the world, and to effect relatively easy delivery. They could thus assume the offensive and force Arab acceptance of a Jewish state. Other nations could be expected to grant diplomatic recognition, which would add to the prestige of Israel and its government and help to ease current economic difficulties.

The Arab states would, of course, look upon such an embargo as a hostile act intended to defeat their claims in Palestine and to guarantee Israel's independence. Arab leaders have already declared that, if increasing aid is given the Jews by other powers, the Arab states will

leave the UN, break off diplomatic relations with those nations most directly concerned, and cancel the concessions held by the same powers in Arab countries. These concessions might eventually be transferred to more friendly powers.

In terms of self-interest, the Arab states would lose little by severing diplomatic relations with the SC members responsible for the embargo or even by withdrawing from the UN. The imposition of economic sanctions by the Arab states on the powers which had voted for the embargo would cause serious dislocations in the Arab countries and would delay development programs indefinitely. Nonetheless, the Arabs might well be willing to sacrifice economic benefits in order to punish the offending nations. Sanctions would likely include the cancellation of oil and air concessions or the sequestration of foreign installations. Moreover, the Arab masses would probably turn against their own governments, holding them responsible for the defeat. The violence and unrest accompanying these political upheavals would create the chaotic conditions most favorable to Soviet exploitation.

4. Implications of UN Failure To Take Positive Action.

In the event that the UN truce expires with the UN having taken no positive action, the development of the military situation in Palestine will depend largely on the policies pursued by the US and UK regarding arms shipments to the Middle East. If the US and the UK should maintain embargoes, the Jews could obtain more arms and equipment from other sources than the Arabs. This advantage, however, would not be immediately decisive; fighting would continue on a greater scale but would not bring outright victory to either side.

The USSR probably would not support either side exclusively. If it should attempt to increase its influence in Israel by making large shipments of matériel to the Jews, or if for any reason a Jewish victory appeared imminent, the UK would almost certainly seek to redress the balance by resuming arms shipments to the Arabs. Thus the military deadlock would hold.

The UK's action would cause the Zionists to increase their pressure on the US to lift its embargo. If their efforts were successful, the result would be an increasingly bloody struggle in Palestine for an indefinite period of time, coupled with a catastrophic deterioration in already strained US-UK relations. Should the UK subsequently stop its shipment of arms to the Arab states in order to avoid a complete break with the US, the Arabs would be in a desperate situation. At this stage, the USSR would almost certainly give support to the Arab Armies considerably beyond the small amount of matériel aid already reaching them through the Soviet satellites and would take advantage of the isolation of the Arab world from the West to extend its control into the Arab countries.

[Here follow Appendix A, "Present Military Situation"; Appendix B, "Israeli Arms Supply"; Appendix C, "Arab Arms Supply"; Appendix D, "Aircraft and Air Defense Supply"; and Appendix E, "Naval Strength and Supply."]

501.BB Palestine/8-1348

*Memorandum by the Deputy United States Representative on the Security Council (Jessup) to Mr. John C. Ross*¹

CONFIDENTIAL

[NEW YORK,] August 5, 1948.

In No. 36 from Tel Aviv of August 2, and No. 1148 from Jerusalem of August 2,² there is a repetition of a theme which I have noted in previous telegrams. The theme is the Israeli argument that the Christian nations have shown that they are not interested in Jerusalem and that this justifies the Jews in taking a different attitude toward the City. It seems to me we should not allow this to pass unchallenged. The United States and France, particularly, have over and over again publicly reiterated their interest in Jerusalem and we have privately encouraged other approaches representative of the Christian churches. I am not sure of the best way to handle it, but would like to see either a formal note to the Israeli Government, or some joint approach with the French. I think it ought to be done in such a way as to give some publicity to the action. If such a step is not approved, then I think James G. McDonald should be asked to make a strong statement in Tel Aviv on the subject.

¹This memorandum and the one *infra* were transmitted to Mr. Rusk by Mr. Ross in a memorandum of August 13, not printed.

²Neither printed; the former noted that at a press conference on August 2, Mr. Shertok had stated that "Israel originally impressed by emphatic expression Christian world that Jerusalem be internationalized but when Mediator proposed turning over Jerusalem to Arab rule not one Christian nation raised slightest objection." (867N.01/8-248)

501.BB Palestine/8-1348

Memorandum by the Deputy United States Representative on the Security Council (Jessup) to Mr. John C. Ross

CONFIDENTIAL

[NEW YORK,] August 5, 1948.

No. 1153 from Jerusalem of August 3¹ contains the Ben Gurion proclamation establishing military rule in Jerusalem. Paragraph 3 says that "The residents of the occupied area are hereby required . . . to assist the Israeli Defense Army as directed". This in its terms goes

¹Not printed; regarding the proclamation, see telegram 37, August 3, from Tel Aviv, p. 1273.

beyond the powers of a military occupant. If they should attempt to exact improper assistance from American citizens, I think we would need to protest. On general principles, I think it might be useful to call their attention to the item and to express our conviction that the powers of the occupant would be used only in accordance with international law. My own view on the legal point would of course have to be checked by Le if anything were to be done. Such a statement as I suggest would of course be an acknowledgement on our part of the propriety of their military occupation, but I think that is unobjectionable.

501.BB Palestine/8-648 : Telegram

The Consul General at Jerusalem (Macdonald) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

JERUSALEM, August 6, 1948—noon.

1166. I saw Mediator yesterday afternoon at Tel Aviv following his conference with Foreign Minister (see mytel 1158, August 4¹) re demilitarization Jerusalem. Foreign Minister refused accept in principle demilitarization Jerusalem but informed Bernadotte PGI would not be adverse to entering into discussion of ways and means to improve general situation in Jerusalem during which talks question of demilitarization might be raised. Therefore Mediator instructed Truce Commission and his representatives to initiate talks with Military Governor Jerusalem soonest and report to him on his arrival here August 9.

Bernadotte is very dissatisfied with Foreign Minister's attitude but is determined to continue pressing for demilitarization Jerusalem. It seems Foreign Minister is using delaying tactics pending such time as PGI feels it has built up sufficient reasons to officially refuse to consider demilitarization and demand Jerusalem be included in Jewish state.²

Contents Deptel 793, August 3 communicated Mediator to which he voiced considerable disappointment and displeasure. He requested me to point out once more the utter impossibility and inadvisability to

¹ Not printed ; but see footnote 2, p. 1277.

² Apparently, the question of possible peace negotiations between Israel and the Arab States was also discussed at the meeting of August 5. Mr. Shertok, the following day, addressed a note to Count Bernadotte in which he requested the latter "to transmit to the Governments of the Arab States now at war with Israel our offer that their representatives should meet the representatives of the Provisional Government for the purpose of peace negotiations." (SC, 3rd yr., Supplement for August 1948, p. 144) The Mediator transmitted the note to the Governments of the Arab States the same day and announced his readiness to transmit their replies (*ibid.*). The Egyptian Government, in a communication to Count Bernadotte, refused to enter peace negotiations with Israel. A copy of the communication was transmitted by Tel Aviv in despatch No. 42, August 22 (501.BB Palestine/8-2248).

even attempt recruiting an Arab and Jewish force for policing Jerusalem. Bernadotte is absolutely correct and unless an international force or some token military force under UN command is sent immediately it will be impossible demilitarize Jerusalem and question of internationalization will be dead issue. Situation is deteriorating daily and Jews are gaining confidence and building up stronger case for claiming Jerusalem as part Israel.

MACDONALD

501.BB Palestine/8-648 : Telegram

*The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations
(Jessup) to the Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET US URGENT NEW YORK, August 6, 1948—5:23 p. m.

1000. The views concerning the future settlement of the Palestine question, as set forth in London's 3484, dated August 2, correspond broadly with discussions we had with Beeley before his return to London at the end of the special session, and recommendations set forth in USUN's 831, June 29 [30], and 837, July 1, and subsequent telegrams.

Although in general agreement with British views, we have following preliminary comments on specific points of detail:

1. Referring to paragraph 5 of London's 3484, we think it is essential that the British stop toying with the idea that Jerusalem might be placed under Arab sovereignty. It seems inescapably clear to us that the PGI would never agree to this, nor would it be possible for us to justify it to American public opinion generally. Maintenance of prior position favoring some international status seems desirable.

2. With reference to the territorial matters referred to in the same paragraph, please see paragraphs 7 and 8 of USUN's 831. It is our impression that the Jewish position with regard to the transfer of the Negev to the Arabs has become much more rigid during the past several weeks than it was previously. We therefore feel confirmed in our opinion that if the PGI can be persuaded to consider any territorial transfers, they would expect not only all of western Galilee in return for the Negev, but probably also additional territories included within the Arab portion of Palestine under the November 29 resolution. Compare paragraph 4 below.

3. For our views on the status of Haifa, please see paragraph 9 of our 831. As indicated there, we feel that Haifa should continue to be considered as a Jewish city in the State of Israel, but arrangements might be made for a free port, and arrangements for the operation of the refineries. We are certain that the PGI would not accept the internationalization of Haifa.

4. In paragraph 8(c) of our 831, we suggested that Jaffa should be considered as included in the Jewish state. If we were, however, to concede this to the PGI, we should bear in mind that its bargaining value in terms of concessions from the PGI would be very substantial.

5. In considering the territorial question generally, the British "line-

of-force" frontier appeals to us. We might contemplate a provisional settlement in the nature of an armistice based on the line-of-force frontiers, with provision for a boundary commission to assist parties in working out the details of the territorial settlement, subject, however, to some basic decisions on main problems such as those discussed in paragraphs 2 and 3 above.

6. We agree with the British view that some form of international guarantee of frontiers would be desirable. Our views on this question were set forth in paragraphs 10 and 11 of our 831. The British view that frontiers could only be changed by the UN and that any attempt to do so otherwise would be a breach of the peace seems to us unduly rigid. Presumably, any future change in the frontier brought about by peaceful means, that is, by agreement between the parties, should not require action by the UN. It might be provided that any attempt to alter the frontier, once determined, by other than peaceful means, would be considered a threat to or breach of the peace and a cause for action under chapter 7 of the charter.

7. Referring to paragraph 6 of London's 3484, in the light of the SC debates in February and March on the question of enforcing the settlement envisaged in the November 29 resolution, it seems unrealistic to imagine that any future settlement could be enforced. We suggest that the Department will wish to review carefully our position with regard to the enforcement by the SC of a political decision in the light of the statements made in the council by the US representative under instructions from the Department.

8. Referring to paragraph 7 of London's telegram, it is our hope that it will be possible to avoid a situation wherein the Mediator again makes proposals which are considered very unrealistic by both sides and rejected by them. This can be avoided, it seems to us, only by the development of a concerted US-UK position which would then be communicated to the Mediator and supported by our two governments with the principal parties.

9. We are inclined to agree that we are most likely to get acquiescence rather than clear agreement from the parties. It seems clear to us that Abdullah, on the Arab side, is prepared to acquiesce, if not actually to agree, in reasonable proposals. The major stumbling block, however, as we see it, consists of the extremists within the Arab League, principally Syria, Iraq, Azzam Pasha, and, on the outskirts, the Mufti. If, because of these extremists, we cannot even secure acquiescence by the Arab League in reasonable proposals, it would be interesting to know the British view as to the possibilities of agreement or acquiescence by Abdullah alone, supported by the combined diplomatic pressure of both the US and the UK.

10. The parenthetical reference in paragraph 7 of London's telegram to the possibility of the Mediator's reporting either to the GA or the SC reflected, it seems to us, a persistent error in British thinking. It is our view that any report by the Mediator should be made to the GA, which created his position and set forth his functions with regard to the future settlement, rather than to the SC, which should be concerned not with the future settlement, but with the maintenance of peace and security in Palestine. As we have pointed out before, the Russians take advantage of any opportunity to disparage in the SC the Mediator's function with regard to the future settlement as they were laid down not by the SC but by the GA. Moreover, we do not

want to run any risk of impairing the chances of a future settlement by Russian support in the Council of an intransigent PGI position involving the possibility of a Russian veto. The same argument applies, although perhaps in lesser degree, to the British support of an intransigent Arab position.

11. Referring to paragraphs 8 and 9 of London's telegram a positive resolution covering a definitive settlement would obviously, we feel, be preferable. Although we think the arguments in favor of a positive resolution, as set forth in paragraph 9, possibly reflect a certain amount of wishful thinking, we would urge strongly that every effort be made to achieve a definitive solution which could be acted upon by the GA this fall. Parenthetically, we feel that the negotiations involved should be conducted as quietly as possible with a minimum of publicity in order to avoid the risks and delays envisaged in a propaganda battle between the Jews and Arabs, with the mediator caught in the middle.

As a matter of calculated risk, we are not at all sure that the disadvantage of a positive resolution feared by the British is justified. It is our impression, from the various reports we have received, that the Arabs would welcome being "coerced" into acceptance of a resolution that would involve at least implicit recognition of the existence of a Jewish state.

On the whole, it is our view that there is a great deal to be gained, and very little if anything to be lost, by making a vigorous effort to arrive at a definitive solution in time for the GA this fall. If this effort should not develop successfully, we could still fall back on the idea of a provisional resolution, which might be developed in consultation with the British along the lines of London's 3485.¹

Such a provisional resolution may be the minimum necessary to encourage the Mediator to continue with his task. On the other hand, both we and the British should bear constantly in mind that the situation in Palestine and the status of negotiations for a peaceful settlement may be such as to warrant keeping the question of Palestine out of the GA altogether.

12. We agree strongly with the views set forth in paragraph 10 of London's 3484. Bernadotte has himself given us an opening to express our views by his instructions to Bunche to discuss the future settlement with US, the British, and the French.

13. Referring to paragraph 11 of London's telegram, we feel in strongest terms that it would be a great mistake for the British to bring question of the future settlement up in the GA, if for any reason, including "special difficulties", referred to in paragraph 11, the USG cannot join with the UK in advocacy of a particular program. If there are any reasons which would prevent our joining with the British, it would be precisely those reasons which in all probability would cause us to oppose the British line, thus leading to a resumption of hard feelings between our two governments and impairment of the prospects of future settlement.

On the other hand, we do not think we should assume that there are any special difficulties which should prevent our getting together with

¹ Dated August 2, not printed; it outlined the tentative views of the British Foreign Office regarding the nature of a resolution which might be introduced into the General Assembly in September (501.BB Palestine/8-248).

the British on a joint program in the Assembly, if on the merits of the case such action should seem desirable. To be quite frank about it, both of our political parties are irrevocably committed to support of the PGI; there is not likely, therefore, to be any substantial change in our position with regard to the peaceful settlement in Palestine; we have an excellent opportunity to consult leaders of both our parties and the future would therefore be no better time than the present to work out with the British a joint policy if the circumstances in Palestine warrant.

14. London's 3484, in particular paragraph 12, reveals what we feel is another persistent error in British thinking about Palestine. This is the idea that the British are the advocates for the Arabs, although prepared if necessary to "cold-shoulder" them, while the US is the advocate for the Jews. The objective facts are, as we see them, that the US has just as much interest as the UK in the development and maintenance of good relations with the Arabs, while the UK, on the other hand, has just as much interest as the US in the development and maintenance of good relations with Israel, both considered in terms of our mutual political, economic and strategic interests in the Middle East.

We should not continue thinking, therefore, that it is the task of the UK alone to bring about Arab acquiescence (paragraph 13) any more than we should think that it is the task of the US to bring about Israel acquiescence in the future settlement. As we see it, both we and the UK have a joint and equal task in bringing about the acquiescence of both Arabs and Jews.

The first step in this direction, we venture to recommend most strongly, would be to work out with the UK at the earliest possible moment the coordinated recognition by the US of Transjordan, and by the UK of Israel.

JESSUP

761.00/8-648 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the
Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET

LONDON, August 6, 1948—7 p. m.

3567. 1. Bevin asked me to call late yesterday and spent one and half hours expounding deep concern of British Cabinet re security situation in the Middle East in general and Palestine in particular (Embassy's 3545, August 5¹).

2. Bevin opened by saying that if we get out of our Berlin difficulties it will be because the USSR finds Western Europe too hard to tackle at this time. Past performance has shown that USSR when thwarted at one point soon transfers its attentions to another. Middle East is normally a "soft spot" from point of view of its social, economic and ethnic difficulties. Such groups as Kurds offer ready targets for Soviet activities. To this pattern has been added Palestine conflict which threatens joint US-UK strategic objectives in Middle East and

¹ Not printed.

in which there is clear evidence that USSR is displaying keen interest. Evidence of last is supply of arms to Israel through Czechoslovakia, activities of Stern gang, and Menahem Beigin's² speech August 3 in Zion square Jerusalem, during which Beigin said that fighting underground will resist any international regime that attempts to wrest Jerusalem from Jewish control. Whatever political orientation may be, it would be naive to suppose USSR would refuse to take advantage of a personality such as Beigin and of the apparent determination on the part of Jews generally not to let truce work.

3. Likely pattern for Soviets according to Bevin, would be to foster resumption fighting in Palestine. This would result in drawing more Iraqi troops into conflict there and thus create auspicious moment for USSR to arouse Kurds in Iraq and to increase activities Soviet agents in northern Iran. These steps might or might not be followed up by Soviet military action. But even without firing a shot Bevin thinks there is good chance that by such carefully timed activities USSR could achieve what US and UK least desire—chaos in Iraq and Iran.

4. British Intelligence reports made available to us indicate that Jews already have an appreciable airforce, are far better armed than the Arabs and British military estimate from this and cumulative effect of aggressive Jewish declarations that it is not unlikely that "within the next few days" Jews on grounds of some Arab provocation, real or manufactured, will reopen their offensive with the objective of seizing more territory. Jewish offensive at this time stands every chance of success because arms embargo has prevented Arab Legion from replenishing its munitions. Bevin thinks it likely Jews may be so ill-advised as to attack Transjordan. If so, Bevin said, Britain's treaty obligation to Transjordan is unequivocal and would have to be honored.

5. Bevin said that Palestine situation is just as serious as Berlin and that in Palestine also "if US and UK go slack, we lose".

6. First of measure which Bevin believes desirable is agreement with US on road ahead in Palestine. He hoped fervently that USG would agree to British proposals set forth in my 3484, August 2. He feels situation has deteriorated rapidly even in past week and he now hopes Mediator will make his final proposals in very near future. He still believes Mediator should know views of US and UK before publishing his proposals. (I told Bevin that I understood Department is formulating reply to my 3484³ on an urgent basis.)

7. Bevin said there were other urgent steps which he felt should be taken. One might be strong warning to PGI by USG with regard to effect on world public opinion of Jewish impediments placed in way of Mediator's work: Effect of outright Jewish aggression would be even more grave. He thought that United States Government might

² Leader of the Irgun Zvai Leumi.

³ Dated August 2, p. 1266.

wish to request Mediator for an appreciation of present Jewish intentions. He thought that in larger picture there is very little reality in disavowals by PGI of IZL and Stern activities. From point of view of Arabs and ME peace they were Jews with same objectives, only difference being that one group is more activist than the other.

8. Bevin said he wished me to put to Department in accord with our understanding that US and UK will consult each other, the pressing problem of measures for the defense of British RAF installations in both Iraq and Transjordan. Jews have already bombed Amman and British military feel that if fighting is resumed British installations in Transjordan will be liable to attack. This danger also exists in Iraq but in this instance attacks are more likely to take form of 1941 troubles⁴: Following defeats suffered by Iraqi Army in Palestine, for which UK is certain to be assigned blame, the Iraqis will attack RAF. British installations must be ready for use in event Soviet move from north. Bevin said that up to present these installations have been armed and equipped on a "training" as opposed to an "operational" basis. British Chiefs of Staff feel strongly there is urgent need to bring in ammunition and equipment for storage in these installations. His Majesty's Government has no intention to transfer these stores to Arabs for use in Palestine unless Transjordan territory is threatened with attack and to obviate charges of this kind His Majesty's Government would welcome observation by Mediator. At all times munitions would be guarded by regular British RAF units. Bevin would like it clearly understood, however, that in event Transjordan is threatened with attack His Majesty's Government must be free to release to Arab Legion, which is responsible for guarding British installations, munitions and stores from these dumps to repel aggression. In Iraq Bevin would wish to be free to make stores available to Iraqi units only in event of their being engaged in suppressing internal disorders. Here again stores could be subject to Mediator's supervision. If, as Bevin strongly hopes, United States Government will agree that providing for defense of British installations in Transjordan and Iraq is reasonable in the light of possible Soviet moves in the area, Bevin has in mind informing Mediator of British intention to move in munitions for defense of British installations under Mediator's supervision.

9. Last mentioned, but in view of His Majesty's Government most serious of all problems facing US and UK in ME is, according to Bevin, situation in Jerusalem (Embassy's 3527, August 5 [4]⁵). Bevin

⁴For documentation on the anti-British coup in Iraq in 1941, see *Foreign Relations*, 1941, vol. III, pp. 486 ff.

⁵Not printed; it gave the view of Mr. Burrows, then acting for Mr. Wright in charge of Palestinian affairs for the British Foreign Office, that the situation was if anything possibly more dangerous than that described in Jerusalem's telegrams 1146 and 1147, August 1, pp. 1264 and 1265 (501.BB Palestine/8-448).

said His Majesty's Government favors strongly demilitarization and internationalization of Jerusalem. Judging from recent Israeli statements Jews seem determined that neither shall take place and Jewish purpose is strengthened by failure of Mediator to receive French, Belgian and US guards for which he has asked so urgently. I need not go into Bevin's description of situation in Jerusalem since it is identical in substance with that of Consul General Macdonald as repeated to me in Department's 3055, August 3⁶ and in his 1157, August 4 to Department. Bevin said he understood United States Government is unwilling to supply men for Bernadotte's guards even though US attitude in this regard probably would be decisive in formulation of Belgian and French attitudes. He asked what United States Government now proposes in the circumstances, since all evidence indicates that earlier US proposals re cooperation of well-disciplined units of Arabs and Jews is impracticable.

10. I spoke along lines Department's 3049 and 3055, August 3. Bevin expressed view that supplying guards to Bernadotte would not require special SC action but would be "cooperation with the Mediator," as indicated in paragraph 5, July 15 SC resolution and instruction to Truce Commission in immediately following paragraph. He did not deal with Department's other points, but said simply, "well, what can we do now?"

11. I promised to put his thinking (and I have never seen him in a more solemn—not petulant—mood) to the Department and to seek its views re foregoing on an urgent basis.

12. Re Bernadotte's guards, whose presence as UN instrument seems likely to be restraining influence on both sides, it occurs to me that Department should consider proposing that if French and Belgian Governments will supply contingents for guard duties United States Government will undertake to transport men from France and Belgium to Palestine, and to supply vehicles, communications equipment, medical facilities, maintenance men, et cetera, in Palestine. On this basis there would be handful of non-combatant US uniformed personnel in guarded area as token force which would give proof of US cooperation with Mediator without risking possibility US personnel would shoot either Jews or Arabs and with reduced likelihood of our men being targets. If internationalization and demilitarization of Jerusalem is really at stake, as I understand it is, it seems to me that we might consider seriously something approximating the suggestion which I have just outlined.

DOUGLAS

⁶ This was a repeat of No. 793 to Jerusalem, p. 1275.

501.BB Palestine/8-748 : Telegram

The Chargé in Egypt (Patterson) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

CAIRO, August 7, 1948—11 a. m.

1103-A. (1) Count Bernadotte in reviewing recent developments his mission Palestine with Ireland at Alexandria said he was making progress in obtaining acquiescence existence Israeli state if not its formal acceptance by Arab states. His talks with Transjordan and Lebanese Prime Ministers indicated Transjordan and Lebanon would so acquiesce. Both sought speedy decision. Azzam Pasha also apparently convinced necessity to admit existence Jewish state although not ready to make statement now since he believed time should be given for preparation public opinion. Bernadotte had pointed out to Azzam Pasha that decision could not be delayed beyond next meeting GA in September. Bernadotte expected to see Prime Minister Nokrashy Pasha for his views this problem and that of refugees. He had not seen Prime Ministers Syria or Iraq but expected them to be more intransigent.

(2) With reference refugees Bernadotte said condition 300,000 to 400,000 Arab refugees without food, clothing and shelter was appalling. He hoped various welfare organizations could be induced take interest but basic problem was their eventual return to their home. In this connection Bernadotte said PGI was "showing signs of swelled-head". Shertok to whom he had put this most pressing and urgent problem had indicated politically PGI could not admit Arab-refugees as they would constitute fifth column. Economically PGI had no room for Arabs since their space was needed for Jewish immigrants. Shertok when pressed had replied nothing could be done until peace was made. In any event government reserved right to replace them with Jews from Arab countries who had expressed desire to come to Palestine. Bernadotte commented that it seemed anomaly for Jews to base demand for Jewish state on need to find home Jewish refugees and that they should demand migration to Palestine of Jewish DP's when they refused to recognize problem of Arab refugees which they had created.

In regard to property Arab refugees he said apparently most had been seized for use by Jews. He had seen Haganah organizing and supervising removal contents Arab houses in Ramle which he understood was being distributed among newly arrived Jewish immigrants. He was putting problem before SC¹ but was not counting on its assistance. Also spoke of asking for special session GA to consider refugees.

¹ For Count Bernadotte's cablegram of August 1 to Secretary-General Lie concerning Arab refugees, see SC, 3rd yr., Supplement for August 1948, p. 103.

(3) Concerning future peace Palestine he would put forward no further proposals but would engage in informal talks. In addition to necessity acknowledging existence Jewish state three possibilities lay before Arabs (1) resumption of war, (2) creation of Arab state as proposed in November 29 SC resolution, (3) partition of Arab Palestine among Arab states. Apparently he leaned towards last solution as enabling Arab states to publicize definite benefits to their people.

He was also working for consolidation Israeli territory although PGI was proving completely intractable. It demanded retention of all Galilee by right of conquest, corridor from Jerusalem to Tel Aviv, and the return of Negeb as an area promised Israel in partition scheme. He commented that role of peacemaker for Palestine was decidedly no easy one.

(4) Bernadotte indicated great concern for immediate future Jerusalem. Was convinced action was brewing there. He had called attention to [of] Bernard Joseph, Military Governor Jerusalem to alleged statement by Shertok that Jews now had right to fight Egyptians everywhere since they had attacked Jews in Negeb. He had informed Joseph this was contrary to fact and he hoped Shertok would withdraw statement. Joseph said he could not agree with Bernadotte's views. Bernadotte said he would raise question with Shertok when he saw him August 5.

(5) He expressed concern that UN was not giving him tools required for task including adequate observers and guards. He had dispatched Bunche to America and hoped efforts there would bear fruit.

Bernadotte leaving August 5, for Haifa and thence to Rhodes.

Memo of conversation by pouch to London and Arab capitals.

PATTERSON

501.BB Palestine/8-748: Telegram

The Consul General at Jerusalem (Macdonald) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

JERUSALEM, August 7, 1948—2 p. m.

1173. As suggested by Mediator Truce Commission and Commander Arab Legion, Jerusalem held preliminary discussions yesterday re demilitarization Jerusalem. Commander presented Truce Commission with following notes on demilitarization which are considered very fair and basis for further talks with view of accomplishing demilitarization as provided for in SC resolution of July 15.¹

¹ The Department, on August 14, agreed that the suggestions of the Commander of the Arab Legion at Jerusalem for demilitarization of that city were fair and reasonable. It also noted the "increasing tendency of Israelis to take a stiffer line regarding Jerusalem in particular and eventual terms of settlement in general." (Telegram 3237 to London, 501.BB Palestine/8-948)

"Notes on demilitarization Jerusalem.

"1. The settlement aimed at under the demilitarization is temporary without prejudice to the final settlement of the future of Jerusalem which must depend upon the final settlement of the Palestine question as a whole.

"2. The boundaries of the demilitarization area of Jerusalem for [omission] reasons and in order to include important Holy places in the area must include an area larger than the municipal or the town planning areas. The area must be something like: Shaafat in the north—Issawich, Bethany, Bethlehem, Beit, Jala, Lifta, Shaafat.

"3. It is understood that essential supplies (non-military) will at all times be allowed to the Jews under a mixed control comprising of United Nations, Arabs and Jews.

"4. Under demilitarization the Arabs will run their own areas, the Jews will run their own areas and United Nations will run common things like electric current supply, water supply, telephones and sewerage.

"5. Arab and Jewish police in equal numbers and equally armed with normal police weapons will police the two areas. The UN guards will keep the frontier between the two areas.

"6. Demilitarization must mean a return to normal, as far as possible a return to the *status quo ante*, as far as the area is concerned, i.e. the Arabs and Jews must be allowed to regain possession of their houses.

"7. For security reasons, however, pockets must be eliminated as far as possible and the frontier line must be drawn so as to correspond with the property position eliminating pockets and exchanging areas temporarily at least.

"8. The owners of non-Arab and non-Jewish buildings properties must opt as to the area to which they want to belong.

"9. Ex-Govt owned buildings to be kept temporarily by the UN.

"10. Return of looted moveable property or compensation for it specially in areas occupied without fighting in breach of the truce existing on May 14/15.

"11. Visits to Jewish Holy places to be allowed at fixed times and in fixed numbers under United Nations escort.

"12. A survey of Arab property in Jewish hands must be made as soon as possible, with a view to preventing its willful misuse by the Jews."

MACDONALD

S67N.01/8-748 : Telegram

The Consul General at Jerusalem (Macdonald) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

URGENT

JERUSALEM, August 7, 1948—5 p. m.

1177. During past two days there has been increasing sniping and gunfire principally from Jewish side and according most reliable information available it has been initiated by Jews.

Yesterday afternoon when returning from Truce Commission meeting with Arab Commander in Old City my car was fired on several times by Jews while still in Arab territory and just before crossing

over to Jewish lines. Consulate's two jeeps driven by guards returning from Old City with food were fired on few minutes later in same place. Today about noon in same area Consulate General's official car driven by Burdett was hit and guard Przywitoski slightly injured.

Inasmuch as road on which firing took place is used only by Consular, Red Cross and UN personnel and other persons authorized to cross lines there is no excuse for either side firing on vehicles traveling over this route.

A strong note of protest has been sent to the Jewish Military Governor of Jerusalem calling attention to above. It is requested this information be brought to the attention of the SC pointing out Jewish deliberate violation of truce and failure to take adequate measures to protect lives of official personnel who are compelled to travel in performance of their duties.

MACDONALD

501.BB Palestine/8-948 : Telegram

*The Acting United States Representative at the United Nations
(Jessup) to the Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET

URGENT

NEW YORK, August 9, 1948—1 : 30 p. m.

1003. We are becoming more and more concerned by reports from our missions abroad based on radio intercepts, etc. (see for example Haifa's 293, July 31, Haifa's 298, August 5, London's 3561, August 6,¹ Jerusalem's 1177, August 7), indicating Israel becoming increasingly intransigent with regard to Jerusalem, Mediator, observers, the Truce Commission, fighting personnel and war material.

Heavily discounting probably prejudiced sources, there have been enough of these reports and from enough widely separated points to indicate at least some truth in what ordinarily might be put aside as rumor.

Basis for whatever truth there may be in these reports is probably a combination of (a) wholly natural and understandable desire of Israel to press present advantages as far as possible, and (b) pressure by the Irgun and other dissident elements in favor of extreme positions may be greater than we had imagined.

Appeasement of dissidents will not help Israel's cause but quite the contrary.

If reports of intransigence are not true, then prompt action by PGI to disavow these reports is essential in their own interest and in the interest of peace in Palestine.

If on the contrary reports have any substantial basis of truth, then

¹ None printed.

in our judgment Israel may damage its own cause irreparably and the precarious peace in Palestine will be very difficult to maintain.

If the reports we are getting are true and if the PGI persists in the line indicated, we must envisage the possibility that Israel may be in the same position before the SC that the Arab states were in following the end of the first four week's truce. This would be very embarrassing to us in terms of (a) our relations with Israel, (b) our relations with the Arab states, (c) our relations with the UK, and (d) our position in the SC and in the UN.

In view of the seriousness of this problem and its implications we hesitate to take any action with PGI representatives here, however personal and informal, without instructions from the Department.

We feel, however, that some action is essential and we suggest that it be taken with Epstein in Washington along the following lines after prior clearance, we venture respectfully to suggest, with the White House:

(1) US is the best friend that Israel has or is likely to have for some time to come.

(2) As Israel's best friend we feel they should know we have received a considerable number of reports from widely varied sources indicating an intransigent attitude with regard to: (see points above).

(3) If these reports are not true than prompt action by the PGI seems essential not only to disavow these reports but also to demonstrate by wholehearted cooperation with the Mediator, the Truce Commission, and the observers that the attitude of the PGI is in fact cooperative and peace loving.

(4) If there were any substantial degree of truth in these reports we would as Israel's best friend be very much concerned from the viewpoint of (a) peace in Palestine and (b) Israel's own future.

(5) The risk to peace is obvious.

(6) With regard to Israel's own position the risks they run involve (a) a very thin margin of support for them in the SC (b) recognition by other states (c) membership in the UN.

(7) On the question of membership we have informed them we would support them. This position is based on their constructive, co-operative, peace-loving attitude in connection with extending the truce. If the reports we have been getting since then are true and the attitude reflected is persisted in, we could scarcely avoid having to reconsider our position. Even if we continued to support Israel for membership it is very doubtful whether they could under the circumstances command the necessary number of votes either in the SC or in the GA.

(8) We hope therefore that the PGI is in a position to disavow categorically as rumors reports as to their hostile, uncooperative and even intransigent attitude.

(9) We hope further that the PGI will continue by positive acts of cooperation with the Mediator, his observers, the Truce Commission, etc., to maintain its reputation for cooperative and fair dealing in all matters relating to the demilitarization of Jerusalem, the maintenance of the truce including the importation of war materials and

paragraphs 3 and 4 of the May 29 resolution concerning fighting personnel and men of military age, and the eventual settlement.

(10) We hope further that if dissident and extremist Jewish groups and individuals are responsible for any lack of cooperation that the PGI will deal firmly with them rather than yield to the temptations of expediency and appeasement.

Referring again to Haifa's 293, and to various cables from our Military Attaché Damascus and other sources concerning the shipment of war materials to Israel and in some cases to the Arab countries, we feel strongly that in order to avoid being in a very weak position both ethically and politically that information of this character should be made available to the Mediator.

JESSUP

867N.5151/8-1148

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to President Truman

WASHINGTON, August 11, 1948.

Mr. Epstein, the Representative in Washington of the Provisional Government of Israel, is pressing for a decision on his Government's application for a loan of \$100 million, now pending before the Export-Import Bank, for economic development in connection with the resettlement of immigrants.

Although Israel will probably need substantial financial assistance if it is to maintain economic stability during a period of large-scale immigration, there are difficulties in the way of extending a loan at this time. The United Nations Mediator, Count Bernadotte, is now engaged in difficult and delicate negotiations, in which he is seeking the terms of a settlement which might be acceptable both to the Provisional Government of Israel and to the Arab Governments. The Government and people of Israel have a vital interest in the success of these negotiations. The immediate effect of a large United States loan to Israel both on the Arabs and on the Jews might be such as materially to prejudice Count Bernadotte's mediation efforts. In any event, it would be necessary to consult with Count Bernadotte beforehand in order to ensure that serious consequences would not follow for which this Government would be blamed.

Information from Palestine shows clearly that the present truce in Palestine is being subjected to great pressures by all parties concerned. Our principal concern is to find a basis of agreement before the truce itself breaks down. The Arabs are restive under the truce because they believe that the Jewish military position is being steadily strengthened despite the conditions of the truce, a belief which is given greater currency by the public statements of high officials of Israel itself. The Department of State believes that we must take into

account that the Arab Governments would undoubtedly charge that economic aid to Israel by the United States would materially upset the balance of military advantage in favor of Israel and would thus alter the basis of the existing truce which was ordered by the Security Council on July 15, 1948.

From the economic aspect, the Department is informed by Mr. Epstein that the basis for repayment of the \$100 million loan would largely be contributions from private sources to the Provisional Government of Israel, which in turn would make available these contributions for the service of the loan. The soundness of the loan must be assessed in connection with the fact that the State of Israel is, in effect, in a state of war and that a resumption of hostilities would render promises to pay almost meaningless. Accordingly, from the strictly banking aspect, the loan presents great difficulties to the Export-Import Bank.

The Export-Import Bank has had numerous discussions with the representatives of Israel, and Mr. Martin notified Mr. Epstein on July 26 that “. . . reports reaching me do not appear to warrant at this time active consideration by the Export-Import Bank of the credit application[”]¹

Although the Department of State does not believe that a flat \$100 million loan should be made to the State of Israel at this time, it is suggested that Mr. Epstein be informed by us that the Export-Import Bank will be prepared to consider *specific projects* for which a loan might properly be granted and for which assurance of repayment and service could be provided on sound banking principles.

I thought it advisable to seek your approval of this recommended position since Mr. Epstein and Dr. Weizmann have previously discussed the loan application with you.

ROBERT A. LOVETT

¹ See footnote 1, p. 1261.

501.BB Palestine/S-1148 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Jerusalem (Macdonald) to the
Secretary of State*

SECRET

JERUSALEM, August 11, 1948—1 p. m.

1187. At meeting yesterday morning Bernadotte informed military governor Jewish Jerusalem that Jews have been more aggressive in violating truce by sniping and small arms fire than Arabs. This is definitely correct re Jerusalem area although accusation denied vigorously by military governor.

Mediator asked military governor if he had any suggestions for safeguarding Jerusalem from possibility of future fighting to which

he replied that Arab Legion should withdraw to Transjordan but stated he realized this suggestion would not be accepted. Bernadotte then said he would issue an order prohibiting any return fire by either side for three days as soon as more observers arrive as an attempt to eliminate sniping. Joseph agreed to this proposal but refused to accede to a following suggestion made by General Riley, chief of American observers, that armed troops and guns be withdrawn from strategic place such as Notre Dame on Jewish side and from equally strategic place on Arab side as an initial effort to withdraw military forces from Jerusalem. Joseph based his refusal on grounds Arabs could not be trusted and any withdrawal of Jewish troops would leave that area open to Arab attack. He also said this was a military matter to which he could not commit the military commander. When asked to refer it to the military commander he said he doubted military commander would agree to consider or discuss this suggestion with UN observers because of its political implications. Political implications to which the military governor constantly refers is the question of an international Jerusalem. Mediator then specifically requested Joseph to endeavor arrange meeting between the military commander Jewish Jerusalem and UN observers to carry on discussions along above lines to which military governor agreed but stated he could not guarantee military commander would meet Bernadotte's request.

Military governor was on defensive yesterday and his attitude was better than last week. Mediator referred to him as being slightly less objectionable than usual.

Similar suggestions were made to Arab Legion leaders yesterday afternoon as presented Jews and Arabs agreed but suggested that prohibition against returning fire be a permanent order rather than limited to three days.

Mediator presented strong letter to both sides regarding sniping and similar violations truce and threatened to get tough and refer question to SC if conditions do not improve.

Disregard for truce has increased steadily creating mounting distrust on part of Arab and Jews re each other's intentions. Mediator's latest efforts in addition to greatly increased number of observers Jerusalem area should result in improving situation if Jews cooperate but from their past actions and general attitude at recent conferences I am pessimistic regarding their intentions. Inasmuch as they are very sensitive to criticism and public opinion their attitude and policies might be influenced and directed towards better cooperation if they were publicly criticised by the UN and especially by the United States of [*for*] their failure to cooperate in finding a solution to the Palestine problem.

MACDONALD

501.BB Palestine/8-248 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 12, 1948—1 p. m.

3187. Dept appreciates provisional UK views on Palestine and desires present following informal reactions to numbered paragraphs urtel 3484, Aug 2:

1. Para. 3a and 4 imply abandonment Nov 29 resolution, which might complicate handling of question in UN and might cause sharp reaction in US on basis probable charges US-UK were attempting sabotage UN recommendations. We believe preferable approach is to continue to improve Nov. resolution, consistent with our efforts last regular session, to improve UNSCOP report, along functional or practical lines to make it more acceptable to parties. Within framework this principle modifications could be effected as result informal Arab-Jewish negotiations.

2. Para. 5: We concur in view that political or economic union is unrealistic and impractical. Re territorial recommendations, (a) we continue believe Jerusalem should not be placed under sole authority either Arabs or Jews (see our para. 9a); (b) we agree with free port proposal but believe internationalization Haifa and Lydda impractical; (c) inclusion Jaffa in Israel considered desirable if Arabs agree but its value as bargaining point should be retained for time being; (d) transfer of all or part of Negev to Arabs should include portion of Mediterranean coast line to provide access to sea; (e) some adjustment of eastern frontier Israel as defined Nov. 29 resolution desirable to effect more practical distribution and administration communications in frontier area. We believe transfer Jaffa and all or portion western Galilee to Israel in exchange for transfer all or part of Negev good basis for informal Arab-Jewish negotiations. We concur UK view that political future of Arab territory would eventually be for Arabs to decide but, in light of diversity views and interests of Arab states, believe PGI and Transjordan should undertake initial informal negotiations.

This Govt would indeed view with concern attempt by either Israel or future Arab state (whether Transjordan or Palestinian Arab State) to prejudice territorial integrity of other, and assumes such aggression would be raised in UN for consideration and action under Charter. We would not agree to UK suggestion concerning recommendation by Mediator that UN should lay down frontier which could only be changed by UN. Frontiers must be based upon agreement of parties, who could agree to changes. If such frontiers are violated by one party without agreement of the other, UN would presumably act, under Chapter VII if necessary.

3. Para. 5a: Dept believes it desirable avoid interjecting problem

European Jewish DP's into negotiations or settlement for Palestine, but considers solution Arab DP problem intrinsic to negotiations and settlement.

4. Para. 5*b*: See our para. 9*g*.

5. Para. 6-7: Dept agrees that Arabs and Jews would probably reject Mediator's next set of suggestions if formally presented without intermediate steps. We feel that essential intermediate steps now called for are, first, US-UK agreement concerning basic recommendations, and, second, parallel general approach by US and UK to PGI and Arab states, informing them of general substance of our concerted views, in effort secure their cooperation in immediate informal discussions between PGI and Arab states looking towards development working basis for settlement. Such immediate discussions, we believe, should first be confined to PGI and TJ as most moderate and cooperative Arab League state. TJ might thereafter be expected to present them to other Arab states. Dept believes essential that we follow principle of similar approach to both Arabs and Jews by US and UK, rather than that of division of responsibility, which would weaken desirable position of neutrality set forth your para. 12. The objective facts are, as we see them, that the US has just as much interest as the UK in the development and maintenance of good relations with the Arabs, while the UK, on the other hand, has just as much interest as the US in the development and maintenance of good relations with Israel, both considered in terms of our mutual political, economic and strategic interests in the Middle East. We should not continue thinking, therefore, that it is the task of the UK alone to bring about Arab acquiescence any more than we should think that it is the task of the US alone to bring about Israel acquiescence in the future settlement. As we see it, both we and the UK have a joint and equal task in bringing about the acquiescence of both Arabs and Jews. If US-UK efforts result in Arab-Jewish acquiescence in working agreement, this could then be used by Mediator as basis for further action.

HMG reference para. 6 to enforcement unclear. US could not concur in military enforcement of imposed settlement. (See Anstin speech in SC dated February 24.)¹ We would however be prepared make maximum efforts as outlined above to secure acquiescence both sides; if Arab-Jewish agreed settlement were obtained, we would be prepared to support such action in UN as might be necessary to insure maintenance of peace.

6. Para. 8-9: Dept sees no useful result from GA resolution at this stage and believes question of appropriate GA action should await development of negotiations. We have grave doubts desirability GA consideration Palestine in forthcoming session except on basis of an agreed settlement.

¹ *Ante*, p. 651.

7. Para. 10: We believe informal US-UK approach to Mediator desirable, informing him of our agreed views concerning settlement, and of our desire use our joint good offices and influence with PGI and Arabs to encourage early working agreement.

8. Para. 12-13: We agree with UK view concerning mutual necessity maintaining neutral attitude vis-à-vis Arabs and Jews in effort achieve workable settlement, and with view expressed your para. 13 concerning desirability giving Arabs evidence Western understanding of their position (see our para. 9 *f-g*). See also paras 1 and 2 above.

9. Additional tentative comments of Dept follow:

a. Status of Jerusalem. Pending establishment of Jerusalem police force, we believe Mediator should endeavor convince PGI and Arabs of desirability contributing small well-disciplined military units, to which UN representatives should be assigned in observer capacity, to assist in demilitarization and to control possible extremist outbreaks. We are prepared make strong representations to PGI and TJ to provide such assistance (Deptel 3055, Aug 3²). (See Embtel 3567 Aug 6 to Dept from London to which reply is being prepared.)

Some degree of UN responsibility for administration of Jerusalem still appears essential, with provision for protection holy places, free access thereto, and guaranteed transit rights to city. In view special importance Jerusalem to both Arabs and Jews, however, US is giving some thought to possible advantages modified condominium principle under which Israel, future Arab state, and UN would share administrative responsibility for Jerusalem. Administrative board might consist of three Israeli, three Arab, and three UN representatives under rotating chairmanship. Condominium might represent compromise politically for both Israeli and Arabs, and would place financial responsibility and responsibility maintenance law and order squarely upon peoples of Palestine rather than on UN. UK views re feasibility this solution would be appreciated.

b. Israel's independence. Final settlement must be predicated on full acceptance Israel's independence including full control immigration, subject during truce to Mediator's supervision; once final settlement achieved and frontiers defined, it is probable that limiting geographic-economic factors would eventually check tendency to excessive Jewish immigration.

c. Arab Palestine. While we desire UK views concerning merits various proposals for disposition Arab territory, we hold provisional view that inclusion Arab territory into TJ (or among various Arab states) might be supported by US-UK as basis for proposed Arab-Jewish discussions. Palestinian Arabs should however have right of expressing their views in some manner. We would welcome UK views re means accomplishing this objective.

d. Boundaries. We believe initial PGI-TJ discussions should include attempt resolve boundary questions, taking into account principles of Nov resolution and present military situation; wishes of

² This was a repeat of No. 793 to Jerusalem, p. 1275.

population; administrative convenience, emphasizing desirability compact administrative entities and avoidance of enclaves; relevant economic factors.

Concurrently discussions should include question of exchange of populations in certain cases, as well as desirability of permitting return of refugees so desiring, including assistance in effecting resettlement and property restoration, and appropriate civil rights guarantees.

e. Economic relations. Economic union or similar system of formal economic arrangements is impractical at this time. We believe gradual development of economic relations between the two states, arising out of common interests and needs, is more acceptable principle in effecting settlement. Certain working arrangements arising in this manner could be progressively extended, and might form basis for economic understanding at time of final settlement.

f. Recognition and UN membership. US is currently considering idea of extending *de jure* recognition concurrently to Govt of Israel and TJ in near future, in return for assurances of cooperation in truce observance and in actual negotiations for settlement. US believes recognition of Israel by UK in return for similar assurances would be important contribution to these ends. We would also welcome concerted US-UK action in supporting applications of both to UN as further means stabilizing NE situation.

g. Economic assistance. Following final settlement, US is prepared consider sympathetically Israel's application \$100,000,000 loan for resettlement of DP's and economic projects in Israel in connection therewith. We believe Israel's industrial capabilities should be encouraged in order establish it as manufacturing center and entrepot. Such development might ultimately lead to mutually advantageous economic relations with Arab states.

In connection with settlement for Arab Palestine, US-UK should consider problem of providing administrative aid and counsel as emergency measure during formative period. Possibilities of governmental and of international economic and financial assistance should be explored, with view to possibility providing assistance when evidences political stabilization emerge. We should also give early attention to problem of economic aid to NE on regional basis through UN agencies and through appropriate aid on basis Anglo-American discussions for cooperation in economic-social affairs in NE. We believe such assistance essential to development economic equilibrium and restoration political cooperation among Near Eastern peoples.

As soon as US-UK agreement on general principles of settlement obtained, we propose prepare instructions to our missions for early approach to Mediator, PGI, TJ, other Arab League states, and key UN members such as France, Belgium, Canada and China.

Sent London, repeated to New York.

MARSHALL

501.BB Palestine/8-1248 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Jerusalem (Macdonald) to the
Secretary of State*

SECRET

JERUSALEM, August 12, 1948—3 p. m.

1190. During extended talk yesterday with Mrs. Myerson, Israel Minister-Designate to USSR, she made following statements:

1. Internationalization Jerusalem is definitely impossible now and Jews will never agree accepting it. If Jerusalem does not become all Jewish city Israel might consent to partition on following lines. New Jerusalem to be part of Israel. Old city to be considered a museum and be given some sort of international status under the United Nations. Allocation of some small area outside of old city to Arabs might be given consideration.

2. Israel must have all of the Negev.

3. Unrestricted and complete control of immigration will be demanded by Israel as its right to sovereign state.

Mrs. Myerson's attitude re Jerusalem is alarming as she is considered one of the most moderate of Jewish leaders.

MACDONALD

501.BB Palestine/8-1248 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Jerusalem (Macdonald) to the
Secretary of State*

JERUSALEM, August 12, 1948.

1191. Latrun pumping station blown up today thus preventing supply water to Jerusalem. United Nations observer who passed Latrun after blown up states two diesel pumps apparently destroyed and station in flames. Station had been taken over by United Nations.

MACDONALD

867N.48/8-1248

The Minister in Syria (Keeley) to the Secretary of State

RESTRICTED

DAMASCUS, August 12, 1948.

No. 220

Subject: Transmitting Arab Higher Committee Note to Arab League on Refugee Situation.

Supplementing the Legation's telegram No. 520, August 12, 1948,¹ the Minister has the honor to transmit herewith a translation of the

¹ Not printed.

text of a note concerning Palestinian refugees sent by the Arab Higher Committee (AHC) to the Secretary General of the Arab League.²

The AHC categorically rejects proposals that Arab refugees be returned to Jewish controlled areas, arguing that to do so would:

1. "Constitute a recognition of the imaginary Jewish state."
2. Place the refugees at the mercy of the Jews as virtual hostages.
3. Permit the Jews to exploit the refugees in a political sense, possibly winning their votes in a likely plebiscite.
4. Place the refugees on the marginal fringe of the Jewish economy.

In addition to arguing against the return of the refugees to Palestine, the AHC presents its own suggestions for the solution of the refugee problem. In brief, these call for centralized handling of the situation, financial assistance from the Arab countries and the International Refugee Organization, dispatch of men "capable of carrying arms" to Palestine "in the defense of their country," and the establishment of refugee camps in Arab parts of Palestine.

The tenor of the entire note reflects the irreconciled position of the AHC that the struggle against Zionism must continue unabated.

Although eventually published, it is worthy of note that this document was at first suppressed by the Syrian authorities. A reliable informant who saw the original AHC release states that the newspaper version used in preparing the Legation's translation is complete and accurate except for the omission of an introductory paragraph of no great significance.

[JAMES H. KEELEY, JR.]

² Not printed; the text was taken from the August 12 issue of *Al Fegyha'*.

501.BB Palestine/8-948: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 13, 1948—1 p. m.

3208. For the Ambassador. You will be interested to know in light of your 3590, August 9,¹ that the Secretary on August 9 received Dr. Ralph Bunche, Personal Representative of UN SYG, who is No. 2 on Count Bernadotte's team in Palestine.² Bunche called for purpose of giving Secretary Bernadotte's views as to immediate requirements of Mediator and his tentative notions as to long-range settlement of Palestine problem.

Although Bernadotte would have preferred a regular UN armed guard for Jerusalem he suggested as alternative that corps of military observers supplied by Belgium, France and US be augmented by 300

¹ Not printed.

² The remaining participants in the conversation were Andrew Cordier, Executive Assistant to Secretary-General Lie, Fraser Wilkins, and Robert McClintock, the last of whom prepared the memorandum of conversation (501.BB Palestine/8-948).

additional military observers, all of whom were to be enlisted men. Bernadotte desired these additional observers for duty in preserving strategic positions evacuated by Jews and Arabs by mutual agreement, such as Mt. Scopus, Victoria Augusta Hospital, and water pumping station at Latrun. The Secretary informed Bernadotte's representative that although he could not speak for Defense establishment he saw no reason in principle why this govt could not supply its requested contingent of 125 enlisted men as military observers, it being understood that France would match this number and that Belgium would send 50 men to complete total. Secretary has now inquired of Forrestal if necessary contingent cannot promptly be sent to assist Bernadotte. You may tell Bevin that, although final decision has not been reached, Dept does not anticipate much difficulty in this regard and it is hoped that our share of additional enlisted observers will very promptly receive orders to proceed to Jerusalem.

As for long-range settlement, Bernadotte is not eager to offer suggestions until he is assured that US and UK govts are in agreement on general lines of an equitable settlement. Bernadotte of course realizes that Jews on one hand will make exorbitant demands and Arabs will refuse to countenance officially existence of Jewish State. Nevertheless Mediator is said to feel that if UK and US are in agreement and if these govts can reach a general line in accord with his views (upon which he does not insist), chances are that both Jews and Arabs, although violently protesting, may quietly move along lines of eventual settlement.

Bernadotte's preliminary views are similar to those which we have informally discussed with Bevin through your auspices. Bernadotte thinks that Jews should be given valuable lands in western Galilee which they now hold by virtue of military conquest but in return for this acquisition should permit Arabs to take over most of Negev. As for Jerusalem, Bernadotte feels that UN organization contemplated by resolution of November 29, 1947, is not only cumbersome and troublesome but essentially unworkable. Rather, he visualizes Jerusalem under nominal Arab sovereignty but with local autonomy for the Jewish population and with an international commission appointed by the UN to receive possible complaints from the Jews or, for that matter, the Arab population. Although Bunche was not specific on this point he seemed to visualize Transjordan profiting largely by the arrangement with possible territorial compensation to Egypt in the lower part of the Negev.

The Secretary did not make any comment on Bernadotte's territorial suggestions but, as you will have perceived from Deptel 3187, Aug. 12, these views, with the exception of Jerusalem (Cf. Par 9a Deptel 3187), are similar to those which have already been arrived at on working level in Dept. As you know, however, top clearance from

the White House has not yet been received at this stage in formulating opinions as to the most practical solution of the Palestine problem.³

We should be glad to have Bevin's suggestions as to how—provided there is a meeting of the minds as between ourselves, UK and Bernadotte—a territorial solution can most profitably be arranged. We do not at this stage of our thinking feel that it would be useful for General Assembly to debate a possible frontier. Not only would such debate become surcharged with emotion and cross-currents of self-interest, but it would involve basic principle, which we endeavored to make clear in Austin's speech of February 24, that recommendations of Assembly are not enforceable by UN agency. In a preliminary way we feel that if our two govts are in agreement Bernadotte might in his report to SC merely state what to him, on basis of facts and justice, seems to be most equitable frontier for Israel. If our two govts were in agreement a statement by Bevin and the Secretary supporting Bernadotte's suggestion would have great weight. No additional action would be taken however and it would be left to diplomatic means to achieve an eventual agreement between Israel and Transjordan, later to be acquiesced in by other Arab states. Once this point were reached, blessing of UN would be easy.

It is important to emphasize to Bevin and others in FonOff that foregoing views are highly tentative and are given you in an endeavor to advance our mutual thinking on this problem with all possible swiftness.

For your own info we agree with Bevin that Palestine situation is serious, as he emphasized in conversation reported your 3567, Aug. 6, but feel that his references to Russian threats against Iraq are somewhat of the red herring variety. As for his notion of building up RAF munitions in Iraq and Transjordan, as reported in para. 8, your 3567, we feel that you should caution him to go very slowly. From this point of view danger of Britain appearing as military guarantor of Arabs against Jews, which would invoke popular outcry here for US to lift arms embargo in favor of Israel, is much greater than Bevin's qualms over Soviet machinations against Iraq.

MARSHALL

³ For further information on the conversation with Dr. Bunche on August 9, see telegram 634, August 24, to Stockholm, p. 1340.

867N.48/8-948 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 14, 1948—11 a. m.

3236. Dept currently considering questions raised urtel 3591, Aug. 9,¹ and will inform you as views are formulated. Ref your para 1, Amcross

¹ Not printed.

has made available 250,000 dollars medical clothing supplies to International Committee Red Cross for distribution Jews Arabs Near East. Depts Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid is actively stimulating assistance by church organizations in US and voluntary lay organizations. Church World Service² shipping immediately 38,000 pounds clothing 175 pounds vitamins to American School Oriental Research Jerusalem, distributing agency for American voluntary relief. Depts Committee Vol Foreign Aid hopeful that US lay groups interested Near East may organize assistance on more adequate scale for Arab refugees only, since assistance from church groups being raised for both Jews Arabs.

No US public funds presently available to assist Arab refugees. We are giving earnest consideration to means of organizing international assistance this group but not now in position to advance concrete proposal. For your info solely we are exploring possibilities establishment Joint IRO-Mediator Committee and participation of IRO in Arab relief problem. IRO constitution not yet in force, and any indication of extension IRO assistance to Arab refugees would seriously affect current parliamentary action in three countries now considering ratification. If suggestion for IRO action is advanced in SC at this time, USUN is instructed to point out that IRO not yet activated and that many postwar groups refugees not now under care have prior claims on IRO assistance.

Ref your para 2, we are informing USUN of our views³ as follows:

"With ref to economic, political military factors in connection with return Arab refugees to Israel, we appreciate security considerations governing PGI attitude but believe that under supervision Mediator substantial number refugees so desiring could be permitted gradually return their homes and resume occupations without prejudicing maintenance internal security Israel. From economic viewpoint, Israel now demonstrating ability absorb large numbers European DP's monthly. It would therefore be unfortunate for PGI, by continuing refuse permit Arab repatriation, to create impression that assimilation Jewish immigrants was taking place at expense former Arab inhabitants Israel. From political standpoint, PGI action to permit gradual return Arab refugees would provide Arabs with tangible assurance of PGI desire establish cooperative relations with Arab states on long range basis.

["]We consider overall solution Arab refugee problem intrinsic to final settlement Palestine problem, but believe increasingly critical nature refugee problem makes it essential that at least partial return of refugees should be permitted for those so desiring prior to achievement final settlement. Moreover, we believe PGI assistance in alleviating situation would substantially improve chances securing early peaceful settlement Palestine problem. Conversely, PGI failure to cooperate by partial repatriation refugees might create difficulties for 265,000 Jews permanently residing Arab states."

² On behalf of Protestant organizations in the United States.

³ In telegram 534, August 14, 11 a. m., not printed.

Eventuality mentioned your para 3 would be affected by relaxation of present PGI attitude towards repatriation.

While US continues believe Iraq development scheme (your para 4) worthy of implementation, it has no evidence that Iraq Govt has been or is prepared take effective steps towards implementation such program, particularly in light of its current preoccupation with Palestine. In any event Dept believes long-range Iraq development scheme would not represent solution for immediate refugee problem.

Dept's tentative thinking⁴ re your para 5 outlined Deptel 3187, Aug 12, para 9 *g*.

Dept considers short-term program may be summarized as follows:

(1) Mediator should be urged by SC to estimate as soon as he can numbers and location of Arab refugees, numbers desiring to return to their homes and those for whom immediate resettlement might prove practical, food and other supplies required, sources and costs thereof, food costs per person per diem and currencies in which supplies can be procured. Mediator should also be urged to make interim practical proposals for meeting problem. Suggest Mediator request assistance of experts from PCIRO and WHO in making survey.

(2) Efforts by UN should continue to induce PGI to accept return Arab refugees initially in small numbers but increasing movement as experience demonstrates PGI security and economy not endangered in fact.

(3) All possible assistance voluntary agencies of UN members under Mediator should be stimulated.

(4) Possibility (not to be communicated to UK) of IRO participation in Arab refugee relief should be kept under active study until IRO activated early Sept with view to possible consideration problem by General Council IRO at initial meeting now convened for Sept 13 Geneva.

Consideration Arab refugee problem at current meeting ECOSOC not considered feasible as ECOSOC agenda was adopted after only three days debate and disposition items of agenda proceeding slowly. ECOSOC not in position to give constructive consideration to hastily drafted proposals concerning which expert and up-to-date info is at present lacking.

Long-term program in meeting Arab refugee problem can only emerge after Mediator's report mentioned above. Chief problem is source of funds and responsible estimate of amount required annually over specified period of time.

MARSHALL

⁴ As originally set forth in telegram 531, August 13, 4 p. m., to New York, not printed.

Truman Papers, President's Secretary's File

*Memorandum by President Truman to the Under Secretary
of State (Lovett)*

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] August 16, 1948.

I read the memorandum ¹ regarding the Israel request for \$100 million loan and I sincerely hope that there will not be a flat turndown until further consideration has been given by the World Bank.

Of course, I don't want any loans made that are not proper for the Bank to make but this situation has all sorts of implications.

Sometime in the not too far distant future I'd like to have a conversation with you on the subject and incidentally on several other subjects about which I do not want to talk with the Secretary because of their political implications.

H[ARRY] S. T[RUMAN]

¹ Dated August 11, p. 1300.

501.BB Palestine/8-1648

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Truman

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 16, 1948.

Subject: Proposed Representations to Provisional Government of Israel Regarding Maintenance of Peace in Palestine

Information from a wide number of sources causes the Department increasing concern over the apparent tendency of the Provisional Government of Israel to assume a more aggressive attitude in Palestine.

Following the termination of the British mandate on May 15 and the establishment of a Jewish State, the Israeli authorities were quick to respond to United Nations efforts to stop the fighting in Palestine. After the termination of this four-week truce on July 9, hostilities were resumed and it soon became apparent that Israel had materially improved its military position during the period of the earlier truce. Nevertheless, both the Government of Israel and the Arab States agreed to accept the Security Council's order of July 15 for a cease-fire and truce of indefinite duration in Palestine. The demilitarization of Jerusalem was included in the Security Council's resolution and was accepted by the Government of Israel and the Arab States in principle. In recent weeks, however, a new and aggressive note has become manifest, and the readiness of Israel to maintain the truce has become subject to doubt.

The Department has noted evidence of hostility of Israelis in Palestine toward the military observers serving under Count Bernadotte; the inflammatory speeches of the Israeli Foreign Minister, Mr. Shertok, with regard to alleged "rights" of Israel in Jerusalem; the mili-

tary occupation by Israel of much of the Jerusalem area; and the refusal of the Israeli military governor in Jerusalem to cooperate with Count Bernadotte in discussions regarding the demilitarization of Jerusalem. The Department has likewise noted increasing evidence of systematic violations of the United Nations truce by the forces of Israel, including forward movement of Israeli forces from agreed truce positions, continued sniping and firing against Arab positions; and conclusive evidence of the organized transport of arms shipments to Palestine from France, Italy and Czechoslovakia.¹ Furthermore, the Israeli Foreign Minister has officially proclaimed that Israel will not accept, pending negotiation of a final peace settlement, the return of the approximately 300,000 Arab inhabitants of that part of Palestine now comprising the Jewish State who fled from their homes and are now destitute in nearby Arab areas.

The Foreign Minister of Great Britain, in a conversation with our Ambassador on August 6 [5],² expressed grave concern over the situation in Palestine. He was fearful not only that the USSR would take advantage of this situation to foment trouble in Iraq and Iran but also that within "the next few days" the Jews, on grounds of some Arab provocation, real or manufactured, would reopen their offensive with the objective of seizing more territory—probably Transjordan. Mr. Bevin thought that the Palestine situation was as serious as Berlin. "If the United States and United Kingdom go slack (in Palestine), we lose."

The Department, in light of these developments, feels that it would be wise to call in Mr. Eliahu Epstein, the Representative of the Provisional Government of Israel, and discuss frankly our concern with him. We would tell Mr. Epstein that, as he undoubtedly knows, the United States is the best friend of Israel. We have recognized that State and desire to see it continue in existence and prosper as a peaceful member of the community of nations. We have now before us the question of *de jure* recognition of the Provisional Government of Israel, support for Israel's membership in the United Nations, and the application from Israel for a loan from the Export-Import Bank. We should like to see all these matters arranged in a manner satisfactory to both governments but we should find it exceedingly difficult, for example, to advocate a loan to Israel if that country is likely to resume hostilities. Similar difficulties would arise concerning membership in the United Nations.

As a friend of Israel we deem it of paramount importance that this new republic not place itself before the bar of world opinion and the

¹ The Department, on August 17, expressed to Consulate General Jerusalem its concern regarding information that Israel might resume hostilities unless peace were promptly negotiated or unless Arab troops were withdrawn from Palestine (telegram 835, 501.BB Palestine/8-1748).

² See telegram 3567, August 6, from London, p. 1291.

United Nations in the role of an aggressor. We should like to tell Mr. Epstein for the information of his government that we shall be not less zealous in the Security Council to oppose aggression from the Israeli side as we were when the attack was launched by the Arab side.

From the wider political aspect and not for the information of Mr. Epstein, it is obvious that it would be most injurious to the interests of the United States if hostilities should be opened by Israel against Transjordan with the result that the United Kingdom would automatically honor its commitments to Transjordan under its existing treaty with that country. This would bring forth an outcry in the United States for the lifting of our arms embargo in favor of Israel, with the result that the two great Anglo-Saxon partners would be supplying and aiding two little states on the opposite sides of a serious war, from which only the Soviet Union could profit.

With your concurrence the Under Secretary of State proposes immediately to discuss these matters with Mr. Epstein.

G. C. MARSHALL

Editorial Note

Count Bernadotte, in an undated telegram to Secretary Marshall from Geneva, received in the Department on August 16, made a plea for assistance to Arab and Jewish refugees, noting that successful mediation might continue only if a solution were found for the most urgent aspects of their human disaster.

The Secretary of State replied on August 20 that the Department was working "to determine what can be done quickly and practically." The reply was transmitted via telegram 622 to Stockholm, which was repeated to Arab capitals, Jerusalem, and New York. For the full text of the exchange of telegrams, see Department of State *Bulletin*, August 29, 1948, pages 266, 267.

867N.01/8-1648 : Telegram

*The Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald)
to the Secretary of State*

SECRET

TEL AVIV, August 16, 1948—9 p. m.

55. Mediator's optimism reported from Stockholm about present truce finds no supporting evidence here. On contrary, truce being broken nightly not only by heavy fighting Jerusalem but by intermittent sniping several fronts. Destruction [Latrun?] pumps attributed on seemingly irrefutable evidence by Colonel Perry, UN observer Chargé that area, to Arab Legion and Arab irregulars and PGI as

sumption Arab responsibility [are?] additional proof futility truce and dangerous optimism of Mediator.¹

Personally convinced truce in reality not increasing chances peace but rather contrary. Hence conditions appear to call for concentration efforts secure real peace negotiations. I realize this point view parallels that recently expressed by PGI but that does not invalidate soundness point view.

McDONALD

¹ Tel Aviv, on August 14, advised that the "Destruction Latrun pump station seriously affects prestige UN here and increases Israeli skepticism efficacy truce supervision." (Telegram 52, 867N.01/8-1448)

867N.01/8-1748

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Hare)*¹

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] August 17, 1948.

Participants: Mr. Eliahu Epstein, Special Representative of the Provisional Government of Israel

Mr. Uriel Heyd, First Secretary of the Israeli Mission

Mr. Hare, NEA

Mr. Mattison, NE

Mr. Epstein called at his request to discuss in general the views of his government on the current situation in Palestine.

His particular theme was the reliance which his government placed on the November 29 resolution of the General Assembly. That resolution was the legal basis for the Jewish State and any change in the provisions of the resolution might affect the legal basis for Israeli statehood. This was particularly true with respect to the question of boundaries. Israel would not negotiate on the question of boundaries as a condition of a peace settlement. After a peace settlement, Israel as a free and sovereign state would negotiate any boundary adjustments which might prove advisable.

With regard to the question of the internationalization of Jerusalem, the Israeli Government still adhered to the provisions of the November 29 resolution. However, Bernadotte's proposal that Jerusalem become part of an Arab State, and the lack of concern on the part of the Christian world over this proposal had greatly disturbed the Israelis, and particularly the 100,000 Jewish inhabitants of Jerusalem. To them the question resolved itself very simply: if it were a question of Jerusalem being either Arab or Jewish it must be Jewish. If it were to be internationalized, that was well and good, otherwise it must be Jewish.

¹ Drafted by Mr. Mattison.

Turning to the question of the dissident elements, Mr. Epstein stated that they were a small minority, and that the Israeli Government was well able to control them. The only trouble arose when the dissident groups were also to capitalize on some popular issue, such as the question of Jerusalem's future.

Mr. Epstein next touched on the question of the Truce, and emphasized the necessity of an early peace settlement. Israel, he stated, was anxious to proceed with its development and resettlement program. It was impossible to do this as long as the country was completely mobilized. Furthermore, present conditions represented a heavy drain on Israel's economy. Mr. Epstein expressed the hope that at the latest the truce would end before the opening of the General Assembly and that peace negotiations would be well under way by that time. (I inferred from this that the PGI was anxious that the Palestine question not be reopened in the GA, fearing that modification might be made in the November 29 resolution which would be regarded as unfavorable to Israel.)

Mr. Epstein then went on to elaborate at some length on other factors which presented difficulties to the PGI. Among these he mentioned the lack of *de jure* recognition on the part of the United States and the difficulties which were anticipated in getting UN membership.

I told Mr. Epstein that I very much appreciated the opportunity of this discussion with him. I added that I realized that there were many perplexities and difficulties, but hoped that these would not be allowed to crystalize into patterns which would render more difficult the task of securing peace in the area.

501.BB Palestine/8-1748 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Jerusalem (Macdonald) to the
Secretary of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

JERUSALEM, August 17, 1948—10 a. m.

1202. For practical purposes truce in Jerusalem broken down at least for present. Firing involving use automatic weapons, mortars and artillery resumed last night and is continuing this morning. Fighting during past three nights has been on large and organized scale as distinct from scattered firing and sniping prevalent since start second truce.

United Nations observers appear powerless take effective action bring about cease-fire. Their moral authority has practically evaporated. Jewish authorities obstructing work United Nations observers:

movements restricted, denied access certain areas and permitted visit front lines only specified times.

Sent Department 1202, repeated Cairo 114, Baghdad 13, Beirut 72, Damascus 31. Department please pass London as 30.

MACDONALD

501.BB Palestine/7-2948 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Legation in Saudi Arabia

SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 17, 1948—noon.

313. Dept notes (Legtel 441 July 29¹) Ibn Saud's pessimism re Bernadotte's mediation efforts and Ibn Saud's informal suggestion re meeting of American, British, Jewish and Arab experts on Palestine and ME.²

Dept appreciates motives which have influenced King in thus seeking realistically to find early settlement to Palestine problem. Dept recalls (Legtel 292 July 23, 1947³) conciliatory manner in which Ibn Saud has consistently approached Palestine question.

It may also be recalled that Dept previously expressed belief to Ibn Saud (Dept 224 Aug 12, 1947⁴) that prestige of UN itself was involved in task of achieving solution to Palestine problem and, as member of UN, U.S. desires strongly to support principles for which UN stands and to cooperate to full in promoting its influence in solving one of great problems presented to it.

Dept believes UN and UN Mediator have made substantial contributions toward solution of problem and that successful conclusion depends on continued U.S. support of such effort. It is hoped that the Arabs and the Jews themselves will work with UN Mediator to assist him in promoting the peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine under GA resolution May 14.

Please discuss foregoing orally with SAG. British informed Dept Aug 16 that British Ambassador is replying in same general sense.

Sent Jidda; repeated London.

MARSHALL

¹ Not printed.

² Telegram 441 read in pertinent part as follows: "His Majesty desired to express informally to US and British Governments that two Americans and two British nationals thoroughly acquainted with ME problems and particularly that of Palestine should be selected and charged with getting in touch informally with both Arabs and Jews with view to working out some settlement." (501.BB Palestine/7-2948)

³ *Foreign Relations*, 1947, vol. v, p. 1131.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 1137.

501.BB Palestine/8-1748 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET US URGENT

LONDON, August 17, 1948—8 p. m.

3732. I delivered to Bevin this morning for study and early comment substance Department's 3187, August 12 and pertinent portions Department's 3208 August 13. I took opportunity to speak to Bevin along lines final paragraph Department's 3208 making it clear that Department's considered views regarding Embassy's 3567 August 6 would be forthcoming.

2. Bevin said he would reconsider problem in light of Department's caution "to go very slowly" but he pointed out that this placed him in a serious difficulty. Britain has personnel stationed Iraq and Transjordan whose lives might be jeopardized at any time. He wondered whether in circumstances US would be willing to deny its soldiers adequate weapons for their defense.

3. Later today Bevin asked to speak to me again. He had received in the meantime two telegrams from Dow in Jerusalem reporting Jewish seizure Government House ridge which is summarized mytel 3731.¹ These telegrams as might be expected, reopened in minds of Bevin and British military grave possibilities set forth Embtel 3567 August 6.

4. Bevin referred to his statements to me this morning (Paragraph 2 above) and expressed hope that I would emphasize to Department the difficulties which latest Jewish action has created for him. He asked me to urge Department to consider whether, since Department has asked him to hold his hand regarding arming British bases in Middle East, USG could itself take some immediate and forceful steps with PGI to halt Jewish mailed fist. If something of this kind is not done immediately Bevin inclined to belief that not unlikely result will be complete change of balance in Palestine and the disappearance of the Arab Legion which is incapable of resisting determined Jewish attack because ammunition and other shortages. Should this occur disintegration of Transjordan would probably closely follow.

5. Bevin asked urgently whether he should not now move ammunition for defense of British airfields and British troops stationed there. At my request he agreed to hold his hand until word received from you which he fervently hopes you can send by tomorrow, the 18th.

¹ Dated August 17, not printed.

6. Please advise me also what reply I can make to Bevin with particular regard to our representations to PGI as this is related to Paragraph 5 above. If we take action which will restrain PGI British will not feel so strongly that they are leaving their own troops defenseless.

DOUGLAS

501.BB Palestine/S-1848

*Memorandum by the Director of the Office of United Nations Affairs
(Rusk) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)*

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] August 18, 1948.

Subject: Deterioration in Palestine Situation

Your attention is invited urgently to Mr. Douglas's telegram 3732 of August 17, reporting Bevin's very serious concern over the Palestine situation and his hope that this government will be able to take immediate and forceful steps with the Provisional Government of Israel to halt Jewish aggression. You will note that Bevin requests an answer by today, the 18th.

Mr. Douglas's telegram underscores the need for action pursuant to the memorandum to the President which was submitted by the Secretary to the White House on August 16. I venture to suggest, therefore, that you or the Secretary inquire of the President his reaction to this memorandum, particularly in light of Ambassador Douglas's telegram of yesterday.¹

Copies of these documents are attached.

¹ Marginal notation by Mr. Lovett: "Called Clifford 6 PM".

Editorial Note

In a statement before the United Nations Security Council on August 18, Mr. Jessup noted "suggestions" that the truce in Palestine might not continue. He then stated: "I should like to state in the clearest possible terms the view of the United States on this question. It is the view of the United States that the truce can be terminated only by the Security Council which on 15 July ordered the parties to observe the truce. No one of the States concerned, no group of the States concerned, can terminate the truce."

Mr. Jessup also noted that the resolution of July 15 dealt with an immediate and unconditional cease-fire in Jerusalem and instructed the Mediator to bring about the demilitarization of Jerusalem. He concluded that "The parties are under an obligation to cooperate with Count Bernadotte to this end." (SC, 3rd yr., No. 106, pages 3, 4)

501.BB Palestine/S-1648 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Jerusalem

SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 18, 1948—5 p. m.

838. Conversation reported your 1198 August 16¹ reflects theme previously noted in other telegrams such as your 1148 August 2¹ and Tel Aviv's 36 August 2² to effect that in Israeli eyes Christian nations have shown they are not interested in Jerusalem and that this justifies Jews in taking new attitude toward the City.

We are at loss to understand Dr. Senator's³ remark stressing "particularly Christian disinterest in fate Jerusalem" in light very strenuous efforts made in Special Session GA by French and US delegations to insure demilitarization Jerusalem and safety of holy places. These efforts are matter official record, known to every member UN.

In future conversations with Jewish leaders please energetically refute these allegations.

Changed attitude Jews in Jerusalem toward Bernadotte and UN reported your 1198 is due, we feel, perhaps not so much to intrinsic loss of prestige by Mediator and by UN as to fact that Jews are seemingly lifting their sights and are campaigning to achieve new objective; namely control Jerusalem itself. It would seem natural, if this is case, for them to deprecate UN and Mediator.

As for Senator's comment that UN is unable to enforce its decisions you may take occasion to indicate him and other Jewish leaders sharing this view that US is in grave earnest in its determination that SC action shall be considered, if necessary, under Chapter VII of Charter. Israelis, we feel, will be making great mistake if they seek to base policy on alleged decrease UN prestige and ability UN to carry out its decisions.

Repeated Tel Aviv as 49 for background and for appropriate use with officials of PGI; repeated for info London as 3283; Paris as 3187; Brussels as 1250; and USUN as 542.

MARSHALL

¹ Not printed.² Not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 1286.³ Dr. Werner Senator, Administrative Director of the Hebrew University and representative of the most moderate element among the Jews, according to telegram 1198 from Jerusalem.

S/S-NSC Files, Lot 63 D 351

Memorandum by the Secretary of Defense (Forrestal) to the National Security Council

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 19, 1948.

NSC 27

Subject: U. S. Military Point of View for the Eventuality of United Nations Decision to Introduce Military Forces into Palestine.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the possible military implications of the resolution submitted by the United States and adopted with amendments by the Security Council of the United Nations on 15 July 1948. In this resolution the Security Council has declared that failure by any of the governments or authorities concerned in military action in Palestine to comply with the Security Council's order to desist from further military action and to this end to issue "cease fire" orders to their military forces and paramilitary forces would demonstrate the existence of a breach of the peace within the meaning of Article 39 of the United Nations Charter requiring immediate consideration by the Security Council with a view to such further action under Chapter VII as may be decided upon by that Council. The Council has also declared that, subject to further decision by the Security Council or the General Assembly, the truce shall remain in force until a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine is reached.

The following views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this matter are forwarded to the National Security Council for their consideration:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have consistently stated their opinion that it would, from the military viewpoint, be most inadvisable for Soviet or Soviet satellite armed forces to be permitted to enter Palestine or for United States forces to be committed there.

The entry of Soviet forces into Palestine would have the most far-reaching strategic implications in that the Soviets would then be entitled to land or sea lines of communications, either of which would entail the very serious consequence of Soviet entry into other Near and Middle East areas, and in that there would be no limitation on the number of Soviet forces that might enter Palestine with or without justification by the developing situation. The way would thus be open for Soviet military domination of the Near and Middle East, which would exert tremendously harmful influence on and even jeopardize our global strategy and resources in the event of war with our most probable enemy. The foregoing would also apply eventually to the entry of any Soviet satellite armed forces into Palestine in view of their close relationship with and control by the Soviets.

As for commitment of United States forces in Palestine, the consequences, from the military viewpoint, would be very grave indeed if action anywhere in advance of adequate military readiness on our part should lead to major military commitment; that is, actual major use of armed forces. Participation in enforcement of peace in Palestine by United States armed forces, no matter of what strength, must be viewed as the quite probable genesis of a series of United States deployments to Palestine which might ultimately attain such proportions that our military responsibilities in other parts of the world, which are vital to United States security, could not be either promptly or effectively met.

In view of the worsening world situation and the international appreciation of our current lack of military preparedness, it would be militarily unsound to endanger our world military position, as well as that of other nations dependent upon us for support (most im-

portantly and specifically those concerned in the European Recovery Program), by initiating such a series of deployments to Palestine in advance of adequate capability of major effort there, and in advance of provision to meet those other commitments which are vital to us and other courses of action on which we are embarked.

As for the adequacy of our present capability of major military effort, a reasonable estimate of the number of United States troops that would be required to enforce, or assist in enforcing, peace in Palestine indicates that substantially our entire present ground reserve, both Marine and Army, would be involved either initially or later. In other words, there would be no troops available for deployment to any other area at least until such time as the strength of our establishment had been sufficiently replenished through the operation of Selective Service. Until then, the United States would have to accept the loss of the bulk of its general reserve, as well as the training cadres necessary for the preparation of the units, soon to be organized, and the others which would be required.

Also, the logistical support of troops committed in Palestine would require a major effort within the Zone of the Interior and this in turn would have important bearing on our ability to carry out existing and projected programs of military assistance for our potential allies.

On the other hand, it is obvious that entry of Soviet forces into Palestine and commitment of US forces there would constitute a highly satisfactory arrangement from the Soviet military viewpoint. Only a small percentage of available Soviet armed forces would be necessary and these would open the way, as pointed out above, for Soviet military domination of the Near and Middle East, whereas this relatively minor effort on the part of the Soviets, as also pointed out above, would necessitate commitment of U.S. forces to an extent that would both seriously limit our current efforts to strengthen our military posture and result in non-availability of our present limited forces for emergency employment elsewhere. Thus, Soviet freedom of military action not only would be retained, but also would be improved, while that of the United States would be immediately restricted, and to an unpredictably serious extent.

In short, since our policies in a number of areas and countries are at least partly based on our ability to provide troops and military equipment, either currently or under certain future contingencies, the non-availability of such troops and equipment as a result of United States participation in Palestine peace enforcement might render these policies meaningless because incapable of military support.

At present, an extremely pertinent case in point is the Berlin situation, which in itself undeniably demands as a matter of military prudence not only every effort to hasten the strengthening of our military posture but also the husbanding of every military resource we now have.

It is thus apparent that the situation which now confronts the Joint Chiefs of Staff is one in which the ultimate extension of United States policy in the sequence of events it has already initiated through resolution of the Security Council will lead to two results: the introduction of U.S. forces and of Soviet or Soviet satellite forces into Palestine, either of which the Joint Chiefs of Staff again reaffirm would be seriously prejudicial to our national security.

The Security Council resolution of 15 July, which involves consideration of the use of armed forces, is an accomplished fact. However, further United States support in subsequent steps, such as consummation of agreements under Article 43 and Article 106, would be necessary in arriving at a decision by the United Nations to use such forces. The United States is not now firmly committed to the provision of United States military forces to be used in support of the resolution, nor to acquiescence in the employment of any United Nations' forces. Therefore, there exists no firm commitment on the part of the United States to provide armed forces.

In summation, it is the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that it would be incompatible with the security interests of the United States to have either United States or Soviet or Soviet satellite forces introduced into Palestine. They therefore recommend that the United States policy neither endorse nor permit a decision by the United Nations to employ military enforcement measures in Palestine.¹

JAMES FORRESTAL

¹The National Security Council undertook preliminary discussion of Secretary Forrestal's memorandum on August 19 and assigned to the Department of State responsibility for considering the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and commenting on them at the next Council meeting (note of August 23 by the Executive Secretary of the Council, Admiral Sidney W. Souers, to the Council, NSC 27).

501.MA Palestine/8-1948

Memorandum by the Department of State to President Truman

SECRET

WASHINGTON, [undated.¹]

Subject: Relief of Arab and Jewish Refugees in the Near East.

As the result of the recent fighting in Palestine, approximately 330,000 Arab inhabitants of that country residing in areas now under occupation by the Provisional Government of Israel or the military forces of Israel precipitately fled from their homes and are now scattered either in the Arab portions of Palestine or in neighboring countries, including Syria, Transjordan and Egypt. There are likewise approximately 7,000 Jewish refugees who require assistance. The plight of the Arabs, however, is much more grave. They are destitute of any belongings, are without adequate shelter, medical supplies, sanitation and food. Their average daily ration, made up exclusively of bread, is only 600 calories. Once the rainy season commences and winter sets in, tragedy on the largest scale will be inevitable unless relief is forthcoming.

Thus far the Provisional Government of Israel has refused to admit the Arab refugees to their former homes, which have in some cases been destroyed by fighting and in others preempted by Jewish immigrants. The Israeli Foreign Minister has officially stated that his

¹ Drafted on August 19.

government will not permit the return of the refugees except in conjunction with a general peace settlement and under conditions which will not threaten either the economic stability or the internal security of Israel.²

The United Nations Mediator, Count Bernadotte, on August 16, requested the Government of the United States to assist the 330,000 destitute Arab refugees and 7,000 Jewish refugees by donating and diverting to him at Beirut 2500 tons of wheat, 100 tons of canned meat, 50 tons of cheese, 50 tons of butter and 20 tons of DDT. He has further requested that 10 percent of these items be diverted immediately from United States seaborne supplies or in the nearest ports and that the remaining 90 percent be furnished within three months at the latest, except for the full amount of DDT which is required immediately.³

In the absence of public United States funds authorized to meet the request of Count Bernadotte, the Department of State has turned to private American agencies, such as the Near East Foundation, the American Red Cross, and the Church World Service Committee, all of which have already contributed toward the relief of Arab and Jewish refugees in the Near East. In addition, the American-Arabian Oil Company has offered \$100,000 to the Mediator for relief purposes. The American Red Cross has offered to furnish the 20 tons of DDT requested, and a telegram has been sent to the Chairman of the Red Cross, who is now in Stockholm, asking authorization to furnish \$300,000 of needed supplies for the Mediator's purposes as outlined in his telegram.

Although Count Bernadotte's immediate requirements of the United States do not total more than \$414,000, without adding the cost of transportation, his present request is but the first of many measures which will have to be taken if the Arab and Jewish refugees remain separated from their homes and without means of livelihood. It is estimated that if they continue as at present the total relief need will run between \$2 and \$4 million a month to keep them from starvation and epidemic disease.

The Department of State recommends:

1. That the Department continue its efforts to secure immediate donations from American private relief organizations.
2. That the Department be authorized to approach other agencies of this government with a view to assuming some share of the international burden of relief for refugees in the Near East.
3. That, as part of this government's diplomatic participation in securing a peaceful settlement of the Palestine problem, it urge upon the Provisional Government of Israel and other governments con-

² See Mr. Shertok's letter of August 10 to Secretary-General Lie, SC, *3rd yr., Supplement for August 1948*, p. 157.

³ Regarding Count Bernadotte's request of August 16, see editorial note, p. 1315.

cerned the need for repatriating Arab and Jewish refugees under conditions which will not imperil the internal security of the receiving states.⁴

⁴ Mr. Rusk sent copies of this memorandum to seven officers of the Department on August 19. His transmitting memorandum stated that it "was discussed with the President on the same day by Secretary Marshall. The Secretary has stated that the President gave his oral approval to the three recommendations. . . ."

Later in his memorandum, Mr. Rusk noted that "It is hoped that the President's approval to the Department's recommendations can be used effectively in securing the utmost cooperation from governmental agencies and from private relief organizations. As the memorandum points out, we are but at the threshold of this acute human problem. A much greater effort will have to be made and means found if tragedy is to be averted in the Near East, with consequent repercussions not only in terms of human suffering but also in terms of the political and security interests of the United States."

867N.00/8-1948

*The Special Representative of the United States in Israel
(McDonald) to the Secretary of State*

RESTRICTED

No. 38

TEL AVIV, August 19, 1948.

[Received September 9.]

SIR: I have the honor to report that on August 13, 1948 I was invited to pay my official courtesy call on the Minister of Foreign Affairs Moshe Shertok whom I have known as a personal friend for some years. I was accompanied by the Counselor of Mission.

The Minister received me with great friendliness and the meeting lasted some forty-five minutes, following which the Minister introduced me to Dr. Walter Eytan, Director-General of the Foreign Office with whom I had tea and pleasant conversation.

In the course of my conversation with the Minister I referred to my visit en route with Dr. Chaim Weizmann in Vevey, Switzerland. This turned the conversation into fields of considerable interest—i.e. the plans which the Provisional Government are making with reference to the forthcoming general elections for the Constituent Assembly, the return of Dr. Weizmann and his inauguration as President of the Council of State, the efforts being made to formulate a draft of a Constitution for eventual consideration by the Constituent Assembly, etc.

The Minister stated that, in accordance with the expressed will of the Council of State, a Special Committee of the Council was working strenuously to draw up procedures for a general registration of the electorate. The immediate problem was to determine what form of identification and registration of voters is possible under the extraordinary war time conditions existing; some members of the Committee are in favor of requiring identity cards with photographs and fingerprints; others reject the idea of fingerprints as being associated with police control. Also there arises the question of how to register the

armed forces who remain mobilized on a war footing at the fronts, and many other procedural and technical problems.

The Minister emphasized, however, that the Council had ordered that the registration of voters be completed by October 1, 1948 and that the Provisional Government would do its utmost to carry out the order of the Council. After registration is complete, general elections for representatives to a Constituent Assembly will be held, the tentative date being sometime in January 1949.

In the meantime, stated the Minister, plans are proceeding rapidly to bring Dr. Weizmann to Israel on or about September 15, and to inaugurate him, with appropriate ceremonies, as President of the State Council. The Minister stated categorically that there was absolutely no foundation in the tendentious rumors that Dr. Weizmann's return had been delayed because of the Government's inability to protect his person from unfriendly elements within, or without, Israel. The delay has been occasioned, he affirmed, by the sheer overwhelming burden of organizing the government, fighting off the attacks of six nations, and formulating plans for a proper reception and inauguration.

As regards the preparation of a Constitution, the Minister stated that the task was, of course, the prerogative of the Constituent Assembly and that the Provisional Government had no concern in the matter. By agreement, however, with the Council of State, a group of eminent constitutional lawyers are drawing up tentative suggestions and ideas which will give the Constituent Assembly a working paper from which to proceed.

I am convinced that the Provisional Government is determined to proceed with electoral registration and elections to a Constituent Assembly at the earliest possible moment. When one considers the burden and confusion of the war, however, there arises in my mind the question as to whether it is mechanically possible to register all the people of voting age by October 1st and I consider that the Council may have to concede an extension of time in this regard.

The Mission will keep the Department informed of all developments in these matters.

Respectfully yours,

JAMES G. McDONALD

501.BB Palestine/8-1948 : Telegram

The Consul General at Jerusalem (Macdonald) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

JERUSALEM, August 19, 1948—5 p. m.

1210. Consul General greatly appreciates Department's comments on its telegrams 1198, August 16 and 1148, August 2¹ reporting pres-

¹ Neither printed.

ent Jewish attitude towards Jerusalem (Deptel 838, August 18). Indication given of Department's present position most useful.

By Christian disinterest in Jerusalem Senator meant lack of evidence available in Jerusalem, that Christian institutions such as Vatican, Church of England and Protestant Council of Churches have vigorously condemned fighting here or taken any action to force cessation hostilities. Any information of positive action by organizations mentioned would be most useful.

Consul General feels that shift in attitude towards Bernadotte and United Nations attributable both to Jewish desire obtain control Jerusalem and to loss confidence in United Nations willingness or ability to carry out decisions. At time first truce Jews relatively weaker militarily than Arabs and realized dependence on United Nations for survival at least in Jerusalem. At present conscious of own superior military position and consider United Nations obstacle to their military conquest Jerusalem and perhaps remainder [apparent omission] this explains their present lack cooperation with observers and efforts depreciate Bernadotte and United Nations in contrast to attitude during first truce. However, in view failure United Nations solve Palestine problem or take effective action prevent fighting, Consul General feels majority populace and Jewish leaders in Jerusalem doubt United Nations will take positive steps assert its authority. Because present East-West division in SC and past fluctuations in United States policy Jewish feeling is punitive action particularly versus State Israel most doubtful. Jews have made every effort build up case against Arabs as violators present truce and are confident this evidence will also prevent SC from declaring Israel is aggressor. Consul General considers Jews are actually attempting to provoke incident permitting resumption hostilities blame for which could not be conclusively attributed to Jews.

Consul General therefore wishes reiterate views expressed in its telegram 1157, August 4, that visible evidence SC determination such as despatch armed forces for demilitarization Jerusalem is required to stabilize present situation.

MACDONALD

501.BB Palestine/8-648 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

TOP SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, August 19, 1948—6 p. m.
 NIACT

3302. Ref. para. 8 urtel 3567, Aug. 6, you should reply to Bevin along following lines:

The US offers no objection to measures which the UK considers it must take to protect its own military forces and installations in the

Middle East, as a consequence of its estimate of possible internal disorders or Soviet activity in that area. At the same time, we must assume that the UK will act in accordance with relevant SC resolutions on Palestine and that Count Bernadotte will be informed.

For your confidential information, we do not desire to put the British in position to claim US support if they decide to turn arms and ammunition over to Arab forces despite SC resolutions. We believe they must accept full responsibility for distinguishing between protection of British forces and installations and military assistance to parties in Palestine in violation of truce arrangements as well as responsibility for any determination which they might make that circumstances in Palestine might require action contrary to resolutions of the SC.¹

MARSHALL

¹ Ambassador Douglas replied on August 21 as follows: "When I conveyed to Bevin yesterday substance Deptel 3302, August 19, he expressed appreciation for the understanding attitude which Department has shown in this instance. He said that he had intended all along to inform Mediator before taking any such action and that in order to minimize criticism he intended to ask Bernadotte to arrange to observe any such arms movements. It has been made quite clear to Foreign Office that HMG must accept full responsibility for distinguishing between protection of British forces and installations and military assistance to parties in Palestine." (Telegram 3802 from London, 501.BB Palestine/8-2148)

*Resolution 56 (1948) Adopted by the Security Council on August 19, 1948*¹

The Security Council,

Taking into account communications from the Mediator concerning the situation in Jerusalem,

1. *Directs the attention* of the Governments and authorities concerned to its resolution 54 (1948) of 15 July 1948;

2. *Decides* pursuant to its resolution 54 (1948), and so informs the Governments and authorities concerned, that:

(a) Each party is responsible for the actions of both regular and irregular forces operating under its authority or in territory under its control;

(b) Each party has the obligation to use all means at its disposal to prevent action violating the truce by individuals or

¹ Reprinted from SC, *3rd yr., Resolutions*, p. 24. The resolution was introduced jointly by Canada, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States and was adopted in paragraph-by-paragraph votes. No vote was taken on the text as a whole (SC, *3rd yr., No. 107*, pp. 41-49 ff.). Paragraph 2(c) was added to the draft resolution in response to a request made by Count Bernadotte in his cablegram of August 18 to Secretary-General Lie. The cablegram noted that the situation in Jerusalem was gradually getting out of hand; for text, see *ibid.*, p. 40.

Count Bernadotte, in a cablegram of August 19 to Secretary-General Lie, submitted an interim report regarding the demilitarization of Jerusalem, in which he expressed "serious doubts whether demilitarization can be attained in near future"; for text, see SC, *3rd yr., Supplement for August 1948*, p. 162.

groups who are subject to its authority or who are in territory under its control;

(c) Each party has the obligation to bring to speedy trial, and in case of conviction to punishment, any and all persons within their jurisdiction who are involved in a breach of the truce;

(d) No party is permitted to violate the truce on the ground that it is undertaking reprisals or retaliations against the other party;

(e) No party is entitled to gain military or political advantage through violation of the truce.

501.BB Palestine/8-2048

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] August 20, 1948.

Subject: Cabinet Meeting

Finally, I outlined the nature of Bernadotte's request for relief assistance for the Arab DPs, depicting the situation and its urgency in connection with the settlement of the Palestine problem. All expressed great interest in this and thought we ought to find some way to make the appeal more public. Forrestal thought the oil companies could come across with larger sums and I replied I thought we had better reserve the pressure on the oil companies for the period following Bernadotte's first three months. I did a little thinking out loud and stated that we had not yet touched one phase of the problem which was highly important, which was the reception and distribution of the supplies which would require a great deal of administrative ability and planning and supervision. Incidentally I should think we might approach this on the basis of getting the Red Cross to send in the individuals who are trained in this business and have them assist the various Arab governments, and particularly to assist Bernadotte's staff in establishing the preliminary basis of reception and distribution.

There was nothing else of any consequence that came up in the meeting.¹

G. C. M[ARSHALL]

¹ Marginal notation by William J. McWilliams, Executive Officer of the Office of Departmental Administration: "Copies sent to Rusk and Hare. Appropriate action being taken."

Forrestal's account of the Cabinet meeting is included in his diary entry for August 20 (Forrestal Papers).

501.MA-Palestine/8-2048

*Memorandum by the Director of the Office of United Nations Affairs
(Rusk) to the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] August 20, 1948.

Subject: Arab and Jewish Refugees in Palestine.

On August 19, 1948 the Secretary of State gave a memo to the President on the question of relief of Arab and Jewish refugees in the Near East. The original copy of this memo with General Marshall's endorsement is attached (tab A).²

Your particular attention is invited to the three recommendations made by the Department to which the President gave his oral approval on August 19. The third recommendation reads as follows:

"That, as part of this government's diplomatic participation in securing a peaceful settlement of the Palestine problem, it urge upon the Provisional Government of Israel and other governments concerned the need for repatriating Arab and Jewish refugees under conditions which will not imperil the internal security of the receiving states."

It is suggested that irrespective of the other matters pending between the Department and Mr. Epstein, and on which White House clearance seems yet to be in abeyance, you may wish to call in Mr. Epstein and discuss the specific question of the Arab and Jewish refugees.

As documentation for such a *démarche* there are attached a copy of Security Council document S/948 5 August 1948 setting forth the text of a telegram from Count Bernadotte to the United Nations Secretary General on Arab Refugees (tab B) ; Security Council document S/949 5 August 1948 transmitting a letter from the Foreign Minister of Israel to the Mediator on the same subject (tab C) ; Security Council S/962 12 August reproducing the text of a letter from Sir Alexander Cadogan to the President of the Security Council regarding Palestinian Arab refugees (tab D) ; and Security Council document S/965 12 August 1948 setting forth a letter from the representative of the provisional government of Israel to the Secretary General concerning refugees and displaced persons (tab E).³

In brief, the Mediator takes the firm position that a very large proportion of the 330,000 Arabs who fled from their homes in Jewish

¹ Memorandum drafted jointly by the Office of United Nations Affairs and the Division of Near Eastern Affairs; cleared by Mr. Hare.

² See p. 1324.

³ Tabs B, C, D, and E not found attached.

Palestine to other areas should return to those homes. A very large percentage of these refugees consists of children, women and aged who under no stretch of the imagination could be regarded as a security threat against Israel. As set forth in the memo to the President, the condition of the Arab refugees is appalling. They exist in terms of utmost destitution and if adequate relief is not forthcoming or they are not returned to their homes a large proportion will die before the end of winter.

The replies of Foreign Minister Shertok suggest that the Provisional Government of Israel may be using the fate of these unfortunate people to enhance its bargaining position in connection with eventual settlement of the Palestine problem. Furthermore, there is evidence that many of the homes and household effects of Arabs who fled Israeli-occupied territory have been given to newly arrived Jewish immigrants.

The Provisional Government takes the position that political, economic, and security considerations preclude the return of Arab refugees prior to final settlement of the Palestine problem. If this matter is discussed with Mr. Epstein, you may wish to speak along the lines set forth in Deptel 534 to USUN (Tab F) : ⁴

1. With regard to economic considerations, the state of Israel is demonstrating its capacity to assimilate substantial numbers of Jewish immigrants monthly. If the Provisional Government continues to prevent the repatriation of Arab refugees, it will strengthen the already prevalent impression that the entry of European displaced persons is being accomplished at the expense of the former inhabitants of Israeli territory.

2. While we recognize that Israel's attitude is influenced by considerations of security, we believe that, under the supervision of Count Bernadotte, a substantial number of refugees who so desire could be allowed to return to their homes and occupations without prejudice to the domestic security of the state of Israel.

3. Politically, Israeli cooperation in effecting the gradual return of these refugees would give the Arabs concrete evidence of Israel's frequently expressed desire to construct a firm basis for cooperation with the Arabs. Moreover, such action by Israel would substantially improve the possibility of obtaining an early peaceful solution of the Palestine problem.

⁴ Dated August 14, not printed (501.BB Palestine/8-348).

867N.48/8-1948 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Legation in Lebanon

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, August 20, 1948—8 p. m.

514. Reurtel 439, Aug 19.¹ [Here follows remainder of paragraph indicating that the bulk of the shipments outlined in the first paragraph

¹ Not printed.

of telegram 3236, August 14, to London, page 1310, were already in the Near East or en route.]

US also supported International Childrens Emergency Fund decision Aug 16 allocating 411,000 dollars for assistance refugee children Near East, first shipment of which scheduled leave US Aug 24 for Beirut.

In response to Count Bernadotte's appeal Aug 16 to Secy for refugee aid,² Secy in press conference Aug 18 referred to seriousness refugee situation expressing hope that American relief agencies will respond in their usual manner. He also stated Dept is in process of discussions with various govt agencies to see what might be done to help out.

Dept is actively stimulating private American relief agencies. Amcross has pledged 14,000 dollars to cover 20 tons DDT specifically requested by Bernadotte, and has now authorized additional 200,000 dollars medical supplies for immediate shipment Near East.

War Relief Services of National Catholic Welfare Conference is prepared make substantial contribution including early shipment of supplies. Near East Foundation presently carrying on sanitation work in refugee camps and villages Syria and Lebanon and is prepared expand its services.

Other American organizations and relief agencies have expressed willingness and readiness render substantial assistance alleviating refugee situation. Dept will inform you further as soon as these commitments firmed up.

You may inform appropriate authorities of these developments, assuring them that Dept is giving active attention to refugee situation and that American organizations are responding with traditional generosity to needs Near Eastern peoples.³

MARSHALL

² See editorial note, p. 1315.

³ This telegram was repeated to other Arab capitals, Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, and New York. In a telegram of August 26 to Count Bernadotte, Secretary Marshall stated that the Arabian American Oil Company and the Trans-Arabian Pipeline Company had donated \$100,000 for the purchase of foodstuffs and DDT and that the International Bechtel Incorporated had donated an identical amount for the same purpose. The Secretary also cited contributions in the form of medical supplies, clothing, services, etc., by the American Red Cross, the Federal Council of Churches, the Christian Rural Overseas Program, American Middle East Relief Incorporated, the Near East Foundation, the National Catholic Welfare Conference, and Lutheran World Relief Incorporated. The telegram was transmitted to the Embassy in Sweden as No. 640 and was repeated to New York (501.BB Palestine/8-2048).

The Department, on September 11, informed Cairo that no public funds were available to assist refugees in the Near East and that since the Congress was not in session, such funds would not be forthcoming to meet the current emergency. The Department noted also that United States Government action in stimulating assistance by voluntary groups had already met with "gratifying response" and that further commitments were expected (telegram 1266, 867N.48/9-648).

867N.01/8-2048 : Telegram

*The Special Representative of the United States in Israel
(McDonald) to the Secretary of State*

SECRET US URGENT

TEL AVIV, August 20, 1948—10 p. m.

63. At official reception for me and staff today I had 45 minute confidential conversation with Ben-Gurion. I took occasion to emphasize danger if PGI should have illusion that the USA would under no circumstances participate in imposition of sanctions. I added that conditions might rise wherein US sense of justice and right would, despite US deep friendship for Israel, lead to such action.¹

Ben-Gurion appeared to appreciate friendliness of my frankness. He replied, however, that there were two points on which Israel would never compromise (1) the independence of state, and (2) any action involving threat to national security. As regards point (2) he was at moment referring to danger of allowing mass return Arab refugees prior to peace.

I made no comment on Prime Minister's dictum, but my view concurred in by my staff, is PGI cannot from military standpoint now allow mass return refugees within small confines state, thus creating danger of having enemy at back as well as in front.

I must also add that I believe PGI, suicidal though such policy might seem, would under conceivable circumstances resist UN sanctions rather than compromise on either of above two points.

MCDONALD

¹ After his discussion with the Israeli Prime Minister, Mr. McDonald repeated the same point of view to Mr. Shertok, who made no special comment (telegram 64, August 20, 6 p. m., from Tel Aviv, 867N.01/8-2048).

501.BB Palestine/8-2048 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the American Mission at Tel Aviv

SECRET US URGENT
NIACT

WASHINGTON, August 21, 1948—10 a. m.

59. The Dept is concerned at report in Haifa's 334 Aug 20 repeated to you in next telegram.¹

Please telegraph immediately your estimate of situation. If it appears that PGI is on point of breaching truce and embarking on renewed hostilities you should call immediately on Ben Gurion and Shertok and impress on them the risks PGI will run in SC of being

¹ Not printed; it advised that responsible neutral elements at Haifa were convinced that the Jews were about to make a determined effort to take all of Jerusalem and that "In opinion of many observers drain on financial resources Israeli Government and economic disruption of country caused by maintenance large armed forces makes impossible situation for Government which must act immediately despite truce." (501.BB Palestine/8-2048)

found to be the aggressor, with consequent sanctions, etc. Furthermore, you should point out the continued determination of this Government to do utmost to preserve truce and through it peace in Palestine.

MARSHALL

501.BB Palestine/8-2148 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting United States Representative at the United Nations (Jessup)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 21, 1948—2 p. m.

553. The following is text of letter to UN SYG copy of which will be forwarded to you by pouch with regard to latter's request for 125 additional military observers from US to assist Count Bernadotte:

"With reference to your request of August 10, 1948 for my assistance in providing to the United Nations Mediator for Palestine 125 additional military observers who should be non-commissioned officers and enlisted men, I am pleased to inform you that the Secretary of National Defense, Mr. Forrestal, has indicated¹ the readiness of his establishment to comply with your request, subject to the considerations set forth below.

Mr. Forrestal, prior to taking this action, requested the comments and recommendations of the Senior United States Observer in Palestine. This observer, Brigadier General William Riley, USMC, after careful study and extensive discussions with the Chief of Staff and personal representative of the UN Mediator, concluded that the present number of United States, French and Belgian observers is sufficient in view of the critical shortage of transportation and communications equipment and the inadequate number of Jewish-Arab liaison officers. He believes, and states that Count Bernadotte's personal representative concurs, that what is needed is additional transportation and communications specialists and equipment, rather than more observers, and specifies the number and quantities required.

Mr. Forrestal states that he attaches great importance to assisting the UN Mediator in every practicable way but also considers that the recommendations of the United States and United Nations commanders in the field are entitled to great weight in determining United States further participation in observing the Palestine Truce.

Based on these reports from the field and in accordance with the above considerations, the Secretary of National Defense has instructed the Secretary of the Navy to arrange to provide the following additional personnel:

6 enlisted clerk-typists	
3 officers	} communications specialists
11 enlisted men	
3 officers	} field motor maintenance specialists
12 enlisted men	

¹ In a letter of August 19 to the Secretary of State, not printed.

The Secretary for National Defense has also asked the Secretary of the Navy to make available, at the request of the UN Mediator, and in accordance with specific requirements therefor as determined by the Senior United States Military Observer in consultation with the Mediator or his representative, not to exceed 100 additional enlisted personnel, together with any necessary support, equipment and officer supervision. Such personnel will be provided, however, only to the extent that they are not used for purposes other than observation and supervision of the truce. In no event should they be assigned to guard, protective or enforcement duties, or be employed to provide personal services. In addition, the Secretary of the Navy has been instructed to provide such added transportation and communications equipment as may be specified by the Senior United States Observer as necessary.

The foregoing additional assistance to Count Bernadotte is gladly offered by the United States Government in earnest hope that the United Nations Mediator, with such assistance, will be able to bring his difficult task in Palestine to a successful conclusion. It is understood that the other governments represented on the Truce Commission will provide similar additional assistance to Count Bernadotte, although the number of observers to be provided by Belgium will be less than those from France and the US.”²

Repeated to Jerusalem as 847, Paris as 3241, Brussels as 1259, London 3331.

MARSHALL

² For the statement issued on August 21 by the Department of State on the furnishing of additional military observers to Count Bernadotte, see Department of State *Bulletin*, September 5, 1948, p. 293.

501.BB Palestine/8-2248 : Telegram

*The Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald)
to the Secretary of State*

SECRET URGENT
NIACT

TEL AVIV, August 22, 1948—11 p. m.

66. I anticipated Deptel 59, August 22 [21], indicated mytel 63, August 20. However, discussed question again today with Shertok informing him of grave Washington concern. He categorically stated any reports PGI about take general action Jerusalem or northern Galilee in violation truce were “fantastic”; that he aware responsibility PGI would incur such move. He reiterated, however, his public statement that indefinite continuation truce without any move toward peace settlement creating intolerable situation money, manpower for Israel.

In answer direct question Shertok said [Ben-]Gurion’s views identical those Foreign Minister. Since [Ben-]Gurion absent Jerusalem, impossible immediately confirm Shertok statement but have no reason suspect [Ben-]Gurion’s answer would be different.

My estimate is PGI will not now take deliberate overt action, but if increasingly tense situation is to be relieved there must be evidence near future through UN or otherwise of measurable progress toward peace.

McDONALD

867N.01/8-2348 : Telegram

*The Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald)
to the Secretary of State*

SECRET US URGENT

TEL AVIV, August 23, 1948—4 p. m.

67. Regarding Arab proposal demilitarize Jerusalem (re Jerusalem telegram to Department 1173 August 7 and ourtel 64 August 20¹) Shertok today told me that PGI does not consider it basis for negotiation because (1) the proposal for UN guards is unrealistic since unarmed guards would be wholly inadequate and since SC has shown no willingness supply sufficient armed force; (2) enlargement of demilitarized area would further complicate Jewish problem by increasing chance Arab sudden seizure key Jerusalem positions; and (3) demilitarization of Jerusalem is integral part of whole problem of peace.

He amplified the above by emphasizing that political and geographical considerations including lack of Jewish hinterland are also vital deterrents. He said "as long as danger of Arab conquest exists I can see no other way to protect Jerusalem except through Jewish military force".

Shertok added that rejection Arab demilitarization plan does not preclude Israel consideration internationalization and partition Jerusalem.

McDONALD

¹ Latter not printed.

501.BB Palestine/8-2448 : Telegram

*The Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald)
to President Truman*¹

TOP SECRET US URGENT

TEL AVIV, August 24, 1948—10 a. m.

Already a crisis—perhaps you, Mr. President, foresaw it when you asked me to report on grave issues directly to you—is in the making. It threatens, if not wisely handled both in Washington and Israel, to place the government of this small state before the tragic alternative of accepting dangerous humiliation from the US and the UN or of

¹ Transmitted to the Department by Tel Aviv in telegram 70, "for the personal attention President and Secretary."

defying both US and UN. Either Israel's humiliation or Israel's defiance could bring to the President personally and to our Government—not to speak of the UN—only new and embarrassing problems.

This crisis is threatening because of two basic facts:

1. The seeming wide difference of opinion between our Government and that of Israel on the next important step which should be taken. Washington appears to concentrate on the maintenance of truce, the demilitarization of Jerusalem, and the alleviation of the Arab refugee problem. The Israeli Government, instead of concentration on either of these partial measures, wants peace negotiations now. The truce they regard as merely a thinly-disguised continuation of the war. They insist that the truce, which does not permit them to demobilize any of the very large section of Jewish population under arms, is imposing an unbearable burden.

The Arab proposals for the demilitarization of Jerusalem, which the Department of State reports it and the British regard as fair basis of discussion, the Israeli Government says are unacceptable because: (a) They would work to the advantage of the Arabs and (b) they could not in fact be made effective. To try to enforce such demilitarization could only continue, say the PGI, the present futile and debilitating state of ineffective truce.

Arab refugee problem was, says PGI, created by war and can be finally solved only at peace conference.

According to [Ben-]Gurion and Shertok, there is only one peaceful and practicable way out of the present impasse. This is prompt peace negotiations directly between Jews and Arabs either on their own or under UN or other auspices. Once negotiations were begun or even clearly foreshadowed through acceptance of the principle by both sides, such "secondary" questions as the continuance of the truce, the demilitarization of Jerusalem and the Arab refugees, would all become manageable. Israel wants and would welcome US and UN pressure to force such peace negotiations now.

Striving to see the whole problem objectively, I have reached the conclusion that the Jewish emphasis on peace negotiations now is sounder than the present US and UN emphasis on truce and demilitarization and refugees.

2. The second fact which is inviting crisis is the existence of two dangerous illusions. The one is held in some quarters here that the US would under no circumstances be a party to UN sanctions against Israel; last Friday I frankly warned Ben Gurion and Shertok against this illusion. The second illusion and in my opinion just as dangerous as the first is the feeling in some Washington quarters that Israel would under no circumstances resist a US-supported UN decision carrying a threat of sanctions.

I am convinced that neither [Ben-]Gurion nor Shertok in their talks with me exaggerated when they said in substance: "On no matter adversely affecting our independence or our security will we yield to the threat of UN sanctions, even if these are backed by your Government, which we know to be our friend. What we have won on the battlefield we will not sacrifice at the council table."

Suicidal though it may seem, these people would resist, and not merely passively. I cannot too strongly emphasize my conviction that, rather than submit to what would be regarded as infringement in-

dependence or weakening of security, they would fight both the US and the UN.

My urgent plea—which in different language I have presented to Department of State—is that our government guard zealously against permitting its good intentions and love of peace betray it into supporting a UN policy which would mean armed conflict with Israel.

This message sent through Haifa. Department reply directly Tel Aviv.

McDONALD

Clifford Papers

*The Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald)
to the President's Special Counsel (Clifford)*

PERSONAL

[TEL AVIV,] August 24, 1948.

DEAR CLARK: This letter is to supplement the long telegram I sent day before ¹ yesterday ² to the President and General Marshall outlining the nature of and the causes for the threatening crisis in Israel-U.S. and U.N. relations—a crisis which despite or rather because of Washington good intentions might lead our government into open hostilities with Israel.

To you I want to explain more fully why from the point of view of the PGI the seeming continued concentration by the U.S. and U.N. on the indefinite prolongation of the truce is (a) tantamount to taking sides with the Arabs against the Jews and (b) may finally force the PGI to resume the war despite the possibility of U.S. and U.N. sanctions.

I. So long as the Arabs refuse peace negotiations either directly with the Jews or through the U.N. or other auspices, it should be perfectly clear that Israel cannot demobilize. Until through such negotiations the Arab states recognize the existence of an independent Israel, the Jewish authorities will know that the Arabs are continuing to prepare to destroy the Jewish state.

Hence, an indefinite truce is from Israel's point of view equivalent to a death sentence to be executed at the convenience of the Arabs.

II. Economically a prolonged truce is unbearable for Israel because by precluding demilitarization it keeps perhaps as many as 70 or 80 thousand men and women under arms. To argue that Israel does not need such a disproportionately large section of its population in the Army falls on deaf ears here because the PGI authorities are determined to rely on their own strength to defend their independence and security; and naturally, they will insist on being the judge of what such strength ought to be.

¹ The words "day before" appear on the source text as an addition in McDonald's handwriting.

² The reference here is clearly to McDonald's message printed *supra*.

The danger is that the time may come when PGI will consider resumption of the war as a lesser burden than the continuation of the armed truce.

My own conclusion is that since the President and the Department want peace, they should concentrate on getting peace negotiations started. To reply that this is difficult or that the Arabs won't accept is to confess that the Arabs can indefinitely call the tune.

On this issue, I do not think that the U.S. should be overly influenced by the views of either the Mediator or the British. The former, so far as I can judge, is almost completely discredited not only among the Jews but among the Arabs. His inability to enforce his "decisions" and his loquacious pronouncements have left him neither substantial moral authority nor dignity.

As to the British, it cannot be too strongly emphasized that: (a) their record here in recent years has shown that they can be completely unrealistic in their estimate of existing forces; (b) they are not, and in the nature of the case cannot be, impartial as between Jews and Arabs. Unless and until this is always kept in mind by Washington, there will be unnecessary misunderstanding about the elements in the problem here.

My telegram to the President and General Marshall of August 22 [24] and this letter to you are motivated by concern lest the U.S. get itself needlessly involved and lest the President be needlessly and gravely embarrassed.

Cordially yours,

JAMES G. McDONALD

501.BB Palestine/8-2448 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Sweden

TOP SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, August 24, 1948—6 p. m.

634. Press and radio reports from Stockholm cite "high UN source" as authority for statement Count Bernadotte proposes to lay before Paris session UN GA question possible solution Palestine problem.

Aug 9, Bernadotte's UN Secretariat aide, Dr. Bunche, called on Secy and, speaking for Bernadotte, inquired Dept's view possible Palestine settlement and whether it would be wise for Mediator report directly GA.

Secy did not comment on Bernadotte's territorial suggestions. However, Bunche was told by officers Dept that we did not favor bringing Palestine settlement into Paris GA. This view was based on feeling that development of agreement between Jews and Arabs has not sufficiently matured and that for GA again to debate Palestine issue in absence of such meeting of the minds would merely exacerbate situation. Furthermore, as we instructed Douglas to tell Bevin (Deptel

3208, Aug. 13, to London), submission proposed Palestine settlement Assembly would involve basic principle, which we endeavored make clear in Austin's speech Feb. 24, that recommendations Assembly are not enforceable by UN agency.

Naturally, if Bernadotte can get Arabs and Jews to point of agreement on basic solution and some extra push is necessary in order enable leaders on both sides to carry their public opinion in accepting such arrangement, we should have no objection if Mediator brings matter to GA for its blessing. However, this will be a matter of most careful timing.

Please call on Count Bernadotte and set forth foregoing considerations which we feel warranted in suggesting because Bernadotte's representative in his name has asked for our comments. You should add that we are endeavoring to concert a common line of Palestine policy with UK and hope, once these conversations have borne fruit, to discuss our views with Mediator. It is our hope that, provided UK, US and Bernadotte can all agree on a suggested settlement, it will be possible persuade Arabs and Jews accept a *modus vivendi* which will eventually crystalize in treaty terms. However, this last development seems far off and meanwhile we feel that any approach GA on so delicate a question should be most carefully weighed with respect its timing.¹

Repeated to London as 3358, USUN as 557.

MARSHALL

¹ When Ambassador H. Freeman Matthews presented these views to Count Bernadotte, the latter was reported as saying that "his talks with Arabs have convinced him that they will never recognize existence of Jewish status voluntarily for fear of public opinion in their countries. They must, he says, have something 'to save face with their own people' and they have told him that if they can tell their people that world opinion as represented by UN is against them they will not resume warfare. He therefore feels that if GA passes some resolution similar to one of last year the Arabs will not start another war and will accept existence of Jewish state." (Telegram 987, August 26, 11 a. m., from Stockholm, 501.BB Palestine/8-2648)

Ambassador Matthews, on August 31, reported information from Mr. Bunche that Count Bernadotte understood the Department's viewpoint and was agreeable to keeping the Palestine question off the agenda of the General Assembly, "if that is possible." (Telegram 1003 from Stockholm, 501.BB/8-3148)

861.20200/8-1348 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Legation in Syria

SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 25, 1948—5 p. m.

329. Certain info contained in Legtel 522 Aug 13¹ combined with reports from widely separated independent sources fit into pattern indicating serious efforts being directed toward Syrian-USSR *rap-prochement* character of which though unknown may be of important significance.

¹ Not printed.

Among these items are recent discussions between Soviet diplomats at Damascus and high ranking Syrian officials allegedly including President Kuwatly, visit to Moscow Soviet Minister to Syria, acceleration and intensification communist activity in Syria, reversal Syrian communist party policy which now advocates cessation Palestine war, and Moslem Brotherhood advocacy of seeking Soviet assistance. According sources London Syrian Minister Moscow has been instructed explore possibility obtaining some form Soviet support, and Iraqi Govt has manifested interest Syrian approach to Soviets.

Keep Dept informed developments which you may gain knowledge, repeating messages London, Moscow and interested Arab capitals.²

MARSHALL

² This telegram was repeated to London, Moscow, Arab capitals, and Jerusalem. Baghdad, in reply on September 17, reported that "Neither in private nor official conversations has Embassy detected any manifestation of interest on part Iraq Government to effect *rapprochement* with Soviets. To contrary, high government officials continue voice fear US policy on Palestine has opened door Soviet penetration. . . . Although political *rapprochement* seems unlikely Embassy believes principal danger at present is possible closing of economic ties with Soviets because of Iraq's desire obtain war material from any source and such other supplies as Soviets prepared make available." (Telegram 547, 861.20200/9-1748)

501.BB Palestine/8-2548 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the
Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET

LONDON, August 25, 1948—8 p. m.

3851. Foreign Office has been pressing forward its detailed consideration Department's views as embodied Department's 3187¹ and more tentatively in Department's 3208, August 13. Foreign Office has in mind advancing exchange of ideas with United States Government one step further by submitting its views to Department partly in form of draft report and recommendations by Mediator to UN. At level of officials this draft is already well advanced and should be ready for despatch soon.

2. While Foreign Office views may change, Embassy understands from usual Foreign Office sources that British reply likely to be upon following lines.

3. Foreign Office finds substance Department's thinking not far from its own on major points. However, Foreign Office entertains certain differences of view re practical approach to problem, and has been trying to work out satisfactory compromise. Outstanding among differences is Foreign Office belief that at this stage it will be impossible to bring about negotiations or even informal discussions between Arabs and Jews (paragraph 5 Department's 3187). Foreign Office

¹ Dated August 12, p. 1303.

feels that if acquiescence both sides is to be secured this can only be on basis of Israeli frontier physically drawn by Mediator without consultation with either side as to its main features. Wherever possible Mediator would take into account views local inhabitants, communications, etc., but his decision re boundary location would be final.

4. In particular, for reasons given in paragraph 3 Embassy's 3756, August 18² Foreign Office believes Transjordan Government should not at this stage be asked to undertake negotiations with PGI (paragraph 6 Department's 3208, August 13). Foreign Office believes that if Transjordan Government should do this it would lose last vestige respect accorded Transjordan by other Arab states and net result might be disappearance from scene of most moderate and cooperative Arab League state along with Arab Legion (see Embassy's 3592, August 9²).

5. Another idea likely to be in reply is free zone at Haifa (paragraph 2 Department's 3187) including oil area. This would be under Israeli sovereignty but in initial stages at least Mediator would have to be charged with getting zone into operation on basis free use by Arabs who would be called upon to place no obstacle in way oil deliveries. Zone would be governed by UN port commissioner with international police force. Foreign Office also believes both sides must have access to Lydda airfield.

6. Re future Jerusalem Foreign Office believes Department's idea tripartite condominium would be improved and chairmanship by interested parties two-thirds of time avoided if Jerusalem made fully autonomous municipal unit under neither Arab nor Jewish sovereignty. Jerusalem would be governed by a governor responsible to UN assisted by a force of international police responsible to him. Governor would be appointed in such a way as to avoid deadlock as over governor Trieste. Administration of city would be carried out by Arab and Jewish municipal administrations on either side of line demarcated on ground. UN governor would have overriding authority (powers of veto and of initiative) over both municipal administrations which Foreign Office hopes would fuse after a time into one municipal authority. Meanwhile governor would make necessary arrangements for common services, and would have special responsibilities re rights of Christian communities, preservation of holy places and access thereto. There would be no Jewish corridor to Jerusalem and governor would make necessary arrangements for transit facilities; failure by either party to enter into reasonable arrangements or to respect arrangements made in this regard would be reported by him to SC.

¹ Not printed.

7. Re Arab refugees (paragraph 3 Deptreftel) Foreign Office considers that realistic appraisal this problem indicates that either Jewish authorities should agree to allow refugees to come back or give them compensation for property they have left behind. Mediator would report to SC if PGI refused to enter into reasonable arrangements in this regard. Foreign Office believes that despite their plight in other Arab countries many Arab refugees are too terrified of Jews ever to return (paragraph 7, Embassy's 3785, August 20 ³).

8. Re prospective 100 million dollar US Government loan for PGI (paragraph 9*g* Deptreftel) Foreign Office still has in mind desirability equaling outside economic help to both Jews and Arabs (paragraph 5*b* Embassy's 3484 ⁴) and wonders whether Department plans to make similar or smaller loan to Arab states, who might be slow to realize ultimate advantage to them of encouraging Israel's industrial capabilities.

9. Foreign Office appears in general agreement with principle of letting Arabs decide future Arab part Palestine but thinks it unlikely Palestine Arabs and Arab states could reach agreement on disposal. Foreign Office thinks agreement could only be reached on unrealistic idea independent Arab state. Therefore it believes Mediator should fix general principles disposal with Arab Palestine going to Trans-jordan subject to any frontier rectification desired by Egypt, Mediator to supervise demarcation.

10. Foreign Office shares Department's views that reference Palestine to UNGA except on basis of agreed settlement would be undesirable. However, Foreign Office is doubtful that this can be prevented particularly if Mediator's proposals are vetoed or fail to secure majority in SC.

11. Re paragraph 10 above interesting minority view exists in Foreign Office to effect that there is something to be gained by letting case go to UNGA. Idea is that Mediator should ask UNGA to authorize him to go ahead on a new plan for Palestine which in Mediator's view is most just possible settlement in circumstances. Simultaneously SC would stand by its resolutions and if Mediator should meet with opposition to carrying out his proposals after he has been authorized to go ahead by UNGA he can summon offending side before SC as a truce breaker. Thought is that by using dual origin Mediator's powers it would be possible to reconcile the concept that only UNGA can propose a solution but only SC can impose its will (Department's 3358, August 24 ⁵ paragraph 3). Even minority recognizes undesirability long UNGA debate and believes that if its views adopted matter should be introduced late in session with a view to securing UNGA's rubber stamp approval Mediator's ideas.

³ Not printed.

⁴ Dated August 2, p. 1266.

⁵ This was a repeat of telegram 634 to Stockholm, p. 1340.

12. Foreign Office thinking is against making a commitment at this time re recognition of PGI by HMG (paragraph 9f Deptrefel) although all concerned realize that this will come at some stage. Re US-UK support for applications of Transjordan and Israel for UN membership Foreign Office believes that practically speaking two states are in very different positions: Israel would be elected and Transjordan would be vetoed by USSR. Re committing itself on recognition PGI Foreign Office arguments are familiar ones: (a) HMG must retain vestige influence with Arabs on threshold of all-out drive to secure acquiescence Arab states to Mediator's proposals now under discussion with US, (b) HMG must know frontiers of state it recognizes particularly because of UK-Transjordan treaty commitments, (c) PGI has consistently displayed indifference to British interests and normal rights British subjects.

13. Before British reply is handed this Embassy for communication to Department it is likely that Bevin will take precaution of advising British Cabinet of its outlines. This may be done August 26.

DOUGLAS

867N.01/8-2648

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Under Secretary of State (Lovett)*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] August 26, 1948.

Participants: Mr. Eliahu Epstein, Special Representative of the Provisional Government of Israel

U—Mr. Lovett

NEA—Mr. Hare

NE—Mr. Wilkins

Mr. Epstein called on me this afternoon at my request. Mr. Epstein told me he had been requested by Foreign Minister Shertok to return to Tel Aviv "for a few days". Mr. Epstein said that although Mr. Shertok had not indicated the purpose of his mission, he assumed it would relate to matters which might arise at the forthcoming General Assembly in Paris.

I told Mr. Epstein that I had been hoping to have an opportunity to see him before today but that developments in Europe had prevented my doing so. I said that I was glad to see him now in view of his returning to Israel because I had a few items of business which we might profitably discuss:

1. *Export-Import Bank loan*

I said that I had received his letter with regard to the application of the Provisional Government of Israel for an Export-Import Bank

¹ Drafted by Mr. Wilkins.

loan and that although I had not had an opportunity to reply or discuss it with him I had gone into the matter with the President and with members of the Board of the Export-Import Bank. I pointed out that, in my opinion, Martin's sentence—" . . . Reports reaching me do not appear to warrant at this time active consideration by the Export-Import Bank of the credit application filed with the Bank . . ."—from the Export-Import Bank's letter of July 25 [26]², as quoted in Mr. Epstein's letter of August 3,³ appeared to me to be subject to misinterpretation. This sentence, as explained to me by members of the Board, did not mean that the Export-Import Bank was no longer considering the extension of the loan but that members of the Board still had it under study pending the receipt of further information from the applicants. As a banker I understood the difference between a political loan and a banking loan, and gathered from members of the Board that they would be comforted if the Provisional Government of Israel would make application for loans on the basis of specific projects and would be even more comforted if there were some immediate prospect of peaceful conditions in Palestine and progress toward a final settlement of the Palestine question. I suggested that the Provisional Government of Israel's first application for a loan for a specific project such as harbor construction or some housing unit should be a particularly good one. I observed that the members of the Board of the Export-Import Bank were required, as one of the basic principles of the Bank, to make only loans which offer reasonable assurance of repayment. I said that I could not speak for the members of the Board or say what action they would take, and was merely suggesting a manner in which the Provisional Government of Israel might care to handle its loan application. I expressed the hope that Mr. Epstein in discussing the loan with his colleagues in Tel Aviv would not indicate, as a result of our talk, that loans for specific projects would be immediately forthcoming.

Mr. Epstein said that he appreciated and understood my explanation, and that it was "good news". Mr. Epstein said that my suggestions were concrete and would certainly give the Provisional Government of Israel a line on which to proceed. He said that he thoroughly understood that I could not speak for the members of the Board and that, on banking grounds, the question of a loan was a matter between the Export-Import Bank and the Provisional Government of Israel.

2. *Arab Refugees*

I told Mr. Epstein that we were receiving an increasing number of reports from the field indicating that the condition of some 330,000 Arab refugees from Israel was appalling, and that there was grave

² See footnote 2, p. 1261.

³ Copy not found in Department of State files.

danger of the outbreak of epidemics. It seemed to me that here the Provisional Government of Israel had an opportunity to demonstrate its friendship toward the Arab states and its desire to establish amicable relations with them by gradually permitting the return of such refugees.

Mr. Epstein said that he appreciated my point of view but that the Provisional Government of Israel felt that the return of Arab refugees would endanger the security of Israel and would constitute a serious drain on its economic resources. The Provisional Government of Israel felt that the return of Arab refugees could not be considered prior to peace negotiations between Israel and the Arab states, as this question would be of importance to them as a bargaining point in such negotiations.

I said there might be differences of view with regard to the merits of the question and that I merely desired to stress the concern which the whole world felt regarding the Arab refugees. I pointed out that unless those concerned now took constructive steps we would have a great deal of difficulty with the problem. Mr. Epstein said that he appreciated my point of view in this respect and would discuss it with his colleagues on his return to Tel Aviv.

3. Final Settlement of the Palestine question

I remarked I had noted reports in the press that the Provisional Government of Israel had approached Arab leaders in Paris and possibly elsewhere with regard to a final settlement.⁴ I wondered how Israel regarded the efforts of Count Bernadotte and whether they had lost confidence in him.

Mr. Epstein said that he was not informed of the position of the Provisional Government of Israel on this subject but that, personally, he believed that the Provisional Government of Israel attached great importance to negotiations with the Arabs, and that he believed that the Provisional Government of Israel did not place great reliance on Count Bernadotte's efforts. It was extremely important that peaceful arrangements with the Arabs be found as quickly as possible because the continuance of armed conflict in Palestine represented a terrific drain on Israel's resources. Count Bernadotte had prejudiced his efforts during the first Security Council's truce by proposing that the City of Jerusalem be placed under Arab sovereignty and this had in-

⁴ London reported, on August 25, that "Early in August Elias Sassoon, former head Oriental Section of JA, now resident Paris appears to have written personally to Riad Bey Solh, Lutfi Haffar and Transjordan Minister at London saying that he knew each to be a distinguished Arab personality with whom he would like to renew his acquaintance. . . . A conversation appears to have taken place between Sassoon and Transjordan Minister during which Sassoon is reported to have said that PGI stands on original partition scheme but would be prepared to give economic aid to Arab areas once settlement reached." (Telegram 3849, 890B.00/8-2548) Riad Bey Solh was the Lebanese Prime Minister; Lutfi Haffar was a prominent Nationalist Party politician in Syria.

creased the Provisional Government of Israel's difficulties with dissident elements, such as the Irgun and the Stern Gang in Israel. Israel had however temporarily weathered the crisis as evidenced by its action in the *Altalena* incident and in its military control in the City of Jerusalem.

Mr. Epstein expressed the personal view that the only hope for a final settlement of the Palestine question would be through the direct intervention of the US and Great Britain; that if these two countries approached Israel and the Arabs a settlement would more quickly be arranged; and that otherwise no progress would result from Count Bernadotte's efforts.

I said that I appreciated Mr. Epstein's personal views but could make no comment on them. Mr. Wilkins suggested that both the Israelis and the Arabs might informally express their views to Count Bernadotte and that he might thereafter consolidate them and announce the result as a reasonable settlement of the Palestine question. It would seem, in this case, that the UN through the General Assembly might subsequently take official notice of Count Bernadotte's announcement and might even proclaim it as a final recommendation. Such steps might constitute an expression of UN opinion in which the Arabs could acquiesce. If such a development were properly timed and handled the Arab leaders could more safely return to their capitals with the recommendation that the Arab Governments must of necessity bow before the considered opinion of the UN. Mr. Epstein thought an approach in this manner had considerable merit.

I stressed that our conversation had been informal throughout and that we had expressed personal views. I hoped that Mr. Epstein, in discussing these matters with his colleagues in Tel Aviv, would present them in this fashion and would endeavor to point out the importance we attach to an early settlement of these various questions.

L[OVETT]

501.BB Palestine/8-2648 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consulate at Haifa

SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 26, 1948—3 p. m.

327. Pls contact Bernadotte immediately and inform him of following:

1. Dept has rec'd text Bernadotte's letter Aug 3 re operation Palestine truce terms in connection possible emigration Jewish DP's US Zones Germany, Austria.

2. Pursuant Mediator's reply (para 1 above) Dept and Army have instructed US Mil authorities Germany, Austria adopt following emigration procedures for Palestine certificate holders:

a. Continue prohibit exit all persons identified as fighting personnel (as defined 1st sentence para VI subpara 1, SC truce resolution May 29).

b. Concerning men mil age (18-45) authorize exit those persons for whom accredited reps PGI submit to US mil authorities advance clearance for emigration from zones obtained by PGI reps from Mediator. Lists such personnel submitted by PGI to Mediator for clearance will have been previously scrutinized by mil auths and certified by latter that no identified fighting personnel included thereon.

c. Mil auths will permit emigration without clearance of all non-fighting, non-mil age personnel.

d. Mil auths will notify mediator or Lundström at Haifa in advance of point of departure any group movement of refugees authorized exit US Zones and total numbers refugees such groups.

In formulation above procedure Dept and Army have taken into account (1) direct responsibility PGI as party to truce to carry out provisions thereof, (2) fact that emigration Jews from US zones will generally be for purpose transit France or Italy with eventual embarkation from ports those countries for Palestine. Clearance departure refugees from ports those countries will be concern govts such countries, PGI and Mediator.

If necessary repeat above to appropriate points to insure soonest contact with Bernadotte.¹

MARSHALL

¹ This telegram was repeated to Berlin, Vienna, and Cairo.

867N.01/8-2748

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] August 27, 1948.

Participants: The Secretary
 Mahmoud Fawzi Bey, Egyptian Representative to the
 United Nations
 Anis Azer, Chargé d'Affaires of the Egyptian Embassy
 Raymond A. Hare, Acting Director of NEA
 S.K.C. Kopper, Spec. Asst. to the Director, NEA

After a preliminary exchange of courtesies during which I commented on Fawzi Bey's impending departure for Cairo, he said that he wished to discuss three subjects with me. These subjects were the problem of Palestine in general, the problem of the Arab refugees, and the question of Arab representation in the United Nations.

Fawzi Bey briefly stated that he and other Arab officials had been thinking of what could be practically done to solve the situation in Palestine. He said that time was an important factor. Two things which cause the Arab leaders concern at this moment are the aspirations and plans of the Zionists and the threat of Communism in the

¹ Drafted by Mr. Kopper.

Middle East. He believed that it was most essential to find a solution to the Palestine difficulties which could permit the Near Eastern states to resume a more normal life. He pointed out that projects and plans which had been developed by the Arab states had come to a standstill. It was essential that they be started again as soon as possible. Before offering any suggestions as to how the Palestine situation could be improved Fawzi Bey turned to the other two matters he wished to discuss with me.

Fawzi Bey remarked that the problem of the Arab refugees was becoming a serious question. The Arabs believed that these peoples were entitled to return to their homes. He cited the opinion of Count Bernadotte that the refugees should be allowed to return without the imposition of any conditions. He said that there was a universal belief among the Arab states that something would have to be done very soon since the refugees were becoming a great burden upon the adjacent Arab states.

Turning to the question of Arab representation on the United Nations the Egyptian representative spoke chiefly about the vacancies which will occur on the Security Council at the end of this year. While he did not announce Egypt's candidacy for the Security Council, he left no doubt in my mind that Egypt would be a candidate and would have the support of Syria. He expressed appreciation for the support which the Arab states had received from the United States in the past for election to the various United Nations' Councils and Commissions. He thought that it would be a valuable demonstration of the good faith of the United Nations if they elected an Arab state to the Security Council this year. In addition it would have a very salutary effect in the Arab world.²

Fawzi Bey then came back to the question of Palestine. He said that if it were possible to find some solution based on principle taking into account political realities, we might be nearer to a solution which could, in the long run, be acquiesced in by the Jews and Arabs in Palestine. He suggested that the principle of self-determination might be utilized on the basis of Jewish and Arab population in separate districts in Palestine. He thought it would be realistic to accept as a fact the presence of Jews in Palestine who had come there in the last twenty-five years even though the great majority of them were non-Palestinian. He believed that if it were possible to delineate boundaries on the basis of population areas a major step toward peace would have been achieved. The second important step, the relationship between the Jewish and Arab communities in Palestine, could be settled there-

² The Department, on October 11, informed Cairo that "In light Egypt's successful election SC it may be useful know USDel Paris decided vote for Egypt on first ballot and so informed Egyptian Rep Oct. 7." (Telegram 1410, 501.BC/10-1148)

after. Whether it would be in the form of entirely separate states, or in the form of a dual government like the Austro-Hungarian Empire or a federal state would be left for future determination.

I then responded to the points raised by Fawzi Bey along the following lines:

(a) *Displaced Arab Refugees*—There were two aspects to this problem. First, there was the question of immediate relief required to prevent a catastrophe. Secondly, there was the long range question of what could be done to return the displaced persons to their homes. With regard to the first aspect, the request of Count Bernadotte to the United States for assistance had been more than met by contributions from various organizations in the United States. The Red Cross had sent medical supplies valued at over \$200,000. The Church World Service had sent over 35,000 pounds of clothing. The request for DDT had also been met while the oil companies had given monetary contributions amounting to \$200,000. The Red Cross had authorized an additional \$200,000 for medical supplies and there were other contributions both in money, clothing and medical supplies which had brought the amount contributed from the United States above that requested by Count Bernadotte. The United States had also supported allocation of the ICEF for the relief of Near Eastern children. We did not know what other governments had done. As regards the long range problem we understood it would cost two or three million dollars a month to provide for the refugees. This, however, would simply keep them from starving or dying from disease. We could not say exactly what steps should be taken to effect a permanent settlement since there would be enormous difficulties confronting us. Among these would be whether the homes of the displaced Arabs had been destroyed or occupied by people who had recently arrived in Palestine. However, we would give our support to the Mediator in his efforts to secure a settlement of this matter.

(b) *Arab Representation in the UN*—I was familiar with the representation on the United Nation Councils. The United States had not come to any conclusion on whom it would support to fill the vacancy which would be created by the expiration of Syria's term this year. However, with regard to Egypt the United States would of course have to note the fact that Egypt was a party to two cases on the Council's agenda i.e. the Anglo-Egyptian case and the Palestine question.

(c) *Palestine*—I told Fawzi Bey that I would give thought to his suggestion regarding the possibility of working out a solution to the difficulties there on the basis of self-determination. At the present moment the United States was giving full support to Count Bernadotte. I said that I knew Count Bernadotte was being subjected to some criticism but nobody had suggested to me any person who could do a better job. He has a most difficult job as the Palestine Mediator. I could speak from my experience in China on the difficulties which mediators have to confront.

With regard to the positions of the Arabs and Jews Bernadotte was facing a very difficult situation. It was now apparent that the Israeli forces had achieved a certain degree of military success and were being more difficult to deal with. Some months ago the situation was the

reverse. When I had talked with Arab leaders in New York, they were quite polite but there was an unmistakable note in their tones that they would rely on force in the event they were unable to achieve their desires by other means. It is a serious error to imply that force will be used to settle matters particularly if one's military potential is not adequate to support the threat. By this I did not mean that it was an error to have a force in hand.

An additional difficulty in the situation is the fact that leaders of both sides have permitted the public to be misled and inflamed by sanctioning intransigent statements which do not accord with the facts. Count Bernadotte would have a very difficult time dealing with the question as long as the leaders of both sides did little to exert a calming influence. The situation requires great statesmanship from both the Israeli and Arab leaders.

In connection with Fawzi Bey's remark about the concern of the Arab leaders about the entry of Communism in the Middle East I said that this was also a cause of concern to the United States. I hoped that the leaders in the Near Eastern areas would recognize the necessity for stabilizing conditions in order that Communism might not spread.

I then reviewed briefly some of the problems which confront the United States in other parts of the world as well as in the Near East. I mentioned China, Japan (where we were spending a billion dollars a year) and Europe. I said that we were very hopeful that the European Recovery Program would be successful at an early date. This would be beneficial to the Near East and Asia.

501.BB Palestine/8-2748 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

LONDON, August 27, 1948—9 p. m.

3878. Strictly personal for Secretary and Lovett eyes only. This refers to my immediately following telegrams numbers 3879, 3880 and 3881.¹

1. Although Bevin received Cabinet approval (see my 3879) August 26 for working out with USG Palestine settlement along lines my 3880 and the circle of persons in London having knowledge of US-UK talks on this subject has thus been widened, he told me that even in British Cabinet special security precautions were taken. Only Cabinet members immediately concerned have seen document transmitted my reftel. To other Cabinet members its substance has been mentioned in general terms only.

¹ All dated August 27, printed pp. 1354 and 1358.

2. I am taking special precautions to preserve secrecy at this Embassy and trust Department is doing the same. For reasons which I know you will understand Bevin is particularly anxious that circulation this correspondence be limited only to those who necessarily must study it and that every precaution be taken to prevent leakage and published or rumored speculations re British position.

3. When I told Bevin today (paragraph 1, 3879) that I would communicate his latest views to Department, I expressed personal view that prospects of early US agreement would be improved if I could communicate something of his views re recognition of Israel by HMG.

4. Bevin said that, for the eyes of the Secretary and Lovett only, he would be glad to make clear his own thinking re recognition PGI. What he would say would not be an undertaking and the question has not been discussed in the Cabinet nor has any decision been reached. However, it was his view, which he thought the Cabinet might support, that if, as a result of the plan now under discussion between the US and UK, Israel is firmly established within frontiers drawn by UN, if the remainder of Arab Palestine is disposed of satisfactorily, and if the international character of Jerusalem is preserved, he believed that the UK would extend full *de jure* recognition to Israel without delay. While he could not speak for the Commonwealth, he thought the majority of Commonwealth nations would do the same.

5. Bevin said that in principle he did not like the "halfway house" of *de facto* recognition. Moreover, if HMG were to recognize *de facto*, this would create a period in which Arabs would bend every effort to change the attitude of HMG. If HMG extended *de jure* recognition, however, this would be a final act discouraging to such efforts.

6. Bevin said, in connection with the foregoing, that much would depend upon how "the Jews played the game." If the Jews continue to stress their aggressive intentions and to be mainly responsible for breaches of the truce (as his reports lead him to understand) it would make it much more difficult if not impossible for him to carry out his idea of full *de jure* recognition.

7. Re recognition Bevin expressed view that *de facto* recognition Israel is powerful weapon in hands USG. He thought that if PGI should show signs of aggressive intentions or be intransigent re Mediator's proposals and all else failed he hoped USG would consider threatening PGI with the withdrawal of US *de facto* recognition.

8. I told Bevin that we have already taken steps to make clear to PGI (Department's 3339 August 23 ²) our determination to preserve truce and through it peace in Palestine. I said PGI is under no illusions that US would refrain from imposing sanctions against PGI if this were warranted. Bevin expressed his appreciation for what we are

² Not printed; it repeated five telegrams exchanged by the Department with Tel Aviv and Haifa (501.BB Palestine/8-2348).

doing in this regard and said he hoped we would continue to follow developments in Israel closely.

DOUGLAS

501.BB Palestine/8-2748 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the
Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET

LONDON, August 27, 1948—9 p. m.

3879. 1. I told Bevin this morning when we discussed outline of Palestine settlement which he had handed me last night (see my 3880¹) that I would put his latest views to Department at once. I said I could not predict Department's reaction to them but that, like himself, I hoped it would be possible for US and UK to work out an agreed line in near future.

2. Bevin said he had been authorized at yesterday's Cabinet meeting to continue the conversations already begun with USG through this channel and to present to Department as next stage in these talks settlement quoted my 3880. Cabinet gave him full discretion to agree with USG on what seems most appropriate organ of UN and method of conducting our business there. Cabinet authorization was given on understanding that what US and UK should seek is a UN decision to which the Arabs and Jews would acquiesce. Bevin said last was possibly the most important difference from US views as set forth in Department's 3187 August 12 (see Paragraph 3, Embassy's 3851 August 15 [25]), but Cabinet agreed with him that at this stage it would be impractical to attempt to get the parties to negotiate an agreement. Bevin stressed fact that he is quite ready to continue discussions over whole field.

3. As of help to Department in appraising the thinking underlying the "outline of settlement," Bevin handed me the informal Foreign Office working paper quoted my 3881.² This closely approximates Embassy's 3851 August 25.

DOUGLAS

¹ *Infra.*

² Dated August 27, p. 1358.

501.BB Palestine/8-2748 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the
Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET

LONDON, August 27, 1948—9 p. m.

3880. Following outline of settlement prepared in Foreign Office and approved by British Cabinet August 26 was handed me late yester-

day by Bevin (see Embassy's 3851, August 25 and my 3879 reporting Bevin's remarks).

"1. Most convenient way to present our ideas on kind of settlement which we should wish to see is in the form in which they would appear if Mediator agreed to sponsor them. In that event he might present report to UN on following lines.

2. Report might begin with short historical passage recounting Mediator's efforts maintain truce and various difficulties which he had experienced owing to attempts by both sides to gain advantages for themselves by military action and owing to absence of any force with which Mediator could prevent such action. Mediator could then give his opinion of relative culpability of each side in these matters.

3. Mediator would no doubt wish to add that in his attempt to reach a peaceful solution, as he was instructed to do by UNGA resolution of fourteenth May, he has been thwarted by the entirely incompatible claims of both sides, by difficulty of bringing them together on any common ground and by the entirely unrealistic picture of situation which public opinion on both sides has been allowed to obtain, thus making it more difficult for leaders to accept any reasonable compromise.

4. Mediator might then say that further progress towards a settlement cannot be expected by negotiation between the two parties. Jews will only negotiate on basis of prior acceptance of the existence of a Jewish state; Arabs refuse to recognize existence of this state and maintain that to negotiate with its representatives would give away whole basis of their position before negotiations had begun. On other hand, some success has been achieved, except in a few particularly contentious localities such as Jerusalem and its western approaches, in practical steps to delimit the areas held and administered by either side. The agreement of local commanders on each side has been obtained to an exact definition of a line of this character extending over X kilometres. This process has resulted in a growth of respect for the *status quo* in such areas and has made it easier for UN observers to carry out their functions.

5. In spite of this, continued breaches of truce and cease-fire make it clear that international peace and security will continue to be endangered by situation in Palestine unless a settlement on following lines is immediately adopted.

6. No further attempt should be made to negotiate with the two parties about the general principles on which a peaceful solution should be reached, but a permanent frontier line should be laid down on the ground as quickly as possible. Failure to respect this line would be regarded as a breach of the truce. Frontier line should be laid down on the ground by a UN representative; Mediator might express his willingness to assume responsibility for this task. In discharging it, he would put into effect the general principles set out below, and would consult appropriate representatives of both parties in the areas concerned. He would also take account of administrative conveniences and communications. His decision on location of the boundary would be final.

7. Subject to arrangements mentioned below re Jerusalem and Haifa, the Arab and Jewish authorities shall have complete independence on their respective sides of boundary line. Provisions of SC

truce resolutions of twenty-ninth May and fifteenth July would be maintained until SC acting in light of advice from Mediator, decided to terminate them. For a period of six months after the boundary had been laid down, observers would be maintained on frontier to ensure that SC received early and impartial reports on any attempt or alleged attempt by either side to infringe boundary.

8. Developing his earlier suggestions, Mediator might then lay down following general principles on which the boundary should be drawn. Division between Arab and Jewish areas should follow very generally the lines now held by the forces of either side. As compared with the boundary proposed by UNGA on twenty-ninth November 1947 Jews would gain western Galilee and Jaffa. Arabs would gain the Negeb, i.e., the whole area in southern Palestine south of the latitude of El Majdel, which UNGA allotted to the Jews. This area is larger in extent than Jewish gain in western Galilee, but is at present very considerably less productive.

9. Municipal area of Jerusalem should be a fully autonomous unit under neither Arab nor Jewish sovereignty. It would be governed by a governor responsible to UN but appointed in such a way as to avoid a deadlock of kind which has prevented establishment of a governor in Trieste. Governor would be assisted by force of international police responsible to him. A line should be demarcated on the ground in Jerusalem between the existing Arab and Jewish areas, each of which would have its district municipal administration. Both municipal bodies would be subject to the overriding authority of UN governor, who would have powers both of veto and of initiative. It would be hoped that after a certain time the two bodies would fuse into one municipal authority. Meanwhile, necessary common services would be operated by special arrangements to be made by governor. Governor would have special responsibility rights of Christian communities and preservation of holy places, together with access thereto.

10. There would not be a corridor of Jewish territory joining Jerusalem to the coast but UN governor would make necessary arrangements with Arab and Jewish authorities to ensure transit facilities for requirements of the authorities and all inhabitants of Jerusalem. Failure by either party to enter into reasonable arrangements or to respect them when they had been made would be reported to SC.

11. At Haifa a free port should be established covering a sufficient part of the port area including the oil dock and the oil refineries and pipeline terminals. Goods would be imported and exported through this area on behalf of the Jewish authorities and the authorities of the Arab countries without interference and without payment of customs duties. Agreed facilities would be given for movement of sealed trains and road transport on determined routes between free port and neighbouring Arab territories. Arab authorities would place no obstacle in delivery of oil by pipeline to free port. Any infraction of these arrangements would be dealt with by SC. Pending agreement between Arab and Jewish authorities about operation of port and transit facilities, free port would be governed by a UN port commissioner responsible to UN and having at his disposal an international police force. In absence of agreement between Arab and Jewish au-

thorities, commissioner would demarcate boundary of free port area. Administration of free port during this period would be carried out by a port authority set up by the commissioner and responsible to him. Port commissioner would make every effort to bring about as quickly as possible agreed arrangements for operation of free port and transit facilities. He would report to SC failure of either side to agree to reasonable arrangements in this regard.

12. Both parties should have access to Lydda airport.

13. In relation to Arab areas Mediator might point out that it is unlikely that agreement would be easily reached by Arab Governments and representatives of Arabs of Palestine on the disposal of these areas. It is necessary, therefore, that general principles on which they should be disposed of must be laid down by UN. In November 1947 UNGA recommended that Arab areas should form a separate Palestinian Arab state. But this recommendation was bound up with the proposal, since shown to be impracticable, for an economic union of the whole of Palestine. Without such a union, the Arab areas do not form a viable administrative or economic unit by themselves. It would not be a permanent solution to set up an independent Arab state covering this territory. The territory should therefore be incorporated in Transjordan, subject to any frontier rectification which may be desired by the Egyptian Government. Mediator might declare his readiness to make necessary arrangements, after consultation with Governments of Egypt and Transjordan. If it were decided to modify the southern frontier, its new demarcation should be supervised by Mediator.

14. Mediator might then ask Security Council to endorse above recommendations as only means of ensuring international peace and security. They should inform all parties concerned:

(1) That they should give Mediator (or others in authority charged with demarcating boundaries) all possible assistance in carrying out this task;

(2) That they should respect the United Nations areas in Jerusalem and Haifa and make all necessary arrangements with UN authorities responsible for them; and

(3) That any attempt made during truce to infringe the new boundaries, once they were laid down, would be treated by SC as a breach of the truce and would be dealt with under Chapter VII of UN Charter.

15. Mediator would presumably include in his recommendations some action as to the Arab refugees. Nature of this recommendation will depend largely on the investigations which he is making into the numbers of refugees and the proportion of them who wish to move back to Jewish areas. Subject to this, recommendation might be to effect that as part of the boundary settlement, the Jewish authorities should be made to allow refugees to come back or to give them compensation for the property which they have left behind. The Mediator would report to SC if the Jews refused to enter into arrangements which he considered reasonable."

501.BB Palestine/8-2748: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

LONDON, August 27, 1948—9 p. m.

3881. Following is text Foreign Office working paper entitled "Tactics for Putting into Effect the Mediator's Recommendations" handed me by Bevin today (see my 3879, August 27 and Embassy's 3851, August 25).

"1. Mediator would be advised by HMG and USG to make a recommendation to SC on lines draft attached. (This is quoted my 3880).¹

2. Reference of whole question for discussion by UNGA would much better be avoided. SC can properly deal with Mediator's recommendation as a matter affecting international peace and security. Effect of SC endorsing Mediator's recommendation and communication to all parties as proposed therein would be to enable Mediator to carry out task entrusted to him by UNGA, of seeking a peaceful solution of Palestine question.

3. This procedure is in many ways less attractive than the alternative proposal under which Jewish and Arab leaders would be induced to negotiate within the general framework of the recommendations in order to work out a detailed settlement, particularly with regard to exact position of the frontier. The Foreign Office are convinced, however, that such direct negotiations are in present circumstance impracticable. It is cardinal point of the approach to the problem by the Foreign Office that neither party in Palestine is at all likely to make any positive act of acceptance of the kind of settlement to be proposed by Mediator, but that both parties might well acquiesce in it if it were put into effect with sufficient determination. They hold, therefore, that it would be useless to ask representatives of either party to negotiate on the execution of the Mediator's recommendations. Both parties would have objections of principle to doing so. In particular, they do not favor the suggestion that Transjordan might be singled out from the Arab States to take part in such negotiations. They fear, in fact, that positive acceptance of any such scheme by Transjordan at an early stage would not predispose acceptance of it by other Arab States but would merely serve to make Transjordan's already difficult situation almost intolerable.

4. It is, therefore, suggested that when Mediator has made his recommendations, SC should be asked to endorse them and to issue necessary instructions. HMG and USG would explain situation fully to the Arab and Jewish authorities on the basis of Mediator's report, but before this was published, and would make every possible effort to ensure that they would acquiesce in the adoption of Mediator's recommendations. The two Governments would show that they were quite determined that these recommendations should be put into effect in shortest possible time and that they would not support any attempt to modify or infringe them.

5. If it was impossible to obtain necessary majority in SC or the proposals were vetoed there, it would probably be necessary to take

¹ *Supra*.

matter to UNGA in the hope that they would recommend the adoption of Mediator's proposals and ask SC to take the necessary action to see that they were put into effect, but it would be far better not to have the question discussed in UNGA until SC had acted, and, if favorably, the necessary measures were being put into effect."

DOUGLAS

867N.01/8-3048

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Truman

SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 30, 1948.

Subject: *De jure* recognition of the Governments of Israel and Trans-Jordan.

Although the United States has not recognized the Government of Trans-Jordan, it has supported its application for membership in the United Nations since 1946. This Government plans to support the application of Israel for membership in the United Nations if it makes application and complies technically with the provisions of Article 4 of the United Nations Charter.

A number of considerations favor *de jure* recognition of the Government of Trans-Jordan. Recently it played a major part in securing Arab agreement to the present truce. It is cooperating with the Mediator in discussions concerning the demilitarization of Jerusalem. Trans-Jordan's spirit of compromise, as reflected by the attitude of King Abdulla, is a highly significant factor for the development of a policy of moderation within the Arab League.

It would appear that the *de jure* recognition of Trans-Jordan by the United States would be regarded as favorable by Israel, provided, of course, Israel itself received *de jure* recognition.

The *de jure* recognition of Israel should follow the elections scheduled for about October 1st, and the formation of a permanent Government. There would then be the necessary evidence that the Government of Israel is based on the consent of the people and that the Government is in fact in control of the country and is prepared to carry out its international obligations.

In the light of the truce and the present critical efforts of the Mediator to secure a solution of the Palestine problem, the *de jure* recognition by the United States of the Israel Government and not the Trans-Jordan Government would almost certainly endanger the provisions of the truce, as the Arab states would consider such action as unfriendly. The reverse action of the *de jure* recognition of Trans-Jordan and not of Israel would, of course, provoke serious reactions.

It therefore appears that the United States should plan for the simultaneous recognition of both Israel and Trans-Jordan. It is believed the recognition of Trans-Jordan by the United States would be regarded with favor by Israel. We believe the British Government

would welcome such action and might thereby be induced to favorable consideration of the recognition of Israel.

It is proposed that we utilize the weeks prior to October 1st to discuss the question of recognition with the Provisional Government of Israel and the Government of Trans-Jordan. It is anticipated that we may be able to obtain assurances to this effect from the two Governments, which would be of great benefit in expediting a prompt solution of the Palestine problem.

In accordance with our present policy of Anglo-American cooperation regarding Palestine, we should discuss the question of *de jure* recognition with the British Government before undertaking discussions with the Provisional Government of Israel and the Government of Trans-Jordan. At this time we could include the question of British recognition of Israel.

Your approval of the foregoing procedure is requested.¹

G. C. MARSHALL

¹ Marginal notation by President Truman: "Approved Aug. 30, 1948." The Department transmitted the text of the memorandum, except for the last two paragraphs, to London in telegram 3470, September 1. The latter message concluded as follows: "We would appreciate your discussing this matter with Bevin for his comments before we approach PGI and Transjordan Govt. Re Brit recognition Israeli Govt, we appreciate considerations set forth Embtel 3878 Aug 27 but suggest informal approach by Brit to PGI at some stage should not be precluded and might increase possibility obtaining assurances from both PGI and Transjordan Govt of cooperation with Mediator in his truce and mediation efforts." (867N.01/S-3048)

S/S-NSC Files, Lot 63 D 351

*Department of State Comments on NSC 27*¹

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON, undated.]

NSC 27/1

The Joint Chiefs of Staff summarize their views on Palestine, as set forth in NSC 27, as follows:

"It would be incompatible with the security interests of the United States to have either United States or Soviet or Soviet satellite forces introduced into Palestine. They therefore recommend that the United States policy neither endorse nor permit a decision by the United Nations to employ military enforcement measures in Palestine."

¹ Mr. Rusk, in a memorandum of August 26 to the Secretary of State, transmitted a draft of the Comments and noted: "It is obvious from NSC 27 that the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were formulated without benefit of all the facts bearing on the Palestine problem and upon the role of the United States in the United Nations in dealing with this problem." (501.BB Palestine/S-2648) A "final" draft, superseding the comments transmitted with Mr. Rusk's memorandum, was prepared by Messrs. Rusk and McClintock on August 30 and cleared by Mr. Satterthwaite.

The National Security Council noted the views of the Department on September 2. The following day it formally circulated the paper among its members as NSC 27/1, under a cover sheet entitling the paper "A Report to the National Security Council by the Secretary of State on U.S. Military Point of View for the Eventuality of United Nations Decision To Introduce Military Forces into Palestine" and dating it September 3, 1948. For NSC 27, dated August 19, see p. 1321.

The Department of State has been keenly aware of the dangers involved in the entry of Soviet or Soviet satellite forces into Palestine and the Middle East. United States diplomacy in the Security Council prevented the USSR from sending military observers to Palestine for the use of the United Nations Mediator, Count Bernadotte. It was suggested to the Mediator that only the governments represented on the Security Council Truce Commission for Palestine (Belgium, France and the United States) should supply military observers. An attempt by the USSR to challenge this formula and to secure the adoption by the Security Council of a resolution which would have enabled the USSR also to send military observers was defeated, there being only two votes (USSR, Ukraine) in the Security Council in favor of the resolution.

As for participation of United States forces in maintaining peace in Palestine, the Department of State has repeatedly refused to consider any unilateral military responsibilities in that country. In addition, the Department has firmly resisted the repeated requests of the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the United Nations Mediator for armed contingents of U.S. forces to make up a special guard for Jerusalem to insure the demilitarization of that city.

The considerations adduced in the memorandum of the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not, however, exhaust the problem. Although there appears to be no immediate prospect that USSR armed forces will be moved into Palestine, there is a constant threat of Soviet infiltration into that area which could seriously impair the security of the United States. The following examples indicate the nature of the threat:

(a) In open defiance of the Security Council's resolutions of May 29, 1948, and July 15, 1948, the Czechoslovakian Government has permitted the movement of fighter aircraft, bombs, and other war material from an air base at Zatec to Tel Aviv. Further, there is evidence that the Czechoslovakian Government is now training mercenaries of various nationalities, but predominantly Czech citizens, for parachute and other landings in Israel.

(b) It is known that dissident Jewish groups such as the Stern gang and the Irgun Zvai Leumi are receiving assistance from Soviet forces and that such groups constitute a serious threat to the authority of the present Provisional Government of Israel. Although the USSR, as indicated in (a) above, supports the establishment of the Jewish state in Palestine, it likewise seeks to strengthen Communist influence within Israel. The possibility that Soviet or Soviet satellite personnel and arms will be made available to these dissident groups might result either in an overthrow of the present government or in an orientation of its policy against the interests of the United States.

(c) There is evidence that considerable effort is being made by Eastern European governments, particularly by the USSR, to encourage disorder and unrest in the Arab states, presumably with the purpose either of overthrowing certain Arab Governments or of forcing upon them an anti-western policy. Encouragement of separatist sentiment

within the Arab States, as in the case of the Kurds, is a part of the same effort.

Apart from the specific threats indicated above, United States security would be seriously prejudiced by large-scale fighting anywhere in the Middle East, but particularly in Palestine. Continued warfare between Jewish and Arab forces would undermine the gains which have been made in Greece, Turkey and Iran, might permanently alienate the Arab world from western influences, and might impose upon the United States a basic re-examination of its own world security position.

With regard to the United Nations aspects of the problem, the Security Council is required by Article 39 of the Charter to "determine the existence of any threat to the peace . . ." As a permanent member of the Security Council, the United States is subject to this obligation. It cannot be maintained that the situation in Palestine is not a threat to the peace. Such a finding by the Security Council does not in itself imply the use of armed force by the Security Council. Under Articles 39, 40 and 41 a wide range of Security Council action is available for the maintenance of international peace, without recourse to the use of armed force. For example, the arms embargo imposed by the Security Council on Palestine and neighboring Arab countries has been largely responsible for the present truce in Palestine, however imperfectly the truce might appear to operate. Modification of this arms embargo in favor of the party abiding by Security Council decisions is a powerful weapon of enforcement. Financial and economic embargoes are other measures which might be used if necessary.

United States policy toward Palestine is based upon the maintenance of the present truce, a negotiated settlement (which will include an independent state of Israel, some form of governmental structure for Arab Palestine and an internationalized Jerusalem) and a gradual reestablishment of the ties of friendship and common interest between the peoples and governments of the Middle East and the United States.

It is accordingly clear that the United States has thus far followed a policy of preventing the introduction of United States or Soviet or Soviet satellite forces into Palestine. United States policy has thus far neither endorsed nor supported a decision by the United Nations to employ military enforcement measures in Palestine. It is, however, quite possible that some situation may arise in the Middle East or in Palestine requiring the use of armed forces to protect the vital security interests of the United States, or to prevent the deterioration of the situation in that area to a point requiring an even greater commitment on the part of the United States. Obviously any decision

involving the use of United States forces would have to be made at the highest governmental level, in the light of all existing circumstances, including the availability of armed forces and our military commitments elsewhere.

The Department of State believes, meanwhile, that the best chance for reestablishing stability in the Middle East under present circumstances lies in bringing to an early and successful conclusion the present mediation effort of Count Bernadotte, who was appointed pursuant to the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly of May 14, 1948. The cooperation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in promptly furnishing observer personnel and equipment represents a major contribution to the processes of peaceful settlement.

501.BB Palestine/8-2448

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Truman

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, August 31, 1948.

There is attached a proposed reply to Mr. McDonald's top secret telegram from Tel Aviv, No. 70, August 24,¹ a copy of which is also attached.

It is proposed to answer Mr. McDonald in terms of the enclosed draft telegram.

The Department of State, if you concur, would then inform the British Foreign Secretary immediately of our suggestions to the Provisional Government of Israel.² It seems probable that the question of Palestine will be placed before the United Nations General Assembly in September and it is essential that US and UK policy be coordinated before that time. Likewise, it would be of great advantage if the two governments could concert a line of policy with the United Nations Mediator, Count Bernadotte, whose views on a territorial settlement are very similar to those set forth in the attached draft telegram. The only exception is that Count Bernadotte now seems to feel that Jerusalem cannot be internationalized—successfully, and has suggested that the city be placed under Arab sovereignty but with wide guarantees for local autonomy for the Jewish population. The Department is still inclined to believe that internationalization of this holy city would be the wisest course.

G. C. MARSHALL

¹ See the second footnote 1, p. 1337.

² President Truman, in a marginal notation, gave his approval on September 1. For the reply, see telegram 72, September 1, to Tel Aviv, p. 1366.

867N.01/8-1648

The Secretary of State to the Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald)

RESTRICTED

WASHINGTON, August 31, 1948.

DEAR McDONALD: Thanks for your letter of August 16.¹ I am glad to have your general impressions regarding the prospects of recognition by Great Britain, France, Italy and Greece.

Regarding the present truce, the President and I have received and discussed your telegram no. 70 of August 24.² As a lengthy telegraphic reply will be sent to you shortly, I will not comment on this subject in this letter, other than to express the conviction that the truce is a necessity to any hope for a peaceful settlement and the present evident aggressive tendencies of the Israeli Government to capitalize to the limit on military advantages, real and anticipated, is bound to have unfortunate results where a more conservative course can well lead to a settlement advantageous to that Government.

Faithfully yours,

G. C. MARSHALL

¹ Not printed.

² Sent 10 a.m., p. 1337.

501.MA Palestine/9-148

*Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON, August 31, 1948.]

PLAN OF ACTION ON ARAB REFUGEE PROBLEM

[Here follow sections on background and action taken.]

Conclusion:

A more adequate plan for dealing with the problem, including action to be taken by the General Assembly of the United Nations, the Mediator, the General Council of the IRO and the United States Government, should be developed immediately.

Recommendations:

(1) That a goal of \$25,000,000 in funds or relief in kind to be raised be established tentatively until further information indicates the neces-

¹ Drafted by George L. Warren, Adviser on Refugees and Displaced Persons, and John D. Tomlinson, Assistant Chief of the Division of United Nations Economic and Social Affairs, on August 31; transmitted to Mr. Lovett by Mr. Rusk with his memorandum of September 1, which noted that the proposals were the product of discussion by a working group. Mr. Rusk's memorandum also transmitted two draft telegrams to London which were approved and transmitted, on September 3, as Nos. 3507 and 3508. These messages set forth the belief of the Department that the International Refugee Organization should contribute \$5,000,000 of its holdings of currencies of limited convertibility and that the General Assembly stimulate additional world wide contributions of \$20,000,000 to relieve the Arab refugee problem (501.MA/9-348).

sity of adopting an amended figure; any contributions from the IRO and further contributions from the Children's Fund would be credited to this amount;

(2) That steps be taken immediately to prepare action by the General Assembly of the United Nations looking toward an appeal to the governments and voluntary agencies to provide approximately \$25,000,000 in relief for the period to late spring 1949;

(3) That the Dept recognize that the US should raise a substantial portion of any funds which may be required and that immediate steps be taken to raise these funds from private sources in view of the fact that an appropriation by the Congress for the purpose is unlikely to be made during the period in which relief is required;

(4) That the Department through the Advisory Committee on Voluntary Foreign Aid take steps immediately to set up an organization to raise the American contribution from voluntary sources;

(5) That the Department give further study immediately to plans for more adequate administration of the relief to be raised including the possible attachment to the Mediator's staff of a relief administrator like Bayard Dodge who has the confidence of the Arab community and would be able to make the maximum possible use of indigenous Arab agencies in coordination with relief activities of Red Cross organizations.

(6) That the Department take steps to study the long-range aspects of the problem in terms of repatriation and resettlement.

501.BB Palestine/9-148 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

LONDON, September 1, 1948—5 p. m.

3927. Asked August 31 re timetable FonOff has in mind re course suggested Embassy's 3880 August 27, Burrows and Beeley spoke along following lines.

2. As visualized in FonOff, stage one would be achievement of agreement between US and UK re substance Mediator's statement and tactics best suited to making it effective. This will depend upon time required to iron out differences in US and UK thinking but it should be as short as possible.

3. Stage two would be US and UK presentation to Mediator of their agreed views which Mediator may wish to alter in accordance with his own ideas. British regard this as stage of cardinal importance since statement must appear to be entirely Mediator's own and must have behind it full weight of Mediator's conviction. Time required for stage two might be one week.

4. Stage three would be US and UK agreement to support Mediator's final draft of statement and agreement on substance of US and UK public statements to be issued at stage four. Department suggested such statements in paragraph 6 Department's 3208, August 13. Time required might be relatively short.

5. Stage four would be active one involving (a) approaches by US and UK to both Arabs and Jews urging them to acquiesce to Mediator's proposals; (b) publication of Mediator's statement by SC; and (c) issuance immediately afterwards of US and UK endorsements worked out at stage three. FonOff considers it important that US-UK approach to Arab and Jewish leaders should be made in advance of public outcry which will inevitably follow publication of Mediator's proposals. Danger that this procedure might seem to prove US-UK collusion with Mediator would be reduced if he could be persuaded to give copies of his report to principal parties before sending it to Sec Gen. This delicate period, which would also include US and UK lobbying with SC members for support for proposals in SC, might take ten days.

6. Stage five would be consideration of proposals by SC. If all goes well this might take place about September 20. British believe SC action desirable before UNGA gets down to work.

7. FonOff would appreciate receiving Department's views re foregoing ideas at early date.

DOUGLAS

501.BB Palestine/9-148 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald)

TOP SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, September 1, 1948—6 p. m.

72. For McDonald. I have carefully considered your No. 70, Aug. 24,¹ and have discussed it with the President.

Re Section 1, urtel, it would appear that PGI may be making several issues out of an integral problem, professing its desire for immediate peace negotiations but maintaining its disinclination to carry out certain essential preliminary steps which you cite as "partial measures", including maintenance of truce, demilitarization of Jerusalem, and alleviation of Arab refugee problem.

The maintenance of truce is indispensable to successful peace negotiations. We do not, as member of UN, intend to see solution of Palestine problem by force of arms and accordingly if there is any sincere desire for peace negotiations on either side, they must be carried out while strict truce is maintained.

¹ Sent 10 a.m., p. 1337.

As for demilitarization of Jerusalem, this was in response to Security Council resolution of July 15, which reflected worldwide concern for fate of this holy city and determination of international community that sacred shrines of Jerusalem should not further be desecrated by conflict.

Arab refugee problem is one which, as you quote PGI as saying, did develop from recent war in Palestine but which also began before outbreak of Arab-Israeli hostilities. A significant portion of Arab refugees fled from their homes owing to Jewish occupation of Haifa on April 21-22 and to Jewish armed attack against Jaffa April 25. You will recall statements made by Jewish authorities in Palestine promising safeguards for Arab minority in areas under Jewish control. Arab refugee problem is one involving life or death of some 300,000 people. The leaders of Israel would make a grave miscalculation if they thought callous treatment of this tragic issue could pass unnoticed by world opinion. Furthermore, hatred of Arabs for Israel engendered by refugee problem would be a great obstacle to those peace negotiations you say PGI immediately desires.

In the light of the foregoing I do not concur in your conclusion that "Jewish emphasis on peace negotiations now is sounder than present US and UN emphasis on truce and demilitarization and refugees".

Nevertheless, this govt has for months past been seeking possible bases for a settlement which, if not agreed to, might be acquiesced in, and has made several efforts to bring about negotiated settlement. Some efforts failed because of Arabs, some because of Jews. When you state that Jewish emphasis on peace negotiations now is sound, do you mean that PGI has any assurance that there is any Arab govt with which it can negotiate? Please telegraph on this point.

Provided Arab govts as a group can be induced to participate in peace conversations with Israel, which at the moment seems most improbable, or provided that PGI can initiate private peace talks with one Arab govt such as Transjordan, which seems more within limit of possibility, we feel that PGI would be wise in not insisting on too much. We had reluctantly derived impression from recent developments that PGI desired to obtain all that was recommended in GA Resolution of November 29, 1947 (and which they formally accepted by public proclamation in requests for recognition) plus such additional territory as is now under military occupation by Israeli forces, including the rich area of western Galilee and a portion of Jerusalem. We are aware of the problem presented by Extremists and internal political complications presented thereby. However, we would appreciate some indication of the true intentions of PGI in respect to their territorial claims.

For your own info, the US feels that the new State of Israel should have boundaries which will make it more homogeneous and well in-

tegrated than the hourglass frontiers drawn on the map of the November 29 Resolution. Perhaps some solution can be worked out as part of any settlement with Transjordan which would materially simplify boundary problem. Specifically, it would appear to us that Israel might expand into the rich area of Galilee, which it now holds in military occupation, in return for relinquishing a large portion of the Negev to Transjordan. This would leave the new State with materially improved frontiers and considerably enriched in terms of natural resources by acquisition of Galilee in return for the desert Negev.

Since Jerusalem is such a bone of contention between Arabs and Jews and is focal center of Christian interest in Palestine, we believe that it should form international enclave along lines recommended by GA resolution of Nov. 29, 1947, or by Trusteeship Council in its meetings in April and May, 1948. Any other arrangement satisfactory to both Jews and Arabs would, however, be acceptable to us, provided guarantees were given for access to and safety of holy places.

Please discuss foregoing suggestions with Ben Gurion and Shertok, making clear that although tentative and in the nature of "trying on for size" they are offered in an earnest desire of this govt to assist Israel to become a permanent factor for economic development and maintenance of peace in Middle East.

You should make clear to Shertok and Ben Gurion that we feel that demands in excess of foregoing suggestions would prejudice the possibility of a permanent peace in Palestine.

If authorities of PGI show any constructive response to these suggestions US is willing to present them to Mediator, in its role as member of SC Truce Commission, as being proposals which commend themselves to very serious consideration, and will take similar line with UK which can be expected to exert considerable pressure on Arab govts.

Adverting to concluding paragraph of reference telegram you should make very clear to Israeli leaders that this govt in Security Council will be zealous in advocating that Council apply measures, if necessary, under Chapter VII of Charter, to restrain resort to arms, whether by Arabs or by Israel. Leaders of PGI should be quick to see that non-military sanctions voted by SC as, for example, a ban on any financial transactions with aggressor state or modification of arms embargo, would have immediate consequences in such a state as Israel. In fact we are hopeful that wise counsels in Israel will perceive that new state cannot exist except by acceptance of international community and that PGI, of all new govts, should be most responsive to this fact.

We believe that leaders of Israel stand at moment of greatest opportunity for showing true statesmanship and thus to establish their

republic on impregnable moral basis which will lead to sound political and economic development. US stands ready to give Israel its assistance to this end.²

MARSHALL

² A marginal notation indicates that telegram 72 was approved by President Truman on September 1. No. 72 was repeated to London the same day in telegram 3469.

501.BB Palestine/8-2748: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

TOP SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, September 1, 1948—6 p. m.

3468. Re para. 8 your 3878, Aug. 27, you are authorized to show Bevin text of my 72 to McDonald at Tel Aviv, sent today. This is repeated in our next telegram.¹ You perceive from this instruction to McDonald that our views on possible territorial settlement in Palestine are practically identical with those suggested in British working paper as reported your 3879, 3880 and 3881, Aug. 27.

On question of Security Council power to lay down a permanent frontier for Israel and to regard failure to respect this line as breach of truce which would call for sanctions under Chapter VII (para. 6 and 14 (3) your 3380 [3880], para. 4 your 3381 [3881]), we desire further to study constitutional aspects of this question in light of position taken by this govt in Austin's speech to SC Feb. 24. Our views will be communicated to you shortly.

As for tactics to be followed we agree with Bevin that it is improbable that Jews and Arabs can be brought into face to face negotiations. However, PGI has repeatedly mentioned possibility of negotiations and for this reason that word was used advisedly in our reply to McDonald. We should be content with acquiescence of the parties to an equitable settlement.

As you have perceived from previous telegrams, Dept is not at all anxious to have Palestine issue ventilated at Paris session of GA and our view in this respect is identical with that of UK. You may tell Bevin that as result of private suggestions which we made to Bernadotte, UN Mediator now shares our view and has stated that he will report to Lie in Paris that he believes placing of Palestine question on agenda at this GA session would be unwise. However, it is obvious that both UK and US must be prepared for full-dress debate in event some other delegation lodges Palestine problem before Paris GA.

We should naturally welcome Bevin's comments on our views as expressed to McDonald.

MARSHALL

¹ As No. 3469, see footnote 2, *supra*. The Department, on September 3, telegraphed to London the second paragraph of Secretary Marshall's letter of August 31 to Mr. McDonald, p. 1364, because of its possible interest to Ambassador Douglas and Mr. Bevin (No. 3505, 501.BB Palestine/9-348).

867N.01/9-248 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

Moscow, September 2, 1948—6 p. m.

1843. During long talk on Near Eastern situation Syrian Minister Zeineddine denied that he has received any instructions or made any move toward seeking Soviet support. He stated he has not seen or heard from Soviet Ambassador Solod and that he has had no information indicating latter is here in connection with any negotiations or possible deal between Syrian and Soviet Govts. Moreover, he claims to have no intimation of any weakening of Soviet support of Israel or of Soviet receptivity to Arab appeals or proposals.

While foregoing are factual statements emerging during conversation on subjects mentioned Deptel 1014, August 25 (sent Damascus 329) and Damascus 566, August 27 to Dept,¹ following digest of opinions expressed by Minister may be of interest: *Begin digest.*

Soviet Govt adopted pro-Israel line in May 1947 only after being sure of US position on this same line and deciding this line best ensured promotion chaos and weakening Anglo-American position throughout Near East. While Soviet Govt capable *volte-face* at moment's notice, as intimated to him by Vyshinski² (Embtel 1016, May 31), no such change is likely in the near future. Soviet interests in continuing chaos and "softening up" area better served by further support Israel, since growing Jewish strength and increasing menace Jewish expansionism, combined with Arab set-backs, arouses Arab populations and further discredits Arab Govts and ruling classes in eyes their peoples. Only great improvement in Israel position, including general recognition, large scale immigration and arms supply and actual expansion Israel borders, would impel Soviet Govt to aid Arabs. This might be done, covertly, to extent necessary ensure continuance conflict, while public pro-Israel policy maintained.

Arab Govts are in desperate situation. The popular and local press indignation now directed at US and UK would be aimed mainly at those govts if they were not protected by martial law. They are committed to and constantly pushed further toward policy of force and *intransigence* by popular opinion and are too weak to change direction later even if they wished. Most they could possibly accept in way compromise at this stage would be Bernadotte formula, coupled with curtailed borders autonomous Jewish state too small permit further significant immigration.

Since this unlikely, vital problem for Arab Govts is procurement arms. None could refuse a Soviet offer such arms and survive. If no progress made in GA toward acceptable solution and US and UK

¹ Latter not printed; it reported allegations that the visit of Minister Solod to Moscow was in connection with a Syrian offer to grant bases in Syria to the Soviet Union in return for arms to be used in defense of Palestine (861.20200/8-2748).

² Andrey Yanuaryevich Vyshinsky, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.

continue arms export ban Arab Govts may in fact feel obliged to approach Soviet Govt for help, if only to force British and Americans to come to their senses. Arab leaders realize risks involved such course but Arab proverb justifies deal with devil when no other course open.

It is inconceivable that Arab-Jewish conflict might eventually be settled by act of realistic statesmanship like Venizelos-Ataturk 1930 agreement³ ending ages-old Greco-Turk strife. Situation is not parallel because Israel is frankly expansionistic (as witness even Ben Gurion's recent interview with *Time* correspondent) and because no Arab leader exists with strength and stature comparable Ataturk. *End digest.*

Source must be protected.

Sent Dept 1843; Dept please pass Damascus 2, Beirut 4, London 194, Cairo 2, Jerusalem 14, Baghdad 5, Jidda unnumbered.

SMITH

³Treaty of Friendship, Neutrality, Conciliation, and Arbitration between Greece and Turkey, signed at Ankara, October 30, 1930; for text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cxxv, p. 11.

Editorial Note

The Secretary of State, in a note of September 3 to Eliahu Epstein, replied to the latter's note of August 26 requesting that the United States military authorities in the American zones in Germany and Austria be instructed to remove restrictions on the emigration of men of military age from these zones to Israel. The note of September 3 informed Mr. Epstein that "further instructions have now been issued by the United States Government to the zonal military authorities. The instructions provide for the continued prohibition of the exit of emigrants for Israel identified as fighting personnel, and authorize the departure of those men of military age for whom accredited representatives of the Provisional Government of Israel submit to the zonal military authorities advance clearance for emigration obtained from the Mediator by such representatives." For the full texts of the exchange of notes, see Department of State *Bulletin*, September 19, 1948, page 386.

501.BB Palestine/9-348

Memorandum by Mr. Robert M. McClintock to the Director of the Office of United Nations Affairs (Rusk)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] September 3, 1948.

Subject: Formulation of Joint UK-US Position on Palestine Settlement.

I attach Mr. Douglas' telegrams 3879, 3880, and 3881 of August 27, reproducing a proposed British working paper which might form

the framework for Count Bernadotte's recommendations for a peaceful adjustment of the Palestine problem, together with London's subsequent telegram 3927, September 1, setting forth a suggested timetable whereby Bernadotte's suggestions could be formulated and then approved by the Security Council. I likewise attach the Department's No. 72 to Tel Aviv, September 1, which sketches our views on a possible territorial settlement in Palestine, as approved by President Truman on September 1. The last enclosure is our telegram to Ambassador Douglas sent the same day, No. 3468, which indicates that our territorial views are almost identical with those of Foreign Secretary Bevin, but that we have pending for further study his suggestion that the Security Council in effect will lay down a permanent frontier for Israel and regard failure to respect this line as a breach of the truce which would call for sanctions under Chapter VII.

The issues before this afternoon's meeting would seem to be not the question of what the best frontiers for Israel would be, since the UK, US, and Count Bernadotte are all in general agreement. Rather, what must be presently determined are the following points:

a. Should the Security Council affirm Bernadotte's suggestions by possible Chapter VII action?

b. Should the Security Council seek to affirm Bernadotte's suggestions in light of the probability that, given UK-US agreement on a line of policy, the USSR may veto any recommendation we seek to have the Council support?

c. Should the General Assembly endeavor to make recommendations in support of Count Bernadotte's suggestions?

d. What timetable of action should be adopted by the US, UK, and the Mediator?

For what they are worth, my own views are that quite aside from the Charter grounds for possible Security Council action to enforce a political settlement in Palestine it would be inexpedient to bring the issue before the Council, because of almost certain Soviet opposition to any just settlement. It would similarly be inexpedient to ventilate the issue further in the Assembly unless there were prior acquiescence by both Arabs and Jews and one or both required the extra stimulus of an Assembly recommendation in order to convert their public opinion to accept a given settlement. I would suggest that the United Nations role at this delicate juncture should be confined to the activities of the Mediator and that the final pressures to be applied in order to achieve acquiescence to the Mediator's recommendations should be largely through diplomatic channels. Naturally, the Security Council would continue to discharge its responsibility for the maintenance of the truce in Palestine.

[ROBERT M.] M[CCLEINTOCK]

501.BB Palestine/9-348 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

LONDON, September 3, 1948—4 p. m.

3962. Bevin being absent substance Department's 3468, 3469 September 1,¹ was conveyed September 2 to Sir Orme Sargent, Wright and Burrows. I have no doubt that Bevin's personal reaction will be as favorable as that of officials named to the general tenor of these messages. Because British Cabinet has given FonOff full authority to approach Mediator in conjunction with us (my 3879, August 27) and because Department's forthright approach to PGI has considerably advanced the matter, FonOff officials lost no time in formulating definitive British views which follow :

2. FonOff considers Department's action in putting to PGI through special representative McDonald substance of US-UK thinking has added major new element to situation. Officials were pleased by the character and content of line taken by Department with Israel. At the same time they point out that there is extreme danger of leaks occurring in Tel Aviv. They fear that if through leaks a Jewish-American label should become attached to US-UK thinking this would stiffen Arab resistance to proposals when US and UK voice support for Mediator and ask Arab States to acquiesce in them. Officials feel it important that from moment proposals become known they should carry as label "Mediator—made in Sweden."

Since FonOff has cabinet authority to approach Mediator with proposals, officials suggest that time table in my 3927 September 1 should be speeded up and US-UK proposals placed in hands of Mediator by US and UK at earliest possible moment. As put by one official "now cat is half out of bag, quicker bag is handed to Mediator the better."

3. Officials believe desirability early action with Mediator seems to be supported by recent press reports from Rhodes to effect that Mediator may summon Jews and Arabs there in relatively near future and that he may report to SC on or about September 20.

4. While officials see that there would be some advantage in knowing in advance Israeli reactions to US representations, they see no objection and much to be gained by US and UK taking parallel action with Mediator in very near future without reference to PGI response.

5. Re US approach to PGI, officials inquired whether it meant that Department is coming around to view that circumstances are such that USG will be largely responsible for dealing with PGI and British Government for dealing with Arabs. Embassy replied that it doubted

¹ Regarding the latter, see footnote 2, p. 1369.

that Department had given up principle of similar approaches by US and UK to both Arabs and Jews (paragraph 5 Department's 3187, August 12). Incidentally FonOff recently queried Arab capitals as to effectiveness US-UK approach as compared to approach by UK alone. Replies received today show that British Chiefs of Missions almost unanimously express preference for joint approach. Is Embassy's reply correct?

6. FonOff study Department's messages has given rise to certain queries. FonOff asked whether Department's 3469 in light of Department's 3468 constitutes Department's reply to my 3880 and 3881 August 27. In particular officials asked whether they might assume that paragraph 1 Department's 3468 means that US concurs with ideas re Israeli frontiers as set forth in my reference messages. On basis paragraph 4 and 10 of Department's 3469 re Jerusalem they asked whether they could assume that US does not favor Jewish corridor to Jerusalem. Officials noted that Department did not refer to free port at Haifa and expressed hope that US still regards this as important point. Officials also hoped that Department's strong line with PGI re Arab refugees (paragraph 5 Department's 3469) would prove effective and that US agrees that Mediator's proposals should refer specifically to Arab refugees (my 3880, paragraph 15).

7. Officials were pleased to learn that Department would be content with acquiescence of parties to an equitable settlement since all evidence available to them (see my 3954 September 3²) is unfortunately, to effect that face to face negotiations are presently out of question and that Abdullah of Transjordan is not strong enough to ride out storm which would arise in Arab states were he to embark on bilateral negotiations with PGI.

8. Officials understand fully Department's desire to study constitutional aspects (paragraph 2 Department's 3468) of SC power to lay down a permanent frontier for Israel. They remarked that they would welcome Department's views in this regard and said they were not unshakably wedded to their conclusions if Department had some better ideas. They are inclined to consider this problem "secondary" although they reiterated belief that prolonged debate on Palestine issue at UNGA would be unfortunate. Officials were glad to know that Department has succeeded in convincing Mediator that it would be unwise for him to report in first instance to GA.

9. Wright expressed personal view that despite serious risks of leak (paragraph 2 above) Department's action in giving such a categorical warning to PGI was well-timed since uneasy character truce continues to be matter meriting deep concern. He said that FonOff is continuing to urge utmost restraint upon Arabs and mentioned in this connection

² Not printed.

paragraph 8 of British policy guidance Embassy's 3909 August 30.³ He added that additional warning in same sense will be despatched to all Middle East Missions very shortly.

10. Both Sargent and Wright expressed strong hope that US will agree to joint approach to Mediator (paragraph 2 above) along lines of stage two (paragraph 3 Embassy's 3927 September 1) since they understand from Department's telegrams under reference that stage one is now virtually concluded.

DOUGLAS

³ Not printed; this paragraph directed British diplomatic representatives in the Near East to emphasize to Arab leaders the importance of not breaking the truce. The paragraph also stressed that resumption of fighting would be welcomed by and profitable to the Jews, especially if responsibility could be pinned on the Arabs (501.BB Palestine/8-3048).

501.BB Palestine/9-648 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Jerusalem (Macdonald) to the
Secretary of State*

JERUSALEM, September 6, 1948.

1256. Situation Jerusalem shown marked improvement since Thursday noon when agreement reached under auspices chief UN observer here between Arab Legion, Egyptian and Jewish commanders to cease all fire. Although occasional rifle fire still heard, mortar and automatic fire has practically ceased. Number complaints by both sides of truce violations greatly decreased.

On 4th opposing forces evacuated Red Cross zone including Government House, Jewish training farm and Arab agricultural college. Demilitarized area successfully established including Red Cross zone and surrounding territory. All fortifications in process removal.

Sent Department as 1256, repeated Beirut as 76, Baghdad as 14, Cairo as 118, Damascus as 33, Jidda and Tel Aviv by pouch.

MACDONALD

501.BB Palestine/9-1248

*Memorandum of Conversation Prepared in the Office of the Special
Representative of the United States in Israel*¹

TOP SECRET

[TEL AVIV,] September 7, 1948.

(Note: Mr. McDonald with the assistance of Messrs. Knox and Cummings² had a very carefully phrased statement, incorporating

¹ Transmitted in despatch 58, September 12. The conversation took place at 3:30 p. m., September 6, at the Israeli Foreign Office, with Messrs. McDonald, Shertok, and Knox participating.

² Herbert J. Cummings, a career official in the Department of Commerce, detailed for temporary assignment to the Mission at Tel Aviv.

in paraphrase all of the important points contained in the Department's TS No. 72 of September 2 [1]. 5 [6] p. m., so that Mr. McDonald could read the statement to the Foreign Minister thus eliminating any possibility of misunderstanding or misinterpretation thru verbal lapse. A copy of this prepared statement is attached as Appendix A to this memorandum.)

After an exchange of amenities Mr. McDonald explained that he had something of primary importance to communicate from his government and that he preferred to read it, and that he would add nothing to it verbally, suggesting that the Foreign Minister might care to make notes as he proceeded.

Mr. McDonald read, slowly and clearly the contents of the prepared statement. Mr. Shertok took extensive notes.

When the reading was finished, Mr. Shertok commented as follows; first, he said he greatly appreciated that the U.S. was taking an active interest in the problem of a peace settlement; second, he thanked Mr. McDonald for the expressions of willingness on the part of the U.S. to assist Israel in establishing peace and in building the state into a constructive force for good in the Middle East; third, he stated that as regards Jerusalem he was pleased to note that the suggestion allowed for some flexibility; fourth, he stated that of course he was not prepared to comment at this time on the suggestion regarding an exchange of territory; fifth, as to the specific interrogation as to whether the PGI would give any assurance that any of the Arab States were willing to negotiate peace he went into a lengthy explanation, the substance of which is as follows:

That about two months ago the PGI had sent some officials to Paris in the hope of contacting some Arab representatives there. The efforts were not successful although the PGI agents did have discussions with the Ministers in Paris of Syria and Lebanon, and with the Transjordan Minister to Great Britain who made a special trip to Paris to see them; these conversations were in the most general terms and although very friendly did not progress to the "brass tacks" level. Also contacted were several prominent (though not official) Egyptians whose attitude was not unfriendly but who could not contribute anything concrete. As regards the Transjordan Minister in London it was anticipated by the PGI that he would come back to Paris for further discussions but he never returned, possibly owing to British interference.

One month ago, upon the conclusion of the Fast of Ramadan, the Belgian Consul General in Jerusalem sent the customary letter of congratulations to King Abdullah, concluding with a final sentence which hoped for peace. The Belgian Consul General informed Mr. Shertok that, to his surprise, the King seized upon the last sentence of the letter, asked the Belgian Consul General to visit him personally,

and told him verbally that he was most anxious for peace with the Jews, making in that connection several complimentary remarks about Mr. Shertok and asking the Consul General to suggest to Shertok that the Jews and Arabs meet in Cyprus to talk matters over. Shertok sent word back to the King, through the Consul General, that the PGI was equally anxious for peace but suggested that Paris would be a better place to meet than Cyprus. The King is reported to have agreed to Paris as the rendezvous and stated that his representative would appear there in due course to meet with the PGI representatives. Shertok says that nothing has happened in the meantime although the PGI is waiting; Shertok felt that the British had probably gotten wind of the King's move and advised him not to carry it thru.

Shertok then launched into an extremely brilliant historical summary of British policy in Palestine and stated that, although it was pure conjecture on his part, he was now convinced that the British were deluding themselves and the Arabs into believing that the truce if carried long enough would so soften up Israel that she would be forced to her knees before peace plans would be allowed to materialize. He stated that last week the British Consul in Jerusalem, Mr. Sherringham, stated informally to an Israeli official that the truce would be dragged out deliberately until Israel was on its knees and begging the Arabs for mercy. Mr. Shertok said he believes this attitude is the latest phase of immutable British policy to weaken Israel and that in reply thereto he could only say that the Jews were a determined and resistant people with a remarkable adaptability and that, if necessary, time would tell who would hold out the longest under conditions of truce.

Mr. McDonald said that he had instructions to discuss our government's suggestions with the Prime Minister also and that he hoped for an early reply from the PGI. Shertok agreed to this procedure stating that the issues involved were very important and would have to be discussed in strict confidence with the government.

Appendix A

The Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald) to the Israeli Foreign Minister (Shertok)

Memorandum: (Note: This memo was read verbally by Mr. James G. McDonald to the Foreign Minister on Sept. 6, 1948)

My Government has asked me to express: 1. its hope that Israel will become a great force for constructive rebuilding within Israel's own territory and will be able to exercise a beneficent influence upon this whole area; and, 2, its desire to aid in every proper way in this creative development.

I am also requested to reemphasize in the clearest possible terms the statements which I made to Your Excellency and separately to Mr. Ben Gurion during our first talks more than a fortnight ago. The United States is determined to use all of its influence to prevent a violation of the truce and—should unhappily such a violation occur—will support in the Security Council immediate action, if necessary under Article 7, against the aggressor. My Government feels strongly that such violation must not be tolerated because the maintenance of the truce is an essential prerequisite to peace negotiations.

My Government would be grateful if the PGI would let it know through me if the Israeli authorities have any assurance that any one Arab state or group of such states is prepared to initiate peace negotiations.

In order to determine whether there is a basis for facilitating peace negotiations, my Government in the strictest confidence desires to learn the reaction of the PGI to the following suggestions—suggestions which, although tentative and in the nature of “trying on for size”, are put forward by my Government in its earnest desire to aid Israel in becoming a permanent force for the maintenance of peace and economic development in the Middle Eastern area:

The suggestions are advanced that:

1. perhaps a solution can be worked out as a feature of any final understanding with Transjordan which would exchange a large portion of the desert land of the Negev for that portion of fertile Western Galilee which Israel now occupies militarily.

2. while my Government believes that Jerusalem should be an international enclave along lines recommended by the GA resolution of November 29 or the TC resolutions of April and May, the U.S. would consider acceptable any other arrangement satisfactory to both Israel and Arab States, provided the safety of, and access to, the Holy Places is guaranteed.

3. The PGI consider some constructive measures for the alleviation of Arab refugee distress, which is a factor influencing world opinion.

It should be clear that my Government feels that demands which exceed the suggestions 1 and 2 would be prejudicial to the possibility of effecting a permanent peace in Palestine.

If the PGI is prepared at this time to make known to my Government constructive views in response to the above suggestions, the U.S. is willing to commend above program to Mediator and to British Government which, it is contemplated, can exert considerable influence on neighboring governments.

News Division Files

Memorandum of the Press and Radio News Conference of the Secretary of State, Wednesday, September 8, 1948, at Washington

[Extract]

No. 34

Israel

Asked if any consideration was being given to *de jure* recognition of Israel, the Secretary said it was being considered very carefully and was a matter of timing. Asked if the timing was up to the State Department or the White House or both, Secretary Marshall said it was up to both, but particularly the White House, since the decision naturally was the President's. He said that the recommendation was with him. Asked if this meant that he had decided to recognize Israel but had not decided when to do it, Secretary Marshall said that it was the hope of the United States that we could find it proper to recognize the government of Israel in a *de jure* manner. He continued that final decision would have to be taken in the matter of timing because it has something to do with the elections. Asked if he were referring to the Israeli elections, the Secretary said that he believed that they have elections on October first. A correspondent said that from what had been said it would appear that the Secretary had said that he had decided to recognize Israel after the elections. Secretary Marshall replied that it was hoped that we could. He was then asked if the implication was that it was now premature to extend *de jure* recognition. The Secretary declared that he would make no more comments.

M. J. McDERMOTT

867N.01/9-848

Memorandum by the Secretary of State to President Truman

SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 8, 1948.

Reference is made to my secret memorandum of August 30, 1948, relating to the *de jure* recognition of the Governments of Israel and Transjordan.

For your background guidance, I am attaching press clippings relating to my press conference on September 8¹ at which I was ques-

¹ Attached to the ribbon copy are typescript copies of two unidentified news dispatches (Truman Papers, President's Secretary's File).

tioned concerning the extension of *de jure* recognition to Israel by the United States. I became committed to a reply of the nature made by me because of my ill-advised use of the expression that the *de jure* recognition was "a matter of timing".

If you are also questioned on this subject, it is suggested that the press correspondents be informed that the question of *de jure* recognition of Israel will not be finally decided until a recommendation is received from the State Department. It might also be stated that a recommendation is not expected from the State Department until elections have been held in Israel, now scheduled to take place about October 1.

G. C. MARSHALL

Editorial Note

President Truman was asked at his press conference of September 9 whether recognition of the Government of Israel would have to wait until after the election in that country. He replied that "I have that matter under consideration now. I cannot give you a definite answer on it now." (*Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1948*, page 482.)

867N.01/9-S48

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State*¹

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] September 8, 1948.

Participants: Secretary of State George C. Marshall
General Julius Klein and sixteen other representatives
of the Jewish War Veterans

This afternoon, shortly after 3:00 P.M., I received a delegation of seventeen representatives of the Jewish War Veterans of the United States, headed by Mr. Julius Klein, their national commander.

Klein informed me that the group had met with the President earlier in the day. He then made a statement to me of the views of the Jewish War Veterans regarding Palestine which was generally more moderate in tone than other statements I have received from similar groups. (At the close of the interview Mr. Klein presented me with a copy of the formal statement of the views of his organization on this topic).²

In my remarks I replied generally to Klein's statement and said that I approved the emphasis which had been given to the national interest in Klein's statement.

¹ Drafted by Garland C. Routt of the Division of Public Liaison.

² Not attached to file copy.

I emphasized that as Secretary of State it was my duty to approach the problem of Palestine on a realistic basis, as free as possible from the emotionalism which surrounds the issue. My duty, I pointed out, was to seek calmly a wise long-range solution which would adequately serve the interests of the United States.

I mentioned that, to some extent at least, the emotionalism of the issue had caught up the Arab peoples to such an extent that Arab leaders are not able to make concessions which otherwise they might be willing to make. I remarked, off-the-record, that in the very polite talks with diplomatic representatives of Arab nations there had been recurring reference to the use of Arab military force and that this tactic had been both unwise and ineffective. Likewise there was the suggestion of political reprisals by Jewish groups in the United States.

I also indicated that the expansionist tendencies of the U.S.S.R. in this area further complicated the already complex situation.

I discussed the terrible condition of the Arab refugees and emphasized that, regardless of where the fault lay for their plight, immediate assistance was required for the people involved and that the United States Government was helping to provide needed assistance. This problem I described as a sore in the midst of an area which we are trying to heal.

Klein said that the President had indicated that the activities of extreme Zionist groups had greatly complicated the problem of dealing with the Palestine issue, and asked if I wished to comment on this. I indicated that I had no comment to make.

I stated that the present situation in Palestine gave more promise of a satisfactory solution than at any time since the problem had arisen, and that the prospect[s] for such a solution were good. I warned that an effective solution would probably please neither the Arab nor Israel governments.

501.BB Palestine/9-148: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

TOP SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, September 8, 1948—noon.

3544. Re Deptel 3468, Sep 1 and urtel 3927 Sep 1 we are [of] opinion that, quite aside from such doubts as might exist on constitutional interpretation UN Charter as to SC powers to use Chapter VII enforcement action to establish a permanent frontier in Palestine, it would be highly unwise from political point of view for SC to entertain resolution to that effect. For your strictly private info SC enforcement action to establish final frontiers in Palestine might not find popular support in US at a given moment and would certainly meet with disapproval of JCS on strictly military grounds if enforce-

ment were contemplated which would involve use of troops. Furthermore (and this seems conclusive to us) it would be inexpedient to bring issue before Council because of almost certain Soviet opposition to any settlement on which UK and US were in agreement.

In consequence foregoing considerations we do not find ourselves able agree with suggestion para 6 your 3880 Aug 27. SC would however of course continue its responsibilities for maintenance truce in Palestine.

Likewise, on political grounds, we feel it would be inexpedient to reanimate Palestine issue in SC or GA unless there were prior acquiescence by both Arabs and Jews to a suggested settlement and one side or both required extra stimulus of SC or GA recommendation in order to convert public opinion to accept a given settlement. In such case we would have no objection appropriate UN action.

Re timetable suggested Embtel 3927 Sep 1 we agree with FO view in second para Embtel 3962 Sep 3 that timetable should be speeded up and US-UK proposals placed in hands Mediator by US and UK earliest possible moment. We consider, however, that we should await PGI reaction, which should be forthcoming shortly. We agree on immediate joint approach Bernadotte thereafter with view public announcement by him of reasonable solution. This solution would include Mediator's territorial recommendations for frontier between Israel and Transjordan. We continue believe preferable for both of us to exert extreme diplomatic pressure on both sides. Both Govts would inform PGI and Arab states their belief that recommendation Mediator was equitable and to advantage all concerned to accept. If this procedure is attended with success GA, toward end session, might be able pass quickly brief resolution recommending Mediator's suggestion to favorable consideration of parties, thus saving face Arab and Jewish leaders.

Re para 5, Embtel 3962 Sep 3, Embs reply was correct. Dept has not given up principle similar approaches by US and UK to both Arabs and Jews.

Re para 6 Embtel 3962 Sep 3. Deptels 3468 and 3469 Sep 1¹ may be considered replies in principle to Embtels 3880 and 3881 Aug. 27. Further replies re specific points and details will follow. Dept concurs in general with Brit ideas re Israeli frontiers. US does not favor Jewish corridor to Jerusalem on assumption some acceptable plan for Jerusalem itself can be worked out. Dept still considers Haifa as important point. US agrees that Mediator's proposal should refer specifically to Arab refugees.

Pls insure foregoing is treated with utmost discretion.

MARSHALL

¹ Regarding the latter, see footnote 2, p. 1369.

501.BB Palestine/9-848 : Telegram

*The Consul General at Jerusalem (Macdonald) to the
Secretary of State*

RESTRICTED

JERUSALEM, September 8, 1948—3 p. m.

1261. In speech over Transjordan controlled Ramallah radio on 5th Azmi Nashashibi, director station and brigadier in Arab Legion, indicated Arabs might consider direct talks with Jews under following "conditions": Jews return to areas held before November 29, return of all Arab refugees, payment by Jews for damages. Jews not attempt to dictate to Arabs. Although conditions mentioned obviously unacceptable, speech significant as further indication possible Arab willingness negotiate directly with Jews.

MACDONALD

501.BB Palestine/9-948 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the
Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET

LONDON, September 9, 1948—noon.

4033. For the Secretary. I plan to take up subject of Department's 3470, September 1¹ with Bevin personally at an early opportunity and to elicit considered British views, but I believe they are likely to be along lines of following reactions at Wright-Burrows level:

1. Announcement by PGI that its elections have been postponed from October 1 to November 15 in view Foreign Office officials may obviate dangers which they believe would be inherent in simultaneous *de jure* recognition by US of PGI and Transjordan during or before crucial period of discussion following announcement of Mediator's proposals. Officials in principle welcome US intention to recognize Transjordan, see logic of US extending *de jure* recognition to Israel (Embassy's 3878, August 27, Paragraph 5) and agree that there are advantages in simultaneous recognition both countries. In their view, however, timing of recognition in relation to action which US and UK have been discussing (Embassy's 3962 September 3) is vitally important.

2. Foreign Office officials fear US recognition of Transjordan before acquiescence of Arab States to Mediator's proposals is achieved would greatly weaken already shaky position of Transjordan in eyes of its Arab neighbors who would be quick to allege that US recognition of Transjordan is clear evidence of US-Transjordan "deal" by which former paid Transjordan with recognition for "selling out" Arab cause in Palestine. Foreign Office officials have no doubt that Arab press and public will in any case roundly denounce any proposals put forward by Mediator even though they believe that "acquiescence" of Arab States to proposals can be secured eventually. However, vigor of these denunciations would be greatly increased if local scapegoat

¹ See footnote 1 to memorandum of August 30, p. 1360.

wearing horns of perfidy were available. UN has advantage of being an intangible villain but "Rabbi" Abdullah, upon whom we will have to rely so heavily at a later stage, is already on the spot and would be in even worse one if he were to appear prior to UN action as party to "deal".

3. Officials believe it is essential that if Transjordan is to be useful in achieving a lasting settlement Abdullah must seem just as outraged as other Arab leaders with whom it is expedient that the [he?] display every evidence of solidarity.

4. In essence view of Foreign Office officials is that timing of US *de jure* recognition of both Transjordan and PGI should be decided on basis of progress actually made with regard to Mediator's proposals.

5. Goldmann confirmed November 15 election date today.

DOUGLAS

501.BB Palestine/9-948 : Telegram

*The Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald)
to the Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET

US URGENT

TEL AVIV, September 9, 1948—4 p. m.

NIACT

98. This message sent through Haifa; Department reply directly Tel Aviv.

On September 8 I had one hour and half meeting with Ben-Gurion and Shertok (reDeptel 72, September 1 and 80, September 8¹) Knox and Epstein present.

Prime Minister began by stating that most important feature of US suggestions was evidence positive interest in offering assist facilitate peace settlement; however, he stated he was confused by our procedure of agreeing to "commend" a program to UN Mediator and was doubtful that such step would result fruitful negotiations; he said he would preferably welcome US good offices to "mediate" directly with Arabs, or to facilitate Israel direct negotiations with Arabs.

Prime Minister, obviously showing signs near exhaustion, then commented on truce in serious and emphatic tone as follows:

1. Indefinite truce is an indirect sanction of Arabs keep their invading armies in Palestine indefinitely.

2. UN has taken no action punish serious Arab truce violations such as destruction Latrun pumping station which, except for foresight Jews in constructing independent pipe lines would have condemned 110,000 Jews in Jerusalem to death by thirst.

3. While UN observers "swarm" over Israel PGI has no evidence that Arab armies are being restrained in Arab states. On contrary PGI intelligence indicates Arab armies are massing and arms ammunition are being obtained; Prime Minister also stated parenthetically that he understands large ship with arms for Arabs now on way from Italy to Beirut.

¹ Latter not printed.

4. Indefinite truce means foreign supervision Israel for indefinite period and this deeply resented by Israel; as now interpreted truce means supervision on immigration, not only by UN but now also by USA action restraining emigrants in Germany which actions Prime Minister stated were tantamount imposition new White Paper; such restrictions immigration is "intolerable" and that, if necessary Jews will fight for right of Jews return Israel which is fundamental reason for and principle on which state was founded.

5. Prime Minister concluded comment on truce by saying indefinite truce is not the way to peace.

As regards specific suggestions Prime Minister's reactions were as follows:

1. Exchange of territory: he asked what does word "large" mean in connection Negev, stating that word when used by US is terrifying to Jews in consideration diminutive size Israel. Also he asked what is reason back of suggestion giving desert land to Transjordan which already has enormous uninhabited areas desert land; does this suggestion affect development of Dead Sea industries in which Israel has so valuable share? Also he asked what is meant by "fertile" portion of "occupied" west Galilee, stating that all of Galilee can be made fertile by Jewish effort. What change in situation has occurred since November 29, that US now wishes enlarge Arab area at expense Israel? Prime Minister's general reaction to suggested territorial exchange was thus definitely negative, but also inquisitive.

2. Jerusalem: Prime Minister observed that at least US suggestions admitted of some flexibility. Jerusalem, he stated, meant more to Jews than Paris to French or London to British. He asked, however, did our suggestion envisage Jewish corridor to Jerusalem which he declared was absolutely vital? He observed reflectively that the people of Israel had right to all of western Palestine but that personally in order get agreement with Arabs on Jerusalem he would recommend sacrifice of much that was dear to Israel for the sake of real peace with Arabs. Shertok interrupted to say that his personal opinion was that Old City might be internationalized and a portion of New City be given to Arabs under some mutually acceptable partition agreement. Prime Minister and Shertok feel this suggestion can be further examined.

3. Arab refugees: Prime Minister stated PGI willing consider constructive suggestions alleviate refugee problem, but he offered no plan. He stated he saw no possibility mass return refugees until peace settlement effected and that comprehensive solution must wait on peace. Shertok observed that problem was twofold, i.e. (a) interim international relief for refugees (he mentioned Egypt should certainly give some aid) and (b) permanent solution of resettlement majority refugees in Arab areas in which resettlement work Jews willing to assist. Shertok further stated that Israel willing consider admission now very small number individual family hardship cases but was vague on details. Prime Minister reemphasized that solution depended on firm peace so that refugees could return as friends and not enemies.

Prime Minister observed in conclusion that while US tentative suggestions were much appreciated what PGI really wanted was direct

negotiations with Arabs which he considered possible only through US good offices. He stated he wanted peace and a firm alliance with Arab states.

I made no comment on observations of Prime Minister and Shertok other than say I would transmit them to my Government.

McDONALD

501.BB Palestine/8-2748: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 9, 1948—7 p. m.

3577. Deptel 3544 Sept 8 para 4. For Ambassador Douglas. Preliminary PGI reaction may be found in Amreptel 94 Sept 7 from Tel Aviv ¹ being repeated to you.

Reference Embtel 3962 Sept 3 para 6 and Embtels 3880 and 3881 ² we have following specific points on our replies in principle contained in Deptels 3468 and 3469 Sept 1.³

Reference para 8 Embtel 3880 we concur but believe as stated Deptel 3187 Aug 12 that in supporting present lines now held in Palestine Mediator should emphasize changes as improvement of Nov 29 along functional or practical lines.

Reference para 9 Embtel 3880 we agree municipal area Jerusalem should be fully autonomous unit under neither Arab nor Jewish sovereignty with UN Governor and token UN guard force. We do not believe line should be demarcated on ground but that existing Arab-Jewish areas should have their own district municipal administration including Arab and Jewish police units respectively. We believe UN Governor should have powers of initiative and veto and that representatives of Jews and Arabs should have seats on his Council. We doubt if Arab and Jewish district municipal administrations can be fused into one municipal authority at this time.

Reference para 10 Embtel 3880 we concur.

Reference para 11 Embtel 3880, we accept in principle idea of Haifa free port area including refinery, oil dock, and pipeline terminals. However we believe UN port commissioner and international police force would constitute undesirable and unacceptable limitation on Israeli sovereignty. We believe it would be sufficient for Israeli Govt to give guarantees re free port area, and that UN observer should be stationed Haifa for time being.

Reference para 12 Embtel 3880, we concur both sides should have access to Lydda Airport as under Nov 29 resolution.

¹ Not printed.

² Both dated August 27, pp. 1354 and 1358.

³ Regarding the latter, see footnote 2, p. 1369.

Reference para 13 Embtel 3880, we concur in necessity incorporating remainder Arab territory into adjacent area. However we believe that any frontier rectification in favor Egypt should not give latter control of coastal strip, since access to sea for new Transjordan state appears essential.

Reference para 15 Embtel 3880, we concur that solution Arab refugee problem should be incorporated in Mediator's proposed settlement.

MARSHALL

501.BB Palestine/9-1048

The Secretary of State to Mr. Robert M. McClintock

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 10, 1948.

SIR: You are directed to proceed at the earliest opportunity to Rhodes to consult with the United Nations Mediator Count Bernadotte who, pursuant to the General Assembly's Resolution of May 14, 1948, is endeavoring to arrange a peaceful adjustment of the situation of Palestine.¹

You are authorized to inform Count Bernadotte of the views of this Government with respect to such a peaceful adjustment of the situation of Palestine. In communicating this Government's views to the Mediator you will be guided by the suggestions set forth in the Department's telegram to Tel Aviv No. 72 of September 1, which was approved by the President on that date. It is understood that your conversations with Count Bernadotte will be concurrent with, but not necessarily a joint representation of, similar conversations to be had with the Mediator by representatives of the United Kingdom.

You are authorized at your discretion to visit the Mediator in other localities than Rhodes, if he cannot be found in that place. You are further authorized in your discretion to consult with the American Ambassador in Cairo.

You should report the results of your conversations with the Mediator to the American Delegation to the General Assembly of the United Nations at Paris en route to Washington.²

Sincerely yours,

G. C. MARSHALL

¹The Department, on September 9, had informed London of its anxiety "to concert with British on immediate approach to UN Mediator re possible terms of territorial settlement in Palestine, upon which our two Governments are now in general agreement" and of its "desire to have top secret conversations with Mediator as soon as possible" through Mr. McClintock (telegram 3573, 501.BB Palestine/9-348).

²The Department, on September 10, directed Cairo as follows: "With utmost secrecy inform Bernadotte and Bunche [of] McClintock's impending arrival and nature conversations he authorized undertake. We re-emphasize need for absolute secrecy. In response chance inquiry from outsiders, it can be said that purpose McClintock's flight Near East is to study Arab refugee problem in which Secretary has expressed deep personal interest." (Telegram 1253, 501.BB Palestine/9-1048) This communication noted also that Mr. McClintock planned to fly directly to Rhodes on September 11.

501.BB Palestine/9-1048: Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the
Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET

LONDON, September 10, 1948—4 p. m.

4057. 1. Because at this stage it seems to me that more progress can be made by dealing with Foreign Office officials acting for him than by direct conversations on Palestine between me and Bevin whose mind is so absorbed by our mutual problems in Berlin, Department's 3544, September 8 has been discussed with Sir Orme Sargent, Michael Wright and Burrows. Following memo embodying their thoughts was handed Embassy this morning (see also my immediately following telegram).

2. (*Memo begins*):

Foreign Office has carefully considered Department's views in September 8 telegram¹ and is glad to note that there is now a large measure of agreement. Only important outstanding point of difference seems to be that Department only envisages reference to UN on basis of some measure of acquiescence by two parties, whereas Foreign Office, while very much hoping that such acquiescence will be reached at early stage, fears that it is far more probable that weight of UN would have to be put behind recommendations before any signs of acquiescence will be made. Foreign Office bases this view largely on experience of second truce, since on that occasion intense diplomatic pressure failed to secure agreement of Arabs, but immediately SC had endorsed truce recommendation Arab opposition was overcome. Foreign Office feels it is unfortunately most likely that same process will happen possibly with both sides in case of recommendations now to be made by Mediator.

3. Reference in paragraph 3 Deprefitel to UN action in order to convert public opinion suggests, however, to Foreign Office that Department may in fact be willing to contemplate UN action even if signs of acquiescence are limited to private statements from responsible people on either side to effect that acquiescence will be assured provided UN action is taken.

4. Foreign Office also points out that if as is presumed, Mediator makes his report to SC or Secretary General, it may be difficult to prevent matter being raised by some member state in either SC or UNGA. They also feel that if after Mediator has made his recommendation and US-UK diplomatic pressure has been applied, there is no progress, it will then certainly be necessary for Mediator to report his failure to SC or UNGA.

5. In general, Foreign Office feels that need for definite progress is becoming so urgent that earlier and agreed stages of programme should be immediately put into effect without spending any more time on US-UK discussion of later stages. Foreign Office view on later stages remains as stated above and Foreign Office hopes Department will in due course come to accept same view, but it does not press for any commitment on this at present. Foreign Office therefore proposes

¹ Presumably No. 3544, p. 1381.

that contact should be immediately made with Mediator by British and US representatives who would convey to him US-UK views. Mediator would be urged to make recommendations on these lines and to send copies to Secretary General of UN, Arab Governments and Jewish authorities, who would be asked not to give publicity to proposals for time being. British and US representatives would thereupon use strongest possible diplomatic pressure on Arab and Jewish authorities to persuade them to acquiesce in a settlement on lines recommended by Mediator. Both parties would be warned that truce resolution is still in force and would remain in force during implementation of Mediator's recommendations and that USG and HMG would make every effort to ensure that breach of truce was effectively dealt with under powers of SC. At subsequent date to be agreed, proposals would be published and public statements made by US and UK endorsing them.

6. Foreign Office suggests that approaches to Arab and Jewish authorities should be parallel rather than joint.

7. If Department agrees to proceed as above, Foreign Office proposes that British Consul [at] Rhodes should be instructed to make detailed arrangements with Mediator for meeting with UK and US representatives at mutually convenient place which Foreign Office suggests might be Cairo in order to avoid undesirable publicity of visit by special British and American representatives to Rhodes. (*Memo ends*).

8. Re paragraph 3 above, please advise on this point.

9. Paragraph 6 above is intended to clear up possible confusion (Department's 3544, September 8, paragraph 4). Foreign Office assumes Department does not envisage US and UK representatives calling on Mediator and officials of states together. Please confirm.

10. Re British Consul arranging meeting with Mediator (paragraph 7 above) see my 4058.²

11. Action which resulted in British memo quoted above was taken prior receipt Department's 3573, September 9³ which constitutes Department's reply to number of points raised in memo. To keep things in sequence reply to Department's 3573 is embodied in my 4058.

DOUGLAS

² *Infra*.

³ Not printed, but see footnote 1, p. 1387.

501.BB Palestine/9-1048 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the
Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET US URGENT LONDON, September 10, 1948—5 p. m.

4058. For Lovett from Douglas. Following reply to Department's 3573, September 9¹ should be read in connection with my 4057, Sep-

¹ Not printed, but see footnote 1, p. 1387.

tember 10 which was prepared prior receipt Department's reference telegram.

1. Foreign Office is gratified by Department's desire to approach Mediator as quickly as possible and believes it would be most helpful, as do I, to have McClintock come here for consultation. Foreign Office points out that this need not involve undue delay.

2. Latest Foreign Office information re Mediator's movements is that he was due to return to Rhodes today to start work on his report. As Foreign Office suggested in paragraph 7 Embassy's reference telegram, FonOff believes that British Consul [at] Rhodes should arrange at earliest possible moment for Mediator to meet with McClintock and British representative at mutually convenient place. Foreign Office agrees that Cairo probably most desirable spot and hopes for early US reply so that steps can be taken with Mediator. Foreign Office will entrust its top secret conversations with Mediator to either Troutbeck or Dow depending on which is most convenient. If meeting Cairo, it would be Troutbeck.²

3. Foreign Office considers it essential that US and UK representatives say substantially same things to Mediator but are opposed to handing Mediator any agreed document; Foreign Office is preparing for discussion with McClintock brief from which British representative will speak. Text brief will be telegraphed if completed before McClintock arrives.

[Here follows paragraph numbered 4 dealing with flight arrangements for Mr. McClintock.]

DOUGLAS

² Sir John M. Troutbeck, Head of the British Middle East Office at Cairo.

Editorial Note

The Clifford Papers contain the ribbon copy of a "Memorandum to Secretary Marshall", dated September 11, 1948, which deals primarily with the question of extending *de jure* recognition to the government of Israel. The memorandum bears no indication of authorship. Included also in the Clifford Papers are four undated sheets of notes in the handwriting of Mr. Clifford which are an outline of the memorandum and are at times quoted in it. Three of the four sheets are stamped "Pres[idential] Party", indicating that they were prepared on the Presidential yacht, the *Williamsburg*. Matthew Connelly's Appointment Book indicates that Mr. Clifford was aboard the *Williamsburg* from September 10 to 12.

Mr. Clifford has acknowledged to the Historical Office that he prepared the memorandum dated September 11 aboard the *Williamsburg*.

The Clifford Papers do not document whether or not he discussed the paper with President Truman, and Mr. Clifford did not later recall having discussed the paper with the President. (Memorandum of conversation, June 20, 1974, by William M. Franklin, 501.BB Palestine/3-2248)

The Secretary's messages of August 30 and September 8 to President Truman and the President's statement of September 9 (see editorial note, page 1380) suggest that the question of *de jure* recognition of Israel was very much in the thoughts of the White House and the Department of State at this time. Any immediate action to extend such recognition seems to have been ruled out, however, when the Israeli Government announced the postponement of its elections from October 1 to mid-November (the *New York Times*, September 9, 1948, page 11). The editors are of the belief that the memorandum prepared by Mr. Clifford was not actually sent to Secretary Marshall. It reads as follows:

"Sept. 11, 1948

"Memorandum to Secretary Marshall:

"1. As you well know, since becoming President I have consistently favored the establishment of an independent state for Jews in the Middle East. This country has taken a position of leadership in the establishment of such an independent state, and I think it should continue to take such leadership.

"2. It is my belief that strong American support of the new state of Israel will hasten the ultimate settlement of the problem of the Middle East, and will contribute toward the attainment of world peace.

"3. We are engaged now in extending economic aid and moral support to the nations of Western Europe, in order to stem the spread of Communism. I consider it necessary, at this time, to lend our same support and extend economic aid to Israel for the same reason.

"4. There is ample precedent in international law for the extension of *de jure* recognition to Israel. This is illustrated by the fact that fourteen nations have extended *de jure* recognition to Israel since it became an independent state on May 15, 1948. It is my opinion that *de jure* recognition by the United States will hasten the recognition of Israel by other nations, and this will have a stabilizing effect in the Middle East.

"5. In view of the above, it is my wish that the following course of action be taken:

"1. Extend *de jure* recognition to Israel at once.

"2. Make loan to Israel just as soon as details can be completed.

"3. Take active steps to assist Israel in gaining admission to the United Nations.

"I am preparing now a release announcing the *de jure* recognition of Israel. I shall submit it to you for suggestions. Kindly keep me advised of progress made in granting the loan, and in the admission of Israel to the United Nations."

501.BB Palestine/9-1048 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

TOP SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, September 11, 1948—1 p. m.

3604. For Ambassador. Department believes we are now in general agreement with British as their thinking is revealed in your 4057 Sept 10. Re paras 2 and 3 your telegram, Dept's position is one of persistent hope that Palestine dispute may be kept out of UN debate at this juncture. However, British are correct in assuming in para 3 that it may be necessary to have UN GA or possibly SC give blessing to any suggested settlement in order to enable leaders on both sides to carry their public opinion to acquiesce in such settlement.

Our 2593 [3593] Sept 10¹ will have answered para 5. Re para 6 we agree that approaches to Arabs and Jews should be parallel rather than joint. Your para 9: We have no objection if US and UK representatives call on Mediator together but we prefer that representations be parallel and not identical.

MARSHALL

¹ Not printed.

501.BB Palestine/9-1248 : Telegram

The Consul General at Jerusalem (Macdonald) to the Secretary of State

JERUSALEM, September 12, 1948.

1274. Press reports Eban made following statements yesterday re Jerusalem during speech in Tel Aviv and held out prospect United Nations would accede Jewish request for Jerusalem: some delegates who supported internationalization Jerusalem November 29 now admit project dead. They acknowledge United Nations shown itself unable handle situation. United Nations rule in Jerusalem without force impossible and United States refusal provide troops for demilitarization proved impossible raise force for international Jerusalem.

Israel delegation will endeavor show indefinite truce intolerable.

MACDONALD

867N.01/9-1248 : Telegram

The Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald) to President Truman¹

TOP SECRET URGENT TEL AVIV, September 12, 1948—7 p. m.

In your letter July 21,² Mr. President, among other points you in-

¹ Transmitted to the Department by Tel Aviv in telegram 104 for "personal attention President and Secretary."

² The text of the letter is incorporated in Mr. Lovett's memorandum of conversation of July 21, p. 1232.

structed me to report to you on "appropriate time for full recognition" PGI. That time has, I believe, now come.

After more than four weeks intensive study here and further to my telegram to you (70, August 24³) that indefinite truce cannot lead to peace without positive action to clarify situation, I am convinced that full recognition by the US now of PGI would accomplish four major US objectives:

1. Strengthen PGI moderates who want if humanly possible avoid renewal warfare.
2. Give Arab moderates, especially Abdullah (who knew past months decision battlefield was gravely adverse and who fear renewed warfare might result personal and national debacle), additional reason accelerate move towards settlement.
3. Remove major obstacle to peace negotiations by demonstrating to Arab intransigents fact that Israel's existence cannot longer be denied or ignored.
4. Encourage British relax its non-recognition policy.

Unless US makes up own mind as in original recognition without waiting on British corresponding or related action, I see delay dangerous and possibly fatal to peace hopes. British present procrastination is continuation of His Majesty's Government's non-cooperation policy since UNSCOP partition recommendation and reflects same stubborn miscalculation of basic elements in this area. Judged by present results, British experts—except General D'Arcy and General Gort who warned that Jews would defeat Arabs—gravely misled their government and are still doing so. Hence, to wait on British is to invite failure.

Grounds justifying full recognition are found in PGI's—(a) plans early election constituent assembly, (b) its control of state, (c) its repeated public and official expressed willingness negotiate peace settlement with Arabs.

In urging full recognition now I am aware of possible repercussions in Arab countries, including possible danger to Americans. However, I believe that clear statement to Arab governments given in advance through neighboring missions that such US action be not unfriendly but acceptance of Israel as *fait accompli*; and notification that US expects fullest protection its citizens would remove or greatly minimize danger. Furthermore, in this connection I wish observe that several other nations have accorded full recognition Israel without suffering danger or damage their missions or citizens in Arab countries.

I have also kept in mind fact that there are important unanswered questions about PGI's attitude towards (a) Jerusalem, (b) November 29 frontiers, (c) Arab refugees. Despite these questions, I am convinced that *de jure* recognition in advance UN assembly would in-

³ See footnote 1, p. 1337.

crease chances satisfactory settlement these and related issues during peace negotiations.

Bernadotte and staff's urgent recommendation peace effort at UN and their conviction that otherwise truce must lead to war within few weeks (refmytel 101, September 10 ⁴) are additional reasons immediate full recognition. There can be no fruitful peace negotiations until Arab states see that Israel is definitely established.

Although legal differences between *de facto* and *de jure* recognition are regarded by some distinguished lawyers as slight, it would be difficult exaggerate practical value US decision full recognition advance UN Assembly.

Mr. President, your and Secretary's action May 15 [14] ⁵ was highest statesmanship because it courageously set constructive example. Completion now of what you both then began might be decisive for peace in Palestine and Middle East.

Department please reply direct to Tel Aviv.

McDONALD

⁴ Not printed.

⁵ See Secretary Marshall's letter of May 14 to Mr. Epstein, p. 992.

501.BB Palestine/9-1448: Telegram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Bliss) to the
Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET

LONDON, September 14, 1948—7 p. m.

4111. 1. Visit here of Jessup and Ross has been timely and helpful regarding Palestine. Meetings took place in Foreign Office September 13 and 14. Conclusions of informal and cordial conversations follow.

2. It was apparent from outset that on British side proposals which have been discussed between US and UK have been largely formulated at political level with only general consultation with Jebb's UN Department. Wright and his subordinates readily agreed time had come to work out tactics and Jebb attended both meetings. On many points of procedure latter's views were closer to those of Jessup and Ross than to those of other Foreign Office officers.

3. It was agreed that definite road ahead reference UN strategy would not be charted even tentatively without some indication Mediator's reactions to talks with McClintock and Troutbeck, future plans, et cetera. It was further agreed that any 'plan of campaign which might be developed between US and UK would have to take into account likelihood sudden changes being necessitated by unexpected leaks, violation of truce, et cetera. Consequently, it was agreed that Foreign Office officials would remain in close contact with

GADel in Paris as well as with Embassy. Beeley will depart for Paris September 19 or 20.

4. While no definite conclusions were reached considerable exchange tentative thinking took place reference timing of publication of Mediator's proposals. In view postponing major debate on Palestine for some weeks Jessup and Ross expressed thought that it might be wise for Mediator to begin by converting lines of truce into "lines of armistice" upon which SC report would be forthcoming. At later stage Mediator would make recommendations for Jerusalem, Haifa, Lydda, [garble] and recommend to UNGA that lines of armistice (with some modification, in particular elimination of Jerusalem corridor) should become permanent frontiers. General discussion, however, produced alternative idea that Mediator might pave way for his proposals, and at same time achieve a degree of delay calculated to keep Palestine out of UNGA until November, by sending SecGen in very near future factual report (Paragraph 1, Embtel 4076 September 12¹) in which Mediator would indicate that he planned to present to UNGA within a few weeks new proposals for a final settlement of Palestine problem. It was agreed that in intervening 3 or 4 weeks before Mediator publishes his proposals, Mediator would make details known to Arab and Jewish leaders with request that they be kept secret, and towards end period US and UK could quietly apply diplomatic pressure to Arabs and Jews. If between now and October 15 rumors of these proposals became public they would still be in nature of rumors and as such, perhaps would be less likely to bring down an avalanche of pressure upon US and UK from Arabs and Jews. It was further agreed that, if this idea of timing was found reasonable in light of reports from McClintock and Troutbeck regarding their conversations with Mediator, US and UK should lose no time in putting their views regarding timing in this sense.

5. Americans expressed grave doubts that international contingents could be secured to assist UN governor Jerusalem (Paragraph 9 Embassy's 3880 August 27). Jebb reported this point and conclusion reached after some discussion was that probably best plan would be for governor to have personal force of about 200 UN guards which would be the nucleus of a Jerusalem international police force to which PGI and TJ would be called upon in UNGA resolution to contribute contingents for service in the Arab and Jewish municipalities. It was thought that even though neither PGI nor TJ would possess sovereign rights in Jerusalem they would by this means be given definite responsibility for maintaining law and order in Jewish and Arab municipalities.

¹ Not printed.

6. Full agreement was reached that Arab acquiescence to existence of Israel would be hastened if it were apparent to Arabs that Israeli frontiers would be subject to special guarantee. Wright said that British obligations under treaties with Egypt and TJ would automatically be extended to cover any areas added to Egypt and TJ. Consequently, a onesided extra guarantee would exist. Americans suggested and Foreign Office agreed that some guarantee of a more general character was desirable. The suggestion which was finally found apt was that there should be resolution on this subject recommending that, until frontiers were recognized by agreement between the parties concerned, lines drawn by Mediator should be considered to be an international frontier, and that any violation of it should be treated by SC as breach of peace.

7. Foreign Office, Embassy and USGADel, Paris would appreciate early comments Department regarding substance Paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 above.

8. Jessup and Ross returned to Paris today.²

Sent Department 4111, repeated Paris for Jessup and Gadel 604.

BLISS

² A further account of the conversations with the British officials was sent to Mr. Satterthwaite by Mr. Ross in his letter of September 15 from Paris, not printed (867N.01/9-1548).

501.BB Palestine/9-1448: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 15, 1948—8 p. m.

3661. Embtel 4111, Sept 14. Our tactical course in immediate future will be determined as soon as we have McClintock's and Troutbeck's reports re Mediator's views.

Meanwhile reply para 4 reftel we believe our action should be based on procedure outlined Deptel 3544, Sept 8. We hope it will be possible keep Palestine question out GA or SC but anticipate it will be raised by some Member or Bernadotte may wish report to SC or UN Members under GA resolution May 14. In any event we anticipate US-UK views or Mediator's suggestions will become known at early date as envisaged para 2 Embtel 3962 Sept 3. Consequently Bernadotte's over-all suggestions might well be included as conclusions in his report either to members GA or to SC. It is hoped Bernadotte will give us advance notice content his report so US-UK can begin quiet diplomatic preparation with Arabs and Jews. We doubt Mediator's conclusions should be divided into separate reports as this would tend

confuse issue. We also doubt factual report by Mediator at present stage would suffice. We do not think Mediator's conclusions can be kept secret for 3- or 4-week period mentioned. It accordingly seems preferable make Mediator's conclusions public and endeavor mobilize world opinion to persuade acceptance by parties.

Ref para 5, we concur.

Ref para 6 we do not agree special guarantee re frontier should be provided by UN (Brit for their part could, however, extend treaty obligations in agreement with Egypt and Transjordan). We do not agree, furthermore, that UN could give general guarantee in form of resolution recommending Mediator's lines as international frontier and violation of such lines as breach of peace. We have consistently taken position (ref Austin's Feb. 24 statement) that political recommendations GA or SC could not be put into effect by force. However it may be possible for Bernadotte draw truce line which might eventually become frontier on which parties could agree.¹

MARSHALL

¹ This telegram was repeated as 3660 to Paris for Messrs. Jessup and Ross.

501.BB Palestine/9-1548 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Griffis) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

US URGENT

CAIRO, September 15, 1948—10 p. m.

NIACT

1315. For Lovett and Rusk from McClintock. Mediator's report on Palestine directed to SYG for information of all UN members will be flown to Paris tomorrow. It contains three sections which will be published separately as parts of one document: (1) The mediation report (2) Efforts to maintain truce and (3) Assistance to refugees. Depending on time for translation and printing it is expected report will be made public around September 22. (Bernadotte flies to Beirut and Damascus tomorrow thence Baghdad returning Rhodes 19. He plans to fly to Paris 21st.)

Following is verbatim text of Bernadotte's conclusions to part one setting forth his proposals for a political settlement:

[Here follow Count Bernadotte's conclusions to part one of his report; for text, see page 1401.]

Sent Department as 1315; repeated Paris for Jessup as 85; Paris pass to London Niac with request that Foreign Office be provided copy foregoing text. [McClintock.]

GRIFFIS

501.BB Palestine/9-1548: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Griffis) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

US URGENT

CAIRO, September 15, 1948—midnight.

NIACT

1316. For Lovett and Rusk from McClintock. Sir John Troutbeck, representing UK, and I arrived Rhodes 13th, he from Cairo, I from Athens. We found Bernadotte had already prepared first draft of his report on Palestine dealing with mediation, truce and refugees. (Cairo's 1315, September 15, provides text of Mediator's recommendations for a political settlement.)

1. *Substance.*

Department will note general similarity of Bernadotte's conclusions with US and UK views. Our conversations were devoted more to perfection of Bernadotte's first draft of the conclusions than to matters of substance in which all three were in agreement. Neither Troutbeck nor I went over body of Bernadotte's report, attention being concentrated solely on conclusion to Part 1. Troutbeck had detailed brief from Foreign Office while I was guided by terms of Department's 72, September 1, to Tel Aviv and Secretary's instructions of September 10.

Principal matter of substance upon which views of Bernadotte and UK were at variance with our own was whether Israel should be given even a token salient into Negev, such as our suggestion for a projection of Israeli territory south to Beersheba-Gaza Road. British proposed southern frontier terminate at latitude of Majdal and found firm support from Mediator. Bernadotte said the responsibility was to propose terms founded on strict justice. If Jews were to receive all of rich Galilee in return for giving up Negev to Arabs to whom it would ever remain a worthless desert, Jews should not in his opinion have any salient to that area. Bernadotte was also swayed by information that there are mixed councils in Tel Aviv, Shertok and the more moderate leaders tending to feel that Negev for Galilee is a good bargain, while Weizmann and Ben-Gurion looked with mystical tenacity toward holding Negev and Galilee too.

I told Bernadotte that I would recommend that Department support his proposals in their entirety, including his suggestion of Majdal-Faluja line as southern boundary of Israel. I made it clear, however, that this recommendation was in no way binding on US Government, that Negev was a question of much political importance to Jews, and that it might eventually be a political good judgment to give Israel a token holding in that area. (I think, however, that from point of impartial equity that Bernadotte is right.)

On internationalization of Jerusalem, UK instructions were to advocate a UN governor and provision for an international police force. I suggested that language be less specific, leaving choice open between complete UN control and responsibility or merely supervisory functions, at same time making clear that US at this stage did not contemplate contributing to an international police force. Bernadotte had been favoring a request to French Government for loan of several battalions of foreign legion for Jerusalem police duty but it was pointed out that Arabs, and particularly Azzam Pasha, would be affronted by presence of legionnaires who had fought their brethren in Morocco. Bunche and Begley favored using proposed UN guard for Jerusalem police, Begley putting minimum number at 6,000.

As for additional comment on Bernadotte's conclusions, which seem self-explanatory, it might be said that I questioned phrase in 4(b) whereby in absence of agreement between Arabs and Jews frontiers "should be *established* by UN," but it was pointed out this language came from November 29th resolution which we supported.

On Haifa refinery UK advocated in addition to free port a UN port commissioner with an international police force and special guarantee for transit of sealed trains and flow of oil to and from Iraq. It was, however, possible to agree on present language in 4(e).

Troutbeck's instructions indicated that Foreign Office still clings to belief SC can lay down a frontier in Palestine under threat that any violation of that frontier would constitute a breach of peace calling for use of Chapter VII sanctions. It was agreed with Mediator's approval that what was essential was that resort to force should not be attempted by either Arabs or Jews, and that SC responsibility was confined to keeping peace, not to establishing a frontier by compulsion. Further talks with British on this point of charter interpretation would be useful. As will be seen issue does not arise in Mediator's conclusions.

2. *Procedure.*

Two days were devoted to discussion of substance of what may eventually be called "the Bernadotte plan." Third meeting with Mediator this morning dealt with tactics and timing.

Bernadotte from outset of conversations insisted that it was imperative to bring Palestine situation before GA at earliest possible moment. His conversations with Arab and Jewish leaders on returning from Stockholm had convinced him that failure of GA to deal with his recommendations promptly would cause situation in Palestine greatly to deteriorate, possibly irretrievably. He based this judgment on following considerations:

(a) Arab Governments following last Arab League Council meeting were sending Foreign Ministers and Prime Ministers to Paris. These leaders were in need of rapid UN action in order to channel public opinion at home to accept a solution which they now admit to be essential even though maintaining their bluster about "never" recognizing a Jewish state and "never" dealing with the Jews.

(b) Israel may not be long restrained from taking matters into its own hands if GA seems to regard Palestine situation as not urgent. Severe economic strain of maintaining men under arms during truce makes Jews restive to get some return on this investment in manpower. Mediator felt PGI would use GA inaction as pretext for action by Israel.

I told Bernadotte we had hoped his influence, abetted by UK and US diplomatic pressure, would have sufficed for parties to reach a measure of acquiescence without incurring risk of further bitter and perhaps inconclusive debate in GA. If his judgment was correct and matter should immediately be placed on agenda, I urged in strongest terms that political recommendations of Mediator be dealt with in committee I with all possible expedition. No sub-committee to drag out proceeding should be formed, and "the Bernadotte plan" should be rushed through if possible almost by acclamation. Mediator's recommendation on refugee problem should be dealt within committee III. Bernadotte concurred with these views.

When asked how Palestine issue should be placed on agenda, I said US had already had its share of the limelight. Bernadotte and his advisors favored having some friendly delegation such as France, Canada or New Zealand place a specific item on agenda phrased, "further consideration of situation of Palestine. Consideration of the Mediator's report." An alternative would be to ask SYG to place matter on agenda.

As for sponsorship of an eventual resolution embodying the "Bernadotte plan" it was obvious that Mediator felt support of UK and US would be a determining factor. Troutbeck explained he had no instructions covering this point. I said I was in similar position, but offered personal comment that it would seem odd for US and UK, who were prepared to give fullest diplomatic support to "Bernadotte plan" not to give equal support once it was before GA.

It was agreed that Bunche would draft a resolution setting forth essence of Mediator's recommendations which he will make available. My overall impression of conversations is that Bernadotte, who has taken an immense amount of first-hand testimony, has come from last minute talks with leaders on both sides, and who is sternly determined to advocate only a solution based on equal justice to both sides, feels that now is the optimum moment: that if not "now" it is "never," and that the General Assembly must seize the opportunity.

Sent Department as 1316; repeated Paris for USUN as 84, London as 97. [McClintock.]

GRIFFIS

*Progress Report of the United Nations Mediator in Palestine*¹

[Extracts]

[PART ONE] VIII. CONCLUSIONS [regarding the Mediation Effort]

1. Since I presented my written suggestions to the Arab and Jewish authorities on 27 June, I have made no formal submission to either party of further suggestions or proposals for a definitive settlement. Since that date, however, I have held many oral discussions in the Arab capitals and Tel-Aviv, in the course of which various ideas on settlement have been freely exchanged. As regards my original suggestions, I hold to the opinion that they offered a general framework within which a reasonable and workable settlement might have been reached, had the two parties concerned been willing to discuss them. They were flatly rejected, however, by both parties. Since they were put forth on the explicit condition that they were purely tentative, were designed primarily to elicit views and counter-suggestions from each party, and, in any event, could be implemented only if agreed upon by both parties, I have never since pressed them. With respect to one basic concept in my suggestions, it has become increasingly clear to me that, however desirable a political and economic union might be in Palestine, the time is certainly not now propitious for the effectuation of any such scheme.

2. I do not consider it to be within my province to recommend to the Members of the United Nations a proposed course of action on the Palestine question. That is a responsibility of the Members acting through the appropriate organs. In my role as United Nations

¹ Reprinted from United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Third Session, Supplement No. 11 (A/648)*, pp. 17 ff., 43 ff., and 52 ff.; signed by Count Bernadotte on September 16 at Rhodes; and transmitted to Secretary-General Lie by the Mediator in a letter of the same date. The transmitting letter stated in part: "I understand that the question of Palestine has not yet been placed on the General Assembly's agenda. . . . Two matters require the most prompt action, namely, certain decisions relating vitally to the peaceful settlement of the Palestine question, and humanitarian measures to relieve the desperate condition of more than three hundred thousand Arab refugees I would emphasize that an extremely crucial stage has been reached in the Palestine question, and it is this conviction which alone prompts me to be so bold as to suggest that steps should be taken to bring the urgency of the matter to the attention of the General Assembly. . . ." The full text of the letter is printed in United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Third Session, Part I, Plenary Meetings, Annexes to the Summary Records of Meetings, 1948* (hereinafter identified as GA, 3rd sess., Pt. I, Annexes), p. 152.

Mediator, however, it was inevitable that I should accumulate information and draw conclusions from my experience which might well be of assistance to Members of the United Nations in charting the future course of United Nations action on Palestine. I consider it my duty, therefore, to acquaint the Members of the United Nations, through the medium of this report, with certain of the conclusions on means of peaceful adjustment which have evolved from my frequent consultations with Arab and Jewish authorities over the past three and one-half months and from my personal appraisal of the present Palestinian scene. I do not suggest that these conclusions would provide the basis for a proposal which would readily win the willing approval of both parties. I have not, in the course of my intensive efforts to achieve agreement between Arabs and Jews, been able to devise any such formula. I am convinced, however, that it is possible at this stage to formulate a proposal which, if firmly approved and strongly backed by the General Assembly, would not be forcibly resisted by either side, confident as I am, of course, that the Security Council stands firm in its resolution of 15 July that military action shall not be employed by either party in the Palestine dispute. It cannot be ignored that the vast difference between now and last November is that a war has been started and stopped and that in the intervening months decisive events have occurred.

SEVEN BASIC PREMISES

3. The following seven basic premises form the basis for my conclusions:

Return to peace

(a) Peace must return to Palestine and every feasible measure should be taken to ensure that hostilities will not be resumed and that harmonious relations between Arab and Jew will ultimately be restored.

The Jewish State

(b) A Jewish State called Israel exists in Palestine and there are no sound reasons for assuming that it will not continue to do so.

Boundary determination

(c) The boundaries of this new State must finally be fixed either by formal agreement between the parties concerned or failing that, by the United Nations.

Continuous frontiers

(d) Adherence to the principle of geographical homogeneity and integration, which should be the major objective of the boundary arrangements, should apply equally to Arab and Jewish territories,

whose frontiers should not, therefore, be rigidly controlled by the territorial arrangements envisaged in the resolution of 29 November.

Right of repatriation

(e) The right of innocent people, uprooted from their homes by the present terror and ravages of war, to return to their homes, should be affirmed and made effective, with assurance of adequate compensation for the property of those who may choose not to return.

Jerusalem

(f) The City of Jerusalem, because of its religious and international significance and the complexity of interests involved, should be accorded special and separate treatment.

International responsibility

(g) International responsibility should be expressed where desirable and necessary in the form of international guarantees, as a means of allaying existing fears, and particularly with regard to boundaries and human rights.

SPECIFIC CONCLUSIONS

4. The following conclusions, broadly outlined, would, in my view, considering all the circumstances, provide a reasonable, equitable and workable basis for settlement :

(a) Since the Security Council, under pain of Chapter VIII sanctions, has forbidden further employment of military action in Palestine as a means of settling the dispute, hostilities should be pronounced formally ended either by mutual agreement of the parties or, failing that, by the United Nations. The existing indefinite truce should be superseded by a formal peace, or at the minimum, an armistice which would involve either complete withdrawal and demobilization of armed forces or their wide separation by creation of broad demilitarized zones under United Nations supervision.

(b) The frontiers between the Arab and Jewish territories, in the absence of agreement between Arabs and Jews, should be established by the United Nations and delimited by a technical boundaries commission appointed by and responsible to the United Nations, with the following revisions in the boundaries broadly defined in the resolution of the General Assembly of 29 November in order to make them more equitable, workable and consistent with existing realities in Palestine.

(i) The area known as the Negeb, south of a line running from the sea near Majdal east-southeast to Faluja (both of which places would be in Arab territory), should be defined as Arab territory ;

(ii) The frontier should run from Faluja north northeast to Ramleh and Lydda (both of which places would be in Arab territory),

the frontier at Lydda then following the line established in the General Assembly resolution of 29 November;

(III) Galilee should be defined as Jewish territory.

(c) The disposition of the territory of Palestine not included within the boundaries of the Jewish State should be left to the Governments of the Arab States in full consultation with the Arab inhabitants of Palestine, with the recommendation, however, that in view of the historical connexion and common interests of Transjordan and Palestine, there would be compelling reasons for merging the Arab territory of Palestine with the territory of Transjordan, subject to such frontier rectifications regarding other Arab States as may be found practicable and desirable.

(d) The United Nations, by declaration or other appropriate means, should undertake to provide special assurance that the boundaries between the Arab and Jewish territories shall be respected and maintained, subject only to such modifications as may be mutually agreed upon by the parties concerned.

(e) The port of Haifa, including the oil refineries and terminals, and without prejudice to their inclusion in the sovereign territory of the Jewish State or the administration of the city of Haifa, should be declared a free port, with assurances of free access for interested Arab countries and an undertaking on their part to place no obstacle in the way of oil deliveries by pipeline to the Haifa refineries, whose distribution would continue on the basis of the historical pattern.

(f) The airport of Lydda should be declared a free airport with assurance of access to it and employment of its facilities for Jerusalem and interested Arab countries.

(g) The City of Jerusalem, which should be understood as covering the area defined in the resolution of the General Assembly of 29 November, should be treated separately and should be placed under effective United Nations control with maximum feasible local autonomy for its Arab and Jewish communities, with full safeguards for the protection of the Holy Places and sites and free access to them, and for religious freedom.

(h) The right of unimpeded access to Jerusalem, by road, rail or air, should be fully respected by all parties.

(i) The right of the Arab refugees to return to their homes in Jewish-controlled territory at the earliest possible date should be affirmed by the United Nations, and their repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation, and payment of adequate compensation for the property of those choosing not to return, should be supervised and assisted by the United Nations conciliation commission described in paragraph (k) below.

(j) The political, economic, social and religious rights of all Arabs in the Jewish territory of Palestine and of all Jews in the Arab terri-

tory of Palestine should be fully guaranteed and respected by the authorities. The conciliation commission provided for in the following paragraph should supervise the observance of this guarantee. It should also lend its good offices, on the invitation of the parties, to any efforts toward exchanges of populations with a view to eliminating troublesome minority problems, and on the basis of adequate compensation for property owned.

(k) In view of the special nature of the Palestine problem and the dangerous complexities of Arab-Jewish relationships, the United Nations should establish a Palestine conciliation commission. This commission, which should be appointed for a limited period, should be responsible to the United Nations and act under its authority. The commission, assisted by such United Nations personnel as may prove necessary, should undertake.

(i) To employ its good offices to make such recommendations to the parties or to the United Nations, and to take such other steps as may be appropriate, with a view to ensuring the continuation of the peaceful adjustment of the situation in Palestine;

(ii) Such measures as it might consider appropriate in fostering the cultivation of friendly relations between Arabs and Jews;

(iii) To supervise the observance of such boundary, road, railroad, free port, free airport, minority rights and other arrangements as may be decided upon by the United Nations;

(iv) To report promptly to the United Nations any development in Palestine likely to alter the arrangements approved by the United Nations in the Palestine settlement or to threaten the peace of the area.

[PART THREE] VI. CONCLUSIONS [regarding Assistance to Refugees]

1. Conclusions which may be derived from the experience to date are summarized as follows:

(a) As a result of the conflict in Palestine there are approximately 330,000 Arab refugees and 7,000 Jewish refugees requiring aid in that country and adjacent States.

(b) Large numbers of these are infants, children, pregnant women and nursing mothers. Their condition is one of destitution and they are "vulnerable groups" in the medical and social sense.

(c) The destruction of their property and the loss of their assets will render most of them a charge upon the communities in which they have sought refuge for a minimum period of one year (through this winter and until the end of the 1949 harvest).

(d) The Arab inhabitants of Palestine are not citizens or subjects of Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Transjordan, the States which are at present providing them with a refuge and the basic necessities of life. As residents of Palestine, a former mandated territory for which the international community has a continuing responsibility

until a final settlement is achieved, these Arab refugees understandably look to the United Nations for effective assistance.

(e) The temporary alleviation of their condition, which is all that my disaster relief programme can promise them now is quite inadequate to meet any continuing need, unless the resources in supplies and personnel available are greatly increased. Such increased resources might indirectly be of permanent value in establishing social services in the countries concerned, or greatly improving existing services. This applies particularly to general social administrative organizations, maternal and child care services, the training of social workers, and the improvement of food economics.

(f) The refugees, on return to their homes, are entitled to adequate safeguards for their personal security, normal facilities for employment, and adequate opportunities to develop within the community without racial, religious or social discrimination.

(g) So long as large numbers of the refugees remain in distress, I believe that responsibility for their relief should be assumed by the United Nations in conjunction with the neighbouring Arab States, the Provisional Government of Israel, the specialized agencies, and also all the voluntary bodies or organizations of a humanitarian and non-political character.

2. In concluding this part of my report, I must emphasize again the desperate urgency of this problem. The choice is between saving the lives of many thousands of people now or permitting them to die. The situation of the majority of these hapless refugees is already tragic, and to prevent them from being overwhelmed by further disaster and to make possible their ultimate rehabilitation, it is my earnest hope that the international community will give all necessary support to make the measures I have outlined fully effective. I believe that for the international community to accept its share of responsibility for the refugees of Palestine is one of the minimum conditions for the success of its efforts to bring peace to that land.

F. BERNADOTTE

501.BB Palestine/9-1648 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Jerusalem

CONFIDENTIAL
US URGENT

WASHINGTON, September 16, 1948—7 p. m.

908. Following message should be delivered to Count Bernadotte soon as possible:

US Govt refers to its previous exchange of views with Mediator concerning implementation of ban on war material prescribed by the

SC resolutions of May 29 and July 15, 1948, and particularly to four questions presented by this Govt to Mediator on July 16 and his answers thereto.

In accordance with desire of Mediator as expressed in his answer to question 3 the UK and US Govts have continued to discuss definition of "war material" within meaning of SC resolutions. In view of indefinite continuation of Palestine truce further consideration has been given in these discussions to outright ban on aircraft parts and replacements for Middle East civil airlines as recommended by the Mediator in his answer to question 1. As result of these discussions, it is view both Govts that such an inflexible policy, if continued indefinitely, could result in serious impairment of civil air transport and communications of states concerned. In fact, serious curtailment of air commerce in certain areas of Middle East is now imminent due to failure of airlines to obtain certain essential maintenance equipment. Such a result, it is felt, was not contemplated by UNSC action. Consequently, US recommends that Mediator consider following proposal:

(1) That all civil airlines in Middle East be permitted to obtain abroad civil aircraft parts and replacements essential to maintenance of services which they operated as of date of commencement of present truce (July 15). This should also include airlines and air services in this area established since July 15 which the Mediator determines to be eligible.

(2) That sales or exports of such parts and replacements be reported promptly to Mediator by Govt of country from which export is made.

(3) That Mediator take note of quantities of such items supplied and notify all Govts concerned whenever he deems quantities are exceeding those necessary for maintenance existing services.

(4) That all requests for aircraft parts and replacements for airlines or services not included in (1) above be referred to Mediator by Govt of exporting country before export is permitted. It is understood UK Govt will also forward a recommendation on this subject to the Mediator.

It is requested that Mediator advise US Govt as soon as possible whether he accepts above proposal. If not, Mediator is strongly urged to prescribe such other procedure as may meet the exigencies of situation.

If above proposal is approved, US Govt would require as basis for consideration of requests under (1) above certification from interested Middle East Govt that items were for approved purposes.

US Govt is concerned that control measures taken by it in cooperation with Mediator are not being observed by other states and that in some cases material denied from US sources is being obtained elsewhere. It is suggested that this situation, in some measure, could be remedied if the Mediator would communicate the revised lists of war material, when available, and the procedures affecting transfer of

marginal items, to all states, including both members of UN and non-members. Perhaps this could be accomplished most effectively through official communication of SYG of UN.¹

MARSHALL

¹This telegram was repeated to Cairo as 1290 and to Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, Jidda, London, Paris, and Tel Aviv. Jerusalem, on September 18, reported that "General Riley and Bunche agree to proposals contained in Deptel 908" (telegram 1314, 501.BB Palestine/9-1848). The Presidential Embargo on the sale of spare parts to airlines in the Middle East was lifted on September 20 (letter of October 8 from the Embassy in Egypt to the Acting United Nations Mediator; copy transmitted to the Department by Cairo in despatch 844 the same day, 501.BB Palestine/10-848).

501.BB Palestine/9-1748: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald)

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 17, 1948—1 p. m.

100. For McDonald. We have had question *de jure* recognition Govt of Israel under study for several months. On several occasions, I have discussed question with President and have also discussed urtel 104 Sept 12¹ with President.

No question has arisen re *de jure* recognition of State of Israel as state. Our recognition of State on May 14² was full and complete. Present question is conversion of *de facto* recognition of provisional govt to *de jure* recognition of permanent govt. In our opinion *de jure* recognition should be extended to a permanent govt which is based on will of people, which is in fact in control of country, and which is prepared to carry out its international obligations. Israeli authorities themselves decided to postpone their elections and themselves have designated their present govt as "Provisional".

We do not agree immediate *de jure* recognition would strengthen PGI moderates. Such recognition would prejudice success their efforts and would, in effect, sanction a regime before it had been established. We consider prospect *de jure* recognition should stimulate and aid PGI moderates in retaining effective control of permanent govt.

As there has been no basic change in the governmental status of Israel since its proclamation on May 15, we consider immediate extension *de jure* recognition would subject us to charge that our recognition had been based on domestic political considerations in US rather than on development of governmental processes in Israel.

We consider premature *de jure* recognition would inflame Arab world and would make it difficult for Arab states to make those concessions for which Bernadotte has been striving in his efforts to obtain

¹ See footnote 1 to telegram to President Truman, p. 1392.

² Washington time.

equitable solution of Palestine question. We might expect, in addition, that Moslem states in UN would be strongly affected by premature step favoring Israel and that US and other Western powers would thereby have additional and increased difficulties with other important problems before UN.

We refer also to crucial situation in Berlin. Because of current developments there we do not believe we should take any unnecessary step such as premature recognition which would aggravate unrest throughout Moslem world at this critical juncture.

We cannot too emphatically stress importance we attach to present efforts Mediator to secure peaceful adjustment Palestine situation under GA resolution May 14. We believe that we now have most favorable opportunity to persuade both parties in Palestine situation to co-operate with Mediator in his truce and mediation efforts. If these are successful many of other problems relating Palestine may be expected quickly to be solved.

In light foregoing we believe interests US and Israel would be best served by withholding for time being *de jure* recognition PGI.

MARSHALL

501.BB Palestine/9-1748: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

US URGENT

LONDON, September 17, 1948—5 p. m.

NIACT

4153. Personal for eyes Secretary and Lovett only.

1. Believing as I do that work which has been done here and in Washington with British Government on what should constitute a fair and equitable solution of the thorny and even dangerous problem of Palestine is no small achievement, I draft this message with deepest sense of its importance; for it represents what can be the keystone of the arch which we have been building. When one reviews the situation in its historic perspective, the progress that has been made, however tedious, is not far short of being a miracle.

2. Bevin sent for me urgently this morning to discuss Palestine. He referred briefly to the likelihood that Mediator's report may be published as early as September 20 and said that in these circumstances (he does not believe publication Mediator's report can be postponed as suggested Department's 3664, September 16¹) it appeared to him that best plan for US and UK at this time would be to issue statements, supporting Mediator's proposals as fair and equitable basis for settlement along lines which he imagined Department contemplated

¹ Not printed.

last August (penultimate paragraph, Department's 3208, August 13 and Embassy's 4146, September 16 ²). He said that he had read Mediator's conclusions (Cairo's 1315, September 16, to Department) and that while they contained a number of features which His Majesty's Government would have preferred to see handled differently, in main he was satisfied with proposals as a whole as being substantially in accord with US and UK thinking. He felt that proposals would stand or fall as a whole and that although British Government's views might differ on particular points these views should be sacrificed to general good and solid US-UK front. He therefore accepts plan in its entirety, foregoes any effort to amend it, believes it should not be modified in any respect and that efforts to amend should be resisted. He believes that there would be little left of plan if amending process should once be begun.

3. Bevin then handed me draft statement quoted my immediately following telegram (Embassy's 4154, September 17 ³). He said that it had been drafted with great trepidation because if this made it will "once and for all put His Majesty's Government flatly on record as favoring partition as a permanent solution for Palestine and thus burn His Majesty's Government's boats with Arabs." However, US and UK have moved together so far forward in this vital matter that he feels time has come for him to ask British Cabinet approval to burn any boats necessary.

4. Bevin has in mind following course of action which is based on premise that Mediator's report will be published September 20.

5. Bevin will put statement quoted my 4154 to British Cabinet this afternoon. He will bring Cabinet up to date with regard to exchanges of views which have taken place since meeting August 26 (Embassy's 3879, August 27). He feels fairly certain British Cabinet will approve this statement for inclusion in foreign affairs debate September 22, at which Bevin personally will speak, provided United States Government will make comparable statement September 20th or 21st.

6. Bevin said alternatives to US making statement first were simultaneous statements or UK speaking first. Simultaneous statements would in his view strengthen idea that Bernadotte plan is "deal" between US and UK. If UK were to speak first, and be echoed by later US statement, this would strengthen idea which Zionists have been propagating that US foreign policy is formulated in Whitehall. Moreover, if Bevin made his statement first and US statement were delayed or were to suggest amendments to Bernadotte plan, all we have tried to accomplish in recent weeks would have been to no avail since US and UK would again appear before world as entertaining separate points of view re Palestine settlement. Finally, if Bevin

² No. 4146 not printed.

³ Not printed.

should speak first and we were to give qualified approval or to suggest modifications, His Majesty's Government's remaining influence with Arab states, so vital at this moment, would vanish like snow under a desert sun.

7. In accordance with foregoing, it is Bevin's hope that US reply as to whether or not we will issue a statement can be delivered to him tomorrow September 18th if possible or at latest on afternoon of September 19th when he departs for Paris. (He will return for debate September 22.) Actual release statement Washington will depend upon release date of Mediator's report. If latter occurs September 20, he hopes that Department's statement would be issued September 21. In this event he would ask Mayhew to say in Parliament September 21 that a full statement would be made by Bevin in foreign affairs debate September 22. This action would be quite appropriate because there is keen desire both sides of the House for statement and early settlement. If Secretary General should release report September 21, this would be too late for debate September 22, but Department could make release September 22 and Bevin would stay additional day to make his statement September 23.

8. Bevin pointed out that his own draft statement (Embassy's 4154) has been cast in form he would use in debate September 22. He did not think US statement, if we agreed to make one, need be as complicated. The two essential points which he hopes US will cover are :

(a) That Bernadotte plan in opinion United States Government offers a fair and equitable basis for a settlement, and

(b) That USG will give its fullest support to Bernadotte plan as whole.

9. To my mind, statements by US and UK of the kind and in the sequence suggested by Bevin represent our best and perhaps only effective course in present circumstances. Statements would fix the positions of US and UK firmly behind Bernadotte plan as a whole. Working on this basis shoulder to shoulder with UK is best devised, it seems to me, to influence both Arabs and Israelis to acquiesce. If we should become the prey of Zionist forces, which will cause the UK to become the protector of the Arabs, this will only prolong that dangerous sore in Palestine and possibly spread the area of infection. I believe the reasons which Bevin has advanced in paragraph 6 above for US making its statement first are valid. They are in accord with my knowledge of the political situation here. (This I have since confirmed from authoritative Conservative sources.)

10. For what my judgment is worth, I recommend with all the force at my disposal that we make the statement suggested above in the circumstances indicated. I believe that this, coupled with the British statement, will be an effective double blow which may go far to achieve

a permanent and workable settlement of what has been a potentially, if not actually, serious threat to our national interest.

11. I hope that security aspects of this message will be observed with utmost care (see also caution in final paragraph my reference telegram).

DOUGLAS

501.BB Palestine/9-1748: Telegram

*The Consul General at Jerusalem (Macdonald) to the Secretary
of State*

URGENT

JERUSALEM, September 17, 1948.

1306. Please pass United Nations Paris for Secretary General from Bunche, Jerusalem, 17 September.

Following for information Security Council.

Count Folke Bernadotte, United Nations Mediator on Palestine, brutally assassinated by Jewish assailants of unknown identity, in planned, cold blooded attack in the new city of Jerusalem at 1405 GMT today, Friday, 17 September. Mediator, in Jerusalem on official tour, was en route from Government House to YMCA in a convoy of three cars, two of which were flying United Nations flags and one a Red Cross flag. Party accompanied by an official liaison officer of the Jewish forces. In the Katamon quarter of new city, well within Jewish lines, all three cars were stopped at a road block in which was parked an Israeli Army type jeep filled with men in Jewish Army uniforms all of whom got out but the driver. Two of these men, apparently recognising the Mediator's car approached it, stood by the window and fired at point blank range. Count Bernadotte and Colonel Andre P. Serot, French Air Forces, United Nations Observer, sitting beside him in rear of car, were both hit several times, Colonel Serot being killed instantly, and Count Bernadotte having lost consciousness almost immediately, dying within a few minutes of his arrival at Hadassah Hospital, where he was driven by UN Secretariat Officer Frank Begley, who was driver of Mediator's car at time of attack and who suffered only powder burns. General Aage Lundstroem, Chief of Staff of Truce Supervision, also seated in rear of car, miraculously escaped injury. Commander William R. Cox, United States Navy, United Nations Observer, seated in front of car also uninjured.

Dr. Bernard Joseph, Military Governor of Jerusalem and Colonel Dayan, Military Commander of Israeli forces in Jerusalem immediately expressed deep regret and concern and stated their intention to hunt down assailants.

Situation in Jerusalem tense. Consulting with Truce Commission and senior observers concerning future arrangements affecting observer personnel in Jerusalem who are in constant danger.

General Lundstroem, as personal representative of Mediator and his chief of staff, carrying on with direction truce supervision work in consultation with Truce Commission and General William E. Riley, United States Marines, senior United Nations Observer.

All members of Observer Corps and United Nations Secretariat staff deeply shocked at sudden loss of their leader in this work whose high

integrity, tirelessness, devotion to his mission and great personal courage were inspiration to us all.

Signed Bunche.¹

MACDONALD

¹ For the statement by the Secretary of State on the assassination of Count Bernadotte and the preliminary report from the Consul General at Jerusalem on the assassination, both released September 17, see Department of State *Bulletin*, September 26, 1948, p. 399.

The Consul General, on September 18, informed the Department of the "general assumption of UN observer group, this office and Jewish military authorities, that assassins were of terrorist group, L.H.Y., commonly known as Stern Gang." (Telegram 1308 from Jerusalem, 501.BB Palestine/9-1848)

Mr. Ben-Gurion read to Special Representative McDonald, during the evening of September 18, the orders he had given to the military commander of Jerusalem to arrest all Stern members and to seize their bases and arms. He advised also that he would present to the cabinet meeting that evening an ordinance outlawing the organization. Within 24 hours of the assassination, Israeli forces arrested 40 Stern members in Tel Aviv and 150 in Jerusalem (telegram 122, September 18, midnight, from Tel Aviv, 867N.01/9-1848).

Acting United Nations Secretary-General Sobolev cabled the Secretary of State on September 18 that he had instructed Mr. Bunche to assume full authority over the Palestine Mission pending a decision by the General Assembly or the Security Council (unnumbered telegram from Paris, 501.BB Palestine/9-1848).

501.BB Palestine/9-1748 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 18, 1948—2 p. m.

3690. For Ambassador Douglas.

(1) We agree (para 2 Embtel 4153, Sept. 17) Bernadotte report may be published as early as Sept. 20.

(2) Secretary will make decision in Paris (para 6). Confidentially our present inclination is to make statement there before British.

(3) Sec plans leave Washington early afternoon Sept. 19, arriving in Paris Sept. 20.

(4) We are preparing US statement (para 8) which Sec will probably take with him for discussion with GADel Paris following arrival.

Sent London, repeated Paris for Jessup and McClintock in reply Delga 59, Sept. 18.¹

MARSHALL

¹ Not printed; Mr. McClintock, in this message to Messrs. Lovett and Rusk, recommended strongly that there be no ten-day delay in publishing the Bernadotte report and concluded: "Bernadotte's death will give maximum weight to recommendations in his report. I feel that if report is issued promptly, there will still be sufficient time for diplomatic preparation, particularly since British already contemplate swift action." (501.BB/9-1848)

Editorial Note

On September 19, some two days after the assassination of Count Bernadotte, Special Representative McDonald sent a letter to Presi-

dent Truman which stated that "no matter what happens in the next days or weeks, I do hope that you will discourage any possible move to weaken this Mission or to withdraw its head as a form of sanctions or as evidence of U.S. displeasure." The President replied on October 4 that "I heartily approve the course you have pursued and are pursuing and shall, as you recommend, discourage any move to weaken the Mission or to withdraw its head as a form of sanctions." The full texts of the two messages are printed in Mr. McDonald's *My Mission in Israel*, pages 81-82.

501.BB Palestine/9-1848 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly, at Paris*¹

SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 20, 1948—3 p. m.

Gadel 25. [For Jessup.] Dept. view that unless direct pecuniary loss sustained by UN on account murder Bernadotte, inappropriate for UN demand indemnity PGI. Delga 65, Sep 18.² Punitive damages not generally favored in international law even as between states. Matter propriety apology UN left your discretion.

LOVETT

¹ The first part of the Third Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly opened at Paris on September 21, 1948, and lasted until December 12. The United States Delegation was headed by Secretary Marshall until his departure for Washington on November 21. With respect to the membership of the U.S. Delegation, see vol. I, Part 1, pp. 9-20 and Department of State *Bulletin*, September 12, 1948, p. 330.

² Not printed, it suggested that if it were "duly established that PGI failed to use means at disposal to prevent murder or to punish murderers, it would be responsible to make apology and pay indemnity to UN" (501.BB Palestine/9-1848). A further exchange of telegrams on this subject (Delga 93, September 23, from Paris, and Gadel 49, September 24, in reply, 501.BB Palestine/9-2348) is not printed.

501.BB Palestine/9-2048 : Telegram

The Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

URGENT

TEL AVIV, September 20, 1948—6 p. m.

NIACT

128. Foreign Minister informed me at 4 p. m. that at noon today PGI issued 24-hour ultimatum to IZL forces in Jerusalem to unconditionally surrender their arms and enlist unreservedly in Israeli Army, or be attacked by military force.¹ Ultimatum expires 12 noon,

¹ Consul General Macdonald, on September 22, reported that Irgun Zvai Leumi forces in Jerusalem had agreed, the previous day, to disband and that its members had begun reporting to the Israeli army for duty. He noted also that in the State of Israel, i.e., outside of Jerusalem, the IZL had joined the Israeli army in July (telegram 1321 from Jerusalem, 867N.01/9-2248).

September 21. Foreign Minister states only factor which will affect government decision to force compliance ultimatum is if Arabs attack before noon tomorrow.

This most important decision revealed after I had expressed to Foreign Minister contents Depcirtel September 19, 4 p. m.² concerning which Foreign Minister reiterated assurances that PGI would not take military action violation truce and would only defend itself if Arabs attack. As for prevention further violence, Foreign Minister recounted current strenuous actions being taken against Stern Gang and said operations proceeding successfully so far with government more hopeful of finding leading conspirators and assassins. Am promised English text already approved Cabinet decrees against terrorist organizations within few hours and will telegraph soonest.³

McDONALD

² Not printed; it requested diplomatic officers at Arab capitals, Tel Aviv, and Jerusalem to inform appropriate officials "that we consider UN task which Count Bernadotte so effectively commenced should be vigorously pursued. We attach greatest importance to maintenance present truce and continuation of mediation. We are confident Arab and Jewish leaders will take every precaution to prevent further violence and will, particularly, refrain from any military step contrary to terms of SC truce." (501.BB Palestine/9-1948)

³ In a message sent via air pouch courier on September 24 to Mr. Clifford, who was aboard the President's Special Train, Acting Secretary Lovett stated in part: "In general Israel appears to be making a determined effort to control terrorist organizations, Irgun and Stern gangs. Some success with former but Stern leaders not yet caught and important figures already gone underground. Safety of American personnel is doubtful. Israeli Government giving McDonald, Tel Aviv, strong police guard as protection against assassin groups. Consul Macdonald, Jerusalem, is reported to have received warnings and we are concerned his safety. He has requested additional Marine guards for Consulate and military establishments are considering matter." (Clifford Papers)

501.BB Palestine/9-2148: Circular telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices*¹

WASHINGTON, September 21, 1948.

SecState released following statement on Palestine in Paris at 4 p. m. Paris time (11 a. m. EDT), Tuesday, Sept 21:²

"The US considers that the conclusions contained in the final report of Count Bernadotte³ offer a generally fair basis for settlement of the Palestine question. My government is of the opinion that the conclusions are sound and strongly urges the parties and the General Assembly to accept them in their entirety as the best possible basis for bringing peace to a distracted land.

"No plan could be proposed which would be entirely satisfactory in

¹ At Arab capitals, Tel Aviv, and Jerusalem.

² Mr. Lovett, in a memorandum of September 21 to the White House Message Center for the attention of Mr. Clifford, sent the text of the Secretary's statement and advised of the date, time, and place of release (501.BB Palestine/9-2148).

³ Released on September 20.

all respects to every interested party. The UN has endeavored to achieve a solution by peaceful adjustment and entrusted the task to its Mediator, Count Bernadotte. He energetically, courageously and with a spirit of complete fairness, we feel, canvassed all the possibilities and proposed as his last contribution towards a world of peace a sound basis for settlement. He gave his life to this effort.

"The complexities of the problem and the violent emotions which have been engendered are such that the details of any plan could be debated endlessly. As a matter of fact, the debate on this question has been carried on for years in almost every kind of public forum. It is our sincere hope that the parties concerned will realize that their best interests and the interests of the world community will be served by accepting in a spirit of fair compromise the judgment of Count Bernadotte."

LOVETT

IO Files : US(P)/A/24

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Henry S. Villard of the Advisory Staff of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly

CONFIDENTIAL

[PARIS,] September 22, 1948.

Participants: Amir Faisal, Chief of Saudi Arabian Delegation
Henry S. Villard, U.S. Delegation

In conversation today with members of the Saudi Arabian Delegation, I was told by Amir Faisal that his Delegation was strongly opposed to accepting any part of the Bernadotte Report. Amir Faisal said that he would fight against the report to the end, in which he would be fully supported by the other Arab states.

The Saudi Arabians consider the report to be a "prejudiced one" favoring the Provisional Government of Israel. I asked Amir Faisal if he considered Count Bernadotte to have been a prejudiced person. Faisal replied that while he did not know Bernadotte personally, he regarded the UN solution for Palestine as altogether prejudiced and that the present proposal would never be acquiesced in by the Arab nations.

While personally friendly, Amir Faisal spoke with bitterness about the Palestine problem. He said that as long as the State of Israel existed the Palestine problem would never be solved. He attempted to draw a parallel between the illegal government of "Free Greece" under General Markos, and the Provisional Government of Israel, and charged the United States with inconsistency in opposing the former while supporting the latter.

The Saudi Arabian Delegation made it clear that as far as they and the other Arab Delegations were concerned, the Bernadotte Report would not be accepted and could only be "imposed upon" them.

501.BB Palestine/9-2248 : Telegram

The Chargé in Lebanon (Kuniholm) to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

BEIRUT, September 22, 1948—10 a. m.

479. Re Depcirtel September 19, 4 p. m. Since President and Prime Minister are absent from Beirut I transmitted message to Foreign Minister, who said he would relay it to President.

Frangié paid tribute to Bernadotte as impartial and honest mediator, who tried to perform an impossible and hopeless task.

He repeated what he has stated on frequent occasions, that Arabs would never recognize state of Israel. Jews, he said, would be boycotted by Arab states; any state which engaged in trade with Israel, furthermore, would also be boycotted by Arab states. When I observed that such a boycott could be as dangerous to Arabs as to Jews, and almost impossible to enforce, he replied that ways would be found to make it effective.

Frangié assured me that Lebanese Army would never attack Jews unless attacked first.

KUNIHOLM

800.00 Summaries/9-2248 : Circular telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and
Consular Offices*¹

SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 22, 1948—2 p. m.

Please urgently bring to attention Head of State, PriMin or FonMin Sec's statement Sept 21 re Bernadotte's conclusions for settlement Palestine question (cirtel Sept 21).

In so doing you should stress this Govt's deep concern over dangers inherent in present Palestine situation. This Govt considers that acceptance of Bernadotte's conclusions would provide Arab and Jewish leaders with statesmanlike opportunity of making major contribution to NE peace and thereby to world peace. We believe such acceptance would serve best interests of all NE countries. It would permit resumption of stable conditions under which NE peoples may again devote their energies and resources to constructive purposes. Rejection of reasonable settlement, on other hand, which would prolong present disturbed conditions in NE would undoubtedly have further detrimental effect on wellbeing of NE peoples and on stability and security of whole NE. This Govt accordingly urges that favorable consideration be given by all NE States to Bernadotte's final report to UN.

For your info only, we realize that acquiescence rather than acceptance conclusions may be most we can hope for. We feel, however, it would be tactical mistake to urge less than acceptance.

LOVETT

¹ At Arab capitals, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, London, and Paris, the last for the information of the Delegation to the General Assembly.

Editorial Note

On September 22 London reported on a telegram sent by the Foreign Office to British missions at Arab capitals, in which they were instructed to hand to the governments to which they were accredited a copy of the statement that Mr. Bevin was to make before the House of Commons that day. The telegram informed the missions that the British Government would push firmly for acceptance by the United Nations of Count Bernadotte's recommendations in their entirety; it also instructed them, together with their American counterparts, to persuade the Arab Governments not to oppose implementation of those recommendations. It noted further that active acceptance of the recommendations and recognition of the position of the other party were unnecessary; what was required was acquiescence (telegram 4220, 501.BB Palestine/9-2248).

For that portion of the text of Mr. Bevin's statement dealing with Palestine, see *Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, 5th series, volume 456, column 898.

195.91/9-2348 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Griffis) to the Acting Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

CAIRO, September 23, 1948—noon.

1373. Replying Deptel 1299, September 17, 8 p. m.,¹ under authority military proclamations five and thirteen, Egyptian Government is seizing all cargo destined to or en route from Palestine. Increasingly rigorous inspections of passengers and baggage and cargo inevitable. Fuel, food, water and other supplies are being denied to vessels calling Palestine.

Government now proposes to deny entry into Egyptian ports to any vessel repeatedly calling Palestine. Extremely likely that passengers of military age (probably including women) en route Palestine will be removed from vessels and interned. Strong likelihood that vessels themselves if allowed to call at Alexandria may be interned if repeatedly carrying military age personnel or cargo for Palestine. No new decrees or regulations issued covering these proposals which are administrative decisions under above military proclamations. Copies of all decrees have been sent Department. All Arab League countries reportedly determined adopt similar restrictions.

¹Not printed; it stated that since it was not clear what positive action the Egyptian Government planned to take against American ships trading with Israeli ports and since the Department had not found technical legal grounds on which to base a protest, the Department requested Cairo's "considered views as to character probable Egypt action and any suggestions which you feel would be effective in formulation of protest." (195.91/9-1348)

Agent of American Export Lines has strongly promised line temporarily to eliminate Palestinian ports from schedule.

It is not believed that any further protest is advisable or would be effective at this time, since more onerous of these measures determined upon since Egyptian Government's receipt of memo and verbal communication contents Deptel 1210.² Embassy believes that only close adherence to Egyptian Government emergency regulations will prevent serious embarrassment US flag vessels this area. Might be possible to have Palestine-bound passengers unmolested Alexandria if UN certification as to their non-military status were obtained prior embarkation from US and possibly American consular certificates for those embarking at intermediate ports. Re Deptel 1242 and 1259,³ American citizen M. S. Zia, passenger to Alexandria last trip *Marine Carp* reports large group Jewish passengers for Haifa made no secret military status, conducted commando tactics practice on deck daily, insisted bulletins and announcements be made in Hebrew, and paid \$6,800 charges for excess baggage which took seven hours to unload at Haifa, including some 75 or 80 US Army type trunks so heavy took two men to lift.

GRIFFIS

² Dated September 2, not printed; it stated that "any actions on part either party to present controversy in Palestine which would impede normal" movements of passengers and cargoes "would be viewed most seriously by this Govt." (195.91/9-248)

³ Dated September 9 and September 10, respectively, neither printed.

501.BB Palestine/9-2448: Telegram

Mr. Wells Stabler to the Secretary of State

SECRET

AMMAN, September 24, 1948—5 p. m.

63. Since for reasons given by King (mytel 62, September 24¹) it may be difficult for Transjordan to accept Bernadotte's conclusions, am convinced no problem will be encountered in obtaining Transjordan's acquiescence to them if they are adopted by UN and imposed by resolution.

King's well-known reluctance pursue war, his past and present reasonable attitude toward Jews, his desire annex Arab parts Palestine, his Greater Syria scheme, and his close alliance with British are all calculated make his position among Arab states difficult, if not

¹ Not printed; the reasons given by the King were that "he is surrounded by hostile elements in Syria, Lebanon, Egypt and to certain degree in Iraq. . . . Arab hostile elements are seeking destroy him and Transjordan and criticize every step he makes which they consider not in concert with Arab League decisions. Therefore as an Arab leader he is obliged concur in and adopt decisions made by majority other Arab leaders." (501.BB Palestine/9-2448)

dangerous. So far strength of Arab Legion has been deterrent to any overt conspiracy. King realizes therefore that any forthright acceptance Mediator's conclusions would make his position untenable and that in storm such acceptance would cause, he might lose all he had struggled for. No doubt exists that King generally favors Bernadotte's conclusions (with possible exception matters as Jaffa and Jerusalem) since he is one of principal beneficiaries. Accordingly, Transjordan will be among first, if not first, to urge acquiescence by Arab states to UN imposed solution based on Mediator's conclusions.

Although realize matter under active consideration, feel US recognition this country, even if *de facto*, at this time would contribute to solution Palestine problem by placing Transjordan on equal footing with Israel before UN and by giving it needed support for taking major lead in any debate by Arab League concerning acceptance or acquiescence Bernadotte's conclusions.

Department pass Jerusalem 46, Tel Aviv 2.

STABLER

Truman Papers, President's Secretary's File : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to President Truman*¹

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, September 24, 1948—7:46 p. m.

Memorandum for the President.

White 97. A reliable newspaper correspondent has told us in confidence that the American Zionist Emergency Council (Dr. Silver's organization) has endeavored to plant on [*in?*] his paper the story that Bernadotte's Report relating to Palestine was written in the State Department, that it was taken to Bernadotte by a State Department official after coordination with the British, and that Bernadotte used it with a few minor changes.

There is no truth in this story. It is true that representatives of the Department had many opportunities to exchange views with Bernadotte, that we were aware of his thinking, and that he was aware of ours, as were the British and the Israelis.

We had no part in the preparation of Bernadotte's Report. We had not seen the complete Report prior to its publication by the UN in Paris. We were, however, confidentially informed of the conclusions relating to the future of Palestine as contained in Part 1 of the Report shortly prior to the publication.

ROBERT A. LOVETT

¹ Transmitted by the White House Signal Detachment to the President, who was aboard the Presidential train in California and Arizona.

501.BB Palestine/9-2448 : Telegram

The Minister in Syria (Keeley) to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET URGENT

DAMASCUS, September 24, 1948—11 p. m.

618. Whereas my instructions (Depcirtel September 22, 2 p. m.) limit me to urging "acceptance" Bernadotte conclusions, Bevin's instructions (London's 4221 to Department September 22, 7 p. m.¹) to British Chargé Dundas pointed out cardinal point of plan is that neither party is called upon to make any active sign of acceptance or to recognize position of other party and charged him in collaboration with his US colleague "who will receive similar instructions" to seek "acquiescence" of Syrian Government [apparent omission] at his discretion in initial interviews, in subsequent conversations and in publicity guidance suggested arguments given him in great detail. "Only essential" said Bevin "is that our persuasions should be successful".

After consultation with me and before receipt of my instructions (Legtel 617, September 24, 11 p. m.¹), Dundas made to Barazi plea for "acquiescence" on ground that however imperfect Bernadotte's conclusions might be they were considered by HMG as best proposal likely to get universal support. Dundas and I are in agreement that Arab weakness in both political and military sphere is such as to give them no reasonably acceptable alternative. He plans support my arguments in this sense with President, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister and I propose generally to support his arguments as suggested by Bevin to extent applicable to our somewhat different situation.

Since Barazi has frequently expressed Syrian Government's grave doubts re value of UN guarantee of any recommended Palestine frontiers, because Syrians sincerely doubt Israel's peaceful intentions and fear its aggressive designs, they might well be more amenable to reason in this crucial point and hence more willing acquiesce in imposition of Bernadotte conclusions if American Government were on record at least as approving British position. I therefore respectfully recommend out of depth my conviction and that of my staff concerning its desirability and timeliness that US show some awareness of Arab fears of announced Zionist pretensions and offer something as *quid pro quo* for Arab acquiescence. Specifically I request Department's authority make, at moment which may seem to us here most opportune for promotion of Syrian acquiescence in plan, a statement along following lines:

"British assurances that unprovoked Israeli violation of Arab

¹ Not printed.

frontiers would be considered in effect 'act of war' against Britain and would put into operation various Anglo-Arab treaties under Article 51 of Charter is made with knowledge and full approval American Government. Furthermore, US Government, which fully understands that alleged Zionist ambitions are source of grave concern to Syrian Government, desires emphasize that, while for constitutional reasons it cannot give pledge similar to British assurances it is bound by UN Charter in concert with other UN members 'to take effective collective measures for the suppression of acts of aggression.'"

In interest not only of influencing Syrians to "go along" with implementation of Bernadotte plan but in concern for future of American interests in this area, I urge above message or some show of sympathy with disagreeableness of bitter pill Syrians are being asked to swallow in acquiescing in perpetuation in Palestine of Zionist state which they honestly feel will be perpetual threat to their national security. Even words alone, a few understanding ones, mean far more in eastern psychology than in occidental. Let us not lose this opportunity honestly to fortify our position for the future.²

Pouched Arab capitals, Athens, Ankara.

Sent Department; Department pass Paris 19 for USUNDel and London 7.

KEELEY

²The Department, in reply on September 30, expressed its appreciation of the reasoning underlying the penultimate paragraph but regretted it was unable "at present" to authorize Mr. Keeley to make a statement along the lines suggested (telegram 377, 501.BB Palestine/9-2148).

501.BB Palestine/9-2548: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Griffis) to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

CAIRO, September 25, 1948—noon.

1392. Azzam Pasha, AL Secretary General in informal conversation with Secretary Ireland, arranged obtain Azzam's reaction Bernadotte report said flatly that report was not acceptable to Arabs. He particularly found objectionable:

1. The assignment to Israel of Galilee containing overwhelming majority of Arabs. Return of Negeb could not be compensation since population there also overwhelmingly Arab;

2. Failure make Haifa with 100,000 Arabs and 60,000 Jews an international city as he had understood had been intention of Bernadotte;

3. Assignment to Jews of Jaffa, a purely Arab city with a population of 100,000;

4. Failure assign Jerusalem to Arabs. If such failure was based on presence of 100,000 Jews at Jerusalem, he must point to reverse situation at Jaffa and Haifa. Jews could not have it both ways.

Even more important was failure recognize Arab objections to Jewish state with Arab majority. If it were said that since May 15 Arab majority no longer exists, he must point out that flight of Arabs had been due entirely to Jewish terrorism.

When asked whether guarantee of international frontiers would not constitute gain for Arabs, he responded that guarantee of frontiers of state not recognized by Arabs in first instance was of no interest. In any case UN guarantees mean nothing. Zionists were defying UN now and would continue to do so.

He then reiterated familiar themes concerning partition and attitudes of King Abdullah, US and Great Britain. He could understand how ambition swayed Abdullah as tool of British but still could not understand attitude of Great Britain or US. Both maintained they backed report in interest of peace and out of friendship for Arabs. In regard to former both US and Great Britain were actually making it impossible achieve permanent peace in ME, since all who were familiar with realities in plan knew peace would be impossible under Bernadotte's plan.

Azzam said British Ministers Troutbeck and Clayton had just talked with him for more than two hours, urging acceptance Bernadotte plan. He had answered Arabs could not accept plan, they could not acquiesce.

In conclusion and in same mood, he repeated to Ireland that Arabs would continue resist. If US and Great Britain and UN wished to impose plan on Arabs let them send men, planes and battleships. In no other way could Bernadotte's plan be enforced. Similar line pursued by Azzam in statement to press.

Sent Department as 1392, repeated London as 105.

Department please pass to Paris for USUN.

Paraphrased to Arab capitals.

GRIFFIS

IO Files : US(P)/A/C.1/5

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Henry S. Villard of the Advisory Staff of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly

SECRET

[PARIS,] September 26, 1948.

Participants: Mahmoud Fawzi Bey, Egyptian Delegation
Henry S. Villard, United States Delegation

I took Fawzi Bey to lunch in the country yesterday and spent the better part of the afternoon discussing Palestine. Fawzi Bey's attitude

seemed essentially reasonable, in contrast to the aggressiveness of the Saudi Arabian Delegation, and I gathered the impression that his main preoccupation was that of saving face for the Arab states in a settlement of the Palestine problem.

Fawzi Bey said that if the General Assembly attempted to push through a solution based on an all-out acceptance of the Bernadotte recommendations, the Arab Delegations would refuse to have anything to do with the matter and would regard the solution as one imposed upon them. There would thus be no real solution of the problem, since the Arabs could not acquiesce flatly in the Bernadotte Report. The main objective should be, rather, to achieve a solution on the basis of conciliation and negotiation. To accept the Bernadotte Report hastily, merely because everyone was tired of Palestine and wanted to dispose of the subject quickly, would be a fatal mistake, for this is a crucial moment in the history of the Palestine question. If the Assembly voted a solution in which the Arabs could not acquiesce, the struggle would go on for years.

Fawzi Bey outlined his views as to the most acceptable procedure from the Arab point of view :

1. There should be a general discussion of the Bernadotte proposals in Committee 1, carefully steered by the Chairman in order to avoid pressure for an immediate decision.

2. At the proper moment a very small sub-committee should be appointed of carefully chosen nations to work for a negotiated settlement on the basis of the Bernadotte proposals, under the leadership of one or more "neutral" states. Possibly Belgium might qualify in this respect, with the addition perhaps of certain states which had abstained on the partition vote, together with one which had voted for and one which had voted against partition.

3. The role of such a sub-committee would be to conciliate opposing viewpoints on the Arab and Jewish sides and to bring forth a solution which both sides could accept under the urging of other members of the General Assembly.

It was pointed out by Fawzi Bey that both parties to the controversy have extremists in their midst and have publicly assumed positions from which they cannot officially retreat. Nevertheless, the possibility remains of finding a middle ground on which agreement could be reached without serious loss of face, particularly in the light of over-all General Assembly opinion. The best way of finding this ground would be outside of formal debates in the Assembly or in the heat of Committee 1 proceedings.

I asked Fawzi Bey what he regarded as the main objection to the

Bernadotte proposals from the Arab viewpoint. In the order of their importance he said they were as follows:

(a) *Boundary line for Israel*. The main difficulty would be in drawing a line so as to incorporate as many Arabs as possible in Arab territory and as many Jews as possible in Jewish territory. The Arabs object to giving Galilee to Israel. I asked Fawzi Bey whether, in all the past attempts to draw a boundary, a line satisfactory to both parties had ever been suggested. Admitting that it had not, he nevertheless thought that some agreement could yet be reached. In this connection he noted that Galilee and the port of Jaffa had previously been assigned to the Arabs, whereas now these areas were to be given to Israel.

(b) *Status of Jerusalem*. Fawzi Bey found the Bernadotte suggestion in this respect too vague, but said he was open-minded. Exactly what plan was in mind? The administering authority for the city must be very carefully selected in Arab opinion because of the danger of infiltration by the Jews and gradual taking over of the administration by them.

(c) *Haifa and Lydda*. Specific details of the free port status of these places would have to be worked out and agreed upon.

(d) *Conciliation commission*. The Arabs were doubtful of the efficacy and usefulness of this body. Again, Jewish infiltration and influence were feared by the Arabs.

Fawzi Bey made it clear that in the Arab view, the primary basis for a settlement would be the return of Arab refugees to their homes in Israel. It was essential that these people should be permitted to return to live where they have previously taken root, and monetary compensation would not serve as a substitute. He seemed to feel that in general the Bernadotte recommendations were satisfactory in this respect.

It was significant that during our entire conversation, Fawzi Bey made no objection to the existence of the State of Israel. He observed that the idea of a unitary state for Palestine was now outmoded, nor would the Arabs desire such a solution. A settlement would have to be reached "on the basis of present facts". While the Arabs could not of course officially accept the existence of Israel, I had the feeling that Fawzi Bey's entire objective is to achieve a settlement on the basis of negotiation in regard to the points enumerated above, and that if this can be done quietly the Arabs would be prepared to take a conciliatory line.

Finally, I asked Fawzi Bey what he thought the Russians would do. He replied that he had no information on this score, but that he felt sure the Soviet Union would play the game to serve their own interests—which would be to prevent any workable arrangements between the Arabs and the Jews.

501.BB Palestine/9-2248 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Consulate General at Jerusalem

SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 27, 1948—5 p. m.

929. Dept has informally emphasized (urtel 1323 Sept 22¹) to Israeli rep here urgent necessity demilitarization Jerusalem.²

LOVETT

¹ Not printed.² Telegram 929 was repeated to Tel Aviv.

501.BB Palestine/9-2448 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to Mr. Wells Stabler, at Amman

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 27, 1948—9 p. m.

15. Dept appreciates reasoning penultimate para urtel 63, Sept 24 but considers that in light many important factors involved in over-all picture, particularly urgent necessity acquiescence Arab states and Israel in Bernadotte's conclusions and successful outcome GA discussions Bernadotte report, any kind of recognition of Transjordan by US at this particular moment would be premature and prejudicial. However in conversations with Transjordan Govt officials you are authorized state in strictest confidence that formal recognition Transjordan is under active consideration by this Govt and that acquiescence by Transjordan in Bernadotte conclusions and degree of cooperation offered by Transjordan in implementing actions and decisions of UN re Palestine will be an important factor in determining this Govts final attitude on recognition.¹

LOVETT

¹ This telegram was repeated to Jerusalem as No. 932.

501.BB/9-2848 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

SECRET

US URGENT

WASHINGTON, September 28, 1948—3 p.m.

3790. Louis [Lewis] Jones from McClintock. Confirm to Wright my remarks to him Sep 23 concerning desire Dept that, in light existing circumstances, top priority be accorded treatment Palestine problem Paris GA. [McClintock.]

LOVETT

501.BB Palestine/9-2848 : Telegram

Mr. Wells Stabler to the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

US URGENT

AMMAN, September 28, 1948—4 p. m.

66. Am grateful to Department for guidance contained its 15, September 27 and shall take early opportunity convey to King and Transjordan Government officials substance last sentence.

Before doing so, however, will Department wish consider also authorizing me assure King and Transjordan Government officials that same yardstick being applied in connection *de jure* recognition Israel? Recent statement by Secretary would appear indicate US Government is contemplating *de jure* recognition of Israel within next days. Such development could only have most disillusioning effect to King's and Transjordan Government's belief in USA sincerity and impartiality, particularly in light of US Government's present attitude on formal recognition Transjordan as expressed in reftel.¹

Department pass Jerusalem 49.

STABLER

¹ In reply, on September 30, the Department informed Mr. Stabler that it "regrets unable at present authorize you give King and Transjordan Government officials assurance subject urtel 66." It also left to his discretion whether he would tell those officials that acquiescence in Count Bernadotte's conclusions and co-operation in implementing actions on Palestine by the United Nations would help determine the United States Government's final attitude on recognition of Transjordan (telegram 17 to Amman, 501.BB Palestine/9-2848). Mr. Stabler informed the Prime Minister on October 2 and the King on October 3 that the United States was giving active consideration to formal recognition of Transjordan. Both expressed great satisfaction, the King expressing his hope that he would be able to visit the United States when the question was resolved. Mr. Stabler did not make use of the authorization given to him, as set forth in the second sentence in this footnote (telegram 72, October 3, 9 a. m., from Amman, 501.BB Palestine/10-348).

867N.48/9-2848 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Paris

SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 28, 1948—6 p. m.

Telmar 19. For the Secretary: Following memorandum from Joint Chiefs of Staff dated Sept 22 transmitted to Dept by Secretary Defense: ¹

"The Joint Chiefs of Staff have on frequent occasions pointed out the critical strategic importance of the Near East area and the necessity, from a military standpoint, of maintaining the Arab world oriented toward the United States and the United Kingdom.

"The present distress of some 300,000 Arab refugees from Palestine and the inability of the Arab nations to provide for their urgent needs

¹ On September 23.

present an opportunity for the United States to strengthen the friendship of the Arab people for the people of the United States and to enhance the prestige of the United States, both of which have suffered as the result of recent events in connection with the Palestine situation.

"Therefore the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that, as a measure to strengthen our military position, the United States should emulate the actions of the United Kingdom by the early provision of general assistance to the Arab refugees from Palestine. Signed William D. Leahy."²

Mr. Forrestal in the transmitting letter forwarding the JCS views stated that "only purpose of this letter is to advise you of the considered views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the urgency of taking definitive action and of my concurrence therein".³

LOVETT

² Fleet Admiral, United States Navy, and Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Armed Forces.

³ Acting Secretary Lovett, in his reply of September 29 to Mr. Forrestal, stated that "the Department is deeply conscious of the urgency of the Near Eastern refugee problem and of its military and political implications, and is making every effort, in cooperation with representatives of the Secretary of the Navy, and with other agencies of the Government, to find means of extending assistance to the Near Eastern refugees." (867N.48/9-2348)

A marginal notation by Mr. Humelsine on Mr. Forrestal's letter of September 23, made on September 29, states that he "notified Mr. Ohly of Mr. Forrestal's office of Mr. Lovett's view that cited JCS decision should be made known to President."

501.13B Palestine/9-2848 : Telegram

*The Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald)
to the Secretary of State*

SECRET

US URGENT

TEL AVIV, September 28, 1948—9 p. m.

NIACF

151. Reference Depcirtel September 22, 8 [2?] p. m., and further Mistel 148, September 27.¹ Foreign Minister goes Paris tonight prepared acknowledge Bernadotte's report as basis of discussion and in spirit of hope for reasonable settlement, but prepared by Cabinet instructions to fight for claims that PGI consider legitimate. Among these will be principally the vital problem of the Negev, and some not unfavorable solution of Jerusalem.

As regards exchange Galilee for Negev, Bernadotte's proposal considered unacceptable by PGI because :

1. Reduces Israel's net area by nine million dunums, leaving state with but five million dunum total.

2. Deprives Jews access Dead Sea.

3. Cuts off any hope Jewish trade route to Orient through Gulf Aqaba.

PGI argument is that Negev is only large unpopulated area afford-

¹ Latter not printed.

ing hope settlement Jewish refugees and allowing absorption natural population increase for many years. To give up Negev means reducing Israel to miniature state which would constitute area of population pressure and breed future conflict; gain of Galilee is not compensatory in that Galilee is relatively small and already heavily populated. The loss of the 22 Jewish settlements in Negev, which are still holding out against tremendous odds, is a politico-military factor which public and army will simply not permit PGI to ignore.

With reference to Jerusalem, Foreign Minister was instructed in secret session Cabinet to take stand:

1. That internationalization of total city, although theoretically possible, is very improbable of effective implementation, basically impracticable, will be source of constant difficulty owing natural topographical and racial complications and create terrific economic problem in that Jerusalem has no economic basis survival cut off from Israel.

2. To request that Jewish-held part of Jerusalem be incorporated in Israel as well as a corridor roughly of same area scope as present Jewish military corridor. In order accomplish (2), Jews might agree to partition of new city Jerusalem between Arabs and Jews and might suggest internationalization of old city within walls.

My personal opinion is that PGI delegation Paris will do utmost prove that loss of Negev is fatal blow to Israel's future and the argument is patent.

Apart from above, but as general consideration, I note press here making much ado about British desire have air bases in Negev by agreement with Transjordan. Although without any information on subject, it is not impossible imagine Israel considering give British same airbase rights if Jews can retain Negev.²

Further, in my own mind I raise question of possibility, improbable as it may seem at moment, of Abdullah and Jews coming some sort of arrangement, under which both would agree re-stake Arab territory of Palestine roughly as shown in November 29 partition (leaving most of Negev and Jaffa to Israel) and straightening out weird frontiers configuration, followed by bilateral agreement or regional pact of economic cooperation and mutual military alliance to defend both states against outside aggression. Such an alliance would, in my opinion, afford only effective native military force in entire Middle East area south of Turkey.

Department pass Paris information GADel.

MCDONALD

² Mr. Burrows of the British Foreign Office "categorically" informed an Embassy officer on October 1 that "British Government has no special ideas re air base or bases in Negeb, although if territory went to Transjordan and thus came within area of Anglo-Transjordan treaty British military would naturally consider Negeb on its merits from point of view UK strategic needs." (Telegram 4357, October 4, 1 p. m., from London, 501.BB Palestine/10-448)

501.BB Palestine/9-2948

Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] September 29, 1948.

Mr. Clark M. Clifford called me at 4:30 from Tulsa ¹ and said that the President was deeply concerned by an apparent over-emphasis by the Secretary on the necessity for accepting the Bernadotte Plan *in its entirety*. He said that the pressure from the Jewish groups on the President was mounting and that it was as bad as the time of the trusteeship suggestion. The line of attack was that the position taken in Paris by this Government was contrary to that of the Democratic National Platform.

The President first had instructed Clifford to send a telegram to the Secretary in Paris.² I told Clifford that the consequences of a telegram indicating a reversal of the President's clear approval of a program discussed with him by the Secretary on September 1 and formally signed by the President on that date³ would put the Secretary in an intolerable position and, because of the agreements made with other countries in the light of the agreed policy, would label this country as violating its agreements and as completely untrustworthy in international matters. The consequences could be absolutely disastrous to us in the United Nations and elsewhere.

After prolonged argument, Clifford agreed to use his best efforts to have this approach to the matter cancelled when I read to him the memorandum⁴ specifically approved by the President on September 1

¹ Mr. Clifford was aboard the Presidential train.

² The Clifford Papers contain a draft message from President Truman to Secretary Marshall at Paris in the President's handwriting. The editors are of the opinion that this message was intended to be the "telegram to the Secretary in Paris". It reads as follows:

"Your statement that the Bernadotte report should be used as a basis for negotiation in the settlement of the Palestine question requires clarification.

"The government of the United States is on record as having endorsed the action of the United Nations General Assembly of November 1947 as to boundaries. As President I have so stated officially. The Democratic Platform endorsed the findings of the General Assembly.

"I shall have to state that my position as to boundaries has not changed.

"You should know that my statement will be made on October first."

At the end of the draft telegram is a note that the message was to be sent immediately, with a copy to Acting Secretary Lovett at Washington.

Mr. McClintock's memorandum of September 30, p. 1437, which gives a further account of the Clifford-Lovett telephone conversation, states that the draft telegram was not sent.

³ See footnote 2, p. 1369.

⁴ The memorandum of August 31, p. 1363.

which set out in detail the possibility of a swap of Western Galilee for portions of the Negeb. I also called his attention to the fact that a message sent to the President through the White House Signal Center ⁵ and dispatched at 4:18 p. m. on September 18 telling the President of the Secretary's proposed statement and asking for instructions if the President were not in agreement produced no reply to date. At 6:20 on Monday evening, September 20, the White House Signal Center was checked with and again on Tuesday morning the 21st. No reply had been received in any form.

Clifford said this was all news to him and that he would take the matter up promptly.

The conversation was interrupted and some time later Clifford told me that an alternative suggestion had been made that the President reply to a telegram from Rabbi Wise, apparently in connection with the Jewish New Year but timed for release during the period of registration in New York. The telegram seemed reasonable except for a sentence which read, "It seems to me that the Bernadotte Plan might well serve as a basis of negotiation for such a settlement." I pointed out that this was an obvious weakening of the position taken by the Government in Paris and in reliance on which Bevin made his subsequent public statement before the House of Commons. Clifford agreed to take the matter up with the President and to call me back at the next stop.

At 6:50 p. m. a telecon message came in suggesting alternate language to replace the sentence quoted above. The new language read: "It seems to me that the Bernadotte Plan offers a basis for continuing efforts to secure a just settlement." As this approximated the statements made in Paris, it seemed acceptable to me. Before replying, however, I communicated with Satterthwaite and checked with others in the Department, who said that they saw no objection to this language. Accordingly, at about 7:00 p. m. I replied to Clifford's message via the Signal Center at the White House stating that the new language was acceptable.

It was my understanding that the President proposes to release his wire to Wise Thursday or Friday in an effort to offset the full-page advertising campaign of the American Zionist Emergency Council directed against the Bernadotte Plan.

Attached is the reply given me by telephone which the President expects to send to Rabbi Wise.

ROBERT A. LOVETT

⁵ Copy not found in Department of State files.

[Annex]

Proposed Telegram by President Truman to Rabbi Stephen S. Wise

In answer to your telegram, there is no question but that my action on May 14, 1948, constituted an unconditional recognition of the State of Israel. In addition, at that time, a provisional government had been established and *de facto* recognition was given the provisional government. When a permanent government is established, I have no reason to doubt but that it will promptly be given *de jure* recognition.

I sincerely hope it will be possible to find a peaceful settlement of the distressed conditions in Palestine which can be accepted with honor by all the interested parties. It seems to me that the Bernadotte Plan offers a basis for continuing efforts to secure a just settlement. Already substantial progress toward peace has been achieved and, with these more stabilized conditions, this Government is now in a position to give further consideration to making loans immediately available for productive projects within the State of Israel.⁶

⁶ There is no record in the files of the Department of State of the proposed telegram having been sent. A copy in the Clifford Papers contains the word "elected" instead of "established" in the penultimate sentence of the first paragraph.

501.BB Palestine/9-2948 : Telegram

The Chargé in the Soviet Union (Kohler) to the Acting Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

Moscow, September 29, 1948—7 p. m.

2186. Arab colleague tells me during recent talk, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Zorin informed him while Soviet Government had supported GA partition resolution of November 29, Soviet position was subject review since this plan was not being carried out. Strong implication to source was that dramatic Soviet reversal might be expected if present GA session should attempt solution other than reaffirmation original resolution.¹

Sent Department 2186, pass Damascus 3, London 245, Paris for Gadel 412, Jerusalem 18, Tel Aviv 7.

KOHLER

¹ Messrs. Wright and Burrows of the British Foreign Office "commented that such a reversal must be very tempting to the Kremlin since Arabs have never been so susceptible to Communist blandishments and have never been so friendless. Both believe that if USSR should turn against PGI, as USSR might very easily, stock of USSR in Arab state[s] would immediately soar." (Telegram 4360, October 4, 2 p. m., from London, 501.BB Palestine/10-448)

501.BB Palestine/9-2948

*Draft Telegram to the Diplomatic Offices in the Arab Capitals*¹

SECRET US URGENT

WASHINGTON, undated.

Pursuant to Depcirtel Sept 22 instructing you to inform Govts to which accredited of this Govt's full support of conclusions Bernadotte Plan in its entirety, please call at once on Prime Minister or Foreign Minister in your discretion and make following points:

1. Arab Govts will undoubtedly have received Bernadotte's report and have given it careful study. US Govt has likewise scrutinized Mediator's report and his conclusions with utmost care and as indicated by Secretary of State feels that his proposals afford a workable basis for peaceful adjustment of Palestine situation.

2. In view of special weight which attaches in Arab world to issues of personal honor and integrity, Govt to which you are accredited will undoubtedly be interested to know that Dept has received from source of unimpeachable authority info that Count Bernadotte only two days before his tragic death felt that his proposals regarding "peaceful adjustment of situation of Palestine" were eminently reasonable and just to both sides. You may add that Dept places this info in hands of interested Govts as statement of historical record and because US is convinced that Mediator has produced a plan for Palestine which is based upon principles of right and justice.

3. Scrutinizing Bernadotte Plan from Arab point of view it will at once be seen that his conclusions under Para. 4 (d) are particularly designed to allay Arab fears that Jewish state, once having achieved lodgment on Palestine coast, may encroach on Arab world.

The assurance by UN that boundaries between Arab and Jewish territories as recommended by Mediator shall be respected and maintained can in the opinion of this Govt be made effective, provided Arab Govts and PGI can even tacitly acquiesce in recommendations of Bernadotte as reinforced by decision of GA. Under UN charter not only shall all members of UN settle their international disputes by peaceful means and shall refrain in their international relations from threat or use of force against territorial integrity or political independence of any State (Art. 2, Para. 3 and 4), but the organization shall ensure that States which are not members of UN act in accordance with these principles. There is therefore a Charter obligation to respect territorial integrity of existing States. If new frontier in Palestine can be demarcated on GA recommendation and with acquiescence of the parties this frontier will automatically be pro-

¹ Drafted on September 29 by Mr. McClintock for Mr. Lovett's signature. This message and the one, *infra*, were not sent; see last paragraph of Mr. McClintock's memorandum of September 30, p. 1437.

ted by Charter articles cited above. Furthermore this Govt has many times made clear its unequivocal view that SC has responsibility to prevent recourse to force to settle international differences. US in future will insist in SC that any recourse to hostilities from either side in Palestine situation be opposed if necessary by action under Chapter VII.

In addition to fixing of new boundaries pursuant to UN action there are other possible guarantees of new frontier which will be apparent to Arab Govts such as UK treaties of guarantee and the possibility of diplomatic action on part of friendly govts which would make clear that these powers regarded new frontiers in Palestine as having been established in interest of world peace and—it is profoundly hoped—with acquiescence of the states concerned.

4. In light of fact that Bernadotte Plan contemplates “freezing” of Israeli frontier principal Arab worry over unlimited Jewish immigration to Palestine would seem to have no basis provided Arab states as we hope will concur in application of Bernadotte Plan. It should be apparent to farseeing Arab statesmen that there is a finite limit to Israeli territory under Bernadotte’s recommendations and that more than a limited amount of new inhabitants cannot be established on such a limited territory.

5. Arab Govts will be quick to note also special assurance in Bernadotte Plan regarding right of refugees to return to their homes or to receive adequate compensation for property lost in event they opt to remain elsewhere. Arab Govts will also, we presume, have noted statement in Secretary’s speech to GA Sept 23² regarding not only repatriation of refugees but also his reference to economic aid to Jews *and* Arabs to restore and strengthen their economic well-being.

6. In the long run as history has shown, Arab statesmen are realists. You should in most friendly way quote to them Bernadotte’s words in Sect. II, Para. 9, of Mediator’s report, Part I. This section is entitled “Basic Factors in the Palestine Situation.” The para opens with sentence “It is fruitless to conjecture whether Arabs or Jews might have won a decisive victory in Palestine had international intervention not brought the fighting to a halt . . .³ Had the war continued it would most likely have ended in a stalemate, which in itself would amount to a Jewish victory. But the UN had firmly determined that the war could not go on and that the Palestine dispute must be settled by peaceful means. And that is the Arab dilemma. The Jewish State, established under the cloak of UN authority, can be eliminated only by force. The UN, however, has decreed that force must not be employed. Therefore the Arab States must resign themselves to the pres-

² For the full text of Secretary Marshall’s address, see Department of State *Bulletin*, October 3, 1948, p. 432.

³ As in the source text.

ence of the Jewish State or pursue the reckless course of defying the UN and thereby incurring liabilities the full burden and danger of which cannot be calculated in advance."

You should add that logic of this statement seems irrefutable and that facts altho they may be accepted with most poignant regret by Arab leaders must speak for themselves. Since this Govt in company with other Govts is determined that force shall not be used to achieve a solution of Palestine problem and will use its utmost endeavors in SC and elsewhere to ensure this end, Arab govts would be well advised to seek course of statesmanship and accept or at least acquiesce in Bernadotte Plan. You should make clear that in offering this counsel US has no other motivation than to act as steadfast friend of Arab world.

Sent for action to Cairo as ———, Damascus as ———, Beirut as ———, Baghdad as ———, Jidda as ———, Wells Stabler, Philadelphia Hotel, Amman, as ———.

Sent for info to Paris as Gadel ———, London ———, Jerusalem ———.

501.BB Palestine/9-3048

*Draft Telegram to the Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald)*¹

SECRET US URGENT
NIACT

WASHINGTON, [undated.]

Please call on Ben Gurion and leave memorandum in following terms:

"1. The US Govt, which as events have shown, has proved a sincere friend of PGI, desires in spirit of friendly counsel to urge that PGI accept or acquiesce in conclusions of Bernadotte Plan in their entirety. US Govt is gratified to be informed by its Representative in Tel Aviv (your 151, Sept 28) that Israeli Foreign Minister departed for Paris prepared to acknowledge Bernadotte's report as basis for discussion and in spirit of hope for a reasonable settlement.

"2. Although conclusions of Mediator may not in all respects meet with Jewish desires this Govt is convinced after careful analysis of Bernadotte's recommendations that his plan affords a common denominator for present acquiescence as between Israel and Arab States and eventual formal acceptance of a peaceful and permanent solution of Palestine problem.

"3. This Govt is fully cognizant of value attached by PGI to the Negev but cannot agree that relinquishment of this desert area is in fact a basic loss to the new Jewish State. Territorial proposals of the dead Mediator were not based on the number of square miles accruing to one side or the other but on terms of real value. Mediator's proposals were motivated by Count Bernadotte's firm determination to

¹ Drafted on September 30 by Mr. McClintock for Mr. Lovett's signature. This message was not sent.

accord even-handed justice to both Jews and Arabs. While admittedly neither side will receive under Bernadotte plan all that it desires, Jewish statesmen must realize that in any viable political settlement concessions must be made by both sides. To US Govt it would accordingly seem to be the course of wisdom for PGI to accept or acquiesce in Bernadotte's territorial recommendations, confident that once a basis for peaceful development has thus been established Jewish State will achieve its additional objectives such as a trade route to the Orient or peaceful commercial access to the Dead Sea by only sure means to make possible attainment of these goals: friendly agreement between neighboring peoples, both Arab and Jewish, founded on mutual accommodation and interest. In consequence, this Govt believes that, taking Bernadotte plan as a whole, Israel stands materially to benefit.

"4. As for pretensions of PGI to extension of its authority to include the greater part of Jerusalem, US Govt is convinced that recommendations of Mediator which are in effect identical to those recommended by UN GA in its resolution of Nov 29, 1947, afford most equitable settlement of Jerusalem problem. This Govt, while sympathetic to views of both Arab and Jewish Govts regarding their respective communities in the Holy City, nevertheless must look to worldwide interest in preservation of Jerusalem and its ready access to persons of all three religious faiths who regard Jerusalem as a central and symbolic point. Accordingly this govt does not believe that PGI should control part of Jerusalem or that it should have a corridor to that city. Conclusions in Bernadotte Plan specifically providing for right of unimpaired access to Jerusalem by rail, road and air would seem in our opinion to obviate any need for a Jewish corridor.

"5. PGI should be prompt to recognize advantages to it of Bernadotte's conclusion in 4(d) which provides for special assurance that new frontiers of Israel shall remain inviolate. These assurances should be of particular value to the small Jewish State as affording a bulwark against possible pressure from the vast Arab world. This govt believes that under UN charter not only shall all members of UN settle their international disputes by peaceful means and shall refrain in their international relations from threat or use of force against territorial integrity or political independence of any State (Art. 2, Para. 3 and 4), but the organization shall ensure that States which are not members of UN act in accordance with these principles. There is therefore a Charter obligation to respect territorial integrity of existing States. If new frontier in Palestine can be demarcated on GA recommendation and with acquiescence of the parties this frontier will automatically be protected by Charter articles cited above. Furthermore this Govt has many times made clear its unequivocal view that SC has responsibility to prevent recourse to force to settle international differences. US in future will insist in SC that any recourse to hostilities from either side in Palestine situation be opposed if necessary by action under Chapter VII.

"6. Although we are cognizant of fact that PGI would prefer direct peace negotiations with Arab Govts, Arab experts of PGI will undoubtedly have themselves informed their Govt that under present

emotional stress it is most unlikely that Arab leaders will agree to enter into such negotiations. Accordingly it seems to us that Bernadotte plan with backing of UN Assembly and SC affords a ready instrument for achieving those conditions of peace and tacit agreement which are indispensable to peaceful development of Jewish State."

You should in your contacts with them leave no doubt in minds of any responsible statesmen in Israel that US Govt and people believe that Mediator has left a legacy to the world of a workable solution of Palestine problem. In consequence this govt has a duty to use its utmost endeavor as member of UN and as loyal friend of Israel to see that Bernadotte plan is placed into effect.

Sent Tel Aviv for action as ———, repeated for info to Paris for Gadel as ———, London as ———, Cairo as ———.

501.BB Palestine/9-3048

Memorandum for the Files by Mr. Robert M. McClintock

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] September 30, 1948.

Mr. Lovett received a call during luncheon yesterday from Mr. Clark Clifford, who was on the Presidential train somewhere in Oklahoma. Mr. Clifford said that the President had ordered him to send a telegram to the Secretary of State in Paris, completely disavowing the statement made by the Secretary on September 21 in support of the Bernadotte Plan. Mr. Clifford said that on his own responsibility he had held up this telegram in order to consult with Mr. Lovett but that he could not delay sending the message beyond three hours. He arranged to call Mr. Lovett from Tulsa at 4:30 yesterday afternoon to get the Acting Secretary's reactions.

Mr. Lovett conferred with Messrs. Kennan, Satterthwaite, Rockwell and myself. We were unanimous in the opinion that the President should under no circumstances disavow the Secretary of State. Not only had the President been fully informed by Mr. Lovett of the text of the proposed statement which the Secretary would make supporting the Bernadotte Plan, but the plan itself was in essence almost identical with the Department's suggestions for territorial changes in Palestine which had been explicitly approved by President Truman on September 1 in his own handwriting. A telegram from Tel Aviv, dated September 28, indicated that even the Jewish Foreign Minister was going to Paris prepared to accept the Bernadotte Plan as a basis for negotiation. The President should be told that the Marshall state-

ment in support of the Bernadotte Plan had been made after consultation with the British Foreign Secretary, who had indicated his willingness to make a statement on Palestine favoring the Bernadotte report in the House of Commons with the explicit understanding that the Secretary would have issued a prior statement likewise in support of the Bernadotte Plan. In addition, the President should be told that after the Marshall statement of September 21 the Department had made official representations to six Arab governments and to the Provisional Government of Israel in terms of the Secretary's statement.¹ Accordingly, for the President now to disavow what the Secretary said would impugn the integrity of the United States and would have far-reaching repercussions on our foreign policy not only with respect to the Palestine problem but in every other matter where the pledged word of the United States might henceforth be regarded as valueless.

Mr. Lovett said that he would urge these considerations on the President or Mr. Clifford. He thought it prudent, however, in the event that the President should insist on sending some message to General Marshall to have a draft text which would possibly serve to meet the President's domestic political requirements by showing that not every detail of the Bernadotte Plan need be placed into effect but at the same time not disavowing this Government's support of the plan. Such a statement was prepared but not used.

Mr. Lovett spent an hour and a half on the telephone yesterday afternoon with Mr. Clifford, who had established himself in the freight yards at Tulsa, where the conversation was punctuated by the whistles of on-coming trains. There was a later telecon-conversation with the President at 7 p. m. As the outcome of this strenuous telecommunication debate the President was dissuaded from his original intention and compromised on a draft message which he might send to Rabbi Stephen S. Wise.² The text of this message, which is unobjectionable from the Department's point of view, is appended to this memorandum.

As the result of this episode it was agreed this morning in consultation with Mr. Lovett and Mr. Satterthwaite that the Department would withhold its contemplated representations to the Arab Governments and Israel at least until the President has returned to Washington this weekend. Since Mr. Truman plans to make a speaking tour of New York next week at a time when the Jewish vote will be brought most urgently to his attention, it would seem that the climacteric is yet to be reached.

ROBERT MCCLINTOCK

¹ See circular telegram of September 22, p. 1417.

² Not found attached; but presumably the draft telegram, p. 1432.

.501.BB Palestine/9-3048

Mr. Robert M. McClintock to Mr. Dean Rusk, at Paris

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, September 30, 1948.

DEAR DEAN: Since the decision of Committee I to debate the atomic energy and Soviet disarmament proposals before taking up Palestine, it seems apparent that several weeks, if not a month, will go by before the Bernadotte Plan is discussed in the Political Committee.¹

Meanwhile, the pressures are building up at home. The American Zionist Emergency Council is running full-page ads in the metropolitan papers, decrying the Secretary's support of Bernadotte's conclusions and calling on the President to stick rigidly to his party platform. It declares:

"We approve the claims of the State of Israel to the boundaries set forth in the United Nations Resolution of November 29 and consider that modification thereof should be made only if fully acceptable to the State of Israel."

Needless to say, this special pleading has resulted in some strenuous moments in the Department of State. I do not know what the outcome will be but so far Mr. Lovett has done a magnificent job in keeping the train on the track.

I do want to suggest for your consideration the probability that we shall have to adjust our sights at least to the point of agreeing that the territorial recommendations of the Mediator be modified in favor of Israel to the extent of giving the Jewish State a salient into the Negev which would include most, if not all of the Jewish settlements in that area. Such a salient would not extend further than the Gaza-Beersheba Road and would in fact put us in precise accord with the proposed territorial settlement which was approved by the President on September 1. I do not suggest that you take any action on this information but wanted you to have it in advance for background in your conversations in Paris. As you know, I was very careful to warn Bernadotte that our government would probably have to modify its views regarding the Negev salient and I took a similar line while in London in my conversations with Michael Wright. I am sending a copy of this letter to Louis [Lewis] Jones in London for his most private information.

Cheers,

ROB MCCLINTOCK

¹ The General Assembly, on September 24, had referred Count Bernadotte's progress report as a whole to the First Committee and part three, concerning the refugee problem, to the Third Committee (United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, 3rd session, Part I, Plenary Meetings, Summary Records, 21 September-12 December 1948*, hereinafter identified as "GA, 3rd sess., Pt. I, Plenary", p. 110.

IO Files: US(P)/A/C.1/52

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. William I. Cargo

SECRET

[PARIS,] September 30, 1948.

Subject: Palestine—Future of Jerusalem

Participants: Sir Hugh Dow, British Commissioner in Jerusalem
Mr. Harold Beeley, United Kingdom Delegation
Mr. Morgan Mann, United Kingdom Delegation
Mr. Dean Rusk, United States Delegation
Mr. John C. Ross, United States Delegation
Mr. Fraser Wilkins, United States Delegation
Mr. Samuel K. C. Kopper, United States Delegation
Mr. William I. Cargo, United States Delegation

As proposed by Mr. Beeley the previous evening, Sir Hugh Dow, British Commissioner in Jerusalem, came with Mr. Beeley and Mr. Mann, to give us his own information and his views about the present situation in Jerusalem in relationship to the Bernadotte Report. A general discussion of the future status of Jerusalem ensued.

Sir Hugh stated the view that the Arab and Jewish communities in Jerusalem were now entirely separated and strongly divided. In point of fact, he added that there was a physical no-man's land between the two areas. It was his misfortune, he observed, to live in that no-man's land. In his opinion, Jerusalem was beyond the point where effective United Nations control could be established. Alluding to the fairly common suggestion that a United Nations authority should provide for the carrying out of "necessary common services", he remarked that there were no "necessary common services". The two communities lived essentially separate existences.

Sir Hugh felt that any realistic planning must start with the assumption that there would be in effect two separate municipalities with defined frontiers. He personally saw no objection to placing these separate areas under the respective sovereignty of the Jewish State and the State which would arise from or control the Arab area.¹

In response to a question, Sir Hugh observed that United Nations control in Jerusalem might have been possible if it had been vigorously sought through the agency of the Mediator at the time of the first truce. He felt that the Mediator's first suggestion for government of Jerusalem by the Arabs, as well as subsequent events, had made this now impossible. Expressly he believed that a force of 10,000 troops would be needed to maintain law and order in Jerusalem. The Irgun, he

¹ On September 9, Embassy London had brought to the attention of the Department Sir Hugh's views regarding the division of Jerusalem into separate municipalities under the sovereignty of Arab and Jewish states and his belief that once the concept of Jerusalem as an international enclave were abandoned, there was no strong reason for external control of the Arab and Jewish municipalities (telegram 4044, 867N.01/9-948).

pointed out, was extremely powerful in Jerusalem and maintained its existence separate from the Haganah. In reply to a further question, Sir Hugh expressed the view that the two communities in Jerusalem would provide revenue only for their own administrations and would not pay the expense of a United Nations administrative staff.

On the question of a land corridor for the state of Israel between Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, Sir Hugh regarded this as unnecessary. He characterized it as a "plan for war and not for peace". He also pointed out that a land corridor under the sovereignty of one state not only connects two areas, but inevitably divides a third.

Mr. Beeley observed that outright sovereignty by the state of Israel and an Arab state over respective portions of Jerusalem was not compatible with the conclusions of the Bernadotte Report, which both the United States and the United Kingdom had endorsed. There was general assent to this comment.

Attention was turned to the question of the ultimate status of the City of Jerusalem. Mr. Rusk asked Sir Hugh's opinion of the possibility of Jerusalem becoming a condominium under the joint control of the State of Israel and the Arab State. Sir Hugh expressed the definite opinion that this was not feasible because the two parties would not sit down together in a common council. The situation which must be contemplated, he felt, involved a practical separation of the two communities. Mr. Rusk asked what role the United Nations might play if sovereignty were held by the two states over portions of Jerusalem. Sir Hugh's reply was that would depend upon the personality of the United Nations agent involved; he felt that the need was for a real municipal expert to be sent on behalf of the United Nations.

Mr. Rusk suggested that it might be feasible to work out arrangements whereby the state of Israel would become the administering authority of the Jewish part of Jerusalem under the terms of a trusteeship agreement, and the Arab State the administering authority of the Arab portion of Jerusalem. In the ensuing discussion it was observed that such a device offered attractive possibilities in that the terms of trusteeship could include guarantees for the Holy Places and that the Trusteeship Council could watch over the interests of the international community in Jerusalem through the examination of reports and petitions and the making of periodic visits in accordance with its usual procedures. Mr. Beeley stated the view that the United Kingdom Government, at an appropriate time, would be willing to give serious consideration to this possibility. He said, however, that they would not be willing to consider any departure from the Bernadotte Report at this Assembly since they had already endorsed it and particularly that they would not like to take any action which would suggest Jewish sovereignty over the Jewish portion of the City. It was indicated to Mr. Beeley that the discussion of trusteeship had not been

with a view to the possibilities of such a proposal at the present session of the General Assembly. Sir Hugh inquired whether the trusteeship suggestion just made was not the sort of thing which might be suggested to the next session of the General Assembly by a United Nations Commissioner for Jerusalem, if provided for by the present session and appropriately empowered to make proposals concerning the future discharge of United Nations responsibilities toward Jerusalem. It was agreed that this was the case.

WILLIAM I. CARGO

*The Acting United Nations Mediator (Bunche) to the Secretary-General*¹

RHODES, 30 September 1948.

1. The assassinations of Count Bernadotte and Colonel Serot have thrown a tragic light on an increasingly serious situation in Palestine as regards the authority, prestige and even the safety of the personnel engaged in the truce supervision work.

2. During the truce ordered by the Security Council in its resolution of 15 July 1948, there has been a disturbing tendency on the part of both Arabs and Jews to withhold co-operation from the Truce Supervision Organization and to place obstacles in the way of its effective operation.

[Here follow paragraphs numbered 3, which gave illustration of practices and attitudes greatly hampering the truce supervisors, and 4, which gave evidences of disregard for the authority of the United Nations, its personnel and property.]

5. The current attitudes of both parties toward the truce supervision involve a serious tendency to disregard the provisions of the resolution of the Security Council of 29 May and 15 July. The resolution of 29 May "*Calls upon* all concerned to give the greatest possible assistance to the United Nations Mediator" while the resolution of 15 July "*Calls upon* all Governments and authorities concerned to continue to co-operate with the Mediator with a view to the maintenance of peace in Palestine in conformity with the resolution adopted by the Security Council on 29 May 1948".

6. There can be little doubt that appropriate action by the Security Council at this time would be helpful to the effort to ensure the mainte-

¹ Reprinted from SC, 3rd yr., *Supplement for October 1948*, p. 46.

nance and the effective supervision of the truce in Palestine. In this regard it might well be called to the attention of the disputing parties that the Security Council resolutions of 15 July and 19 August remain firm, and that all of the obligations on the parties therein set forth with regard to the maintenance of peace in Palestine are to be fully discharged.

7. In particular it would seem desirable to give special emphasis to the following obligations and liabilities of the parties with regard to the Truce Supervision: (a) The obligation to allow duly accredited United Nations observers and other Truce Supervision personnel bearing proper credentials, on official notification from Central Truce Supervision Board, ready access to all places where their duties require them to go including airfields, ports, truce lines and strategic points and areas; (b) The obligation to facilitate the freedom of movement of Truce Supervision personnel and transport by alleviation of burdensome flight clearance restrictions on United Nations aircraft now in effect, and by assurance of safe conduct for all United Nations aircraft and other means of transport; (c) The obligation to co-operate fully with the Truce Supervision personnel in their conduct of investigations into incidents involving alleged breaches of the truce, including the making available of witnesses, testimony and other evidence on request; (d) The obligation to implement fully by appropriate and prompt instructions to the commanders in the field all agreements entered into through the good offices of the Mediator or his representatives; (e) The obligation of each party to take all reasonable measures to ensure the safety and safeconduct of the Truce Supervision personnel and the representatives of the Mediator, their aircraft and vehicles, while in territory under its control; (f) The liability of each party for any assault upon or other aggressive act against the Truce Supervision personnel or the representatives of the Mediator in territory under its control, including the obligation to make every effort to apprehend and promptly punish the guilty.

8. Since the question of reparations for injuries incurred in the service of the United Nations is now under consideration by the General Assembly it has not been included among the obligations and liabilities suggested in the preceding paragraph.²

²The Department, on October 6, authorized the American Delegation at the United Nations to inform its colleagues on the Security Council that the United States as a member of the Palestine Truce Commission supported the recommendations set forth in paragraphs 6 and 7 of Dr. Bunche's communication of

Footnote continued on following page.

Editorial Note

John J. Macdonald, as Chairman of the Palestine Truce Commission, sent a cablegram to the President of the Security Council on September 30, which reported that a deliberate Jewish campaign to discredit the Truce Commission and Acting Mediator Bunche was apparently developing along the lines of the attack launched against Count Bernadotte. For the text of the cablegram, see SC, *3rd yr.*, *Supplement for October 1948*, page 48.

An Israeli spokesman, the following day, described this message as a "figment of the imagination" and alleged the Truce Commission seemed to be "trying to discredit the Jewish authorities." He also denounced the "persistent unfriendly attitude" of the Commission in its decisions and statements. (Telegram 1365, October 6, from Jerusalem, 501.BB Palestine/10-648.)

Footnote continued from preceding page.

September 30. The Department also directed the Delegation to "inform French and Belgian colleagues SC this govt's attitude" and to airmail the text of Dr. Bunche's communication to American Missions at the Arab capitals and at Tel Aviv, with a "statement Dept supports Bunche's recommendations and requests US Reps these capitals should occasion arise make our view plainly known govt to which accredited." (Gadel 131 to Paris, 501.BB Palestine/10-348)

Truman Papers, President's Secretary's File

The Secretary of Defense (Forrestal) to President Truman

SECRET

WASHINGTON, 1 October 1948.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I think you may be interested in the enclosed copy of a memorandum¹ which I recently received from the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the matter of providing relief for Arab refugees. I believe this memorandum summarizes very succinctly the importance, from the standpoint of national security, of taking all possible measures to assist these individuals.

I have brought this memorandum to the attention of the Secretary of State, with the request that he institute such measures for the relief of these refugees as might be practicable.²

Respectfully yours,

JAMES FORRESTAL

¹ Dated September 22; text contained in Telmar 19, p. 1427.

² President Truman replied to Forrestal on October 4 in a memorandum which read as follows:

"Your note of the first, enclosing me a memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the Arab refugee situation has been discussed with the Secretary of State and I sincerely hope that some means can be found for meeting this situation." (Truman Papers, President's Secretary's File)

501.BB Palestine/10-148

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Satterthwaite)*¹

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] October 1, 1948.

Subject: Developments concerning the Bernadotte Report and the situation in Palestine.

Participants: Mr. T. E. Bromley, First Secretary of the British Embassy
NEA—Mr. Satterthwaite
UNA—Mr. McClintock
NE—Mr. Rockwell

Mr. Bromley called to state that the British Embassy had been instructed to convey to the State Department the sense of a telegram which the Foreign Office had sent to Mr. Bevin in Paris and which Mr. Bevin would take up with Secretary Marshall. The Foreign Office desired to inform the State Department of its concern over the delay in the discussion of the Bernadotte report in the General Assembly,² and to emphasize its conviction as regards the necessity of maintaining the Anglo-American unity which had now, after so many difficulties, been established as regards the Palestine question. The Foreign Office was apprehensive concerning the pressure of interests in this country seeking an alteration of the stand taken by the United States Government in this regard.

Mr. Satterthwaite stated that the Department of State was thoroughly in agreement with the Foreign Office as regards the necessity of maintaining a united front on this vital question.

Mr. Bromley then stated that the Foreign Office had again instructed the British Embassy to sound out the Department as regards the possibility of the Department's instructing its representatives in the Arab states to impress upon Arab leaders the United States Government's firm conviction that the most logical disposition of Arab Palestine would be its incorporation in Transjordan. Mr. Bromley said that the Foreign Office was concerned lest Arab leaders gain the impression that there was lack of unity between the United States and Great Britain on this question.

We told Mr. Bromley that Secretary Marshall had publicly expressed this Government's support of the Bernadotte plan in its entirety, and that the Department was in complete agreement that the most logical disposition of Arab Palestine would be its incorporation

¹ Drafted by Stuart W. Rockwell of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs.

² High officials of the British Foreign Office deemed the delay a "major setback", fearing that the delay greatly increased the danger of a serious breach of the truce by the Jews. They also expressed the fervent hope that the United States would exercise all of its influence to restrain the Israelis from embarking on military adventures (telegram 4344, October 1, 8 p. m., from London, 501.BB Palestine/10-148).

in Transjordan. However, we did not believe it would be helpful to the achievement of this conclusion of the Mediator's to have the United States Government make a specific approach to Arab leaders as desired by the Foreign Office. Rather, we felt that such course of action might dispose the other Arab leaders against Transjordan. In our opinion it was a question of timing, and the present moment was not opportune to make such a representation. We repeated that so far we had had no evidence from the field that Arab leaders believed there was any lack of unity between the United States and Great Britain on this issue.

Mr. Bromley then said that the Foreign Office hoped that the American Government would express to Arab statesmen its approval of British assurances that the various Anglo-Arab treaties would come into effect in the event of Jewish violation of frontiers established by the United Nations in Palestine. Mr. Satterthwaite said that this question had already been brought to the attention of the Department and was under discussion.

J[OSEPH] C. S[ATTERTHWAITE]

501.BB Palestine/10-148: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET URGENT

PARIS, October 1, 1948—noon.

Martel 21. Personal and Eyes only for Lovett from the Secretary. Please deliver following message to President:

Dulles¹ received a message from Dewey² Wednesday requesting him to meet Dewey on his return to New York and bring him up to date on developments here. He leaves Sunday for quick turn around.

Dulles referred this morning to reported article in New York *Post* that there was a split between the two of us on Palestine, observing that this was probably inspired to force a statement out of Dulles or Dewey.

I am very grateful to you for resisting what I imagine are great pressures to qualify the stand I have taken. Over here I am receiving strong if not violent Jewish demands, particularly from Congressional Jews and at same time equal pressures in formal public statements from Arab delegates in convention on other side of the question. The Jewish attacks are gradually resulting in modifying the Arab resistance to the Bernadotte Plan as they are not now so convinced that I am taking a purely pro-Jewish stand. The opposite, and I trust equal reactions may cancel each other to the long sought solution.

MARSHALL

¹ John Foster Dulles, Member of the United States Delegation to the General Assembly and a senior spokesman for the Republican Party on foreign policy.

² Gov. Thomas E. Dewey, nominee of the Republican Party for President of the United States.

867N.01/10-248 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in Egypt (Griffis) to the Acting Secretary of State
(Lovett)*

CAIRO, [undated.]

[Received October 2, 1948—12:53 p. m.]

Unnumbered. From Ahmad Hilmi Pasha, Premier and Acting Foreign Secretary. In virtue of the natural right of the people of Palestine for self-determination which principle is supported by the Charters of the League of Nations, the United Nations and others and in view of the termination of the British mandate over Palestine which had prevented the Arabs from exercising their independence, the Arabs of Palestine, who are the owners of the country and its indigenous inhabitants and who constitute the great majority of its legal population, have solemnly resolved to declare Palestine in its entirety and within its boundaries as established before the termination of the British mandate an independent state and constituted a government under the name of the All Palestine Government deriving its authority from a representative council based on democratic principles and aiming to safeguard the rights of minorities and foreigners, protect the holy places and guarantee freedom of worship to all communities, I wish to take this opportunity to express to Your Excellency the earnest desire of the All Palestine Government to establish relations of cordiality and cooperation with your country.¹ [Ahmad Hilmi Pasha.]

[GRIFFIS]

¹ Mr. Burrows informed an Embassy officer of information from Amman that the Arab Palestine Government had been established at Gaza under Egyptian auspices, that word had been sent to supporters of the Mufti to rally to Gaza, and that arms had been distributed to anti-Hashemite elements (telegram 4312, September 29, 6 p. m., from London, 867N.01/9-2948). London, on October 7, advised the Department that the British Government had no intention of recognizing "this so-called government" (telegram 4423, 867N.01/10-748).

Earlier, Jamal Husseini, Foreign Minister designate in the new government, informed Mr. Stabler that the government had been formed "so that Palestine Arabs would have legal position vis-à-vis Arab League and as evidence Palestine Arabs determination continue fight against Jews" (telegram 65, September 26, 1 p. m., from Amman, 867N.01/9-2648).

According to Lebanese Foreign Minister Frangié, the "Gaza Government was set up as opposition to Abdullah. . . . popular reaction is that other Arabs wish to thwart Abdullah's ambitions for federation of Arab regions with Transjordan [and] concomitant tacit recognition of Israel." (Telegram 498, October 1, 3 p. m., 867N.01/10-148)

501.BB Palestine/10-248 : Circular telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices*¹

SECRET

WASHINGTON, October 2, 1948—1 a. m.

Pls seek opportunity in informal conversations with Govt leaders to express US Govt's attitude re "Arab Palestine Govt" along following lines.

¹ At Arab capitals, London, Paris (for GADel), and Tel Aviv.

In spirit of friendly counsel US Govt considers establishment of "Arab Palestine Govt" under present circumstances prejudicial to successful solution Palestine problem as well as to best interests Arab States and Arab inhabitants Palestine. "Govt" apparently being set up without prior consultation wishes Arab Palestinians. Also appears dominated by Mufti, an adventurer, whose reprehensible wartime activities in association with our enemies cannot be forgotten or forgiven by US. Best interests Arab States being prejudiced by published indications that Arab unity disturbed by formation of "Govt". Moreover by claiming speak for all Palestine "Govt" affords ready pretext to Jewish revisionists make similar claims for right [of] PGI control all Palestine.

If asked re US attitude on future of Arab Palestine you should recall to questioners that US Govt has announced its support of all Bernadotte's conclusions.

LOVETT

501.BB Palestine/10-248 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

PRIORITY

PARIS, October 2, 1948—8 p. m.

Delga 190. Eyes alone for Lovett from Rusk. Since Secretary is away from Paris today and tomorrow, I am sending brief summary of conversation with Dulles on Palestine. Dulles had absented himself from delegation meetings on Palestine question because of lack of bipartisan approach. In view of presence both Democratic and Republican candidates New York this coming week, I believe you should have following memorandum despite fact contents have not yet been discussed with Secretary.

My memorandum to Secretary starts:

"I had further talk with Dulles about bipartisan implications of Palestine question.

I told him I recognized that leaders of two parties had not succeeded in getting together on Palestine question on bipartisan basis. Nevertheless, it would be mistake for other delegations or our own US public opinion to conclude there were major differences between two parties on subject. On all of fundamentals, two parties were in agreement. Examples of such agreement are: Existence of Israel as independent state, early and full recognition of new government of Israel, admission of Israel to UN, economic assistance, and peaceful settlement Jewish-Arab difficulties through UN.

The apparent differences between two parties have arisen (1) because administration has been specifically responsible for conduct of negotiations and for elaboration of details of policy, and (2) Jews have succeeded in playing one party leadership off against the other in contest for votes—votes which obviously cannot be delivered to both parties.

Speaking as a non-political civil servant, I told Dulles I thought the leadership of two parties had unnecessarily exposed themselves to Jewish pressure by failure to arrive at bipartisan agreement.

Dulles then indicated that early this year Dewey had expressed willingness arrive at bipartisan policy but efforts bring Democratic Party along had been unavailing. He specifically mentioned Forrestal's efforts in this connection. I then told Dulles that if position we have now taken in this Assembly on Palestine is undermined by bitter political rivalry and controversy in US, effect will be to subject US once more to contempt, acrimony and ridicule. I told him I was speaking only individually but that I knew every possible effort was being made to hold our present policy to lines of Bernadotte report. Obviously no one could give any assurances about what might happen on Democratic side during campaign, but I hoped very much that if Democratic policy made it possible to do so, Republicans would use greatest restraint and do everything they could not to upset situation.

Dulles said he understood complexities of situation and that, although he, too, was in no position to offer any commitment, he would do everything he could to influence Republican side toward moderation. He further expressed hope that matter might be settled before election. During conversation, he dropped useful idea that since Republicans felt quite confident, it might be possible for them to take broader view on this specific issue than they might be able to do if contest for votes were very close and bitter.

I do not believe there is much chance to get formal bipartisan agreement on Palestine before election. I do think, however, that if Department is able to hold the line on Bernadotte report and to persuade Democratic leaders not to start fresh round of new bids for Jewish support, there is good chance that Republicans will take moderate view and assist in keeping matter from flaring up once again."

[Rusk]

MARSHALL

867N.01/10-448

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State*¹

TOP SECRET

[PARIS,] October 4, 1948.

Participants: The Secretary
Ambassador Caffery
Mr. Bohlen and
Mr. Ernest Bevin
Mr. Frank Roberts

Subject: Palestine

Mr. Bevin said he wished to discuss the suggestion which had been received from the American Delegation that Great Britain should go

¹ Drafted by Mr. Bohlen.

on the Conciliation Commission. He said he did not see how Great Britain could be represented on this Commission. He emphasized, however, that they were doing all that they could to induce a more reasonable frame of mind on the part of the Arabs and that he personally had seen the Egyptians and other Arab representatives here to that end.

The Secretary inquired what Mr. Bevin's idea of the functions of this Commission and, in particular, the United States position therein should be. He mentioned that he was under attack by Jewish groups in the United States for his support of the Bernadotte plan, but that on the other hand the Arabs regarded his position as completely pro-Jewish. He wondered whether it would be helpful in Mr. Bevin's opinion to have the United States represented on this Commission and in particular its effect upon the Arabs. Mr. Bevin said that he did not think the Arabs would have any objection to the United States remaining on the Conciliation Commission since together with Belgium and France they had formed the Truce Commission. The Secretary said he had not reached a definite conclusion on this point and he understood the British feelings about their participation on the Commission. Mr. Bevin said that British participation would be greatly misunderstood in England and would be viewed as an attempt on his part to get back into the Palestine situation through the back door; the Jews would not welcome it and the Arabs would misunderstand it.

The Secretary said that since the matter would not come up for some time in the Assembly he would like to think it over. Mr. Bevin said that he thought the continuance of the Truce Commission would raise no new problems of membership and that in general he felt there was a reasonable chance to get Arab acquiescence in the Bernadotte plan. They would of course fight it, but he felt in the end they would acquiesce.

[Here follow remaining two paragraphs, dealing with the British Consul General at Haifa.]

501.BB Palestine/10-448 : Telegram

*The Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald)
to the Secretary of State*

SECRET US URGENT NIACT

TEL AVIV, October 4, 1948—8 p. m.

161. Personal for President and Acting Secretary. A well-informed and influential Israeli official, during strictly personal confidential

conversation with Knox, expressed following opinion regarding Bernadotte proposal give Negev to Transjordan :

1. The US has firm friend in State of Israel, which is oriented toward the West politically and culturally, and which, up until now, is deeply grateful for US support.

2. The Arab states, weak, vacillating, and of dubious friendship toward the West and the US, as evidenced in World War II, have already been offended by the US support of the November 29 partition, and what has been done cannot now be undone.

3. US support of British proposal to give Negev to Transjordan would be no solution to anything and can have only following results:

(a) It would not endear the other Arab states to the US.

(b) It would create a miniature State of Israel, which would inevitably become embittered toward the US.

4. Thus, by forcing transfer of Negev, the US would gain no further friends in Middle East and lose one friend.

Furthermore, Transjordan would not be grateful to US for our support of what is considered to be a British gift of Negev to Abdullah. Abdullah has neither the population, capital, skill, nor desire to utilize the Negev and his position would be merely that of "holding" it for British.

Another factor enters the picture at this point. If British force gift of Negev to Transjordan in order secure air bases that region for use in event East-West clash, it will do so at cost of creating an embittered and hostile State of Israel directly adjacent. This doesn't seem make much sense.

By British and US support of Negev feature Bernadotte report, an extremely difficult situation has been created. This has virtually destroyed any hope of Israel Transjordan direct reasonable settlement because Abdullah now can sit back and await developments; he will hardly be disposed settle for less than the proposals in Bernadotte report. The Jews once again see themselves in hopeless position of having their minimum position being considered maximum, and being whittled down from minimum.

In listening to above arguments of Jews there is, of course, no reaction indicated on part of Knox or myself. We do not know exactly what special reasons motivate US policy and in any event must firmly support that policy whatever it may be, or wherever it may lead. However, our confidential opinion is that although adoption of Negev Bernadotte proposals might serve British strategic interest, it would disproportionately entangle this situation and sow dangerous seeds of bitterness.

Sent Department 161. Department pass Paris 7 for GADel.

MCDONALD

501.BB Palestine/10-548

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State*¹

SECRET

[PARIS,] October 5, 1948.

Subject: Palestine—The Bernadotte Report

Participants: The Secretary

Mr. Moshe Shertok—Minister for Foreign Affairs of
the Provisional Government of IsraelMr. Aubrey Eban—Representative of the PGI to the
United Nations

Mr. Fraser Wilkins—U.S. Delegation

Mr. Shertok called on me this morning at his request.

Mr. Shertok said that a great deal had happened during the past five months and it was now clear that the State of Israel had been able to establish its government and to defend itself against its enemies. He believed the Arab States which had invaded Palestine after May 15 were convinced that the State of Israel was established and that the Jews could not be pushed into the sea.

Mr. Shertok continued that the Jews have recently received two blows: one was the Bernadotte Report and the other was our support of Count Bernadotte's specific conclusions.

Mr. Shertok said that their principal objection to the Bernadotte Report lay in the assignment of the Negev to the Arabs for three reasons:

1. *Loss of a desert area which the Jews could develop for the absorption of immigrants.* Israel planned to irrigate the Negev and to develop it agriculturally. Israel had, for example, already established approximately thirty settlements in the Negev. The Negev was the potential land reserve of Israel. The Arabs, if they had it, would never develop it as has been the case for centuries.

2. *Loss of access to and utilization of the Dead Sea.* The General Assembly November 29th Resolution had specifically provided for Jewish access to the Dead Sea and for control of approximately one-quarter of it at its southern end. Count Bernadotte's Report now took this source of mineral wealth away from them. It was important that the Palestine Potash Company, which was a Jewish enterprise, remain in Jewish territory. Israel ought to have the opportunity of making use of the Dead Sea as a vital factor in its own economy and as a factor in developing economic relations with the Arab States.

3. *Loss of access to the Gulf of Aqaba.* The General Assembly November 29th Resolution by giving Israel all of the Negev gave them access to the Gulf of Aqaba and thereby to the Red Sea. The waters

¹ Drafted by Fraser Wilkins.

of the Gulf were well stocked with fish. Israel planned to develop a fishing industry there. Israel planned rail and highway communications between the southern end of the Dead Sea and the Gulf. Mr. Shertok stressed the latter point as of importance because they wished to avoid, if possible, Suez Canal toll charges and feared "Egyptian surprises" (presumably Egyptian interference with Israeli shipping) which would make it necessary for Israel to have a port on the Red Sea in addition to ports on the eastern Mediterranean.

I asked Mr. Shertok for his views regarding Galilee. Mr. Shertok said that although the General Assembly November 29th Resolution had not assigned Western Galilee to Israel, they had subsequently won it by force of arms. They still needed all of Galilee for reasons of defense. Galilee alone would not be adequate for the settlement of immigrants to Israel.

Mr. Shertok pointed out that the Arabs frequently argued that a Jewish State which followed a policy of unrestricted immigration would soon press for additional territory. Mr. Shertok believed, on the other hand, that if the Negev were lost to them Galilee would not be adequate to absorb immigration into Israel. Mr. Shertok also added that the Arabs frequently argued that a Jewish Negev would be a wedge driven between the Arab States. Mr. Shertok was of the opinion, however, that a Jewish Negev might be considered as a link in a chain including a Jewish State and the Arab States following a settlement of the Palestine question and the development of friendly political and economic relations.

Mr. Shertok concluded by stressing the small size of Israel under the General Assembly November 29th Resolution, the further reduction in size under the Bernadotte Report, and the necessity for Israel's having adequate area in which to live and grow.

I said that I agreed with Mr. Shertok's view that the Arab leaders now seemed to be taking a more realistic approach toward the Palestine case, but observed that the reaction on the other side had been as I expected. I pointed out that the Arab leaders were now confronted by the problem of bringing the Arab peoples to accept the realities of the present situation. I said that I had been criticized by both Arabs and Jews for our support of the Bernadotte plan which was probably the best evidence of our impartiality. I told Mr. Shertok I would like to discuss the points which he raised with my associates. I would not, therefore, reply now but would see him again shortly.²

² Secretary Marshall transmitted a paraphrase of this memorandum to the Department in telegram Delga 264, October 9, 9 p. m. (501.BB Palestine/10-948). The telegram noted that the conversation lasted a half hour.

501.MA Palestine/10-548

*Draft Position Paper on Relief for Near Eastern Refugees*¹

[WASHINGTON,] October 5, 1948.

PROBLEM

The conclusions of Part III of the Progress Report of the United Nations Mediator on Palestine point out that the temporary alleviation of the Palestine refugees is quite inadequate to meet any continuing need and suggests that responsibility for their relief be assumed by the UN in conjunction with the neighboring Arab states, the provisional government of Israel, the specialized agencies and voluntary organizations of a humanitarian and non-political character. The problem is to determine what kind of action should be taken by the General Assembly in meeting this responsibility.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. It is anticipated that the Mediator will present an overall program of relief assistance for Arab and Jewish refugees for the period January 1 to September 1, 1949, which will take account of the assistance now being rendered or which may be furnished by UNICEF, the specialized agencies, members of UN, the neighboring Arab states, the provisional government of Israel and voluntary organizations. It is recommended that the governments having important interests in the Near East, particularly the United States and the United Kingdom, furnish a large proportion of the assistance required under the program and that the U.S. delegation announce that this government is prepared to present to the Congress, when it reconvenes in January 1949, a request for an appropriation for a contribution to such a relief program. The amount of the proposed U.S. contribution will be formulated after the Acting Mediator has presented such a program.

2. It is recommended in addition that the U.S. delegation initiate or support a resolution including the following points:

(a) Utilize, for a relief program for Arab and Jewish refugees, at least \$6,000,000 of the residual funds of UNRRA allocated to UNICEF by the Central Committee of UNRRA, such expenditures to form part of an integrated program under the coordination of the Acting Mediator;*

(b) Invite the IRO to render the fullest practicable assistance

¹ Transmitted by Mr. Tomlinson to ten officers of the Department with a memorandum of October 5, which stated that the recommendation regarding a United States contribution would need to be cleared with Mr. Lovett and Congressional leaders.

*When reference is made to the Acting Mediator, it is intended to include any body which may be designated by the General Assembly to succeed him, such as the Conciliation Commission or the Secretary General. (See section on Organization in the discussion.) [Footnote in the source text.]

within its budgetary and constitutional limitations in line with the resolution adopted by the General Council of IRO on this subject;

(c) Invite the WHO to provide such medical personnel or other services as may be feasible in order to assist in the control of disease and in preventing the outbreak of serious epidemics;

(d) Invite the FAO to furnish such expert assistance on food supply and nutritional problems as may be requested by the Acting Mediator;

(e) Take note of the assistance being rendered by governments and non-governmental organizations and stress the necessity for full co-ordination of all such assistance with the program of the Acting Mediator;

(f) Provide the Acting Mediator immediately with a supplementary credit of not less than \$1,000,000 for obtaining the services of such staff as he may require in coordinating relief assistance other than personnel detailed by specialized agencies or by governments, and for emergency purposes, pending the receipt of aid from other sources.

DISCUSSION

FINANCIAL PROBLEM

The Mediator's Report points up the action already taken to alleviate the desperate condition of the 330,000 Arab and 7,000 Jewish refugees, and of the contributions in supplies and personnel furnished by governments, specialized agencies, UNICEF, and voluntary organizations, for the short term program, September–December 1948. Although reference is made to the need for a long-range program through August–September, 1949, and the hope is expressed that the General Assembly will assume responsibility for it, no concrete program has yet been presented for consideration by the General Assembly. It is believed, however, that such a program will be submitted as soon as the reports of the experts (supply, medical, nutritional) who have been surveying the situation have been completed. Preliminary estimates and suggestions have been forwarded to Paris by Sir Raphael Cilento,² but he has indicated that he would not have the full picture until the above-mentioned reports were submitted to him, which were due about October 1. Consequently the position outlined in the recommendations cannot be finalized until a program is laid before the General Assembly.

Whatever the size of the program, it is clear from rough preliminary estimates that it will cost not less than about \$25 million, and that ways and means must be found for financing it. It is equally clear that the principal burden will have to be carried by those governments which have a strong, direct interest in the Near East, namely the United States and the United Kingdom, in addition to the Arab states themselves. The remainder would be raised on a humanitarian or welfare basis from UNICEF, certain specialized agencies, some

² Director of Disaster Relief for the United Nations.

governments, and voluntary organizations. An operation of such proportions cannot be financed under the UN scale of contributions, and therefore UN financial responsibility must be limited to a relatively small amount such as that suggested in recommendation 2(f). The position of the United Kingdom as outlined in Delga 158, September 29,³ is silent on the costs of expanding the present disaster relief operations, but indicates that the whole financial burden would be borne by the UN as its responsibility. This position is considered unrealistic because it would result in nearly doubling the contributions of all Members, without regard to their degree of interest or ability to contribute. (There are other financial implications in the Mediator's report which will place a heavy burden on some, if not all UN Members, e.g., the Jerusalem police force, tentatively estimated by the Department to cost about \$30 million.) If the UN scale is not practical, neither is any other scale applicable to all UN Members (such as the IRO) which carries with it a specific obligation. The only alternative, therefore, is for those governments having a strong interest in the problem to proffer voluntary contributions. Because of the important strategic and political interests of the United States in the Near East, it is considered that those interests would be advanced by announcing the intention of this government to seek an appropriation from Congress for the assistance of these refugees. The amount to be proposed will need to be determined after the relief program has been submitted, but it is tentatively suggested that about \$10 million would be appropriate. If the United Kingdom were to contribute half that amount, the two contributions, together with \$6 million from UNICEF would total \$21,000,000. Contributions from all other sources would make up for the difference. In making any announcement of the intention of the U.S. to make a voluntary contribution, stress should of course be given to the humanitarian aspects of this problem rather than to the interests of the U.S. The statement should at the same time express the hope that other governments would likewise contribute.

It is hoped that the Acting Mediator will not submit a plan for financing the program. Sir Raphael Cilento in a letter to M. Laugier⁴ September 21, made several suggestions on this subject which the Department considers unrealistic. For example, he anticipated that about \$9,000,000 could be raised through voluntary organizations. Insofar as the U.S. is concerned, the response from the voluntary organizations and the oil companies to the Mediator's appeal of August 16 is disappointing. The potentially large donors, including the oil companies, have indicated a reluctance to make contributions for purely

³ Not printed.

⁴ Henri Laugier, Assistant Secretary-General of the United Nations in charge of Social Affairs.

relief purposes, especially food and have indicated a much greater interest in longer-range social development. The agencies which control CROP (Church World Service, National Catholic Relief Service, Lutheran World Relief) have not proven as cooperative as had been hoped in providing a contribution in wheat. Moreover, they are planning at this stage to launch a publicity campaign themselves to broaden the program of collections to include appeals for refugees from the Holy Land. The Department therefore considers that any program which relies so heavily upon contributions from voluntary sources from the U.S. is likely to fail, and that measures along the line recommended above are required. Similarly, contributions from private sources cannot take the place of a U.S. government contribution which is required to demonstrate U.S. interest. This position is a reversal of the earlier position set forth in the Memorandum of August 31 on "Plan of Action on Arab Refugee Problem".⁵

[Here follow sections on possible UNICEF and IRO assistance.]

UN BUDGETARY PROVISION

The proposed UN allocation of \$1,000,000 is to provide an adequate staff for the Director of Relief Operations for the entire period and to furnish him with a reserve for emergency purposes pending the receipt of aid from other sources. It would be desirable to vote a part, if not all, of this sum as a supplementary credit for the current fiscal year in order to enable Cilento to move in on the problem in a more effective way as soon as possible. Shortly before his death Count Bernadotte stated that he needed \$100,000 immediately to provide staff for Cilento and informally inquired whether the U.S. could contribute that sum.⁶ As indicated in Gadel 31, September 21,⁷ the Department considered that such staff should be provided by the UN to the extent that personnel has not been detailed by specialized agencies, governments, or voluntary agencies.

[Here follows further discussion of UN budgetary provision.]

ORGANIZATION

No recommendation has been submitted herewith with regard to the organization which should take the place of the Mediator insofar as the direction or control of relief operations are concerned. This matter is receiving further consideration in the Department and a separate paper will be forthcoming.

The foregoing recommendations assume that responsibility for relief operations will continue to be under the Director of Relief Operations. The British have suggested, as reported in Delga 134,

⁵ *Ante*, p. 1364.

⁶ As reported by Mr. McClintock in telegram 1327, September 16, 7 p. m., from Cairo, not printed.

⁷ Not printed.

September 28,⁸ that while the disaster relief operations should presumably work under the Conciliation Commission initially, it could be placed directly under the Secretary General as its responsibilities were expanded to include resettlement. Until further progress has been made concerning the role of the Conciliation Commission, the Department is not prepared to commit itself on the possible assignment of disaster relief operations to this body. In the second place it is conceivable that the governments or bodies (such as UNICEF) making substantial contributions for relief may wish to have some control over relief policies in spite of the relatively short time the program will be in operation. Similarly the Director of Relief Operations might wish to be responsible to such a group rather than to the Conciliation Commission whose functions as outlined in the Bernadotte report do not include supervision of relief activities. The principal objection to making the Director of Relief Operations responsible solely to the Secretary General is that the relatively small number of contributing governments would have little opportunity except at the next session of the General Assembly to see how their money had been spent or to exercise any supervision over the operations during the course of the year. It is also conceivable that Congress may wish in making an appropriation for this program to be assured that U.S. interests are adequately protected. A further paper on this subject will be forwarded as soon as possible.

REPATRIATION AND RESETTLEMENT

No recommendations are set forth in this paper concerning repatriation and resettlement which the Department considers should be distinguished from relief operations. The Department is giving consideration to the repatriation and resettlement problems which will form the basis of a separate paper. To the extent that the matter has been discussed, there seems to be no reason why the relief operations should be expanded to include resettlement in view of the distinctly different nature of the problem. In the second place the financing of resettlement is closely linked with the problem of compensation for the property of those who choose not to return. Furthermore, there is considerable doubt as to whether the UN should assume any direct responsibility for financing resettlement. In this connection it should be borne in mind that the IRO resettlement program does not involve the expenditure of funds for resettlement projects in the countries of reception and that its expenditures for resettlement are almost entirely devoted to providing overseas transportation and a small amount of pocket money. The UN, however, might undertake to provide experts in an advisory capacity to assist the Arab countries in the development of resettlement projects. These preliminary observa-

⁸ Not printed.

tions are tentatively put forward for discussions with the UK delegation pending the completion of the paper on this subject.

501.BB Palestine/10-648

Memorandum by Mr. Robert M. McClintock to the Acting Secretary of State (Lovett)

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] October 6, 1948.

[Subject:] Secretary's return to Washington: Palestine

Undoubtedly the Secretary in his weekend consultation with the President will be asked to deal with the stated US position on Palestine as embodied in his support of the Bernadotte Plan along the lines of his statement in Paris on September 21. The President may mention the considerations which formed the topic of your railroad conversation with Mr. Clark Clifford a week ago today.

The President will also have received Mr. McDonald's Niact telegram 161, of October 4, from Tel Aviv, the effect of which is to urge that we agree to the demand of the Provisional Government of Israel that it retain most of the Negeb despite Count Bernadotte's recommendation to the contrary.

I believe the Secretary could usefully urge on the President a compromise which would preserve the essence of the position he adopted in Paris on September 21. Official statements of Israeli leaders and press reports from Tel Aviv indicate that the Provisional Government of Israel has laid special stress on retaining some twenty-two "embattled" Jewish settlements in the Negeb. According to our information, most, if not all, of these settlements lie in an area north of Beersheba. It would therefore seem possible for us to agree that Israel retain a salient into the northern Negeb as far south as the Beersheba-Gaza Road, giving to Israel the bulk of the twenty-two Jewish settlements but retaining for the Arabs the bulk of the Negeb as recommended by the slain UN Mediator. Such a settlement would be in precise accord with the territorial settlements embodied in the Department's telegram to Tel Aviv #72 of September 1, which the President approved in his own handwriting and of which you have the text. Before proposing a compromise of this nature to the UNGA, we have at least a moral obligation to endeavor to obtain British agreement.

It is of the utmost importance, if there is to be any chance of success in securing UN adoption of the Bernadotte Plan and thereby a material advance toward a solution of the Palestine problem, that this government undertake immediate and urgent representations with the Arab governments and the Provisional Government of Israel urging their acquiescence in the Bernadotte Plan. Draft telegrams providing arguments to our various chiefs of mission for this purpose have been

prepared now for some time and await top-side approval.¹ I enclose three such telegrams² in the accompanying folder. It would be most helpful if the Secretary could approve the despatch of these instructions. The British have taken a more forthright line at least with the Arab States and, quite naturally, look to us to do our share in securing acquiescence not only on the part of the Arabs but on the part of Israel.

¹ See pp. 1433, 1434.

² The editors have been unable to identify the third such telegram.

501.BB Palestine/10-648: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Delegation,
at Paris*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, October 6, 1948—6 p. m.

Gadel 134. Dept has given careful consideration recommendation Para. 4(g) Bernadotte conclusions for placing Jerusalem under effective UN control. This study has necessarily involved consideration problem policing Jerusalem area.

Colonel Begley¹ Sept 15 at Rhodes and subsequently Paris strongly expressed opinion that minimum force for international police Jerusalem area under UN control would be six thousand men. Begley suggested that these men form bulk SYG's UN guard² and be at once sent Jerusalem.

Independent estimates made by Dept in consultation UN Naval Observers returned this week from Jerusalem and Haifa indicate minimum number international police force for Jerusalem may be fixed at four thousand. We believe this force should be separate from proposed UN guard because difference in function.

Although administratively it would be more simple for govts members Palestine Truce Commission to assign troops to this special Jerusalem police service we feel on balance that nature of duties and responsibilities UN administration in Jerusalem suggest that Jerusalem international police force should be clearly UN responsibility and that force should be recruited by SYG. However, this govt would have strong objections to establishment of UN international police force for Jerusalem if there were any material representation in that force of Soviet or satellite nationals.

Our preliminary rough estimate cost to UN of international police force totaling four thousand men is that first year outlay would be twenty million dols. It is our hope that this initial expenditure could be materially reduced in subsequent years through (a) increasing em-

¹ Frank Begley, Chief Security Officer of the United Nations Secretariat.

² For documentation on the attitude of the United States towards the proposal by the Secretary-General of the United Nations for the establishment of a United Nations Security Guard, see vol. I, Part 1, pp. 29 ff.

ployment Arab and Jewish policemen and (b) fact that initial expenses for outfitting will not recur subsequent years.

We are fully aware difficulty recruiting effective, disciplined, international police force and placing such a force promptly in No-Man's Land of Jerusalem. Recruitment should in fact be in progress now. However we are unwilling to separate elements of Bernadotte Plan and accordingly at this juncture request you sound out other delegations and SYG their thinking this respect. For your info any commitments this govt to defray expenses international police for Jerusalem will have to be carefully checked with Congressional leaders and accordingly our views at this time are purely tentative.

We are studying general problem financing UN Govt Jerusalem. Believe eventual cost should be borne by local revenues far as possible but recognize this not practical immediate future. For interim period choices are:

1. Contributions by members UN on regular budget scale.
2. Contributions by members UN on special scale with Big Five bearing major share.
3. Contributions only by Big Five.
4. Loan to working capital fund of entire amount by fifteen largest contributors to UN budget with repayment scheduled over twenty-year period by all members on regular contribution basis and by govt of Jerusalem to extent possible.

Foregoing alternatives may be used as basis for discussion with other delts. but without any commitment. For your info only we now inclined favor No. 2 on basis principle universal participation, with US prepared bear up to 55 percent of total and with only token contributions from smaller countries.³

LOVETT

³ This telegram represented "the Department's preliminary thinking on the problem of how to supply the United Nations administration of Jerusalem with an effective international police force" (memorandum of October 4 by Mr. McClintock to Mr. Lovett, 501.BB Palestine/10-448). Mr. McClintock noted that he did think "we can deal with any estimates which do not squarely face the need for having an adequate body of police in Jerusalem: something far more disciplined and tough than a mere token guard. Such a force, of course, means money."

"From a congressional point of view it would seem helpful if the Department's preliminary ideas with regard to the Jerusalem international police were checked early with leaders in both the House and the Senate."

195.91/9-3048: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, October 6, 1948—7 p. m.

1382. Position which Dept has consistently maintained (urtels 1435 Oct 2, 1425 Sept 30, and 1420 Sept 29¹) is that Amer vessels are free

¹ None printed.

to trade with ports of all nations and US has refrained from recommending that Amer vessels accede to pressure or sanctions imposed by Arabs upon vessels trading with other nations. At same time Dept has kept shipping companies informed of Arab and Israeli actions affecting their interests and has informed them that decision re continuance of operating schedules must be made by them and at their own risk.

Egypt, in order not to be accused of being aggressor nation, has maintained position that its intervention in Palestine was solely to restore peace and order. This Govt has never recognized that Egypt has belligerent status and insists that interference US shipping inconsistent with peacetime practices. Therefore, Emb should continue to impress upon authorities that US considers interference US shipping as contrary to international practice and as injurious to international trade and particularly that between US and Egypt.

For your info re subject US retaliation raised by AmExp reps (see memo conversation Sept 22²), there is of course possibility that activities of Egyp Govt might lead Amer shipping companies to request President or Congress to take retaliatory measures against Egyp shipping interests.³

LOVETT

² Memorandum by Mr. Satterthwaite of conversation with representatives of the American Export Lines, not printed (195.91/9-2248).

³ Minister Pinkerton, on October 24, reported information from the Lebanese Foreign Office that the *Marine Carp*, an American Export Lines vessel, would not be permitted entry into Beirut. He concluded that "Experience . . . shows that insuperable difficulties may be expected if attempt is made to serve both Israeli and Arab ports with same vessels." (Telegram 547, October 24, from Beirut) As a result, the Department, the next day, recommended to the United States Maritime Commission "that the outbound itinerary of the S.S. *Marine Carp*, which is scheduled to sail from New York on November 3, be restricted to Piraeus and Haifa." Both messages are filed under 195.91/10-2448.

Truman Papers, President's Secretary's File

*Memorandum by the Secretary of Defense (Forrestal)
to President Truman*

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, 7 October 1948.

This is to advise you that upon the urgent request of the Acting Secretary of State, I have directed the Secretary of the Navy to increase the number of Marine guards stationed at the Consulate in Jerusalem from 13 to 40. This action had been recommended by the Consul General as necessary to provide what he considered minimum protection under existing circumstances—six guards on duty at all times. The request for this added complement of men was reported as well justified by General Riley, the Senior United States Military Observer in Palestine, in response to a request for his opinion. The

Secretary of the Navy recommended against the action on the ground that the additional personnel would not provide effective protection and would increase the possibility of incidents. I felt, however, in view of the strong representations of the Department of State and personnel in the field, that the request should be complied with.

JAMES FORRESTAL

867N.01/10-748

Memorandum by Mr. Dean Rusk to the Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

[PARIS,] October 7, 1948.

Immediately upon his return Mr. Dulles called me in to discuss further the bipartisan aspect of the Palestine question.

He said he had discussed the matter at some length with Mr. Dewey and that Mr. Dewey had "a very strong intention" not to stir up the Palestine issue during the remainder of the campaign. Although Mr. Dewey is under enormous pressure, his present plan is to leave the matter alone. Mr. Dulles emphasized that he was not authorized to make any flat commitment and also stated that Mr. Dewey's conduct would be conditioned somewhat on the President's. I had the impression that when Mr. Dulles used the words "very strong intention" he was seeking words which were as strong as possible short of an absolute commitment.

I told Mr. Dulles that I certainly was not in a position to make or seek a commitment from the other side but that I felt the Secretary would be encouraged in his own efforts to know that Mr. Dewey would probably co-operate in keeping the matter out of the campaign.¹

¹The text of this memorandum was transmitted to the Department in telegram Delga 252, October 8, 6 p. m. (501.BB Palestine/10-848)

501.BB Palestine/10-748: Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, October 7, 1948—7 p. m.

4421. Following obtained October 6 and 7 from Wright, Burrows and Beeley regarding Palestine.

1. Maneuvers of PGI in Paris to amend Bernadotte Plan are understood by Foreign Office officials to be forceful and widespread. PGI representatives have been very active with delegations and are taking line that decision regarding Negeb is most important point requiring modification. Israeli strategy appears to be that once principle has been established that Bernadotte Plan can be amended regarding

Negeb it will be possible for them to bring about other amendments.

2. By contrast, only Arab intervention in Paris has been working for delay in Committee I and this has been harmful to Arab cause. Arabs do not seem to be doing much lobbying.

3. Foregoing activities PGI regarding emphasizing in the minds of Foreign Office officials crucial importance of US-UK standing firmly together against any amendments to Bernadotte Plan. Wright said that if difficult task of obtaining acquiescence from both sides is to be accomplished, US and UK must both turn deaf ears to appeals for amendments involving Negeb or anything else. Strength of Bernadotte Plan rests largely on US and UK solidarity in accepting plan in its entirety. On this basis French Government, although it has been subjected to strong Zionist pressure, is prepared to support plan in its entirety, and there are other governments in roughly same position. However, if UK should be induced to back some pro-Arab amendment, US would probably back a pro-Israeli amendment and from this divergence (perhaps at first on some very minor matter) there would develop a flood of inspired amendments from smaller states which would very shortly put situation back to pre-Bernadotte Plan days.

4. Wright emphasized that so far British Government has firmly resisted various Arab offers of collaboration with UK if only latter will abandon its support for Bernadotte Plan (Embassy's 4308, September 29 reference talk with Gallad Bey; Embassy's 4361, October 4 reference Bevin's talk with head Iraqi delegation Paris; and Embassy's 4350 October 1 reference talk British Chargé with Syrian Foreign Minister).¹ HMG can only hold this line if US likewise maintains its support for entire Bernadotte Plan.

5. Foreign Office officials believe that in the interval between its publication and present a good deal of the emotional appeal and drive behind Bernadotte Plan has been dissipated. Consequently they feel some steps will have to be taken to refocus attention of world on uneasy character of truce in Palestine and vital need for the fair and equitable settlement offered by Bernadotte Plan. UK delegation Paris will discuss with USGADel in near future desirability of holding, shortly before Committee I takes up Bernadotte Plan, an SC meeting to consider latest report of truce commission and Bunche's report that authority of UN is being undermined by both sides. Bunche has asked for a new SC resolution and "has almost drafted it."

6. Eastern Department has been considering also attitude which UK should adopt toward UNGA hearing of representatives of Transjordan and Provisional Arab Government (PAG). Present thinking is that Transjordan representative should be heard but there is divergence views re PAG representative. In case of latter there could be

¹ None printed.

no question of referring to him by title but some Foreign Office officers think that he might be allowed as spokesman for Arab population Palestine to occupy seat vacated by Arab Higher Committee. This school of thought believes that if Transjordan representative is seated and PAG representative is refused seat this will direct undesirable spotlight on Transjordan.

7. When possibility Soviet reversal re Palestine was mentioned to Beeley (Embassy's 4360, October 4²) he said UK delegation knows that Soviet delegation has been in touch with Lebanese Prime Minister Paris although details of meeting are not known. Beeley said there has been no indication of line of Soviet thought beyond rather vague reference to effect Western Powers are sabotaging November 29 resolution.

Sent Department 4421, repeated Paris for Gadel 720.

HOLMES

² Not printed ; but see footnote 1, p. 1432.

501.BB Palestine/10-1048 : Telegram

Mr. Wells Stabler to the Secretary of State

SECRET

AMMAN, October 10, 1948—5 p. m.

78. Conditions Palestine Arab refugees in Transjordan and Arab Legion occupied areas, severely deteriorating daily with increase death rate in various camps and sites. Transjordan Government now responsible for about 200,000 refugees and though it continues extend modicum assistance, its administrative and material resources are too meager to provide prompt action needed relief—food, medicine and shelter. Despite presence one UN relief official Amman, no relief supplies, except for small amount powdered milk for children and pregnant women, have as yet been forthcoming from UN relief organization. Understand reason is that UN relief headquarters insists Transjordan Government organize group to take responsibility for distribution supplies and that no such group has been formed. Meanwhile, winter approaches and plight refugees grows worse not better. If aid does not come soonest and in liberal quantities, nature will solve problem which man apparently cannot.

While realizing Transjordan Government should theoretically take major responsibility for distribution relief supplies, submit that well known lack of organization and initiative in Arab Governments should prove *a priori* that major burden must be borne by UN relief organization, if in fact any relief work is to be done. Immediate relief is not only of importance from humanitarian standpoint, but also as essen-

tial factor in arriving at satisfactory solution Palestine problem based on Bernadotte's conclusions. This running sore of refugees will make Arab acquiescence therein more difficult and odious as it will remain evidence of UN inability cope with complicated yet urgent problem.

Appreciate fact USA is only one of many participants in relief program. However, further delay can only result in appalling number deaths and prompt action is so vital that strongly urge Department, in continuance its deep interest in matter, take urgent steps stimulate immediate action by UN relief headquarters at Beirut in providing necessary supplies. Believe that once supplies come in, distribution can be satisfactorily worked out by UN officials in collaboration with Transjordan Government.

Department pass Jerusalem 54, and Arab capitals.

STABLER.

501.BB Palestine/10-1048

*Draft Statement Prepared in the Department of State*¹

[WASHINGTON, undated.]

From the statements made by the Arab leaders and by spokesmen for the State of Israel, it is clear that the Mediator's plan for a settlement of the Palestine problem will cause debate in the United Nations. The Arabs still refuse to admit the existence of the State of Israel and take other less important exceptions to some of Bernadotte's proposals. The Israelis strongly object to the Mediator's proposal under which the Negeb, which was allotted to the Jewish State under the November 29th Resolution of the General Assembly, was to be turned over to the Arabs. Under the Mediator's plan Western Galilee, previously allotted to the Arabs, was to go to the Israelis.

The two parties are, therefore, far apart in their respective views and must be brought together if there is to be a settlement of the Palestine issue.

In our opinion, the Bernadotte plan provides a sound basis for the adjustment of their differences before the United Nations. It should not be too difficult to reach an agreement given a real desire on the part of the two peoples.²

¹ A marginal notation by Mr. McClintock states that this paper was prepared on October 10 for Mr. Lovett's press conference of October 13. Another copy of the proposed statement, filed with Mr. Clifford's telegram of October 11, *infra*, bears a marginal notation stating that President Truman approved the paper at 12:50 p. m., October 10.

² A marginal notation by Mr. McClintock on October 11 reported information from Mr. Lovett that the statement approved by the President had been disapproved by White House political advisers "who preferred to say nothing at all than to give this statement."

Clifford Papers : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the President's Special Counsel
(Clifford)*¹

TOP SECRET URGENT

WASHINGTON, October 11, 1948—6:36 p. m.

White 174. Referring our conversation Sunday, have discussed matter with Secretary in light of your comments and he is most anxious to be as helpful as possible. His proposal for handling and his draft aimed to do this but he says if it does not he will try again.

He has in mind discussing immediately on arrival in Paris tomorrow alternative language along line used by Mrs. Roosevelt and will wire me soonest. Meanwhile I have his authority to make no comment on question if asked press conference Wednesday provided President agrees. Please get my existing instructions cancelled and wire me urgently. Regards.

LOVETT

¹ Marshall was absent from Paris on October 9–11 for consultation with the President in Washington.

501.BB Palestine/10–1148 : Telegram

*The President's Special Counsel (Clifford) to the Acting Secretary
of State (Lovett)*

TOP SECRET

ABOARD PRESIDENTIAL SPECIAL TRAIN
October 11, 1948—11:30 p. m.

Black 93. I have your White 174.¹ Have discussed the matter with the President and he directs me to inform you that your existing instructions are cancelled.² If you are asked questions on Wednesday ³ you are to make no comment.

We note with great interest the plan of the Secretary to discuss alternative language on arrival in Paris. We feel it would be most helpful if he would include Ben Cohen ⁴ in such discussion because of the latter's familiarity with our problems here.⁵

Will appreciate your forwarding to us as soon as possible any new language. If you prefer we can always be reached by telephone.

Best regards,

[CLARK CLIFFORD]

¹ *Supra.*

² The expression "existing instructions" possibly refers to Presidential authorization for Mr. Lovett to use the statement.

³ October 13, the date of Mr. Lovett's press conference.

⁴ Benjamin V. Cohen, Alternative Representative in the United States Delegation at the first part of the Third Session of the General Assembly at Paris.

⁵ Acting Secretary Lovett quoted this paragraph in part to Secretary Marshall in telegram Telmar 63, October 12, 1 p. m., to Paris (501.BB Palestine/10–1248).

867N.51/10-1248

*Statement To Be Made by the Alternate Department of State Member to the Board of Export-Import Bank With Regard to the Israeli Loan*¹

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] October 12, 1948.

On June 2, 1948 the Provisional Government of Israel made a request for an Eximbank loan of \$100,000,000. This request was made during the first truce in Palestine, which was of only 30 days duration. The State of Israel had just been established, and its future seemed uncertain.

Since that time a number of changes have taken place in the political, military, and economic situation of Israel.

The second truce of indefinite duration was arranged and has now been in effect since July 18. While the UN observers have reported many violations of the truce on both sides, at present there is little reason to believe that the truce will not continue or be replaced by an armistice under the Bernadotte Plan. The Palestine problem is soon to come up for discussion in the General Assembly of the United Nations on the basis of Count Bernadotte's final report, which the Department believes constitutes a generally fair basis for the solution of the problem.

In the meantime, the Provisional Government of Israel has taken the following steps:

- a) it has taken firm hold of the machinery of government;
- b) it has gained and in general maintained effective control of the territory under its occupation.
- c) it has also consolidated its internal political position and appears successfully to be bringing under control the dissident elements which previously threatened internal order and security;
- d) it is making definite plans for elections for a Constituent Assembly, probably to be held in the latter part of this year.

Attention is drawn to the following statement which appears in the conclusion to Count Bernadotte's final report to the United Nations "A Jewish state called Israel exists in Palestine and there are no sound reasons for assuming that it will not continue to do so."

From a military standpoint, there is much less likelihood now than at the time the original request for the loan was made that the Arabs will undertake a large scale military attack against Israel.

The prospects for economic viability and growth of the Israeli

¹ Drafted by Messrs. Satterthwaite, Roswell H. Whitman, Acting Chief of the Division of Investment and Economic Development, and Joseph B. Knapp, Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy. A memorandum of October 14 by Mr. Whitman states that Mr. Lovett approved the statement and that it was made to the Bank's Board of Directors on October 13. The Alternate State Department Member was Garrison Norton, Assistant Secretary of State for Transportation and Communications.

economy are favorably affected by the increased prospects for a lasting political settlement. In addition the improved political conditions may be expected to result in a decrease in the drain of military expenditures on the resources of the Government.

In view of these changes in the situation of Israel the Department of State believes that the Export-Import Bank should give renewed consideration to loan applications from the Provisional Government of Israel. As an initial step in this direction, the Department suggests that the Bank invite the Provisional Government of Israel to submit new loan applications covering some selected specific projects for resettlement and economic development.

501.BB Palestine/10-1348 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET US URGENT

LONDON, October, 13, 1948.

NIACT

4486. For Lovett's eyes only from Douglas. When I discussed with Bevin this morning the draft, particularly the last paragraph, of the statement which you intend to make regarding Palestine at your press conference this afternoon, he said that he was unhappy that it should be necessary for either US or UK to mention publicly modifications of the Bernadotte proposals since the new and forceful element behind them was the announced intention of US and UK to support these proposals in their entirety. So accustomed had the world become to seeing US and UK on opposite sides of the fence on this issue that our present agreement will be a vital factor in achieving Arab and Jewish acquiescence.

2. Bevin said, however, that if there are compelling reasons for the US mentioning modifications, to his mind the important thing is that the equilibrium of the Bernadotte proposals should not be disturbed. He and I together went over your statement and after discussion Bevin told me that he would regard its purport as being less disturbing if statement were to read as suggested in immediately preceding telegram No. 4485.¹

¹ Dated October 13; it advised that Mr. Bevin had acquiesced in the following wording of the last two paragraphs of Mr. Lovett's proposed statement at his press conference on October 13: "The two parties are, therefore, far apart in their respective views. The only hope for a solution of the Palestine issue lies in the wisdom of the United Nations.

"In our opinion, the Bernadotte plan provides a sound basis for the adjustment of their differences before the United Nations. It should not be too difficult to reach a solution even though the United Nations may find it wise to make minor modifications which do not disturb the equilibrium provided for in the Bernadotte recommendations." (501.BB Palestine/10-1348)

3. You will note that changes have been made only in the last two paragraphs to introduce the idea of equilibrium and to remove the hint it is still possible for the two sides, without the intervention of UN, to reach an agreement between themselves.

[Here follows paragraph numbered four regarding conversations between Mr. Bevin and Commonwealth Prime Ministers on Palestine.]

Sent Department as 4486; repeated Paris for Marshall's eyes only as 742.

DOUGLAS

501.BB Palestine/10-1348: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET NIACT

PARIS, October 13, 1948—midnight.

Delga 319. Eyes alone for Lovett from the Secretary. Reference Douglas' 4485¹ and 4486² London on amendments to statement.

For your press conference and regarding your telephone conversation with Rusk and Telmar 63:³ I have modified Bevin's proposed last two paragraphs by striking out words "may" and "minor" in sentence commencing "it should not be et cetera" and inserting the word "essential" before word "equilibrium".

Cohen makes this proposal as substitute last paragraph: "In our opinion the Bernadotte Plan provides a sound basis for a renewed effort in the part of the UN to bring about a peaceful adjustment of differences. This should not prevent such modifications of the Bernadotte Plan as the UN finds helpful to promote a peaceful settlement which would open the way for the long term development and stability of the Near East."

Comment on Cohen's proposed paragraph: Cohen believes his more general statement would help reduce pressures building up on President. I see no difference between his and my last paragraphs as far as UN Assembly is concerned. I would accept Cohen's suggestion provided Douglas can assure us that it would not seriously interfere with joint US-UK action Palestine. Douglas please follow up and advise Lovett and me immediately. *End of comment.*

Palestine, by decision Committee I today, will be taken up for one day on Friday, while awaiting reports of Subcommittees on Atomic Energy and Disarmament. We do not expect to speak in Committee I on Friday and present likelihood is that Palestine debate would not be resumed until late next week. We, and particularly Dulles, desired to place it after Greece on the agenda but did not succeed in getting the change. Effort was to hold it until after election. Bohlen, Rusk and

¹ Dated October 13, not printed; but see footnote 1, *supra*.

² Dated October 13, *supra*.

³ Dated October 12, not printed; but see footnote 5, p. 1467.

I feel certain that if President himself makes statement, as his political advisers no doubt insist, he will inevitably carry issue direct into political campaign as Dewey will certainly respond. Issue here will be thrown into confusion and possibility of settlement at least postponed and truce imperiled.⁴

Repeated to London 105 [1058], eyes alone for the Ambassador.

MARSHALL

⁴ Acting Secretary Lovett, on October 13, informed Mr. Clifford that he had "told Rusk to use best efforts to have American Delegation let others do the talking" on October 15 (telegram White 203, Clifford Papers).

The United States Delegation at Paris decided, on October 15, that "US would not participate in any substantive debate on Palestinian problem during Committee One discussions October 15 and 16, but that explanation our position would be postponed until Palestine problem is more fully considered upon conclusion of Committee One's work on atomic energy and conventional armaments—perhaps at end of next week." (Telegram Delga 340, October 15, 5 p. m., from Paris, 501.BB Palestine/10-1548)

501.BB Palestine/10-1348 : Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Griffis) to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

CAIRO, October 13, 1948—3 p. m.

1485. Evidence here indicates Egyptian opposition to Bernadotte Plan has greatly increased due to widely held belief that British support for plan is based principally on desire secure merger Arab Palestine and Transjordan as step in enlarging their sphere of influence and toward creation Greater Syria. Such opinion stimulated by (1) British emphasis on Bernadotte's recommendation for merging two areas rather than on his statement that disposition Arab Palestine should be left to government of Arab States; (2) recent pressure on Arab States (mytels 1439, October 3, 1442, October 4, 1445, October 5¹) against recognition Arab Government Palestine interpreted by most Arab leaders as rising less from reasons advanced than from British desire promote Transjordan and their interests.

Problem together with suggestion that British statement might be issued emphasizing Bernadotte's view concerning disposition Arab Palestine should be left to Arab States has been reviewed with British Chargé Chapman-Andrews. British Chargé inclined believe (1) destruction of AGP of overriding importance and; (2) that British emphasis on Bernadotte proposal re disposition of Arab Palestine by Arab States would encourage Arab Government's support AGP with adverse effects. He also maintained enlarged Transjordan would enhance British ability maintain security of ME.

Would appreciate comments of Department on validity of British

¹ None printed.

argument that greatly enlarged Transjordan necessary to security of ME. Unless overriding reasons of security exist it would appear that continued British insistence on enlarged Transjordan and Arab Palestine will work against Arab acquiescence Bernadotte Plan. Insistence seems particularly unnecessary in view general belief that AGP notwithstanding Egyptian and Iraqi recognition will soon collapse out of weakness and that most Arab Palestine will fall naturally into hands Abdullah.

In this connection would also appreciate Department's comments on interesting Egyptian Government in acquiring portion of Arab Palestine possible Gaza and part of Negeb as compensation for acquiescence Bernadotte Plan. Bernadotte known to have favored partition Arab Palestine among Syria, Transjordan and Lebanon (Embtel 1105, August 7²). This view also responsible for this reference plan to "frontier rectifications regarding other Arab States as may be found practicable and desirable". Nokrashy to whom Bernadotte mentioned partition vigorously repudiated such suggestion as unethical but it is now possible that both King and Nokrashy might be favorable to acquisition of portion Palestine return for acquiescence Bernadotte Plan.

GRIFFIS

² This number was not used by the Department to identify any telegram from Cairo in 1948; presumably the reference is to telegram 1103-A of the same date (see paragraph numbered 3), p. 1296.

501.BB Palestine/10-448: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald)

SECRET

WASHINGTON, October 13, 1948—5 p. m.

149. For McDonald from Acting Secretary for your info only. We have given careful consideration ur 161 Oct 4 and Secy has discussed it with President. Dept has following comments on opinions Israeli official as transmitted by you.

US naturally desires friendship of Israel and wishes see Israel take definite and sincere stand at side of Western democracies. Regardless passions of moment, disadvantages of not adopting latter position must be abundantly clear to every thoughtful Israeli. US has already given ample evidence its support of Israel. At same time importance to West of friendship of Arabs as majority inhabitants of strategic ME area is obvious.

US Govt deeply concerned by threat to peace, prosperity and security ME which situation in Palestine presents and desirous see

solution worked out without use force which will as nearly as possible under existing circumstances meet desires both sides.

On Sept 1 after consulting President Secy cabled you ¹ that US Govt felt Israel should have boundaries which would make it more homogeneous and well integrated than frontiers proposed Nov 29 resolution. He also stated that our thinking was that Israel might expand into rich area of Galilee and that a large portion of Negev might go to Transjordan. We thought then and still think that some small area of Negev, such as that containing principal Jewish settlements, might be retained by Israel. This matter is of course one for final decision by GA when it considers whole problem, and it is possible that GA may not accept Mediator's conclusions in their every detail.

As regards official's remark that US support of conclusions re Negev would not endear other Arab states to US, Secy stated in Paris that no plan could be proposed which would be entirely satisfactory in all respects to every interested party. Any additional Arab ill will toward US over Negev would only be part of far deeper resentment which Arab world harbors against US because of our support of Israel.

We can understand Jewish objections to any proposal which would reduce area of Israel, but gain of rich Galilee area and advantage of more homogeneous state are very important counter-balancing considerations. Jews as well as Arabs must, we believe, be prepared make sacrifices in interests security and peace in ME.

We have so far recd no evidence Transjordan is dissatisfied with Bernadotte's conclusion on Negev. We have also been informed by Brit Govt that they have no projects for air bases in Negev. There is no question, as Israeli official states, of "British forcing gift of Negev to Transjordan in order secure air bases" but rather one of UN implementing conclusion of Mediator reached in sincere desire achieve fairest possible solution Palestine problem.

Re penultimate para urtel, does Israeli official have any convincing evidence to support belief possibility successful direct negotiations between Israel and Transjordan ² in view Abdullah's relations with Arab League and other Arab states?

To sum up, US support of Bernadotte conclusions was given in belief, as Secy stated in Paris, that conclusions taken together offer generally fair basis for settlement of Palestine problem. These conclusions were reached independently by Mediator, who was well-known

¹ In telegram 72, p. 1366.

² Mr. McDonald advised, on October 24, of official information that there were no current peace negotiations between the Provisional Government of Israel and Transjordan, but that Elias Sassoon was waiting in Paris for Abdullah's envoy (telegram 205 from Tel Aviv, 867N.01/10-2448).

as fair-minded and impartial, after months of discussion with Arabs and Jews. We feel that Count Bernadotte's conclusions afford a just common denominator upon which to found mutual accommodation.³

LOVETT

³ This telegram was sent to Paris as Gadel 202, October 14, 4 p. m., which was repeated by the Department to London as No. 3949.

Editorial Note

Mr. Bunche's cablegram of September 30 (see page 1442) and Mr. Macdonald's message of the same date (see editorial note, page 1444) were considered by the Security Council on October 14. Mr. Bunche addressed the Council, noting the increasing tendency by the parties concerned to ignore their responsibilities under the several truce resolutions. He concluded his presentation with the view that "an expression by the Security Council, at this time, of its firm expectation that all the obligations resting on the disputing parties as a result of the Council's truce resolutions of 29 May, 15 July and 19 August would be honoured, would be very helpful indeed to the situation. . . ." (SC, *3rd yr., No. 116*, pages 14-20). The United Kingdom, thereupon, offered a draft resolution which outlined the duties of both sides regarding the truce and called on the Provisional Government of Israel to report on Count Bernadotte's assassination; for text, see *ibid.*, page 28. China associated itself as co-sponsor of the draft resolution (*ibid.*, page 37).

501.BB Palestine/10-1448: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State, at Paris

TOP SECRET

US URGENT

LONDON, October 14, 1948—3 p. m.

NIACT

753. Re Delga 319,¹ repeated London as 1058.

1. I do not have at my disposal the substance of what was apparently Lovett's telephone conversation with Rusk, nor do I have a copy of Telmar 63.² In these respects I am, therefore, in the dark.

2. It will, I think, be difficult enough, even under the most favorable circumstances with the US and UK standing shoulder to shoulder, to obtain a $\frac{2}{3}$ vote in favor of the Bernadotte proposals in the GA. I fear that the language of Cohen's proposal would give the public impression that there is a cleavage between the US and UK, thereby

¹ Dated October 13, p. 1470.

² Dated October 12, not printed; but see footnote 5, p. 1467.

making favorable action of the GA more difficult, if not unlikely. Should the GA fail to endorse the plan, we will be in a position as critical as, if not more serious than the one in which we found ourselves many months ago.

3. While I can well understand Cohen's desire to have language along the lines of his proposal, I would not be candid with you were I to refrain from saying that it goes much farther in its implications than the proposed language agreed to by Bevin yesterday with, I can assure you, a not inconsiderable amount of effort, tact and persuasiveness.

4. I was unable to see Bevin this morning, because of the Commonwealth meeting which he had to attend. I did, however, see Wright. His very strong view was that the language of the last two paragraphs of the statement which was discussed with Bevin yesterday is dangerous enough. Even it, on the eve of GA consideration, is a public recognition by the US that amendments to the Bernadotte plan are necessary. It may therefore encourage a variety of corroding proposed modifications which may eat away at the "reasonable, equitable and working basis for a settlement" which the Bernadotte plan attempts to provide. Nevertheless, if it is absolutely essential from US point of view that such a statement be issued with the three changes which the Secretary suggests, the UK will understand.

5. We have labored patiently and tediously to undo the mistakes which both the US and UK have made in the past. We have brought together what were two widely divergent approaches to the problem. We have convinced the UK of the stability of our position, and therefore have inspired their confidence in us. Similarly, the UK, largely as a result of our efforts, has accepted partition and acknowledged the existence of Israel, thus giving us reason for reposing faith in their cooperation on the agreed line of action. To run the risk of undoing what has been so tediously and laboriously accomplished by a statement along the lines of Cohen's proposal would, I think, be taking chances with fate. I can give you assurances that the Cohen proposal would turn back the clock many months, interfere with joint US-UK action, cause a rebirth of doubts as to the stability of US policy, and hazard the outward recurrence of a serious menace to our national interests.

6. I most earnestly hope that if any statement at all is issued it will not come from the White House. I recognize, of course, that the intimate advisers of the President would much prefer that he, himself, make a pronouncement. But he himself would be the first to realize that no political position, however high—no public office, however great its prestige, is worth gambling with the vital interests of the US.

7. I would not be serving you, the President, and my country to the best of my ability were I to withhold what I realize is a blunt but considered statement of my best opinion.³

Sent Paris (for the Secretary—eyes only) as 753; repeated Department as 4503.⁴

DOUGLAS

³ Mr. Lovett did not make the proposed statement at his press conference of October 13. The only matter regarding Palestine that arose at the conference was the attitude of the United States toward the new Arab government. Mr. Lovett stated that "the United States had already recognized the State of Israel but was not in a position to recognize this Arab government. Asked if [the] United States would recognize it in the Arab section of Palestine, Mr. Lovett replied in the negative and said that we were not in a position to recognize it at all because it has not conformed yet to the normal attributes which have been stated before." (Memorandum by Mr. McDermott, News Division Files)

⁴ This telegram is printed from the text as repeated to the Department, marked "For Lovett (Eyes Only)."

867N.01/10-1448: Telegram

*The Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald)
to the Acting Secretary of State*

SECRET US URGENT

TEL AVIV, October 14, 1948—5 p. m.

179. From official Israeli sources both the Military Attaché and the Counselor are confidentially informed that the activities of Egyptian armies in south are causing major concern Israeli Army. Reports are that for last 10 days Egypt forces have been moving reinforcements and deploying troops toward Israeli positions and indications last two days point toward Egyptian offensive action near El Falujah which, according Israeli G-2 may materialize next four or five days. Israeli forces also undertaking strengthen positions. El Falujah is a key point both as regards command of supply routes to besieged Jewish Negev settlements and as regards east-west Arab communications.

Mission does not know where fault lies in present jockeying for position on southern front as between Jews and Arabs, but each side apparently blaming other. Israeli public and Army will never allow Egypt forces get in position annihilate agricultural settlements and if enemy starts offensive to push Jews out of present positions which strategically hold only eventual hope of saving settlements there is strongest probability Jews will counter-attack in force. Egypt Army activity probably related formation Gaza Government. Recognition of Gaza by Egypt, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq has placed both Israel and Transjordan in peculiar position, particularly latter. Abdullah is reported to have moved his flag as far south as Hebron and Bethle-

hem and indications are that he is watching Egypt activities very closely.¹

Solely for confidential and restricted information Department and Army, mission believes a very peculiar situation could develop if war resumed in south. Abdullah now in the middle, might stand by and let Israel Army maul Egyptian forces in order eliminate both Gaza Government and potential Egyptian menace his territory.

Jewish estimate of situation is that they can successfully defend against all six enemy forces. They cannot take offensive all fronts, but if Egypt Army forces Jews into counter-offensive they believe they can soundly defeat Egyptians, provided Abdullah holds his Legion back.

In strict confidential opinion mission this unhappy situation could open up interesting possibility future avenue of political settlement between Israel and Transjordan, although time is not yet ripe at moment owing Abdullah's delicate position vis-à-vis Arab League.

Situation becoming tense. Jews start new year with hope and high Army morale.

Sent Department 179, Department pass Jerusalem 8, Paris Gadel 1 and Department of Army.

McDONALD

¹ Saudi Arabian recognition of the Arab Palestine Government was extended on October 13 (telegram 560, October 21, from Jidda, 867N.01/10-2148).

501.BB Palestine/10-1448 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY

PARIS, October 14, 1948—10 p. m.

Delga 326. [Here follows a discussion of various aspects of the question of assistance to Arab refugees, including information that Dr. Bunche would soon present a report estimating requirements for approximately 468,000 refugees for the period January through August 1949 at \$23,500,000 and additional administrative costs at \$2,500,000.]

Following being presented members USDel, October 15, as US interim position :

1. Action on measures of assistance to Arab refugees and on provisions for their implementation should be taken in relation to general settlement of political problem of Palestine.

2. As to substance of problem of assistance USDel should take position :

a. That UN should take initiative in organizing assistance and should determine organization to administer assistance (preferably expansion of Mediator's relief organization).

b. That total amount required be determined and a recom-

mendation adopted that all governments contribute voluntarily in accordance with an operational scale of contributions to be recommended by Committee on Contributions, subcommittee (of?)¹ Committee 5 reflecting capacities of members to pay and their special interest in this particular problem.

c. That recommendation to be adopted by GA described in *b* above include an appeal to specialized agencies of UN, particularly FAO, WHO, IRO, and ICEF, to contribute specialized personnel, supplies, and services within limits of their constitutional provisions and financial resources.

3. Budget Bureau and Congressional leaders should be apprised of nature of problem by Acting Secretary of State and at least tacit approval obtained of program outlined in paragraph 2. Question of obtaining US supplies such as blankets and food on urgent emergency basis in advance of Congressional appropriation subject to reimbursement or replacement should be explored with Department of Defense and with Red Cross. This would require clearance with Congressional legislative and appropriation leaders of both major parties.

4. USDel should be prepared to support moving this item up on agenda of Committee 3 for debate as soon as principal governments had had time to mature their positions on basis of Acting Mediator's report on assistance to Arab refugees. This report will be presented to Committee 3 promptly after completion, perhaps by October 20-22 to enable delegates to study problem.

Following alternatives thoroughly explored and considered less desirable:

1. Include item assistance in UN budget with mandatory contributions on basis special operational scale;
2. Refer problem to IRO;
3. Include appeal to voluntary agencies for contributions; and
4. Appeal solely to private sources.

US, UK delegations will have opportunity to examine Cilento's budget in detail before presentation to Committee 3.

Department will be advised as soon as GADel has firm recommendation US position.²

MARSHALL

¹ As in the source text.

² The Delegation approved the recommended position on October 20 (Delga 110, October 20, 3 p. m., 501.BB Palestine/10-2048).

Clifford Papers

Memorandum by the Department of State to President Truman

SECRET

WASHINGTON, October 15, 1948.

Subject: Relief for Arab and Jewish Refugees in the Near East.

Reference is made to the memorandum which you approved, on August 19,¹ authorizing the Department to approach other agencies

¹ See p. 1324.

of this Government with a view to assuming some share of the international burden of relief for refugees in the Near East, and to continue efforts to secure immediate donations from American private relief organizations. Recently reports from our Missions in the Near East and from the Acting Mediator have indicated a desperate need for blankets and clothing in addition to larger quantities of food supplies. The situation is becoming daily more critical as cold weather sets in. After approaching other agencies of the Government to ascertain what assistance might be given, it appears that none of the relief supplies which are urgently required can be made available under existing legislative authority. The response to the Department's efforts to date to stimulate contributions through voluntary organizations has been wholly inadequate to meet these urgent needs.

Reports from our Missions in the Near East emphasize that the failure of the United States Government to render substantial assistance in this emergency is jeopardizing our relations with the Near Eastern states. Moreover, it is the Department's considered view that continued failure of this Government to respond to the critical needs of these refugees will be directly reflected in the attitude of the Arab states towards any political settlement of the Palestine problem.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have strongly recommended that this Government contribute to the relief of these refugees because of the importance of improving relations with the Arab states in view of their strategic importance. The Secretary of Defense concurs strongly with the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.² (Copy of letter attached)

It is understood that the question of your authority as Commander-in-Chief to direct the furnishing of material aid to foreign populations in the absence of specific statutory authorization is one which the decisions of the courts and the opinions of the Attorney General have never firmly and clearly answered. Such authority has, however, been broadly construed where the surrounding facts and circumstances were sufficient to dictate the necessity of such action in the interest of the defense and security of the United States. It is the view of the Department that the surrounding facts and circumstances warrant consideration of the exercise of such authority.

The Department of State therefore recommends that under your authority as Commander-in-Chief, the National Military Establishment be directed to release to the extent available from stocks on hand or which may be quickly obtained from other departments or agencies: 100,000 blankets; 5,000 tons of wheat; cloth or appropriate clothing for 200,000 persons; typhus vaccine, atabrine and other urgently needed medical supplies; and to provide transportation facili-

² See telegram Telmar 19, September 28, to Paris, p. 1427.

ties for shipment of these supplies to the Near East. The total value of supplies and transport should not exceed \$1,500,000, to cover the period from now until the end of the year. A relief program for the period January–September 1949 is to be considered by the General Assembly. A recommendation on this subject will be submitted as soon as more information is available on the total requirements and the manner by which it is proposed to be financed.

867N.01/10–1548 : Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Smith) to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

Moscow, October 15, 1948—7 p. m.

2345. As Palestine question comes up in GA¹ there are no fresh indications Soviet attitude beyond those previously reported, which coincide with statements in joint manifesto of CPS of Near East (Damascus 634, October 7 to Department,² repeated Paris as 22 for GADel). It seems clear Soviet delegation will:

(1) strongly support original partition resolution November 29, 1947 pressing particularly for setting up independent Arab state in non-Israel portion Palestine;

(2) charge Anglo-American maneuvers responsible for non-application partition and continuance civil war, citing especially activities British officered Arab Legion and exclusion Soviet representatives from Truce Commission;

(3) strongly oppose Bernadotte report as imperialistic Anglo-American sponsored scheme;

(4) similarly oppose any proposal involving extension territories or influence Abdullah, whom they regard as British agent despite intimations to Arab diplomats here of possible dramatic *volte-face* in Soviet position (Embtel 2186, September 29) and press attack on present Israel government (Embtel 2078, September 21²), we do not really expect any major public shift. In voting against Bernadotte Plan or any variation thereof, Soviet delegation would, however, publicly disassociate itself from UN action or any responsibility in connection with application of UN decision and thus gain relative freedom of action to exploit chaotic Near-Eastern situation to maximum.

Sent Department 2345, repeated London 261, Paris for Gadel 478.

SMITH

¹The First Committee began discussion of Count Bernadotte's progress report on October 15 (United Nations, *Official Records of the Third Session of the General Assembly, Part I, First Committee, Summary Records of Meetings, 21 September–8 December 1948*, p. 160; hereinafter identified as "GA, 3rd sess., Pt. I, First Committee, Summary Records, 1948").

²Not printed.

501.BB Palestine/10-1548 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

PARIS, October 15, 1948—11 p. m.

Delga 350. Next following telegram ¹ contains text of draft Palestine resolution representing culmination numerous discussions Bunche and Beeley, taking fully into account Department and FonOff views and reflecting agreement definitive text staff level.² Beeley telegraphing text tonight London for final clearance. We plan present text to delegation early next week and for this purpose would greatly appreciate any further Department comments not later than Tuesday, sooner if possible. Suggest Department not seek top-level clearance before delegation consideration. Commentary this text follows Saturday.

MARSHALL

¹ *Infra.*

² The United States Delegation at Paris had transmitted to the Department on October 6 a draft resolution which had the concurrence of the British Delegation. On October 11 the United States Delegation forwarded to the Department a draft resolution prepared by Acting United Nations Mediator Ralph Bunche. The Department's views were transmitted to Paris on October 13. After further consultation with Bunche and the British on the same day, the United States Delegation submitted to Washington a revised draft resolution, on which the Department commented two days later. (501.BB Palestine/10-648, /10-1148, and /10-1348.)

501.BB Palestine/10-1648 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY

PARIS, October 16, 1948—1 a. m.

Delga 351. Verbatim text:

"The General Assembly,

"Having adopted on 14 May 1948 Resolution 186 (S-2) empowering a UN Mediator in Palestine to exercise certain functions including the use of his good offices to promote a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine;

"Having received and examined the progress report of the UN Mediator in Palestine (Document A/648) submitted by the late Count Folke Bernadotte;

"Having taken note of the resolution of the SC of 15 July 1948 (Document S/902) which 'orders the governments and authorities concerned, pursuant to Article 40 of the Charter of the UN, to desist from further military action,' and which also provides 'that, subject to further decision by the SC or the GA, the truce shall remain in force, in accordance with the present resolution and with that of 29 May 1948, until a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine is reached';

"And taking account of the fact that the governments and authorities concerned have accepted the order of the SC of 15 July;

"1. Expresses its deep appreciation of the progress achieved through the good offices of the late UN Mediator in promoting a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine, for which cause he sacrificed his life;

"2. Notes with satisfaction Part I of the progress report of the UN Mediator and endorses the specific conclusions contained in Part I of that report, which are attached hereto, as a basis for a peaceful settlement of the Palestine question;

"3. Establishes a conciliation commission consisting of three states members of the UN to carry out the functions assigned to it by this resolution in accordance with the provisions of the specific conclusions attached hereto and such instructions as the GA or the SC may issue. (The members of the conciliation commission shall be selected by a committee of the GA composed of representatives of China, France, the USSR, the UK, and the USA.)

"4. Declares that since the SC on July 15 has forbidden further employment of military action in Palestine, hostilities in Palestine should be considered as terminated; instructs the conciliation commission to make arrangements for the transition from the existing truce to a formal peace or armistice in Palestine, and, pending the establishment of such a formal truce or armistice, recommends to the SC that existing truce obligations and arrangements be maintained subject to consideration of any modifications thereof which the conciliation commission may propose; and authorizes the conciliation commission to make such arrangements as may be necessary to utilize the personnel and equipment of the present truce supervision organization;

"5. Instructs the conciliation commission to appoint a technical boundaries commission to assist in delimiting the frontiers in Palestine based on the specific conclusions of the UN Mediator (paragraph 4(b) of the attachment to this resolution), subject to such adjustments as may promote agreement between the Arabs and the Jews (without altering the general equilibrium of the Mediator's conclusions), and taking into account the nature of the terrain and the unity of village areas;

"6. Endorses the recommendation concerning the disposition of the territory of Palestine not included within the boundaries of the Jewish state contained in paragraph 4(c) of the Mediator's specific conclusions and instructs the conciliation commission to use its good offices in consultation with the governments of the Arab states and the Arab inhabitants of Palestine to effectuate this recommendation;

"7. Declares that the holy places and religious buildings and sites in Palestine should be protected and that free access to them should be assured and that religious freedom should be guaranteed, and instructs the conciliation commission to make arrangements for such protection, for such assurances and for such guarantees;

"8. Determines that in view of its association with three world religions, the territory of Jerusalem, as defined in the GA resolution of November 29, 1947, should be accorded special and separate treatment from the rest of Palestine and should be placed under effective

UN control with maximum feasible local autonomy for the Arab and Jewish communities; and instructs the conciliation commission (*a*) to take all feasible steps to facilitate the effective administration of the territory, coordinating to the fullest extent possible organs of self-government and administration of the Arab and Jewish communities of the territory of Jerusalem, (*b*) to report to the SC for appropriate action any attempt to interfere with its functions with respect to Jerusalem, and (*c*) to present to the fourth regular session of the GA detailed proposals for a permanent international regime for the territory of Jerusalem;

"9. Determines that the right of unimpeded access to Jerusalem by road, rail, or air should be fully respected by all parties and instructs the conciliation commission to report immediately to the SC for appropriate action by that organ any attempt by any party to impair such access;

"10. Declares that, in the interest of peace in the Middle East, the UN has a continuing interest in and concern for the maintenance of the frontiers to be delimited by the technical boundaries commission, and that these frontiers shall not be altered except by mutual agreement of the parties concerned;

"11. Recommends to the SC that after the frontiers have been established in accordance with this resolution, the SC consider any attempt to alter these frontiers by force as a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression;

"12. Recognizes the right of the Arab refugees to return to their homes in Jewish-controlled territory at the earliest possible date; and the right of adequate compensation for the property of those choosing not to return and for property which has been lost as a result of pillage or confiscation or of destruction not resulting from military necessity; and instructs the conciliation commission to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement, and economic and social rehabilitation of the Arab refugees and the payment of compensation;

"13. Decides that the conciliation commission shall assume such functions as were assigned to the UN Mediator as may be appropriately be continued and that the position of UN Mediator shall be discontinued when the conciliation commission enters upon its duties;

"14. Authorizes the conciliation commission to appoint such auxiliary bodies and to employ such technical experts, acting under its authority, as it may find necessary to the effective discharge of its functions and responsibilities under this resolution;

"15. Instructs the conciliation commission to render progress reports periodically to the SYG for transmission to the UN and to members of the UN; and a consolidated report not less than thirty days before the opening of the next regular session of the GA;

"16. Calls upon all governments and authorities concerned to cooperate with the conciliation commission and to take all possible steps to assist in the implementation of this resolution;

"17. Requests the SYG to provide the necessary staff and facilities and to make appropriate arrangements to provide the necessary funds, required in carrying out the terms of this resolution."

501.BB Palestine/10-1648 : Telegram

*The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)¹ to
the Acting Secretary of State*

SECRET US URGENT
NIACT

PARIS, October 16, 1948—10 p. m.

Delga 366. From Rusk, Ross, Wilkins. Reference is made to Bern[adotte] report paragraph four (g) which incorporates conclusion Jerusalem should be treated separately and should be placed under effective UN control with maximum feasible local autonomy for Arab and Jewish communities, with full safeguards for protection holy places and sites and free access to them and for religious freedom.

Reference also made US opening statement last regular GA in which US representatives on October 11 said if new political institutions are to endure they must provide for early assumption by people themselves of responsibility for own domestic order.

US has subsequently followed policy of suggesting maintenance law and order in Palestine rests with people concerned and specifically in Jerusalem has suggested use well disciplined units Jewish and Arab military forces under UN supervision. US has also consented in principle to recruitment UN guard force through SYG for protection UN representatives in field but not for maintenance law and order in area under UN consideration.

USGADel staff believes Department should thoroughly review Palestine situation in light of unrealistic character under present conditions of (1) an international force for Jerusalem and (2) an international budget for Jerusalem administration. Such police force and budget would require US to assume major role if there is any hope of obtaining GA approval. It does not appear likely that US would be willing to make commitment lion's share this effort. Alternative is to tie city of Jerusalem and surrounding community under such international guarantees as are required to preserve special status as Holy City. For example, on assumption basic agreement between Israel and Abdullah could be obtained on other issues, it may be possible to place Jewish Jerusalem under an Israel trusteeship and Arab Jerusalem under a Transjordan trusteeship, the two to be coordinated by representatives in Jerusalem of UNTC. Trusteeship agreements would provide international guarantees of access to Jerusalem and protection of and access to holy places, etc. Such an arrangement would leave security and budgetary responsibility upon those primarily concerned and would go long way toward meeting prestige demands of both Jews and Arabs for Jerusalem.

Something along trusteeship line might be developed without

¹ Austin was the ranking officer of the Delegation in the absence of Marshall, who had just left for a 3-day trip to Athens and Rome.

formal trusteeship arrangements if that appears desirable. However, Bernadotte report seems to exclude direct annexation of Jerusalem to either Israel or Transjordan or to both as integral parts national territory.

Perhaps present session GA should indicate that it understands Bernadotte proposal to mean no integral annexation of Jerusalem to either Jewish or Arab state, maximum local autonomy, and some form international guarantees of legitimate international religious interest.

USGADel staff believes Department should give urgent and serious consideration to review Palestine problem in order that we might sound out other delegations this basis. On most informal and unofficial basis, British preliminary reaction was objection based on augmentation of TC by another four members upset of balance between administering and non-administering interests. That indicates they have no serious objection to the merits of the solution insofar as Jerusalem and Palestine alone are concerned.

On the other hand British and Bunche feel most strongly consideration detailed proposals Jerusalem this session might bog down whole Palestine problem in committee and that it would be preferable to establish principle UN control, leaving preparation detailed proposals to CC and next GA session as suggested paragraph eight, Delga 351, October 15 [16]. [Rusk, Ross, Wilkins.]

AUSTIN

501.BB Palestine/10-1648 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt

SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, October 16, 1948—11 p. m.
 NIACT

1432. Dept is informed from USGADel Paris¹ that Hamilton of *NY Times* has filed story of Troutbeck's and McClintock's visit to Bernadotte on Rhodes, to appear in Sunday edition Oct 17.²

We are saying if asked that purpose of visit was to concert joint plans for relief of Arab refugees. Press will be informed for background that McClintock spent brief time in Athens to study supply situation there; consulted with Troutbeck and Bernadotte and finished his rapid survey in consultation with you, in view of fact that Dept is focusing much of its field operations on refugee problem in Embassy Cairo. McClintock later reported to Secretary in Paris. Back-

¹ In telegram Delga 354, October 16, 2 p. m., not printed.

² Delga 354 related that the purpose of the visit of Messrs. McClintock and Troutbeck to Rhodes, according to Mr. Hamilton's story, was to participate in the drafting of Count Bernadotte's report. It also noted that "Bunche prepared to say second draft [of] report, including specific conclusions, completed before McClintock, Troutbeck arrived Monday, 13th September, and report not changed as result their visit." (501.BB Palestine/10-1648)

ground info makes reference to fact that President on Aug 19 approved Dept directive to explore every means of prompt and adequate relief to Arab refugees. Trip of U.K. and U.S. reps to Rhodes in fact underscores this deep and continuing concern.

Please take similar line with press in response to inquiries.

Repeated for appropriate action to Paris as Gadel 228; London as 3984; USUN—608; Beirut 653; Tel Aviv 163; Athens 1486.

LOVETT

501.BB Palestine/10-1748 : Telegram

*The Special Representative of the United States in Israel
(McDonald) to President Truman*¹

SECRET URGENT

TEL AVIV, October 17, 1948—4 p. m.

Arab refugee tragedy is rapidly reaching catastrophic proportions and should be treated as a disaster. Present and prospective relief and resettlement resources are utterly inadequate. UN administrative machine is both inappropriate and inadequate and result in gross inefficiency and wastefulness. (All adjectives used above are realistically descriptive and are written out of fifteen years of personal contact with refugee problems.)

Of approximately 400,000 refugees approaching winter with cold heavy rains will, it is estimated, kill more than 100,000 old men, women and children who are shelterless and have little or no food. Situation requires some comprehensive program and immediate action that dramatic and overwhelming calamities such as vast flood or earthquake would invoke. Nothing less will avert horrifying losses.

Mediator's administration is completely unsuited [to] energetic and competent handling emergency relief and resettlement problem. When Mediator was parenthetically given refugee responsibility, no one conceived present scope or urgency of tragedy. Mediator's administrative machinery can deal only with governments and at top level remote from refugees.

Leaving to individual governments as Mediator must, distribution of relief results, as is inevitable under present system, in waste estimated by competent technicians as high as 90%. Other 10% is often delayed weeks or months in reaching individual refugees.

No criticism is hereby intended of Acting Mediator or his associate, Sir Raphael Cilento who is directly in charge. It is not men; it is the system which is at fault.

¹ Transmitted to the Department by Tel Aviv in telegram 188 "For President and Acting Secretary."

Inescapable conclusion that responsibility for raising funds and administering relief from top to individual recipients must be transferred promptly to International Red Cross. It alone is geared to do essential work in all phases. It would, I believe welcome and accept this challenge.

Some of difficulties and possible objections to this transfer are serious but none are insuperable.

1. UN action to transfer officially responsibility from Mediator to Red Cross need not imply any reflection on Bernadotte's planning; rather it could be interpreted as carrying out his own Red Cross ideals.

2. Transfer would not involve delay because Red Cross staff already working in Arab Palestine and neighboring states.

3. Transfer would not weaken Mediator's role, on contrary would free him from embarrassing responsibility not directly related mediation.

4. Arab Governments might at first cavil at proposal have whole administration under Red Cross, but prospect saving refugees should be compelling.

5. Israeli Government and Jewish organizations, once they understood purpose of change, could not reasonably object because Arab refugee problem unsolved will reflect, justly or not upon Israel and make its future relations with Arab states more difficult.

6. Program suggested above is non-partisan, non-sectarian. Properly presented it should win support of all party leaders and hence could not be criticized as campaign move.

7. Instead of confusing or making more difficult a solution of the Palestine political problem, Red Cross handling of refugees would be sorely needed evidence of world's humanitarianism.

Though I have had no chance confer believe Basil O'Connor and Gower (latter now in Paris) of Red Cross and Herbert Hoover would approve.

Every consideration of mercy, justice and expediency call for this radical change at the earliest possible moment.

Department may care pass GADel and I personally see no objection pass Arab Capitals for comment our Missions.²

McDONALD

² The Department sent this telegram to Arab capitals, the United States Delegation at Paris, and Jerusalem for comment in a circular telegram of October 18, 3 a. m. (501.BB Palestine/10-1848). Ambassador Griffis, on October 20, commented in part as follows: "The telegram is entirely accurate and merely confirms what I have repeatedly stated that Arab refugee problem is tragic disaster, that substantially none of the relief goods or funds have actually reached the refugees; that Mediator's administration is entirely incapable of coping with problem and that it should be promptly transferred to trained experts in relief problems." (Telegram 1503 from Cairo, 501.BB Palestine/10-2048)

501.BB Palestine/10-1848

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense
(Forrestal)*

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, October 18, 1948.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: In his final report on Palestine the UN Mediator, the late Count Bernadotte, recommended that:

"The City of Jerusalem, which should be understood as covering the area defined in the resolution of the General Assembly of 29th November, should be treated separately and should be placed under effective United Nations control with maximum feasible local autonomy for its Arab and Jewish communities, with full safeguards for the protection of the Holy Places and sites and free access to them, and for religious freedom."

As you will recall, on September 21, 1948 the Secretary of State publicly declared that the United States considered that the conclusions contained in the final report of Count Bernadotte offered a generally fair basis for settlement of the Palestine question.

If the territory of Jerusalem is to be placed under effective United Nations control it will be necessary for the United Nations to establish an adequate police force in that area. Under present circumstances such a force can scarcely be recruited from the local inhabitants, Arab and Jew, who are divided by fierce animosity. Colonel Begley, Chief Security Officer of the United Nations Secretariat, who has had personal experience of actual conditions in Jerusalem, has indicated his firm opinion that the minimum number for an international police force in Jerusalem would be 6,000 men. Independent estimates by American military observers suggest that the absolute minimum force could not be less than 4,000 men. The recently returned American Consul General in Jerusalem, however, concurs with Colonel Begley's estimate of 6,000 men.

Two methods of supplying an international police force are open to the United Nations. One would be for interested governments to supply contingents of troops or police personnel to make up the Jerusalem security force. The other would be for the Secretary General of the United Nations to recruit a quasi-military organization from nationals of states members of the United Nations. Should the first alternative be adopted it might be possible, through proper selection of the governments concerned, to exclude Soviet or Soviet nationals but if this force were recruited by the Secretary General on the same basis as he has employed members of the Secretariat there would no doubt be a certain number of such nationals in the UN Jerusalem police force.

In light of this Government's pledged support of the Bernadotte Plan, an integral part of which is his specific recommendation for effective United Nations control of Jerusalem, and in light of the necessity in the national security interests of the United States that

conditions of peace be reestablished in Palestine at the earliest moment, the Department of State believes that this Government must in one form or another support a proposal to establish a United Nations police force in Jerusalem.

The Department of State requests your advice as to which type of international police for Jerusalem this government should support: a force made up of contingents supplied by certain governments, or a body recruited by the UN Secretary General. It is likewise requested that you indicate the opinion of the National Defense Establishment as to the employment of American citizens in the Jerusalem international police, either as private individuals recruited by the Secretary General or as members of the United States armed services detailed for this particular duty.

The conclusions of the Bernadotte report will be debated before the General Assembly of the United Nations commencing October 15. Accordingly, it would be appreciated if an answer to this request could be forthcoming within the next week.

Sincerely yours,

ROBERT A. LOVETT

Editorial Note

The Department, on October 18, sent to the Delegation at Paris a draft statute on the administration of Jerusalem. The draft was said to represent the "preliminary views of Dept as to action which may be taken this session GA. . . . Dept does not have closed views on the appropriateness of brief statute of this type as compared with more elaborate document such as that prepared by the TC."

The draft statute designated the United Nations as administering authority for Jerusalem, with the Trusteeship Council, operating under the authority of the General Assembly, exercising the functions of the administering authority. The Government of Jerusalem was to consist of a United Nations Commissioner and his appointees, a Legislative Council and a Judiciary (airgram Gadel A-8 to Paris, 501.BB Palestine/10-1848).

501.BB Palestine/10-1548 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State,
at Paris*

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, October 18, 1948—11 a. m.

Telmar 72. Eyes only Marshall and Rusk from Lovett. After long discussions Saturday and Sunday afternoons reference Delga 335 October 15,¹ my present understanding with President is that no statement will be made by President or State Department in clarifica-

¹ Not printed.

tion position regarding Mediator's plan. President and his advisers appeared to feel that neither of the two drafts submitted adequately meet his problem, even reinforced by Bunche statement. Complexity of matter is such that they are prepared to leave situation in its momentarily quiescent status for the time being and have so far accepted my advice that we had better say nothing than say something wrong. I am unable estimate how long this decision will stand.

In conversation Sunday afternoon President was most insistent that our Delegation use utmost efforts to have debate on Mediator's plan deferred until after elections if possible, using any parliamentary procedures available, and instructed me to request you to use every effort to avoid having U.S. Delegation drawn into the debate. When I explained difficulties this would cause it became evident that President and his advisers feel we have gratuitously taken the leading role and that we should let others carry the ball in connection with plan if we wish to make it possible for the President to avoid a public statement.

Since climax of campaign comes within next two weeks, President asked utmost cooperation in avoiding having matter thrown again into political debate here. At 9:40 Sunday night ² I received following message and was directed to transmit it to you top secret basis:

"From the President to Secretary of State.

I request that no statement be made or no action be taken on the subject of Palestine by any member of our Delegation in Paris without obtaining specific authority from me and clearing the text of any statement. H.S.T."

Above was hand-delivered to my home by Clifford.

Separate cable ³ gives report discussions on Arab refugees.⁴

LOVETT

² October 17.

³ *Infra*.

⁴ This telegram was repeated to Rome where a copy was turned over to Secretary Marshall on October 19. The latter was en route to Paris after his visit to Greece. Mr. Rusk, at Paris, informed Mr. Lovett on October 19 that "In Secretary's absence I showed Telmar 72 to Austin and called special instruction from White House contained therein to attention four principal delegates present in Paris. Otherwise some untoward incident might have occurred." Mr. Rusk stressed that Senator Austin at no time spoke as United States Representative but always as President of the Security Council and that "No possible exception could be taken to his conduct of meeting or his statements on any grounds contained in Telmar 72." (Telegram Delga 395)

In a memorandum of October 19 to Secretary Marshall, Mr. Rusk reported that the First Committee was ready to postpone action on the Palestine question. He concluded that "The general situation on Palestine, therefore, looks reasonably stable for the remainder of our election campaign. There will almost certainly be press stories that the United States has sought postponement; on the other hand, we can with complete accuracy point out that the majority in Committee 1 which objected to placing Palestine first on the agenda has grown even larger in favor of further postponement and that we have no choice in the matter whatever." Both Delga 395 and Mr. Rusk's memorandum are filed under 501.BB Palestine/10-1948.

501.BB Palestine/10-1848 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Delegation
at Paris*

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, October 18, 1948—3 p. m.

Gadel 232. Eyes only Rusk from Lovett. Discussed Arab refugee problem at White House yesterday and submitted Dept's memo ¹ suggesting that President might use authority as Commander-in-Chief to direct military establishments to issue blankets, cloth, wheat, medicines, etc., to tide situation over to minor extent until UN takes over. There is serious legal question whether President's authority in peacetime permits such order for foreign relief. Matter will have to be carefully explored by Attorney General's office and White House. We estimate this will take approximately two weeks but White House has requested Attgen give it priority. President is anxious for this country as a Government to do all it properly can but does not feel he can act unless and until formal legal opinion received.

In connection with discussion in GA regarding UN program for Arab refugees, press reports state U.K.-U.S. Resolution does not provide for an appropriation of UN funds but requests governments and individuals to help and states U.S. Del wants ask Congress make special appropriation this purpose.

In light information first paragraph above, our exploration matter so far indicates no Governmental funds available from current appropriations unless President can take step under discussion. Therefore about all we can say publicly at present appears to be that this Government is giving most active and earnest consideration to methods of providing assistance in the absence of Congress, and particularly the legal problems presented by the situation.

We think there is much merit in proposal Tel Aviv message October 17 ² repeated Paris as Dept's circular 3 AM Oct 18.³ It may be far easier to make contribution to domestic Red Cross for International Red Cross use. Will check with Red Cross here. What are your views?

LOVETT

¹ Dated October 15, p. 1478.² See footnote 1, p. 1486.³ Not printed ; but see footnote 2, p. 1487.

501.BB Palestine/10-1848 : Telegram

*The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin)
to the Acting Secretary of State*

SECRET NIACT

PARIS, October 18, 1948—11 p. m.

Delga 387. Fawzi Bey approached us urgently this afternoon on the following matter and said he considered it important enough to take

up with the Secretary or acting head of our delegation. He requested a prompt expression of our view.

Fawzi said it was clear to the Egyptian Government that the Jews had unlawfully, in violation of the truce, taken the initiative in military activity in the Negev during the past few days.¹ He explained that whether it was a convoy or not it was certainly not a convoy in the UN sense because there had been no notification of any such convoy to UN authorities and UN authorities had certainly not accompanied such convoy. He also said that the Israelis had in any event bombed Egyptian installations.²

In the circumstances, Fawzi wanted to know what action the Government of the US would take. We asked if he intended to imply unilateral action by the US. He replied that the questions for us to decide were whether we would take any action and if we were prepared to take action whether it would be unilateral or in support of SC action.

Fawzi went on to say that paper resolutions were turning out to serve very little purpose. It would not be enough for the SC merely to pass another such resolution. He recalled that the July 15 resolution provided for consideration of further action by the SC under Chapter VII in the event either party violated the truce laid down in that resolution.

It is essential for us to make at least some interim reply to Fawzi, particularly since SC is meeting Tuesday morning at urgent suggestion of Acting Mediator to consider report from him on last days events in Negev area, including his request to both parties for an immediate cease-fire.³ In this connection, Bunche has talked with Egyptian and Israeli foreign ministers here, but at late hour this afternoon they had not received replies from their governments.

We planned to say to Fawzi that we have reported his inquiry to the Department and that we feel this inquiry must be considered in the light of the Acting Mediator's report and consideration of this report by the SC.⁴

AUSTIN

¹ For cablegrams of October 15 and 16 from Acting Egyptian Foreign Minister Ibrahim Dessuky Abaza to Secretary-General Lie concerning alleged violations of the truce by Israeli forces, see SC, *3rd yr., Supplement for October 1948*, p. 54. For the texts of the letters of October 8 and October 18 from Mr. Eban to the President of the Security Council concerning alleged violations of the truce by Arab forces, see *ibid.*, pp. 50, 63.

² Foreign Minister Abaza in discussing with an officer of the American Embassy on October 18, the alleged Egyptian refusal to permit Israeli convoys to traverse lines to beleaguered settlements in Negev, "did not deny Egyptian halting of convoy but stated that Egyptians had offered to discuss problem of re-victualing the settlements. The Jews had, however, answered by armed attack." (Telegram 1504, October 20, 10 a. m., from Cairo, 867N.01/10-2048)

³ For the text of Mr. Bunche's report of October 18, see SC, *3rd yr., Supplement for October 1948*, p. 55.

⁴ The Department, in reply on October 19, stated: "You should tell Fawzi Bey US will of course continue to act within framework UN and will not take unilateral action re present military activity in Negev (Delga 387). Dept approves action outlined last para urtel." (Telegram Gadel 247, 501.BB Palestine/10-1848)

Editorial Note

The Security Council discussed the Palestine question on October 19. Mr. Bunche made an appeal to the Council to end the fighting that had been raging in the Negeb (SC, *3rd yr.*, No. 118, page 2).

The Syrian Representative proposed that the Council adopt the suggestions made in paragraph 18 of Mr. Bunche's report. His proposal, as amended, was adopted in two separate votes. The cease-fire section was adopted unanimously; the lettered portions were adopted by nine votes, with the Soviet Union and the Ukraine abstaining; its text read:

"The present situation in the Negeb is complicated by the fluid nature of military dispositions making the demarcation of truce lines difficult, the problem of the convoys to the Jewish settlements, as well as the problems of the dislocation of large numbers of Arabs and their inability to harvest their crops. In the circumstances, the indispensable condition to a restoration of the situation is an immediate and effective cease-fire. After the cease-fire, the following conditions might well be considered as the basis for further negotiations looking toward insurance that similar outbreaks will not again occur and that the truce will be fully observed in this area:

"(a) Withdrawal of both parties from any positions not occupied at the time of the outbreak;

"(b) Acceptance by both parties of the conditions set forth in the Central Truce Supervision Board decision No. 12 affecting convoys;

"(c) Agreement by both parties to undertake negotiations through United Nations intermediaries or directly as regards outstanding problems in the Negeb and the permanent stationing of United Nations observers throughout the area." (SC, *3rd yr.*, *Resolutions*, 1948, page 25.)

The text of the Central Truce Supervision decision in Case No. 12 is printed in SC, *3rd yr.*, *Supplement for October 1948*, page 62.

The Security Council, later the same day, adopted unanimously the United Kingdom-Chinese draft resolution; its text read:

"*The Security Council*,

"*Having in mind* the report of the Acting Mediator concerning the assassination on 17 September 1948 of the United Nations Mediator, Count Folke Bernadotte, and United Nations observer Colonel André Sérot, the report of the Acting Mediator concerning difficulties encountered in the supervision of the truce, and the report of the Truce Commission for Palestine concerning the situation in Jerusalem,

"1. *Notes with concern* that the Provisional Government of Israel has to date submitted no report to the Security Council or to the Acting Mediator regarding the progress of the investigation into the assassinations;

"2. *Requests* that Government to submit to the Security Council at an early date an account of the progress made in the investigation and to indicate therein the measures taken with regard to negligence on the part of officials or other factors affecting the crime;

"3. *Reminds* the Governments and authorities concerned that all the obligations and responsibilities of the parties set forth in its resolutions 54 (1948) of 15 July and 56 (1948) of 19 August 1948 are to be discharged fully and in good faith;

"4. *Reminds* the Acting Mediator of the desirability of an equitable distribution of the United Nations observers for the purpose of observing the truce on the territories of both parties;

"5. *Determines*, pursuant to its resolutions 54 (1948) and 56 (1948), that the Governments and authorities have the duty:

"(a) To allow duly accredited United Nations observers and other truce supervision personnel bearing proper credentials, on official notification, ready access to all places where their duties require them to go including airfields, ports, truce lines and strategic points and areas;

"(b) To facilitate the freedom of movement of truce supervision personnel and transport by simplifying procedures on United Nations aircraft now in effect, and by assurance of safe-conduct for all United Nations aircraft and other means of transport;

"(c) To co-operate fully with the truce supervision personnel in their conduct of investigations into incidents involving alleged breaches of the truce, including the making available of witnesses, testimony and other evidence on request;

"(d) To implement fully by appropriate and prompt instructions to the commanders in the field all agreements entered into through the good offices of the Mediator or his representatives;

"(e) To take all reasonable measures to ensure the safety and safe-conduct of the truce supervision personnel and the representatives of the Mediator, their aircraft and vehicles, while in territory under their control;

"(f) To make every effort to apprehend and promptly punish any and all persons within their jurisdictions guilty of any assault upon or other aggressive act against the truce supervision personnel or the representatives of the Mediator." (Resolution 59 (1948), SC, 3rd yr., *Resolutions*, 1948, page 26.)

501.BB Palestine/10-1948

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to President Truman

SECRET

WASHINGTON, October 19, 1948.

Subject: General Assembly Resolution on Palestine.

Pursuant to your directive last night I have telegraphed the Secretary of State that no action on the Palestine question now before the General Assembly shall be taken without clearance from the White House.

As indicated in the two attached telegrams from our Delegation in Paris, Nos. 351 and 367 of October 16,¹ our Delegation has devised a draft resolution which in general terms seeks to give effect to conclu-

¹ Latter not printed.

sions of the Mediator's Report on Palestine, dated September 16, 1948. This draft resolution has been discussed with the British Delegation and with the Acting Mediator for Palestine, Dr. Ralph Bunche. It is a working paper and a final decision has not been reached as to whether it should be submitted by the United States Delegation, the United Kingdom Delegation, or jointly by both Delegations. UK-US agreement on the Palestine problem is regarded in Paris as the most hopeful element in the Palestine problem at this session of the Assembly.

As will be seen from the two telegrams and in light of the Acting Mediator's statement before the First Committee on October 15,² the draft resolution does not "freeze" Count Bernadotte's conclusions. It purposely leaves the way open for negotiation with a view to such adjustments as may promote agreement between the Arabs and Jews for a pacific settlement of their differences.

The proposed resolution as indicated in Paragraph 2 of Telegram 367 is still open to drafting changes, provided they do not alter the general sense of the document.

This matter is likely to come up Wednesday, October 20.

ROBERT A. LOVETT

² See Department of State *Bulletin*, October 24, 1948, p. 517. Mr. Rusk, in a telegram of October 16 to Mr. Lovett, gave his opinion that Mr. Bunche's statement on Count Bernadotte's report "should relieve tension of those who have been afraid of rigidity in precise detail. . . . Bunche's statement as a whole gives full credit Jewish side and should steady the nerves of those who are being bombarded by partisan propaganda." (No. Delga 362, 501.BB Palestine/10-1648)

501.BB Palestine/10-1648: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Delegation at Paris

TOP SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, October 19, 1948—11 a. m.

Gadel 241. Eyes only for Rusk from McClintock. Text of draft resolution set forth Delga 351, Oct. 16, meets with general approval in Dept except for considerable reservation re Art. 8 and some thought as to possible drafting changes in Para. 5. Latter will be subject separate tel. Meanwhile Lovett (who signs this message) is sending text Delga 351 to White House for approval, since we realize from Para. 2, Delga 367,¹ that time is of the essence.

Suggestion Delga 366, Oct. 16, for Jewish and Arab trusteeships over Jerusalem is disturbing to me² and to colleagues in NEA. However Lovett, who is keenly aware budgetary, political and military difficulties inherent in establishing UN police force for Jerusalem, is attracted by your suggestion.

¹ Dated October 16, not printed.

² Mr. McClintock.

Meanwhile Dept has officially inquired National Defense Establishment its views re UN Jerusalem police force.

For time being Para. 8, Delga 351, may take care situation without prejudicing final solution. For your own consideration I desire advance view that partitioning of Jerusalem, even under UN trusteeships, in effect grants PGI what it has asked in respect of Jerusalem. Corollary will be inevitably request for a grant of land corridor from Israel to Jewish Jerusalem trusteeship. Eventual outcome, in opinion here at working level, will inevitably be that all Jerusalem will become a Jewish city with or without UN benediction.

A further consideration is whether any Arab Govt would find itself able, in view political position in Arab world, to accept trusteeship for a fragment of Jerusalem.

I realize that these comments are not very constructive but at least they snag for your scrutiny certain fishhooks in the basket. [McClintock.]

LOVETT

501.BB Palestine/10-1648 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Delegation at Paris

SECRET US URGENT
NIACT

WASHINGTON, October 19, 1948—7 p. m.

Gadel 246. Dept has given careful consideration to Delga 351 and Delga 367, Oct. 16.¹ We have reservations re Para 5 and objections to Para 6. President has not yet approved proposals.

Present phraseology Para 5 leaves vague both powers of Conciliation Commission and subordinate Boundaries Commission. For example, who is Boundaries Comm to assist in delimiting frontiers: Conciliation Comm, or parties involved, or both? Without endeavoring to suggest specific language we do feel it necessary that this article make clear that GA gives Conciliation Comm a definite mandate to demarcate frontiers in Palestine generally along lines Mediator's recommendations, subject to adjustments now provided for present language Art. 5. We take it this is your intention, since Para. 10 Delga 351 specifically refers to delimitation of frontiers by Boundaries Comm.

Dept believes Para 6 inconsistent with position on possible territorial readjustments Palestine approved by President and sent Tel Aviv Deptel 72, Sep 1 for communication to Israeli authorities. View this Govt's belief, which was informally communicated Count Bernadotte, that area of Negev such as that containing principal Jewish settlement

¹ Latter telegram not printed.

might be retained by Israel, Dept believes essential Para 6 be modified along following lines:

"Endorses the recommendation concerning the disposition of the territory of Palestine not included within the boundaries of the Jewish State contained in paragraph 4(c) of the Mediator's specific conclusions, subject to such adjustments as may promote agreement between the Arabs and the Jews (without altering the general equilibrium of the Mediator's conclusions), and instructs"

Art 8 re Jerusalem as read in light Delga 366, Oct. 16, will require further scrutiny and separate instructions will be sent.

LOVETT

591.BB Palestine/10-2048: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET US URGENT

PARIS, October 20, 1948—2 p. m.

Delga 411. Following is text of proposed US draft resolution approved by GADel this morning (reference Delga 410, October 20¹).

"Whereas the UN Mediator for Palestine in his progress report of September 18 [16], 1948, Part III, states that 'action must be taken to determine the necessary measures of relief (to the Palestine refugees) and to provide for their implementation' and asserts that 'the choice is between saving the lives of many thousands of people now or permitting them to die;'

"Whereas the Acting Mediator in his supplemental report on October 18, 1948,² declares that 'the situation of the refugees is now critical' and that 'aid must not only be continued but very greatly increased if disaster is to be averted;'

"Whereas the alleviation of conditions of starvation and distress among the refugees of Palestine is essential to the success of the efforts of the UN to bring peace to that land; the GA

(1) Commends the governments, organizations, and individuals which have given assistance directly or in response to the Mediator's appeal;

(2) Determines upon the basis of the Acting Mediator's recommendation that the sum of \$30,000,000 will be required to provide relief for 500,000 refugees for a period of nine months from December 1, 1948 to August 31, 1949;

(3) Urges all states members of the UN to make initial or further voluntary contributions in kind or in funds to the UN in accordance with the special operational scale of contributions for this purpose attached as Annex One to this resolution;

(4) Requests the SYG to take all necessary steps to extend aid

¹ Not printed.

² United Nations, *Official Records of the General Assembly, Third Session, Supplement No. 11A*.

to the Palestine refugees in accordance with the terms of this resolution, utilizing, as appropriate, voluntary agencies, the agencies of the several governments, the specialized agencies of the UN, and such administrative organizations as may be required for this purpose;

(5) Authorizes the SYG of the UN to advance from the working capital fund immediately for the purposes stated in this resolution not to exceed \$5,000,000 to be repaid by the first cash contributions received from members for this project under the terms of this resolution;

(6) Urges the WHO, FAO, IRO, UNICEF, and other appropriate organizations and agencies, acting within the framework of the relief program herein established, promptly to contribute supplies, specialized personnel and other services permitted by their constitutions and their financial resources, to relieve the desperate plight of the Palestine refugees."

MARSHALL

501.BB Palestine/10-2048 : Telegram

The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET URGENT

PARIS, October 20, 1948—11 p. m.

Delga 421. SC action Tuesday morning re Palestine truce can only be described as holding action. If not sufficient stop fighting, restore previous situation Negev, and prevent outbreak elsewhere seems US inescapable immediate consideration SC further action under Chapter VII probably Article 41 pursuant paragraph 4, July 15 resolution in order prevent deterioration situation Palestine below point peaceful settlement basis Bernadotte report possible. Recall we have consistently taken position both in UN and diplomatically that US would be prepared, in view July 15 Res, to take strong position in SC, support such action as may be necessary.

AUSTIN

501.BB Palestine/10-2048 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET US URGENT

PARIS, October 20, 1948—11 p. m.

Delga 424. For Lovett from Rusk. Following are comments on Department's cirtel, October 18, 3 a. m.¹ Extent and urgent character Arab refugee problem recognized. UN administrative organization has been inadequate primarily because of lack of financial resources and supplies. GADel agrees that UN relief organization could be improved by addition of staff personnel experienced in relief administration in Middle East but has no evidence that UN relief organization inappro-

¹ Not printed ; but see footnote 2, p. 1487.

priate if supplied with funds and relief supplies and reorganized as suggested above.

Inadequacies in administrative organization of Arab governments and delays of internal transport also recognized but GADel not convinced that transfer complete responsibility to CICR for raising funds and distributing relief would solve problem because (1) CICR can only appeal to national Red Cross organizations for funds and through them to their respective governments and general publics; (2) GADel considers that contributions by governments are required as private contributions already have and would prove to be inadequate (Delga 423, October 20²); (3) governments would make contributions more readily through UN than through CICR because UN can appeal to governments on basis that assistance to refugees will facilitate Palestine settlement. Appeal based solely on humanitarian grounds would fail produce action by legislative and appropriating bodies of governments; (4) transfer responsibility to CICR likely to dry-up assistance from Arab states which have a continuing responsibility under proposed UN program.

GADel approach to problem envisages concentrating control and coordination in SYG UN with discretion in his hands utilize private and government agencies and specialized agencies of UN (paragraph 4, US draft resolution, Delga October 20). This would permit full utilization CICR. [Rusk.]

MARSHALL

² Not printed.

501.BB Palestine/10-2048 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

PARIS, October 20, 1948—11 p. m.

Delga 425. For Satterthwaite and McClintock from Kopper. Oral reply was made to Fawzi Bey today in accordance with Department's instructions (Gadel 247, October 19¹). Fawzi Bey seemed distinctly disappointed. He then made following points:

1. US reply to his urgent inquiry was not sufficient at all. It was off the mark and indicates too much complacency in sense that US seems to be waiting on SC action instead of stirring SC into action. Situation in Palestine and its environs deteriorating rapidly. Security of Arab states gravely endangered.

2. Shipment of arms should really be stopped to Jews as well as Arabs or else Arabs should be allowed to obtain arms for self-defense.

3. UK is exceeding terms of SC truce resolution by volunteering self-imposed obligation not to allow Egyptians to obtain arms stored in Egypt although belonging to UK. This not in accord with 1936

¹ For text, see footnote 4, p. 1492.

treaty. Jews continue to arm by obtaining munitions, planes, pilots. This is well known whether we admit it officially or not. Dangerous difference in armament between Jews and Arabs growing. Arabs should have enough arms to defend themselves. They are not asking for arms to drive Jews into sea, only enough to defend selves.

4. Egyptians hoped closer cooperation between UK and US might make it possible for US to indicate informally to UK that balance between Arabs and Jews should be rectified. Egyptian Ambassador London taking this up with British Government. Likewise representations being made at Cairo to British Ambassador.

5. Fawzi Bey says difficulties of US are recognized by Egyptian Government and delegation. To Arabs, however, it is not only question of difficulties but life and existence as independent nations. Economically Egypt and Arab states already severely disrupted and social structure dangerously shaken. Far-reaching repercussions may result. In meantime situation cannot serve as basis for any solid cooperation between Arab part of world and western powers.

6. Many Egyptians and Egypt delegation Paris have been exerting exceptional efforts to improve atmosphere between Egypt and western powers. What is happening in and around Palestine now can set back these efforts.

7. Time is running fast. At earliest possible moment we should start to build together for all eventualities, for peace as well as war.

8. Fawzi Bey suggested there were several ways to help:

a. British should announce that because of the serious discrepancy resulting from Israeli arming, shipments would be released to Arab countries of stocks stored in those countries. Continued arming of Israeli[s] is not a contribution toward peace and balance should be preserved. Fawzi described this as the formal legal way. It was pointed out to him that such a course would simply precipitate an armaments race since Israel would commence pressure to raise embargo.

b. US might confidentially intimate to UK that stocks should be released in order to rectify the balance. This was described as an extra legal way. It was pointed out that besides other considerations, same thing would happen here as in first alternative.

c. There should be an immediate formation of military force on behalf of UN. Formation of such a force could be organized in way in which SCTC was established so that there would be no Soviet participation. Such a force is immediately required.

d. It was suggested to Fawzi that the most effective means of correcting situation was to make the embargo really effective. Fawzi thought this was not enough since the Israeli[s] had a superfluity of arms now. The lack of balance would continue to exist.

9. Arab refugees must be given assurance of opportunity to return to their homes. Stopgap aid was not enough—people were dying every day. Each day that passes makes the plight of the refugees more critical.

Fawzi Bey's attitude today reflects attitude expressed by Khashaba

Pasha ² last night. Khashaba was quite distressed that SC had taken no real and constructive action on Palestine question yesterday. He said security of Egyptian and Arab states was menaced. Other questions such as self-determination, humanitarianism were now becoming somewhat secondary to security of Arab states in face of continued Israeli advances.

Sent Department Delga 425; repeated London 1088. Department please repeat Cairo as 81. [Kopper.]

MARSHALL

² Egyptian Foreign Minister.

Forrestal Papers

*Diary Entry for October 21, 1948, by the Secretary of Defense
(Forrestal)*

National Security Council

Mr. Forrestal referred to the State Department request for four to six thousand troops to be used as guard forces in Jerusalem in implementation of the Bernadotte Plan for Palestine. This unexpected request was an example of how the Palestine situation had drifted without any clear consequent formulation of United States policy by the NSC. Mr. Forrestal said that actually our Palestine policy had been made for "squalid political purposes" and had been largely the work of David Niles and Clark Clifford. He said that he had no objection to the Jews establishing a homeland in Palestine, but that United States policy should be based on United States national interests and not on domestic political considerations.

He hoped that some day he would be able to make his position on this issue clear.

867N.01/10-2148 : Telegram

Mr. Wells Stabler to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

AMMAN, October 21, 1948—3 p. m.

86. During talk with King this morning he said he most anxious following views be conveyed to Jews:

1. Prior May 14 he had favored partition and had informally undertaken with Jews to occupy Arab areas of Palestine only, provided Jews remained in their areas.

2. Massacre at Deir Yassin and other provocations had incited all Arabs including himself, and he had entered war with serious intent which he still holds. Arab Legion alone among Arab armies still strong.

3. However he now desires restoration peace and understanding

with Jews with whom he believes he could have close relations. He realizes Jews and Arabs can only live peacefully in separate areas with defined boundaries.

4. Palestine question now under jurisdiction and discussion UNGA and all parties must contribute to finding solution in that body.

5. In meantime he hopes Jews will appreciate his sincere desire find solution and refrain from attacking Arab Legion and areas occupied by them. Such attacks merely incite further animosity and delay settlement.

6. On his side King has given strict orders Arab Legion must respect truce and must not attack unless attacked. He believes his orders are being obeyed.

[7.] King said except for contact with Jews through Prince Abdel Majid Haidar, Transjordan Minister to London, and Sassoon of Israeli Foreign Office, he had not requested anybody previously to convey his views to Jews.

Informed King his comments would be reported to Department for whatever action it deemed fit. Indicated it doubtful US Government would consider such approach to Jews desirable, appropriate or helpful while entire question being considered by UNGA. In any event believed USA would probably not wish act as intermediary.

Would appreciate any guidance Department desires give as King will undoubtedly inquire re status matter in near future.¹

STABLER

¹ The Department, on October 23, transmitted the text of telegram 86 to the Secretary of State and Mr. Rusk at Paris, adding the following comment: "We are inclined question advisability US authorities communicating above views of Abdullah to Israelis. However, we consider GADel to be in best position make final decision. Suggest that if you believe advisable convey views to Israelis this be done via Shertok in Paris and not thru authorities Tel Aviv. Pls advise in order Dept may inform Stabler." (Telegram Gadel 291, 867N.01/10-2148)

501.BB Palestine/10-2148 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET US URGENT
NIACT

PARIS, October 21, 1948—5 p. m.

Delga 432. Eyes alone for Lovett from Marshall. It may become necessary at any time, in order to comply with President's directive on postponing Palestine with which I am in full accord, to support placing Greece ahead of Palestine in Committee One.¹ If matter arises, a bitter debate will be provoked during which, if we are entirely silent, slurs and insinuations will be heaped upon us to the serious injury

¹ The Cuban Representative, on October 20, had proposed to the First Committee that it modify the order in which items on the agenda were to be examined. The effect of the proposal was to defer consideration of the Palestine question. The Committee, after sharp discussion, adopted the Cuban measure by 34 votes to 11, with 10 abstentions (GA, 3rd sess. Pt. I, First Committee, Summary Records, 1948, pp. 208-217).

to our prestige and our influence in this session of the Assembly. Mrs. Roosevelt, Austin and I believe that the best way to handle it would be to make the short frank statement given below. If you agree, please obtain White House clearance immediately. Question will not arise today but we should have your reply today if possible. Although Dulles was not asked to concur, he stated to Rusk some such statement would be a very good thing here and, if decided upon, he would promptly inform Dewey.

Text of statement follows :

"Mr. Chairman : My delegation believes that Committee One should pass next to the consideration of the Greek case. This would mean further postponement of our consideration of Palestine.

"Apart from the urgency of the Greek case, we believe that we should postpone our discussion of Palestine for two reasons :

"(a). A peaceful adjustment of the situation in Palestine can be more wisely solved if the security measures adopted by the SC on October 19 are demonstrated to be effective.

"(b). We do not wish to have the GA's consideration of Palestine exposed to partisan political pressure from outside the UN.

"Until the vigorous and democratic processes of election now going on in the US are over, consideration of Palestine in the UN might be exposed to such pressure. It has been said that our interest in postponement results from partisan politics; the exact opposite is the case. My delegation desires to take partisan politics, or even the appearance of partisan politics, out of our further debate on this subject".

MARSHALL

501.BB Palestine/10-2148 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Paris

TOP SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, October 21, 1948—7 p. m.
NIACT

Telmar 86. Eyes alone for Marshall from Lovett. After careful consideration President feels that statement contained in Delga 432, October 21, would be extremely unwise and requests that reason given in paragraph (b) and last paragraph not be used under any circumstances. While he would prefer not to have paragraph (a) used, he is willing to have this argument used if considered absolutely unavoidable.

Senior advisers in Department likewise feel for quite different reasons statement as proposed would be serious mistake. We believe "reason" paragraph (b) and succeeding paragraph might be construed as open acceptance of a precedent which would be most unfortunate. With respect to paragraph (a) in its present form, we fear it may be distorted by groups here into a unilateral threat to use Chapter 7 to make security measures effective.

Our main worry is that the approach seems negative rather than positive in justification of placing the Greek or any other case on the agenda prior to Palestine. We believe the Secretary's recent trip to Greece highlights in the public imagination our concern with conditions in that country which are aggravated by the continued disregard of previous UN resolutions and in defiance of the UNSCOB. We feel that a statement on the affirmative side might improve our case.

Furthermore, if it appeared wise inject additional question, we now have the Korean civil war threatening the government established under quasi-UN auspices.

On balance, the Department recommends against the statement as proposed and suggests that we limit ourselves to affirmative arguments in the Greek case in public debate.¹

LOVETT

¹ In reply on October 22, the Secretary of State informed Mr. Lovett that "Rusk and I fail to find any affirmative arguments that would not be instantly and loudly proclaimed as insincere, especially in view of present activities in the Negeb. We think we or poor Austin must generally sit silent and grin and bear it." (Telegram Martel 73, from Paris, 501.BB Palestine/10-2248)

501.BB Palestine/10-2048 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Delegation at Paris

SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, October 21, 1948—7 p. m.
NIACT

Gadel 266. Re Delga 421, Oct 20 we feel that we must abide by our commitments under the Charter and by our statements last May and July advocating SC action if necessary under Chapter VII to prevent further hostilities in Palestine in defiance of SC in its efforts to preserve peace. We would much prefer however not to play role of protagonist or have to speak first. This telegram has been approved by the President.¹

LOVETT

¹ Marginal notation: "Cleared by President 12:40 PM, Oct. 21". The text of this telegram was sent to London as No. 4058 the following day (501.BB Palestine/10-2248).

501.BB Palestine/10-1348 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt

SECRET WASHINGTON, October 21, 1948—7 p. m.

1455. Dept considers security of ME would probably be strengthened if large part Arab Palestine were incorporated in Transjordan after satisfactory solution problem demarcation Arab-Israel frontiers reached through UN (ur 1485 Oct 13). We agree however that con-

tinued Brit insistence on merging Arab Palestine with Transjordan may have adverse effects Arab capitals.

Dept would not object to acquisition by Egypt small portion of Arab Palestine, in line with Mediator's conclusion 4-*c*. However, Egypt has apparently so far shown no desire to do so. We believe it preferable that matter be raised by Egypt on own initiative and independently.

Re final para reftel, while Bernadotte may have held views in Aug as reported ur 1105 [1103-A],¹ he definitely on Sep 14 rejected UK suggestion that Syria profit by partition of Arab Palestine. Bernadotte also applied same reasoning to Lebanon. Foregoing for your info only.²

LOVETT

¹ See footnote 2, p. 1472.

² This telegram was repeated to London and Paris, for GADel.

501.BB Palestine/10-2248 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Paris

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, October 22, 1948—5 p. m.

US URGENT NIACT

Telmar 91. Personal for Marshall and Rusk from Lovett. Re Martel 73,¹ reaction of White House so strong against action suggested in Delga 432,² with specific prohibition against paragraph (*b*) and most reluctant and qualified acceptance paragraph (*a*), there is no chance of getting decision reversed. Our Telmar 86³ was merely playing for a break in hopes Secretary's Greek trip may have disclosed facts which might help affirmative presentation.

We agree any cover plan would be transparent and can only hope Arab bloc and other countries supporting postponement may continue take the lead. Postponement appears increasingly important if problem is to be dealt with realistically on its merits and outside domestic politics.

LOVETT

¹ Dated October 22, not printed; but see the first footnote 1, p. 1504.

² Dated October 21, p. 1502.

³ Dated October 21, p. 1503.

867N.01/10-2348 : Telegram

Mr. Wells Stabler to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

AMMAN, October 23, 1948—10 a. m.

89. Careful investigation does not disclose King has ever requested Belgian Consul General¹ (Deptel 24, October 18²) to act as inter-

¹ Jean Nieuwenhuys.

² Not printed.

mediary between him and Shertok. Nor is there any evidence Nieuwenhuys has done more than talk with King on several occasions about general Palestine question. While King has freely admitted to me he not adverse to considering separate peace negotiations without other Arab states, provided acceptable plan put forward, and that he has had contact with Shertok through Prince Abdel Majid Haidar, Transjordan Minister to London, and Sassoon of Israeli Foreign Office then in Paris (mytels 47, September 3, [53?] September 17,³ 56, September 20⁴ and 86, October 21) (this contact broken off some time ago as result leak which was given publicity in Arab States), doubt whether he now engaged in such conversations and whether in any event he would choose Belgian Consul General . . . as his intermediary.

. . . . Abdullah is, of course, renowned for being frank and outspoken and it is likely he made certain comments regarding his attitude toward Jews and Palestine settlement which Belgian interpreted as King's desire he should transmit them to Shertok. It is not at all improbable Belgian did convey such comments to Jews and that during subsequent general conversations with King mentioned his talks with Shertok and other Jewish officials. However, if this is so, whole episode has made very little impression on King as he has never mentioned matter to me or British Minister Kirkbride. It seems almost certain Belgian has assumed function on his own responsibility.⁵

STABLER

³ Nos. 47 and 53 not printed.

⁴ Not printed; it reported information from King Abdullah that "month and half ago had received several communications from Shertok through Sassoon of Israeli Foreign Office, then in Paris, apparently dealing with direct peace negotiations. Had replied urging Jews to stop aggression in Jerusalem. Jews did not heed his advice and he now pessimistic that lasting solution can be found without force of arms." (501.BB Palestine/9-2048)

⁵ Mr. Stabler, on November 4, advised of information from Mr. Kirkbride that the King had told him "he had requested Belgian Consul General . . . to talks with Israeli Delegate to GA along lines mentioned mytel 86, October 21. . . . Since it is recalled Belgian was last in Amman on October 17, it appears King was not quite accurate when he said (paragraph seven mytel 86) he had not asked any one previously to convey his views to Jews." (Telegram 104 from Amman, 867N.01/11-448)

501.BB Palestine/10-2048: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Delegation at Paris

SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, October 23, 1948—11 a. m.

Gadel 286. For Rusk from Lovett. Line reasoning advanced Delga 424, Oct. 20, seems perfectly sound if applied to long-range relief program which we all agree should preferably be UN responsibility if members UN rise to occasion and appropriate actual cash or materials in kind.

We are however confronted with immediate emergency if there are to be any refugees left alive by time UN swings into action. I have discussed matter with President and he shares our view that Red Cross best geared for prompt measures. Amcross stands ready to move immediately and we are urgently exploring legal basis which might permit President as Commander in Chief to instruct armed services to turn over needed supplies to Amcross, which in turn could arrange for distribution Middle East. There is no thought undercutting UN but merely an earnest desire to get supplies to area in adequate quantity and at earliest moment.¹

LOVETT

¹ This telegram was repeated to Cairo for Ambassador Griffis.

501.BB Palestine/10-2348 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Paris

TOP SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, October 23, 1948—1 p. m.
 NIACT

Telmar 92. Eyes only for Marshall from Lovett. In a letter¹ addressed to Dean Alfange, Chairman, American Christian Palestine Committee of New York, released last night from Republican headquarters, Governor Dewey in effect repudiated Administration's Palestine policy with respect to the Bernadotte Plan. He reaffirmed his "wholehearted support of the Republican Platform and that certainly included the Palestine plank". This plank pledged "full recognition to Israel with its boundaries as sanctioned by the UN and aid in developing its economy". While the careful language "with its boundaries as sanctioned by the UN" could be used subsequently to support argument that November 29th Resolution was not specifically mentioned, entire statement is clearly aimed to support the original UN partition plan with boundaries unchanged.

Furthermore, statement obviously designed to take advantage of widely publicized criticism of President for abandoning Palestine plank in Democratic Platform and timed specifically to embarrass President during his windup trip to Chicago, New York and Brooklyn next week.

I therefore feel positive that President's reaction will be immediate and aggressive, largely because good faith of Democratic candidate has been directly challenged for breach of his platform pledge. Although President has not yet communicated with me, I anticipate unhappy weekend and propose, unless you instruct me otherwise, to urge that he content himself with reaffirmation his support of Demo-

¹ Dated October 22.

cratic platform language and stress importance of UN efforts in Paris in trying to find acceptable solution. Platform read in pertinent part: "We approve the claims of the State of Israel to the boundaries set forth in the UN Resolution of November 29 and consider that modifications thereof should be made only if fully acceptable to the State of Israel". Latter phrase is the important part at present. It is only by some such general statement that we can avoid detailed discussion in succeeding political speeches of Negev and other problems raised by Bernadotte Plan or flat disavowal USDel September 21st statement, which I hope and believe can be avoided. Will also urge he use Bunche's exposition Bernadotte Plan if absolutely necessary.

You may wish inform Douglas so he can batten down hatches.

LOVETT

501.BB Palestine/10-2348 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Delegation at Paris

TOP SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, October 23, 1948—1 p. m.
NIACT

Gadel 289. As indicated last sentence Gadel 192, Oct. 13,¹ we have for some time felt that certain concessions would have to be made to Israel in northern Negev. This view is consistent with line originally laid down and approved by President as set forth in Deptel 72, Sept. 1, to Tel Aviv, pursuant to which McDonald informed PGI of our view that Israel might expand into rich area of Galilee in return for relinquishing a large portion of Negev to Transjordan. It is likewise consistent with advice which McClintock gave Bernadotte as reported Cairo's 1316, Sept. 15, when he said that although Bernadotte's recommendation regarding Negev might be just there were nevertheless strong considerations favoring concessions in favor of Jews, at least to extent of a salient into Negev as far as Beersheba-Gaza Road.

According to press reports, Jews have now carved out this salient since they have taken Beersheba and are said to be astride Egyptian communications even south of Gaza.

We feel that in conversation with Arab and Israeli delegates this Govt's view should be informally emphasized that, among adjustments in Bernadotte Plan mentioned by Acting Mediator in his presentation to Committee One, should be territorial rectification in northern Negev in favor of Israel. Extreme care should be taken however to make it clear that this Govt in no way condones Jewish military operations in defiance of SC resolution which have resulted in conquest by force of arms of territory which this Govt felt could peacefully be

¹ Not printed.

conveyed to Israel.² In this regard please see Gadel 266, Oct. 21, reaffirming our position as already taken in SC, supporting Chapter VII action if Palestine truce is further breached.³

Repeated for similar informal action to Tel Aviv as 175.

Repeated for info to London as 4071, Cairo as 1471, Amman as 25.

LOVETT

² At this point in the telegram as drafted by Mr. McClintock appeared the sentence: "It is of special importance to make it very clear to Israeli representatives that further encroachments of this kind will not be tolerated." This sentence was deleted by Mr. Lovett.

³ At this point in the telegram as drafted appeared the sentence: "You are authorized to add that Gadel 266, Oct. 21, has received the approval of the President." This sentence, too, was deleted by Mr. Lovett.

Truman Papers, President's Secretary's File: Telegram

*The President's Special Counsel (Clifford) to President Truman*¹

SECRET

WASHINGTON, October 23, 1948—1:05 p. m.

White 227. After reading statement of Dewey on Israel, I contacted Lovett and have spent most of morning with him. I explained to him that your integrity has been attacked by Dewey whose purpose is to infer that you have reneged on Democratic platform. I suggested to Lovett that by reason of Dewey's action, you had no alternative but to reaffirm your support of the Democratic platform. Lovett agrees completely. I suggested to him that you would have to give out statement clearly stating your position on Israel. Lovett agrees. He sent Marshall a cable² stating in substance that Dewey has violated bipartisan approach on Israel and that Lovett feels that President has to reaffirm his support of Democratic platform. I am working on a statement on Israel now and will have it ready to submit to you on Sunday morning.³ I consider Dewey's action a serious error on his part and the best thing that has happened to us to date. Affectionate regards.

¹ Transmitted by the White House Signal Detachment to the President at Pittsburgh. Mr. Clifford's handwritten draft of this message is in the Clifford Papers.

² Telegram Telmar 92, October 23, p. 1507.

³ For the statement by the President, see telegram Telmar 97, October 24, p. 1512.

501.BB Palestine/10-2048: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Delegation at Paris

SECRET

US URGENT

WASHINGTON, October 23, 1948—2 p. m.

NIAC

Gadel 290. Reurtel Delga 411, Oct. 20, Dept's comments are following:

In first and third para preamble change ref to Palestine refugees to read "refugees in or from Palestine."

Numbered paras 2 and 5: In recommending basic sum \$30,000,000 and advance (para 5) from working capital fund, it would be desirable to insert clause placing limitation on administrative expenditure in order prevent establishment complex top-heavy administrative organization and assure maximum utilization funds for relief supplies per se. We believe \$500,000 (Delga 410, Oct 20, para 5b¹) adequate for UN administrative functions as envisaged Deptel AmEmb Gadel 4141 Oct 22.² However, allowance would also have to be made for fiscal assistance to Red Cross (see below) to supplement their administrative and operational expenses. Therefore we suggest ceiling be placed on combined UN and Red Cross administrative expenditures and specified in para 2 after consultations Paris. If it is practical to increase proposed advance from working capital fund to seven or eight million dollars, we would prefer this to five million figure, since any US contribution to long range program which might be forthcoming could not be expected before March-April 1949.

Para. 3: After full consideration relevant arguments, we believe UK clause (Delga 423, Oct. 20³ para b) more realistic than use of operational scale of contributions and therefore more acceptable. Scale implies obligation which US Government not in position assume at moment. Furthermore we must not lose sight of hard fact that contributions this program will be determined in last analysis on basis national interests of each govt, which in fact will mean that only significant contributions will be those of the US, UK, and Arab states. We therefore believe operational scale, which involves fictitious budget and designation by UN rather than by United States Government of extent of our interests in NE is impractical.

Para 4: We concur. However, relief organization although nominally under SYG, should not be encumbered by complex machinery at Lake Success but should be established in manner to insure that it functions as autonomous administrative unit to maximum extent practicable. Dept. notes and approves that US draft places relief operation under SYG rather than Conciliation Commission. We believe that relief organization, as distinguished from problems of repatriation, resettlement, and reparations, should be kept distinct from mediation or conciliation machinery Committee I may establish.

Para. 6: We suggest that UNICEF be taken out of para and presented separately making special reference large percentage refugees

¹ Not printed; this paragraph stated that GADel considered the sum of \$500,000 for administrative expenses inadequate (501.BB Palestine/10-2048).

² The editors are unable to identify this message.

³ Not printed; it conveyed the text of the latest British draft resolution on assistance to Arab refugees. Paragraph b of the British draft read: "Urges states members of the UN to make initial and further contributions in kind or in funds sufficient to ensure that the amounts of supplies and funds required are obtained." (501.BB Palestine/10-2048)

eligible UNICEF aid and taking into account any action by UNICEF October 23.

We wish to add additional para to resolution as follows :

“Invites appropriate Red Cross agencies to continue their collaboration with the relief program and recommends that the SYG make appropriate administrative and fiscal arrangements with the International Committee Red Cross and the League of Red Cross Societies with a view to delegating thereto primary responsibility for the field operational and distribution functions of the United Nations relief program”.

Dept will take up with congressional leaders as soon as practicable proposal that USDel be authorized announce before end current GA session intention this Government seek appropriation \$14,000,000–\$16,000,000 refugee relief when Congress reconvenes.

Hope to get top clearance for US to introduce resolution as amended jointly with British Delegation.⁴

LOVETT

⁴ The Department notified GADel, on October 27, that President Truman had approved the composite draft resolution set forth in Delga 411, as modified by Gadel 290, and had authorized its joint sponsorship by the United States and the United Kingdom (telegram Gadel 321, 501.BB Palestine/10–2748).

501.BB Palestine/10–2348 : Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET URGENT
NIACT

PARIS, October 23, 1948—2 p. m.

Delga 462. Eyes alone for Lovett from Rusk. Political committee decided today by the narrowest of margins to defer Palestine debate for one week.¹ This is the last postponement which we can obtain without complete loss of both our self-respect and the respect of others. Prospect is that opening days of Palestine debate will concern itself with procedural matters and that it will not be necessary for us to speak before the middle or latter part of week beginning November 1. Jessup sat for us in political committee this morning and said nothing at all. However, estimate here is that we can expect a very bad press on this point.

Just informed by Dulles that Dewey is releasing letter to Dean Alfange reaffirming Republican platform on Palestine. Any help you can give to keep this from starting chain reaction would be greatly appreciated. [Rusk.]

MARSHALL

¹ This proposal by the Iranian Representative was adopted by the First Committee on October 23 by 19 votes to 16, with 14 abstentions (GA, 3rd sess., Pt. I, First Committee, Summary Records, 1948 p. 243).

501.BB Palestine/10-2348 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET PRIORITY

PARIS, October 23, 1948—7 p. m.

Delga 467. During informal discussion with representative USDel, Acting Mediator informed us he had just had long talk with Eban PGI in which latter had spoken in very conciliatory manner re Bernadotte Plan.

According Bunche, Eban had indicated Israel would be quite content if UN action this session should consist of UN affirmation such matters as existence Jewish state, termination hostilities and right individual Arab refugees to return to their homes and if UN would throw into hopper of proposed conciliation commission for negotiation such matters as frontiers, Haifa, Lydda and access to Jerusalem, Israelis would not in addition, resist internationalization Jerusalem nor would they open up discussion in Paris of Bernadotte Plan by requesting amendments.

Bunche attributed conciliatory approach toward increasing realization by Israelis of merit of Bunche argument that if Israelis adopted uncompromising attitude on Bernadotte Plan it appeared most unlikely $\frac{2}{3}$ vote would be obtainable at UN for Bernadotte Plan or any other scheme. Present armed truce and possibly renewal hostilities would continue Palestine. Such situation would be harmful both Arabs and Jews but particularly to Israel which needed UN settlement in order it might turn its attention to peaceful pursuits and development friendly relations with Arab states.

MARSHALL

501.BB Palestine/10-2448 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Paris*TOP SECRET URGENT
NIACT

WASHINGTON, October 24, 1948—7 p. m.

Telmar 97. Eyes only Marshall or Rusk from Lovett. As expected reaction to Dewey statement (see my Telmar 92¹) was instantaneous. After best efforts following is final draft White House statement which will appear tomorrow morning Monday papers. It represents most we could get in reference to U.N. Statement follows:

"Statement by the President

The Republican candidate for President has seen fit to release a statement with reference to Palestine. This statement is in the form of a letter dated October 22, 1948, ten days before the election.

I had hoped our foreign affairs could continue to be handled on

¹ Dated October 23, p. 1507.

non-partisan basis without being injected into the presidential campaign. The Republican candidate's statement, however, makes it necessary for me to reiterate my own position with respect to Palestine.

I stand squarely on the provisions covering Israel in the Democratic Platform.

I approved the provisions on Israel at the time they were written. I reaffirm that approval now.

So that everyone may be familiar with my position, I set out here the Democratic Platform on Israel :

'President Truman, by granting immediate recognition to Israel, led the world in extending friendship and welcome to a people who have long sought and justly deserve freedom and independence.

'We pledge full recognition to the State of Israel. We affirm our pride that the United States, under the leadership of President Truman, played a leading role in the adoption of the resolution of November 29, 1947, by the United Nations General Assembly for the creation of a Jewish state.

'We approve the claims of the State of Israel to the boundaries set forth in the United Nations' resolution of November 29 and consider that modifications thereof should be made only if fully acceptable to the State of Israel.

'We look forward to the admission of the State of Israel to the United Nations and its full participation in the international community of nations. We pledge appropriate aid to the State of Israel in developing its economy and resources.

'We favor the revision of the arms embargo to accord to the State of Israel the right of self-defense. We pledge ourselves to work for the modification of any resolution of the United Nations to the extent that it may prevent any such revision.

'We continue to support, within the framework of the United Nations, the internationalization of Jerusalem and the protection of the holy places in Palestine.'

I wish to amplify the three portions of the platform about which there have been considerable discussion.

On May 14, 1948, this country recognized the existence of the independent State of Israel. I was informed by the Honorable Eliahu Epstein that a Provisional Government had been established in Israel. This country recognized the Provisional Government as the *de facto* authority of the new State of Israel. When a permanent government is elected in Israel it will promptly be given *de jure* recognition.

The Democratic Platform states that we approve the claims of Israel to the boundaries set forth in the United Nations resolution of November 29, 1947, and consider that modifications thereof should be made only if fully acceptable to the State of Israel.

This has been and is now my position.

Proceedings are now taking place in the United Nations looking toward an amicable settlement of the conflicting positions of the parties in Palestine. In the interest of peace this work must go forward.

A plan has been submitted which provides a basis for a renewed effort to bring about a peaceful adjustment of differences. It is hoped

that by using this plan as a basis of negotiation, the conflicting claims of the parties can be settled.

With reference to the granting of a loan or loans to the State of Israel, I have directed the departments and agencies of the Executive Branch of our Government to work together in expediting the consideration of any applications for loans which may be submitted by the State of Israel.

It is my hope that such financial aid will soon be granted and that it will contribute substantially to the long-term development and stability of the Near East."

LOVETT

501.BB Palestine/10-2548: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET US URGENT

PARIS, October 25, 1948—2 p. m.

NIACT

Delga 476. Gadel 289, October 23. It is our view it would be most serious mistake at this juncture to inform any other delegations, particularly Arab and Israeli delegations, that we favor territorial rectification northern Negev in favor of Israel. Although we agree this position is necessary to final solution Palestine question we feel most strongly this or any other rectification should be worked out under auspices Conciliation Commission and by agreement between parties after, but not during, present GA session. Article 5 draft resolution (Delga 351, October 15) was worked out with greatest care with British and Bunche and has as its objective working out of "such adjustments" as contemplated by Dept.

To inform other delegations at this time before GA has even begun consideration Bernadotte plan will have following serious consequences:

(1). This action would lead almost inevitably to proposal of specific amendment to Bernadotte plan leading to other specific amendments. Once this process is started we would very quickly find ourselves in intolerable parliamentary situation in GA seriously damaging our chances of arriving at any viable solution of Palestine question at this session GA. Whether we or Israelis like it or not Bernadotte's conclusion re Negev is part of fabric of whole Bernadotte plan. To cut fabric at this vital point during GA consideration might unravel whole fabric and make it impossible get two-thirds vote adopt Bernadotte plan as a whole as basis for settlement Palestine question.

(2). Very private talk Rusk, Ross with Shertok indicates that Israeli principal concern to avoid laying down hard and fast Majdal-Faluja line not subject to alteration. Shertok was much encouraged to know we contemplate a more flexible arrangement which would make adjustment Negev a frontier possible under auspices Conciliation Commission. Subsequent conversation with Bunche, Eban indicated

Israelis not likely to seek introduction amendments Bernadotte plan (Delga 467, October 23). If we take hard and fast line and so inform other delegations we favor alteration line, say to Gaza Beersheba this will unquestionably harden Israeli position seek entire Negev as first bargaining position. This extreme position would, of course, completely destroy Bernadotte plan and we assume therefore Dept would not support it. But if Israeli representatives take and maintain such position in GA chances settlement in GA virtually nil.

(3). Negev question very sore point with Arabs, particularly Egyptians, who smarting under their current defeats northern Negev. To inform them this juncture we favor giving northern Negev to Israel would cause incalculable harm our relations Egypt and other Arab states and would undoubtedly harden their opposition to whole Bernadotte plan to such point we would again run most serious risk future obtain Arab acquiescence in Bernadotte plan.

(4). Unilateral action our part this point informing other delegations we favor giving northern Negev to Israel would constitute most serious breach our relations UK this question. Virtually certain most British will agree to in current GA is formula agreed to Article 5 draft resolution. Apart from substance procedure informing other delegations our view in any event is directly contrary understanding no important action taken either by US or UK without prior consultation the other.

(5). To take action contemplated by Dept now would also greatly stiffen Israeli intention which everyone assumes they have to retain positions won during last week's military operations in defiance SC truce and contrary to clear intent SC action October 19 that parties should withdraw to previous military positions. At same time this would also greatly strengthen Arab conviction that whole US maneuver to delay Committee One consideration Bernadotte plan had as its intention to permit time for Israelis achieve military conquest northern Negev. This factor would have most serious consequences prestige SC and US as member of SC.

Repeated to London as 1105 October 25, 2 p. m.

MARSHALL

501.BB Palestine/10-2548 : Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET US URGENT

PARIS, October 25, 1948—2 p. m.

Delga 477. For Lovett from Rusk. We believe discussion with Shertok along lines Gadel 291¹ would be most useful in light of conversations already held here between USGAdel and Shertok on one hand and Eban and Bunche on the other (Delga 467, October 23). We therefore expect to see Shertok Tuesday afternoon or Wednesday. Also coming is longer telegram reference Gadel 289, October 23, approved by Secretary. You may wish to ask Tel Aviv to hold up action if they

¹ Dated October 23, not printed; but see the first footnote 1, p. 1502.

have not already discussed Gadel 289, October 23 with Israeli authorities.² [Rusk.]

MARSHALL

² The Department at 6 p. m., October 25, directed Tel Aviv not to discuss Gadel 289 with the Israeli authorities, pending further instructions (telegram 176, 501.BB Palestine/10-2548). The following day it similarly instructed Amman to refrain from discussion with Transjordan officials (telegram 29, 501.BB Palestine/10-2648).

Editorial Note

The Truce Supervision Headquarters, at Haifa, addressed identical notes on behalf of the Acting Mediator to the Government of Egypt and to the provisional Government of Israel, which called for withdrawal of the armed forces of both sides from positions in the Negev they had occupied at the outbreak of hostilities on October 14; for text, see SC, *3rd yr., Supplement for October 1948*, page 70. This source dates the notes October 26; yet Mr. Bunche in referring to them before the Security Council, dates them October 25 (SC, *3rd yr., No. 121*, page 23, and *No. 122*, page 3).

501.BB Palestine/10-2648: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET
NIACT

US URGENT

LONDON, October 26, 1948—11 a. m.

4621. Depts 4071 October 23¹. It is my view that if at this stage GADel emphasizes to Arab and Jewish delegations that US would favor territorial rectifications in northern Negev of benefit Israel we will be playing directly into Soviet hands since it will destroy irretrievably the slim chance, already seriously jeopardized by weekend Republican and Democratic statements of achieving a settlement of Palestine problem this UNGA. Nothing would please the USSR more than to have another year of turmoil in Palestine and this is an almost certain prospect unless the US and the UK by standing shoulder to shoulder can command a $\frac{2}{3}$ majority in favor of Bernadotte's proposals.

2. As I see the situation a number of amendments will be proposed from the floor to the Bernadotte plan and it is at this time that US and UK delegations should consult together and decide upon line which the US and UK should take in concert towards each amendment. One amendment likely to be proposed by some state other than US and UK

¹ This was a repeat of telegram Gadel 289 to Paris, p. 1508.

is that Israel should receive part of the northern Negev now understood to be under Israeli Military occupation in defiance of UN truce efforts. I think we should make known our views at that time, not now.

3. It will in my view be an act disastrous to any Palestine settlement for GADel prior to UNGA consideration of Palestine to break step with the British as it would do if instructions in final paragraph Dept's 4071 October 23 are carried out, even though informally. I fail to see how GADel can even mention the Negev at this of all times without giving the appearance of condoning Israeli military aggression across UN truce lines. The UN delegates of other countries are not without worldly wisdom and their cynical reactions to such an approach by GADel would be something which I would prefer to see my country spared.

4. If Dept is determined to destroy US-UK cooperation by step such as in Dept's 4071 in all fairness I think we should so advise Bevin and UKDel before a single such approach is made. The British Government is under heavy pressure from its Ministry of Defense and members of Parliament to make some pro-Arab gesture which would help to restore faith of Arab countries in UK. This has been jeopardized by scrupulous observation of the provisions of the arms embargo by UK throughout period when, according to all the evidence, USSR through Czechoslovakia has been arming Israel. This latter, combined with other Soviet activities, should at least establish presumption in regard to her intentions and hopes to foster confusion if not more than confusion in ME. Recent fighting showed clearly military might Israel has acquired behind back SC.

5. My understanding with Bevin clearly implies that if the US takes a pro-Israeli step Britain shall be free to take pro-Arab step. If we take the step contemplated and UK considers it necessary to take pro-Arab step the process of the US and the UK working at cross purposes re Palestine instead of cooperating for Palestine settlement will begin anew—with probably greater danger to US than in the past. You will recall that to satisfy the US the UK reluctantly agreed to delay UNGA consideration of Palestine.

6. Wright said yesterday that SC meeting today will be supreme test SC authority and in this connection I was pleased to be in a position to reassure him along lines Dept's 4058, October 22.² However, if this is only a palliative it would be better for the British Govt to know at once that the US no longer values the common ground achieved with regard to the Bernadotte proposals.

7. Present plan of US and UK to support Bernadotte proposals in their entirety and to establish within them international machinery to make such adjustments as may be necessary seems to me to be by far

² Not printed; it repeated the text of telegram Gadel 266, October 21, to Paris, p. 1504.

the best solution. Among such adjustments might be arrangements for Arab part of Palestine to go to TJ and for tip of Negev to go to Israel in return for some adjustment in favor of Arabs in north. Present plan to my mind avoids breaking with British and playing into hands of USSR.

8. Palestine situation is probably as dangerous to our national interests as is Berlin. The danger of the latter has been played up in the headlines. The danger (not the situation) of the former has been ignored in the headlines. I have sometime thought that this concealment of the danger in Palestine has permitted the Soviet to play her game in the Middle East without attracting attention.

9. Foregoing drafted before I received Delga's 476 October 25 to Dept with which I concur wholeheartedly.

Sent Dept for Lovett 4621; repeated Paris for Gadel 788.

[DOUGLAS]

501.BB Palestine/10-2648: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET US URGENT
 NIACT

PARIS, October 26, 1948—8 p. m.

Delga 488. Both Egyptian and Israeli Governments have accepted cease fire ¹ and Case 12 decision (document S/1042) relating convoys northern Negev. Meanwhile, General Riley ordered yesterday in name Bunche parties return their previous military positions (October 14 truce line) contemplated October 19 SC action. Informed by Eban, Comay last night PGI very reluctant agree withdrawal to previous positions.² At SC meeting this morning Egyptian, Lebanese, Syrian delegates laid very heavy stress on Israeli conquest territory by force and in effect served notice they would regain own freedom action in event Israeli failure comply Riley's order. This would undoubtedly lead serious truce violations in northern Palestine and renewed fighting Negev.

Next meeting Council set for Thursday morning and Bunche ex-

¹ As of 12 noon, GMT, October 22.

² Mr. Eban gave the Israeli position on this matter in a statement before the Security Council on October 26. He noted that in its action of October 19 (see editorial note, p. 1493), the Council had set three conditions as "the basis for further negotiations looking toward insurance that similar outbreaks will not again occur and that the truce will be fully observed in this area." He then requested the Council to "observe that no distinction is made . . . between sub-paragraph (a), referring to suggested withdrawal to previous positions, and sub-paragraphs (b) and (c), referring to other questions . . . which were referred to the parties with a recommendation for direct negotiation. But, in the speech of the representative of Egypt this morning, we find that, instead of opening the negotiations on subjects recognized by the Security Council as controversial, he seeks to prejudice the outcome of these negotiations by expressing himself in favour of withdrawal and ignoring the Security Council's injunction to make these three points an immediate subject of negotiation." (SC, 3rd yr., No. 121, p. 20.)

pects have report from Riley regarding compliance his withdrawal order by that time.

UK delegate instructed introduce resolution, text in next following telegram (Delga 489, October 26³). Instructed seek joint sponsorship US, France or other appropriate Council members. We discouraged idea US joining sponsorship but British feel very strongly US support essential. We assume in light of Gadel 266, October 21, Department would prefer that we not join UK in sponsoring this resolution but that we should speak briefly in support of and vote for resolution if it comes to vote Thursday morning. Please instruct most urgently any contrary view.

Department will observe UK draft resolution is still in nature of holding and time-serving action. If after passage such resolution either party refuses comply with order for withdrawal to previous military positions such refusal would be most serious breach of truce and affront to prestige of SC which is not at present very high regarding Palestine. Minimum immediate action required in this event would be further SC resolution ordering parties return at once previous military positions as further provisional measure under article 40 (compare July 15 resolution) together with strong declaration failure comply would be cause imposition sanctions under article 41 against party failing comply or if single party not determinable because of confused situation then against both parties. Strong US support and preferably joint sponsorship resolution along foregoing lines would not only be minimum consistent our previous position in SC but also essential effective SC action and maintenance US prestige in SC particularly in view recent factors which have again seriously weakened our prestige in UN regarding Palestine. Failure such action by SC under circumstances envisaged would not only further seriously weaken prestige of SC and of US but would also most seriously impair chances GA settlement based on Bernadotte plan or Arab subsequent acquiescence therein.

It would obviously be desirable if at all possible avoid deterioration truce situation Palestine to point requiring further SC action along strong lines indicated preceding paragraph. We feel therefore that every possible step should be taken prevent such deterioration and, in addition support UK resolution referred to above, recommend strongly Department send most immediate circular telegram to Tel Aviv, Cairo, particularly, as well as Amman, Baghdad, Beirut and

³ Not printed; for the text of the joint resolution offered by the British and Chinese Representatives on October 28, see SC, *3rd yr.*, No. 122, p. 12. It proposed the Security Council's endorsement of the Acting Mediator's order to the Egyptian and Israeli Governments to withdraw to the positions they occupied on October 14 and establish a committee of the Council "to examine urgently and report to the Council on the measures which it would be appropriate to take under Article 41 of the Charter if either party or both should fail to comply with the order of the Acting Mediator"

Damascus, instructing US representatives urge strongest terms prompt compliance with orders withdraw to previous military positions. Informed by UK delegation their missions Arab capitals instructed make strong representations avoid hostilities.⁴

Repeated London as Paris 1114.

MARSHALL

⁴ The Department, on October 27, informed Secretary Marshall of its "Regret owing to conditions which you will understand we do not yet find it possible to take action recommended last para. Delga 488." (Telegram Gadel 329 to Paris, 501.BB Palestine/10-2748)

501.BB Palestine/10-2548 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Delegation at Paris

TOP SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, October 27, 1948—12 noon.
NIACT

Gadel 317. We agree with logic set forth Delga 476 Oct. 25, that from tactical point of view it would seem inadvisable at this time to mention territorial rectification in northern Negev favoring Israel. Re London's 4621, Oct. 26, rptd Paris as 788, Dept has no desire break step with Brit on Palestine issue. We are keenly aware that principal hope achieving some UN arrangement on Palestine lies in arduously achieved UK-US solidarity, and that Bernadotte Plan affords broad basis for working out permanent solution.

We leave tactical handling this problem with delegation Paris, but would point out that US has been on record with PGI, as well as with UK FonOff and late Mediator, as being in favor some allocation land in northern Negev to Israel. Agree, however, that this adjustment could be worked out after Bernadotte Plan is on books.

Rptd London as 4099, Eyes Only for Amb.

LOVETT

501.BB Palestine/10-2748 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET URGENT PARIS, October 27, 1948—2 p. m.
NIACT

Martel 90. For Lovett eyes only from the Secretary. During his call this morning Bevin said the British Government was finding itself in an increasingly difficult position with the Arab States, in particular Transjordan, because of the complete embargo which Great Britain had imposed following the UN truce in Palestine and because of his understanding with the US on the sale of any munitions, arms, etc. to the Arab countries.

Bevin said that Great Britain had been instrumental in persuading the Arab States to accept the Security Council cease-fire order in the expectation that its provisions embargoing arms to the parties would be effectively honored. For this reason the British Government had gone so far as even to cancel certain pending contracts for munitions which had already been negotiated with Transjordan. It was now apparent to all that the Jews during this period had been able to violate the arms provision of the truce arrangement with impunity and had been receiving all types of arms, and in particular planes, from Czechoslovakia and elsewhere while the Arabs had been unable to obtain any munitions whatsoever. With the defeats inflicted upon the Egyptian Army and the present position of the Jewish forces, Abdullah's Arab Legion might become exposed to annihilating attacks on the part of the Jews. Bevin said he was under great pressure to let Abdullah obtain at least some arms in order to permit the Arab Legion to survive. He dwelt in some length on the importance of the Arab Legion as the only disciplined Arab force for the implementation of any Palestine partition solution. He made it quite plain that Great Britain could not stand by and see Transjordan and the Arab Legion placed in a position where it would be unable to defend itself against possible Jewish attack. He went so far as to state categorically that if the Israel forces should attack Transjordan proper at any time, the treaty of assistance with Great Britain would be immediately operative.

Cadogan, who was present, stated that the Security Council tomorrow is taking up the Palestine question and he believes that the Chinese would agree to join UK in introducing a resolution under Article 41 of Chapter 7 to induce parties to comply with provisions of truce.

Bevin agreed to withhold any decision on the arms question until the Security Council had considered this matter and until it was clear whether or not Israel would abide by the decision reached in the Council.

Bevin was fully aware of the effect upon US-UK relations of any departure from the present arms embargo in favor of Transjordan, but he made it quite plain that because of the discrimination in the manner in which the arms embargo had operated due to the successful evasion of its provisions by Israel, if matters continued as they were now the British Government would feel bound in fairness to let Abdullah acquire some munitions in England.

Under the present arrangement we would not be able to speak in support of a resolution under Article 41, but after my talk with Bevin, I believe acceptance of Security Council authority in regard to observance of truce is the only chance of preventing the British Gov-

ernment from taking the action indicated by Bevin in regard to arms for Transjordan.¹

MARSHALL

¹ Mr. Bohlen, who was present at the conversation, reported on this aspect as follows: "The Secretary told Mr. Bevin that we were fully aware of the fact that Israel was obtaining arms from Czechoslovakia and that we had been making great efforts to attempt to control this illegal traffic or at least to obtain sufficient facts to make them public but that, as Mr. Bevin could understand, it was difficult to obtain any satisfaction in Czechoslovakia at the present time. The Secretary said that we were fully aware of the dilemma in which the British Government found itself and of the great significance of this matter." (Memorandum of conversation drafted by Bohlen, October 27, 501.BB Palestine/10-2748)

501.BB Palestine/10-2648: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Delegation at Paris

SECRET US URGENT
 NIACT

WASHINGTON, October 27, 1948—5 p. m.

Gadel 330. Assumption set forth third para. Delga 488, Oct. 26, is correct. Under authority Gadel 266, Oct. 21 you should limit your action to speaking very briefly in support of and voting for resolution whose text was transmitted as Delga 489.¹ We suggest that last para. this draft resolution might more appropriately repeat language of resolution July 15, which referred to "further action under Chapter VII" rather than specific reference to Art. 41.

LOVETT

¹ Dated October 26, not printed; but see footnote 3, p. 1519.

501.BB Palestine/10-2048: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Delegation at Paris

SECRET US URGENT
 NIACT

WASHINGTON, October 27, 1948—6 p. m.

Gadel 337. In our opinion, US introduction and/or sponsorship text providing for scale of contributions (Delga 494 Oct. 26¹) involves a US commitment which would make prior consultation Congressional leaders essential. Such consultation not practicable at present, and would necessitate further and unfortunate postponement Committee Three discussion.

Regardless of means presentation appeal, we believe we can expect little tangible assistance from any states except US, UK, Arabs, and possibly dominions. Therefore, since bulk of contributions under either proposal will come from same sources, we much prefer UK

¹ Not printed.

draft,² embodying only moral obligation for all Members, rather than USDel proposal which involves specifying degree of interest for every member. Dorr³ concurs foregoing and view that fictitious budget more difficult present Congress.

Re your numbered para 3, introduction resolution along US lines would almost certainly open up undesirable and prolonged political debate concerning question responsibility for creation refugee problem.

Moreover Committee 3 action might be prejudiced if draft scale contributions not submitted with draft resolution. Determination scale would involve time consuming and difficult negotiations.

Dept. feels that UK proposal (Delga 423, Oct 20 par *b*) would be more likely win Committee 3 support.⁴

LOVETT

² As transmitted in telegram Delga 423, October 20, 11 p. m., from Paris, not printed.

³ Goldthwaite H. Dorr of the Executive Secretariat.

⁴ The joint resolution was actually sponsored, on October 29, by Belgium and the Netherlands, as well as by the United Kingdom and the United States; for text, see United Nations, *Official Records of the Third Session of the General Assembly, Part I, Third Committee, Annexes*, 1948, p. 51.

501.BB Palestine/10-2748: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Paris

TOP SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, October 27, 1948—7 p. m.
NIACT

Telmar 116. Eyes only for Secretary from Lovett. Martel 90 today quotes Cadogan as saying that possibly Chinese and British will introduce resolution in SC tomorrow under Art. 41 to induce Jews and Arabs to comply with provisions of truce. This statement goes considerably further than draft resolution contained Delga 489, Oct. 26,¹ which contemplated merely appointing committee to consider possible action under Art. 41.

If British now plan go beyond draft resolution in Delga 489 and propose sanctions under Art. 41 tomorrow, we shall not be able support them without specific Presidential approval. We hope that USDel's efforts will be successful in keeping SC action tomorrow confined to scope of Delga 489.

Meanwhile we have informed President that Dept concurs third para. Delga 488² and believes that while not joining UK in sponsoring resolution contained in Delga 489 USDel should speak briefly in support of and vote for that resolution. These instructions were in Gadel 330.³

¹ Not printed; but see footnote 3, p. 1519.

² Dated October 26, p. 1518.

³ Dated October 27, p. 1522.

It is of the utmost importance that British be restrained from arming Transjordan, which would have immediate consequence of popular outcry here for lifting of arms embargo as now applied to Israel and which embargo, as Bevin knows, we have scrupulously observed.

LOVETT

S/S-NSC Files, Lot 63D 351

*Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense
(Forrestal)*

TOP SECRET
NSC 27/2

WASHINGTON, 29 October 1948.

As requested in your memorandum, dated 19 October 1948, dealing with the provision of a military or police force for Jerusalem, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the questions raised in the attached letter from the Acting Secretary of State ¹ and have formulated the following statement of their views on the matters therein.

In a memorandum to you dated 18 August 1948 ² and for reasons fully discussed therein, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that it would, from the military viewpoint, be seriously prejudicial to our national security either for Soviet or Soviet-satellite armed forces to be permitted to enter Palestine or for United States armed forces to be committed there. The entry of Soviet or Soviet-satellite personnel as individuals is likewise considered objectionable by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

However, with specific reference to the questions raised in the letter from the Acting Secretary of State, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that from the military viewpoint :

a. As a matter of national security, an international police force for Jerusalem should not be made up of contingents supplied by certain governments. (They note that it might be possible, as stated in the letter from the Acting Secretary of State, to exclude Soviet forces, but commitment of United States forces would, nevertheless, be involved.)

b. That an international police force for Jerusalem recruited as individuals by the Secretary General of the United Nations is less objectionable from a U.S. security viewpoint than *a* above, since Soviet personnel that might be recruited would enter Palestine as individuals and not as Soviet troops.

c. It is considered highly undesirable that American citizens be employed in a Jerusalem international police force, either as private individuals recruited by the Secretary General or as members of the United States armed services, although their employment as private

¹ Dated October 18, p. 1488.

² For text, see Mr. Forrestal's memorandum of August 19 to the National Security Council, p. 1321.

individuals would be less prejudicial to United States security interests than the use for peace enforcement in Palestine of United States armed forces.

In order to mitigate the predominantly negative character of the above replies, the Joint Chiefs of Staff suggest the following possible alternative to the course of action referred to by Mr. Lovett. Jerusalem in the circumstances envisaged, would presumably be established as a "trust territory" as contemplated by the original United Nations General Assembly recommendation of November 1947, which, in this respect, the Bernadotte Plan merely confirms. Under the United Nations Charter, responsibility for maintenance of law and order in a "trust territory" is exercised by the "administering authority" under the supervision of the United Nations Trusteeship Council. It appears from the military viewpoint that a possible method of providing the necessary police force would be to have this force recruited and administered by the "administering authority" rather than by the Secretary General of the United Nations.³

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

WILLIAM D. LEAHY

Fleet Admiral, U.S. Navy,

Chief of Staff to the

Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces

³ Copy transmitted to the Secretary of State by Secretary Forrestal in a letter of October 30, the concluding paragraph of which read as follows: "In supplement of the enclosed views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I would like to say that the issues involved in the question which you presented are of such a far-reaching character that I believe they should be the subject of consideration and decision by the National Security Council. In view of the belief of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the introduction of either United States or Soviet, or Soviet-satellite forces, in Palestine is incompatible with the security interests of the United States, I believe that we should at least explore alternative methods of dealing with the problem presented. In this connection, I believe most serious consideration should be given to the proposals of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as contained in the last paragraph of their memorandum of 29 October 1948." (501.BB Palestine/10-3048)

At Secretary Forrestal's formal request of November 2, the National Security Council undertook consideration the following day of Mr. Lovett's letter of October 18, Secretary Forrestal's reply of October 30, and the memorandum of October 29 by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

501.BB Palestine/10-2948 : Telegram

*The Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald)
to the Acting Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET MOST IMMEDIATE

TEL AVIV, October 29, 1948—noon.

US URGENT NIACT

217. Press and radio announce Great Britain resolution to SC for application sanctions unless Israeli forces retire to former Negev positions. This resolution if approved will create a tragic dilemma for

Israel and US comparable that envisaged mytel 70, August 24.¹ PGI could not in my opinion yield but instead would resist sanctions. Plain fact as regards Egypt forces in Negev is (1) Egypt refused respect UN decision to open supply route to settlements and (2) the Egyptian Army has no right in opinion PGI to be in the Negev in the first place. Last night Egyptian forces evacuated Isdud, moved south to Majdal and civilians in area surrendered to Israeli which indicates Egypt realizes adjustment is inevitable. Also more important last night Ben-Gurion in State Council took conciliatory attitude which local press interprets as offer negotiate separate peace with Egypt. In other words, insofar as we can see from this point, Israeli victory has clarified situation in Negev and raised some hope of settlement. To undo all this by demand Israeli return positions under threat SC sanctions will create complete disillusionment here about UN and also US.

Moreover in considering possible decision to support sanctions, US should take account of almost certain necessity—threats will not be enough—of employing economic or more direct punitive measures before Israel, through economic or military exhaustion can be expected to surrender. The struggle that would precede such surrender might have for Israel the tragic solace of being regarded as a modern Massada while for the sanction enforcing powers, it could at best be an unpleasant and unprofitable business. Meanwhile Russia would rejoice at our discomforture and pose as Israel's sole friend.

Sent Department 217, Department pass niact Paris Gadel 11.

McDONALD

¹ See telegram of August 24, p. 1337.

501.BB Palestine/10-2948 : Telegram

*The Israeli Foreign Minister (Shertok) to the Secretary of State,
at Paris*¹

MOST IMMEDIATE

Most respectfully draw your most earnest attention to extreme gravity of situation which will arise if Security Council adopts resolution ordering withdrawal Israel Forces from positions occupied by them in Negev since mid-October. Such withdrawal would amount to act of suicide by State of Israel in respect of area concerned which State of Israel in sheer self-preservation will be unable to commit. Crushing defeat suffered by Egyptian forces in recent brief campaign was brought about by their own wanton aggressiveness, first in

¹ As transmitted by Secretary Marshall for Mr. Lovett in urgent telegram Delga 532, October 29, from Paris. The telegram states that Mr. Shertok's message was received on October 29 from Tel Aviv but does not give the date it was sent by the Israeli Foreign Minister.

invading Palestine territory, secondly in violating truce by occupying certain position with object of cutting off Israel Negev from contact with north, and finally in openly defying express injunction of UN Mediator to let our convoys pass. Egyptians are thus themselves to blame their present debacle and should not be permitted escape consequences their misguided and defiant aggression. Restoration *status quo ante* would recreate conditions which were found glaringly unjust and proved intolerable. Moreover, by adopting such resolution Security Council would in effect extend invitation to Egyptian Army to send fresh troops across Suez Canal to reoccupy positions which cannot possibly be held by remnants their existing forces.

My government sincerely trusts that it will be spared predicament of finding itself involved in conflict with Security Council as result of resolution with which it would be quite unable to comply if most vital and legitimate interests of Israel and those of eventual peace are to be preserved full. Having acted throughout merely in self-defence we are profoundly convinced that justice is on our side and that any state member of UN similarly placed would be unable to adopt different attitude.

MOSHE SHERTOK
Minister Foreign Affairs
Government of Israel

501.BB Palestine/10-2948 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Paris

TOP SECRET URGENT
 NIACT

WASHINGTON, October 29, 1948--1 a. m.

Telmar 119. Eyes only for the Secretary from the President. Following transmitted at President's request by phone from New York:

"I am deeply concerned over reports here of action taken in Security Council on Palestine question. I hope that before this nation takes any position or any statement is made by our delegation that I be advised of such contemplated action and the implications thereof."¹

LOVETT

¹The Clifford Papers contain a penciled copy of the President's message in the handwriting of Mr. Clifford, who has acknowledged to the editors that he was the drafter of the message. A typewritten copy of the message in the Truman Papers, President's Secretary's File, bears the following notation in the handwriting of Mr. Elsey: "this message was phoned by Mr. Clifford to Under-Secretary Lovett in Washington, about mid-night, October 28, with instructions that Lovett send it to Marshall in Paris."

Secretary Marshall, in a personal, eyes only telegram from Paris to Mr. Lovett on October 29, asked: "To what do you think President is referring? If you do not know. ask him direct for me." (Martel 95, 501.BB Palestine/10-2948)

501.BB Palestine/10-2948: Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at London*¹TOP SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, October 29, 1948—3 p. m.
NIACT

4132. Eyes only for Secretary from Lovett. Shortly after eleven Thursday night Clifford called me from New York and asked me to transmit at once message for you contained in Telmar 119.²

I discussed the situation at length on the phone, referred to President's approval of action contemplated in Security Council and his personal approval of telegram of October 21 sent USDel. Consequences of further delay and vacillation on dealing with breaches of truce were emphasized and impossible situation of USDel pointed out. Sender of message to you obviously under greatest pressure and incident which caused message was late paper story that Russian move to postpone consideration for two days was defeated by tie vote with three abstentions and that US vote was deciding factor in tie. Question asked me was why, in view of previous instructions to delay, we did not take advantage this opportunity.

Security Council action this morning in appointment subcommittee and adjournment without vote has composed matter for time being and am directed express appreciation your efforts. Am told removal restrictions on normal procedures may be expected next week when silly season terminates.³

LOVETT

¹ Secretary Marshall arrived in London on October 29 and returned to Paris on November 1. For a report on his conversation with Bevin, see p. 1534.

² *Supra*.

³ This telegram was repeated to Paris as Telmar 120.

501.BB Palestine/10-2948: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET NIACT PARIS, October 29, 1948—5 p. m.

Delga 533. Eyes alone for Lovett from Rusk. Our friends came to our rescue in SC today and, on basis Canadian suggestion, SC established drafting subcommittee to harmonize various suggestions made reference joint UK-China resolution.¹ That covers us over weekend and gives Israeli delegation chance to demonstrate to subcommittee members (UK, China, France, Belgium and Ukraine) that northern

¹ The United Kingdom and China, on October 29, submitted to the Security Council a revision of their joint draft resolution. Like its predecessor version, it did not call for the imposition of sanctions; for text, see SC, *3rd yr., Supplement for October 1948*, p. 72. Before acting on the revision, the Council adopted, without a formal vote the Canadian draft resolution (SC, *3rd yr., No. 123*, p. 22; for the text of the resolution, see SC, *3rd yr., Resolutions, 1948*, p. 27.)

Negev matter can be settled without major truce violation. USDel proposed to take no action this matter whatever. At no point in SC consideration UK-China resolution has USRep spoken or voted on merits. Most unlikely that matter can arise before Tuesday or Wednesday because Monday is national French holiday and UN is closed. US vote Thursday against two-day postponement was within framework our then existing instructions to support UK-China draft, and was cast in light of acute embarrassment which would have arisen had we appeared anxious to postpone, particularly in light postponement GA and clearly drawn issue on maintenance of truce on which our policy has never been thought to be equivocal. Up to moment of vote, Soviets were only delegations suggesting postponement and spotlight was squarely upon USRep. Actually, US vote made no difference since vote was 4 for 4 against with three abstentions.

You will be interested that senior secretariat officials informed us this morning that Israeli delegation was passing word around that President had instructed USDel not to support UK-China resolution almost as soon as we ourselves had received relevant telegram. All press having representatives in Paris now carrying this story which they are attributing to "unimpeachable source". USDel is saying absolutely nothing on this point.

Cadogan has rolled with our punch but is placed in difficult position which we shall try to work out with British in Paris pending such time as we know what we can do.

Sent to Department; repeated London eyes alone for the Secretary and Douglas as 1153. [Rusk.]

MARSHALL

501.BB Palestine/10-2948 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the
Acting Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET US URGENT
NIACT

LONDON, October 29, 1948—5 p. m.

4683. 1. Foreign Office was considerably agitated and alarmed to learn from Paris by telephone this morning that US delegation SC was without instructions re Palestine case (Embassy's 4642, October 27 and Paris 1119, October 27¹ to London). Bevin, through Hector McNeil, immediately sent urgent personal message to Secretary asking him to make certain that USDel voted for Palestine resolution since US abstention would imperil outcome.

2. While mechanical delays may account for unenviable position of USDel this morning, it occurs to me that in dealing with Palestine question we may be inclined to underestimate the importance which

¹ Neither printed; the latter was sent to the Department as telegram Delga 502.

is attached by other nations to every US move in this difficult problem. Rightly or wrongly, world opinion seems to have assigned to US great responsibility for developments in Palestine.

3. It is our purpose to make UN an effective instrument to deal with problems affecting peace and security. I fail to see how we can expect SC to preserve the peace in connection with Azerbaijan and Berlin and ignore it in connection with Palestine.

Sent Department 4683, repeated Paris for Gadel 816.

DOUGLAS

867N.01/10-2948 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the
Acting Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET

LONDON, October 29, 1948—7 p. m.

4684. For Lovett's eyes only. Embassy's 2267, May 25.

1. Five months have elapsed since I met May 25 with Attlee, Bevin and representatives of British chiefs of staff including Lieutenant General Templer, Vice-Chief Imperial General Staff. I considered it wise to inquire whether the British assessment the basic factors of ME defense had in any way altered since that time. On October 28 General Templer called at Foreign Office request to bring me up to date.

2. It is apparent from what Templer had to say that the IGS, which has now had practical experience of getting along without a base in Palestine and which is watching with alarm the disintegration of UK-Arab relations as a result of UK observance of arms embargo, now places even greater emphasis than before on importance of holding the Middle East for offensive purposes in the event of war with USSR. Templer said that the idea held some months ago that ME oil is peacetime oil only has now been abandoned in favor of defending all ME oil resources and at minimum the oil resources and refineries of western Persian Gulf. (Note: Department will have learned from Navy Admiral Conolly's¹ concurring views in this connection.)

3. According Templer the USSR, quite apart from its obvious desire to possess ME oil, is expected to embark on a defensive offensive in the Middle East in the event of war because if ME is in control of US and UK, US heavy bombers can strike deep into the Caucasus—"the achilles heel of the USSR." ME is of special concern to USSR because it is only area in which the USSR thanks to steadfastness of US-UK bolstered Turkey and Iran, has not been able to set up a defense zone beyond its frontier. Thus in time of war, USSR is expected to make from outset a strong effort to deny ME to US and UK

¹ Richard L. Conolly, Commander-in-Chief of United States Naval Forces in the Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean.

as base of operations. In time of peace, however, USSR must employ its foreign policy and secret agents to accomplish the same purposes: i.e. denial to US and UK use of ME. Arab-Jewish hatred and inter-Arab state hatred, judiciously stimulated by the USSR openly and secretly, has gone far and will go further to destroy the possibility of US-UK plans for ME defense making headway.

4. Before Palestine question became active following end World War II ME was "virtually clean" of Soviet influence. Now, according Templer, by carefully playing Palestine issue, the USSR has managed to transfer Palestine into the spearhead of its attempt to disrupt ME and make it untenable for US-UK defense purposes.

5. Following may be cited as evidence of Soviet interest and activities in ME:

(a) Establishment large Soviet mission Tel Aviv to work with other even larger Soviet missions ME, notably in Lebanon. It is expected that Communist headquarters will shift eventually from Beirut to Tel Aviv.

(b) Offer to supply troops for international regime Jerusalem.

(c) Soviet assistance to thousands of Jews from Soviet satellite states to come to Palestine (this move was extremely successful in embarrassing the UK and was factor in British decision to leave Palestine).

(d) Recent union of Jewish and Arab Communist parties in Palestine which may be useful fifth column if and when Palestine becomes battle ground in close defense of Egypt. It is significant that only effective Arab-Jewish cooperation is through Communists and this first impact of Israel on Arab political thinking may be gauge of future Israeli influence particularly if Soviet hope of capturing PGI from below is realized. Forthcoming Israeli elections in Israel will be good index of strength Communists and leftists are believed to possess in Israel.

(e) Soviet connivance in supplying arms and airplanes to Israel through Czechoslovakia (Embassy's 4660, October 28 and 4645 October 27²) thus circumventing UN arms embargo in favor of Israel and building up Arab hostility against US because it has respected UN embargo. This action has been extremely successful because while it appears to represent only central European assistance to Israel, actually its real effect has been to poison Arab-British relations (Embassy is submitting top secret despatch elaborating upon this point).

(f) Continuing Soviet support in UN for November 29, 1947 resolution with its hour-glass frontiers. Latter, if applied, would go far to perpetuate Arab-Jewish friction.

(g) Covert support for Mufti and through him for Arab irregulars. There is no absolute proof of this although presumption is strong. Mufti has at his disposal suspiciously large funds and is well-known for his propensity to take money from any source. His irresponsible followers, whether they know it or not, are most effective agents for Soviet goal of discord.

(h) USSR and US standing together on November 29 resolution was instance US-Soviet cooperation which emphasized divergence

² Neither printed.

US-UK thinking re Palestine. A similar step greatly to Soviet advantage was full Soviet recognition PGI in wake US provisional recognition.

(i) Palestine conflict has resulted in ruinously high war expenditure by Israel and Arab states and in latter's relatively large expenditure on 350,000 Arab refugees. This financial waste has already set back by years plans for ME economic and social development which might go far to immunize ME against communism.

(j) Favorable climate for revolution will be created among populations of Arab states by disappointment and resentment at failure Arab Governments and armies to crush Jews in Palestine. Arab press has presented such false picture Arab successes that there is hint this may be in part Soviet inspired.

(k) Essential Soviet design of disruption is fostered by increasing difficulties of Jewish communities in ME particularly in Egypt and Iraq. Short range, looting and killing in these would affect public order in Arab states; longer range, disappearance Jewish merchants—economic mainsprings in many Arab states—would cripple national economies.

(l) Even if present Arab Governments survive their disillusion with West (i.e. US and UK), vapid UN handling Palestine problem may cause them to look for more purposeful world power and decide this is USSR.

(m) Palestine turmoil has stopped Haifa oil dock and refinery to cost ERP and to possible benefit Rumania with which PGI is discussing oil supplies.

(n) Jewish thrust into Negev has for first time in history split Arab world; there is now no practicable land communication between Egypt and other Arab states—a feat never achieved even by Crusaders. If Arab world is to be bulwark against communism there must be some corporate sense between states as well as free communications.

6. Foregoing received from Templer and supplemented by Foreign Office and controlled source. Some of the evidence cited is conclusive and part of it rests upon intelligent surmise, the latter are largely corollaries of Palestine conflict, perhaps uncalculated by the USSR, but nonetheless effective in furthering the ends of the latter. However, taking the good and the doubtful points together the picture which emerges is clear. This picture caused me to telegraph (Paragraph 8, Embassy's 4621, October 26) as follows:

“Palestine situation is probably as dangerous to our national interests as is Berlin. The danger of the latter has been played up in the headlines. The danger (not the situation) of the former has been ignored in the headlines. I have sometimes thought that this concealment of the danger in Palestine has permitted the Soviet to play her game in the Middle East without attracting attention.”

7. You may wish to show this and my telegram of October 26³ to Dulles and Vandenberg.⁴

³ Presumably No. 4621, p. 1516.

⁴ Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg of Michigan, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

Sent Department 4684, repeated Paris 817 GADel for the Secretary (eyes only).

DOUGLAS

501.BB Palestine/10-3048 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at London

TOP SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, October 30, 1948—12 noon.
NIACT

4155. Eyes only personal for Secretary from Lovett.

1. Expert election predictions published today forecast substantial Dewey majority of electoral votes by States but considerable improvement in Truman's position in popular votes, Dewey getting about fifty percent, Truman about forty-five percent. Senate race very close with probable Republican control by very slim margin.

2. Deterioration Palestine situation, increasingly belligerent attitude Israelis, rumored further postponement Israeli elections to December and increasing British concern over condition Arab states causing us deep concern as to immediate next step in light of possible change of Administration. Platforms of both parties strongly support Israel and recent statements of Taft ¹ in support Jewish claims suggest that vital matter of UN action on breaches of the truce should be made matter of agreed bipartisan policy if we are to be insured against further loss of international prestige by constant vacillation in an area in which our national security is vitally involved as is our policy of endeavoring to counter aggressive Communist moves.

3. Without some firmly agreed course of action between any succeeding Administration and our present one, I am fearful that action taken over next few days or weeks may set a pattern which, if subsequently reversed, could have disastrous consequences not only in Middle East itself but with our European associates in other vital affairs.

4. Accordingly I suggest following procedure for your consideration:

(a) Secretary discuss broad problem with Dulles Monday with particular reference to step that should be taken in SC with regard vote on UK-China Resolution with objective of recommending to President, in light his message Telmar 119,² action to be taken by USDel.

(b) Above action consistent with bipartisan policy approach which should be followed up by more formal understanding immediately after election if Republicans win. A disclosure of the serious immediate security problem and danger of long-range Russian infiltration through well-known methods are compelling reasons for unified and consistent program of action by this country.

(c) Since Congressional support would be essential, problem could

¹ Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio.

² Dated October 29, p. 1527.

be discussed with Vandenberg by me next week. He returns Washington 3 or 4 November.

(d) Matters of greatest urgency requiring full agreement appear from this distance to be action to be taken in event continued truce violations, position on frontiers—especially Negeb, status Jerusalem, Arab refugee problem, provision of UN supervisory force and makeup any UN police force.

5. I am sure you agree that our past experience with formally approved positions and instructions which are subsequently and suddenly altered or revoked is increasingly dangerous and intolerable. I can imagine what you have been through in Paris. It has been absolute hell here. As I see it, the national election itself, regardless of its outcome, gives us a new chance to review our Palestine policy, agree on a bipartisan approach and plan a consistent course of action which we can stick to honorably and resolutely.

Would much appreciate your views. Best regards.³

LOVETT

³This telegram was repeated to Paris as Telmar 124. Secretary Marshall, in reply on October 31, stated: "I agree generally with proposed course and emphatically with present extreme dangers of situation. Will see Dulles Monday on his return from Scandinavia but fear this will not give time for him to consult Dewey and get his instructions before vote on Palestine resolution." (Telegram 4690 from London, 501.BB Palestine/10-3148)

501.BB Palestine/10-3148 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

US URGENT

LONDON, October 31, 1948—2 p. m.

4689. For Lovett from the Secretary. I had a long talk yesterday noon with Bevin, Roberts and Michael Wright, Douglas participating. Much concern over exposed position of Arab Legion with very little ammunition due to strictness of British embargo. Bevin stated that if Haganah moved on either flank of Legion he would be compelled to supply Legion with ammunition. Greatest concern was over next few days. It would require ten days to provide by air lift to British fields the supply necessary.

Bevin and associates feel that Israeli forces have been heavily reinforced with arms and planes, particularly through Czechoslovakia, while Arabs have got nothing. It is believed here that Soviets have facilitated Israeli dealings in Czechoslovakia, just as they are courting Arab dissension with British.

Bevin stated he would take no action on supply of ammunition before Wednesday.

I made guarded statement of the case to the effect that American decision could not be made until final character of resolution re truce was determined and I had received instructions from Washington. At last meeting of seniors of US delegation in Paris Friday morning

Mrs. Roosevelt and Cohen took very emphatic stand. Rusk reported to me later he could find no agreement with Cohen except on basis of 100 percent acceptance of Cohen's view.

I see by morning papers here that special committee of Security Council is proposing adoption of truce resolution apparently as originally drafted, with Ukraine opposing, possibly prophetic of Soviet veto. I am assuming instructions from Washington will meet me in Paris.

I fear this matter will lead to fatal results so far as possibility of Palestine solution is concerned and almost equally serious results re Berlin issue.

Sent Department, repeated Paris as 822 for Rusk and Carter.

MARSHALL

501.BB Palestine/10-3148 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at London

TOP SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, October 31, 1948—5 p. m.
 NIACT

4158. Eyes only personal for Secretary from Lovett. On receipt your message 4689 from London ¹ communicated with President in St. Louis. He instructs me to send you following reply with his request that utmost precautions be taken to maintain its personal and top secret character:

“(1) President again directs every effort be made to avoid taking position on Palestine prior to Wednesday.² If by any chance it appears certain vote would have to be taken on Monday or Tuesday he directs USDel to abstain. (2) On Wednesday or thereafter proceed on understanding of American position previously taken as regards truce in May and July resolutions.”

Any other matters relating Palestine should be reported and cleared until present restrictions removed.

As to point (2) in directive above in view Rusk's report Roosevelt Cohen position suggest you may wish refer alternatives back for clearance in spite general authority above to avoid subsequent possible disavowal. I carefully explained the grave circumstances which may follow in Palestine, Berlin and other critical situations when reporting your apprehension and again when above message phoned me. Feeling was expressed that friendly countries should “bear with us for twenty-four hours”.

Note: If Secretary has left for Paris please forward this telegram to him.

LOVETT

¹ *Supra.*

² November 3.

501.BB Palestine/11-148 : Telegram

*The Special Representative of the United States in Israel
(McDonald) to the President's Special Counsel (Clifford)*

TOP SECRET URGENT TEL AVIV, November 1, 1948—4 p. m.

222. Personal attention Clark Clifford. In light present Paris discussion possible UN sanctions in Palestine, I beg you to ask President reread my letter to him September 19 especially last paragraph and his letter to me October 4.¹ I cannot overemphasize that my judgment now is identical with mine September 19. In answer to possible objection that I am unjustifiably anticipating crisis I would reply that advance consideration is vital in order avoid possibility hasty decision withdraw head mission as a preliminary sanction.

Perhaps President will wish discuss my viewpoint with Acting Secretary.

McDONALD

¹ Copies not found in Department of State files; for texts, see McDonald, *My Mission to Israel, 1948-1951* (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1951), pp. 81, 82. Mr. McDonald's letter, after referring to Count Bernadotte's assassination, expressed the hope that President Truman would "discourage any possible move to weaken this Mission or to withdraw its head as a form of sanctions or as evidence of U.S. displeasure." The President, in his reply, stated that he would "discourage any move to weaken the Mission or to withdraw its head as a form of sanctions."

501.BB Palestine/11-148 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Acting
Secretary of State*TOP SECRET US URGENT LONDON, November 1, 1948—9 p. m.
NIACT

4707. For Lovett (eyes only) from Douglas.

1. For the Secretary.¹ This will confirm in writing what I told you orally of my conversation with Michael Wright this morning in regard to Palestine. (a) Wright said that the SC sub-Committee, appointed for the purpose of drafting a resolution in regard to Palestine, will complete its work and submit its draft to the Security Council tomorrow afternoon, November 2; (b) That the SC will meet on Wednesday to consider this draft; (c) That it would be an obvious and transparent sham to postpone beyond Wednesday a meeting of the SC for the above purpose.

2. Wright expressed great concern about the operations of the Israeli Armed Forces and their success in driving the Arab forces out of Galilee. He said that it might be necessary for the British to consider now delivery of ammunition and arms to the Arab forces which,

¹ At Paris.

because of the meticulous observance by the British of the arms embargo, had reduced the Arab forces and the Arab Legion to a state of almost complete impotence. (See previous telegrams on this subject.)

3. In reply to a question I told Wright that no commitment could be made about the prospects of US-UK concerted support of the resolution which the SC will consider, but that he could be assured that if the British were at the present moment to send arms to the Arabs, they would be running the very great risk of destroying all hope of concerted US-UK support. Particularly would this probably be the case were news of any such action on the part of the British to be given public currency.

4. Wright then said that the British would do nothing during the next 48 hours unless Israeli forces should attack the Arab Legion, when they would have to reconsider and would consult US.

5. Wright reaffirmed British position, with which I concur heartily, that there can be no answer to the Palestinian problem with all of its manifold consequences in the Middle East and elsewhere, unless the US and UK stand firmly together in regard to: (a) The resolution covering the truce, et cetera, on which the SC will act on Wednesday; and (b) The Bernadotte proposals on which the GA will commence consideration during the course of the next week or so.

6. Wright indicated that the position taken by Ukraine on the sub-committee might be prophetic of a Soviet veto of the resolution in the SC on Wednesday.

7. In the event that the UK-US stand together on the truce resolution and that there is no Soviet veto, Wright expressed the hope that should the Israeli refuse to abide by the terms of the SC resolution, we would not support admission of Israeli to the UN and would not extend *de jure* recognition.

8. Wright asked whether any consideration had been given by the US to any course of action should the Soviet veto the SC resolution. He expressed his personal view that the first obvious step would be for the US-UK to stand firmly behind the Bernadotte proposals in the Assembly.

9. Should the Israeli not abide by the terms of the resolution in regard to the truce, even though vetoed by the Soviet while being supported by all the other members, Wright expressed again, personally, the hope that we would maintain our arms embargo, that we would not support the admission of Israeli to the UN, and that we would not, in these circumstances, extend *de jure* recognition. While he could not state formal British position, he thought it not unlikely, under these circumstances, particularly if the Israeli indicated any preparation for further aggressive action, that Britain might have to honor its treaty obligations to furnish ammunition to Transjordan and the Arab Legion. HMG would, of course, consult with US.

10. In view of Parodi's implied change of position in regard to the resolution for the SC, particularly that portion of it dealing with consideration of the imposition of sanctions, Wright wondered whether any member of the American Delegation had been directly or indirectly bringing pressure to bear on French Government.²

Sent Department as 4707; repeated Paris for Secretary as 830.

DOUGLAS

² The Secretary commented on this paragraph on November 2, stating that "No member USDel has been directly or indirectly bringing pressure on French. USDel has taken no part at all in work of sub-committee and has refused to comment even when sub-committee members ask for our views. . . . After all, it must be recalled that the French too have their Zionist pressures." (Telegram Delga 568 from Paris, 501.BB Palestine /11-248)

501.BB Palestine/11-148 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

PARIS, November 1, 1948—10 p. m.

Delga 559. Following is draft resolution on Palestine as prepared in SC subcommittee as USGADel obtained it informally from UK source :

"The Security Council

Having decided on the fifteenth July that subject to further decision by the SC or the GA the truce shall remain in force in accordance with the resolution of that date and with that of 29 May 1948 until a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine is reached;

Having decided on the 19 August that no party is permitted to violate the truce on the ground that it is undertaking reprisals or retaliations against the other party, and that no party is entitled to gain military or political advantage through violation of the truce; and

Having decided on the 29 May that, if the truce was subsequently repudiated or violated by either party or by both the situation in Palestine would be reconsidered with a view to action under Chapter VII of the Charter;

Endorses the request communicated to the Government of Egypt and the Provisional Government of Israel by the acting mediator on the 26 October (S/1058)¹ following upon the Council's resolution of the 19 October 1948; and

(This next paragraph is unofficial translation from agreed French text.) Calls upon the interested governments: (1) To withdraw those of their forces which have advanced beyond the positions held on October 14, the acting mediator being authorized to establish provisional lines beyond which no movement of troops shall take place; (2) to establish, through negotiations conducted directly between the parties, or failing that, through intermediaries in the service of the United Nations, permanent truce lines and such neutral or demili-

¹ See editorial note, p. 1516.

tarized zones as may appear advantageous, in order to ensure henceforth the full observance of the truce in that area. Failing an agreement, the permanent lines and neutral zones shall be established by decision of the acting mediator; and

(Following not translation) Appoints a committee of the Council, consisting of the five permanent members together with Belgium and Colombia, to examine urgently and report to the Council on the measures which it would be appropriate to take under Article 41 of the Charter if either party or both should fail to observe the conditions prescribed in the two sub-paragraphs of paragraph five of this resolution with whatever time limits the acting mediator may think it desirable to fix."

Subcommittee will meet Tuesday afternoon to approve its report to the SC.² In view of plenary session GA on Wednesday now appears unlikely SC will meet before Thursday morning.

Delga 559 to Department, repeated London as Paris telegram 1166.

MARSHALL

² For text of report to the Council on November 2, see SC, 3rd yr., *Supplement for November 1948*, p. 1.

501.BB Palestine/11-248

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to President Truman

SECRET

WASHINGTON, November 2, 1948.

The U.S. Delegation in Paris has been advised that the Security Council Subcommittee, formed to make recommendations in connection with the recent breaches of the truce in Palestine, has prepared a resolution which it will probably approve Tuesday afternoon, the vote being taken by the Security Council probably on Wednesday or Thursday.

A copy of the draft resolution has been received by telegram ¹ and is attached. In accordance with your instructions, the U.S. Delegation requests most urgently that instructions be given them prior to Wednesday morning 9:00 o'clock Paris time (3:00 a. m. Wednesday E.S.T.) as to the position to be taken in the vote on the attached resolution.

While there is a good chance the Security Council may not meet on this subject Wednesday because there is a plenary session of the General Assembly on that date, there is always a possibility that a special session may be called and, in any event, the resolution will most certainly come up for a vote on Thursday.

The Subcommittee which prepared the resolution consists of Belgium, France, China, the United Kingdom, and Ukraine. We are advised that the vote in the Subcommittee was 4 to 1, with the Ukraine

¹ No. Delga 559, *supra*.

voting against it. It is possible that the vote may foreshadow a U.S.S.R. veto in the Security Council although the U.S.S.R. was one of the countries most insistent on "putting teeth into the UN truce order".

This Government supported the May 29 resolution setting up the original truce and was one of the sponsors of the July 15 resolution continuing the truce. We also actively supported the August 19 resolution. On October 21 the President approved instructions to the Delegation to continue to support the truce resolutions by affirmative vote.

As a result of postponements and reference of the matter to the above-mentioned Subcommittee, it has not been necessary to take a formal position until the present instance. The Department feels that we should continue to support the Security Council's efforts to maintain the truce in the light of the deteriorating situation and the possibility that continued military action will be considered by the British as so serious a breach of the truce as to compel them to resume their treaty obligations toward Transjordan involving the delivery of arms and ammunition for Abdullah's troops. These shipments have been effectively stopped under the truce.

May I have your instructions as early as possible today so that I may pass them on to Paris promptly?

ROBERT A. LOVETT

501.BB Palestine/11-148: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Paris

TOP SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, November 2, 1948—5 p. m.
NIACT

Telmar 130. Eyes only for Secretary from Lovett.

1. Copy of Delga 559 was supplied White House this morning with a memorandum to President requesting instructions in confirmation directive contained in eyes only personal message to you in London Niac 4158¹ Sunday night.

2. This step necessitated by headline story *New York Star* of "serious rift in US Del to UN" reporting that Mrs. Roosevelt, Cohen and Dulles opposed any step looking toward imposition of sanctions. My apprehension on point two of directive was covered in fourth paragraph my personal message Sunday night.

3. President's position remains basically unchanged but since vote on matter will occur after American election results are known (this should be about midnight tonight Washington time) President feels consequences any major disunity in delegation along party lines might have most serious results. Therefore he instructs me forward

¹ Dated October 31, p. 1535.

to you following message: "President authorizes support of sub-committee resolution Delga 559 as being consistent with US position in support of truce and of May 29, July 15 and August 19 resolutions, provided that, in event Dewey elected, Dulles agrees and supports this action. If Dulles disagrees he should be asked for his proposals, which should be promptly referred to Washington before US Del takes action."

LOVETT

Editorial Note

General Riley, on November 3, sent a report to Mr. Bunche giving his comments on problems facing the UN observers in supervising the truce in Palestine. He asserted that the truce supervision "has lost whatever authority and moral force it may have had at one time. Its decisions and directives . . . are flouted by the parties to the truce whenever it is in their interests to do so. It now operates almost solely to report violations of the truce, which grow more numerous and open each day, and which reports have less and less significance." Enforcement of the truce, he advised, "has ceased to exist. Observers find themselves absolutely powerless to stop violations of the truce, even when they are on the spot where the violations are about to occur, or are occurring." The observers are "limited almost entirely to issuing threats and requests to Arab forces to refrain from various courses of action that would give the Jews a pretext for taking offensive action, as in the Negev and Galilee."

General Riley summed up the attitude of the parties with the statement that "they ignore, obstruct, or circumvent the mission except when it can serve their own interests. This attitude is most pronounced in the Jews. . . . Willful and premeditated violations of the truce by the Jews are now routine. Emboldened by their recent successes in military operations and evading UN retaliatory action, they obviously intend to ignore the truce mission in carrying out their plans and policies." General Riley observed that the Arab forces, as a general rule, "have endeavored to comply with the cease fire. Violations of [on?] their part have usually consisted of retaliatory actions, which they have had very good reasons for taking." He also noted a recent increase in Iraqi and Transjordan operations in the central sector and an accompanying trend to take matters into their own hands.

In evaluating the capabilities of the parties, General Riley concluded that "The Jews are now far superior to all other forces combined in their offensive military strength. . . . If the Jews so desire, they could undoubtedly clear all of Palestine of Arab forces in a relatively short time."

General Riley concluded his report with the opinion that "it is time to reexamine our present setup as regards the number of observers, both officers and enlisted men, with view to reduction in their numbers to meet future needs." (Delga 660, November 9, noon, from Paris, 501.BB Palestine/11-948)

867N.01/11-348 : Telegram

The Minister in Syria (Keeley) to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

DAMASCUS, November 3, 1948—8 p. m.

684. Rene Servoise, Mediator's political representative Syria and Lebanon, gives following confidential account of recent Galilee fighting:

Whether or not with provocation Qawuqji's irregulars began local attack on Al Manara in far northern salient upper Galilee about 10 days ago which resulted in minor Arab successes. Israeli magnified incident out of all proportion and used it as pretext to launch general offensive in western Galilee which cleared extensive triangular area behind agreed truce lines from apex near Nazareth, some 30 kilometers within Palestine, to south Lebanese frontier. Jews feinted along western flank and then attacked in force westward along road from Safwd to Lebanese frontier achieving singular success. splitting Qawuqji forces and trapping large numbers which are now attempting slip through Jewish lines to Inqax reorganization center near Beit Jubail in Lebanon. Servoise states Israeli disregarded Lebanese frontier and continued their advance into Lebanon in several places to hold strong "tactical frontier".

He states some 25,000 additional refugees have been forced out of Galilee and declares all his pleas for Red Cross or UN disaster help receive same answer; "sorry, without money or supplies we can do nothing".

Servoise asserts Galilee situation basically similar Negeb in that in both cases Jews seized small pretext to launch major offensive. He has so informed Bunche and recommended that SC consider Galilee situation concurrently with Negeb, especially as regards provisions for return to original truce lines. However, Servoise does not believe Jews will withdraw regardless of SC action and seems very pessimistic over UN SC unwillingness or inability take decisive measures to stop truce violations.

Source above information must be protected.

Sent Department 684, Department pass Paris 43 for GADel, Cairo 85 and London 25. Repeated Beirut 57, Jerusalem 50. Pouched other Arab capitals, Ankara.

KEELEY

501.BB Palestine/11-348 : Telegram

*The United States Delegation to the Acting Secretary of State*TOP SECRET URGENT
NIACT

PARIS, November 3, 1948—11 p. m.

Delga 591. Eyes alone for Lovett from Rusk. Secretary met this evening with Austin, Dulles, Mrs. Roosevelt, Jessup, Cohen, Bohlen, Gross and staff to discuss US position in SC Thursday afternoon. Staff here, after careful study Subcommittee Draft Resolution ¹ and assessment general situation with other delegations and attitude of parties recommended to Secretary that we make effort to obtain three changes:

First, to change word "endorses" at beginning fourth paragraph to read "takes note of". This change would remove inconsistency between present fourth and fifth paragraphs, since preciseness of Acting Mediator's request would constitute serious limitation upon flexibility intended for him in fifth paragraph.

Second, to add following language after words "interested governments" in fifth paragraph: "Without prejudice to their rights, claims or position with regard to a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine or to the position which members of the Security Council may wish to take in the General Assembly on such peaceful adjustment". Purpose this change to separate issue of truce from final settlement and to resist charge that we are trying to frame final settlement under guise truce enforcement. Eban told us today McNeil told him that UK was pressing resolution in direct connection final disposal Negeb. If true, this would seriously embarrass us because we are dealing with matter as straight truce matter.

Third, as an alternative last paragraph: "Appoints a Committee of the Council, consisting of the five permanent members together with Belgium and Colombia to advise the Acting Mediator with regard to his responsibilities under this resolution, and in the event that either party or both should fail to comply with the preceding paragraph of this resolution, to study as a matter of urgency and to report to the council on further measures it would be appropriate to take under Chapter VII of the Charter". This change would provide some safeguard on very wide discretion given Mediator in previous paragraph, would not require such committee to undertake immediate study of sanctions, and would use general term Chapter VII rather than Article 41.²

Group named first paragraph agreed changes suggested by staff would greatly improve resolution from our point of view and, although

¹ See telegram Delga 559, p. 1538.

² For statement by Mr. Jessup before the Security Council on November 4, offering these amendments, see SC, 3rd yr., No. 124, p. 2.

one or two might have had reservations, no serious divergence now appears likely within USDel here.

No need to remind you that considerable differences between present resolution, particularly if our changes are accepted, and original text gives us opportunity to offset prospective charge that another reversal has occurred if we support truce resolution. Number of Israel objections have now been met and issue is narrowed down to simple question truce observance on which our attitude has never been in doubt.

In private conversation this evening, Bunche remarked that he could usually tell from attitude of Eban what success Eban was having from US. He added that Eban had been conciliatory today, from which he gathered that we had been firm with Eban on truce observance. We had, in fact, insisted strongly with Eban this morning that truce was vital and that SC could not compromise on such fundamental issue.

Secretary indicated to group that he considered our instructions permitted us to seek amendments of the nature indicated so long as the integrity of basic truce was not endangered. We have not been able as yet to learn attitude of sponsors of resolution toward our suggested changes, but will forward this as soon as possible. [Rusk.]

MARSHALL

501.BB Palestine/11-448

Mr. Aubrey S. Eban to the Secretary of State, at Paris

Aut. 04-10
04-41

PARIS, 4th November, 1948.

SIR: I have the honour to present the compliments and respects of Mr. Moshe Shertok, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Israel, and to convey the following information on his behalf:

1. Approaches of a serious and welcome character are being made by responsible Egyptian circles for negotiations with Israeli authorities on the adjustment of the immediate situation in the Negev, and on a possible permanent settlement between the two Governments in that area.¹ The incentive for these negotiations was the failure of the Egyptians to maintain their obstruction of Jewish communications, and the defeat of their armies in these fruitless attempts. These negotiation prospects would be gravely impaired by any premature action by the Security Council in upsetting the existing situation.² They would, on the other hand, be greatly enhanced by Security Council

¹ Mr. Epstein, presumably on November 3, gave information of a similar character to Mr. Lovett, who suggested that Epstein "pass this info on to his delegation Paris in order that latter might inform members SC this development." (Telegram Gadel 381, November 3, 4 p. m., to Paris, 501.BB Palestine/11-148)

² According to Mr. Epstein, the Provisional Government was "terribly concerned lest vote on subcommittee report (Gadel 381) interfere."

action summoning both parties to negotiate directly or through the Mediator on current outstanding questions. This latter course has been publicly recommended by the Mediator.

Details of the approaches to which I refer above have been conveyed to Mr. Dean Rusk, who has also conveyed to the Government of Israel an important approach by the Government of Transjordan, which also, in Mr. Shertok's view, arises out of the new position in the Negev.

2. In his recent telegram to you Mr. Shertok placed primary emphasis on the inability of Israeli forces to withdraw from positions which they now hold in the Negev territory of Israel, and also on the circumstances which operate against the return of Egyptian troops to the positions which they previously held as a result of their unauthorised invasion of Palestine territory last May. Mr. Shertok now asks me to state that, even if a return of Egyptian troops is not intended, the objections of the Government of Israel to a Jewish withdrawal from the positions now held would remain unaffected. The Government of Israel is not able to give up Israeli territory, regardless of whether it be re-occupied by the enemy or "neutralised". It regards the "neutral zone" proposal as calculated to prejudice the territorial issue against Israel, and as constituting an inadmissible confusion of two questions. The Security Council is primarily concerned with the cessation of hostilities, a result which has already actually been achieved. It should not take action which would prejudice the discussion of the territorial dispositions raised in the Mediator's Report now before the Assembly.³

3. Mr. Shertok wishes to add that he has information from United Kingdom sources that the object of any withdrawal of Israeli troops is conceived by the sponsors of the Draft Resolution as being quite frankly to secure the detachment from Israel of the greater part of its territory without its consent. Such a withdrawal would gravely prejudice Israel's political position.⁴

I have [etc.]

AUBREY S. EBAN

*Representative of the Provisional
Government of Israel at the United Nations*

³ Mr. Epstein, in discussion with Department officers on November 4, "adduced argument for Israel remaining in military occupation of northern Negev on grounds that, if forced to withdraw, Arabs would be encouraged to further action and in any case would feel their hands so strengthened as to make possibility of negotiations very slight. Epstein deplored US support of SC res. on grounds it might jeopardize prospect of negotiation and said his govt was content with res. of Oct. 19. We [the Department officers] reviewed our position under resolutions of May 29, July 15 and Aug. 19, stressing that Govt. of Israel could have been under no illusion as to meaning of language in these resolutions." (Telegram Gadel 412, November 5, 7 p. m., to Paris, 501.BB Palestine/11-548)

⁴ Mr. Rusk acknowledged Mr. Eban's letter on November 8. Cairo, on November 4, expressed great doubt that the Egyptians had approached the Israelis regarding peace negotiations (telegram 1569, 501.BB Palestine/11-448). The following day, however, Cairo advised that an Arab League official had informed the Embassy that a secret delegation had been sent to the Israelis for such negotiations (telegram 1573, 501.BB Palestine/11-548).

*Resolution 61 (1948) Adopted by the Security Council on November 4, 1948*¹

The Security Council,

Having decided on 15 July 1948 that, subject to further decision by the Security Council or the General Assembly, the truce shall remain in force in accordance with resolution 54 (1948) of that date and with resolution 50 (1948) of 29 May 1948 until a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine is reached,

Having decided on 19 August that no party is permitted to violate the truce on the ground that it is undertaking reprisals or retaliations against the other party, and that no party is entitled to gain military or political advantage through violation of the truce,

Having decided on 29 May that, if the truce was subsequently repudiated or violated by either party or by both, the situation in Palestine could be reconsidered with a view to action under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

Takes note of the request communicated to the Government of Egypt and the Provisional Government of Israel by the Acting Mediator on 26 October following upon the decisions adopted by the Security Council on 19 October 1948;

Calls upon the interested Governments, without prejudice to their rights, claims or positions with regard to a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine or to the position which the Members of the United Nations may wish to take in the General Assembly on such peaceful adjustment:

(1) To withdraw those of their forces which have advanced beyond the positions held on 14 October, the Acting Mediator being authorized to establish provisional lines beyond which no movement of troops shall take place;

(2) To establish, through negotiations conducted directly between the parties, or, failing that, through the intermediaries in the service of the United Nations, permanent truce lines and such neutral or demilitarized zones as may appear advantageous, in order to ensure henceforth the full observance of the truce in that area. Failing an agreement, the permanent lines and neutral zones shall be established by decision of the Acting Mediator;

Appoints a committee of the Council, consisting of the five permanent members together with Belgium and Colombia, to give such advice as the Acting Mediator may require with regard to his responsibilities under this resolution and, in the event that either party or both should

¹ Reprinted from SC, 3rd yr., *Resolutions, 1948*, p. 28. The Council adopted the resolution by nine votes to one (the Ukraine), with the Soviet Union abstaining. For the official record of the voting, during which the United States amendments were accepted, see SC, 3rd yr., No. 124, pp. 38-43.

The Committee of the Security Council on the Palestinian Question held its first meeting on November 10.

fail to comply with sub-paragraphs (1) and (2) of the preceding paragraph of this resolution within whatever time limits the Acting Mediator may think it desirable to fix, to study as a matter of urgency and to report to the Council on further measures it would be appropriate to take under Chapter VII of the Charter.

501.BB Palestine/10-3048

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Forrestal)

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, November 4, 1948.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: Thank you for your letter of October 30, 1948,¹ transmitting a memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the question of an international police force for Jerusalem. Your letter suggests that the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff be the subject of consideration and decision by the National Security Council; and recommends that the most serious consideration be given to the last paragraph of the Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum, which indicates that possibly the necessary police force for Jerusalem could be recruited and administered by the "administering authority" of the Jerusalem enclave.

Under the trusteeship system of the United Nations, or the special international program envisaged in the November 29, 1947 resolution of the General Assembly, or the more generalized proposal of the Bernadotte plan, the "administering authority" for the Jerusalem enclave might be either the United Nations itself or one or more governments which would be appointed by the General Assembly as the "administering authority". In the former case the recruitment of an international police force for Jerusalem would, in all practical effect, be the same as recruitment of individuals by the Secretary General of the United Nations. If a specific government or governments were charged with responsibility as "administering authority" for Jerusalem presumably their nationals only would make up the security force.

In light of the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that neither United States, nor Soviet, nor Soviet satellite forces, should be introduced into Palestine, it would appear to follow that the Joint Chiefs of Staff contemplate that the "administering authority" for Jerusalem be either the United Nations itself or some government a member of the United Nations, which is not either the United States, the Soviet Union, or a satellite of the USSR. This Department is not aware of any government which would be prepared to undertake the onerous and expensive obligations of administering the Jerusalem enclave unless it might be the Provisional Government of Israel, which would

¹ Not printed, but see footnote 3, p. 1525.

be bitterly opposed by Arab States, or possibly some Arab government, which would be opposed by Israel.

On analysis, therefore, it would seem that the "administering authority" for Jerusalem would probably not be a single government or governments but, if so voted by the General Assembly, would be the United Nations itself. In this case, recruitment of the Jerusalem security force would be practically the same as that described in Paragraph (b) of the Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum.

Meanwhile, I concur in your view that this problem should be reviewed as a matter of urgency by the National Security Council.

Sincerely yours,

ROBERT A. LOVETT

501.BB Palestine/11-448: Telegram

Mr. Wells Stabler to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

AMMAN, November 4, 1948—9 a. m.

103. King made following comments this morning:

1. Gratified by reelection President who, through previous experience, knows Arabs and their problems.

2. Many delegations of Palestine Arabs have come and are coming to him but not at his suggestion or that of Transjordan Government (Jerusalem's 1451, November 2 to Department¹) to request him take lead either in fighting or, failing that, making peace and said he did not wish open direct negotiations with Jews at this stage in view attitude other Arab states and fact that Palestine question being considered by UN. If he could "finish" with Egypt, Syria and Lebanon he would then be free to do what he considered best.

3. Mentioned telegram from Sassoon and government's reply (mytel 102, November 1²) and said he understood food supplies were being permitted passage to Jewish police on Mt. Scopus. Did not seem concerned by Jerusalem situation and believed there was understanding between Jews and Arab Legion re Mt. Scopus. Reiterated his desire for peaceful settlement.

Department pass Jerusalem as 64.

STABLER

¹ Not printed.

² Not printed; it reported that Elias Sassoon of the Israeli Delegation at Paris had sent a "hardly conciliatory" telegram in English to the Transjordanian Prime Minister on October 29. The telegram claimed that despite an agreement worked out under United Nations auspices, the Arab Legion was preventing food supplies from reaching the Jewish police on Mount Scopus and that the Jewish personnel there were nearing famine. The Transjordanian Government had replied on October 31 that the agreement remained in force and that the Arab Legion was under standing orders to observe it. Mr. Stabler observed that Mr. Sassoon's message was the first open and direct communication by the Jews to Transjordanian authorities. (501.BB Palestine/11-148)

Truman Papers, President's Secretary's File

*The President of the Provisional Government of Israel (Weizmann)
to President Truman*

[REHOVOTH,] 5th November, 1948.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT, Permit me to extend to you most hearty congratulations and good wishes on your re-election. We in this country have been watching the progress of the Presidential contest with bated breath and I am sure that I am speaking the mind of the bulk of my people when I say that we feel deeply thankful that the people of the United States have given you the opportunity of shaping the policies of your country and the affairs of humanity at large during the next critical four years. We interpret their vote as an emphatic endorsement of the policy of peace, security and ordered progress in world affairs for which you have stood since you assumed your high office and for the continued prosecution of which men and women in every part of the globe pray with all their hearts. May you be granted health and strength to carry out your noble purpose.

We have special cause to be gratified at your re-election because we are mindful of the enlightened help which you gave to our cause in these years of our struggle. We particularly remember your unflinching advocacy of the admission of Jewish refugees to Palestine, your determined stand against the attempts to deflect you from your course, your staunch support of our admission to statehood at Lake Success, and your recognition of the fact of its establishment within an hour of our proclamation of independence. We pray that your assistance and guidance may be extended to us also in the coming years. We have succeeded in the past twelve months in defending our independence against enemies from every quarter—north, south and east, as in Biblical times—and in setting up the framework of our State. Enemy armies are still on the borders of our country, maintained there, I regret to say, by the vacillating attitude of the United Nations which have imposed a truce that is becoming ever more, not a forerunner of peace, but an instrument of war. Our essential aim is peace and reconstruction. While the eyes of the world have been turned on to the battlefields in the south and the north, we have succeeded in liquidating one refugee camp after another in Europe and bringing the chance of a new life to thousands of ruined men and women whom the world has all but forgotten. We have brought over 62,000 since we attained independence. To develop this great effort at human rehabilitation we need, above all, three things: first peace; second recognition; and third financial and economic support for the execution of those large projects of agricultural and industrial development which are essential for the absorption of newcomers and the economic progress of the country.

The most important requirement at this moment is that this unreal

and untenable truce be brought to an end and be supplanted by a speedy and enduring peace. Over two months ago we asked the Mediator to call both sides to the conference table, but the other side rejected our offer. We have no aggressive designs against anyone and we are at any moment ready to negotiate a peace settlement. Our enemies have failed in their efforts to beat us by brute force although they outnumbered us by 20 to 1. They are now endeavouring through the medium of the Security Council to undermine the decision taken by the General Assembly last November and to deprive us of the undeveloped areas of the Negev which offer space for new homes for many thousands of our uprooted people, and which will remain a desert land if they are annexed by the neighbouring Arab States, as is evidently intended. This is the real purpose behind the Security Council's Resolution introduced by Great Britain which to my deep regret was supported by the American Delegation. We have no choice but to oppose this design which would destroy last November's decision of the General Assembly and would reduce us to a state of permanent insecurity and vulnerability.

I pray with all my heart that you, Mr. President, may use your high authority to put an end to these hostile manoeuvres. We have successfully withstood the onslaught of the Arab States, who were sent against us by the British, almost like a pack of hired assassins. I am saying this with deep pain because I have throughout my life been deeply attached to Great Britain and have suffered for that attachment. But the evidence unfortunately all points in this direction, and even as I write we are receiving constant reports of Great Britain rearming the Arabs to enable them to re-start hostilities against us. Having failed in her efforts to wipe out our young commonwealth, she now appears bent on detaching the Negev from our State. I feel emboldened to ask for your intervention in this matter, remembering the deep sympathy and understanding which you displayed when I had the privilege of stating to you our case on the Negev and displaying to you maps showing its potentialities for settlement. It was with a deep feeling of elation that I left you on that day and it is this which now encourages me to plead for your intervention to prevent this part of the country, which was allotted to us last November, from being detached from our State. Sheer necessity compels us to cling to the Negev. Our pioneers have done yeoman work in opening up this semi-arid country; they have built pipe lines through the desert, set up agricultural settlements, planted gardens and orchards in what was for many centuries a barren land. They will not give up this land unless they are bodily removed from it.

I venture to hope that clear and firm instructions be issued on this vital matter to the American Delegation in Paris which has of late, apparently, not received directives corresponding to the views which,

I know, you hold on the subject. I would further plead that you may find it possible to direct the competent authorities to enable us to secure that long-term financial assistance which is urgently needed of the execution of the great scheme of reconstruction which I had the privilege of submitting to you in the Summer.

With every good wish,¹

Sincerely yours,

CH. WEIZMANN

¹ President Truman sent this letter to Mr. Niles on November 22 under cover of a memorandum which read: "Attached is a letter from President Weizmann of Israel. I wish you would analyze it and suggest an answer." (Truman Papers, President's Secretary's File)

501.BB Palestine/11-548

*Memorandum by Mr. Robert M. McClintock to the Acting Secretary of State (Lovett)*¹

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] November 5, 1948.

Subject: Future Course on Palestine

The Security Council has passed its tenth resolution seeking to enforce a truce in Palestine by exhortation. It is to be doubted whether this resolution, unaided by diplomatic action, will be successful in securing a withdrawal of Israeli forces from the northern Negev, to say nothing of a withdrawal of their forces from the frontiers of Lebanon.

The First Committee of the Assembly will next week undoubtedly commence its scrutiny of the Bernadotte Plan. Since the British Minister of State, Hector McNeil, has, according to a telegram received by Mr. Epstein from Mr. Eban, told the Israeli Representative in Paris that the Security Council resolution passed last night was designed by the British for its political effect and for the purpose of carrying out the Bernadotte Plan, the Provisional Government of Israel will most certainly have an additional motive to disregard the Security Council's order. We shall thus find ourselves, on the one hand, debating the Bernadotte Plan in the Assembly and, on the other, making increasingly futile gestures in the Security Council with regard to effective maintenance of the truce, unless pursuant to yesterday's resolution we join with other governments in getting down to brass tacks on applying Chapter VII sanctions, which in this case would most probably run against Israel. Please see in this connection General

¹ In a separate transmitting memorandum of November 5, Mr. McClintock noted that "The attached memorandum has been gone over by Mr. Satterthwaite and has received his general concurrence. If any or all of the suggestions set forth in the memorandum meet with your approval, NEA and UNA will be glad to develop a memorandum for the White House which could be submitted to the President for his reactions." At this point, Mr. Lovett wrote a marginal notation, reading: "Better see me."

Riley's top secret despatch to the Chief of Naval Operations, of November 4, attached.²

The damage to United States prestige in the United Nations, given this set of circumstances, is only rivaled by the greater damage to the prestige and the effectiveness of the United Nations itself which will shortly, in my opinion, have reached a new nadir of impotence unless immediate steps are taken to redress the situation.

It would seem necessary urgently to review United States policy toward Palestine and to ascertain what are the President's desires. At the moment we have a Presidential directive of October 21, reaffirmed as according to Telmar 130, November 2, to stand firm by our pronouncements in the Security Council. We have a Presidentially approved position with regard to the territorial settlement, as contained in Department's telegram 72 of September 1, to Tel Aviv. This position is in general agreement with the territorial recommendations of the Bernadotte Plan, except for the northern Negev. We also have the Secretary's statement of September 21, supporting the Bernadotte conclusions in their entirety.

Finally, we have the President's speech at Madison Square Garden of October 28, in which he says that Israel should be "large enough, free enough, and strong enough to make its people self-supporting and secure".³

I believe the Department could fairly recommend to the President, in light of the foregoing documents, that our Delegation follow a course in Paris designed to secure most of the considerations in the Bernadotte Plan, with the important modification that Israel should be permitted to expand its southern frontiers into that portion of the northern Negev where most of the twenty-three Jewish settlements are situated. However, in order to retain at least some "face" for the Security Council it would seem essential that Israel make at least a token withdrawal of its forces in the northern Negev pursuant to the Security Council's resolution of yesterday. A convenient formula for achieving a political settlement along these lines, in my opinion, would be for Israel to withdraw its troops more or less to the position held on October 14, in return for assurances that the Egyptian forces will remain where they are as of today. The disputed territory in the northern Negev would become a United Nations No-Man's Land, to borrow Dr. Bunche's phrase, and be held open for the eventual return to Israeli sovereignty when recommended by the General Assembly.

I should like to stress once more the belief that too little reliance has been placed upon diplomacy in the recent phase of the Palestine problem. The Jews have repeatedly indicated their desire for direct

² Not found attached.

³ For relevant portion of this speech, see *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Harry S. Truman, 1948* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 913.

negotiations and there is increasing evidence that conversations have taken place in Paris, if not elsewhere, to that end between representatives of Israel and certain of the Arab governments. I think that the United States and Great Britain could do much by diplomatic representations to suggest to the parties the need for getting together on some common-sense settlement. Ambassador Griffis' telegram No. 1567, November 4,⁴ lends emphasis to this point. We have certain diplomatic tools which have thus far gone unused as, for example, the question of *de jure* recognition and effective support of Israel's application for membership in the United Nations, and the Specialized Agencies.

Accordingly, it would seem useful also to recommend to the President for his approval that the Department undertake friendly diplomatic action with the Representatives of Israel, both here and in Paris and Tel Aviv, to explore the grounds of a lasting settlement. Similar representations could also be made in certain of the Arab capitals.

Meanwhile, I think it would be useful if an effort were made in London to regain some of the ground which has been lost mutually between the British and American positions. The current British talk of commencing to rearm the Arabs is mischievous and will have an effect contrary from that hoped for by Messrs. McNeil and Bevin.

⁴Not printed; it conveyed the Ambassador's strongly held opinion that "this is psychological moment to bring to and hold before UN firmly resolved plan for Palestine partition jointly approved by UK and US. No matter what plan for such partition and settlement is agreed upon by top levels it should now be forced through by any means possible. . . . world interests, American interests and Near East interests particularly can best be served by forcing early decision if possible." (501.BB Palestine/11-448)

501.BB Palestine/11-548: Telegram

The Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald)
*to the Acting Secretary of State*¹

TOP SECRET

US URGENT

TEL AVIV, November 5, 1948—1 p. m.

NIACT

237. Press accounts here are not entirely clear as to precise effects of SC resolution of November 4 re Negev withdrawal and study of sanctions.

However, in this development my opinion (in which mission staff concurs) is that it opens up the possibility envisaged in my warning

¹The expression "for personal attention President and Acting Secretary" was omitted from this telegram because of an oversight of the code clerk at Tel Aviv (telegram 239, November 7, noon, from Tel Aviv, 501.BB Palestine/11-748). Telegram 237 was delivered to the White House at 4 p. m. Eastern Standard Time on November 6 (telegram 203, November 6, 3 p. m., to Tel Aviv, 501.BB Palestine/11-548).

telegrams Nos. 70, August 24² and 217, October 29.³ Our analysis present situation follows:

1. It is wholly unrealistic politically and militarily imagine Israel will return to October 14 line in Negev thus re-delivering fate of settlements (located in area included Israel by November 29 partition) to mercy invading Egyptian forces which did everything possible destroy settlements during five months warfare notwithstanding UN supervision. Furthermore, in view serious depletion Egyptian Army in Negev, Egypt would have to send new forces to occupy restored portions. Press reports of Bunche statement concerning extreme tension in Negev not corroborated by personal partial inspection by military attaché and general belief here. On contrary, Egyptians voluntarily withdrew from Isdud and Majdal. Faluja pocket relatively quiet except one unsuccessful attempt break out after Israelis evacuated Egyptian wounded at latter's request.

2. While Sino-UK resolution, as amended by US, may be interpreted as delaying action regards sanctions, the power to set date restoration Negev positions risks heavy blow to UN prestige unless US and other powers prepared implement enforcement. As stated referenced telegrams this would, we believe, precipitate conflict between West and Israel. This would give opportunity USSR supply aid sufficient render economic sanctions ineffective.

3. Meantime passage of resolution has increased tension here. If Israel believes sanctions are inevitable she may try, before sanctions could become effective, destroy the Iraqi Army which as per Mistel unnumbered, October 29 (MAI 9)⁴ and Bunche's statement of November 4, is giving ample provocations. Military attaché thinks Israel capable defeating Iraqi, as both north and south fronts now quiet. Such anticipatory military action is highly possible unless Israel has positive assurance veto by Soviets of proposed sanctions. This reliance would, from US viewpoint, make Israel dangerously indebted to USSR. The danger I fear most is that in its understandable desire to keep in step with Britain—despite HMG's record of a decade of mistakes and humiliations in this area and the British Foreign Minister's personal inclination blame President Truman for HMG's failures in Palestine since Anglo-American Committee report—the Department may yield to Bevin's intransigency. To do that would delay peace, weaken the US's influence and gratuitously enlarge the influence of the USSR in this strategic area.

Please inform Army CSGID.

McDONALD

² See telegram of August 24, p. 1337.

³ *Ante*, p. 1525.

⁴ The editors have been unable to identify this paper.

501.BB Palestine/11-648

Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State to President Truman

SECRET

WASHINGTON, November 6, 1948.

Reference is made to the Department's memorandum of October 26, 1948,¹ concerning the draft resolution for aid to Palestinian refugees

¹ Copy not found in Department of State files.

which you approved for introduction by the United States Delegation to the General Assembly jointly with the United Kingdom Delegation. This resolution, slightly amended and sponsored also by Belgium and the Netherlands, is now under discussion in the General Assembly. While the resolution does not commit the United States Government at this stage, it is essential that our Delegation be in a position to announce the amount of the contribution which this Government intends to propose to Congress, in order to stimulate contributions from other governments and to obtain a \$5,000,000 advance from the United Nations Working Capital Fund for immediate relief purposes. The total estimated relief requirements presented by the Acting Mediator to the General Assembly amount to \$32,000,000. Because of the critical importance of the Near East to our national security, it is our belief that the United States should contribute fifty per cent of the requirements as determined by the General Assembly.

It is therefore recommended that the United States Delegation to the General Assembly be authorized to announce the intention of this Government to seek an appropriation from Congress of approximately \$16,000,000, provided that the amount of the United States contribution is not more than fifty per cent of the estimated requirements as determined by the General Assembly.

If you approve this course of action, the Department will undertake informal consultation with Congressional leaders.²

ROBERT A. LOVETT

² Approved by President Truman in a marginal notation on November 6.

501.BB Palestine/11-648 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET NIACT

PARIS, November 6, 1948—6:50 p. m.

Delga 634. Verbatim text Palestine resolution drafted by Bunche for possible use in SC follows:

"The SC

"Having decided on 15 July, 1948 that subject to further decision by the SC or the GA, the truce in Palestine shall remain in force in accordance with the resolution of that date and with that of 29 May, 1948, until a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine is reached;

"Recognizing that in the nature of the case the truce, though of indeterminate duration, must be considered as a first stage in the effort to restore peace to Palestine, and that the transition from truce to the termination of the war is an indispensable condition to an ultimate peaceful settlement of the basic political issues;

"Having in mind the conditions which thus far have obstructed all

efforts to induce the parties to settle their differences by voluntary negotiation;

"*Desirous* of facilitating the transition from truce to permanent peace in Palestine at the earliest possible date; and

"*Taking into account* the resolution of 15 July, 1948 which determined that the situation in Palestine constitutes a threat to the peace within the meaning of Article 39 of the Charter;

"*Calls upon* the parties directly involved in the conflict in Palestine, in order to eliminate this threat to the peace, to undertake immediately to enter into negotiations, either directly or through the acting United Nations mediator on Palestine, with a view to,

"*a.* The settlement of all outstanding problems of the truce in all sectors of Palestine;

"*b.* The attainment of an armistice involving either withdrawal and demobilization of armed forces engaged in the Palestine conflict or their wide separation by creation of broad demilitarized zones under UN supervision; and

"Requests the parties and the acting UN mediator on Palestine to submit to this council frequent reports on the progress of the negotiations."¹

Repeated London as 1205.

MARSHALL

¹ The United States Delegation, on November 6, recommended supporting and voting for the Bunche draft resolution (telegram Delga 632 from Paris, 501.BB Palestine/11-648). The Department, the following day, authorized United States support for the Bunche draft but directed the Delegation not to introduce and not to cosponsor the measure. These directives were "cleared [with] Key West", (Telegram Gadel 420 to Paris, 501.BB Palestine/11-748).

Mr. Bunche submitted a revised draft of his proposed resolution to the Security Council on November 9; for text, see SC 3rd yr., No. 124, p. 62. The following day, the Soviet Representative submitted amendments whose major proposal was "The establishment of a formal peace involving such ultimate withdrawal and reduction of these forces as will ensure the restoration of Palestine to peacetime conditions." (*Ibid.*, p. 64)

501.BB Palestine/11-948: Telegram

Mr. Wells Stabler to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

AMMAN, November 9, 1948—9 a. m.

112. Notwithstanding rumors persisting in Jew Jerusalem that direct negotiations now in progress between Israeli and Transjordan representatives (Jerusalem's 1459, November 6 to Department¹) and information reported in Jerusalem's 1461, November 4 [6] to Department,² no evidence is available Amman to substantiate such reports. Reports seemingly have all originated from Jewish sources and it is

¹ Not printed.

² Not printed; it reported information that the entourage of the Acting Mediator at Paris "suspects existence secret agreement between Arab Legion and Jewish forces which will prevent resumption hostilities Jerusalem." (501.BB Palestine/11-648)

possible Jews are either engaged in creating "war of nerves" between Arab states or are sounding.

2. It is increasingly apparent, however, that official and public opinion, in Transjordan and Arab Legion occupied areas of Palestine is orienting itself toward [an end of?] hostilities and reaching settlement of some sort, through direct negotiations if necessary. Developments in this direction may well manifest themselves in near future.

3. Numbers of delegations of Palestine Arabs, residents of towns as well as refugees, have approached King in past weeks requesting, and some even demanding, that he undertake negotiations. While probably idle threats, several delegations have said that if King would not negotiate with Jews, they would.

4. Within past few days King has commenced to speak more openly and publicly than before of negotiations and settlement. His previous remarks on subject were for official consumption only.

5. In view of King's present outlook, Prime Minister has told His Majesty that if latter does place himself on public record at this stage as favoring negotiations, government will be obliged resign. However, Prime Minister said government not adverse to principles itself and suggested that, as evidence its attitude, he (Prime Minister) send telegram to Prince Abdel Majid Haidar, Transjordan Minister to London and observer to UNGA, requesting him to renew contacts with Jews in Paris. (It is understood that such message has in fact been despatched.)

During Cabinet meeting at Palace on November 5, Prime Minister told King that should His Majesty desire now or later to initiate negotiations, government would voluntarily resign and give its support to another government willing and ready to undertake task. Because of policy which his government has advocated and pursued during its tenure of office (i.e. no open break with Arab League), Prime Minister said present government not able assume functions of negotiator. (It is reliably reported that King is thinking of Fellah Pasha Medadba, Justice Minister, possible Prime Minister "Negotiator" government). Attitude of government is significant change as three weeks ago it would not have given even tacit consent to such principle.

6. While all signs point to possibility of negotiations, direct or indirect within relatively short time, must be pointed out that up to present nobody has displayed degree of moral courage sufficient to "take the plunge" in making initial overtures to Jews or to bear up under odium which would undoubtedly be heaped upon him by Arab extremist elements, which, while willing to profit by benefits derived, would be equally delighted to have "scapegoat".

Department pass Jerusalem, 68 Gadel 10, and Arab capitals.

STABLER

501.BB Palestine/11-948 : Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

JERUSALEM, November 9, 1948—3 p. m.

1468. French Consul General Neuville and I, representing Truce Commission, yesterday visited Arab Jerusalem. Discussed alleged Jewish Arab talks, military position Arabs and demilitarized Jerusalem. Abdullah El Tel, military governor Arab Jerusalem stated flatly no military accord exists between Arab Legion and Jewish military forces Jerusalem. Consul General believes statement and although without information military governor felt informal political talks between either Transjordan or Egypt and PGI possible. He asserted Palestine Arabs discouraged and asking King Abdullah settle issue any way sees fit. Willingness admit possibility talks reflects extent Arab disillusionment. British Consul General stated had no information re Arab talks with Jews and that conversations with Egypt more likely at present than with Abdullah.

Rumors direct negotiations still appear prominently in local Jewish press. Apparently encouraged by PGI perhaps to sow further dissension among Arab states. Reliable American correspondent states good source informs dispute in progress within Israeli Government over whether initiate talks with Transjordan or Egypt. Mapam favors Egypt claiming Abdullah British puppet and Egypt only independent Arab nation. Mapai favor Abdullah since considered more reliable and realistic. Consul General unable find evidence Jerusalem for believing other than informal talks now in progress between Jews and either Abdullah or Egypt probably at Paris. All Arab rulers reluctant make first open move for fear being branded traitor. All seeking face saving device which talks through United Nations might provide.

Abdullah El Tel described Arab military situation as "desperate". Although maintained Arab Legion would fight fiercely if attacked, admitted little chance success. Stated had hoped Egyptians would at least hold their positions but just ran (Jewish press today reports Egyptians evacuating Gaza). Claimed Iraqis did well in battle Jenin but doubt can withstand Jewish assault. Startling change evident in Arab attitude from cockiness displayed before Negev offensive to present willingness face facts, admit own military impotence and seek end conflict.

Arab eagerly inquired when Truce Commission would present plan for demilitarization Jerusalem. Even described demilitarization as "only hope". Dislike provisions permitting Jews retain normally Arab quarters now held but acceptance proposals as whole most likely.

From information available here Consul General feels recent Jewish offensives changed conflict from one between Arabs and Jews to one between United Nations and Jews. Arabs tacitly admit and Consul

General fully concurs Jews can do what they wish militarily. Question becomes what will United Nations allow and what measures will use enforce decisions. Arabs realize clearly dependence on United Nations and hope for some face saving exit. Solution must take account necessity salvaging United Nations as well as Arab prestige.

Sent Department 1468; Department pass Paris for Gadel 7, Cairo 135; repeated Baghdad 25, Beirut 93, Damascus 44; pouched Jidda, Amman.

BURDETT

501.BB Palestine/11-948: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET US URGENT
NIACT

PARIS, November 9, 1948—6 p. m.

Delga 661. Two-hour conference last night, Jessup, Ross with Pearson, McNaughton (Canada), McNeil, Beeley (UK) on SC phase Palestine question failed produce agreement on text of resolution along lines Bunche draft.

Pearson apparently strongly favors Bunche approach but not willing take initiative in absence agreement between US and UK. Pearson favors Bunche draft because he feels November 4 resolution probably a mistake for reasons (a) very doubtful whether SC would follow through and apply sanctions if Jews refuse withdraw from present Negev positions; and (b) if SC failed to apply sanctions in such event, whatever authority remains to SC would be completely lost and Jews would probably feel free take over all of Palestine. He favors Bunche resolution because he feels this gives Jews a way out of dilemma they are in and might induce them to do what they could not do in face of SC order.

McNeil argued very strongly in favor of pending UK resolution and indicated UK felt it essential to extend scope November 4 resolution, in particular to situation in northern Galilee (with Israeli forces still on Lebanese territory). While admitting difficulty Israelis complying any SC withdrawal order because of public opinion and political difficulties at home, UK felt strongly SC must maintain its authority and apply sanctions in event Israeli refusal to withdraw from advanced positions in Negev and northern Galilee. He indicated UK Government firmly committed assist Arabs in event failure SC to apply sanctions in circumstances indicated. Beeley showed us this morning Foreign Office telegram instructing UKDel to "strongly oppose any further consideration Bunche resolution". Two principal arguments against Bunche resolution in Foreign Office view are (a) passage this resolution would confuse peaceful settlement efforts of GA and by drawing "negotiation red herring" across trail might well

ruin chances of effective GA action on Bernadotte Plan, and (b) resolution along Bunche lines would appear to supplant and in any case would definitely weaken effect November 4 resolution. Foreign Office telegram was, however, despatched before UKDel here had cabled report last night's discussion.

Conversation with Parodi this morning indicates he also feels November 4 resolution a mistake and that he strongly favors SC action along lines Bunche resolution. He stated he cannot understand at all objectives UK policy and feels may lead to disaster.

If present situation continues, Council will be in stalemate without possibility majority votes in favor either UK resolution or Bunche resolution. On other hand we feel that it is possible to modify Bunche resolution in such way as to meet UK objections fairly without losing main purpose.

We will, therefore, continue strongly urging UK acceptance compromise text.

Sent Dept Delga 661, repeated London as Paris 1214.

MARSHALL

501.BB Palestine/11-948: Telegram

The Ambassador in Egypt (Griffis) to the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

CAIRO, November 9, 1948—8 p. m.

1585. For Lovett. Against background of (1) my conviction that King Farouk is sole effective source of Egyptian policy today; (2) my belief that HM's influence and prestige are such as to induce other Arab states to follow Egypt's lead; (3) the assumption that UN will either fail to adopt effective measures to bring about settlement in Palestine or will delay taking action until Israelis have completely conquered Negeb, thereby forcing us to abandon our announced support of Bernadotte plan, if we have not already done so, and probably causing collapse Egyptian Government with disastrous impact on stability Middle East, the following thoughts are presented on which I would like the Department's comments.

King Farouk is apparently aware of implications present situation Negeb and may be seeking way out possibly along line direct negotiations. (Embtel 1584, November 9 and Delga telegram 640, November 6).¹ I might further influence King's inclination toward direct

¹ Neither printed.

negotiations by suggesting to His Majesty that US being always eager for peace would look with favor on his entrance into final peace negotiations with Israel and would appreciate instructions being sent his delegation at UN that he was prepared to take this step. His delegation might also be instructed to advise SC or GA. Should King indicate desire for part of Negeb I might also indicate limited US support. I might additionally suggest that US would then promptly agree to negotiate a treaty which would include the exchange of students, et cetera, between the two countries (Fulbright plan); the sending to Egypt from US of such engineering, agricultural and commercial commissions as be desired to aid in Egypt's problems; the existing goodwill Egypt-American treaty of 1929 would be strengthened and extended, the Department would be prepared to recommend to the Tariff Commission a further increase in the cotton quota, et cetera. Facilities might also be granted for training selected Egyptian officers in US Army and air schools, eagerly sought by King Farouk.

I understand perfectly that no military guarantees could be involved and that the proposed treaty would constitute primarily a smokescreen behind which Egypt could negotiate with Israel. HM could, however, combine with his statement of recognition of Israel a statement relative to UN pressure and initiate a tremendous amount of propaganda to what he had accomplished as a result of his negotiations with the US.

The keynote of these suggestions lies in my belief that Egypt desires an authoritative mandate which involves the US rather than the UN. At the same time UN would not be by-passed as HM's entire approach to the matter would be through it.

In this connection Mohamed Ali, uncle of the King, and heir to the throne, stated to me in conversation Saturday that only three things would be required by Egypt to bring settlement Palestine: (1) internationalization of Jerusalem; (2) ejection from Palestine of terrorists and what he described as "Russian Jews"; and (3) guarantee of new borders by US and England.

Please note that practically every high official in government with whom I have discussed Palestine settlement in last ten weeks has referred to this type of guarantee and feeling of impotency of UN guarantee. My answers have been invariably that UN guarantee as good or better than any other as if UN fails we all fail. However, all Egyptians desperately desire US trade-mark.

GRIFFIS

501.BB Palestine/11-1048

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] November 10, 1948.

Participants: Mr. Lovett

Mr. Eliahu Epstein, Chief of Israeli Mission

Mr. Michael Comay, Israeli Representative at United Nations

Mr. Rockwell

Mr. Epstein had requested an appointment to present Mr. Comay. The latter said that the principal reason he had come to the United States was to acquaint Israeli officials in this country with developments in the United Nations.

Mr. Comay stated that the Israeli Government, while in general welcoming Dr. Bunche's proposal looking toward the establishment of an armistice in Palestine, was seriously disturbed by Bunche's suggestion regarding the establishment of demilitarized 'neutral zones. The Provisional Government of Israel felt that this was most unsatisfactory in that such demilitarized zones would be difficult to control and would be subject to entry by irregular forces which would imperil the Jewish settlements. The Provisional Government of Israel would, instead, prefer the demarcation of a line between the Israeli and Egyptian forces.

I pointed out to Mr. Comay that the Bunche resolution does not mention how large the demilitarized zones would be and stated that in my opinion it was essential, if an armistice were to be discussed, that the opposing armies be separated by a neutral zone rather than be face-to-face across a line of demarcation.

Mr. Comay then went on to say that the Israeli Government was also very much disturbed by the Security Council resolution of November 4 calling for withdrawal of forces which had advanced in the Negev beyond the positions held on October 14. The Provisional Government of Israel, said Mr. Comay, was convinced that the British were using this resolution as a means of achieving their ends as regards the final political settlement in Palestine and not merely as a measure in connection with truce violations. Mr. McNeil's statement to Major Eban proved this.

Mr. Comay then produced a cable from Shertok setting forth the points he had just made.

I inquired whether the Provisional Government of Israel's desire not to withdraw from the newly gained positions had anything to do with the forthcoming Israeli elections. Mr. Epstein admitted that domestic political factors were indeed involved, and that the Provisional Government of Israel would be embarrassed politically by such a withdrawal. He said that the extremists were still an important

and dangerous element in Israel and that it was essential they be kept in control. If the Israeli forces should be withdrawn from the new lines in the Negev, apparently under United States and United Kingdom pressure in the United Nations, it would strengthen the hand of those in Israel who claim that the only friend that Israel has is the USSR.

I then went on to mention to Messrs. Comay and Epstein that this Government had given its support to the retention by Israel of the territory allotted to it under the November 29 Security Council resolution, and that this territory included the Negev but did not include Western Galilee or Jaffa, now occupied by the Jews. I said that if the Israelis intended to claim Western Galilee and Jaffa as well as the Negev, their claims to the November 29 territory could not then be justified on the grounds of right and justice. I said that it seemed to me that if Israel desired to retain the Negev she would have to give up Western Galilee. I added that in my opinion, the Provisional Government of Israel was now called upon to show the highest degree of moral courage and statesmanship. The situation in the United Nations as regards Palestine was reaching an impasse and a way had to be found to satisfy, insofar as possible, the claims of all parties without impairing the authority of the United Nations. I said that I would hate to see the matter come to sanctions, but that the United Nations could not continue to be disregarded. I was sure, I added, that a solution could be achieved through negotiation either directly between the parties or through the United Nations, but that it would be necessary for both sides to make some concessions. The United Nations had been and could still be very useful to Israel, and it would make a most unfortunate impression if Israel in the triumph of its military victories, should adopt an uncompromising attitude.

Mr. Comay said that the Provisional Government of Israel regarded the territory allotted to Israel by the November 29 resolution as belonging to Israel by right, and considered that the territory militarily occupied outside of this area could be a matter for discussion. I said that one could discuss all one wanted to, but the fact was that the retention by Israel of Western Galilee as well as the territory allotted to Israel under the November 29 resolution could not be justified on the grounds of right and justice. Mr. Epstein said that the position I had described was entirely correct, and that the Provisional Government of Israel wished to abide by decisions of the United Nations.

Mr. Epstein then said that the Israelis were convinced that it would be possible to work things out by direct negotiations with the Arabs but that the Arabs were encouraged not to negotiate by such United Nations steps as the November 4 resolution and by the machinations of the British.

ROBERT A. LOVETT

867N.01/11-1048 : Telegram

Mr. Wells Stabler to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

AMMAN, November 10, 1948—9 a. m.

113. During conversation evening November 9 with Abdel Moneim Bey Rifai, former Under Secretary Foreign Office and presently King's confidant, following obtained:

1. On November 3 King sent special message to Farouk informing him of desire many Palestine Arabs to end war and reach settlement and of his belief that matter should be seriously considered. Abdullah added he, however, unable take such step alone and wished consult his colleagues. No reply yet received and HM much disappointed. Message believed ill advised and premature as it provides weapon against Transjordan if Egypt and other states choose use it as such.

2. Transjordan delegation to Cairo meeting Arab League Political Committee (mytel 107, November 6¹) had received instructions to explore, without committing itself, attitude Arab delegates towards settlement. Delegation has instead followed lead other Arab states and is reconsidering question unified command Arab armies. On November 7 King received telegram from delegation requesting him send Cairo two senior Arab Legion officers. King apparently annoyed by disobedience his instructions but nonetheless has sent officers.

3. Likely that Political Committee will decide on appointment Egyptian general as supreme commander Arab armies, although Egypt has lost all right that position. Also probable that commander will order Arab Legion to advance in support other armies. However, Legion unable take offensive and order will be disregarded. In such event, Transjordan will again be called "traitor" and will once more take blame for Arab failure.

4. Although Prime Minister willing resign in order new government may commence negotiations, King feels nothing will be achieved such resignation unless all Arab governments resign at same time.

5. King has sent his private secretary, Abdel Ghani Bey Karmi, to Paris and London with instructions to Prince Abdel Majid Haidar re contact with Jews and outline King's views on possible settlement. Latter includes Jaffa, Lydda, Ramale, parts Beisan area and most Negev for Arabs.²

6. When Belgian Consul General met with King October 17 Abdel Moneim Bey acting as interpreter. Initiative re talks with Jews in

¹ Not printed.

² Mr. Stabler, in telegram 114, November 11, reported that the King had sent Abdel Ghani Bey Karmi to Paris and London at the request of the Israelis and that this effort was quite distinct from that involving the message sent to Prince Abdel Majid Haidar as set forth in paragraph numbered 5 of telegram 112, November 9, p. 1556 (867N.01/11-1148).

Paris was taken by Belgian and not by King. Views to be presented were along lines mytel 86, October 21.

Department pass Gadel 11.

STABLER

501.BB Palestine/11-1048 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Paris

TOP SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, November 10, 1948—noon.
NIACT

Telmar 148. Eyes only for the Secretary from Lovett.

1. President discussed our Palestine policy over weekend with Douglas and Lovett. For your information Douglas urged strategic advantage to US of providing Transjordan with a port on the Mediterranean. Douglas also gave considered opinion that (a) British were serious in their talk of rearming Transjordan and Egypt if warfare in violation of truce continued; and (b) that Bevin was now prepared to concede part of northern Negev to Israel.

2. President has established our basic Palestine policy along terms of Democratic Party platform as reaffirmed his statement Oct 24 as follows: "We approve the claim of the State of Israel to the boundaries set forth in the United Nations resolution of Nov 29 and consider that modifications thereof should be made only if fully acceptable to the State of Israel." This position would mean that US would not support a claim by Israel to Jaffa and western Galilee now in its military occupation, the cession of which latter territory to Israel was recommended by Count Bernadotte. It thus seems possible that Israel, as was recommended by Mediator, might well consider relinquishing part of Negev to Arab States as *quid pro quo* for retaining Jaffa and western Galilee. Effect of this would boil down to territorial suggestions to PGI approved by President after discussion with Secretary of State on September 1, as set forth in Deptel 72 that date to Tel Aviv.¹ These suggestions read as follows:

"The United States feels that the new State of Israel should have boundaries which will make it more homogeneous and well integrated than the hourglass frontiers drawn on the map of the November 29 resolution. Perhaps some solution can be worked out as part of any settlement with Transjordan which would materially simplify boundary problem. Specifically, it would appear to us that Israel might expand into the rich area of Galilee, which it now holds in military occupation, in return for relinquishing a large portion of the Negev to Transjordan. This would leave the new State with materially improved frontiers and considerably enriched in terms of natural resources by acquisition of Galilee in return for the desert Negev."

¹ *Ante*, p. 1366.

The President feels that inducement to the parties to negotiate a settlement of the boundary problem will be strengthened by our standing firm on the November 29 boundaries except as modifications may be agreed between parties. If there is no agreement, then the US position will be that the Israelis should relinquish Galilee and Jaffa and the Egyptians should relinquish the Israeli portion of Negev.

3. In light of foregoing basic policy, Delegation should review draft resolution transmitted Delga 351, Oct. 16,² which would have given effect to original Bernadotte Plan. We feel that events have overtaken many aspects of original plan and solution of boundary matters on practical basis in present circumstances is urgently needed. We recall also that President in his statement of Oct 24 said that in UN "a plan has been submitted which provides a basis for a renewed effort to bring about a peaceful adjustment of differences. It is hoped that, by using this plan as a basis of negotiation, the conflicting aims of the parties can be settled".

Problem is therefore to combine fundamental position which President has consistently taken on Palestine—the territorial dispositions of the Nov 29 resolution—with Secretary's general recommendation of Sept 21 on the Bernadotte Plan and with conditions as they exist today. Fortunately we are able to continue to subscribe to all the seven basic premises in the Bernadotte Plan and all his specific conclusions, with the exception of his recommendations regarding the boundaries of Israel. Even on this point, as the record makes clear, Dept expressed reservations with respect to Bernadotte's recommendations on the Negev.

We feel a convenient starting point would be to revert to Bunche's statement before Committee One on Oct 15, when he recapitulated Bernadotte's seven basic premises and stressed that Bernadotte regarded his conclusions as designed principally to afford a basis for negotiation between the parties.

The Govt of Israel has for some time proclaimed its desire to achieve peace in Palestine by direct negotiation. There is now an opportunity for such negotiation. From this Govt's point of view, base line is territorial recommendations of Nov 29 resolution modified by negotiation between the parties if they so desire. Since point at issue is how boundaries of Israel are to be defined by mutual agreement, Israelis and Arabs have choice between Nov 29 boundaries, which will be regarded as having disadvantageous elements from both Jewish and Arab point of view, or some new negotiated frontier.

In plain language, the President's position is that if Israel wishes to retain that part of Negev granted it under Nov 29 resolution, it will have to take the rest of Nov 29 settlement which means giving up western Galilee and Jaffa. We feel that there is room for a mutually

² *Ante*, p. 1481.

advantageous arrangement—Israel to retain western Galilee and Jaffa in return for relinquishing part of Negev to Arab States, presumably Transjordan and Egypt.

We feel that it would be contrary to the President's wishes if US Del came up with a plan of its own at this stage. He feels that our efforts should be directed toward having the two parties settle the matter or stick to the Nov 29 boundaries.

4. For your most secret information, if negotiations are undertaken, our feeling here is that our views on Negev outlined in Deptel 72, Sept 1, to Tel Aviv were then a more equitable and, because of recent developments, are now a more practical, solution. We are inclined to feel that the southern Israeli border, in trade for western Galilee and Jaffa, might be either a line running (a) from Gaza through Beer-sheba and thence southeasterly to Dead Sea, or (b) if necessary to expand area still further, that portion of the Negev allotted to Israel under the Nov 29 resolution lying north of the thirty-first parallel. Since the Nov 29 resolution provided a port for the Arabs on the Mediterranean, we feel this principle should be retained and either (a) or (b) above would seem to accomplish this objective. We think the thirty-first parallel as the negotiated southern frontier of Israel will be found to be the simplest.

5. This telegram has been personally approved by the President.³

LOVETT

³ Mr. Lovett transmitted the text of this telegram in draft form to the White House Signal Center, with a memorandum of November 9, which requested that the telegram be sent to Clark Clifford for the President's approval or comments (501.BB Palestine/11-948). The Acting Secretary, on November 10, suggested to Secretary Marshall that he might wish to send Ambassador Douglas the contents of Telmar 148 (telegram Telmar 151, 501.BB Palestine/11-1048). For the Ambassador's account of the meeting with the President, said to have taken place on November 6, see telegram 4849, November 12, from London, p. 1570. It was not until November 24 that the Department sent excerpts of Telmar 148 for background information to Paris, Moscow, Rome, Ankara, Arab capitals, Tel Aviv, and Jerusalem (telegram 441 to Damascus, 501.BB Palestine/11-2448).

501.BB Palestine/11-1048: Telegram

The Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald)
to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET URGENT
NIACT

TEL AVIV, November 10, 1948—5 p. m.

247. For personal attention President and Acting Secretary. Although necessarily out of touch with details Paris developments Arab refugees, I am fearful following three separate long conferences yesterday with Mohn, Bunche's political adviser; Wolfe, legal adviser ICRC; and Descoedres of UNICEF; that stark mass tragedy will outrun UN Arab refugee efforts.

Diminishing prestige whole Mediator's organization among both Arabs and Jews lessens more than proportionately usefulness Cilento and his scant refugee organization. Moreover, now indisputably clear—as should have been months ago—that Mediator's political role weakens his refugee work. Hence, I hope report of possible UN transfer whole refugee task to Red Cross societies is authentic. Continued failure provide adequate organization and resources would gravely injure authority UN and also hurt position US. British statement yesterday House of Commons shows HMG's concern lest it share odium failure.

I strongly urge that :

1. UN delegation be asked to do utmost speed UN decisions and,
2. A prompt public Presidential appeal be made for essential funds in cooperation with American Red Cross.

I am completely skeptical UN blanket financial appeal to member states whose responses would be slow and inadequate.

Without sensitiveness if again disapproved I repeat earlier suggestion that in role of "refugee expert" I be asked to testify publicly before third committee on urgency governmental and public response comparable to catastrophic need. Such appearance American special representative Israel would help answer Arab criticism that US is disproportionately interested Jews welfare and would not be open to charge of political propaganda.

In view of importance of refugee problem to all countries in Middle East, I also suggest for consideration Department conference on Rhodes (or other neutral ground) of chiefs of mission under chairmanship Griffis to exchange views and analyze what can be done with benefit to whole area.¹

MCDONALD

¹ Acting Secretary Lovett discussed the suggestions in telegram 247 "with Key West" and, on November 12, he directed Mr. McDonald to fly to Paris for consultation with Secretary Marshall (telegram 211 to Tel Aviv). The same day, he requested Ambassador Griffis to fly immediately to Washington, with a brief stop at Paris to discuss the question of Arab refugee relief with the Secretary (telegram 1557 to Cairo). Both telegrams are filed under 501.BB Palestine/11-1048.

501.BB Palestine/11-1048 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET URGENT

PARIS, November 10, 1948—6 p. m.

Delga 685. For Satterthwaite from Kopper. During past 5 days in separate conversations with Riad Solh (Lebanon), El-Rawi (Iraqi), Fawzi Bey (Egypt), Faisal (Saudi Arabia), and Amir Abdul Majid Haidar (Transjordan), several points of interest and importance have emerged.

There are indications that the Arabs believe they would have great difficulty at home if Bernadotte plan were formally approved and adopted in detail by GA. On other hand should Bernadotte plan fail to carry Arabs would also have difficulties. Consequently most Arab leaders here believe that SC should first establish firm truce lines. Along with this methods should be worked out for peaceful settlement in GA. Riad Solh and El-Rawi last night accepted privately idea by which GA would establish commission with firm terms of reference, including mention of previous GA action and Bernadotte plan, to work out peaceful settlement. Both Riad Solh and El-Rawi recognized settlement would have to be worked out with full knowledge that Israel exists as a state. Likewise they have said period during which settlement would be worked out would not be used for preparing for renewal of warfare. When asked whether other Arab states would accept commission concept Riad Solh and El-Rawi expressed opinion they would.

[Here follow additional views of various Arab leaders at Paris.]
Fairly obvious Arab leaders here realize their weak position.

Sent Department Delga 685, repeated London as 1224. [Kopper.]

MARSHALL

501.BB Palestine/11-1148 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Legation in Lebanon

SECRET

WASHINGTON, November 11, 1948—4 p. m.

712. While Dept appreciates concern Leb Govt over reported occupation by Israeli forces area in southern Lebanon, it does not feel it would be appropriate intervene with Israeli Govt this matter.

If you discuss subject further with Leb Govt suggest you point out that incursion into its territory by external forces would appear be issue which should more appropriately be pursued through facilities UN, of which Leb member, rather than by approach this Govt. (Legtel 573 Nov 6¹).

We suggest appropriate action might be taken by SC if reports are indeed true that Israeli forces are now on Lebanese territory. You may inform President Khouri that Acting Mediator's draft resolution currently under consideration by SC should go far to satisfy Lebanese complaint. This resolution contemplates separation armed forces and creation broad demilitarized zones under UN supervision and, if carried into effect, would surely result in withdrawal Israeli forces to

¹ Not printed ; it reported that President Khoury had informally asked Minister Pinkerton "to invite US Government's attention to continued occupation Jewish forces of number of villages and considerable area in south Lebanon. While no formal request was made for intervention it was clear he hoped US Government could influence Israeli Government to withdraw to Palestine frontier" (767N.90E15/11-648).

safe distance from Lebanese frontier. You may add to President that this Govt supports draft resolution.

For your info Dept has heard no indication attitude Leb Govt re possible approach SC this matter. While course action is for sole determination by Leb, Dept would be interested your appraisal its thinking and reasons apparent hesitation.²

LOVETT

²This telegram was repeated to Paris and London. Subsequently, the Lebanese President expressed to Minister Pinkerton his view that any request made by Lebanon for intervention by the United States be considered unofficial, because he did not wish to be placed in a position of entering formal negotiations concerning any phase of the Palestine problem (telegram 603, November 26, noon, from Beirut, 867N.01/11-2648).

501.BB Palestine/11-1248: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET US URGENT LONDON, November 12, 1948—7 p. m.
NIACT

4849. Personal for Lovett (eyes only) from Douglas (no distribution). Re Telmar 148,¹ repeated to me as Paris 1239.

1. Solely for the purpose of elaborating Paragraph One of Telmar 148: At meeting with President Saturday afternoon, November 6, with Lovett and Douglas, after comments on the election, Palestine was discussed.

President referred to the phrase "in its entirety" which appeared in the statement of September 21 in regard to the Bernadotte plan. Douglas took the responsibility for this language which the President said had caused him a great deal of trouble in the campaign. Douglas then recited the reasons why it was his considered opinion that unless US-UK stood together, it would be almost impossible, if not in fact impossible, to obtain a $\frac{2}{3}$ vote in the GA for any settlement of the Palestinian question, and why, therefore, although the US wanted certain modifications of the Bernadotte proposals on the one hand, and the UK sought modifications on the other hand, it was important that neither the US nor the UK give any public indication of offering amendments to the Bernadotte plan. Briefly, the reason for the latter was that if either US or UK gave any public indication of: (a) Either a difference between themselves; or (b) an intention to offer amendments "the flood gates would be open to amendments from all sources, and there would be little if anything left of the cheese when the rats got through." (This is a mixed metaphor.) Accordingly, the US-UK resolution, although it endorsed the Bernadotte proposal, provided international machinery under which the modifications which the US

¹ Dated November 10, p. 1565.

sought on the one hand, and the UK desired on the other, could be had without publicly harming the chances of obtaining $\frac{2}{3}$ vote for Bernadotte proposals in the GA.

Douglas said the British understood clearly that the US desired that "tip of the Negev north of the Beersheba-Gaza road in which Jews had settled and made investments be included in the Israel state," and that Bevin would agree to this if there were some compensation in the north, i.e. in Galilee. On the other hand, the British desired that the Arab part of the divided Palestine be associated with Transjordan. Douglas stated further that the British were insistent that Transjordan, for strategic and other reasons, have a seaport with undisputed access to it on the Mediterranean.

Douglas and Lovett reminded the President of the extraordinary extent to which the British had modified their policy; whereas twelve months ago they were unwilling to accept partition, they are now prepared to approve it, etc. This far-reaching shift of British policy had been accomplished in order to maintain US-UK solidarity without which it was his considered opinion there would be no lasting settlement of the issue in the Middle East.

Douglas then proceeded to explain the seriousness of the existing situation. Notwithstanding the provisions of British treaty with Transjordan and other Arab states, HMG had meticulously observed the arms embargo and, insofar as Douglas knew, had shipped no arms, ammunition or materials of war of any sort to any Arab state, not even to British military installations at Amman and in Iraq. The British had on several occasions raised the question as to whether, in view of the developing seriousness of the war in the Middle East, they should in their own defense move ammunition and reinforcements to these installations, but had refrained from doing so in each case, because on our advice it was thought that such a step might be distorted to mean that they were reinforcing the Arabs.

Douglas explained that, as the President knew, the Israeli forces had received large quantities of arms and ammunition indirectly from the Soviet through Czechoslovakia; that her air force was now of substantial size. As a result of British observance of embargo on one hand and shipments from Czechoslovakia to Israel on the other, Arab Legion had been reduced to a position of relative impotence with no more than 2,000 rounds 25-pounder ammunition, while the Israeli forces had greatly increased in military power. Should the Israeli forces attack the Arab Legion, HMG would doubtless feel it necessary to observe her treaty obligation with Transjordan and to supply the Arab Legion with ammunition and equipment. Moreover, should the Israeli forces drive the Arab Legion across the Transjordan frontier, an event most likely to happen in view of the comparative impotence of the Arab Legion, HMG would feel bound, under the terms of her

treaty obligations, to use her own military forces in the defense of Transjordan. As a result the UK would be at war in the Middle East against the Israeli state. The consequences stretching beyond this would probably be a real division between the US and UK with far-reaching results.

The President replied in effect that this must not be allowed to happen.

Douglas then said that in his opinion the most effective way of preventing the serious consequences referred to above would be for the SC to give both sides clear notice that if the truce were not observed, serious results to the violator of the truce would ensue.

2. See my immediately following telegram² for first blush comments, which you should perhaps have because of my intimate knowledge of British views. In this connection, I have neither revealed nor discussed substance of Telmar 148 with British or anyone else.

Sent Department as 4849, repeated Paris personal for the Secretary eyes only as 868.

DOUGLAS

² The reference is to telegram 4851, p. 1573.

867N.01/11-1248 : Telegram

Mr. Franklin C. Gowen¹ to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

VATICAN CITY, November 12, 1948—7 p. m.

62. My Amvat 60² November 3. Tardini, Vatican Acting Secretary of State received me this morning to give me in strict confidence Pope's views on Jerusalem. He said :

1. Vatican in view position taken respectively by Arabs and Jews in Palestine considers internationalization Jerusalem and outskirts most appropriate solution in present circumstances to ensure peace, order, tranquility in Palestine.

2. Vatican maintains rights traditionally enjoyed by Catholics in Palestine must be fully respected and protected, especially with regard holy places.

3. Vatican has no particular preference with regard any specific manner whereby Jerusalem and environs would be placed under international control provided such control would effectively protect Catholic interests.

4. Vatican has become aware proposed charter or constitution for Jerusalem drafted by Trusteeship Council and submitted to President UNO General Assembly by Secretary General in letter dated New York April 21 last.

[Here follow remainder of this and the next paragraph, giving details.]

¹ Foreign Service Officer at Vatican City.

² Not printed.

6. After first World War and when Great Britain assumed Palestine mandate British Government gave solemn official assurance she would maintain *status quo* regarding rights traditionally enjoyed various religious communities and denominations in Palestine. Vatican has consistently maintained necessity keep this *status quo*, arranged exert force to ensure and maintain full respect protection all rights acquired and enjoyed by Catholics in Palestine, especially rights concerning holy places.

Tardini emphasized his opinion not only Latin America but Christendom at large would heartily welcome placing Jerusalem and environs under international control and likewise, with international guarantees giving free access to holy places throughout Palestine and thus ensure full freedom worship all denominations and security existence moral and physical conditions of life conducive to spiritual and material well-being all concerned.

GOWEN

501.BB Palestine/11-1248 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the
Acting Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET

US URGENT

LONDON, November 12, 1948—8 p. m.

NIACT

4851. Personal for Lovett (eyes only) from Douglas. No distribution. Herewith are my first blush comments on Telmar 148:¹

1. I had understood in Washington that our basic position in regard to the settlement of the Palestinian issue rested on the Democratic Party platform of 1948; that Israeli could not have its cake and eat it too; that if it insisted upon Galilee, it could not have all of the Negev; that if it got a part of the Negev, adjustments would have to be made in the north; that the US was not disposed to impose a settlement on either side.

I had understood, perhaps erroneously, that this position did not preclude our supporting the resolution in the GA which provided for international machinery empowered to make adjustments in line with the above in regard to frontiers.

I also understood that in regard to the truce, it was our view that we should follow the general line of the Bunche proposal with the question of sanctions somewhat clouded.

2. I, of course, have not revealed or discussed Telmar 148 with the British, and have disclosed its contents to no one, but it strikes me at first blush that while it fits the above general framework, the emphasis which it places on certain features and the restraint which it imposes on GADel in connection with other aspects are such that it may

¹ Dated November 10, p. 1565.

seriously disrupt US-UK solidarity which is so important both in the SC and in the GA. I do not mean by this to suggest that we buy the whole British position. This, in any event, would be impossible, for the facts are that the British, because of their extensive shift of policy have in effect bought a large part of the US position.

3. Elaborating on paragraph 2 above, the following observations occur to me:

(a) The southern frontier of Israel, indicated in paragraph 4, when seen on the map goes far beyond the idea of "adjustments" in the Negev in return for compensation for the Arabs in the north. I do not believe that the UK will buy this one for many reasons.

(b) Telmar 148 appears to be a new "plan" for a Palestine settlement since it appears to abandon the principle of US-UK seeking acquiescence by the contending parties to Bernadotte proposals as a basis for settlement by refusing to foster cause of one or the other party. For example, does "fully acceptable to the State of Israel" mean that this criterion must be observed at outset of hoped-for negotiations under Bernadotte aegis, or does it mean that this criterion can be treated elastically to be reflected in the terms of the final negotiated settlement.

(c) While UK would be willing to see "adjustments" in the Negev in the circumstances I have outlined, I am certain that if the Jews should maintain their claim to the hourglass frontiers of November 29 (electing to give up Galilee) the UK on grounds of what it believes to be US-UK strategic interests, would resist all the Negev going to Israel.

(d) Idea inherent in final paragraph of section 3 of Telmar 148, that if Jews and Arabs fail to negotiate a settlement of boundary problem, is US belief that Israel should relinquish Galilee and Jaffa and Egyptians relinquish Israeli part of Negev. Here, it seems to me, is the crux of the problem. Are we prepared, if necessary, to take measures against PGI to expel it from Galilee and Jaffa? If we are not prepared to do so; i.e., apply sanctions under Chapter 7, it seems to me the US position is somewhat unrealistic, since the Jews already hold Galilee and most important part of the Negev by conquest.

4. I am leaving Sunday, 14th, for Paris to discuss situation with the Secretary.

Sent Department (for Lovett eyes only) as 4851; repeated Paris (personal for Secretary eyes only) as 869, no distribution.

DOUGLAS

501.BB Palestine/11-1248: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET URGENT
NIACT

PARIS, November 12, 1948—10 p. m.

Delga 717. In telephone conversation with Jessup today Douglas indicated desire for latest information concerning US-UK agreement

on Palestine and on probability truce will now be observed by Israelis. Following review is, therefore, for information London as well as Department.

We continue attach greatest importance reconciling any divergence views US-UK on question truce observance. November 4 resolution, which passed by vote 9-1-1 as amended by US, reflected virtual identity US-UK views. Psychological impact this resolution has served very useful purpose maintaining authority SC. Work of committee established by resolution and of Mediator in his consultations with parties give every reasonable hope compliance withdrawal beyond demarcation lines both sides which will effectively separate respective armed forces while at same time saving face both sides. Committee should finish work Saturday. Thereafter Bunche informs me few days will be needed initiate plan.

Meanwhile, we feel November 4 resolution represents furthest Council should attempt go in direction truce "enforcement". To crowd beyond this point would ignore practical realities. These are, on one side, every evidence that "truce" both practically and psychologically has served its purpose and it is essential, therefore, to push forward to new constructive phase. Bunche and Riley, who are in best position to know, feel this very strongly. General Riley in particular feels that "truce" as such cannot last longer than two weeks. On other hand, all evidence we have indicates parties finally tired of fighting, want to compass differences and get on with business of final settlement.

For these reasons we feel British, having achieved November 4 objective, are now making mistake wanting push further along same road which in our opinion strongly shared other members SC, such as Canada, France, could only lead disaster because psychological atmosphere of tension, rigidity positions, state near-war would not only be continued but further stimulated.

This might readily upset steady progress settlement Negev question and lead to defiance Mediator and SC. This in turn would immediately raise question whether SC should apply sanctions which we are convinced SC would not do.

This is so because (1) USSR might veto but would probably abstain; (2) under present circumstances we cannot envisage as practical reality US voting in favor any SC resolution calling imposition sanctions against Israel; (3) we are virtually certain France would not support. Others would probably abstain and we doubt whether UK at best could get more than three or four votes total (UK, Syria, possibly China, possibly Belgium). Failure of SC to impose sanctions in unhappy event it is confronted with necessity examining this question would (a) cancel psychological effect already gained and present restraining effect November 4 resolution; (b) generally damage prestige and authority of SC probably beyond any possibility of

repair; (c) destroy possibility GA contributing solution Palestine question; and (d) greatly increase risk that expansionist pressures within Israel would lead to new adventures.

In event SC failed apply sanctions British position, in light considerations advanced above, presumably would be arm Arabs in conformity treaty commitments. Result would be three-cornered arms race between UK, US, USSR to supply respective sides in long-continuing struggle which would set back common US-UK objectives in Middle East for years. The US, UK, Israel, the Arab states and UN would all lose; the USSR would be only one to gain and they would gain very substantially.

In the event, which we consider unlikely, US and France vote in favor of, and a sanctions resolution passes the Council, the ultimate result will be same but reached by slightly different route. We do not feel USSR would vote in favor sanctions and they would feel no obligation whatsoever, legal, moral or otherwise, to withhold arms from Israel. Effect of this would be to throw Israel into Soviet camp rather than holding them in Western orbit.

In view of foregoing we have been trying capitalize strong sentiment Council (e.g. France, Canada) favor new approach along lines Bunche armistice idea. We drafted last night short punchy resolution (text new [*next*] following telegram¹), establishing armistice but at same time reaffirming truce while parties with aid acting Mediator work out details armistice. This armistice phase will not, as we see it, impede straightening out Negev situation as contemplated November 4 but will actually facilitate Jewish cooperation with acting Mediator in Negev and will clear decks prompt consideration Committee One of permanent settlement. We are convinced rapid progress with this program is surest guarantee against new Israeli military operations. Consequently we earnestly hope British will recede from their present rigid position which we feel blind alley with disaster lurking at end, and that they will find it possible support our brief resolution.

Canadians pressing for soonest meeting SC and working on UK to meet our views with which they agree. Canadians think McNeil was persuaded in our joint evening conference on November 9 (see Delga 661²—London 1214) but was slapped down by London.

In addition to UK and Canada we gave copy our short resolution on personal basis to Eban this morning making clear this paper had no delegation our [*or*] US Government standing. Eban has since consulted Shertok and first reaction indicates our resolution basically acceptable to Israel subject, however, to drafting changes we believe can be worked out.

¹ No. 718, not printed, but see footnote 1, p. 1582.

² Dated November 9, p. 1559.

Sent Department Delga 717, repeated London as 1250 for the Ambassador.

MARSHALL

USUN Files

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State*¹

CONFIDENTIAL

[PARIS,] November 13, 1948.

Participants: The Secretary

Mr. Shertok, Israeli Foreign Minister

Mr. Eban, Israeli Representative at United Nations

Mr. Wilkins, United States Delegation

Mr. Shertok called on me this afternoon at his request to discuss the Palestine question.

Mr. Shertok told me he wanted to discuss two aspects of the question at the present time:

- 1) *The Security Council Resolution of November 4 and its relation to a proposed Security Council resolution providing for the establishment of an armistice in Palestine and for the commencement of negotiations leading to final settlement of the Palestine question*

Mr. Shertok said that his government attached the greatest importance to immediate negotiations and that it felt that if the Security Council called upon Israel and the Arab States to commence negotiations directly or through a United Nations representative, armistice demarcation lines could be established at an early date. Mr. Shertok did not think that the principle of broad demilitarized or neutral zones should be followed, although it might be necessary to have narrow "no man's land" strips. In particular, Mr. Shertok objected to the November 4 Security Council resolution as it related to the Negev in that it would prevent administrative and military control of Israeli Negev by Tel Aviv. Mr. Shertok said that his government felt that the November 4 Resolution should be superseded by the proposed Security Council resolution providing for the establishment of an armistice in Palestine and for the commencement of negotiations leading to a final settlement of the Palestine question.

- 2) *Admission of Israel to the United Nations*

Mr. Shertok said that their lack of membership in the United Nations at the present time was of considerable disadvantage to them. He said that, for example, it prevented them from dealing on a basis of equality with the six Arab States both in the United Nations and in Palestine. He said that it prevented them from having a vote on

¹ Drafted by Mr. Wilkins.

important matters affecting Israel. He said that if they were not admitted at this session of the General Assembly, Israel would not be able to become a United Nations member for another year. He said that so far the Provisional Government of Israel had been recognized by eighteen countries, that these included the United States and Russia and the Soviet satellite states but did not include any of the Western European states. Mr. Shertok was of the opinion that the admission of Israel into the United Nations would not make it necessary for other members of the United Nations to recognize it immediately unless they wished to do so, but that the fact of Israel's admission would have the international effect of establishing Israel's status and thus prove a stabilizing factor in the Near East.

Mr. Shertok said that he wished to speak very frankly and confidentially to me, as he had instructed Mr. Epstein in Washington to communicate with Mr. Lovett, with regard to Israel's general foreign relations with the United States and the U.S.S.R. Mr. Shertok said it had been his Government's endeavor to steer a middle course, that, if it became necessary, there was no doubt where Israel's tone [*sic*] sympathies lay but that Israel was having increasing difficulty in proving to its people, in view of the position which we had taken on various aspects of the Palestine question, that the United States desired friendly or as friendly relations with Israel as did the U.S.S.R. Mr. Shertok pointed out, for example, that the U.S.S.R. had a full Minister whereas the United States had only a Special Representative at Tel Aviv. Mr. Shertok said there was no doubt that the U.S.S.R. was friendly towards Israel, as revealed by the Soviet position in the United Nations and elsewhere; consequently, many Israelis now say: "Why should we not go along with the Russians who are friendly towards us?"

Mr. Shertok seemed to feel that American support for their position regarding negotiations and an armistice as well as for Israel's immediate admission to the United Nations would counterbalance the sympathy of the Israeli people for Soviet Russia.

Mr. Shertok said he understood I was perturbed regarding recent reports that Israel was obtaining men and munitions from the Soviet Union. Mr. Shertok said he wished to assure me categorically that no men or munitions had been received from the Soviet Union, but that men had come from all parts of the world to help Israel and that munitions had been purchased and received from Czechoslovakia, France and Switzerland.

I told Mr. Shertok it was our main purpose to bring about agreement between the Arabs and the Jews in Palestine and that we were not necessarily concerned as to what the agreement was as long as it did

not involve conquest by war. I re-emphasized this point several times during my conversation. I said that if Israel openly flouted or defied the United Nations or the Security Council, it seemed clear it would be unable to gain admission to the United Nations, and that such other matters as loans and *de jure* recognition would, of course, be affected.

I said that we had been endeavoring for a long time to make it possible for the Arabs and Jews to agree. I said that thus far we had been successful in bringing the Arabs and, I might add, the British along with us, in the steps which the United Nations had taken. I said that I was convinced the Arabs greatly feared that Israel might not be content with its present position in Palestine, and that it might endeavor to branch out and would actually take steps in this direction. I said that reports of Israeli arms purchases in Czechoslovakia and their receipt increased Arab fears in this respect. I expressed the opinion that we were closer to an agreement between the Arabs and the Jews at the present time than we ever had been and said to Mr. Shertok, in brief, "Don't overplay your hand."

I also added that I had not seen any of the Israeli representatives in Paris since my last conversation with Mr. Shertok in October, and that I had not done so because I had learned from experience that what was said in confidence was immediately thereafter known in New York. I said that I understood the long historical background in Israel's struggle, but that my attitude was that we should now deal with each other in the normal fashion as Foreign Secretaries each representing his own Government.

Mr. Shertok thanked me for the frank expression of my views. Mr. Shertok said that he wished to be equally frank and to state he was convinced the British were seeking through the November 4 Resolution to accomplish in the Negev what they had been unable to do in any other way. He said that they wished to prevent its control by Israel and that the November 4 Resolution was not a truce resolution but a political resolution for this purpose. Mr. Shertok added that his Government had two choices: 1) to cooperate in the implementation of the November 4 Resolution through the present plan of the Acting Mediator, or, 2) to oppose it by refusing to withdraw Israeli armed forces from recently occupied areas in the Negev. Mr. Shertok said that he did not know what position his Government would take, but he personally was inclined to the latter.

Mr. Shertok added that Israel had definite evidence that the British were now supplying the Arabs with men and arms. I told him I had heard reports to this effect, had investigated them and was convinced that the British were not supplying the Arabs with men and arms.

I emphasized again the importance of an agreement between the

Arabs and Jews and strongly stressed that we now had a real opportunity of reaching it.²

² Secretary Marshall transmitted the text of this memorandum of conversation to the Department on November 18 (Delga 825, 501.BB Palestine/11-1848).

Editorial Note

Mr. Bunche, through his representatives at Tel Aviv and Cairo, transmitted to the Provisional Government of Israel and the Government of Egypt identical communications of November 13, establishing provisional demarcation lines for Israeli and Egyptian forces in the Negeb. This action, taken pursuant to the Security Council resolution of November 4, fixed November 19 as the effective date. The communications stated that "As soon as the provisional demarcation lines have been put into effect, my good offices and those of the Chief of Staff and the entire truce supervision personnel will be fully at the disposal of both parties to assist them in undertaking the negotiations envisaged in the resolution for the establishment of the permanent truce lines and such neutral or demilitarized zones as may appear advantageous."

The communications were made public by the United Nations in press release PAL/381, November 13. Paris transmitted them to the Department on November 16 (Delga 783, 501.BB Palestine/11-1648).

501.BB Palestine/11-1348: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald)

SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, November 13, 1948—1 p. m.

216. Dept had received several reports indicating number Amer citizens and aircraft of Amer and Panamanian registry involved in movement fighter aircraft and arms from Czecho to Israel in violation SC resolutions May 29 and July 15 and contravention US Govt Policy on arms shipments to Near East. (Urtel 243 Nov 8.¹) Planes overflying Austria refused respond international signals to land given by US Air Forces. Rather than accede Air Force request for authorization to shoot down planes Dept on basis affidavits from Amer citizens involved instructed Emb Praha end July request assistance Czech Govt in stopping use Czech airfields by Amer aircraft using Amer crews and bearing Amer markings and engaged in clandestine operations. Czech Govt also requested assist Emb take up passports personnel such crews. Foregoing action believed in accord SC resolutions May 29 and July 15 as well as US Govt Policy on this matter.

LOVETT

¹ Not printed.

501.BB Palestine/11-1348 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Delegation at Paris

SECRET

WASHINGTON, November 13, 1948—2 p. m.

Gadel 473. 1. President approved proposed Congressional appropriation of \$16,000,000 US contribution Palestinian refugees. Congressional leaders being consulted. Will inform soonest when announcement can be made.

[Here follows discussion of possible appointees to the position of administrator of Palestinian refugee relief operations.]

LOVETT

501.BB Palestine/11-1448

The Israeli Foreign Minister (Shertok) to the Secretary of State, at Paris

Aut. 04-10
04-41

PARIS, 14th November, 1948.

DEAR MR. MARSHALL: In our conversation yesterday you thought that I was unduly critical of the British in suggesting that their prime interest as sponsors of the November 4th resolution of the Security Council lay, not in their concern for the stability of the truce regime, but in their desire to achieve a definite territorial settlement, namely the exclusion of the Negev from the territory of Israel. You felt sure that the two issues were being kept separate.

After we left, I learnt from Mr. Eban that, in a recent conversation with him, Mr. Hector McNeil freely argued that the adoption of the November 4th resolution was essential to secure the implementation of the Bernadotte Report. Mr. Eban reported at the time the gist of that interview to members of your Delegation. Mr. McNeil's statement came as a clear admission of the British political and territorial interest behind the sponsorship of a resolution designed, on the face of it, to stabilise the truce. My apprehensions as to the real motives of the British attitude thus appear to be fully justified.

It came to my knowledge only after our interview that the Security Council sub-committee had in the meantime decided, by majority, to endorse the Acting Mediator's plan for the withdrawal of the forces in the Negev. If you would bear in mind what I put before you in my two cabled messages, and what I submitted yesterday orally, I am sure you will appreciate the utter gravity of the issue which has now been created. Conflict with the Security Council, or for that matter with any organ of the United Nations, is the very last thing we would wish to see ourselves involved in, but when avoidance of conflict entails the sacrifice of most fundamental national interests, I fear that we are left with no choice.

I take this opportunity of most earnestly repeating the plea that the Security Council should now concentrate on the resolution enjoining an armistice and the initiation of peace talks, and that this over-all resolution be taken to supersede and render superfluous the *ad hoc* arrangement proposed for the Negev. Insistence upon the latter can only reduce, and may even wreck, the chances of success of the former, whereas more forbearance on the minor issue, now that a fresh start is being made to tackle the problem in its major aspect, must enhance the effectiveness of the new approach.

I feel deeply alarmed by the apparent determination to pursue the November 4th line to the bitter end, and would venture to express the hope that, under your enlightened leadership, and in the interests of all concerned, the United Nations and we may be spared this unnecessary ordeal.

Yours very sincerely,

M. SHERTOK

501.BB Palestine/11-1448 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET US URGENT
 NIACT

PARIS, November 14, 1948—9 p. m.

Delga 746. Verbatim text revised draft SC resolution on Palestine follows:¹

"The SC

Reaffirming its previous resolutions concerning the establishment and implementation of the truce in Palestine and [recalling] in particular, its resolution of 15 July 1948 which determined that the situation in Palestine constitutes a threat to the peace within the meaning of Article 39 of the Charter;

¹ This draft, providing for an armistice in Palestine, was the third text sent to the Department in as many days. Secretary Marshall, on November 2, had transmitted the first of these (Delga 718, 501.BB Palestine/11-1248). The following day, he sent a revised draft, developed during consultation with the British and Canadian Delegations (Delga 740). In commenting on the revised draft, the Secretary wrote: "Department should note that inclusion of reference to November 4 resolution in second paragraph of new draft will probably not be very satisfactory to Israel. British, however, wanted stronger reference to November 4 in the first paragraph. We believe it essential to reach agreement with British re this matter and we believe it essential in order to reach such agreement to admit some reference to November 4. British have receded about 80-90 percent from their original position (a) of not being willing to consider the Bunche armistice approach at all and (b) of insisting on extending scope of November 4 resolution, including sanctions aspect, to other sectors of Palestine, in particular northern Galilee. On other hand new draft gives Israel 80-90 percent what they want, most important of all being (a) SC recognition of armistice concept replacing truce as transition to permanent peace, (b) SC endorsement of principle of direct negotiation, and (c) elimination from Paragraph 3, Subparagraph (b) of preceding draft of language relating to 'broad demilitarized zones.'" (Delga 739) Delga 739 and 740 are filed under 501.BB Palestine/11-1348.

Taking note that the GA is continuing its consideration of the future government of Palestine in response to the request of the SC of 7 April 1946 [1948];

Without prejudice to the action of the Acting Mediator regarding the implementation of the resolution of the SC of 4 November 1948 in regard to which he has consulted with the Committee of the Council appointed by that resolution;

Decides that, in order to eliminate the threat to the peace in Palestine and to facilitate the transition from the present truce to permanent peace in Palestine, an armistice shall be immediately established in all sectors of Palestine;

Calls upon the parties directly involved in the conflict in Palestine, as a further provisional measure under Article 40 of the Charter, to enter into negotiations immediately, either directly or through the Acting Mediator on Palestine, with a view to the immediate establishment of the armistice including:

(a) The delineation of permanent armistice demarcation lines beyond which the armed forces of the respective parties shall not move;

(b) Such withdrawal and reduction of their armed forces as will ensure the maintenance of the armistice during the transition to permanent peace in Palestine.”²

Sent Department Delga 746, repeated London as 1263.

MARSHALL

²This draft resolution was agreed to by spokesmen for the United States, United Kingdom, and Canadian Delegations on November 14. The United States Delegation informed the Department of its view that “we are free under present instructions to support and vote for this revised text.” (Delga 745 from Paris, 501.BB Palestine/11-1448)

The Department, in reply on November 14, stated: “Your Delgas 739 and 740 November 13 were sent to President at sea for his instructions which are not yet forthcoming. Meanwhile we have received your 745 and 746 November 14 and concur that under instructions set forth in Gadel 420 you may support and vote for, but not sponsor, revised draft resolution whose text is contained in Delga 746.” (Gadel 475 to Paris, 501.BB Palestine/11-1448). Regarding Gadel 420, see footnote 1 to telegram Delga 634, p. 1556.

With minor changes, the draft resolution in Delga 746 was submitted to the Security Council on November 15 by the Canadian, French, and Belgian Representatives (SC, *3rd yr.*, No. 125, p. 4). For the statement by Mr. Jessup the same day on the draft resolution, see *ibid.*, p. 25.

501.BB Palestine/11-1348: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State, at Paris

SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, November 14, 1948—11 p. m.
 NIACT

Gadel 476. Urtels Delgas 739 and 740¹ were sent last night to President for instructions which have not yet been received. Mean-

¹ Both dated November 13; neither printed, but see footnotes 1 and 2, *supra*.

while I have talked with Clifford by telephone and we agree that:

1. Language in second pgh ² Delga 740 with reference to SC resolution of November 4 is equivocal.

2. As a matter of practice within realm of possibility, sanctions applied by SC in instant case are out of question.

3. We can not place ourselves in position of "being against peace".

Accordingly, on constructive side, we feel that utmost emphasis should be placed on getting both parties to war in Palestine to negotiate armistice and eventual peace. If you make it clear that draft resolution contained in Delga 746 ³ is but a step to this paramount end, I feel that, under authorization in Gadel 420 November 7 ⁴ you are free to vote for that draft resolution. (This telegram is commentary on Gadel 475 ⁵ which precedes.)

Attitude toward Soviet amendments to Bunche's draft resolution (Delga 634 ⁶) has not yet been cleared with President and if these amendments come to vote you should abstain.

LOVETT

² This paragraph read: "Decides that, in order to eliminate this threat to the peace and to facilitate the transition from the present truce, without prejudice to its application under the resolution of 4 November, to permanent peace in Palestine, an armistice shall be immediately established in all sectors of Palestine". (501.BB Palestine/11-1348)

³ *Supra*.

⁴ Not printed; but see footnote 1 to telegram Delga 634, p. 1556.

⁵ Dated November 14, not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 1583.

⁶ Dated November 6, p. 1555.

501.BB Palestine/11-1548

Memorandum by Mr. Robert M. McClintock to the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] November 15, 1948.

In light of this afternoon's press reports of Shertok's statement before Committee I of the General Assembly,¹ Mr. Satterthwaite and I agree that it might be useful to repeat to the President Ambassador Douglas' Niac 4851, November 12 attached. Both the press reports and this telegram relate to your description of the President's feeling

¹ Mr. Shertok, in a statement before the Committee on November 15, announced that "The Mediator's proposal concerning the Negeb was in itself a sufficient reason why the Government of Israel could not consider the [Bernadotte] report even a basis for discussion." He stated also that Israel would not give up any part of the Negeb, that it claimed permanent inclusion in Israel of modern Jewish Jerusalem and of the territory linking Jerusalem with the coast and that all of the Galilee should be part of Israel. The text of Mr. Shertok's statement is printed in GA, 3rd sess., Pt. I, First Committee, Summary Records, 1948, p. 640.

Ahmad Shukairy, Vice President of the delegation of the Arab Higher Committee at the United Nations, the following day, also rejected Count Bernadotte's proposals as a basis for settling the Palestine problem (*ibid.*, p. 647).

that if he was to keep his contract the Israeli would have to keep theirs.²

² Marginal notation by Mr. Lovett: "Discussed substance with Clifford 5:45 Nov. 15th. No need to send."

501.BB Palestine/11-1548: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET NIACT

PARIS, November 15, 1948—noon.

Martel 134. Personal eyes only for Lovett. Douglas came from London to see me this afternoon and reported as follows:

Begin Douglas Report.

1. Prime Minister Attlee sent Douglas word November 12 that he would like to see him on a matter of grave importance at Chequers November 13. Douglas, accompanied by Lewis Jones, kept this appointment and found that Attlee had asked Lord Tedder and Michael Wright to be on hand for talk which lasted for three-quarters of an hour.

2. Attlee opened by stating that British Government is gravely perturbed about Palestine and sees situation there as presenting dangers as great and immediate to world peace and to Anglo-American cooperation as Berlin or any other present problem.

3. Only hope, said Attlee, lies in close Anglo-American cooperation. If this cannot be achieved over Palestine it will become much more difficult to achieve in other fields. Moreover, Palestine question contains seeds of possible impairment, if not impotence, of UN and of serious Anglo-American divergence. It is, therefore, essential that US and UK should maintain common ground.

4. Palestine problem has two aspects: (a) preservation of the truce, and (b) nature of a permanent settlement. Without preservation of truce there can be no settlement.

5. Re truce British Government has scrupulously observed conditions of truce and has refrained from delivering arms to Arab countries in spite of their treaty obligations to do so. However, truce has not been observed by Israel, which in breach of truce has built up a considerable modern fighting force largely with material from Czechoslovakia. Fact that truce has operated to advantage of one party has stretched relations of British Government with Arab countries almost to breaking point.

6. Attlee said that under SC resolution of November 4 Acting Mediator is about to fix a time limit for withdrawal of forces from their present positions so as to maintain principle that neither side benefits from breaches of truce. British Government considers this

issue is crucial. If Jews refuse to comply and SC is unwilling or unable to take any action under chapter seven, way will be open for further unlimited breaches of truce by either side. When Arabs broke truce British Government publicly stated that it was willing to take part in application of measures against Arab countries under chapter seven and voted accordingly. Arab governments bowed to authority of SC. If Jews refuse to comply, same issue arises, but in respect to other party.

7. Speaking with great feeling Attlee said that in this matter British Government believes future of UN itself is at stake. Failure of League of Nations to take action on a similar issue was beginning of its downfall. Same is likely to be true with UN. Apart from specific issue, it seems to British Government essential that UK and US should do their utmost to secure action by SC if Israel flaunts [*flouts*] its authority. Among possible first steps would be strengthening arms embargo on party which fails to comply and lifting of arms embargo on other party; denial of loans; severance of financial and commercial relations, and of communications; and possibly at a later stage, blockade.

8. Meanwhile, said Attlee, British chiefs of staff have advised British Cabinet that, as a result of recent Jewish advances, security of Transjordan, who is Britain's ally, is threatened. Consequently, British Govt is bound to consider what action it should take if Jews, in further violation of truce, were to attack TJ forces which have never entered any part of Palestine which, under November 29 UNGA resolution, would have gone to Jews. If Jews attack TJ territory as they have already attacked Lebanon (Jewish forces are now in occupation of sixteen Lebanese villages) British Govt would be obliged to give armed assistance to its ally. Same would apply in case of Egypt, but British treaty with TJ does not specify that assistance should only be given when TJ territory is attacked. British Govt would, therefore, be in grave dilemma. Objections to assistance by British armed forces to TJ forces in Palestine are obvious and serious, and British Govt has no desire to find itself embarked on this course. If, on other hand, British stand aside and allow TJ forces to be driven back across Jordan, their assistance may come too late, and the blow to value placed by other countries on any treaty of alliance with UK may be irreparable. It might be, said Attlee, that whole British and perhaps western position in Middle East might be lost. The more British Govt considers this dilemma, the less it likes it. It concludes that every possible step should be taken to avoid dilemma arising, always bearing

in mind that at some point (e.g. TJ frontier) HMG would be obliged in any case to intervene with armed forces.

9. Attlee said it is hope of British Govt that if SC shows that either party which defies its authority will have measures taken against it, the dilemma will never arise.

10. Attlee then turned to what he described as an "immediate question" and said the British Govt has to consider not only threat to Transjordan but threat to safety of UK airfield at Amman, remembering that Jewish forces have already crossed Lebanese frontier and in an earlier stage of operations bombed Amman. UK airfield Amman is virtually defenseless at present. Consequently, British Govt has decided that reinforcements should be sent to UK airfield Amman (at present garrisoned by 150 men of the RAF regiment (training) with six armoured cars but without any AA defense). These reinforcements will be confined to RAF personnel, some light anti-aircraft equipment and necessary supplies, including some 30/50 tons of ammunition which could be held available at Amman under RAF guard for despatch to Arab Legion in event this is ordered as result Israeli attack.

11. Attlee said British Cabinet has also decided that if Jews refuse to comply with orders of Acting Mediator, it is intended to send UK detachment to Aqaba to forestall any possibility that Jews might attempt to occupy Aqaba.

12. Douglas reports that Attlee asked him in spirit of US-UK cooperation to advise me without delay of British Cabinet decision described paragraph 10 above since, as Tedder confirmed, British military are most anxious to begin airlift reinforcement Amman November 15 or 16. Douglas promised to deliver message to me and to report to Attlee any comments I might wish to make. Attlee said he would welcome these.

13. Speaking generally of arms embargo, Attlee said British Govt has scrupulously refrained from supplying any arms to Arab countries and are not proposing to do so now, but if Jews refuse to comply with SC, a new situation will have arisen. British Govt feels that in event non-compliance Jews SC should agree that arms embargo as a general measure should be lifted in respect of other party. In any case it would be very difficult for British Govt to continue to withhold arms which it is bound under its treaties to deliver.

14. Re permanent settlement to be worked out in UNGA Attlee said both US and UK have publicly supported Bernadotte proposals. He

hoped UK would soon receive comments of US on draft resolutions which it is proposed US and UK jointly should introduce in UNGA in support of Bernadotte proposals, and that US and UK would soon agree on their tactics in matter towards other delegations. In British view Bernadotte proposals are not only those of Mediator, but are only common ground for a settlement on which UK and US have been able to agree. Attlee said "we are most anxious to make our area of agreement as solid as possible".

15. After Attlee had finished Douglas reports that he took up with him following points.

16. Re desire for close US and UK cooperation in connection with both truce and final settlement (paragraph 3 above) Douglas assured Attlee that US is also anxious that this be maintained. Flexibility on both sides would contribute to this. Re truce (paragraph 6 above) Douglas presented forcefully my thoughts as embodied in Delga 717 and 618 [718], November 12 ¹ (repeated London as 1259 and 1251) with omission those parts inappropriate for discussion with UK. It was clear from replies of Attlee and Wright that while British Govt is somewhat skeptical as to its effectiveness UK would welcome conversion truce into armistice provided new resolution mentions November 4 resolution. UK feels that omission this reference would vitiate "psychological impact" mentioned paragraph 2 Delga 717. Douglas informs me Delga 739, November 12 [13] ² accurately reflects highest level British thinking in this connection and, comparing resolution text in Delga 718 with text Delga 740 ³ Douglas is surprised and gratified at distance UK has gone to maintain common front with us.

17. Re immediate reinforcement RAF airfield Amman (paragraph 10 above) replying to Douglas questions Tedder confirmed solemnly that UK had sent no military equipment—not even necessary spare and maintenance parts to Arabs since imposition of embargo and stressed fact that present movement would be only from one UK military base in Egypt to another UK military in TJ. Tedder and Wright said that UK entertains no doubts re its legal rights in this connection. Attlee said UK action in advising me in advance and affording me an opportunity to express my views before movement begins is to be faithful to general spirit of US-UK cooperation in common problems. Douglas stressed fact that reinforcement steps could probably only be kept secret for few days and asked whether UK proposed to inform Mediator and have UN observer check fact ammunition flown in remains in RAF stores under RAF guard thus protecting UK against any charge that it is rearming Arabs. Tedder

¹ Latter not printed, but see footnote 1, p. 1582.

² Not printed; but see *ibid.*

³ Dated November 13, not printed; but see *ibid.*

said there was no military objection to this being done. Wright said consideration is being given to parliamentary question on subject but presentation problem would be discussed November 14 with Hector McNeil. Douglas urged importance of presentation problem.

18. Re compliance by Jews with November 4 resolution (paragraph 13 above) Wright inquired whether US is exerting its great influence on PGI to this end. He said UK pressure on Arabs is unremitting and pointed out that if Jews do comply the serious contingencies mentioned by Prime Minister would never arise.

19. Re US comments on US-UK draft resolution (paragraph 14 above) Attlee added that UK can hardly put pressure on Arabs along any lines (see London's 4818, November 10 to Dept ⁴ until it has a ready answer to inevitable Arab question "does US agree with UK on settlement you are recommending?" *End Douglas Report.*

20. I wish to comment immediately to British Govt on specific point of reinforcing British military units and installations in Arab states. An important factor in problem is that early advent of rains will make it difficult or impossible to postpone reinforcement to a later date if reinforcement is to become necessary. Please notify me immediately whether you see any objection to my commenting as follows:

"I have considered carefully the considerations advanced by the British Govt on the subject of Palestine which Ambassador Douglas discussed fully with me today. The United States recognized that the British Govt must insure the security of its own armed forces and military installations. We assume, however, that in assessing the nature of the threat to such armed forces and installations in the Arab states, the British Govt will take into account the attitude of Israel toward the effort of the Security Council to maintain a truce and establish an armistice in Palestine." ⁵

Sent Dept as Martel 134 from Marshall, repeated London 1264 eyes only for Douglas.

MARSHALL

⁴ Not printed.

⁵ Mr. Lovett's reply on November 15 stated that he saw "no objection your comments to British Government as outlined. You may wish consider clarifying drafting third and last sentence, particularly 'attitude of Israel toward the effort, etc.'"

"Assume this would be personal and secret communication from you to Attlee not to be released by British in support their contemplated action, which may be widely misunderstood here unless most carefully handled by them." (Telmar 159 to Paris, 501.BB Palestine/11-1548)

Ambassador Douglas delivered Secretary Marshall's message to Prime Minister Attlee on the morning of November 17 and concluded that, unless the situation deteriorated seriously, the British would not send reinforcements to Amman before the Israeli reply to the Acting Mediator (telegram 884, November 17, 7 p. m., from London to the Secretary, at Paris, 501.BB Palestine/11-1748).

USUN Files

*Memorandum by the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas)
to the Secretary of State, at Paris*

TOP SECRET

[PARIS,] November 15, 1948.

Subject: Conversation with Michael Wright on Palestine

1. Michael Wright had spent Sunday¹ with Mr. Bevin and had come over at Bevin's request in regard to Palestine and particularly the report which I transmitted to you last night and this morning.²

2. (a) As regards the immediate issue, i.e., the movement of anti-aircraft equipment, ammunition and reinforcements to the U.K. air establishment at Amman, I explained to Wright that you were not now in a position to make any comment.

(b) Speaking very personally not on behalf of my Government and not as a reflection of your views, I explained to him why it seemed to me preferable for the British to postpone this step probably for at least another 24 hours when we might have a clearer view of Israeli's attitude toward the Security Council resolution and the Bunche proposals.

3. After some discussion, I suggested to Wright that he cable London informing the Prime Minister:

(a) that I was returning to London tomorrow afternoon and that I would personally transmit your comments;

(b) that in talks here with the representatives of Israeli it was indicated that they would probably accept the Security Council's actions; and

(c) that it was my very personal view that it would be better for the British to postpone their contemplated steps to reinforce their installation at Amman until I arrive in London tomorrow afternoon.

This Wright is doing.

4. Wright said that Mr. Bevin had asked him to reiterate his assurances that the U.K. had no desire whatsoever to throttle Palestine; that at the appropriate moment, if the Israelis behaved appropriately, the U.K. was prepared to extend de jure recognition and to take all the steps necessary for a full recognition of and friendliness toward the state of Israel. If, however, the Israelis failed to comply with the Security Council, Mr. Bevin felt that the arms embargo imposed on the Arab states should be lifted and no loans should be extended to the Israeli Government and that financial sanctions should be employed. In this connection, he said the imports to Israeli were now being financed by the U.K. through the release of sterling for this purpose.

Wright was also asked by Bevin to repeat:

(a) that he attached great importance to internationalization of Jerusalem; and

¹ November 14.

² See Martel 134, *supra*.

(b) that he was deeply concerned with the dilemma in which the U.K. would find itself if the Israeli mounted a strong attack against the Arab Legion. Wright said that it was Mr. Bevin's strong inclination in this event not to stand aside and see the Arab Legion swept away.

5. Wright suggested that when I return to London tomorrow afternoon and meet with either the Prime Minister or Sir Orme Sargent (acting for Mr. Bevin and Mr. McNeil in their absence), they would seek information on the following points:

(a) Have we put as strong pressure on the Israeli to comply with the Security Council as the British have over the course of the last many months been putting on the Arabs?

(b) Have we explained to the Israeli the folly of any further violation of the truce which they may commit?

(c) What are our views on the Bernadotte proposals and have we advised the Israelis to accept them?

(d) What is our position in regard to the imposition of sanctions if the Israelis flout the authority of the Security Council?

6. Wright repeated the British anxiety over U.S.-U.K. cooperation and he implied that they were very apprehensive that the great progress which has been made toward establishing a common line of action might be dissipated at a very critical moment.

While I did not comment on any of the points mentioned in paragraph 5 above, I did impress upon Wright that very great progress toward a U.S.-U.K. concerted position had been made and that we should not be discouraged because at this particular moment the situation did not seem to be wholly clear; that we could really only assess the far reaching events which we had both achieved by clinging to a perspective of the ground we had covered over the course of the last 12 months.³

LEWIS W. DOUGLAS

³ The memorandum bears the following endorsement in Marshall's handwriting: "I discussed this with Douglas. GCM"

501.BB Palestine/11-1648

*Report by the National Security Council on Provision of a Police Force for Jerusalem*¹

TOP SECRET
NSC 27/3

[WASHINGTON,] November 16, 1948.

The Problem

1. To determine the type of United Nations police force for Jerusalem which the United States could accept if Jerusalem is placed under United Nations control.

¹ For the background on this paper, see footnote 3, p. 1525, and Mr. Lovett's letter of November 4 to Secretary Forrestal, p. 1547.

Analysis

2. The Palestine resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on November 29, 1947, recommended with respect to Jerusalem that :

a. The city should be placed under a special international regime to be administered by the United Nations.

b. The Trusteeship Council should discharge the responsibilities of "administering authority".

c. A governor of the city, appointed by the Trusteeship Council, should organize a police force, the members of which should be recruited outside Palestine.

3. In his final report on Palestine, the United Nations Mediator, the late Count Bernadotte, recommended that :

"The City of Jerusalem which should be understood as covering the area defined in the resolution of the General Assembly of 29th November, should be treated separately and should be placed under effective United Nations control with maximum feasible local autonomy for its Arab and Jewish communities, with full safeguards for the protection of the Holy Places and sites and free access to them, and for religious freedom."

4. The present session of the United Nations General Assembly, which is now considering the problem of Palestine, may recommend for Jerusalem an international regime under UN control. The Department of State is of the opinion that this Government must in one form or another support a proposal to establish a United Nations police force in Jerusalem.

5. It is estimated that a police force of from 4,000 to 6,000 men, initially recruited outside Palestine, will be required if the territory of Jerusalem is to be placed under effective international control. Two general methods of supplying such a police force are open to the United Nations :

a. The force might be composed of contingents of troops or police personnel supplied by interested governments.

b. The force might be a quasi-military organization composed of persons recruited as individuals. Such recruitment might be effected by :

(1) The Secretary-General of the United Nations.

(2) The proposed "administering authority" for Jerusalem. (Under the United Nations resolution the Trusteeship Council was recommended as the "administering authority".)

6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion from the military point of view that :

a. As a matter of national security, an international police force for Jerusalem should not be made up of contingents supplied by certain governments.

b. An international police force for Jerusalem recruited as individuals by the Secretary-General of the United Nations is less objectionable from a U.S. security viewpoint than *a* above, since Soviet personnel that might be recruited would enter Palestine as individuals and not as Soviet troops.

c. It is considered highly undesirable that American citizens be employed in a Jerusalem international police force, either as private individuals recruited by the Secretary-General or as members of the United States armed service, although their employment as private individuals would be less prejudicial to United States security interests than the use for peace enforcement in Palestine of United States armed forces.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have also suggested that, from the military viewpoint, a possible method of providing the necessary police force would be to have this force recruited and administered by the "administering authority" rather than by the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

7. Should there be adopted the alternative of forming the Jerusalem police force from contingents supplied by governments, it might be possible, through proper selection of such governments, to exclude Soviet forces. But it would be extremely difficult to exclude also both United States and satellite forces, unless one or a few "neutral" governments were chosen as "administering authority" and sole suppliers of contingents. It is unlikely that any countries acceptable to the United States could be induced to assume this responsibility.

8. Serious difficulties could be anticipated if individual recruitment of members of a Jerusalem police force were decided upon. For obvious reasons, a force initially composed only of Arabs and Jews would be unsatisfactory. Should the force be recruited by the United Nations on the same basis as that on which the Secretary-General has employed members of the UN Secretariat, there would no doubt be a number of Soviet and satellite nationals in the force. Should a different basis be proposed, such as recruitment restricted to nationals of selected "neutral" countries, applicants in sufficient numbers might not be forthcoming. In any case the problems of enlistment, command, language, training, equipment, and budgetary support, if they could be satisfactorily solved at all, would involve long delays in the face of the immediate need for a police force in Jerusalem.

Conclusions

9. There appears to be no practicable way of providing a UN police force for Jerusalem which would meet the requirements of UN administration of Jerusalem and which would also be consistent with the security interests of the United States.

10. In the event the present session of the UN General Assembly recommends establishment of a UN police force for Jerusalem as part

of a plan for UN control of the city, a police force constituted as follows would be least objectionable to the United States:

a. The police force should consist of persons recruited as individuals, and not of contingents supplied by governments.

b. The members of the force should be recruited and controlled by the governor of Jerusalem (or by whatever agency is designated to exercise local administrative authority on behalf of the United Nations).

c. Recruitment of members of the police force should so far as practicable exclude nationals of the United States, the USSR, and the Soviet satellites and would, in so far as points *a* and *b* are concerned, be in general harmony with the pertinent provisions of the resolution passed on November 29, 1947 by the General Assembly of the United Nations.

11. In any event the United States should not accept any proposal for a Jerusalem police force which calls for the provision of armed force contingents by any of the following: the United States, the USSR, or the Soviet satellites.²

² President Truman approved the conclusions contained in NSC 27/3 on November 24 (memorandum of November 24 from Sidney W. Souers, Executive Secretary of the National Security Council, to the Secretary of State, 501.BB Palestine/11-1648).

501.BB Palestine/11-1648: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

PARIS, November 16, 1948—noon.

Delga 761. Eyes alone for Lovett from Rusk. Subsequent telegram ¹ will contain outline position paper on Palestine unanimously approved by delegation this morning, including all delegates and alternates except Austin who is still in hospital. Paper was presented to delegation to obtain basis for staff work and not as a specific action paper. Later telegram will contain revised text of resolution for GA. Fundamental purpose of paper was to cement delegation and prevent explosion and on this point paper has served most useful purpose. Staff recommended to Secretary this morning that we should transmit outline position paper and resolution for clearance in Washington with the request that we then be given normal latitude in meeting parliamentary situations arising in Assembly. We wish to ensure particularly that statements can be made in Committee One if necessary without prior verbatim clearance. Clearance position paper and resolution will be appreciated as soon as possible after receipt of each in Washington.² [Rusk.]

MARSHALL

¹ *Infra.*

² Marginal notation by Mr. Lovett: "Phoned Key West 5:20 Nov 16th."

501.BB Palestine/11-1548 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET URGENT

PARIS, November 15 [16], 1948—noon.

NIACT

Delga 762. There follows statement of "principles applicable to the US position on the Palestine question before the General Assembly" which USDel this morning agreed, in accordance with policy approved by President should serve as guidance in conduct and development US position on Palestine. Revised draft resolution being prepared and will follow soonest.

Verbatim Text

"1. General.

The security and other national interests of the US require a peaceful solution of the Palestine problem which holds the greatest possibility of a friendly relation between Israel and the Arab countries of the N.E. and between those countries and the US.

2. Independence of the state of Israel.

The US has recognized and supports Israel as an independent state. Although the GA resolution of November 29, 1947 contained substantial limitations upon Israel in such arrangements as economic union, the US considers that Israel should now be dealt with as a full-fledged member of the community of nations. It follows that Israel should be entitled to the normal attributes of independent states; it should now, for example, have full control over immigration into its territory; its economic arrangements with neighboring areas should be on the basis of treaty or other agreement.

The GA should not adopt a new resolution delimiting boundaries in Palestine. It should, however, call upon the Arab states and Israel to enter negotiations for the establishment of a territorial settlement in Palestine. To assist in such negotiations the Assembly should appoint a conciliation commission which should on behalf of the UN exert every influence to bring about a final settlement of all questions outstanding between the parties.

3. Boundaries.

It may be admitted that the provisions of the GA resolution of November 29, 1947, regarding the economic union of the whole of Palestine are not at present feasible and that in view of the unfeasibility of an economic union for all of Palestine the area reserved for an Arab state might more appropriately be joined to one or more of the neighboring Arab states. It may further be admitted that in view of those and other circumstances other territorial adjustments in the GA resolution of November 29, 1947 may well be appropriate.

Therefore the GA should recommend that negotiations be conducted either directly or through the conciliation commission with a

view to a territorial settlement on the following general basis, without excluding any settlement mutually acceptable to the parties :

1. Acceptance by parties of elements common to the GA resolution of November 29 and the conclusions contained in section VIII, paragraph 4 of the report of the UN Mediator.

2. With respect to other matters, consultation by the conciliation commission with the parties to determine to which the recommendations of the GA resolution of November 29, 1947 afford a basis for an agreed settlement and as to matters not so settled the extent to which the conclusions contained in section VIII, paragraph 4 of the UN mediator's report can constitute such a basis.

4. Disposition of Arab Palestine.

Although the GA resolution of November 29, 1947 envisaged an Arab state of Palestine in economic union with Israel, it is now evident that Arab Palestine standing alone could not constitute a viable independent state.

It is desirable, therefore, that Arab Palestine be transferred to one or more of the neighboring Arab states through the process of negotiation conducted by a UN conciliation commission, taking into account the wishes of the inhabitants of Arab Palestine.

5. Jerusalem.

The territory of Jerusalem, as defined in the GA resolution of November 29, 1947, should be [*receive?*] special and separate treatment from the rest of Palestine and should be placed under effective UN control with maximum feasible local autonomy for Arab and Jewish communities. Although Jerusalem should not be annexed outright in whole or in part either to Israel or to any Arab state, the eventual solution of the problem of governing Jerusalem should take fully into account the interest and the resources of both Israel and such Arab authority as is established in the area surrounding Jerusalem. The GA should not attempt in its present session to establish a final government for Jerusalem but should ask a UN conciliation commission to arrange with local authorities for its interim administration and to present to the fourth regular session of the GA detailed proposals for a permanent international regime.

6. Holy places.

The holy places and religious buildings and sites in Palestine should be protected and free access to them assured in accordance with existing rights and historical practice. Arrangements to this end should be under effective UN supervision. The UN conciliation commission in presenting to the fourth regular session of the GA its detailed proposals regarding the territory of Jerusalem should include recommendations concerning the holy places in that territory. With regard to the holy places in the rest of Palestine, the commission should consult with the political authorities of the areas concerned with a view to securing appropriate formal guarantees as to the protection of the holy places and access to them. These undertakings should be presented to the GA for approval.

7. Freedom of Movement.

A UN conciliation commission should bear in mind the negotiations for a final settlement for Palestine that the peace, stability and economic development and well-being of the entire area require broad agreement with respect to the movement of persons and trade throughout the region. Particular attention should be given to the need for providing access to ports, airfields and railways which are essential to the economic life of the area.

8. UN conciliation commission.

The GA at its current session should give maximum encouragement to negotiation efforts between the parties, for the evolution of a Palestine political settlement. The GA should constitute at its present session a UN conciliation commission to bring about a final settlement of the Palestine question. The US should be a member of this commission. Although it would be desirable to include the UK, the US should not insist upon such inclusion if both the UK and Israel have fundamental objections thereto. No member of the eastern European bloc should be included in the commission. A logical solution would be to ask the three governments now constituting the truce commission (US, France and Belgium) to accept responsibility of constituting the UN conciliation commission.

9. Settlement by peaceful means.

The US and the Assembly should insist by all practicable means that the war in Palestine is over and that the parties should now, with the cooperation of the UN, proceed to work out a final settlement by peaceful means. Specifically, no party is entitled or should be permitted to exploit military capability as an instrument of pressure during the course of negotiations. The GA should leave to the SC the task of bringing about an armistice at as early a date as possible".

Repeated London as 1269.

MARSHALL

Editorial Note

The Security Council, on November 16, considered the draft resolution prepared by the Acting Mediator and the modifications prepared by the Soviet Union (see Delga 634, November 6, and footnote 1, page 1556). The draft resolution, as modified, was not adopted, each of the paragraphs receiving but two affirmative votes (SC, *3rd yr.*, No. 126, pages 51-53).

The Council then considered the draft resolution submitted by the Canadian, French, and Belgian Delegations (see footnote 2, page 1583). The first three paragraphs were adopted by 8 votes, with three abstentions. Paragraphs 4 and 5 were adopted by 8 votes to 1 (Syria), with two abstentions. The resolution (No. 62) is printed in SC, *3rd yr.*, *Resolutions, 1948*, page 29.

867N.01/11-1648 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald)

RESTRICTED

WASHINGTON, November 16, 1948—4 p. m.

219. US Press Nov 14 carried Nov 13 UP despatch from Tel Aviv quoting "informed sources" as stating that President had notified UK he no longer felt bound follow joint US-UK policy on Palestine. Despatch also stated President told Brit he would propose formation a conciliation committee to work out final Palestine peace and warned that US would not support UN sanctions against Israel if latter refused withdraw troops from Southern Negev.

Response to queries you are authorized state that no such approach to Brit has been made by President and that there is no truth above report.¹

LOVETT

¹ This telegram was repeated to Arab capitals, London, Paris, and Jerusalem.

501.BB Palestine/11-1748

Memorandum by Mr. Robert M. McClintock to the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] November 17, 1948.

I have read the position paper unanimously adopted by our Delegation in Paris on Palestine with much misgiving. This paper is reproduced in Delga 762, November 15 [16]. According to Delga 761, November 16, the fundamental purpose of the paper was to "cement Delegation and prevent explosion and on this point the paper has served most useful purpose". However, later in Delga 761 Mr. Rusk asks that clearance be given to the paper, together with general instructions permitting freedom of statement in Committee 1 without prior verbatim clearance. I understand from Mr. Humelsine that Delga 761 and Delga 762 were despatched last night to the President at Key West.

According to the statement of the Israeli Foreign Minister before Committee 1 on October [November] 15, Israel:

1. Refuses to relinquish the Negev,
2. Will never accept loss of "its share in the Dead Sea",
3. Is uncompromisingly opposed being debarred from the Gulf Aqaba,
4. Claims "permanent inclusion in Israel of modern Jerusalem", and
5. Claims all of Galilee.

Mr. Shertok concluded his sixty-five minute speech by saying that the United Nations should call on aggressors to end war and negotiate

peace. He said the Conciliation Commission proposed by the Mediator should be a Good Offices Commission entrusted with the task of prevailing on the parties to meet each other for peace negotiations.¹

I submit that Mr. Shertok's conclusions seem to be almost identically paraphrased in Paragraph 3 of the Delegation's working paper, which reads as follows :

"The General Assembly should not adopt a new resolution delimiting boundaries in Palestine. It should, however, call upon the Arab states and Israel to enter negotiations for the establishment of a territorial settlement in Palestine. To assist in such negotiations the Assembly should appoint a conciliation commission which should on behalf of the United Nations exert every influence to bring about a final settlement of all questions outstanding between the parties."

I further submit that the working paper, although it may have prevented an explosion in our Delegation in Paris, by no means meets the requirements of Telmar 148, November 10, which set forth the President's instructions on how the Delegation should deal with the Palestine problem in the General Assembly.

The President's instructions requested the Delegation to seek to combine the President's fundamental position on Palestine—the territorial dispositions of the November 29 resolution—with the Secretary's general recommendation of the Bernadotte Plan on September 21. The President's telegram said :

"Fortunately we are able to continue to subscribe to all the seven basic premises in the Bernadotte Plan and all his specific conclusions, with the exception of his recommendations regarding the boundaries of Israel."

It would appear that the working paper should at least provide for mention of the fact that this Government supports all seven of Count Bernadotte's basic premises. A statement to this effect in the preamble of whatever resolution is placed before the Assembly would go far to redress our position with respect to the Secretary's statement of September 21.

As for the specific operational clauses of the working paper, the first one calls for acceptance by the parties of elements common to the General Assembly's resolution of November 29, 1947 and the conclusions of the Bernadotte Report. Unfortunately, the only element of these two documents which is in common is the single recommendation in both with regard to the internationalization of Jerusalem. Accordingly Paragraph 1 would seem to be of little practical effect.

The real heart of the Delegation's working paper is Paragraph 2, which leaves to the Conciliation Commission consultation with the parties to determine to what extent the recommendations of the resolution of November 29 afford a basis for an agreed settlement, and,

¹ For Mr. Shertok's statement of November 15, see GA, 3rd sess., Pt. I, First Committee, Summary Records, 1948, p. 640.

as to matters not so settled, to what extent Count Bernadotte's conclusions can constitute such a basis.

Mr. Shertok said on November 15 that the Provisional Government of Israel could not consider the Bernadotte Report as even a basis for discussion. On the other hand, the Arab Governments have on innumerable occasions stated that they would never consider the resolution of November 29, 1947 as a basis for discussion. The Representatives of three Arab governments said yesterday in Paris they would not consider the Bernadotte Plan as such a basis either. Here, again, therefore, it would seem that the principal operating paragraph of the Assembly's working paper will have little practical effect.

I have a lively fear that the working paper, which is obviously the lowest common denominator which could win agreement among the strong personalities composing our Delegation, will certainly not prove a useful guide for our action in the Assembly, nor does it entirely conform to the directive established in Telmar 148.

I also submit for your consideration the fact that of the five points cited by Mr. Shertok, as listed above, two principal points—the claim to Jewish Jerusalem and to Western Galilee—directly challenge the logic approved by the President in Telmar 148.

However, if the President now approves this working paper he will in effect, in my opinion, have nullified much of the position taken on November 10, and our Delegation will find itself as a matter of practice recommending to the Assembly precisely what Mr. Shertok asked for in the conclusion to his speech of November 15. I recall that the President said to you that "If the Jews hold me to my contract, they will have to keep theirs".

As for Jerusalem, although the working paper provides that the Conciliation Commission shall present detailed proposals for a permanent international regime to the next session of the General Assembly and, meanwhile, that the city should not be annexed in whole or in part either to Israel or any Arab state, it leaves the interim administration of the city to an arrangement between the Commission and local authorities, which, in effect, would continue the present partition of the town and without any guarantees of free access to it.

Meanwhile, the United States Representative on the Security Council joined with other members of the Committee established by the resolution of November 4 in advising the Acting Mediator to call for the withdrawal of Israeli and Egyptian troops, pursuant to that resolution. Dr. Bunche has now established provisional demarcation lines "in full consultation with the Committee" and has set November 19 as the effective date for the establishment of these lines. It is a matter

for interesting speculation as to what action our Delegation will take in the event that the parties refuse to heed the call of the Acting Mediator. A possible guide may be found in the concluding paragraph of the working paper contained in Delga 762, which is entitled "Settlement by Peaceful Means". This paragraph reads as follows:

"The United States and the Assembly should insist by all practicable means that the war in Palestine is over and that the parties should now, with the cooperation of the United Nations, proceed to work out a final settlement by peaceful means. Specifically, no party is entitled or should be permitted to exploit military capability as an instrument of pressure during the course of negotiations. The General Assembly should leave to the Security Council the task of bringing about an armistice at as early a date as possible."

To sum up, I feel that if the President does approve the working paper he should at least suggest that our resolution endeavor to incorporate more of the ideas expressed in Telmar 148. This could be accomplished by the preamble referring to the November 29 resolution and the Bernadotte Plan, with the operative part of the resolution recommending a territorial settlement to the parties, to be worked out invoking the good offices of the Conciliation Commission.

Editorial Note

In November 1948, Israel made two requests of the Department for American technical assistance. On the 17th the Israeli Mission requested that two Israeli police officers be trained in the United States in modern methods of criminal investigation and on the 23rd the Mission requested an American survey of the civil aviation requirements of Israel (letters of Uriel Heyd to Stuart W. Rockwell, 811.22767N/11-1748 and 867N.796A/2348).

The Secretary of State, in a letter of January 25, 1949, informed Mr. Epstein that the Secretary of Commerce would endeavor to procure suitable personnel for the latter request and suggested the assignment of two technicians from the Civil Aeronautics Administration on a reimbursable basis (867N.796A/1-1449).

The Department, on January 27, 1949, regretted its inability to comply with the earlier request. It was explained that "due to the large number of applications from law enforcement officers within the United States it has been necessary to adopt a policy of not accepting representatives of foreign governments at the National Academy of the Federal Bureau of Investigation". (Letter from Mr. Satterthwaite to Mr. Heyd, 811.2276N/12-2748)

501.BB Palestine/11-1748: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State, at Paris

TOP SECRET

LONDON, November 17, 1948—7 p. m.

887. I have had lengthy conversations since returning from Paris with Sir Orme Sargent, Christopher Mayhew (Foreign Office Parliamentary Secretary), Michael Wright and Bernard Burrows. Lewis Jones has also had extensive talks and I feel we are now in a position to give fairly clear picture of reaction of Foreign Office officials to "principles applicable to US position on Palestine question before UNGA" set forth in Paris telegram 1269, November 15 to London.¹ Please note that views reported below without my comments are those held personally by Foreign Office experts named: They do not constitute official UK policy although latter will obviously be influenced by expert thinking.

2. Consensus opinion among officials is that Arabs would acquiesce to UN decision along lines Bernadotte plan provided UN would assume responsibility for drawing up a definite settlement including fairly definite indication regarding frontiers. This, officials feel, would give Arab leaders some reasonable explanation vis-à-vis their own people and, according British information on such a basis (i.e. original Bernadotte plan acquiescence principle) Arab acquiescence is just around the corner. British believe their efforts to persuade Arabs regarding merits Bernadotte plan are beginning to bear fruit.

3. British officials whom I have seen believe that prospects for Israeli-Arab negotiations have grown much worse following recent Israeli military successes because at outset such negotiations (either directly or under aegis conciliation commission) Jews will have behind them such military capability that it will amount to Arabs being called upon by UNGA to negotiate under duress. Expressing his personal view, Sir Orme Sargent said that in present circumstances to enjoin negotiations, however convenient this might be, would be tantamount to piously holding the ring and telling two contestants, between whom military equilibrium has been destroyed by preponderance Israeli arms, to thrash out their problems in their own way. He expressed belief that such an action would amount to cowardly avoidance of responsibility. Sir Orme fears that on the horizon lies another Munich which would be repeated if, after Arabs and Jews fail to negotiate an agreement, the powers were to come to the UK and ask UK to tell Abdullah that if he should refuse to settle with Israel, the UK-Transjordan treaty would no longer be operative. To sell Abdullah down the river for the sake of spurious peace, easy consciences, and

¹ This was a repeat of Delga 762, p. 1595.

"the greater good" would, in Sir Orme's view, be a reenactment of the Czech tragedy.

4. Sir Orme and other officials concede that once the broad lines of settlement are established by UNGA (preferably having been marked out in advance by US and UK) and after these lines have been acquiesced in by both sides it would be possible for details to be negotiated between parties.

5. Other thoughts Foreign Office officials are dwarfed by those in preceding paragraphs. However, Foreign Office officials believe, as do I, that a factor which deserves an important place in Paragraph One, Paris reference telegram, is mutual importance, not only regarding Palestine settlement but also regarding future of UN, of US-UK policy working in concert on this problem particularly since without such cooperation no settlement seems likely.

6. The internationalization of Jerusalem (Paragraph Five Paris reference telegram) continues to be matter of greatest concern to Foreign Office officials who have been perturbed by Shertok's statement that PGI, which no longer feels bound by November 29, will now accept only internationalization old city.

7. When US views regarding settlement by peaceful means (Paris reference telegram) were outlined to Foreign Office officials they found entire substance this paragraph admirable not only regarding UNGA settlement but also in connection with armistice. They noted, however, with great interest that implied in this paragraph is a willingness to take steps to stop recalcitrant party, i.e. sanctions.

Sent Paris for Gadel 887, repeated Department.²

DOUGLAS

² This telegram is printed from the copy received in the Department as Embassy London's 4908.

501.BB Palestine/11-1748: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET NIACT

PARIS, November 17, 1948—midnight.

Delga 797. Next preceding telegram¹ gives text resolution which UK, with possibly China and other delegations but not US as co-sponsors, may introduce Committee One tomorrow² in event parliamentary situation in view UK requires action to prevent situation in committee getting out of hand and in event it is not possible reconcile divergent US-UK views as indicated below. UK representatives telegraphing text London for final clearance. This text results from series

¹ Delga 796, November 17, not printed.

² The United Kingdom introduced its draft resolution in Committee 1 on November 18; for text, see GA, 3rd sess., Pt. I, First Committee, Annexes, 1948, p. 55.

intensive consultations UK representatives in which they have accepted our views substantially all parts draft with exception numbered paragraphs 2, 3 and 5. We strongly urged acceptance following alternative drafts for these particular paragraphs:

Substitute for paragraph 2: ³

"Calls upon the governments and authorities concerned to extend the scope of the negotiations provided for in the SC's resolution of 16 November, 1948, to bring about a final settlement of all other questions outstanding between them."

Substitute for paragraph 3: ⁴

"Establishes a conciliation commission consisting of (three states members of the UN) which shall have the following functions:

"(a) To assume the functions given to the UN Mediator in Palestine by the resolution of the GA of 16 [14] May, 1948;

"(b) To carry out the specific functions and directives given to it by this resolution and such additional functions and directives as may be given to it by the GA or by the SC;

"(c) To assist the governments and authorities concerned in reaching a final settlement of all questions outstanding between the parties, including any questions which may be raised by the parties concerning matters dealt with in the GA resolution of November 29, 1947 and in Part One, Section VIII, paragraph 4 of the progress report of the UN mediator in Palestine;

"(d) To undertake, upon the request of the SC, any of the functions now assigned to the UN Mediator in Palestine or to the UN Truce Commission by resolutions of the SC; upon such request by the SC with respect to all the functions of the UN Mediator in Palestine under SC resolutions, that office shall be terminated."

Substitute for paragraph 5: ⁵

"Instructs the Conciliation Commission to assist the governments and authorities concerned to delimit frontiers in Palestine, taking into

³ British paragraph 2 read: "*Notes* with satisfaction part one of the progress report of the United Nations Mediator and *endorses* the specific conclusions contained in part one of that report as a basis for a peaceful settlement of the Palestine question;"

⁴ British paragraph 3 read: "*Establishes* a Conciliation Commission . . . to carry out the functions assigned to it by this resolution in accordance with the specific conclusions of part one of the progress report of the United Nations Mediator on Palestine and by such instructions as the General Assembly or the Security Council may issue;"

⁵ British paragraph 5 read: "*Instructs* the Conciliation Commission in pursuance of paragraph 3 above to appoint a technical boundaries commission to assist the Governments and authorities concerned in delimiting the frontiers in Palestine based on the specific conclusions of the United Nations Mediator (paragraph 4 (b) of the conclusions to part one of the Mediator's report), subject to such adjustments as may promote agreement between the Governments and authorities concerned without altering the general equilibrium of the Mediator's conclusions, and taking into account the nature of the terrain and the unity of village areas;"

account the following general considerations, without excluding any territorial settlement mutually acceptable to the parties:

“(a) That there are important elements common to both the resolution of the GA of 29 November, 1947, and the progress report of the UN Mediator in Palestine;

“(b) That certain adjustments in the territorial arrangements of the GA resolution of 29 November 1947, should be considered through negotiations directly or through the UN Conciliation Commission; an adjustment of the disposition of Jaffa, all or part of western Galilee and all or part of the Negev.”

Department should compare above substitute paragraph with paragraph 3 delegation position paper contained Delga 762, November 16. Difference represents effort to simplify position paper for purposes of resolution since position paper is somewhat complicated and would be difficult to explain clearly to other delegations.

In explaining their objection to our suggested language, UK representatives on advice Foreign Office made following points:

1. UK is deeply and irrevocably committed to support Bernadotte Plan.

2. They undertook commitment to this effect to Bernadotte before his death.

3. Full British Cabinet approved Bevin's statement in Commons in support of Bernadotte Plan, in other words, they have supported this plan with “greatest formality”.

4. They have carried on very intensive campaign with Arab leaders as result of which those leaders have agreed that if Bernadotte Plan is accepted by Assembly those leaders will do their utmost to secure acquiescence Arab governments and peoples.

5. UK is therefore not able to accept any resolution which omits a specific endorsement of Bernadotte Plan or which does not aim at carrying out this plan integrally.

In response to requests for clarification our policy we read to UK representatives appropriate portions Telmar 148 indicating in response their inquiry that this must be taken as policy US Government. British reaction was this means practically (a) that Israel gets all of Negev because Negev is given to them by November 29 resolution, and (b) that Israel gets all of western Galilee because it is in their possession and no one will force them out. We indicated our interpretation US policy as meaning Israel should not have both Negev under November 29 plus Galilee under Bernadotte Plan. We feel there is no misunderstanding between us on this point.

British indicated view that November 29 plan as stated by Bernadotte, is wholly impractical and that Bernadotte Plan is practical. They indicated further that they have no particular UK interest in Negev. Their primary interest is in stability in Palestine and they feel most strongly that November 29 resolution does not provide such stability.

Moreover, British object strongly to leaving settlement of Palestine question to negotiation between parties. Their view is that Arabs cannot negotiate because negotiation involves recognition of partition (and existence of Jewish State) which they cannot do. Arabs, according to British, will never agree directly or indirectly as result of negotiations to partition. They could, however, acquiesce in a decision of GA because they could say such decision was forced on them. Endorsement by GA of Bernadotte conclusions would be taken by them as such a decision.

British also feel failure to endorse Bernadotte Plan would be widely interpreted by public opinion as a retreat by both British and American Governments from statements already made by President, Secretary of State, and British Foreign Secretary.

Following concerns tactics in current situation in Committee One. If British find necessary to put in draft along lines text sent Department preceding telegram they would expect US to speak to this draft reasonably early (within 24 hours), expressing general sympathy but reserving right to move amendments to specific paragraphs. This would give us time to get as close as possible together on amendments in hope that any amendments we might propose UK representative would be able to accept.

Without undertaking any commitments British feel our aim should be that both our governments could accept will of majority and vote for resolution as a whole, although specific paragraphs or amendments we were supporting individually might not pass. We agreed with foregoing, making clear, however, that we could not agree to any resolution which permitted any alteration in November 29 frontiers of Israel without consent of Israel.

Sent Department Delga 797; repeated London 1282.

MARSHALL

501.BB Palestine/11-1748 : Telegram

*The Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald)
to the Acting Secretary of State*

SECRET US URGENT

TEL AVIV, November 17, 1948—9 a. m.

260. Personal Attention President and Acting Secretary. On eve my departure for Paris President Weizmann invited me personal conference at luncheon his residence and requested I transmit his views on Bunche Negev resolution :

"I am, as you know," said Weizmann "moderate, conciliatory and friend Britain, but I know Israel will never surrender Negev; instead every Jew there will resist to death." He stated that "Britain's policy since President Truman proposed large scale Jewish refugee immigration into Palestine in 1945 has successively been based on series of

gross miscalculations: First, that Israel could not finance war with Arabs; second, that Israel could not resist Arabs who would drive the Jews into sea; third, and currently, that Israel is in the hands of Russians."

Weizmann declared: Last accusation is as groundless as were earlier British misjudgments; that Israel is oriented towards the West, desires to retain closest possible US contacts because Israeli democratic and western-minded and realize that only with cooperation of US can this nation develop and remain free. It welcomes Russian support in UN but dreads Russian embrace. Russian influence can become dangerous here only if UN with US support humiliates and sacrifices Israel to British imperial interests. "I plead", concluded Weizmann, "with President Truman whose prestige among us is incomparably higher than that of any other foreign statesman, to save us from desperation."

Weizmann's consistent reputation for moderation lends special significance to above views.¹

McDONALD

¹ Shertok had expressed similar views to McDonald at a luncheon on November 14. (Telegram 256, November 15, 4 p. m. from Tel Aviv, 501.BB Palestine/11-548)

501.BB Palestine/11-1748: Telegram

The United States Delegation to the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET URGENT
NIACT

PARIS, November 17, 1948—11 p. m.

Delga 803. Eyes alone Lovett from Rusk. In separate telegrams are found text British resolution on Palestine and amendments which we would have to propose to conform to delegation opinion here. At this moment it appears improbable that US and UK can harmonize their positions sufficiently to present joint draft resolution or to permit us to support theirs without amendment. British feel compelled to speak soon and to submit resolution, and apparently consider that formal nature their public and unequivocal support Bernadotte plan and their commitments to Arab states leave them no alternative but to proceed that basis.

Text of possible US amendments suggested by us appear to be minimum we would have to make in light of attitude senior members delegation. However, you should bear in mind that our discussions within delegation may not have reflected real attitude of President on precise relationship between November 29 resolution and Bernadotte plan. If it is necessary to seek reaffirmation of November 29 resolution, or if we can modify our proposed language to bring it closer to British draft, delegation should receive specific instructions on those points. My estimate is that we and British recognize that in practice future events will be about the same under their draft or ours. Difficulty is what to get the assembly to say.

We have in Paris problem not only of reconciling President's and Secretary's statements reference November 29 and Bernadotte Plan, but also that of reconciling widely divergent views within delegation. If possible, instructions which would contain precise wording on any amendment we should seek in British draft or extent to which we could agree British draft would be most helpful.

All members of delegation have made serious and bonafide effort to reach common policy based on understanding President's wishes. Believe, however, results our discussions here need to be carefully checked to confirm that they in fact represent US policy.

British will probably speak in Committee One Thursday morning, but will not introduce resolution until later. We now plan not to speak until after British resolution is circulated, but would speak not later than Friday. Proposed text US opening speech will be forwarded Thursday.

Disadvantages of British proceeding to introduce resolution is that their position becomes more rigid and we lose in part, at least, advantages of joint action. Advantage is that British can make their case for Arab sympathy while we, by amendment, would make move more favorable to Israel and would avoid charge that we are tail to British kite.

We have not given up hope of possible joint resolution with British but much depends upon extent to which Department thinks British draft acceptable or unacceptable and whether delegation view accurately reflects what is wanted by President. [Rusk.]

MARSHALL

501.BB Palestine/11-1848: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Delegation at Paris

TOP SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, November 18, 1948—5 p. m.
NIACT

Gadel 522. We have given immediate consideration to UK draft resolution whose text is set forth in Delga 796, Nov. 17,¹ and to proposed amendments to that resolution suggested in Delga 797, Nov. 17. It is of paramount importance that Delegation's action on any draft Palestine resolution in Com. I conform absolutely to basic policy considerations established by Telmar 148, Nov. 10.

Taking commentary in Delga 797 first, we have following four comments:

(1) We confirm your interpretation of US policy to British as meaning that Israel should not have both Negev under Nov. 29 resolution plus Galilee under Bernadotte plan.

¹ Not printed.

(2) On British objection to leaving Palestine settlement to negotiation between parties, we feel that their own insistence on "compulsion" can be used as an argument in favor of GA "compelling" parties to negotiate. Your substitute for paragraph 2, UK draft, would afford such compulsion.

(3) As for British apprehension lest failure to endorse would be interpreted by public opinion as retreat by UK and US govts from positions formerly adopted, we are impressed by statement of Acting Mediator Bunche Oct 15² that Bernadotte himself did not regard his recommendations as hard and fast, take-it-or-leave-it plan, but as a basis for negotiating a settlement and conciliation of differences between the two parties.

(4) Without "expressing general sympathy" or approval British draft, we concur that you should vote for resolution as a whole (refer last para Delga 797), provided our amendments are carried. We assume however first vote after amendments will be paragraph by paragraph, and that final draft will conform to policy in Telmar 148. Otherwise you should abstain from voting on such final draft. We concur with your statement to British that we cannot agree to any resolution which permits any alteration in Nov 29 frontiers of Israel without consent of Israel.

Following are Dept's comments on Delegation's proposed amendments to UK draft in Delga 796:

Paragraph 2: We accept your suggested amendment.

Paragraph 3: We accept your suggested amendment.

Paragraph 5: We accept initial paragraph and paragraph (a), however paragraph (b) should read as follows:

"That certain adjustments in the territorial arrangements of the GA resolution of 29 Nov. *should* be considered through negotiations directly or through the UN Conciliation Commission; *should the Jewish State desire to remain in occupancy of Jaffa and Western Galilee, compensatory arrangements should be made in the Southern Negev, which should then form a portion of the Arab territory of Palestine.*"³

Other drafting changes in British text contained in Delga 796 seem unobjectionable and an improvement over draft contained in Delga 351, Oct. 16. However, it would seem useful to include Paragraph 10 of draft contained in Delga 351 immediately preceding Paragraph 10 of Delga 796.

Although Dept has not seen text of Delegation's proposed speech it desires to emphasize that Telmar 148, Nov. 10, is a basic policy state-

² Before the First Committee of the General Assembly; see GA, 3rd sess., Pt. I, First Committee, Summary Records, 1948, p. 160.

³ The Department, on November 19, altered a portion of the wording of paragraph 5 (b) on the recommendation of the United States Delegation at Paris in a telephone conversation the night before. It directed that the seven words immediately following the semicolon, from "should" to "remain" be changed to "if as a result of such negotiations the Jewish State remains" (telegram Gadel 533, 501.BB Palestine/11-1948).

ment of the President and that any speech of Delegation must be in precise conformity with that policy.⁴

Repeated to London—eyes only for Ambassador.

LOVETT

⁴ Marginal notation by Mr. Lovett: "Read to Key West 4 PM." At 11 p. m. the same evening, the Department notified the United States Delegation at Paris that although it had been impossible to clear Gadel 522 with President Truman, the Delegation was to treat the communication as a binding instruction (Gadel 527, 501.BB Palestine/11-1848).

501.BB Palestine/11-1848: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State, at Paris

TOP SECRET

US URGENT

LONDON, November 18, 1948—7 p. m.

NIACT

892. 1. I talked with Prime Minister Attlee at length yesterday regarding the Palestine situation which at its present stage is the most serious problem in US-UK relations which has arisen during my mission here.

2. As a matter of reporting only—it is clear to me that the Prime Minister and the Cabinet feel that the US, by adopting inflexibly the criteria set forth in Telmar 148, November 11 [10] to Paris, and in particular the October 24 statement to the effect that modifications defined by resolution of November 29, 1947 "should be made only if fully acceptable to the State of Israel," has in substance undermined the common ground worked out by US and UK so laboriously in connection with Palestinian question and especially re Bernadotte's proposals.

3. The Prime Minister told me yesterday that because UK considers the Bernadotte proposals weighted against the Arabs the UK only accepted these proposals in first instance in order that it might stand shoulder to shoulder with US and thus through joint cooperation obtain a two-thirds vote in UNGA for a workable Palestine settlement. The British Government feels that US has, in effect, put situation back to November 29, 1947, and that UK is so formally committed to the Bernadotte proposals, having urged Arab acquiescence to them so strongly, that it cannot now abandon or greatly modify British support for these proposals. Paris 1282, November 17 gives a very clear picture of British attitude.¹

4. Committed as UK is to Bernadotte proposals, Prime Minister reaffirmed to me the sincere desire of the UK to maintain US-UK co-operation in achieving a settlement in Palestine.

¹ This was a repeat of telegram Delga 797, p. 1603.

5. I take it that our general objective in the light of "recent developments" (paragraph 4 Telmar 148) is that Israel should receive everything granted it under the Bernadotte proposals plus the most useful part of the Negev. If there is any bargain to be struck with the British it will be with regard to what if any part of the Negev should go to Israel. Such bargaining, which perhaps could be carried out most usefully in Paris although I am ready to do my share here, cannot, of course, begin or receive UK support until we are prepared to take a firm and unvacillating position in regard to any US-UK mutually agreed upon demarcation of frontiers. Assurance that once we reach agreement with UK we will not thereafter shift our position is almost the kernel of the nut.

6. To obtain British agreement to making the southern frontier of Israel either alternatives, (a) or (b) in paragraph 4 Telmar 148 will be no easy task. It would involve overcoming deep-rooted British objections on the following grounds:

(a) Negev north of 31 degrees includes virtually all arable land in Negev and would leave to Palestine Arabs only the desert waste and the limestone hills and terraces which form the spine of Palestine. Some criticism would apply to alternative (a) in paragraph 4 Telmar 148 to lesser degree. . . .

(b) Before flight of Arabs in fear of Jews Negev was largely Arab populated excepting portion north of Gaza-Beersheba road and lying between these two points. Even here Jewish population was in clear minority.

(c) To give so large a portion of Negev to Israel would rob Arab leaders and particularly Abdullah of any concessions which they could present to their home populations. This, in British view, would probably result in downfall of Arab governments with consequent confusion and disorder and intrusion of Soviet into Arab states.

(d) Giving part Negev to Israel would recreate hourglass frontier and destroy the integrated homogeneity of Bernadotte Plan frontiers.

(e) Negev (see map) is like a dagger blade dividing Arab world. British feel strongly that it would be great mistake for this to be in Jewish hands because:

(1) Arabs are . . . in no position to protect their interests without UK assistance which could be afforded if Negev went to Transjordan or Egypt.

(2) While British JCS hopes PGI will be friendly it has concluded that it would be unsafe to rely upon PGI to give British air installations in Negev with free access thereto.

(3) Arabs and Transjordan should have undisputed access to Mediterranean and to Gulf of Aqaba with sufficient territory to secure this access from hostile attack.

(4) UK difficulties with Egypt re treaty expiring 1956 and UK uncertainties re Cyrenaica trusteeship (2 just above) make Negev especially important at this time, although even with Cyrenaica importance of Negev territorial sovereignty resting with a British ally or allies is vital to British and US strategic plans.

7. Notwithstanding above British objections, it is my tentative view that the UK might be persuaded to use their influence on the Arabs to accept through the Frontier Commission a southern line of Israel which would fall more or less at Gaza-Beersheba road at the same time leaving Israel all or most of Western Galilee provided that:

(a) Location this southern frontier should not be left to parties to negotiate for reasons paragraph 3 Embassy's 4908, November 17 (repeated Paris as 887), and

(b) US without possibility of deviation is prepared to support without qualification these proposals in conjunction UK.

8. At this juncture I believe we are faced with a major crisis in US-UK relations. I am fully cognizant of the President's commitments in regard to PGI. I am inclined to believe, however, that since the statement on October 24, events have occurred in Palestine which justify in all good conscience and without infidelity to campaign utterances a re-evaluation by the President of the statement he then made. A commitment which may have been appropriate under one set of circumstances does not, it seems to me, require the same faithful observance under a different set of circumstances. I doubt that the President intended to give Israel carte blanche to take military action in defiance of UN and its servants, to go beyond the November 29 frontiers as in Galilee and then to cite the President's October 24 statement as a bargaining counter against the Arabs for the best of two worlds and the best of two plans.

9. Now that Committee One is considering Palestine we have reached the parliamentary stage and perhaps through dexterity of maneuver by US and UK delegations it may be possible to obscure for a time the essential divergence of US-UK thinking re a Palestine settlement. It would, however, be a mistake to imagine that the British Government will easily forget their impression that US has "let them down" in connection with the Bernadotte proposals. Moreover, I believe personally that time will show that it is a delusion to believe that Arab-Jewish negotiations, unless conducted within fairly precise limits of a plan endorsed by UNGA, will bring peace to the Holy Land. Alternatively US and UK should have firm agreement between themselves as to boundary demarcation which they would be prepared to recommend to Conciliation Commission and to stand on. The latter is far less likely to produce peace than the former.²

Sent Paris for GADel for Secretary 892; repeated Department for Lovett 4922.³

DOUGLAS

² Filed with this telegram is an information copy bearing an undated marginal notation by Mr. McClintock: "Sent to Key West for President".

³ This telegram is printed from the copy sent to the Department as Embassy London's 4922.

501.BB Palestine/11-1848: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State, at Paris

TOP SECRET URGENT
NIACT

LONDON, November 18, 1948—8 p. m.

893. Personal for the Secretary (eyes only) no circulation.

1. Have seen the Prime Minister and have discussed Palestine at length with him. I have also seen other officials at the FonOff. Reports on these conversations, together with my (Embtel 4908, repeated Paris 887, November 17 and Embtel 4922, repeated Paris 892, November 18) comments, have been sent Paris and Washington. This cable is a supplement for your information only, to be used according to your judgment. Because of the very personal and confidential nature of this information, I suggest that it be distributed only to your most intimate advisers. You will observe that I am not even sending it to Washington, for I think you can protect its circulation in Washington better than I can.

2. I spent two hours with Eden¹ today discussing Palestine. His attitude is far more flexible than is that of the present Government. He believes that the Jews should have more of the Negev. He agrees with me that the problem is one of arriving at a settlement of frontiers which will, on the one hand, give the Israeli reasonable satisfaction and, on the other hand, allow us to hold the Arab world intact on our side. He thinks it of vital importance that the US-UK stand together in such a way as to eliminate the danger of Israeli attack upon Transjordan. This, in Eden's opinion, might be a shattering blow to both of us.

3. Eden is seeing his old friends in the FonOff for the purpose of trying to make them take a more flexible attitude in regard to frontiers.

4. In view of the above, I hope that we will keep our position in the light of Telmar 148 and my cables to Paris 887, Nov 17, and 892, Nov 18, sufficiently flexible and sufficiently conciliatory vis-à-vis the British to give us a little time to try to bring this matter to rest on some solid foundation of US-UK accord. If both the US and UK can keep the doors open toward each other in their speeches on the matter in Committee One, I do not yet despair of bringing the British more toward our side. We possess enough ingenuity and persuasiveness to resolve what I think is one of the most, if not the most critical issue we now face with the United Kingdom.

DOUGLAS

¹ Anthony Eden, former British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

501.BB Palestine/11-1948: Circular telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices*¹

WASHINGTON, November 19, 1948—6 p. m.

GA plenary session today approved resolution originally submitted by US, UK, Belgium, Netherlands for 32 million dollar program relief Palestinian refugees of all communities covering period ending Aug 31, 1949. Resolution as approved includes 5 million dollar advance from UN working capital fund.² Details will follow.

LOVETT

¹ At Arab capitals, Jerusalem, and Tel Aviv.

² For text of resolution 212(III), see GA, 3rd sess., Pt. I, Resolutions, 1948, p. 66.

501.BB Palestine/11-1948: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

RESTRICTED US URGENT PARIS, November 19, 1948—8 p. m.

Delga 839. Following is text of Israeli reply to Bunche and SC on November 4 and November 16 resolutions of SC, with particular reference to Negev and armistice. This has been communicated formally to Bunche and SC this morning. Comment based on discussion with Israeli and British representatives follows:

“Text of observations of the PGI on the resolutions adopted by the SC on the 4th and 16th of November 1948.

1. The PGI has given most careful consideration to the resolutions of the SC of the 4th and 16th November, and to the Mediator's communication transmitted on November 14.

2. The government reaffirms its policy of adherence to the principles of the UN. It welcomes the SC's decision that, ‘in order to eliminate the threat to the peace in Palestine and to facilitate the transition from the present truce to permanent peace in Palestine, an armistice shall be established in all sectors of Palestine.’ The government notes with satisfaction that the SC ‘calls upon the parties as a further provisional measure under Article 40 of the Charter, to seek agreement forthwith, by negotiations conducted either directly or through the Acting Mediator on Palestine, with a view to the immediate establishment of an armistice.’ The Government of Israel is much encouraged by the reiterated call for direct negotiations made in the SC's resolution of the 4th and 16th of November.

3. It is the consistent policy and practice of the Government of Israel to seek negotiations with the Arab states, whose armies invaded Palestine in wanton defiance of the Charter, with a view to arriving at a permanent peace as envisaged in the resolution of November 16th. The Government of Israel is most anxious to see these negotiations brought to a speedy and successful conclusion and requests that it be

notified without delay of the time and place at which its accredited representatives may meet accredited representatives of the Arab states.

4. The Government of Israel notes that the resolution of November 4th calls upon the governments concerned without prejudice to their rights, claims and position regarding a peaceful adjustment of future situation, to withdraw those forces which have advanced beyond positions held on the 14th October. The government understands that it is not the intention of the SC to require the withdrawal of forces from positions held before the 14th October; and it notes the Mediator's statement that the withdrawal of military forces north of the delined [*defined?*] line is inapplicable to those maintained in the Negev settlements for defence prior to the 14th October. The government recalls that since the 15th May it has uninterruptedly maintained regular mobile forces in the Negev which moved freely throughout the area, in addition to static settlement defence in the narrower sense of the term. It notes with satisfaction that the SC is not demanding the withdrawal from the Negev of forces maintained there before the 14th October in order to safeguard the security and independence of Israel and to protect its inhabitants. The withdrawal of such forces from inland areas, including Beersheba, would invite predatory activities by irregulars, a constant menace to the safety of all who dwell in this area. If Beersheba is deprived of defence, the way would again be thrown open to Jerusalem whose protection against aggression from the south could not be guaranteed.

5. The Government of Israel states that forces which entered the Negev on and after the 14th October for the purpose of reestablishing communications obstructed by the Egyptian army in deliberate defiance of the truce and the UN Chief of Staff's decision, have since been withdrawn to positions north of the line indicated in the Mediator's memorandum.

6. Regarding the coastal area, the government is prepared, after consultation with the UN staff, to order the withdrawal of its regular forces to the north of Deir Suneid, subject to local security arrangements to be agreed upon with the UN Chief of Staff.

7. The Government of Israel sees a contradiction between the Mediator's plan for the establishment of neutral or demilitarized zones, and his decision that the Egyptians may remain in the Bir Asluj area, and that Egyptian control of the Bir Asluj-Rafah road shall be recognized and maintained. The government reserves the right to make representations on this point when the matter arises for practical settlement with the UN staff.

8. The Government of Israel desires, in conclusion, to reaffirm its regard for the decision and recommendations of the SC, and its readiness to do everything possible to facilitate a peaceful settlement in the conflict which has arisen in Palestine, as a result of Arab aggression. It has nominated Col. Yigal Yadin and Mr. Reuven Shiloah as officers whom the UN Chief of Staff may consult in connection with further arrangements. The government reiterates its urgent request to the Acting Mediator that it be informed without delay of the place and time of the meeting with the accredited representatives of the Arab Governments. The Government of Israel expresses its sincere hope that this meeting may open direct negotiations establishing peace

and good neighborliness—an objective which Israel has pursued since the very beginning of this unhappy conflict.”

Sent Department Delga 839, repeated London as 1297.

MARSHALL

501.BB Palestine/11-1948 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State .

SECRET URGENT

PARIS, November 19, 1948—midnight.

Delga 848. Following are comments Eban and Comay¹ to Ross this morning on PGI response to SC resolutions of 4 and 16 November (texts sent Department Delga 839, November 19). Eban stressed the following five points:

1. Principal emphasis should be that there is no desire on part PGI to challenge authority of SC, but on contrary, emphasis should be placed on cooperation with the Council.

2. Main element of Israeli forces which have entered the Negev since October 14 are to be withdrawn.

3. Insofar as forces are not withdrawn from the coastal area the PGI is prepared to withdraw its forces north of Deir Suneid so that the Egyptians can advance to the line set by the mediator.

4. The appointment of officers in response to Bunche's request indicates the willingness of the PGI to cooperate in working out any outstanding matters.

5. With reference to the November 16 resolution, Eban stressed acceptance by the PGI of principles contained this resolution.

Both Israeli representatives stressed that action taken required great deal of courage on part of PGI in view domestic situation Israel. They were encouraged in taking this step by fact that SC found it possible pass armistice resolution November 16 and by assurances compliance with Bunche program in Negev would not prejudice eventual territorial settlement.

Eban quoted Bunche as being very satisfied and stating he felt PGI action “most statesmanlike.” Bunche confirmed this view later in the day.

Beeley's view (which he expressed at press conference today) was somewhat more cautious and marked by understatement. He told us he felt PGI's action “a step in right direction.”

Jessup shares view that this action by PGI gets us over this difficult hurdle.

Sent Dept Delga 848; repeated London 1301.

MARSHALL

¹ Michael Saul Comay, Member of the Israeli Delegation to the General Assembly.

Editorial Note

Mr. Jessup, before the First Committee on November 20, announced the general agreement of the United States with the basic premises of Count Bernadotte's report. He stated that peace must return to Palestine; that a Jewish state called Israel existed in Palestine as a recognized entity; that the boundaries of Israel should be determined by agreement of the parties, aided by the Conciliation Commission, that Israel was entitled to the boundaries set forth in the resolution of November 29, 1947, that any modifications of these boundaries be made only if acceptable to Israel, but that if Israel desired additional territory, it must offer an appropriate exchange through negotiations; that the Palestinian refugees be permitted to return to their homes, with adequate compensation to those who chose not to return; that Jerusalem be accorded special treatment; and that the question of international responsibility for guaranteeing boundaries and maintenance of human rights required careful consideration; for text of Mr. Jessup's statement, see Department of State *Bulletin*, November 28, 1948, page 657.

British reaction to Mr. Jessup's statement was "very unfavorable." Sir Orme Sargent, Permanent Under Secretary of State, said that the statement was worse than the Foreign Office had expected, particularly regarding "(a) abandonment of principle of acquiescence and (b) position that changes can be made in November 29 frontier only with consent PGI." (Telegram 4961, November 23, 7 p. m., from London, 501.BB Palestine/11-2348)

867N.01/11-2048 : Telegram

Mr. Wells Stabler to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

AMMAN, November 20, 1948—4 p. m.

124. Recent reports indicate that Abdel Ghani Bey Karmi ¹ (mytel 114, November 11 ²) has held talks with Israelis in Paris and has discussed possible terms of settlement including disposition of Negev, Abdullah's attitude regarding Jaffa and other points. Prime Minister, on learning such conversations proceeding, objected to King on basis he unable countenance any form "negotiation". King has agreed and telegram has allegedly been sent to Abdel Majid Haidar instructing him to restrain Karmi.

Also understood that Prime Minister has received another telegram

¹ Private Secretary to King Abdullah.

² Not printed.

from Sassoon. Efforts being made confirm this and ascertain subject.³
Department pass to Gadel 19.

STABLER

³ Amman, on November 21, reported that Mr. Sassoon's second telegram to the Transjordanian Prime Minister, friendly in tone, dealt with the protection of the Rutenberg Works by the Arab Legion during the flood period of the Yarmuk River (telegram 125, 867N.01/11-2148). The Prime Minister replied that the area of the Rutenberg Works was the responsibility of the Iraqi Army and that the Transjordanian authorities could not offer much assistance (telegram 127, November 23, 3 p. m., from Amman, 867N.01/11-2348). The latter message also stated that the Prime Minister had received a fourth message from Mr. Sassoon on November 22 "stating that Israeli authorities had heard that Arab Legion was planning mount offensive in Jerusalem and expressing hope that such report not true. Prime Minister has replied that Arab Legion has no [such] intentions and referred to previous message re Mount Scopus in which he indicated desire to cease fire in all Jerusalem."

501.BB Palestine/11-2048 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET US URGENT

PARIS, November 20, 1948—9 p. m.

Delga 862. We have given further consideration Paragraph 5(b) (Gadel 522, November 18 and Gadel 535 [533¹], November 19) and suggest it be reworded as follows:

"That certain adjustments in the territorial arrangements of the GA resolution of 29 November 1947 should be considered through negotiations directly or through the UN Conciliation Commission; if as a result of such negotiations, the Jewish state remains in occupancy of Jaffa and all or part of Western Galilee, compensatory arrangements should be made in the Negev."

Reference Delga 859, November 20,² we are inclined to believe changed wording may make this paragraph more acceptable to British. We believe in any event that reference to "Southern Negev["] might be open to misinterpretation and that it would be preferable to refer to this area as "Negev" as hitherto. If you concur, it naturally follows that last clause as given Gadel 533, November 19 would have to be dropped.

At this stage, it would be difficult to comment in detail on Paragraph 4 of Gadel 522, November 18. After we have had reactions to US statement Committee 1, November 20, we will have more balanced perspective of possible course developments Committee 1.

¹ Latter not printed; but see footnote 3, p. 1609.

² Not printed; it gave British comments on Gadel 522, November 18, p. 1608, and particularly, Ambassador Douglas' report that "Beeley took rather strong exception to Department's suggested redraft of Paragraph 5(b) of the United Kingdom resolution. He said Department's redraft appeared to be in contradiction and wholly inconsistent with Paragraph 1, Gadel 522. Paragraph 1 appeared to establish Galilee and Negev on an equal basis. Department's redraft, however, seemed to be a very important retrogression since it in effect gave Galilee and northern Negev to Jews leaving only southern Negev as offsetting factor." (501.BB Palestine/11-2048)

Reference Paragraph 10, Delga 351, Beeley indicates British would have no objection to inclusion, but failed to see necessity therefor in view Paragraph 10, Delga 796.

Sent Department 862, repeated London as 1310.

MARSHALL

867N.01/11-2148 : Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Acting Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

JERUSALEM, November 21, 1948—3 p. m.

1491. On own initiative Colonel Dayan, Commanding Officer Jewish forces Jerusalem, last night suggested to Consul General meeting with Abdullah Tel, Arab Military Governor, to establish effective cease-fire Jerusalem. Stated given full powers by Israeli chief staff Tel Aviv negotiate agreement binding all Jewish forces under his command including units opposite Bethlehem. Felt cease-fire should extend for about 15 miles either side city Jerusalem. Asserted could guarantee compliance his troops since no longer bothered by IZL or Stern units. Expressed opinion both Arabs and Jews would abide by agreement voluntarily reached as opposed to one ineffectually imposed by United Nations. Wishes discuss with Abdullah Tel question Mount Scopus convoys and use Hadassah and Hebrew unit but will attach no conditions to cease-fire. After consulting Neuville and senior United Nations observers Jerusalem intend proceed Old City tomorrow discuss with Abdullah Tel.

Approach may indicate PGI wishes permanent end fighting Jerusalem and feels possible make effective agreement with Arab Legion.

Sent Department 7491; Department pass Gadel 9, Cairo 139, Amman; repeated Beirut 97; Baghdad 28; Damascus 47.

BURDETT

501.BB Palestine/11-2248 : Telegram

The Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation at Paris (Dulles) to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET URGENT

PARIS, November 22, 1948—2 p. m.

Delga 885. At Shertok's invitation Jessup called on him last evening. Eban only other person present. Shertok stated US statement in first committee¹ read "with appreciation." He singled out for primary emphasis our tribute to the way in which Israel is fulfilling its mission in receiving and providing for immigrants. Secondly, he appreciated references to Israeli membership. He indicated their doubts concern-

¹ For a summary of Mr. Jessup's statement of November 20, see editorial note, p. 1617.

ing our views on boundary matters, suggesting that while they could not give up claim to Negeb, the question was whether their traditional claim to Galilee should not also be recognized. Jessup did not engage in discussion on this point. Shertok wondered why we considered British resolution even basis for discussion though Eban admitted preliminary paragraphs not bad. Jessup stated fundamental difference was that British resolution contemplated Assembly would proceed to some decision on boundaries while US statement indicated this is matter for negotiation.

Shertok touched on relations with US and Soviet Union. He said that permanent good relations with the west and especially with the US were primary considerations in their policy. He then emphasized that they faced necessity of arranging for bringing immigrants from Poland, Roumania, Bulgaria, et cetera, and that these arrangements required friendly relations with Soviet Union, which they must preserve. With something of a plea for support of him and his group in PGI, he stressed necessity of avoiding giving people of Israel picture of the west blocking Israel's future, particularly UN membership. He emphasized importance of membership in connection with inequality otherwise existing between Jews and Arabs before a conciliation commission.

On refugees, he registered doubt as to ability to readmit them and cited self-contradictory statements of Mufti which added up to an indication that Arab refugees should not return to Israel.

[Here follows Mr. Shertok's estimate of the attitude of various members of the Security Council toward Israeli membership in the United Nations.]

Jessup stated frankly that it would be very difficult for the US in promoting Israeli membership if military activities should suddenly commence. Shertok quickly said that assurances on this point can be given, not formally and publicly but to US. Eban added that formal application for membership would contain pledge to observe Charter. Jessup agreed desirability working in close contact in regard to timing on this matter. Jessup inquired whether they knew avoiding [*how to avoid?*] Soviet views [*veto?*] concerning simultaneous admission Transjordan. Shertok reported conversations with Soviet and Ukraine representatives SC had but had no definite statement from them. Shertok agreed that it would be helpful to PGI if Transjordan were admitted. He raised question of Soviet desire for general agreement to admit all applicants. Jessup replied this consideration would complicate Palestine problem and much better from Israeli point of view to help to separate the two cases of Israel and Transjordan.

Regarding Jerusalem, Jessup asked whether they would press for actual incorporation into state of Israel. Shertok stated emphatically that Israel would resist incorporation of all of Jerusalem under Arab

trusteeship, hastily adding that he referred only to verbal battles. He amplified at length his plan for Israeli trusteeship for part of the New City, Arab trusteeship for other part of New City, Old City being under direct UN trusteeship with Christian governor. Old City under such plan would be delimited not by the walls but would also take in such Holy places as Garden of Gethsemane. He stressed that their willingness to accept such a plan was held very secretly and known to very few in Israeli Government. It was not known to Israeli public and premature leak would be very harmful. He said that under previous regime New City had borne major part financial burden administering Old City and under his plan such financial support would continue.

Regarding Beersheba, Shertok said they had not talked recently with Bunche but hoped the representative they had appointed could adjust the matter with Bunche's representatives on the spot. Shertok was cautious in responding to Jessup's suggestion that if any military forces had to be used from now on, they should be considered as police forces in conjunction with Acting Mediator. Shertok excluded possibility of joint Jewish and Arab police teams, e.g., in Negeb.

On Jaffa and Lydda, Shertok inquired whether US statement meant acceptance of proposals in his speech on these subjects. Jessup replied we have not committed ourselves to any particular plan but had merely indicated we interpreted Shertok's speech as revealing fact that these were subjects which might be settled by negotiation.

DULLES

501.BB Palestine/11-2248: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Delegation at Paris

TOP SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, November 22, 1948—5 p. m.

Gadel 551. We approve language suggested for para. 5(b) as contained in Delga 862, Nov. 20.

We have given careful study to Delga 859, Nov. 20, as well as Delgas 848, 849 and 857,¹ providing recent Israeli comment on UK draft resolution and Israeli idea of a "simplified resolution" which might serve to meet immediate requirements in this GA.² We do not feel receptive to Israeli suggestion for such a resolution at this time. We are now on record as supporting the general principles contained in Bernadotte's seven basic premises with amendments. Careful reading

¹ None printed; telegrams 848 and 849 are dated November 19 and 857, the following day.

² The Israelis opposed the British view that the General Assembly determine territorial lines and favored their demarcation through negotiation between the parties. Their "simple resolution" called for extending the Security Council's armistice efforts and the appointment of a conciliation commission which would assist the parties in reaching agreement (Delga 849, 501.BB Palestine/11-1948).

by Israeli representatives of Jessup's statement Nov. 20³ will show that attitude of US is favorable to them but that this govt is publicly on record as feeling that Bernadotte Plan is a basis for negotiating a settlement and conciliation of differences between the two parties.

On the other hand we feel that British position is unduly rigid and in fact somewhat unreal. Conditions which prevailed last Sept. and which prompted Secretary's statement of Sept. 21 in support of Bernadotte Plan have materially changed as result of military operations and political conditions in countries concerned. In consequence we feel that British will defeat their own purpose, which is a prompt and definitive territorial settlement, by clinging stubbornly to every dotted I and crossed T in Bernadotte Plan.

On question of negotiations mentioned para. 1, Delga 859, Nov. 20, we feel it would be useful to tell McNeil and Beeley that neither of our govts. should "freeze" to fixed positions. We favor at least recognizing desirability of direct negotiations (your suggested new para. 2) because one party to conflict—Israel—has consistently expressed willingness to negotiate and because two of other parties—Transjordan and Egypt—have apparently undertaken clandestine conversations with Israel.

We have no thought of either UK or US putting pressure on Transjordan as victim of a Near-Eastern Munich. However, we fail to see why our two govts should not in a friendly way counsel with the parties in an endeavor to work out a meeting of the minds. If there were such an agreement arrived at secretly and soon, it would then be possible to join with British in securing passage of a GA resolution which would give international confirmation by UN to agreement privately reached, thus saving face of Arab leaders. If this should not prove possible, appointment of proposed Conciliation Commission would establish machinery for a continued effort to reach final settlement.

In fact it seems to us that present time is propitious for a settlement. There are two recent significant indications of Israeli statesmanship and moderation which serve to substantiate this opinion. One is Israeli deference to Mediator's order for withdrawal from Negev to Oct. 14 positions. The other is important initiative taken by Jewish Commanding Officer, Jerusalem, as reported Jerusalem's 7491 [1491], Nov. 21, to Dept, repeated Gadel 9. From Arab point of view (providing Bevin does not encourage them to wishful thinking by veiled promises of Brit. aid in form of rearmament) it should be obvious that in light of their own military weakness relative to Israel present moment offers opportunity of reaching a quick settlement which in view of present GA interest in problem need not be on terms disadvantageous to them.

We for our part would be prepared to give most urgent advice to

³ See editorial note, p. 1617.

PGI to continue counsels of moderation which it exhibited in accepting Acting Mediator's request for a withdrawal in the Negev. US stands willing to be of service to parties if they feel that a go-between is necessary or would be willing to see any other friendly govt perform such service. All concerned would welcome a definitive settlement now rather than prospect of dragging out this acrimonious interchange for another year under auspices of a committee optimistically named "conciliation." Furthermore, an agreed settlement now would be hailed with acclamation by other members of UN and would stand out as principal achievement of third session UNGA.

As concluding paragraphs of Delga 859 aptly point out, Israelis want negotiations and no Bernadotte Plan, British want Bernadotte Plan and no negotiations. US position is to bridge gap between these two extremes. We regret however that it is not possible to accept British endorsement paragraphs as suggested final para. Delga 859.

Repeated to London as 4397 for Ambassador.⁴

LOVETT

⁴ Filed with this telegram is an information copy bearing the following marginal notation in Mr. McClintock's handwriting: "Cleared with Clark Clifford, 6:30 pm Nov. 22."

Editorial Note

Mr. Jessup addressed the First Committee on November 23 concerning the British draft resolution of November 18, broadening the scope of the amendments proposed on November 17 by Secretary Marshall in Delga 797, page 1603; for the full text of his statement, see Department of State *Bulletin*, December 5, 1948, page 687. The official text of the United States amendments to the British draft resolution is printed in GA, 3rd sess., Pt. I, *First Committee, Annexes*, page 66. The United States amendments were revised on November 25; for text, see *ibid.*, page 67.

501.BB Palestine/11-2348: Telegram

Mr. Wells Stabler to the Secretary of State

SECRET URGENT

AMMAN, November 23, 1948—noon.

126. Re Jerusalem's 491 [1491], November 21 to Department, it appears that on November 12 Sassoon at Paris sent message to Prime Minister in reply latter's message of October 31 concerning Mount Scopus (mytel 102, November 1¹) and suggested that Jewish and Arab military commanders Jerusalem meet to discuss end hostilities entire Jerusalem area. Sassoon indicated that instructions were being

¹ Not printed; but see footnote 2, p. 1548.

sent Colonel Dayan, CO Jewish forces Jerusalem to arrange meeting. It is understood here that Dayan's absence from Jerusalem has been responsible for delay in meeting but relative quiet in Jerusalem during past ten days has been attributed to receipt of instructions from Israelis at Paris.

In view previous attitude Transjordan authorities and Arab Legion re Jerusalem, it is felt that no difficulty will be encountered from Transjordan side in reaching effective cease-fire agreement.

Department pass Jerusalem, Gadel 21, Beirut, Cairo, and Damascus.

STABLER

501.BB Palestine/11-2448 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

SECRET

WASHINGTON, November 24, 1948—6 p. m.

4422. Hoyer Millar¹ presented Lovett last evening with personal message from Bevin for Secy with verbal request it be passed on to President also. Message reads: "Bevin was much concerned at views on Palestine expressed by US Rep at meeting of Political Comm of GA on Nov 20.² He is convinced that frank and close cooperation between US and UK both as regards Middle East and many other important fields is essential to preservation world peace. He is glad know that US and UK Delegations in Paris are in touch with each other with view to seeking some way of overcoming differences between two govts, but he fears that unless US Delegation is authorised make considerable advance from its present position there will inevitably be open disagreement between two Delegations in Assembly on certain vital points, and that they will probably find themselves obliged vote on different sides. Bevin would very deeply regret any such development, but he feels bound maintain principles which both Govts have publicly endorsed. After long discussion and cooperation between our two govts, it was possible for them both find common ground in shape of support for Bernadotte proposals. It was only after US had announced its support these proposals that HMG likewise gave them their support and HMG have been basing their policy on assumption that this common stand would be maintained. While Bevin would, of course, not exclude possibility of Bernadotte proposals being amended, he regards as essential factors which must be maintained general substance of territorial provisions and principle of solution recommended by Assembly of UN in which both sides are asked acquiesce.

"Bevin earnestly hopes that in light this expression his views, US Govt may feel able instruct US Delegation Paris modify their present

¹ Sir Frederick Robert Hoyer Millar, British Minister.

² See editorial note, p. 1617.

attitude and withdraw their opposition to vital points in UK resolution, to which they are at present taking exception—namely that general substance of territorial provisions of Bernadotte Report should be approved and that Conciliation Comm should be given adequate power put them into effect, relying on acquiescence of two parties in this action but not depending on their prior agreement.”

Brit Min stated he realized events had overtaken message since press despatches from Paris indicated US amendments to UK resolution had already been presented. Emb had therefore hesitated whether [send?] present message at all but decided in favor doing so. Lovett replied that notwithstanding these developments he would pass message on to both Secy and President.

Lovett in commenting on Bevin's message first mentioned Douglas report on Sargent's ³ reaction to US position (London's 4961 Nov 23 ⁴) with specific reference to question territorial provisions Bernadotte report and question acquiescence. He said that US finally has firm position re boundaries namely that Israel must either adhere to those fixed by Nov 29 resolution or if it desires retain Western Galilee and Jaffa must make compensatory exchanges. We believe solution by negotiation essential since our delegation considers it impossible obtain GA approval for boundaries fixed by Bernadotte report. Our two delegations in Paris are in close touch with each other and there is really only small difference between their two positions.

Lovett emphasized point that while it may be impossible persuade Arab states either agree or acquiesce in UK resolution with US amendments this might not be case if Arabs were convinced UK would not supply them with arms. He sincerely hoped therefore that our two delegations could reach common agreement on differences now separating them.⁵

MARSHALL

³ Sir Orme G. Sargent, British Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

⁴ Not printed; but see editorial note, p. 1617.

⁵ This telegram was repeated to Paris as Gadel 572.

501.BB Palestine/11-2448: Telegram

*The Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation at Paris
(Dulles) to the Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET US URGENT PARIS, November 24, 1948—midnight.

Delga 920. For Lovett from Kopper. Fawzi Bey (Egypt) called on Jessup today. Conversations resulted from approach by Fawzi to Bunche saying he wished to see Jessup and Ross prior to Arab delegates meeting this afternoon. Fawzi had discussed with Bunche yesterday much of what he discussed with Jessup.

Discussion commenced with Fawzi stating UK resolution and US amendments did not appear to be so bad after opportunity had been given to study them. He felt them sufficiently strong but not too rigid. Opportunity for some flexibility apparent in drafting of terms. Jessup pointed out that we thought it would be mistake for GA to attempt to make definitive delineation of boundaries. Fawzi agreed that it was wiser to leave this more general in resolution.

Fawzi then made following points :

(a) Israeli should abide by SC resolutions.

(b) While November 16 SC resolution was distasteful to Arabs in that it implied a degree of recognition by Arab States of existence Israeli state, Arabs should be able to conduct negotiations with Mediator in such way as to carry out spirit of resolution.

(c) While official Arab position continued favor unitary state, it was obvious certain practical matter had to be considered. Fawzi favored geographic continuity.

(d) Arabs could not agree to any diminution Negeb as envisaged in Bernadotte [report?]. Egypt could not be separated from other Arab states by Jewish state. Jewish colonies forming bulge in Negeb must be given up in return for transfer of Arab portions of northern Palestine to Israel.

(e) In response to question by Jessup whether any real issue existed between Egypt and Transjordan regarding territorial disposition, Fawzi replied there was not. These matters could be settled if viewed realistically. He then made clear he thought Egypt should have portion of Negeb south of line drawn through Majdal and Hebron. Transjordan should have portion up to Bethlehem and presumably to south. He did not define this specifically.

(f) Re Transjordan access to sea, Fawzi said that if absolutely necessary Transjordan could have strip north of Majdal-Hebron line. Egypt must have Beersheba. (Subsequently Fawzi told Kopper reasons for Egyptian desire to have portion of Negeb were several. Among them were desire to have something to show to their people. We believe apprehension of extension of Transjordan sphere and UK relation thereto also a factor.)

(g) Fawzi felt continuity between Egypt and Arab states should be west of Jordan and Dead Sea.

(h) Arabs do not feel November 29 resolution still stands but thought it would be undesirable to become involved in protracted legal arguments this point. Adverted to his conversation with Secretary last summer when he had emphasized necessity to recognize practicalities of situation.

(i) Most significant point made by Fawzi was at conclusion of conversation when he stated it most important that preliminary understanding should be reached in next few days regarding general form boundaries would take. Thought US, UK, Arab states and Jews should have such understanding on overall boundaries. Re Negeb, thought US, UK, Transjordan and Egypt should have understanding.

(j) When asked whether other Arab states would hold similar views, Fawzi said they were not in position to do anything in present situation so would have to acquiesce.

Later in day Fawzi told Kopper he had informed Khashaba Pasha ¹ of his conversation. Said latter would probably talk to British tonight, particularly on matter set forth in paragraph *z* above. Said he had hoped to hear more from Jessup in near future as to our views. Said he hoped we would talk to British.

Our feeling here on Egyptian boundaries position vis-à-vis Israel and Transjordan is that it constitutes first bargaining position.²

Sent Department; repeated London for the Ambassador as 1351. [Kopper.]

DULLES

¹ Ahmed Mohammed Khashaba, Egyptian Foreign Minister.

² Fawzi Bey, on November 26, had a conversation with Messrs. Kopper, Bunche, and Beeley, at which he elaborated on Egyptian views of Negeb boundaries. He stated that the "Eastern boundary of Egypt would be line drawn from point east of Hebron to junction 35 east longitude and 31 north latitude, then south along 35 east longitude to Transjordan border and then along present border to Gulf of Aqaba." The Egyptian spokesman noted that these boundaries were subject to modification in negotiations with Transjordan (telegram Delga 953, November 26, 9 p. m., from Paris, 501.BB Palestine/11-2648).

867N.01/11-2548 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, November 25, 1948—1 p. m.
N1ACT

4429. Following is text message for Lovett left by Hoyer Millar yesterday under FonOff instructions (see Deptel 4422 Nov 24 to London, London's 4995 Nov 24 and Delga 911 Nov 24 ¹):

"Minister should see Mr. Lovett again today and point out it by no means too late for further efforts to bridge gap between US and UK over Bernadotte proposals. A number of amendments and counter-amendments will be under active discussion in Paris during the next few days, and we in FonOff are constantly making fresh suggestions to the UK Delegation, as you will see from the most recent telegrams. There might even be a drafting subcommittee in Paris to try and reconcile conflicting suggestions.

"Minister should therefore again urge that instructions should be sent to Dr. Jessup, authorizing him to go as far as he possibly can to meet the UK views. Even if the USG maintain their view that they cannot support the whole Brit resolution, could they not even at this stage agree to counter-amendments which would depart less widely from their previous attitude and diminish the most regrettable public divergence between the two Govts?"

Please inform FonOff we are equally anxious there should be no public divergence between two countries and will be glad study pro-

¹ Delga 911 not printed.

posed Brit counter-amendments with view to seeing extent to which they can be accepted within limits present GADel instructions.

GADel should keep Dept promptly informed of such amendments with its recommendations concerning them.²

MARSHALL

²This telegram was repeated to Paris as Gadel 581. The United States Delegation, on November 25, transmitted a revised version of the British draft resolution (Delga 925, 501.BB Palestine/11-2548); for text, see GA, *3rd sess., Pt. I, First Committee, Annexes, 1948*, p. 58. The Delegation noted, later the same day, that the revised draft incorporated some but not all the United States amendments of the original draft (Delga 939, 501.BB Summaries/11-2548). For the statement by the British Representative explaining the revisions, see GA, *3rd sess., Pt. I, First Committee, Summary Records, 1948*, p. 759.

Editorial Note

The Soviet Representative, on November 25, submitted a draft resolution to the First Committee calling for withdrawal of all foreign troops and military personnel from Palestine; for text, see GA, *3rd sess., Pt. I, First Committee, Annexes, 1948*, page 75. The following day, the Syrian Representative submitted a draft resolution calling for creation of a commission "to prepare proposals for the establishment of a single State of the whole of Palestine on a cantonization or federal basis"; for text, see *ibid.*

Several additional resolutions were proposed during the meetings of the First Committee. Inasmuch as many of the provisions of the drafts overlapped, the Committee, on November 26, adopted an oral proposal by the Canadian Representative to appoint a working group to prepare a consolidated tabulation of the various texts and amendments (GA, *3rd sess., Pt. I, First Committee, Summary Records, 1948*, pages 788, 789). The Working Group completed such a tabulation the following day; for text, see GA, *3rd sess., Pt. I, First Committee, Annexes, 1948*, page 76.

867N.01/11-2648: Telegram

The Special Representative of the United States in Israel, Temporarily at Paris (McDonald) to the President's Special Counsel (Clifford)

TOP SECRET

PARIS, November 26, 1948—2 p. m.

6044. Urgent for White House only. Personal attention Clifford. Despite absolute loyalty and able leadership Dulles and other delegates, I am convinced Bevin still hopes undo Assembly resolution November 29 and to secure from this UN resolution which Israel would have to reject and thus place itself in position of "flouting" authority UN. President would thus be checkmated and Britain

would then be freed—even if sanctions were not imposed—to rearm the Arab States and enable and encourage them continue war against Israel.

Unless and until British show Arabs that UK acknowledges Israel to be an inescapable and enduring fact; and until Bevin permits Abdullah to make peace with Israel, British protestations of peaceful intent are mere words to trap the unwary.

Would be most helpful if President would personally telephone Dulles assuring latter of full confidence and appreciation and urging him to:

- (1) Resist firmly any further whittling down US program; and
- (2) Press vigorously President's suggestion that Israel be admitted to UN this session. Such admission depends on enthusiastic American support. (President might thus forestall threatening crisis and help secure Assembly support essential his program.)

Should you wish supporting data above analysis I could supply it if you would telephone me Hotel Crillon, Room 211.

Your advice Wednesday when I telephoned you re remaining Paris was sound. At request Dulles, Dept has granted extension time. Signed James G. McDonald.

501.BB Palestine/11-2648: Telegram

*The Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation at Paris
(Dulles) to the Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET NIACT

PARIS, November 26, 1948—3 p. m.

6047. Eyes only for Lovett from Rusk—no distribution. Now understand that McDonald has sent message¹ direct to President through State Department channels without knowledge of Dulles which comments adversely upon delegation attitude Palestine. Since delegation is acting strictly under instructions and no principal delegate is objecting to our line of action, this may create intolerable situation. Apparently one point of concern is question of UN membership for Israel. Israel has not even applied for membership. Israel knows proper procedure is to file application with Security Council. Israel also knows US will give them as much help as possible when matter comes to SC. We are already taking matter up with other SC delegations.

We thought we had convinced Eban and Comay that negative or marginal vote in GA Committee One on this question prior to SC action would be fatal to their chances. Many delegations would abstain on basis it is undignified for Assembly to solicit membership of

¹ Presumably telegram 6044, *supra*.

state which has not even applied. We have urged Israel to apply but they insist on playing hard to get.

One possibility would be to ask McDonald to hasten back to Tel Aviv with personal message from President to Ben Gurion stating, among other things, (a) US believes now is time to move definitely to final solution Palestine and we are doing everything possible to bring other parties to attitude of negotiation and settlement (b) we are anxious to accomplish Israel membership in UN at this session; we believe prospects are fair but know that attitude of other members SC turns on assurance that Israel has no more military objectives in mind and will cooperate with SC in maintaining peace (c) we believe application to SC by Israel for UN membership in conjunction with conciliatory attitude toward SC effort to establish armistice would be an appropriate step, (d) et cetera, et cetera.

Perhaps no trouble will develop this end, but if we begin to get sudden telephone calls which cut across our instructions, reserve a wing at St. Elizabeth's.² [Rusk.]

DULLES

² Mental hospital in Washington, D.C.

501.BB Palestine/11-2648 : Telegram

*The Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation at Paris
(Dulles) to the Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET URGENT

PARIS, November 26, 1948—5 p. m.

Delga 946. During past week, Bunche has expressed increasing concern to us privately regarding difficulties General Riley was having in getting Israeli acceptance of plan for withdrawal from northern Negeb pursuant to November 4 resolution. Three days ago, Bunche told Shertok he took most serious view of situation and would have to call meeting of Security Council committee within 24 hours if outstanding differences between Riley and Israeli military representatives were not settled. Bunche extended this first 24-hour period by an additional 24 hours which expired yesterday afternoon. He therefore requested a meeting of the committee for this afternoon.

According to Bunche, Shertok has been visibly concerned and had promised to cable Tel Aviv. Ross discussed matter with Eban yesterday morning who informed us that Shertok had urged Tel Aviv to find some way out of the difficulty. According to Eban, the Israeli delegation here is concerned regarding the possible effect this situation might have on the development of Assembly action. He implied that there might be differences of view between Israeli military and political leaders.

According to Bunche, one of his difficulties has been that Tel Aviv

has told Riley they must consult Paris, while the Israeli delegation here has told Bunche that they must consult Tel Aviv.

A major hazard to our efforts to secure effective Assembly action with regard to the political settlement and in turn Security Council and Assembly action looking to the admission of Israel to the United Nations, would be failure to settle the northern Negeb situation pursuant to the November 4 resolution. Accordingly, at our suggestion, Shertok and Eban called on Jessup this morning on their way to Committee One meeting to discuss this matter. Ross was also present.

Jessup initiated the conversation by indicating our grave concern based on the facts as they had been reported to us here that failure to settle this situation promptly would impair our efforts in the Assembly.

Shertok said that with regard to the procedural aspects of the matter, the decision had to be made in Tel Aviv and that while he did not want to remain in any way aloof from the matter, he preferred that the decision remain in Tel Aviv particularly since it was primarily a military matter.

Shertok went on to say that on the substance, Israel had complied with two of the major requirements of the withdrawal plan. First, they had withdrawn their forces from the coastal area allotted to the Arabs under the November 29 resolution, thus permitting the advance of Egyptian forces to the lines laid down for them. Second, Israel had withdrawn all surplus troops which had entered the Negeb since October 14.

As he understood the remaining differences, Shertok went on, there were three, which he then outlined as follows:

1. They could not possibly withdraw from certain areas in the Negeb where their troops were stationed, because to do so would leave dangerous vacuums in which Arab or Jewish irregulars might operate freely. The United Nations did not have any force at its disposal and it was impossible for the United Nations to fill such dangerous vacuums. Until the armistice lines were established, they could not possibly comply with such requests.

2. They could not comply with the request that mobile PGI forces which had been in the Negeb before May 14 should withdraw. These forces should be distinguished from mobile forces which had entered the area after May 14 as well as from static defense forces left in the settlements. The PGI considered it essential that the PGI forces which had been in an area, namely the Negeb, which they considered politically and militarily theirs since May 14 should be allowed to remain there and have freedom of movement.

3. They could not agree to allow the Egyptian brigade now in the Faluja pocket to be evacuated or supplied with food. No military commander could possibly allow a fully armed brigade to escape and remain available to the enemy for offensive operations. This would be

a suicidal move. The Egyptians at Faluja were prisoners of war in every sense of the term except the technical one. So far as feeding these Egyptians is concerned, for three months the Egyptians would not let food go through to peaceful Israeli settlements.

Shertok then made the general comment that they viewed the November 4 and November 16 resolutions of the Security Council as an organic hold [*whole?*]. They had indicated their desire to comply fully with the November 16 resolution and they were trying to comply with the November 4 resolution to the best of their ability.

Jessup commented very frankly along the following lines. Public opinion widely would believe that the Israeli attitude was very much like that of a lion which having caught a mouse in a trap would not let the mouse out because it would be suicidal for the lion to do so. It would be very hard to make people believe that it would be suicidal for Israel to let these Egyptians evacuate the Faluja pocket and withdraw to the lines, that is, Gaza, established for them under the November 4 resolution.

The general atmosphere in the Council and the General Assembly, Jessup went on, is that we are moving forward to peace through an armistice. If we are held up in our work now, because of the situation in the Negeb, this whole atmosphere will evaporate. And as Jessup had told Shertok on Sunday, it would be very difficult for us to help Israel in the Security Council and in the Assembly if a new unfavorable atmosphere should develop.

Jessup went on to say that the question might be reduced to a very simple formula. Israel had to balance a political risk against a military risk. The political risk of an atmosphere unfavorable to Israel developing was great while the military risk seemed to be insignificant in comparison. Shertok said that Israel had "an extreme anxiety to end the war and have peace". But, he went on to say, there was no sign that the other side felt the same way about the situation.

Our discussion concluded for lack of time with assurances by Shertok that they would give careful consideration to the views Jessup had expressed.¹

Sent Department Delga 946 repeated London 1364.

DULLES.

¹ During the afternoon of November 26, Mr. Eban advised the United States Delegation that Mr. Shertok had cabled Tel Aviv immediately following the morning conference and had received a reply indicating that the "PGI had agreed (a) to let food convoys go through to beleaguered Egyptians at Faluja and (b) to discuss release of Egyptians in connection with armistice discussions contemplated 16 November resolution." (Delga 952, November 26, 9 p. m., from Paris, 501.BB Palestine/11-2648)

Truman Papers, President's Secretary's File

*President Truman to the President of the Provisional Government
of Israel (Weizmann)*

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL [WASHINGTON,] November 29, 1948.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Today—the first anniversary of the Partition Resolution—is a most appropriate time for me to answer your last letter, dated November 5th.

As I read your letter, I was struck by the common experience you and I have recently shared. We had both been abandoned by the so-called realistic experts to our supposedly forlorn lost causes. Yet we both kept pressing for what we were sure was right—and we were both proved to be right. My feeling of elation on the morning of November 3rd must have approximated your own feelings one year ago today, and on May 14th, and on several occasions since then.

However, it does not take long for bitter and resourceful opponents to regroup their forces after they have been shattered. You in Israel have already been confronted with that situation; and I expect to be all too soon. So I understand very well your concern to prevent the undermining of your well-earned victories.

I remember well our conversation about the Negev, to which you referred in your letter. I agree fully with your estimate of the importance of that area to Israel, and I deplore any attempt to take it away from Israel. I had thought that my position would have been clear to all the world, particularly in the light of the specific wording of the Democratic Party Platform. But there were those who did not take this seriously, regarding it as “just another campaign promise” to be forgotten after the election. I believe they have recently realized their error. I have interpreted my re-election as a mandate from the American people to carry out the Democratic Platform—including, of course, the plank on Israel. I intend to do so.

Since your letter was written, we have announced in the General Assembly our firm intention to oppose any territorial changes in the November 29th Resolution which are not acceptable to the State of Israel. I am confident that the General Assembly will support us in this basic position.

We have already expressed our willingness to help develop the new State through financial and economic measures. As you know, the Export-Import Bank is actively considering a substantial long-term loan to Israel on a project basis. I understand that your Government is now in process of preparing the details of such projects for submission to the Bank. Personally, I would like to go even further, by expanding

such financial and economic assistance on a large scale to the entire Middle East, contingent upon effective mutual cooperation.

Thank you so much for your warm congratulations and good wishes on my re-election. I was pleased to learn that the first Israeli elections have been scheduled for January 25th. That enables us to set a definite target date for extending *de jure* recognition.

In closing, I want to tell you how happy and impressed I have been at the remarkable progress made by the new State of Israel. What you have received at the hands of the world has been far less than was your due. But you have more than made the most of what you have received, and I admire you for it. I trust that the present uncertainty, with its terribly burdensome consequences, will soon be eliminated. We will do all we can to help by encouraging direct negotiations between the parties looking toward a prompt peace settlement.

Very sincerely yours,

[HARRY S. TRUMAN]

501.BB Palestine/11-2948 : Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

JERUSALEM, November 29, 1948—1 p. m.

1503. Meeting held yesterday at Government House between Colonel Dayan, CO Israeli forces Jerusalem, and Colonel Abdullah Tel of Arab Legion in presence of United Nations observers and Truce Commission. Tentative agreement reached on establishment "complete and sincere" cease-fire for Jerusalem area extending from Beit Jala and Bethlehem in south to Ramallah in north and Latrun on west. Freedom of movement to be permitted within present lines but no movement in no man's land. Proposed concluding statement expresses intention holding additional talks to put into effect other provisions truce and ameliorate conditions in area. Next meeting scheduled for 30th after observers complete delineation no man's land.

Appendix to July 7 Mount Scopus agreement also prepared providing for relief 50% Jewish personnel each fortnight and food convoy each fortnight. Intention expressed to negotiate new comprehensive accord on Mount Scopus. This appendix should eliminate one cause friction Jerusalem considered by Dayan prerequisite any real cease-fire.

Consul General feels atmosphere during meeting indicative definite desire on part both parties terminate fighting Jerusalem. Both commanders advanced practical suggestions for achieving objective. Statements by Dayan re broadening accord and reaching agreement on basis Jerusalem problems particularly significant since apparently acting on instructions from PGI. Contrary to previous meetings questions approached as first step to lasting peace instead effort obtain tactical advantage prior resumption fighting.

Sent Department 1503, Department pass Cairo 140, Gadel 11, London 35. Pouched Tel Aviv 11, Amman, Jidda, repeated Damascus 48, Baghdad 29, Beirut 100.

BURDETT

501.BB Palestine/11-2948 : Telegram

The Secretary of State to the United States Delegation at Paris

SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, November 29, 1948—7 p. m.
 NIACT

Gadel 611. 1. Re Griffis' appointment,¹ confirm (McClintock-Rusk telephone conversation this afternoon) that President highly gratified at word SYG will appoint Griffis as Director Palestine relief (Delga 961, Nov. 27²). Griffis will serve without pay in this post and will be on leave of absence from his Emb at Cairo.

2. Re Delga 986, Nov. 29,² Undersecretary has informally discussed question Congressional appropriation of \$16 million for Palestine refugee relief with Vandenberg, Eaton, Connally, Bloom, Barkley, Lucas and Biffle. Reaction, although not enthusiastic, on whole favorable.

You are authorized officially state that President, following passage by GA of Palestine refugee resolution, will seek \$16 million appropriation from Congress as this Govt's share of \$32 million total in earnest hope other govts will meet remainder this contribution. However, it is of utmost importance your statement make absolutely clear that this is not commitment by US Govt to do more than ask for Congressional appropriation. Final decision must rest with Congress.

MARSHALL

¹ As Director of the United Nations Relief for Palestinian Refugees. The Ambassador's appointment was made public at Paris on December 4 (Department of State *Bulletin*, December 12, 1948, p. 730).

² Not printed.

501.BB Palestine/11-2948 : Telegram

*The Acting Chairman of United States Delegation at Paris (Dulles)
 to the Secretary of State*

SECRET PRIORITY PARIS, November 29, 1948—8 p. m.

Delga 1001. 1. Initial Arab reactions to Israeli application for UN membership¹ reflect considerable anger, disappointment and further disillusionment in US and UN in spite of counter-arguments advanced by us.

¹ For Mr. Shertok's letter of November 29 to the Secretary-General of the United Nations making such application, see SC, 3rd yr., *Supplement for December 1948*, p. 118.

2. In general Arab representatives here believe that Israeli application now is most untimely and will have undesirable effect on effort moderates to achieve or go along with solution of Palestine question. They feel US bears a responsibility because of our strong espousal in spite of our pointing out that Israel made own decision to apply.

[Here follow specific comments by members of Arab Delegations.]

4. Virtually all Arabs unable understand how state with undefined boundaries whose government is recognized by only 17 nations can apply for admission with reasonable prospect of favorable action on its application. No Arab has, however, today alluded to possibility of Arab withdrawal from UN in event Israel elected.

5. Difficult at moment to appraise what effect admission Israel this session will have on efforts to secure peaceful settlement Palestine question. Arabs have injured feelings, probably due to fact they have cooperated pretty well with us on questions major political importance in contrast to their abstention policy last year. How far US can go in support Israel's aspirations in and out UN in forthcoming years while not taking into account numerous legitimate arguments advanced by Near Eastern countries serious question. If policy of cooperation with US on major political questions espoused by certain Arab leaders, some of whom are here, bears no fruit where their specific interests are concerned, position of those leaders likely to become increasingly untenable.

6. Have discussed this with Rusk who believes we must strongly support Israel membership, but hopes Department can find ways and means of seizing this opportunity to demonstrate our interest in Arab world on other matters. He specifically referred to interest expressed by President last spring in getting on with Tigris-Euphrates Valley development and other similar projects in other Arab countries. Rusk stated he was convinced Arab world is ripe now for major effort our part to re-establish friendly relations despite existence of one question on which they feel most bitter.

Department may desire to repeat to Arab capitals.

Sent Department Delga 1001; repeated London 1392 for Satterthwaite from Kopper—limited distribution.

DULLES

501.BB Palestine/11-3048: Telegram

*The Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation at Paris
(Dulles) to the Secretary of State*

SECRET NIACT

PARIS, November 30, 1948—1 p. m.

Delga 996. US and UK delegates have agreed, as result conversations between Ambassador Douglas and British Foreign Office

(Delga 905, November 24 and Delga 925 November 25¹) on following changes in revised text UK draft resolution on Palestine in Committee One:

1. Deletion of paragraph two of UK revised text.
2. Inclusion of paragraph two of US amendment reworded as follows: "Calls upon the governments and authorities concerned to extend the scope of the negotiation provided for in the SC resolution of 16 November and to seek agreement by negotiation conducted either thru the conciliation commission or directly with a view to a final settlement of all questions outstanding between them".
3. Transposition of new paragraph two of British text with paragraph three of British text.
4. Rewording of paragraph four of UK draft as follows:

"Four. Instructs the conciliation commission in pursuance of paragraph 2(c) above to enter into consultations with the governments and authorities concerned with a view to delimiting the frontiers in Palestine, taking into account the following general considerations, without excluding any territorial settlement mutually acceptable to the parties:

a. That there are important elements common to both the resolution of the GA of 29 November 1947 and the progress report of the UN mediator on Palestine;

b. That certain modifications in the territorial arrangements of the GA resolution of 29 November 1947 should be considered taking into account part I, section VIII, paragraph 4(b) of the progress report of the UN Mediator as a contribution to a peaceful adjustment, based on reciprocity and mutual interest, of differences between the parties;"

Comment: It is expected that US delegate in explaining the added words in Committee One would make clear that the idea is that no party can have merely the most advantageous features of both November 29 resolution and Bernadotte report; but that additions to November 29 territory would presumably, by way of reciprocity, call for some reciprocal offset.

5. Addition of new paragraph reading as follows: "Instructs the conciliation commission to seek arrangements among the governments and authorities concerned which will facilitate the economic development of the area, including arrangements for access to ports and air-fields and the use of transportation and communications facilities; in this connection, the conclusions contained in part I, section VIII, paragraphs 4(e) and (f) of the progress report of the UN Mediator should be taken into account."

Comment: The addition of foregoing paragraph was condition of British agreement to deletion of their paragraph numbered 2 and is

¹ Neither printed; the former gave the text of the United States amendments to the British draft resolution of November 18 (see editorial note, p. 1623 and footnote 2 to telegram Delga 797, p. 1603); the latter gave the revised text of the British draft resolution of November 24 (see GA, 3rd sess., Pt. I, First Committee, Annexes, 1948, p. 58).

intended to cover reference to Haifa and Lydda which were not formerly covered by specific paragraphs in British revised draft but were held to be taken care of by endorsement of Bernadotte's specific conclusions under British paragraph numbered 2.

6. Discussions now taking place regarding revised wording paragraph ten on Arab refugees, with regard to which agreement expected this morning.²

7. UKDel plans submit new revised text Palestine draft resolution this afternoon including all foregoing changes.

8. USDel plans, thereafter, withdraw its amendments to former UK revised draft.³

Sent Department Delga 996, repeated London 1390.

DULLES

² The agreed wording appeared as paragraph 11 in the second revised British draft resolution; for text of this draft resolution, dated November 30, see GA, *3rd sess., Pt. I, First Committee, Annexes, 1948*, p. 61.

³ Mr. Rusk, in a statement before the First Committee on December 1, said that the new British draft resolution took full account of suggestions made by the United States Delegation and others and that the United States supported the new British draft (GA, *3rd sess., Pt. I, Summary Records, 1948*, p. 835). The new draft eliminated the paragraph endorsing the specific conclusions of the Bernadotte report and made attendance changes.

Editorial Note

The Arab and Israeli Military Commanders in the Jerusalem area, Lieutenant Colonel Abdullah el-Tel and Moshe Dayan, signed an agreement at Jerusalem on November 30 calling for a "complete and sincere ceasefire" in that area.

The same day a second agreement was signed at Jerusalem in the nature of an annex to the agreement of July 7, 1948, concerning Mount Scopus (see editorial note, page 1195).¹

The agreements were signed in the presence of the United Nations observers and of the Security Council Truce Commission. Their texts were transmitted by Jerusalem the same day in telegram 1507 (867N.01/11-3048).

¹ Jerusalem, on December 1, reported that the "Meeting yesterday between Dayan and Abdullah Tel conducted in atmosphere extreme cordiality" and that "Scope present talks and large area included is such [as] may lead to *de facto* armistice between Transjordan and PGI and informal demilitarization Jerusalem. Conduct talks under guise implementing truce, on present level and between Arab and Jewish spokesmen, ready compromise, and who trust each other possesses many advantages. Minimizes opportunity for criticism King Abdullah by other Arab states on grounds accepting partition and entering direct negotiations with Jews. Permits conclusion practical functional arrangements with minimum regard to final political settlement." (Telegram 1511, 867N.01/12-148)

501.BB Palestine/11-2748 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, December 1, 1948—6 p. m.

4485. US attitude re territorial settlement Palestine (ur 4996 Nov 24 rptd Gadel 928, Delga 971 Nov 27 ¹ rptd London 1376) based on view matter is one for settlement by negotiation, either directly bet parties or through Conciliation Commission, and upon premise that modifications of Nov 29 boundaries of Israel should be made only if fully acceptable to Israel. If Israel desires addition to territory allotted her under Nov 29 resolution, i.e., Western Galilee and Jaffa, US position is that Israel should relinquish part of Negev to Arab States.

If Israel should relinquish Western Galilee and Jaffa, desiring retain all of Negev, US would support Israel in this position. If Israel should desire additions to Nov 29 territory, and should through direct negotiations or through Conciliation Commission reach agreement with Arab States as to portion of Negev to be exchanged for such additions, US would support such agreement, regardless of what boundaries of Israel thus agreed upon would be.

Present view US Govt is that in event Israel should retain Western Galilee and Jaffa, it would be desirable that southern Israeli border be extended to thirty-first parallel within that portion of Negev allotted to Israel under Nov 29 resolution. Portion of Negev thereby made available to Arab States might be divided between Transjordan and Egypt, giving Transjordan access to sea and assuring land communications between Egypt and Transjordan.

If Brit FonOff still attaches considerable importance to access to sea for Transjordan (ur 5031 Nov 28 ²) Dept gathers there is little likelihood FonOff will approve UKDel's suggested Auja-Beersheba line.³

LOVETT

¹ Neither printed; the former reported information from the Foreign Office that the British Delegation at Paris had recently raised with the United States Delegation the question of the precise territorial objectives the United States and the United Kingdom were aiming for in Palestine and that the Foreign Office was extremely interested in the suggestion (501.BB Palestine/11-2448).

² Not printed.

³ Telegram 4485 was repeated to Paris as Gadel 640.

501.BB Palestine/12-148 : Telegram

The Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation at Paris (Dulles) to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

URGENT

PARIS, December 1, 1948—6 p. m.

Delga 1013. Last night I explained our position on Palestine to delegates of Panama, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Venezuela, Peru, Uruguay, Nicaragua, Bolivia, and Ecuador.

Briefly, I said that

(1) We had at least reached a common position with the British and were entirely in accord with the revised British resolution which was presented in Committee One yesterday. We had only reached this position after considerable discussion and compromise on both sides.

(2) By reaching this common position, we felt that we had removed the belief, which had undoubtedly been held up to present, that Arabs could count on British support and Israelis on the support of US, enabling them thus to play one against other. We also felt that present resolution gave as much consideration as possible to conflicting views of parties concerned.

(3) We felt that there was considerable chance of adoption of this resolution *in toto*, but that if there was continued lengthy debate and amendments were introduced, situation would become more confused and the matter might drag on in Committee One indefinitely; however, if there were sufficient support for this resolution, we felt that matter would be removed from GA, an objective which we all desired.

(4) The difficult position in which Arabs find themselves is well known. From this they can probably only extract themselves through pressure brought to bear by UN. We have reason to believe they would acquiesce in such action.

(5) The delegates present discussed problem at length and I gathered impression that majority of them at least intended abstaining when matter came to final vote. They said, however, that what we all wanted was a solution to this long-standing problem and that if joint British-American resolution gave that, they were inclined support it, although instructions to abstain and other commitments already bound them to different course. Most of them indicated they would communicate immediately with their governments, requesting new instructions. As this cannot be counted upon, would urge Department immediately to instruct our missions in the other American Republics to communicate urgently with respective governments, urging support Anglo-American resolution by Latin American delegates here. Instructions to delegates here should be sent immediately as vote on Palestine may be reached today.

Do not consider advisable communicate with the following—Nicaragua, Argentina, Brazil, Guatemala.

View urgency suggest Department repeat this message immediately other Latin American missions.¹

DULLES

¹The Department, by circular telegram on December 1, transmitted the text of Delga 1013 to American Ambassadors in Panama, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, Nicaragua, Bolivia, and Ecuador. The Department directed that Mr. Dulles' views be communicated informally to the respective foreign offices and authorized the Ambassadors to add that the United States Government was giving full support to the revised United Kingdom resolution on Palestine (501.BB Palestine/12-148).

867N.01/12-248 : Telegram

Mr. Wells Stabler to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

AMMAN, December 2, 1948—noon.

138. During talk with Prime Minister this morning following points discussed:

1. Jerusalem cease-fire. Talks had originated on political level with Transjordan Government and Jews having given instructions to military commanders to hold meetings. While at present talks only concern questions relating to truce, it is envisaged they might be extended into political matters. However, Prime Minister said he must proceed with great caution in this connection having regard for attitude other Arab states and depending on general circumstances. Consequently at this stage it will not be possible for Transjordan and Jews meet as governments to consider political points at issue.

Jews appear to show sincere desire reach accord with Transjordan, although it is understood that they have only their interests in mind. Jews have always felt "safe" as regards King but they now see Transjordan Government also responsible. King has maintained contacts with Jews through personal emissaries. While Prime Minister does not approve such contacts, he does not oppose them in belief that they may prove useful channels should time arrive for more direct negotiations. If, however, they become known, they can be repudiated as not approved by government. Publicity re Jerusalem talks is not harmful as truce matters only dealt with. Prime Minister stated he cannot undertake negotiations but would not oppose King's wishes. Latter's policy is definitive and if he chooses negotiate, Prime Minister will resign to open way for government of negotiation.

2. Conciliation Commission. Arab League Political Committee meeting will probably be called as soon as UN makes decision re Palestine. If Conciliation Commission resolution is adopted, believe Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, because of public opinion, will reject it. Egypt's position still unclear but there are signs pointing to more reasonable attitude. If Egypt and Transjordan can agree, probable other Arab states will follow. Prime Minister plans attend League Political Committee meeting himself in order endeavor persuade others to accept UN decisions.

Prime Minister said that in his opinion evidence does exist that other Arab leaders in general are developing more realistic outlook on Palestine situation, particularly in private talks. He was surprised at Iraqi Prime Minister's recent declaration as latter had in recent meetings with Abdullah, Prime Minister and even Palestine Arabs shown himself more in touch with facts.

Speculating on different possibilities Prime Minister said that if

Arab League rejected Conciliation Commission, Transjordan might decide to treat with Commission alone. It would explain publicly that attempts to persuade others to be reasonable had failed and that in deciding to follow this course it had taken into consideration expressed desires of Palestine Arabs. Prime Minister emphasized that such view entirely tentative and that in general it would be preferable to have concurrence of Arab states.

3. Second Palestine conference. (Mytel 136, November 30.¹) Meeting of significance in that it proposed to King that he settle Palestine question either by fighting or by peace. Leaders were not "brave enough" to request peace settlement outright but in any event their resolution gives a definite choice. Believed persons at meeting plus those sharing views far more representative of Palestine Arabs than Gaza Government.

Sent Jerusalem by pouch; repeated Gadel 26 and Arab capitals.

STABLER

¹ Not printed.

501.BB Palestine/12-248:Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the
Acting Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET

LONDON, December 2, 1948—7 p. m.

5079. 1. Believe you will agree that in light Department's 4485, December 1; repeated Paris for GADel as 640, no useful purpose would be served at this time by my pursuing with UK question territorial objectives (my 4996, November 24 and Delga 971, November 27 to Department¹). Because of further strain possibly imposed thereby on US-UK relations I am most reluctant to mention this question unless instructed by Department to do so. Moreover, I feel that at this stage of UNGA proceedings to work out such a side understanding with UK might be made subject of criticism on grounds of moral impropriety.

2. If and when Department undertakes to draft such instructions I hope it will be borne in mind that any chance of success with UK will depend upon convincing UK that there is a southern frontier somewhere in Negev beyond which US will not support Israeli claims.

3. After all excuse for US and UK reaching an understanding re territorial objectives would disappear if parties can negotiate an agreed boundary either directly or through the Conciliation Commission. I sincerely trust that our hopes in this connection will be realized,

¹ Neither printed; regarding the former, see footnote 1, p. 1639.

but I foresee the possibility that we may have to face the problems of an intervening stage prior to a final settlement.

4. Do you agree with my analysis above? ²

Sent Paris 960 GADel for Dulles; repeated Department 5079.

DOUGLAS

² The Department, on December 3, expressed its concurrence that no useful purpose would be served by pursuing the question of territorial objectives with the British (telegram 4518 to London, 501.BB Palestine/12-248).

501.BB Palestine/12-348 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in France

CONFIDENTIAL

WASHINGTON, December 3, 1948—6 p. m.

Gadel 672. For Amb Griffis. On basis verbatim reports Committee III debate on refugee resolution, following countries expressed general willingness contribute to program: Denmark, Lebanon, Netherlands, Sweden, Brazil, Dominican Republic. Egypt stated it had decided lend 10,000 tons wheat. Argentina will contribute but unable give dols or gold. Venezuela prepared contribute "considerable sum of money". Uruguay ready make contribution but must obtain parliamentary approval. Norway prepared make immediate contribution in kind, unable make cash payment before July. India will make symbolic contribution. Australia unable make contribution in dols over and above its contribution in other currencies and in kind. USSR "fully disposed" give all possible aid to Palestinian people. Belgium as co-sponsor resolution presumably prepared contribute. UK contributing one million pounds sterling. France 500,000,000 francs.

In conjunction USDel and Secretariat, you may wish firm up these commitments and any others known to USDel, prior adjournment GA.

LOVETT

Editorial Note

The First Committee, on December 4, adopted the second revised British draft by 25 votes to 21, with 9 abstentions (GA, *3rd sess., Pt. I, First Committee, Summary Records, 1948*, pages 923-924; for text, see GA, *3rd sess., Pt. I, Annexes, 1948*, page 532).

Later the same day, the Committee rejected the Soviet and Syrian draft resolution (see editorial note, page 1628), as well as a second Syrian draft resolution calling on the International Court of Justice to furnish a legal opinion as to the power of the General Assembly to partition Palestine and as to the international status of Palestine upon the termination of the British Mandate (for text, see GA, *3rd sess., Pt.*

I, First Committee, Annexes, 1948, page 88). For the votes on the three draft resolutions, see GA, *3rd sess., Pt. I, Summary Records, 1948*, pages 930–933.

501.BB Palestine/12-448: Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

JERUSALEM, December 4, 1948—11 a. m.

1517. No distribution. Colonel Carlson, senior United Nations observer Jerusalem, apparently acting on orders from General Riley in Haifa now making efforts exclude Truce Commission from participation in future Arab-Jewish meetings. Alleges both parties questioned presence Truce Commission and desired reduce number persons attending. On contrary Consul[ate] General believes both welcomed presence Truce Commission and Truce Commission made considerable contribution towards success meetings. Consul[ate] General is strongly resisting efforts exclude Truce Commission.

As talks progress and scope broadens political considerations will enter to increasing degree and Truce Commission better qualified than observers handle such questions. United Nations should be considered as third interested party in discussions and Truce Commission could influence talks in direction of proposed United Nations decision re city. United States member could likewise be effective instrument for advancing United States policy for Jerusalem. Additional consideration is necessity holding talks through United Nations and under guise implementing truce. Gradual exclusion United Nations representatives while in accord with Jewish desire for direct negotiations could arouse strong criticism of Transjordan from other Arab states (rioters in Damascus attacked cease-fire agreement) forcing King Abdullah suspend talks. Brigadier Lash, CO Arab Legion division in Palestine, yesterday stated to Consul[ate] General political considerations rather than military would determine success talks and emphasized importance continuing meetings under direction United Nations an as [apparent omission] implementation truce.

Department's comments would be appreciated.¹

BURDETT

¹ The Department replied, on December 9, noting its agreement that "as long as both sides Jerusalem willing continue talks under auspices UN, Truce Commission should have primary responsibility conduct talks. However, Dept believes that should both parties state their desire continue talks directly between themselves without presence UN reps latter should not insist participation meetings, inasmuch as important UN objective of bringing parties together would have been accomplished." (Telegram 1051 to Jerusalem, 501.BB Palestine/12-448)

501.BB Palestine/12-448 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Delegation at Paris*SECRET US URGENT
NIACT

WASHINGTON, December 4, 1948—1 p. m.

Gadel 683. According to PW 128 from Garnish and Knapp,¹ Dec. 3, Committee 1 approved by a vote of forty-two to one with twelve abstentions, US suggested language for terms of reference of Palestine Conciliation Commission.² According to this language Commission would be instructed to "assist Governments and authorities concerned to achieve final settlement of all questions outstanding between them". We realize that your alternative phraseology was all that could be achieved in order to win approval of Committee for some form of a resolution dealing with Palestine problem. Dept approves position taken by Del.

We presume Del has considered position which US might find itself in if appointed member of Conciliation Commission under these terms of reference which are so generalized and vague. Although previously Dept was prepared for US to serve as member of Conciliation Commission together with France and Belgium we now wonder, since Commission lacks directives which had been established in par 4 of revised UK draft resolution, whether we might not find ourselves in position of whipping boy if we served on this body.

Pls let us have your views urgently.

LOVETT

¹ John H. Garnish and John P. Knapp of the International Broadcasting Division, apparently attached to the United States Delegation at Paris; the editors have been unable to identify PW 128.

² The Department's position on the terms of reference for the Conciliation Commission had been set forth initially in Gadel 522, November 18, and in footnote 2 to that document. The position had been spelled out further in the United States amendments of November 23 and 25 to the British draft resolution; see editorial note, p. 1623. The vote by Committee One on the United States amendments embodied two negative ballots, rather than one, as erroneously given in the text above; see GA, 3rd sess., Pt. I, First Committee, Summary Records, 1948, p. 887.

867N.01/12-448 : Telegram

Mr. Wells Stabler to the Acting Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

AMMAN, December 4, 1948.

140. Second Palestine Arab conference held at Jericho December 1 (mytel 136 November 30¹) and attended by numerous delegations including mayors of Hebron, Bethlehem, Ramallah, Arab Legion Military Governor General and military governors all districts, and other notables. It is understood that organizers of meeting arranged

¹ Not printed

transportation service to ensure attendance by many delegates. Audience estimated at several thousand.

While 6 resolutions were originally proposed, only 4 were adopted. According to Secretary of Conference, Ajaj Nuweihid, drafting committee still in process of completing final text of resolutions which "will go down in history". Nuweihid said that after preamble which referred to resolutions adopted at meeting of October 1, four new resolutions contained following:

1. Palestine Arabs desire unity between Transjordan and Arab Palestine and therefore make known their wish that Arab Palestine be annexed immediately to Transjordan. They also recognize Abdullah as their King and request him proclaim himself King of new territory.

2. Palestine Arabs express gratitude to Arab states for their efforts in behalf of liberation of Palestine (Nuweihid indicated object of this was hint to Arab states that their job was done).

3. Expression of thanks to Arab states for their generous assistance and support to Palestine Arab refugees.

4. Resolve that purport of first resolution be conveyed to King at once.

Following meeting large delegation proceeded to King's winter quarters at Shuneh to present resolution to King and request his acceptance. King replied that matter must be referred to his government and that he must also ascertain views other Arab states.

Although usual jealousies and frictions were apparent during meeting, it is believed of significance, particularly in light recent developments in UN political committee, as King may regard resolution as his mandate from Palestine Arabs.

Sent Jerusalem by pouch repeated GADel Paris as 27.

STABLER

501.BB Palestine/12-648 : Telegram

Mr. Wells Stabler to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

AMMAN, December 6, 1948—4 p. m.

143. Acting Mediator Bunche accompanied by Chief of Staff arrived Amman morning December 5 and proceeded immediately to Shuneh for conferences with King and Prime Minister.

During talks with Bunche that evening he made following comments:

1. Prime Minister had handed him letter accepting on behalf Transjordan SC resolution of November 16.

2. After giving Prime Minister full and frank review of present situation, latter had indicated Transjordan readiness to cooperate with United Nations and Conciliation Commission in arriving at settlement.

3. Believed other Arab states would also cooperate with Conciliation Commission notwithstanding their attitude as expressed at G.A.

4. King seemed encouraged that political committee's rejection of part of British resolution re disposition Arab Palestine does not necessarily preclude such development as result Conciliation Commission recommendation.

5. Believed that annexation of Arab Palestine to Transjordan at present time would be "actual help" in reaching final settlement. Arab Palestine is now vacuum which must be filled and Transjordan in best position to do it.

6. Basically Palestine settlement rests with Egypt, Transjordan and Israel. If Egypt and Transjordan could get together on matter they could overcome any opposition other Arab states. Emir Abdel Majid Haidar, Transjordan observer at UNGA, held talks with Egyptians at Paris but without result.

While Bunche expected King make some mention of his intentions after result vote in political commission (paragraph 4 above), latter made no mention of scheme outlined in mytel 141, December 4.¹ However Bunche apparently hinted to His Majesty that annexation Arab Palestine Transjordan would probably be accepted as *fait accompli* in view Transjordan's present position in Arab Palestine.

Bunche departed for Tel Aviv morning December 6.²

Sent Jerusalem by pouch. Repeated Gadel 29 and Jidda, Damascus, Beirut, Baghdad and Cairo.

STABLER

¹ Not printed; it advised that King Abdullah, on December 4, had informed Mr. Stabler that when the Jericho resolutions were formally presented to him, "he would announce his acceptance request contained in resolutions and proclaim annexation Arab Palestine to Transjordan." The King indicated further that "he would also announce his readiness to negotiate settlement of Palestine question with anyone, even Jews." (867N.01/12-448)

² Amman, on December 9, reported information from British Minister Kirkbride that after a meeting with his Cabinet, King Abdullah had approved a statement to the "effect that Transjordan Government looks with favor on unification Arab Palestine and Transjordan . . . and promised that as soon as necessary measures regarding international and constitutional changes had been taken resolutions would be executed." The Minister predicted that after Parliamentary approval of the statement, no further action would be taken (telegram 146, 867N.01/12-948).

867N.01/12-648 : Telegram

Mr. Wells Stabler to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

AMMAN, December 6, 1948—6 p. m.

144. Kirkbride said this morning:

1. Prime Minister received another message from Sassoon following signature cease-fire agreement in Jerusalem in which he expressed satisfaction and hope that it would lead to permanent peace settlement. Prime Minister felt that no reply required.

2. Re annexation Arab Palestine to Transjordan, British Govt being "coy". He felt that Transjordan would take no such step without full approval His Majesty's Government as treaty obligations

could not be extended to cover Arab Palestine without consent His Majesty's Government. Moreover believed that present time not propitious and has taken line with Prime Minister that since annexation will eventually take place, not desirable to push it.

3. Prime Minister apparently changing view re his participation in negotiations and settlement. Previously Prime Minister held view that he could not have anything to do with negotiations as his policy based on unity Arab states. However he now beginning to feel wishes to remain in office.

4. Re Transjordan talks with Egyptians in Paris British delegation had approached Egyptian delegation which had replied that it could take no step which would prejudice position it has adopted with other Arab states re Palestine.

Sent Jerusalem by pouch. Passed Gadel 30.

STABLER

501.BB Palestine/12-648: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Delegation at Paris

US URGENT NIACT WASHINGTON, December 6, 1948—7 p. m.

Gadel 688. Following is text of statement to press for simultaneous release at White House and By United States Delegation to General Assembly at Paris, 10:30 a. m. EST., December 7, 1948:

"President Truman, following adoption by the United Nations General Assembly on November 19 of a resolution for assistance to Palestine refugees, will recommend to Congress that the United States contribute fifty percent of the amount provided for in this resolution but in no case more than a total of sixteen million dollars as the share of the United States. The resolution of the General Assembly, adopted at its 163rd Plenary Meeting on November 19, 1948, considered that a sum of approximately \$29,500,000 will be required to provide relief for 500,000 refugees for a period of nine months from 1 December 1948 to 31 August 1949, and that an additional amount of approximately \$2,500,000 will be required for administrative and local operational expenses.

The recommendation of the President to Congress for an amount not to exceed \$16,000,000 will be made in the earnest hope that other countries will meet the remainder of the total required.

The American Delegation to the United Nations Assembly has emphasized that in accordance with constitutional requirements the President's recommendation for an appropriation of \$16,000,000 for Palestinian refugee relief must be accepted by the Congress before any funds become available. The final decision rests with it. The recommendation will be transmitted to the Congress after it convenes in January."¹

LOVETT

¹This telegram was repeated to London, Arab capitals, Jerusalem, and Tel Aviv.

501.BB Palestine/12-648 : Telegram

The Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation at Paris (Dulles) to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET URGENT

PARIS, December 6, 1948—9 p. m.

Delga 1081. USDel has long considered (Gadel 683¹) advantages and disadvantages of willingness to serve on Conciliation Commission. We believe it correct to state that our willingness to serve was based on three principal factors:

(1) Existing truce commission formula which, if disregarded, might pen up whole question and thus increase possibility of Slav membership;

(2) Presence on commission would give us greater opportunity of protecting interest of US in NE;

(3) Presence on commission would give us greater opportunity of assuring security of NE.

We believe these three principal factors are still valid even though present Palestine draft resolution is more broadly worded than original UK draft. In some respects we consider it more important now than before to indicate our willingness to serve. We believe, however, that Slav and Latino (Guatemala, for example) objections to paragraph 3 of present draft providing for selection of members by a committee of permanent members might be one factor prejudicing passage of resolution as a whole. In that circumstance we believe new formula which might not include US should be considered.

One suggestion is that Israel and Arab States might informally indicate a selection such as Australia and Turkey respectively and that these two might select a third. We do not believe commission should be increased to five to include, as has been informally suggested, US, France, Poland, Norway and Australia or Costa Rica because commission of this size would probably become a quarrelsome investigative body rather than a true Conciliation Commission; might impede necessarily delicate negotiations between Israel and Transjordan, Israel and Egypt and between Transjordan and Egypt; and would formally provide a symbol through UN commission of Slav presence in Palestine.

We also believe consideration should be given to desirability of returning to new Mediator under present resolution rather than commission if Slav states insist on five-power formula or if membership of three-power commission were to devolve upon three small, relatively weak powers. Our experience with UN and Palestine commission (under November 29) should be conclusive in this respect.

Sent Delga 1081, repeated London as 1433.

DULLES

¹ Dated December 4, p. 1645.

501.BB Palestine/12-748: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, December 7, 1948—7 p. m.

5137. Following obtained today from Burrows re Palestine. Department may wish repeat substance paragraph 1 below to Cairo, Beirut, Baghdad, Damascus, Jidda, Karachi.

1. UK has decided to take at UNGA no further initiative re Palestine, believing time has come for UK to "sit back". UK efforts behalf Arabs have brought it no thanks and Foreign Office sees no reason why it should court further blame for probably bad consequences either UK resolution as it now stands or for much simpler alternative resolution by lobbying actively for either resolution. Burrows said that following instructions were sent to UKDel Paris repeated for similar action with home governments to British ME Missions:

"You should not join in any lobbying on either resolution but you should explain situation frankly to Arab delegates. You should make it clear that you regard their opposition to stronger parts of our original draft resolution as highly irresponsible and as seriously prejudicing best interest of Arabs. Such action on their part makes it practically impossible for us to attempt to cooperate with them any more. Arabs have clearly shown that they do not wish for our advice on this question and we are not giving them any further advice. We merely wish to inform them that we shall vote for either of two resolutions now under consideration since we consider them even in their emasculated state as being rather better than nothing at all."

[Here follow paragraphs numbered 2 and 3.]

Sent Department 5137, repeated Paris for Gadel 994.

DOUGLAS

S67N.01/12-848

The First Secretary of Embassy in the United Kingdom (Jones) to the Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs (Satterthwaite)

TOP SECRET

LONDON, December 8, 1948.

No. 8

DEAR JOE: I write to you at another one of the periodic low water marks of Palestine. The boys in Paris from Jack Ross down feel completely sunk and I must say I share their feeling because we were on a good bicycle until somebody let the air out of the tires.

At present I am living the role of "whipping-boy." My friends in the Foreign Office must have someone with whom they can "speak

frankly," and I hear a great many things which I would blush to report.

One thing is certain; the boys in GADel fought the good fight step by step and even though hamstrung did better than we had reason to hope.

I sent you a telegram December 7 saying that the UK does not propose to take any further initiative on Palestine in the General Assembly but I doubt very much, considering the stake the UK has in the matter, that this self denial will extend much beyond the end of the General Assembly. Already I can foresee thoughts shaping up in the Foreign Office to the following effect:

UNGA has made hash of our fine theory of acquiescence and the resolution (if we get one) will be only a little better than no resolution at all. A kind of chaos will ensue in Palestine: the Jews will expand their holdings in Palestine in a relatively ordered fashion and the Arabs, without any formal basis, will shape themselves into new lines of occupation. Open negotiations between Arabs and Jews are most unlikely for the next few months, either with or without the Conciliation Commission. Moreover, UK cannot advise the Arabs to negotiate unless UK is convinced that Arabs have a sporting chance of gaining something from such negotiations. Unreserved US support for Israel's territorial claims makes such negotiations difficult. If the UK and the US could reach an understanding regarding the location of the southern frontier of Israel a behind-the-scenes play could begin between Arabs and Jews which in a few months' time might lead to a negotiated settlement. However, the US does not seem disposed to talk Israeli frontiers with the UK. This US must be persuaded to do because only a US-UK understanding of this kind backed firmly by the US offers any hope for settlement in Palestine.

I have carefully noted the Department's view that no useful purpose would be served at this time by discussing with the UK territorial objectives (Department's 4578[4518], December 3, 1948¹). However, I would like you (and Rob McClintock, to whom I am sending a copy of this letter) to be on notice that the idea of working out territorial objectives is likely to be reborn in the British Foreign Office in the relatively near future and it will be pushed pretty hard. I think that if there is any informal thinking on this score which can be sent here, it would be useful to me.

I think you will be interested in the attached editorial from the *Spectator* for November 26,² captioned, "Towards a Palestine Settlement." This makes a point which I consider valid.

With best wishes,

[G.] LEWIS [JONES, JR.]

P.S. Some day I will show you with pride my extensive collection of draft telegrams which were never sent because their principal value was to relieve my feelings.

¹ Not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 1643.

² Not printed.

SG7N.01/12-848 : Telegram

The Chargé in Czechoslovakia (Penfield) to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

PRAHA, DECEMBER 8, 1948—9 p. m.

1812. Information received subsequent to Embtel 1683, November 4 and reported in Embassy's A-828 Nov. 12, A-838, November 17 and A-905, December 7,¹ provides convincing confirmation that Czechoslovakia is for time being at least radically restricting its aid to Israël (Deptel 1557, December 2²) and that Czech policy toward Israel has recently become deliberately and markedly less friendly. Although Embassy does not have information to permit evaluation Soviet and other satellite policy toward Israel, we would assume on general grounds that this change is at Moscow orders and reflects new turn in over-all Soviet policy.

On other hand following plausible case can be made that change is based on much more limited considerations. Ministry Interior is reliably reported to have taken lead in opposing continuation of program and character of trainees indicates it has good reason to regard them as poor political and security risks. Embassy's informants state that attempt was made to educate trainees in Communism and recent inspection of pilots by Red Army officers consisted principally of political examinations but that program has completely failed to create indoctrinated cadre for Israel Army. Assuming that this was one of basic purposes of program, it is not unreasonable further to assume that Soviets have decided to give up attempt at least for time being on theory that far from creating fifth column they may actually be training an army of potential enemies.

Pouched Warsaw, Bratislava.

PENFIELD

¹ None printed.

² Not printed.

501.BB Palestine/12-848 : Telegram

The Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation at Paris (Dulles) to the Acting Secretary of State

RESTRICTED

PARIS, DECEMBER 8, 1948—7 p. m.

Delga 1113. Following is memorandum dated December 7 from Acting Mediator concerning the position of Ben-Gurion on the Egyptian force encircled at Al Faluja and Israeli occupation of Beersheba :

1. In the course of my extended conversations with Mr. Ben-Gurion at Hakirya, Israel on 6 December, I took up the position of the Egyptian force encircled at Al Faluja and the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the town of Beersheba, under the plan of 13

November for the implementation of the SC resolution of 4 November (Doc. [S/] 1070).¹

2. As regards Al Faluja, I pointed out that the plan of 13 November, which had been accepted by the PGI in its letter of 18 November, required the withdrawal of this Egyptian force and that the Jewish forces encircling it were preventing Egyptian compliance with the 4 November resolution. Moreover, I urged that the refusal to accept the principle that food and medical convoys under UN escort were entitled, under the truce, to go through to this beleaguered force was contrary to both the letter and spirit of the truce, since the truce could not be exploited by either side as a means of laying siege. I also expressed the view that Israeli intransigence on this issue was not only preventing the implementation of the 4 November resolution but constituted a severe obstruction to the fulfillment of the 16 November resolution on the armistice.

3. Concerning Beersheba, I explained fully that no question had been raised as to the right of Israeli forces to be in the area, since there are two Jewish settlements in the vicinity of Beersheba which were garrisoned by Israeli forces prior to 14 October. The point at issue, I emphasized, is Israeli insistence on maintaining military occupation of the town of Beersheba, from which Israeli forces were required to withdraw by the resolution of 4 November and the plan of 13 November.

4. Mr. Ben-Gurion stated that the encircled Egyptian force at Al Faluja would not be released and that his government would make no commitment to permit convoys to go through to them regularly, unless and until the Egyptian Government was prepared to undertake armistice or peace negotiations. He added that the release of the Egyptian forces could be given a high priority on the list of subjects to be discussed once such negotiations would be undertaken. A similar position was taken as regards the Israeli military occupation of Beersheba. Mr. Ben-Gurion explained that the basis for the Israeli policy in this regard was the security of his country, since a state of war still existed.

5. At the conclusion of the conference with Mr. Ben-Gurion, which was satisfactory on all other matters, I requested that his position on Al Faluja be summarized in writing. This was done in the following communication addressed to me by Mr. Eytan:

[Here follows the text of Mr. Eytan's communication of December 6 to Dr. Bunche which served to confirm in writing Mr. Ben Gurion's position on al-Faluja, as set forth in paragraph numbered 4.]

6. In my two long conferences with Nokrashy Pasha, Prime Minister of Egypt at Cairo on 4 December, I was informed that no Egyptian reply had been made to my letter on the 16 November resolution since to date neither I nor the SC had been able to obtain Israeli compliance with the 4 November resolution. The Prime Minister emphasized particularly the situation at Al Faluja which he regarded with utmost seriousness. He assured me of Egyptian willingness to comply fully with the 4 November resolution and stated that he would authorize the Egyptian commander-in-chief to enter into negotiations through the UN, envisaged in paragraph 5 (2) of the resolution of 4 November.

¹ See p. 1546.

As regards the 16 November resolution, the Prime Minister stated that his government could regard it favorably providing the 4 November resolution were first carried out.

7. In the circumstances, I must report that I have been unable to achieve full implementation of the 4 November resolution, and that this has obstructed progress toward implementing the 16 November resolution.

DULLES

IO Files

Summary Record of the Seventh Meeting of the Committee of the Security Council on the Palestinian Question Held at Paris on December 8, 1948

[Extract]

Mr. Ross (United States) stated that he found more encouragement than discouragement in the statements of the Acting Mediator.¹ He called attention to the cease-fire which had been obtained in Jerusalem in the past few days, and mentioned the indications of a favourable attitude on the part of Egypt and Transjordan towards the 16 November resolution.

He did not wish, however, to overlook Dr. Bunche's report concerning the difficulties of compliance with the 13 November plan.² The Committee was well aware of the importance attached by Egypt to the release of its forces from Al Faluja. It seemed feasible that a practicable solution could be worked out by the same methods which had been employed in the Jerusalem area, i.e., discussions among the military commanders of both sides and Dr. Bunche's staff. There was no reason to believe that such an approach would not have similar good results in the case of Faluja.

In the opinion of Mr. Ross, it was possible to proceed simultaneously to implement both resolutions and to take steps leading to a prompt conclusion of the armistice called for in the 16 November resolution. Apparently both the Arab and Jewish Governments were prepared to accede and negotiate on the 16 November resolution.

Moreover, Mr. Eytan's letter³ could not be interpreted as a categorical refusal to release Egyptian forces.

Mr. Ross believed that the opposing views, one based on the 4 November resolution, and the other on the 16 November resolution, had been drawing closer together, though the process had been slow and

¹ Mr. Bunche addressed the Committee earlier the same day, advising of his consultations at Cairo, Amman, Tel Aviv, and Haifa and giving his "definite impression that there is a marked change in the attitude of the parties, and that there is a moderate, but nevertheless definite, readiness to take constructive steps toward a solution of the problem."

² See editorial note, p. 1580.

³ See Delga 1113, *supra*.

painful. It ought to be possible with Dr. Bunche's assistance to bridge the remaining gap, and thus advance the problem towards an armistice and a peaceful settlement.

A certain amount of time, perhaps only a few days, might be necessary to enable the Acting Mediator to bring about the implementation of the 4 November resolution. If this were successful, there would be no need for this Committee or the Security Council to consider the matter further. If this proved to be too optimistic a view, Mr. Ross said, he would support the United Kingdom representative with regard to referring the situation back to the Security Council to deal with the request contained in the Egyptian letter.⁴

The Acting Mediator had made a specific suggestion as to the manner in which the impasse might be broken. The representative of Israel had taken note of that suggestion and also of the information in the Egyptian reply concerning the 16 November resolution. Mr. Eban had promised to communicate with this Government and with the Acting Mediator in regard to the matter. The Committee might therefore let the matter rest and leave the next meeting to the call of the Chair in consultation with the Acting Mediator.

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⁴ Presumably the letter dated December 1, sent to the President of the Security Council by the Egyptian Representative at the United Nations. The letter requested that the Council include on its agenda for the following day the question of the implementation of its resolution of November 4; it concluded as follows: "The continued Zionist refusal to abide by this decision seriously affects the situation in Palestine as envisaged by the Security Council's decisions in relation to the truce which has been repeatedly violated by the Zionists, and gravely hampers the possibilities of any progress towards a peaceful settlement of the Palestine question." (SC, 3rd yr., No. 128, p. 1)

501.BB Palestine/12-848: Telegram

*The Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation at Paris
(Dulles) to the Acting Secretary of State*

SECRET URGENT

PARIS, December 8, 1948—midnight.

Delga 1120. Bunche who has just returned to Paris from Cairo, Amman, Tel Aviv and Haifa reports comment in Transjordan principally by Abdullah and Prime Minister that US is withholding recognition Transjordan in order give Israel opportunity at later date to make claim to additional area in Transjordan (which was part of Palestine mandate until 1922). Bunche says Transjordan officials do not understand our continued refusal to recognize Transjordan and are extremely apprehensive as a result. Bunche says that Abdullah would feel more free, if the US had recognized Transjordan, to commence political discussions with Israel. Abdullah apparently feels it

would be difficult for him to take such action without having been recognized, as he would in effect be out in front of the other members of the Arab League. Bunche believes that Transjordan's apprehensions and attitude toward recognition is now a real factor in Palestine situation. Bunche said he realized why US had not yet extended recognition although we had supported Transjordan's application for UN membership since 1946, but wondered whether US extension *de facto* recognition at this time might not have desirable stabilizing effect.

Sent Department Delga 1120; repeated London as 1448, Amman as 4.

DULLES

501.BB Palestine/12-948: Telegram

*The Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation at Paris
(Dulles) to the Acting Secretary of State*

SECRET URGENT
NIACT

PARIS, December 9, 1948—1 a. m.

Delga 1122. Following is situation regarding plenary GA action on Palestine resolution:

1. A group of members including Australia, New Zealand, Canada, China and possibly others will introduce certain amendments in plenary session to Committee I Palestine resolution to make it possible to obtain broadest possible support for such resolution. These amendments, which will be supported by US and UK, are as follows:

(a) Delete all of the preamble of the present Committee I resolution and substitute therefor the following: "Having considered further the situation in Palestine"

(b) Delete sub-paragraph 2(c) which contains a specific reference to the State of Israel.

(c) Delete paragraph 3 containing an unpopular formula for selection of conciliation commission.

(d) Delete last clause of paragraph 10 beginning "in this connection"; Arabs insist upon this deletion because of its reference to Bernadotte report despite fact content is in Arab interest.

(e) Delete first clause paragraph 11 for same reason.

(f) Arabs are expected to insist that reference to November 29 resolution contained in paragraph 8 be deleted and boundaries be indicated by reference to geographical localities.

2. Our best available information is that these amendments will make it possible for Arab States to abstain rather than vote against and that Middle East and Far East friends of Arabs will vote affirma-

tively for resulting resolution. These changes are also believed to be acceptable to Israel.

3. Department's attention is invited to fact that course of discussions on Palestine resolution has clearly indicated that both Arabs and Jews seek straightforward conciliation effort and object to any effort by present assembly to be specific about the details of final settlement. Although Jews and Arabs differ widely in their ultimate objectives, they now appear to agree upon conciliation as method of settling such difficulties.

4. We do not expect strong Jewish reaction in Paris against deletion of sub-paragraph 2 (c) containing specific reference to State of Israel, but some ill-informed press sources in US may give such deletion wrong interpretation. USGADel has told Committee I that we do not seek an Assembly resolution which represents in every respect US policy on Palestine but rather a resolution which we believe will contribute most to a peaceful settlement of outstanding differences. In this sense, we have specifically discouraged introduction into resolution of question of recognition of Israel or of approval of Israel membership, while at same time reaffirming US policy these points both in GA and SC.

5. Deletion of present provision for election of conciliation commission by Big Five is necessary to overcome objections on part of middle and small powers against "undemocratic" procedure. Commission will probably be selected by ordinary election by Assembly (simple majority) following adoption Palestine resolution. Since US is being treated as a candidate, USGADel is not taking active part in selection of commission but we have indicated that commission consisting of Australia, Turkey, and US, or alternatively France, Turkey and US, would be acceptable to us. There appears to be overwhelming sentiment in Assembly, shared both by Jews and Arabs, that US must be member of conciliation commission.

DULLES

501.BB Palestine/12-948: Telegram

*The Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation at Paris
(Dulles) to the Secretary of State*

SECRET URGENT
NIACT

PARIS, December 9, 1948—8 p. m.

Delga 1139. For Satterthwaite and Hare from Kopper.

1. Last evening it appeared to us Arab states would abstain on amended Palestine resolution and would inform friends, Asians and

otherwise, that they would have no objection to their casting votes in favor of resolution (Delga 1122, December 9). This Arab position confirmed by Riad Solh and Ammoun (Lebanon) and Fawzi Bey (Egypt). Only major question remaining to be settled was composition of commission upon which Arab states had themselves been unable to agree and still have not.

2. Announcement today that SC would hold meeting Friday morning December 10 to take up application of Israel for admission UN has had major effect on Arab attitude. At noon today both Riad Solh and Fawzi flatly declared favorable SC action on Israeli application would cause Arabs to reverse stand of last evening. Arabs would vote against GA resolution and strongly urge friends to do so. Riad Solh went so far as to say Lebanon's whole approach to future questions would have to be reviewed if Israel's application were now approved by SC. He urged strongly that action be postponed, reiterating that SC approval now would be complete defeat position Arab leaders here.

3. Arguments that (a) SC action on admission and GA resolution on settlement are separate questions and (b) there is little likelihood GA will approve admission application even though SC might do so are unavailing in discussions with Arabs. Reasons why Arabs are unconvinced seem to be that (a) SC membership committee indicated in its report that questions of admission and GA resolution on settlement were linked by several members, and (b) favorable SC action on Israeli application would be more than a confirmation of November 29, 1947 resolution.

Sent Department Delga 1139, repeated London 1460. [Kopper.]

DULLES

501.BB Palestine/12-1048: Telegram

The Special Representative of the United States in Israel, Temporarily at Paris (McDonald) to the President's Special Counsel (Clifford)

SECRET

PARIS, December 10, 1948—4 p. m.

6246. From McDonald. For White House only. Personal attention Clifford. Before returning Tel Aviv tonight feel impelled repeat my previous high praise of efforts made by our delegates to advance President's Palestine policy but also my earlier warnings lest United States unintentionally through technical moves become involved in threat of sanctions against Israel. Despite optimistic report re prospects peace negotiations made by Bunche, just back from Middle East, Brit-

ish demanded December 8 emergency Security Council meeting to force Israel withdrawals to October 14 line Negev. This was dangerous maneuver to embarrass United States and other countries urging favorable action Israel admission United Nations this Assembly. United States response made in Security Council sub-committee by Ross without opportunity consultation Dulles or Jessup gave partial United States moral support British latest maneuver to indict Israel as aggressor.¹ United States technical cooperation with such United Kingdom tactics could destroy President's peace hopes Middle East. If United Kingdom were told unequivocally that United States will not be party sanctions or moves that direction, I believe United Kingdom might finally accept in good faith viable Israel as reality and encourage instead of discourage Abdullah, Farouk, and others make peace. Central fact remains United Kingdom must desire peace and convince Arab states of such desire before any peace becomes possible. [McDonald.]

¹ For summary record of Mr. Ross' statement of December 8, see p. 1654.

501.BB Palestine/12-1048 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the
Acting Secretary of State*

SECRET

LONDON, December 10, 1948—6 p. m.

5197. Delga 1120, December 8 to Department. While Embassy has not considered it appropriate to discuss with Foreign Office pros and cons US recognition Transjordan as suggested by Bunche and will not do so even informally unless Foreign Office raises matter, Embassy is of opinion that UK now more than ever would welcome this gesture towards Transjordan by US as definite contribution to Middle East stability at difficult juncture. Factor in this connection which had to be considered hitherto was effect of US recognition Transjordan on neighboring Arab states where there is strong likelihood that US action would be interpreted as bribe for Transjordan coming to some arrangement with PGI (Provisional Government of Israel). However British disillusionment with other Arab states now runs deep (Embassy's 5137, December 7) and present British hope is that stature Abdullah will be increased by all means. Foreign Office feeling is that since other Arab states burned their bridges in Paris their reactions to aggrandizement Transjordan become much less important than previously. Consequently, Embassy is fairly confident that US recognition Transjordan, particularly if accorded very soon thus setting PGI

and Transjordan on more equal footing prior inevitable negotiations, would be welcomed warmly by UK.¹

2. Department's guidance requested.²

Sent Department 5197, repeated Paris for Gadel 1022.

DOUGLAS

¹ Mr. Stabler, on December 10, suggested the desirability of *de facto* recognition of Transjordan at this time, noting that "Transjordan has now reached virtual armistice agreement with Israel as result recent cease fire talks in Jerusalem and appears willing continue these conversations on military level, although at same time envisaging their extension at suitable moment to political level (paragraph 1 mytel 138, December 2). There is, however, some reluctance to go further at this stage but believe such could be overcome if Transjordan felt it had support of United States as well as British Governments which would give it equal footing with Israel and Egypt, the other prime factors in reaching solution in Palestine." (Telegram 149 from Amman, 501.BB Palestine/12-1048)

² The Department, in reply on December 14, stated it was advisable "not deviate from present plan, which calls for extension full recognition Transjordan and Israel Govts as soon as permanent Govt elected in Israel." (Telegram 4655, 501.BB Palestine/12-1048)

501.BB Palestine/12-1348

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Chairman of the
United States Delegation at Paris (Dulles)*

SECRET

[PARIS,] December 13, 1948.

Participants: Mr. Riad Bey Solh, Prime Minister of Lebanon
Dr. Malik
Mr. Dulles
Mr. Kopper

With Mr. Kopper, I called on Mr. Riad Bey Solh, Prime Minister of Lebanon, and Dr. Malik, Ambassador to Washington, at the Hotel Bristol on December 10 at 9:00 p. m. I said that I came to talk in relation to the pending resolution to establish a Conciliation Commission to settle the points of difference between Israel and the Arab States. I hoped very much that that resolution would be adopted by the necessary two-thirds vote because if it were not adopted the future in that area might be one of very great difficulty. I wanted to make clear that in my opinion the attitude of the American people and the Government with reference to Israel did not reflect a pro-Jewish, anti-Arab sentiment. The American people and the Government were, however, convinced that the establishment of the State of Israel under livable conditions was a historical necessity and the United States was determined to go through with it. We realized that doing so involved certain injustices to the Arab States. The situation was not one where there was any solution that was totally just to all concerned. The situation was so mixed with so many cross-interests that any solution would involve some injustices. Nevertheless, there had to be a solution, and, we believed, a peaceful solution. We believed that the pending

Resolution with the seven-power amendments would pave the way to that kind of a solution, and it could mean the beginning of closer and happier relations with the Arab States than ever before because the American people would feel that the Arabs in accepting the establishment of the State of Israel had made a sacrifice for the cause of peace. Therefore, our present action could be looked upon not as inaugurating a continuing policy of supporting a Jewish State as against the Arabs, but rather as completing one phase of a historical development which, when completed, would permit of better relations than ever before with the Arab States.

I did not, of course, have in mind any concrete proposals for the future. I knew that if I came offering a certain number of dollars in the way of economic aid in exchange for votes my proposal would be, and should be, indignantly rejected. My purpose was merely to indicate that a certain course of action on the part of the Arab States could, in my opinion, open the door to better relations with the United States than ever before. The United States was, after all, the most powerful nation in the world and it was better to have the United States feel that the Arab States had made a sacrifice and accepted, to them, a painful result in the interest of peace, and to an extent at the behest of the United States, rather than to have a reverse situation.

The Prime Minister said that he greatly appreciated my call and the lofty spirit in which I had presented the situation. I had presented the matter in a form which would appeal most effectively to the Arab States. He would consider carefully what I had said and would communicate with his associates in the Arab League.

Editorial Note

The General Assembly, on December 11, undertook discussion of the resolution of the First Committee. Australia proposed amendments jointly sponsored by seven nations, which "eliminated all references in the resolution to both the original partition plan and the Bernadotte proposals as the basis for a boundary agreement." (Department of State *Bulletin*, December 19, 1948, page 763) The Assembly had released the text of the joint amendments in document A/789. Mr. Dulles extended United States support to the resolution of the First Committee and to the joint amendments; for the full text of his statement, see *ibid.*, page 793.

The Assembly voted on the amended measure the same day, adopting it by a vote of 35 to 15, with eight abstentions. The adverse votes were cast chiefly by the Arab States and the Soviet bloc (GA, *3rd sess., Pt. I, Plenary, 1948*, pages 995, 996). The resolution established

a Conciliation Commission of three members "(a) To assume, in so far as it considers necessary in existing circumstances, the functions given to the United Nations Mediator on Palestine by resolution 186 (S-2) of the General Assembly of 14 May 1948; (b) To carry out the specific functions and directives given to it by the present resolution and such additional functions and directives as may be given to it by the General Assembly or by the Security Council; [and] (c) To undertake, upon the request of the Security Council, any of the functions now assigned to the United Nations Mediator on Palestine or to the United Nations Truce Commission by resolutions of the Security Council; upon such request to the Conciliation Commission by the Security Council with respect to all the remaining functions of the United Nations Mediator on Palestine under Security Council resolutions, the office of the Mediator shall be terminated".

The resolution also provided that Jerusalem and the surrounding area "be accorded special and separate treatment from the rest of Palestine", under effective United Nations control; and that "the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible". For the full text of the resolution, numbered 194 (III), see GA, 3rd sess., Pt. I, *Resolutions*, 1948, page 21.

867N.01/12-1148 : Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Secretary of State

SECRET

JERUSALEM, December 11, 1948—11 a. m.

1528. In conversation last night Colonel Dayan stated: PGI considers present psychological moment open direct armistice talks with Transjordan and Egypt.¹ Should be conducted directly as between any sovereign states and not through UN. In Jerusalem UN is third interested party and should participate.

PGI considers November 16 armistice resolution supersedes SC resolution imposing truce in Palestine. Israel anxious negotiate armistice but if Arabs refuse will consider itself free take any action it wishes.

¹ Mr. Burdett reported, on December 12 that at the meeting that day between Colonel Dayan and Colonel el-Tel, the former announced that the "PGI ready to negotiate armistice and peace with Transjordan but not willing discuss major questions on basis implementing present truce" according to Burdett, the "Jews appear to think now is propitious moment force Transjordan into open peace talks. Perhaps also intend embarrass relations Transjordan with other Arab League states." (Telegram 1529 from Jerusalem, 867N.01/12-1248)

Described Israel as in fortunate position being willing and able engage in both war or peace talks.

Sent Department 1528, Department pass Gadel 17, Amman 7, Cairo 145.

BURDETT

501.BB Palestine/12-1248: Telegram

*The Acting Chairman of the United States Delegation at Paris
(Dulles) to the Acting Secretary of State*

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY

PARIS, December 12, 1948—3 a. m.

Delga 1166. For Lovett from Rusk. In view of hostile attitude Israel is taking publicly toward membership Conciliation Commission, following information furnished confidential basis.

In GA committee of Big Five asked to nominate 3 members of commission; UK, France and China immediately supported US, France and Turkey. Their theory was US was moderately pro-Israel, Turkey moderately pro-Arab and France generally neutral, slightly pro-Israel. US representative (Rusk) stated we had no serious objection to such slate, emphasized necessity for unity of action, and objected to concept that any one member of such committee be expected to act as special advocate for any party. Rusk then stated Big Five should have before them names of other members who had taken active interest in matter or had been suggested by one or more of the parties and indicated names of Colombia, Australia and Norway as deserving consideration. Vishinsky proposed Poland as member commission of small powers and insisted that if US were on commission USSR must also be included.

After further discussion, during which UK, France and China remained firm, and during which Rusk ascertained privately that these three would insist on their slate to point of casting ballots, Rusk stated he would support majority slate in interest of unity and hoped USSR would do same. Vishinsky refused, and committee reported 4-1 to GA recommending US, France, Turkey.

Background this meeting was week's effort on part USGADel to find slate agreeable to parties. No one nominated by Israel such as Guatemala or Australia received support because of general feeling US was pro-Israel and that another strongly pro-Israel member would seriously upset balance of commission.

When Granados of Guatemala attempted to substitute Colombia for Turkey, Colombia promptly declined and slate was voted by 41-7-4. Some reason to think Israel's real objection to commission is to France, because of latter's known views on holy places and internationalization of Jerusalem.

Both Dulles and Cohen were on floor of Assembly for final vote and

appeared satisfied that commission is fair and workable. In any event, fact that US, with its strong support of Israel, is on commission leaves US in poor position to object. Of other 2 members are France, who supported partition, and Turkey, who has been most moderate of all friends of Arabs and who in fact voted in favor Palestine resolution.

We believe commission to be a good one and in any event it was constituted by majority vote in both nominating committee and Plenary Session without any pressure from US. Great contrast between calm attending this action compared with violent feeling of November 29 and May 14 constitutes good omen for peaceful settlement Palestine question. [Rusk.]

DULLES

501.BB Palestine/12-1348

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Chairman of the
Delegation at Paris (Dulles)*

SECRET

[PARIS,] December 13, 1948.

Participants: Mr. Riad Bey Solh, Prime Minister of Lebanon
Dr. Malik
Mr. Dulles

On Monday, December 13th, the Prime Minister of Lebanon and Dr. Malik came to call upon me at the Hotel Crillon. I expressed to him my satisfaction that the Palestine Resolution had been adopted. I said I realized that the Arab States could, if they had wanted, have prevented the adoption of the Resolution by the necessary two-thirds. Of course, the Arab States themselves had voted against the Resolution, but I knew that states friendly to the Arabs had voted for the Resolution. I interpreted this as indicative of a spirit of conciliation on the part of the Arab States, which I thought augured well for the future. I did not, however, ask that the Prime Minister should comment on this aspect of the matter unless he so desired.

The Prime Minister said that he was quite glad to discuss this aspect of the matter. It was true that the Arab States could have defeated the Palestine Resolution at any time up to five minutes before the vote. They had decided not to do so and their decision had in considerable part been influenced by the talk which I had with him and by the hope I had held out that if once the Israel matter could be settled, that would mean an era of good relations, rather than increasingly bad relations, with the Arab States.

I said that the result of the vote had made me feel under a greater obligation than ever to try to assure the result that I had forecast as possible and that I would, upon my return, report our conversation to the President.

The Prime Minister said that he hoped that the matter of Palestine would be disposed of first and the question of relations between the United States and Arab States dealt with only subsequently, not combining the two ideas.

There followed an exchange of courtesies.

501.BB Palestine/12-1348: Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

JERUSALEM, December 13, 1948—3 p. m.

1530. Consulate General has consistently maintained strong international police force first requisite for Jerusalem "under effective United Nations control". This would necessitate agreement (Deptel 1047, December 2¹) among big powers on method selecting force and require heavy outlay United Nations funds for indefinite period. Large and costly administrative staff would also be needed. Now appears impossible obtain either force or necessary funds, assumption confirmed by conversation with Bunche. Unwillingness United Nations take effective action force either Jews or Arabs to accept its proposals for Jerusalem must also be assumed. Problem thus become to devise settlement for Jerusalem and assure protection and free access to Holy places without international force and necessitating only minimum United Nations staff. At same time maximum agreement from two parties must be obtained particularly from PGI which at present from military point view capable imposing own solution on Arabs. Question Jerusalem, corridor to coast and Holy places through all Palestine part same problem.

Based on above considerations Consulate General believes practical solution now might take following form:

1. Division city Jerusalem proper into permanent Arab and Jewish areas former becoming part of Transjordan and latter part Israel. Movement between areas would be temporarily prohibited and restriction relaxed gradually. Demarcation line could run along Ramallah road to Damascus gate, Suleimyn way to Jaffa road, Jaffa road to Jaffa gate, Hebron road past railroad yard and then over to railroad, railroad to water pipeline, straight south to municipal boundary line, east along municipal boundary line to Hebron road, south along Hebron road to present truce lines. Division based generally on results fighting Jerusalem with modifications southern sectors to give Arabs vital south north communications along Nablus Hebron route and to eliminate Jewish and Arab pockets. Jews would be required relinquish strong military positions on Mount Zion and Deir Abu Tor but proposed demilitarization of entire Jerusalem area would diminish their importance. Jews would also have to give up Jewish settlements of Itaplot and Ramat Rahel and claim to Jewish quarter Old City. Changes

¹ Not printed.

would return lower and upper Bakaa where Arabs remaining in New City now quartered to Arabs but Jews would retain Arab sections of Qatamon, German colony and Greek colony now occupied by new Jewish immigrants or Jews displaced by fighting. Railroad would remain within Jewish control thus furnishing east west communication for Jews but Arabs should receive definite right free use railroad for shipments from coast. Hebrew University-Hadassah hospital enclave would have to remain Jewish perhaps joined to Jewish Jerusalem by new road from Nahal at Shimon sector skirting Arab built up area and protected by Arab Legion.

2. Demilitarization Jerusalem area as defined in GA resolution of November 29, 1947 with specific provision that adequate number Arab Jewish police allowed. This could be started by gradually widening stretches from which military forces withdrawn and where military installations destroyed. Proposed retention Jewish corridor should meet Jewish objection to demilitarization on grounds would leave Jews in Jerusalem cut off in Arab sea. Arabs have expressed readiness demilitarize city.

3. Jewish controlled corridor to coastal area including railroad, main Jerusalem Tel Aviv highway and new Jewish "Malaya" road. This would constitute great concession on part Arabs since corridor would run in part through territory normally inhabited by Arabs and would prejudice survival Jaffa even if city returned to Arabs. But Consulate General convinced Jews after experience this summer will refuse relinquish control their lines of communication. Jews currently establishing new settlements along route to assure its protection. North south road through Jerusalem in part compensates Arabs for separation by corridor of southern and northern Arab areas. If Jaffa again becomes Arab city provision should be made for free use by Arab civilian traffic of roads and railways. Arabs should also be entitled free use port Haifa, Lydda airfield and communication routes inland. To accomplish above present truce lines for Jerusalem-Latrun area could remain in force with minor rectifications to permit exclusion from corridor of Arab villages on border. Exception would be Latrun salient from which Arab Legion would withdraw to approximately Beit Nuba relinquishing commanding positions including Deir Aiyub along Jerusalem Tel Aviv highway. This would open main east west route to Jews and allow Jews repair and operate main water pipeline to Jerusalem. Arab Legion has indicated willingness withdraw from salient as no longer of special military significance. Southern limits of Jewish corridor would be determined by final Palestine boundary settlement.

4. Establishment United Nations Commission with seat in Jerusalem to perform among others following functions:

[Here follow subparagraphs *a* through *f* setting forth the proposed functions.]

5. SC resolution calling for immediate economic and if necessary military sanctions against any party violating above provisions. Effective SC action to support United Nations Commission within its comparatively narrow sphere of activity and in carrying out projects on which general agreement exists even between Arabs and Jews much more likely than on broader issues where considerable disagreement

prevails. Also need for SC action correspondingly reduced. Provided Arabs sections central Palestine go to Transjordan extension UK-Transjordan treaty to Arab areas would serve greatly to strengthen SC guarantee and allay very real Arab fears future Jewish expansion.

Consul General feels that taking into account realities present situation above points form basis for settlement Jerusalem section Palestine question which Jews will accept and to which Arab (Transjordan) will acquiesce. Arabs have in fact no power to oppose settlement and refusal could lead to further Jewish successes and ultimate solution depriving Arabs additional territory. United Nations Commission would protect rights of Christians third main religious group interested in Jerusalem which has shown very little activity on own behalf. Same results would be achieved as by paragraph 7, 8 and 9 of UK resolution and would avoid international regime which could easily degenerate into mere shadow regime contributing further to loss United Nations prestige.

Sent Department, repeated Baghdad 35, Beirut 107, Damascus 54. Pouched Amman 9, Cairo 147, Jidda 16, Tel Aviv 15.

BURDETT

867N.01/12-1348 : Telegram

Mr. Wells Stabler to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

AMMAN, December 13, 1948—4 p. m.

155. 1. It is understood that about December 7 King sent message to Nokrashy Pasha by Transjordan Minister to Egypt informing him of Jericho Conference resolutions and requesting Egypt's support. Nokrashy replied to Prime Minister end last week to effect that Egypt considered it unfortunate that Transjordan had decided to pursue independent policy re Palestine when Arab states had agreed that there should be unanimity.¹ Apparently message has annoyed Prime Minister who is sending reply to Nokrashy stating that Transjordan must consider present situation on basis facts and that next meeting Arab League Political Committee he proposes point out realities of situation to other Arab states, which realities may not be pleasing. It appears that "ostrich-like" policy of Arab states is causing resentment here almost to point of determination take independent line.

2. It is reported that Sassoon of Israeli Foreign Office is now in

¹ On December 14, Mr. Stabler reported understanding that Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen had followed Egypt's lead in protesting to King Abdullah regarding the resolutions of the Jericho Conference (telegram 157, 867N.01/12-1448). The Arab League, on December 14, also made a protest in a note to the Transjordanian Legation in Egypt. Cairo, the same day, transmitted to the Department the text of the note, as well as the Legation's note of the previous day to the Arab League (despatch 1009, 867N.01/12-1448).

Jerusalem and has been placed in contact with Abdullah Bey el Tel, Arab Legion Military Governor of Jerusalem, through Colonel Dayan of Israeli forces.

Repeated Jerusalem 74; Cairo 5.

STABLER

867N.01/12-448: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to Mr. Wells Stabler, at Amman

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, December 13, 1948—7 p. m.

52. Dept requested Brit Emb ascertain views FonOff re Abdullah's stated intention proclaim annexation Arab Palestine (ur 142 Dec 4¹). Emb today stated FonOff "not enthusiastic" and believes this not right time for such a move. FonOff opinion, however, is that best solution problem disposition Arab Palestine is eventual incorporation Transjordan.

Dept believes that view probability Abdullah will not at present carry out his plan announce annexation, US approach to King to make known US views this subject not desirable.²

LOVETT

¹ Not printed.

² This telegram was repeated to London as No. 4637.

501.BB Palestine/12-1448

Memorandum of Conversation, by Mr. Stuart W. Rockwell of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs

CONFIDENTIAL

[WASHINGTON,] December 14, 1948.

Participants: Mr. Eliahu Epstein, Israeli Mission
 Mr. Uriel Heyd, Israeli Mission
 Colonel Efraim Ben-Arzi, Israeli Mission
 NEA—Mr. Satterthwaite
 NE—Mr. Colquitt
 Mr. Rockwell

Messrs. Epstein and Heyd came in to present to the appropriate officers of NEA Colonel Ben-Arzi, who has arrived in the United States to assume his duties as Military Attaché at the Israeli Mission.

[Here follow four paragraphs giving Mr. Epstein's views on the question of Israeli membership in the United Nations, the composition of the Conciliation Commission and related matters.]

Mr. Satterthwaite then declared that he had a matter to discuss with Messrs. Epstein and Heyd. He said that the Department had received reports that certain Israeli patrols had penetrated the Transjordan frontier. He said that he realized how indefinite were the

territorial boundaries in that part of the world and how difficult it was to restrain the enthusiasm of young soldiers on patrol, but that such incidents could have serious consequences in view of the British determination to live up to the terms of the Anglo-Transjordan treaty. He wished to bring this matter to the attention of Messrs. Epstein and Heyd in the most friendly fashion, since it had caused the Department some concern. Mr. Epstein and Colonel Ben-Arzi referred to the difficulty of knowing exactly where the border lay and said that they had had no confirmation of the reports, which they believed to have been spread by British sources. They added, however, that if any such incursion into Transjordan had taken place, it was certainly unintentional.

Mr. Epstein then went on to say that the Israelis were going to reply to the renewed British references to the arms received by Israel from Czechoslovakia in violation of the terms of the truce, and that the Provisional Government of Israel, according to a message from Tel Aviv, had proof that the British themselves had been continuing to supply arms to the Arabs. While admitting that the Israelis had received arms from Czechoslovakia, Mr. Epstein felt that the British were in a poor moral position to accuse the Israelis of violating the truce, since, he said, they themselves were sending arms to the Arabs.

501.BB Palestine/12-1348: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, December 14, 1948—7. p. m.

4654. Brit Emb today informed Dept FonOff hoped US Govt would, if suitable opportunities presented themselves, urge upon interested parties in Palestine dispute incorporation in Transjordan of all or greater part of Arab Palestine as best solution problem disposition that area. Dept took occasion inform Brit Emb US position territorial settlement Palestine set forth first two paras Deptel 4485 Dec 1 (ur 5225 Dec 13¹).

In specific reply Brit Emb's query, Dept stated that in view US attitude territorial question is one for settlement by negotiation, either directly between parties or through Conciliation Commission, and that US would support such territorial arrangement agreeable to Arab States and Israel as might be reached through either of above methods. Dept considered it advisable await outcome such direct negotiations as might take place or result experience Conciliation Commission before considering possible positive steps to assist in achieving territorial settlement.

LOVETT

¹ Not printed.

501.BB Palestine/12-1448 : Telegram

*The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the
Acting Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET

US URGENT

LONDON, December 14, 1948—9 p. m.

5244. For Lovett. See mytel 5225, December 13.¹ As anticipated Bevin asked me to call today to discuss future moves with respect Palestine. Expressly concerned over whole problem Middle East considering that internal situation Egypt constitutes grave danger as trouble there would be exploited by Communists and situation might develop similar to that China imperilling western powers Middle East. He urged strategic considerations be taken to account in determining limitation Palestine boundaries. I replied I had doubts expressed in Embtel about too early extra-lateral understanding re frontiers; Bevin answered that at some time he would have to give advice Arabs and wanted this advice be consonant with US views though did not now want necessarily US-UK agreement. He invited me to lunch with him and British Chiefs of staff Monday next in order to convey their views, particularly on strategic considerations, prior to my departure for US. In view I shall express no US opinions but seek only British views, see no objection here.

Bevin hopes that US member Conciliation Commission will be man of high standing and character who would work energetically for an early settlement Palestine boundaries. If US makes first appointment pattern will be set for French and Turkish appointments.

Shall report more fully after Monday's meeting by cable or orally on arrival Washington.

DOUGLAS

¹ Not printed.

867N.2390E/12-1648 : Telegram

The Minister in Lebanon (Pinkerton) to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

BEIRUT, December 16, 1948—10 a. m.

620. Remytel 614, December 8.¹ At his request I again visited President Khouri and he talked at length with regard to Jewish occupation of Lebanese territory. He is worried. While he favors and will support Arab cooperation with newly created conciliation commission, he said other members Arab League will consider his support as strange so long as Jews continue occupy Lebanon. Any Lebanese attempt forcibly remove Jews would result in reopening of hostilities generally which Lebanon does not desire and is not in position to pursue. President

¹ Not printed.

desires US Government take initiative in pressing for Jewish withdrawal as evidence US friendship for Lebanon. This would eliminate any resentment of our Palestine policy held in Lebanon. He pointed out traditional Lebanese friendship for US and emphasized position of Lebanese as moderating influence among Arab states which should be strengthened. As latest evidence of Lebanon's desire to prevent discord in Middle East President pointed out his government has refused take stand for either Abdullah or Egypt in coming controversy over Arab Palestine and has limited its action to counselling Abdullah to avoid precipitate steps which might lead to controversy among Arab states.

On question of treaty of alliance which would safeguard Lebanese frontiers he said he cannot alone sign treaty with single country because he would have to accord privileges to that country which should not be accorded. He would like to sign with group of countries or be one of group which would sign with one country. It was clear he was speaking of UK because he has often mentioned impossibility of signing any such treaty with France. President is now trying to veer away from pro-Arab policy Lebanon has been following, and is in desperate need of friendly counsel which he cannot get from France or UK because they would inject too many of their own interests in such advice.

I believe maintenance of *status quo* in Lebanon and strengthening its political and economic situation would prove stabilizing influence in area, and would at same time continue reservoir of good will US has in Lebanon more than any other Middle Eastern country. President said there is some sentiment for reduction of Lebanon to its early boundaries of Mount Lebanon and he believes such state would not be viable and would become mere troublesome pawn in Middle East political group. He is therefore seeking moral support as opposed to military which he is convinced will not be necessary and he points out security of Saudi Arabia maintained simply by knowledge that US gives its friendship.

President would appreciate any comments Department may be able to make on his present situation.²

PINKERTON

² In a memorandum of December 21 to Mr. Lovett, Mr. Satterthwaite stated that "NEA concurs in Minister Pinkerton's conclusions and recommends that, when Mr. Eliahu Epstein, Israeli Special Representative, calls on you this afternoon, you inform him of our concern over the continued military occupation of Lebanese territory, and that we consider that the voluntary withdrawal by his Government of its military units from Lebanon would serve to improve the atmosphere in which the Conciliation Commission will shortly undertake its work." (501.BB Palestine/12-2148)

Mr. Lovett's marginal notation read as follows: "a) We should not act as 'good offices.' Our record is too bad on this score. b) will sound out Epstein on their plans." Regarding point b, see Mr. Lovett's memorandum of conversation, December 21, p. 1676.

867N.01/12-1748

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] December 17, 1948.

Participants: Mr. Lovett, Acting Secretary
Mohamed Kamil Abdul Rahim, Egyptian Ambassador
Mr. Raymond A. Hare, Deputy Director, NEA

The Ambassador opened the conversation by saying that the last time that he had talked with me was on the occasion of his courtesy call on his arrival, and he felt that time had come when it would be helpful for him to discuss certain problems of current importance. First of all, he said he wished to emphasize his very sincere personal interest in the maintenance of friendly relations between Egypt and the United States. Such had been his long-standing persuasion and, in fact, it was essentially for that reason that his Government had chosen him as its representative in Washington. I thanked the Ambassador and told him that he could be assured that we entirely reciprocated his sentiments and I felt that we could go forward on that basis.

The Ambassador then spoke of the friendship which had traditionally characterized relations between the United States and Egypt but which had recently been clouded by the Palestine situation. He said that sentiment on the Palestine situation ran deep in the minds of the Arab people, who were convinced that they were gravely endangered by the introduction into their midst of an alien group with aggressive intent.

I interrupted at this point to observe that it would, of course, be fruitless to enter into discussion of the development of this situation, but I did want to emphasize the realities of the case with which we are now faced. The fact is that there is a very considerable group of Jews who are physically in Palestine and who could not be removed from the scene except by a force of arms which cannot be mobilized against them. Consequently, it is necessary to regularize the situation as soon as possible so that this new group can be enabled to take its place as a responsible entity in the society of nations and so that present uncertainties, such as the lack of clearly defined boundaries, may be eliminated. This objective and dispassionate viewpoint is the basis of United States policy, and it seemed to me that the interests of the Arab States, and especially of Egypt, might well be served by a similar unemotional recognition of fact. What we need above all is peace. As the Ambassador was probably aware, the American Government had in the recent past been giving serious consideration to certain economic projects in the Middle East, and American private interests, particularly the oil companies, were prepared to make vast expenditures in the area which would redound to the benefit of the local population

¹ Drafted by Mr. Hare.

But nothing could be done without peace and that was the reason why we must emphasize that aspect of the situation.

The Ambassador said that he appreciated this expression of the American viewpoint and that he also had been grateful to note what had been done at American instigation for the benefit of the unhappy Arab refugees. He felt, however, that there was one aspect of this situation which merited emphasis and that was the attitude of the Arab peoples themselves, irrespective of what the policies of their governments might be. The reaction to the Palestine situation by the ordinary man on the street in the Arab countries was one of fear: fear of Jewish territorial encroachment, fear of cut-throat Jewish economic competition, and fear that Israel is a center from which Communism will spread its tenacles to the Arab countries. The result of these very deep seated and strongly held fears was that, regardless of what policies the Arab Governments themselves might follow, the Arab people felt that they would be endangered by a Jewish State and would not consent to negotiations premised on the recognition of Israel. Furthermore, it was not true, as the Israelis were seditiously [*sedulously?*] asserting, that the Arab armies had been defeated. Actually, Arab casualties had not exceeded one percent and no real test of strength had ever taken place.

Referring to the Ambassador's assertion of the danger of Communism in Israel, I observed that the group from which the present Government in Israel has largely been drawn professes to be strongly anti-Communist, and it was my belief that such was actually the case. Moreover, the stronger opposition elements professed similarly anti-Communist sentiments, and the Communist Party itself was of negligible importance. I said that if the counsels of these more moderate elements were to prevail, it was essential that the solution of the Palestine problem should be by peaceful means. Continuing strife would only benefit the extremists.

Returning to the Ambassador's remark regarding the military side of the question, I said that, speaking as one who had had some slight acquaintance with military matters, I would suggest that it would be unwise of the Arabs to discount Jewish military strength. The Israeli Army is sizeable, well-equipped and has high morale. Furthermore, facilities for production of war materials in Israel have been developed. But the really important point was to get away from any idea of a military settlement and to stress peaceful negotiation. Any attempt to force the issue by a trial at arms would only result in chaos, formidable expenditure and the creation of an opening for bringing in reinforcements from behind the iron curtain. Under such circumstances, Communist influences would indeed have a field day.

To summarize and to emphasize, I said, our policy is to recognize the accomplished fact of Israel's existence and to seek to regularize the

situation by peaceful means. The United States has a real interest in the Middle East and values the friendship of the Arab countries, but the only way in which cooperation can be renewed effectively is by the return to normal conditions through peaceful negotiation.

The Ambassador said that this exchange of views had been very helpful, but he wished to leave with me the idea that it should still not be too late to rethink this whole problem in order to endeavor to find a more satisfactory solution. Time was no longer pressing and he hoped that the United States Government would think again before taking any further action, such as *de jure* recognition or a loan. I replied that I doubted if we really had much time at our disposal. Time might indeed be running quite short if a peaceful solution were to be effected.

[Here follow two paragraphs dealing with the question of Italian colonies.]

L[OVETT]

501.BB Palestine/12-1748 : Telegram

Mr. Wells Stabler to the Acting Secretary of State

CONFIDENTIAL

AMMAN, December 17, 1948—5 p. m.

162. It is understood that Prime Minister informed United Nations representative in Amman on December 16 that since Transjordan has accepted SC resolution of November 16 it is willing consider armistice plan. Suggested that Jews submit armistice plan in writing for consideration of Transjordan Government.¹

Repeated Jerusalem, 76, Damascus, Baghdad, Beirut, Jidda, Cairo.

STABLER

¹ Stabler reported on December 23 that the "King and Prime Minister have decided to consider any plan in writing proposed by Israelis but any negotiations concerning it must await until Conciliation Commission arrives. Theory is that commission will lend its support to action in this regard taken by Transjordan." (Telegram 168, 890i.002/12-2348)

867N.01/12-2048 : Telegram

*The Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald)
to the Secretary of State*

SECRET

TEL AVIV, December 20, 1948—4 p. m.

323. Remistel 317, December 17.¹ While not aware Department thinking re publicized Export-Import Bank loan Israel or exact timing *de jure* recognition, mission deems it most important take into account following considerations:

1. While domestically there are party differences as to future socio-

¹ Not printed.

economic and religious pattern, any appraisal Israel international political problems must proceed from fundamental premise that thinking is conditioned by ardent desire to achieve "kibbutz galuyot" ("ingathering of exiles") to save persecuted Jews abroad.

2. Political struggle coming elections essentially between MAPAI and MAPAM. MAPAI orientated West in belief Western system political freedom and socio-economic justice is closest to objectives Israel people; is aware dangers Soviet, its historic antipathy Zionism and present persecution Zionists USSR; is willing cautiously risk Soviet ire, both nationally and with respect Jews in USSR and satellites to form working liaison with West. MAPAM, which is itself coalition, contains substantial elements who, although not Communists in party-line sense, are nevertheless pro-Soviet in sympathy these elements against any overt move tying Israel irrevocably with West owing desire remain "neutral" and fear Israel will be a pawn for Western powers with consequent disaster hostage Jews abroad; they are impressed by Soviet UN aid and stress US "alliance" with British whom vast majority population now considers Israel arch-enemy. Extended conversations with MAPAM leaders indicate naive and wishful thinking re USSR with great ignorance of USA; they believe that by being "nice" to Soviets and above all avoiding antagonize USSR Soviets will continue give Israel firm support UN and ultimately let 3 to 4 million Jews in Soviet orbit go Israel without any specific *quid pro quo*.

3. As previously reported Mission unable to date obtain evidence any *quid pro* asked or offered other than cash payment for arms purchased satellite countries. However, gratitude population to USSR is strong and if composition Israel Government should be one of amenable type Soviets will press for favors. Incipient pressures this direction may be implicit in action Czechoslovakia, Rumania, etc., re emigration and training recently reported by Missions here. True Soviets failure so far capitalize underlying widespread gratitude, but there is strongest reason believe MAPAI leaders more disturbed than they admit at possibility USSR pressure.

4. In coming election general belief is MAPAI will probably get 30 to 35 percent seats Assembly, MAPAM 18 to 20 percent, and balance will go center and extreme right. Thus MAPAI would have control by margin of coalition with center and right. However, such margin not sufficient insure stability of all probable international contingencies, nor to resist more radical domestic policies of MAPAM. Moreover, Soviets may plan some campaign tricks, possibly using MAPAM front to influence January 25 election Assembly or February elections Hista-drut Council.

5. In view above, Mission hopes Department will immediately consider political advisability some action unambiguously demonstrating

USA determination strengthen those elements here who stand clearly for Western system political freedom and socio-economic justice. In so doing US should avoid forcing those elements make specific declaration they are openly antagonistic to USSR. Since Department is expected ultimately announce *de jure* recognition or recommend loans, it would be advantageous make announcement immediately of recognition, or at least of loan, utilizable by MAPAI as clear evidence reliability US. Regarding loan, MAPAM position is that it is needed but MAPAM will resist imposition political conditions and hence announcement should make clear no political conditions while, of course, reserving free action re credit risk and applicable bank regulations.

6. Mission of opinion that firm declaration by Department on loan to Israel would accomplish much. *De jure* recognition statement would show US not lagging behind USSR and not tied British policies. Mission recommends any announcement action simultaneously Washington and Tel Aviv to obtain maximum effect. Department requested also keep Mission continuously informed, for its comment.²

McDONALD

² Mr. McDonald, on December 21, suggested that telegram 323 be sent to the White House (telegram 325, 867N.01/12-2148). A marginal notation on the latter message by Mr. Rockwell stated that Mr. Humelsine would send No. 323 to the White House. The next day, Mr. McDonald sent a telegram for the "Personal attention Clifford and info Department," which stated in part: "Anxious you study personally recommendations ourtel 323. . . . President's timely action loan and *de jure* recognition could checkmate Russian attempts weaken predominant moderate pro-Western forces during present electoral campaign." (No. 333, 867N.01/12-2248)

501.BB Palestine/12-2148

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State*¹

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] December 21, 1948.

Participants: The Acting Secretary

Mr. Eliahu Epstein, Special Representative of the
Provisional Government of Israel

Mr. Wilkins—NE

Mr. Epstein called on me this afternoon at his request for the express purpose of thanking the United States Government, on behalf of his government, for the continued support and assistance which the United States Delegation had given the Israeli Delegation at the recent meetings of the General Assembly and the Secretary Council in Paris.

Mr. Epstein said Israel particularly appreciated Dr. Jessup's remarks in the Security Council on December 2² with regard to Israel's application for membership in the United Nations and regretted that,

¹ Drafted by Mr. Wilkins.

² For text, see SC, 3rd yr., No. 128, p. 8.

thereafter, France and Canada had been unable to vote in favor. Mr. Epstein was of the opinion the Cairo news release with regard to the El Faluja pocket in the Negev appearing at that moment—possibly deliberately—had prevented favorable action by the Security Council.³ Nevertheless, Israel appreciated to the full our support and hoped developments in Palestine would soon permit favorable reconsideration by the Security Council and the admission of Israel into the United Nations during the April session of the General Assembly.

I told Mr. Epstein that prior to the recent Security Council meeting we had discussed the question of admission with both France and Canada and, in the case of France, understood they were prepared to vote in favor. We had not, however, been so certain of Canadian support. I agreed with Mr. Epstein the Cairo news release had undoubtedly been a determining factor in the Security Council's failure to take action.

I pointed out in this connection that we had recently again been approached with regard to the Israeli troops on Lebanese territory and asked Mr. Epstein if he could tell me anything about it. I said that if Israel troops were in the Lebanon it would undoubtedly serve as a basis for further Arab charges in the Security Council which might, as in the case of El Faluja, have a continuing adverse effect on Israel's application for admission. It seemed to me that it would be helpful if these troops could be withdrawn. Mr. Epstein said he had no recent information and was not informed on the subject but understood Israeli troops were on Lebanese territory because Syrian troops were in occupation of Israeli territory. Mr. Epstein said he realized this was not an answer to my question but that it was the best he could give me at this time.⁴

Mr. Epstein went on to describe in some detail two major problems which now confronted the Provisional Government of Israel. The first of these problems was their relations with the various Arab states. Mr. Epstein hoped the United States Government would shortly be able to take constructive economic steps in assisting the countries of the Near East to raise their social and economic standards. Israel would genuinely support such action. Mr. Epstein said his govern-

³ The Security Council voted on the Israeli application for membership in the United Nations on December 17. Five affirmative votes were recorded, including those by the United States and the Soviet Union. Syria opposed and Belgium, Canada, China, France, and the United Kingdom abstained. The application was rejected as it failed to obtain the necessary seven affirmative votes (SC. *3rd yr.*, No. 130, p. 37). For Department comment, see Department of State *Bulletin*, December 19, 1948, p. 763.

⁴ The Department, on December 23, informed Beirut of Mr. Lovett's suggestion to Mr. Epstein regarding the desirability of withdrawing Israeli troops from Lebanon and authorized the Legation to so inform the Lebanese President. The Department requested that no publicity be given to its action (telegram 789, 867N.2390E/12-2348). The telegram was in reply to No. 620 from Beirut, December 16, p. 1670.

ment was firmly convinced that Israel could not exist as a flourishing oasis in a Near Eastern desert in which political, social and economic conditions were deteriorating. Israel feared demagogues and extreme groups in the Arab countries might take advantage of present conditions to further their own limited objectives. Governments might fall and foreign elements such as Russia might exploit the resulting situation. Mr. Epstein concluded that American aid to the Arab countries would prevent developments of this character and would in the long run benefit the Arab states, the United States and Israel.

Mr. Epstein said the second major problem confronting Israel was their relations with the British. The British had always been a realistic and pragmatic people and were at long last beginning to realize that Israel was established and would continue to exist. Mr. Epstein hoped, on behalf of his Government, that the United States would take every feasible step to assist in the establishment of improved relations between Israel and the British Government. Mr. Epstein considered such improvement as essential because it would assist Israel in improving its own relations with the United States and with the Arab states.

I interjected that my previous experience as a banker before entering the Department clearly showed the British were realistic and pragmatic but preferred to let matters develop slowly and gradually. It occasionally required a considerable period to convince them of a basic change in the situation. I pointed out the Department had exerted strenuous efforts for the past 8 or 9 months to persuade the British Government of our views with regard to the change in the situation in Palestine. I said I believed that we had been successful in this effort.

I then asked Mr. Epstein if he had any news with regard to the proposed elections in Israel. Mr. Epstein said elections were scheduled to be held on January 25, 1949 and expressed the hope that the United States Government would be able to take some action before that date which would strengthen the hands of the moderates in Israel and thus assure control of the government by MAPAI, the central groups and the religious groups. Mr. Epstein did not suggest what type of action the United States Government might take but hoped that we would be able to devise some action. Mr. Epstein added, in response to my query, that Israeli discussions with Export-Import Bank were progressing favorably and did not believe the Department should approach the Bank on the subject at this time.

Mr. Epstein pointed out that as two of the members of the new Palestine Conciliation Commission—France and Turkey—were considered to be pro-Arab, it would be extremely helpful if a “good” American were appointed. Such appointment would give the Israelis increased confidence in the Commission and would be greeted with

favor in Tel Aviv. I said that the Department had sent a list of 10 or 15 names to the White House but that a Commissioner had not yet been selected. I said I felt sure a sound, substantial man with profound legal knowledge would be appointed, one who would study the situation and take a direct line.

Mr. Epstein asked me if I thought *de jure* recognition were feasible at this time. I said I thought not. Mr. Epstein agreed with me.

Mr. Epstein again urged we give thought to some action which would strengthen the hands of the moderates during the proposed elections. I said we would give further thought to the matter. Mr. Wilkins added that, in his opinion, the solution of outstanding military problems in the Negev, particularly El Faluja, and of the question of Israeli troops in Lebanon—in other words constructive steps under the Security Council resolution of November 16—would create a favorable impression upon such members of the Security Council as France and Canada. It might subsequently result [that] the Security Council would be able to take favorable action on the Israeli application for admission prior to the January elections. Such action might strengthen the hands of the moderates and the United States would, therefore, be in a much stronger position to support Israeli admission. Mr. Epstein at first thought such discussions should be solely within the province of the Conciliation Commission but agreed, following further reference to the November 16 resolution, the military commanders could conclude such arrangements immediately. I pointed out excellent progress had already been made in Jerusalem in this respect. Mr. Epstein seemed impressed.⁵

⁵ In a memorandum of December 21 to brief Mr. Lovett for his conversation with Mr. Epstein, Mr. Satterthwaite informed him that Israel had submitted separate loan applications to cover specific projects, as suggested by the Export-Import Bank. The Bank was said to be studying the applications with "a sincere and genuine interest" and proceeding as rapidly as possible. The memorandum concluded with the observation that "The Department is in constant contact with the Bank on this matter." (811.516 Export-Import Bank/12-2148)

867N.01/12-2148 : Telegram

*The Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald)
to the Acting Secretary of State*

SECRET PRIORITY

TEL AVIV, December 21, 1948—11 a. m.

324. In confidential and strictly informal talk Shiloah with Knox, former stated Egyptian and Iraqi refusals talk armistice causing increasing concern PGI. Shiloah stated Egyptian offer tendered through Riley was that if Israel would free half of trapped Egyptian Faluja forces, Egypt would negotiate with Israel through Riley but not direct; Egyptian Field Commander reported stated he would never

negotiate with Israel Chief Staff but would designate subordinate talk with ICS. These proposals unacceptable to PGI as being subterfuges insure further delays solution while Egyptian Army reforms and rearms. Iraqi have apparently made no proposals for armistice.

It is not known what extent Shiloah's remarks reflect official thinking but there is some sentiment in military circles, supported in part by press reflecting public disappointment over failure achieve UN membership, that UN may not arrive at any satisfactory solution owing Arab intransigence and that a further indefinite and difficult truce may drag victor into what might be tantamount partial defeat owing economic and financial strain. Such opinions based on "realistic" argument that no one disposed help Israel but herself and that in this "realistic" world Israel had best think about clearing up situation definitively.

Mission presupposes that Department and Military authorities Washington fully aware by now Israel has stronger military force than any Arab state plus organization and *esprit* that makes for victory.

Estimate situation is even stronger now than Mistel 179, October 14. Israel fully able defeat either Egyptian forces in Negev or Iraqi in triangle alternately while holding on other Arab fronts. If Transjordan maintains neutrality as indicated present truce mission estimates Israel could drive Iraqi over Jordan and Egyptians from Negev simultaneously, although Iraqi operation might be very costly owing adverse terrain.

Mission has no reason believe that PGI is not fully disposed give Conciliation Commission chance to relieve situation but it is important Commission get under way without delay. Transjordan negotiations armistice rumored stalled. Shertok arrives on 23d and expectation is he will actively push direct negotiations with Arabs.

McDONALD

501.BB Palestine/12-2248 : Airgram

*The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Acting
Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET

LONDON, December 22, 1948.

Subject: Appeal of British Government for US-UK understanding with regard to forthcoming Arab-Jewish negotiations re frontiers in Palestine.

A-2377. For Lovett and Satterthwaite (NEA).

Bevin held his "Palestine" luncheon mentioned my 5244 December 14 at his residence December 20. He had invited among others A. V. Alexander (Minister of Defence), Lord Tedder, General Slim

(Chief, Imperial General Staff), Hector McNeil, Sir Orme Sargent, General Hollis, Michael Wright, Admiral Lord Frazer (First Sea Lord), William Hayter and Frank Roberts as well as Holmes and Jones of this Embassy.¹ Post-prandial conversation led by Bevin took place in atmosphere perhaps even more serious and charged with anxiety than at earlier meetings of same character (Embtel 2267, May 25 and Martel 134, Nov. 15 to Dept) and Defence Minister Alexander, when he spoke of Arab loss of faith in US and UK as result of Palestine and British observance of Arms Embargo, seemed particularly disturbed.

2. Bevin began by saying that he thought US and UK had "done well" in Europe: it remained for them to work out a Middle East policy and to "stay put on it". World was in a difficult position: no one can forecast outcome in China and SE Asia although Bevin had been working hard on Indo China and had suggested to French that they should take "bolder line" there with view to establishing a kind of "Western Union for Southeast Asia". Recent Dutch action had for time being spoiled Bevin's hopes this connection.

3. Bevin said Pal developments were disappointing. He had banked on Bernadotte proposals and US support therefor. He now finds that all Arab States are rapidly losing faith in US and UK and deep pessimism re attitude of West is growing in addition to divisions between individual Arab States. Bevin said Pal settlement at the earliest possible date is essential. UK does not intend to "hold out" against recognition PGI and at proper time when UK knows location Israeli frontiers, UK will extend promptly full recognition to Israel. However, UK believes prospects for UK obtaining its strategic requirements from Israel in the foreseeable future are poor and possibility must be faced that "within five years" Israel may be Communist state. Bevin infers this from fact that new Jewish immigrants come largely from countries behind Iron Curtain where they have been exposed to Communist philosophy. There was no great exodus to Israel from the US and UK where democratic philosophy could have been absorbed. To have communist Israel lying athwart vital strategic roads in ME such as Auja-Beersheba, Gaza-Beersheba and El Kuntilla-Aqaba, would be serious blow to UK strategic plans for area. Bevin said provided these roads and airfield area in Gaza coastal strip (see Embs TopSec Despatch No. 2497 of December 21, 1948²) were safely in Arab hands UK would not object to Israel receiving part Negev and recognized this was inevitable. (*Note:* it seemed clear that Bevin had in mind that Israeli portion Negev should be within limits Nov. 29

¹ Ambassador Douglas led the American group but left London for Washington before this airgram was ready for his signature.

² Not printed.

Resolution east and west but not south Auja-Beersheba road which, together with Beersheba itself, should be in Arab hands.)

4. Bevin reiterated (Embs 5244, Dec. 14) that he hoped US would quickly appoint high caliber representative to Conciliation Commission and that CC would deal specifically with frontiers as well as with general conciliation between parties. He thought CC should endeavor to complete its work in not more than 90 days from present. If CC were not successful, Bevin thought it likely that US and UK would be faced with "another China" in ME.

5. When the Ambassador asked Bevin to explain what he meant by "another China" he mentioned following as factors in support this idea:

a) Kurds in Iraq offer admirable opportunity for Sov agents to work up racial feeling;

b) economic stagnation in Iraq following closure south leg pipe line; and

c) possibility that at any time USSR may switch its support from Israel to Egypt and Transjordan thus creating a great impression in Arab world.

Bevin thought it should not be difficult for USSR to coalesce these indigenous factors into a series of ME civil wars.

6. In contrast to above, Bevin said that once Pal is settled US and UK can quickly push ahead with economic development of Iraq along lines of scheme which he had brought to Secretary's attention in Moscow.³ Iraq, on basis present irrigation schemes, could be made capable of absorbing 150% larger population and this might go far to take care of many Arab refugees as well as Arab population increase.

7. Alexander interrupted at this point to make impassioned plea regarding importance Arab goodwill to US and UK since "only this can check subversive Soviet efforts in area".

8. Bevin said that UK took great risk in supporting Bernadotte proposals and in abiding by UK Arms Embargo. UK had been successful in persuading Arabs to accept first Truce and now Arabs hold UK responsible for Israeli successes achieved by breaking practically every phase of Truce. UK asked Arabs to accept Bernadotte proposals on understanding these were supported by US, but when time came US Del Paris urged postponement consideration Pal problem until after November 2. As it turned out, US attitude has not been in any way changed since Nov. 2 and Arabs have grown progressively weaker. Now Arabs are asking UK to supply them with arms up to the level of arms acquired illegally by Israel. Only way out of situation which

³ See Mr. Bevin's undated memorandum transmitted with a memorandum of March 20, 1947, and footnote 33, *Foreign Relations*, 1947, vol. v, p. 503.

Bevin could see was for US and UK to make certain that CC achieves a settlement within next 90 days. With this objective in mind Bevin suggested that US and UK should arrive at an understanding regarding location southern frontier of Israel in Negev.

9. Bevin then asked Tedder to explain latest Brit thinking re broad strategic aspects Pal problem. This Tedder did substantially along lines para two Embtel 2267, May 25. He commented that it was being said that UK military in supporting Arabs "had backed the wrong horse". He did not think that this was the case since all along Brit military have said Jews would win the first round in any Arab-Jewish clash. Tedder spoke forcefully of danger to defence Suez Canal of Communist infiltration in Middle East and other Moslem countries but commented that he did not think Moslems are likely to go Communist unless local governments collapse with resultant chaos. Of various grave aspects Pal situation, among the most important was its effect on stability of local Arab governments.

10. Slim at this point injected the view that it is "very wrong" to think that Moslems do not become Communists: for example, Bokhara, with its Moslem population, early fell under Soviet domination even while USSR was weak. Alexander opined that Israel will go Communist much more readily than any Moslem State.

11. The Ambassador said that if he understood the British proposition correctly, the Brit Chiefs of Staff are anxious to take out insurance against possibility that Israel, in the event of hostilities, would be either a neutral or an unfriendly state. With this in mind UK would like to see Negev boundary Israel so placed that it would not affect most pressing Brit needs in Negev (see para 3 above and Embs Top Sec Despatch No. 2497 of December 21, 1948). Those present agreed with the Ambassador's statement of the British position.

12. The Ambassador then suggested that if Brit military believe Israel possesses the strongest indigenous military force in the Middle East it would be advisable for UK to consider how Israel can be kept oriented towards the West. Bevin promptly agreed with this point and said that his greatest wish is to achieve an early settlement Pal problem provided this is not done at expense of Britain's Arab friends. Hector McNeil expressed view that if CC operates with clear understanding strategic problems involved in locating Negev frontier it should be possible for it to achieve a settlement which would neither outrage Arabs nor perpetuate Arab-Jewish friction in the Middle East. It could be argued, McNeil said, that Israel might become eventually important asset in Middle Eastern defence. However, at present

Transjordan and Egypt are certainly "better bets than Israel", and consequently their goodwill should not be destroyed to satisfy exaggerated Israeli claims upon territory in the Negev. This caused McNeil to believe it would be desirable for CC to have a "working plan" based on US-UK understanding before it sits down to work with parties.

13. Michael Wright said UK is faced with difficult diplomatic problem since it is certain that Arab States will ask UK advice before and during CC negotiations. UK does not wish to advise Arabs contrary to ideas of US. But what are ideas US? Without these UK could say very little to Arabs.

14. Bevin asked that the Ambassador should take particular pains during his brief visit Washington to discuss foregoing Brit view with Dept since in Bevin's view the sooner US and UK reach an understanding re location southern frontier of Israel which UK could recommend to Arabs and which US could recommend to PGI, the better. Vital factor in such an understanding would be unwavering US and UK support to parties of agreed line. The Ambassador promised, without commitment re prospects of success, that he would do this and would send Bevin Depts reactions. He would do this if possible before Jan 1, 1949. The Ambassador made it clear, however, that present trend Depts thinking as he understood it is to leave location Negev frontier so far as possible to CC.

15. Tedder again raised question desirability UK supplying RAF installations Amman along lines para 10 *et seq.*, Martel 134, Nov 15, to Dept. It was clear that he and Alexander regard this as matter of pressing concern but that no immediate moves to take this action are contemplated. Bevin mentioned reinforcement RAF installation Amman in connection with arranging for Brit Consul General to open office Tel Aviv and for release of Jews detained Cyprus. He said that if these two pro-Israel measures were taken, reinforcement RAF Amman would be one of things which he might do in an effort to compensate and restore confidence of Arab side.

16. To summarize foregoing, the British Government is most anxious that:

(a) US immediately appoint a high-caliber man to be US representative on the Conciliation Commission and direct him to use his influence to get the Conciliation Commission operating on the spot in Palestine at the earliest possible date;

(b) US and UK should reach a firm understanding based upon mutual strategic needs regarding the location of the southern frontier of Israel with a view to:

(i) UK recommending Arab acquiescence to this agreed frontier,

(ii) US recommending Israeli acquiescence to this agreed frontier, and

(iii) US member Conciliation Commission being appropriately briefed re US-UK strategic thinking so that in so far as possible he can use his influence to secure Arab-Israeli acquiescence to the agreed frontier.⁴

HOLMES

⁴ A notation on airgram 2377 states that London placed the original and four carbons in an envelope addressed to Ambassador Douglas in care of Mr. Lovett and sent them to Washington via Navy courier. The editors presume that the Ambassador handed what became the Department's record copy of the airgram to officers of the Department during his conversations with them.

In a letter of January 18, 1949, to First Secretary Jones at the Embassy in the United Kingdom, Mr. Satterthwaite wrote in part: "Shortly after Ambassador Douglas' arrival here, a meeting was set up to discuss Palestine with him. Present were Dean Rusk, Ray Hare, Rob McClintock, Stuart Rockwell and myself. The Ambassador went over your long Top Secret airgram 2377 of December 22 with us and described in detail his meetings with Bevin on the general subject. We went into the background of the US position on Palestine, with particular reference to the basic policy set up by the President. At the end of the meeting the Ambassador said that he completely understood the situation and realized that the Department would not be able to go along with Mr. Bevin on the position which the latter wished to see adopted." (501.BB Palestine/1-1849)

867N.01/12-2248 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

LONDON, December 22, 1948—7 p. m.

5337. Following obtained today from Burrows and Beeley re Palestine:

1. On telegram from British Embassy Prague in sense Department's 4592, December 8,¹ re new Czech restrictions on aid to PGI, Bevin personally scrawled, "Watch for Soviet swing towards Arabs—E. B."

2. Burrows said that although there is great activity re Palestine, Amman, and Cairo, so far nothing very definite has emerged and there is little evidence that Egypt and Transjordan have gotten very far towards reconciling their differences. Individual Egyptians have been urging UK to use its good offices to bring two countries together, but so far only UK action has been to express view to both that such reconciliation would be "good thing". Burrows said Foreign Office is reluctant to play an active role at this delicate stage and thinks Abdullah, "who has been doing very well," probably knows best (Embassy 5243, December 14² paragraph 2).

3. Foreign Office considers Abdullah is working in right direction but is wise in not moving too fast because it would be foolish for him to outpace Egypt. His action in appointing new Mufti was "courageous" and one which may help situation because new Mufti was

¹ This telegram transmitted a copy of telegram 1812, December 8, from Praha, p. 1652.

² Not printed.

regarded by former Palestine Government as best Moslem Divine Palestine and as such was appointed by it head Sharia Courts.

4. Burrows said he understood there were roughly three lines of thought re Palestine current in Egypt:

(a) That Transjordan and Egypt might keep their troops in respective areas on *de facto* basis and that this situation would gradually solidify without necessity for controversial declarations re sovereignty, negotiations with PGI etc.

(b) That while direct negotiations with Jews are impossible, Conciliation Commission will offer means and excuse for Arabs to work out realistic settlement.

(c) Extreme Arab League attitude favoring continuing hostilities (Embreftel paragraph 3).

5. Burrows said next move re establishment British Consulate General to Tel Aviv (Embreftel paragraph 1) was up to PGI, which has so far not replied to McNeil approach Paris.³

HOLMES

³ Mr. I. J. Linton, an Israeli representative at London, told an Embassy officer on December 31 that the previous day he had informed Mr. McNeil that Israel was not interested in the establishment of the office unless the British Government would publicly announce *de facto* recognition of his government when the office opened. Mr. McNeil told Mr. Linton that he would present the matter to Mr. Bevin but that he was not optimistic (telegram 5438, December 31, 5 p. m., from London, 867N.01/12-3148).

501.BB Palestine/12-2348

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense
(Forrestal)*

SECRET

WASHINGTON, December 23, 1948.

DEAR JIM: Please do not regard this as a formal communication. I thought I would send you this private word forecasting what I think may develop in Palestine, particularly with reference to the military observers which the National Defense Establishment has been kind enough to furnish in relation to the Security Council truce in that country.

As you know, the General Assembly on December 11, 1948 adopted a resolution on Palestine which, among other things, provided that the office of the United Nations Mediator could be terminated at the request of the Security Council, the new Palestine Conciliation Commission taking over his functions. I expect that early next year the Council will in fact relieve the Mediator of further responsibility for supervising the truce and of attempting to find a solution of the Palestine problem. In this case it would be natural to suppose that the military observers who are servants of the Mediator would return home.

However, the Palestine Conciliation Commission, made up of Representatives of France, Turkey, and the United States, will certainly not wish to relinquish the already functioning machinery which the Mediator has established and will probably have need of some of the military observers to assist it in its endeavors to negotiate a permanent armistice.

I should think, accordingly, that in our planning for the future we should expect to receive a call for continued service by United States military observers, although possibly not in the present numbers since a smaller contingent could, under improved conditions, fill the bill. It would seem reasonable to suppose that the Belgian Government, if discharged from its duties as a Member of the Truce Commission, or even on termination of the Office of the Mediator, would expect to withdraw its present officer personnel. However, the gap left by Belgium could be filled by Turkey.

These predictions are, of course, subject to changing developments and I would not wish you to regard them as hard and fast. However, I do think it would be helpful if General Riley were informed that his staff should not be broken up, nor should officers be given their walking papers, until the situation has become more clear, which I expect will be early in January.

Sincerely yours,

ROBERT A. LOVETT

501.BB Palestine/12-2348: Telegram

The Consul at Jerusalem (Burdett) to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

JERUSALEM, December 23, 1948—1 p. m.

1550. Yesterday Truce Commission called on Colonel Dayan to explore means breaking present impasse in PGI-Transjordan talks. Pointed out to Dayan its conviction both parties sincerely desire peace and present propitious moment carry out to conclusion talks successfully begun. Stated appeared Transjordan considering itself unable in view opposition from other Arab states (particularly Iraq) to engage in direct armistice talks although it recognized such approach best procedure. Suggested same objective might be achieved by secret talks or continuation meetings under guise implementing cease-fire. Agreements could be reached which both sides would recognize as permanent but without publicity.

Dayan replied PGI ready negotiate armistice and peace either publicly or secretly. Formula used made no difference. Revealed that Colonel Tel in private discussion with him at meeting December 5 suggested secret discussions on basic issues for Jerusalem area. Dayan agreed, but Tel apparently received new orders and evaded continuation talks. Only after convinced Arabs stalling did Dayan make public

offer of armistice talks. Dayan believes King Abdullah, after building up Jericho conference and reaching verge of direct talks with PGI stopped short in view adverse Arab reaction. Recalled Abdullah known as wily fox and probably thinks can stall along and await developments over next few months. Dayan accused British of discouraging Abdullah from proceeding with talks. He insisted PGI would brook no delaying tactics. Reiterated PGI opinion its offer negotiate armistice fulfilled obligations under SC resolution November 16 (Contel 1528, 11th) and left it free take whatever action felt necessary. Implied PGI would resume hostilities if stalemate continues.

TC considers Dayan and PGI sincere in desire negotiate permanent settlement with Abdullah. Dayan on previous occasion stated to Consul General PGI anxious terminate war so could devote energy to main problems of immigration and settlement. TC also feels very definite possibility PGI decision resume hostilities, quickly terminate war by pushing to Jordan (both Jews, Arab Legion and United Nations observers feel can do so with no difficulty) and thus end present drain on economy. Delay may also result in breakdown present cease-fire without deliberate intention on either side. According to Dayan, first serious breaches cease-fire occurred yesterday with one Israeli soldier killed by Egyptians south of Jerusalem and heavy fire opened on Jerusalem Tel Aviv road by Arab Legion from Beit Iksa. French Consul General pointed out present stalemate has relatively slight effect economies Arab states who may well deliberately dally along in hope some event will swing situation their favor. Fallacy this tactic should be obvious from constant deterioration Arab position versus Jews and much more unfavorable settlement they can expect now from that offered by first or second Bernadotte recommendations.

Consul General feels strongly every effort should be extended at present secure agreement between PGI and Transjordan instead risking decision by PGI resume hostilities and gradual termination cease-fire Jerusalem. Measure confidence and cooperation now established and advantage should be taken present situation to push through to armistice. From conversations with British Consul General Jerusalem appears British while perhaps not discouraging Abdullah from armistice talks certainly not urging him conclude peace. British appear believe because opposition Arab states present not right moment and armistice agreement would place Abdullah too strongly at mercy of Jews. Consul General suggests Department may wish impress on British advisability conclusion immediate settlement between Abdullah and PGI and may wish Stabler present same views informally to

King. Willingness British extend terms Transjordan defense treaty to include Arab Palestine under Transjordan control on conclusion armistice or peace would prove powerful inducement to Abdullah. At same time Iraqis might be advised to at least acquiesce in such settlement and effect agreement on their part with Jews re resumption flow oil to Haifa would have in relieving their financial situation again pointed out. Among Arabs only Iraqi forces in central Palestine could cause Transjordan difficulty.¹

Sent Department 1550, repeated Baghdad 38, Beirut 111, Damascus 58, London 38, Amman 15; pouched Cairo 153, Jidda 19.

BURDETT

¹ The Department replied on December 24, stating it was "grateful suggestion your helpful and well-reasoned tel 1550 Dec 23. Unfortunately, moves you suggest appear unfeasible view present outbreak hostilities. Dept will give careful consideration suggested course of action if favorable circumstances established." (telegram 1070, 501.BB Palestine/12-2348)

501.BB Palestine/12-2448

*Memorandum by the Director of the Office of United Nations Affairs
(Rusk) to the Acting Secretary of State*

SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] December 24, 1948.

We have spoken with Ralph Bunche, the Acting Palestine Mediator, by telephone, who says that reports from General Riley and his Deputy, Vigier, from Palestine, although of a preliminary nature, do confirm that Israel has resumed hostilities against Egypt, thus violating once more the Security Council's truce resolutions. Bunche is officially communicating these facts to the President of the Security Council, which will meet on Monday, December 27, at the request of Egypt.

In light of McDonald's recent telegrams to Mr. Clifford it would seem useful to make an immediate representation in Tel Aviv couched in fairly strong terms. To balance this it would seem useful also to make representations in Cairo, since the Egyptians have not thus far complied with the Security Council's resolution of November 16, which calls on the parties to negotiate an armistice.¹

¹ Tel Aviv, on December 24, reported that the major military engagement that began in the Negev on December 22, was due to "several factors, including (1) persistent consciousness continued threat of Egypt in south; (2) increasing great economic and financial strain of indefinite duration war; (3) knowledge of Netherlands defection in Indonesia contrary to UN orders; and (4) widening feeling that perhaps only solution is for Israel secure by its own efforts the territory in Negev allotted under partition". (Telegram 339, 867N.00(W)/12-2448)

[Annex 1]

*Draft Telegram by the Acting Secretary of State to the Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald)*²

SECRET US URGENT
NIACT

WASHINGTON, [undated.]

Your 323, Dec. 20, and 333, Dec. 22,³ have been discussed with President who very much hopes that reports will yet prove untrue that Israel has resumed military operations in Palestine. However, preliminary info received by Acting Mediator is to effect that PGI has in fact resumed hostilities. Obviously renewed resort to warfare would have to be taken into consideration by Ex-Im Bank in dealing with Israeli request for loan.

This resort to open hostilities if officially confirmed, despite SC truce resolutions, including that of Nov. 16, and despite GA resolution establishing machinery for final peaceful settlement, does not seem in accord with written assurances given SC by FonMin Shertok on Nov. 29 requesting admission of Israel as member of UN in accordance with Art. 4 of the Charter and giving official declaration that Israel "unreservedly accepts the obligations of the United Nations Charter and undertakes to honour them from the day when it becomes a member of the United Nations".

Please officially communicate these views to Ben Gurion and Shertok. You should add that this Govt would much regret if action by Israel in resorting to open warfare in violation of SC truce resolution should indicate that it is not a peace-loving state. Under such circumstances this Govt would be forced to review its position as a supporter of Israel's application for membership in UN. This Govt profoundly hopes that such a contingency will not arise and trusts that statesmanship of Israeli leaders will again be evidenced in a prompt decision to cease hostilities and to utilize facilities afforded by SC, and GA resolution of Dec. 11, to reach a lasting peaceful settlement. This Govt stands ready to assist Israel in every appropriate way, both as a friendly Power and as a member of Palestine Conciliation Commission, to achieve this end.

Foregoing representation must be made within next twelve hours. Telegraph report of your interview.

Repeated to Paris as ———, eyes only for Jessup.

Repeated to London for info only as ———.

² This draft message and the one below were not sent. The Department of State files do not indicate why they were not sent.

³ Latter not printed, but see footnote 2, p. 1676.

[Annex 2]

Draft Telegram by the Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Egypt

SECRET US URGENT

WASHINGTON, [undated.]

NIACT

Please seek immediate audience with King Farouk and say that your Govt, motivated by its long-standing friendship with Egypt, desires to suggest that Egypt would be in a better position in bringing present alleged Palestine truce violation before SC if Egyptian Govt did in fact now fulfill its obligation under SC resolution of Nov. 16, which called upon parties directly involved in conflict in Palestine to seek agreement forthwith by negotiations conducted directly or through Acting Mediator with view to immediate establishment of armistice. You should add that we hope Egypt will take no action which would contribute to continuation of hostilities.

This representation should be made within next twelve hours.

Repeated for info to London as ———, Paris as ——— for Jessup.

LOVETT

501.BB Palestine/12-2648 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Delegation at Paris

SECRET US URGENT

WASHINGTON, December 26, 1948—1 p. m.

NIACT

4928. For Jessup.

1. Brit Emb on instructions of FonOff today informed Dept that if facts of recent fighting in Negeb were confirmed by reports of UN Palestine Mediator, they would instruct their representative on SC to introduce a resolution reaffirming SC resolutions of Nov 4 and 16, calling on Council to consider possible action under Chapter 7, and fixing a time limit within which parties in Palestine fighting should comply with resolutions of Nov 4 and 16. Brit info thus far is based exclusively on representations made to Brit Amb Cairo by Haidar Pasha Egyptian Min of War.

2. According to Haidar Pasha, he informed Gen Riley on Dec 20 that Egypt was prepared to negotiate armistice under Nov 16 Resolution on condition that Israel would fulfill requirements of Nov 4 Resolution. Egyptians tell Brit Amb that this position still holds good but insist on prompt compliance by Israel with Nov 4 requirement for troop withdrawal from Negeb to positions of Oct 14.

3. Brit have requested Dept's support of their proposed resolution as outlined in Para 1. We made following observations:

(a) It seems futile to propose a resolution which seeks merely to

reaffirm resolutions already violated. SC has already reached point of diminishing returns in this respect.

(b) We thought that Nov 4 and 16th resolutions provide sufficient machinery to deal with present situation, particularly Subcommittee established under Nov 4 SC order.

(c) Most important of all, we felt that US position as member of Conciliation Commission would be gravely jeopardized if we should take line in support of proposed Brit action in SC. We pointed out that rightly or wrongly PGI believes that two members of Conciliation Com are not disposed to be friendly to Israel, since Turkey is a Mohammedan country and France did not vote for Israeli admission to UN in recent SC session. We think chances of US accomplishment as member of Conciliation Commission would be impaired if we played too prominent a role in Council at this juncture.

(d) In consequence we will instruct you to abstain if Brit put down resolution described in Para 1, and to make no statement in Council meeting called to consider present alleged truce violations. After report of Mediator's representatives has been studied we shall determine what course of action to follow.

Repeated to London for info as 4757.

LOVETT

501.BB Palestine/12-2748

*Memorandum of Telephone Conversation, by Mr. Robert M.
McClintock*

RESTRICTED

[WASHINGTON,] December 27, 1948.

Mr. Bromley¹ phoned at 11:10 this morning to say that a telegram had just been received from the Foreign Office in response to the British Embassy's report of its conversation yesterday with Mr. Satterthwaite and myself, the results of which were summarized in the Department's telegram No. 4928,² for Jessup in Paris. The Foreign Office telegram said that a report had been received by the Security Council from Dr. Bunche³ which made clear that there had been "unprovoked aggression from the Jewish side". In view of this, the Foreign Office was disappointed that the Department had not taken a more responsive attitude yesterday but was persuaded by our suggestion that it would not be useful to introduce a new resolution seeking to reaffirm the resolutions of November 4 and 16. The Foreign Office was hopeful that the problem could be dealt with in substance by existing machinery but did very much wish that the State Department would be able to join it in taking appropriate measures, if warranted by the facts.

I told Mr. Bromley that we were yet in ignorance of Dr. Bunche's report and did not know what the facts might be. When we were in

¹ T. E. Bromley, First Secretary of the British Embassy.

² *Supra*.

³ For the texts of Mr. Bunche's report of December 25, as well as his supplemental report of two days later, see SC, 3rd yr., *Supplement for December 1948*, pp. 300, 304.

possession of the facts we would determine our attitude in the Council and elsewhere. I said once more, however, that we were most concerned to maintain our position as a useful member of the Conciliation Commission and that, accordingly, the British should not look to us to make dramatic speeches in the Security Council. I added further that the situation seemed very complex according to the newspaper reports and that in my own mind it was by no means clear as to who was aggressing whom. I concluded by remarking that according to today's press, Mr. Eban of the Jewish Foreign Office had indicated that his government still wanted peace by negotiation but would resort to all-out warfare if no negotiations were possible. I suggested that we might take this statement as our text for the morning sermon and see what might be done to help the parties negotiate a peaceful settlement. I suggested that this need not be done on a completely broad front but could be accomplished piecemeal as, for example, by negotiations between Abdullah and the PGI. I added, however, that Mr. Bromley's Arab clients had an infinite capacity for political blunder and that I was not sanguine as to the auspices.

Editorial Note

Acting Secretary of State Lovett, in a memorandum of December 27, 1948, to President Truman recommended the appointment of Joseph B. Keenan as United States Representative on the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine (501.BB Palestine/12-2748).

Mr. Keenan was appointed to the position the following day. Claude Bréart de Boisanger and Hüseyin Yalçın were designated the French and Turkish Representatives, respectively, on the Commission (Department of State *Bulletin*, January 9, 1949, page 41).

867N.01/12-2848 : Telegram

The Chargé in Egypt (Patterson) to the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

CAIRO, December 28, 1948—11 a. m.

1766. For Satterthewaite from Griffis. Your 1696, December 15¹ has just reached me as I have been Paris, Geneva.

While I am interested in status possible benefits Egypt discussed

¹Not printed; it gave the status of matters on Egypt discussed with Ambassador Griffis on November 30, including increased access to United States and world markets for Egyptian cotton, possible United States assistance in expediting construction of the Assuan Dam, technical assistance missions and the training of Egyptians in the United States by the Army and Air Force. The concluding paragraph of the telegram read: "Regret it evident from foregoing that basis for your proposed approach to King too limited and hypothetical warrant such approach now. Dept will continue pursue all favorable possibilities and will welcome further views or recommendations from you." (611.8331/12-1548)

November 30 I have hitherto expressed my opinion frequently and at length to President, Secretary, Undersecretary, your Department and all top members American Delegation UN Paris that Palestine situation cannot be solved with sanctions, mediators, mediation commissions or any other way until firm and united US-UK front with defined borders likewise acceptable to Israel are decided upon by UK and US. I believe that only by this method can problem resolve itself and until this is done any efforts this Embassy to influence King of Egypt are futile. If, however, UK and US can be brought into stated agreement on this matter I believe it can be solved rapidly and with dignity both to Israel and Arab states. My idea has always been to secure US-UK agreement before approaching King. As I am devoting my entire time to Palestine relief this wire not intended as resumption my duties as Ambassador here but this opinion deserves Department's most prompt and urgent consideration on highest levels.

[Here follows final paragraph dealing with the Cairo-Suez pipeline.]

[Griffis]
PATTERSON

867N.01/12-2848 : Telegram

Mr. Wells Stabler to the Acting Secretary of State

TOP SECRET

AMMAN, December 28, 1948—noon.

173. During frequent talks with King and Prime Minister about matters of current concern, innumerable occasions arise when it would be most useful to have guidance from Department as to line which should be taken. While it is true that Transjordan seeks and welcomes advice from British it is equally true that King and Prime Minister would like to know attitude of US Government which, after all, is playing leading role in endeavors find solution of Palestine problem.

As Department has pointed out, settlement in Palestine is urgently needed. Thus it would seem desirable that every opportunity be seized to influence the protagonists toward reaching an understanding. At this stage, Transjordan has gone further than other Arab States, both in theory and in practice, in achieving such understanding with Israel. Such advance, it is submitted, should be encouraged. Consequently, informal guidance to Abdullah and his government might well be a factor of considerable importance in bringing about the desired peace.

Up to this time it has been necessary to remain mute to any hints King and Prime Minister have put out to obtain United States guidance. This muteness is increasingly difficult to maintain in view United

States concern with Palestine question and it may in fact be harmful to cause of settlement and peace.

Therefore, propose that Department may wish consider preparation of policy guidance statement on Transjordan covering such points as:

- a. Negotiation of armistice with Israel;
 - b. Acceleration by Transjordan toward final peace negotiations with Israel;
 - c. Jericho resolutions;
 - d. Transjordan attitude toward Arab League and other Arab States.
- In other words, what does United States Government believe is most desirable course of action Transjordan should follow in order to achieve peace settlement which, as it is admitted, is so urgently needed.

STABLER

501.BB Palestine/12-2848 : Telegram

The Chargé in the United Kingdom (Holmes) to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET US URGENT

LONDON, December 28, 1948—2 p. m.

5377. According Burrows, deep concern regarding Negev fighting caused Bevin to hold series Foreign Office meetings over holiday weekend. Bevin was "disappointed" with Dept reaction to British appeal via British Ambassador Washington for US support for UK resolution SC (Dept's 4755 [4757¹] December 26). British officials believe US attitude probably decided without benefit full text Mediator's report which makes Israeli responsibility abundantly clear. (See General Riley's report to CNO Washington, December 27.) Officials imagine that study latter may cause US to take firmer attitude since US will understand dangers of appeasement, while conflict continues. Officials also draw attention to strong line by US regarding Indonesian fighting.

2. Burrows said he thought US and UK are fundamentally in agreement regards getting into action existing machinery under November 4 and November 16 resolutions, particularly sub-committee established under SC November 4 order (paragraph 3(b) Dept's 4757 December 26 to Paris for Jessup). Bevin is worried, however, by divergence with US re methods since UK feels strongly that only way to halt PGI which seems bent on expelling Egyptians (paragraph 1 Tel Aviv's 339, December 24 to Dept²) is to place spotlight world opinion upon Israeli activities through new resolution of kind tabled by Beeley³ SC today. British view is that SC should not content itself with quietly getting existing machinery into action. PGI must have already dis-

¹ This was a repeat of telegram 4928 to Paris, December 26, p. 1691.

² Not printed, but see footnote 1 to memorandum of December 24, p. 1689.

³ For text, see p. 1699.

counted effectiveness this machinery and instead of being given pause by it would be encouraged to believe its aggressive action would bring down on it nothing more persuasive than threat of action drafted in other circumstances and out of which PGI lawyers by obstruction should be able to talk themselves.

3. Burrows said Foreign Office has no information from British sources regarding progress of fighting beyond fact that it appears other Palestine fronts are quiet.

Sent Dept 5377, repeated Paris for Jessup 1075.

HOLMES

501.BB Palestine/12-2948: Circular airgram

*The Acting Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic and Consular Offices*¹

SECRET

WASHINGTON, December 29, 1948—8:15 a. m.

In view of the fact that the United Nations refugee relief program will terminate August 31, 1949, it is essential that the long-range aspects of the Arab refugee situation* be given careful consideration with a view to formulating policy on this important question.

The General Assembly resolution concerning Palestine, adopted December 11, 1948, deals with the refugee question as follows: "Resolves that refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which under the principles of international law or in equity should be made good by the governments or authorities responsible" and "instructs the Conciliation Commission to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of refugees and payment of compensation and to maintain close relations with the Director of the UN Relief for Palestine Refugees and through him with appropriate organs and agencies of the United Nations." Al-

¹ At Arab capitals, Jerusalem, and London (for information).

*The latest estimates of refugee totals received by the Department are the following:

160,000-220,000	Northern Palestine
200,000-245,000	Southern Palestine
75,000- 80,000	Transjordan
100,000-110,000	Syria
90,000	Lebanon
5,000	Iraq
8,000	Egypt
7,000	Israel

[Footnote in the source text.]

though this Government will use its best efforts to promote the purposes envisaged in this resolution, account must be taken of the possibility that the Government of Israel will be reluctant to accept the return of all those Arabs who fled from territory under Israeli control or that many of those who fled will not wish to return to the Israeli state.

Against the background of these possibilities, any comments which you can make at this time on the following general subjects would be of considerable value to the Department:

1. Economic—To what extent would the continued presence of the refugees adversely affect the economy of the country to which you are accredited or assigned? To what extent and under what circumstances could the state in question assimilate the refugees which it is now harboring? (In the case of Egypt and Transjordan, please also take into account those refugees in Palestinian territory who are under the supervision of the Egyptian and Transjordanian military authorities respectively.) What economic projects of a limited character might be undertaken as a means of integrating these refugees into the local economy? To what extent could they be utilized in connection with oil expansion projects? As a rough indication of their occupational potential, estimate if possible what proportion of the refugees in your area came from urban centers and what proportion from rural. To what extent and under what circumstances could Iraq, which has only 5,000 refugees, and Saudi Arabia, which has none, assimilate a significant number of refugees?

2. Political—What is your estimate of the long-range effect upon the political stability of the state in question in the event that the present group of refugees remains? What is your estimate as to the number of refugees who would be willing to return to Israeli territory on a permanent basis? What is their attitude towards the country in which they are now taking refuge? Is there any evidence that the government is considering the possibility that it may have to accept a number of refugees on a permanent basis, or that it is formulating any plans with that contingency in mind?

3. In view of the manifest impracticability of continuing indefinitely an international refugee relief program, what are your provisional recommendations for the solution of the Arab refugee question? In presenting your views, special emphasis should be placed upon the long-range effects on Near Eastern security of returning the refugees to Israeli territory or, alternatively, of endeavoring to integrate them into the Arab states.

Despite the highly speculative character of these questions, it would be desirable to obtain provisional estimates at this time, subject to review as conditions warrant, for planning purposes and for the guidance of the American member of the Conciliation Commission.

While it would be inadvisable to discuss these questions with Arab officials at the present time, in your discretion you may wish to discuss them with your British colleagues and possibly with certain American nationals concerned with refugee matters. Such discussion, however, should be on an informal and personal basis and no reference to this instruction should be made.

LOVETT

501.BB Palestine/12-2948 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the United States Delegation at Paris

SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, December 29, 1948—11 a. m.
NIACT

4957. For Jessup. Brit Emb has just informed Dept as follows. Brit FonOff has recd two cables from Brit Emb Cairo dated Dec 29. First quoted Haidar Pasha Egyptian Min War as stating Israeli forces were in vicinity El Auja and some had perhaps crossed Egyptian frontier. Message stated Egyptians were requesting UK permission for Egyptian Spitfires to operate out of Suez Canal zone.

Second and subsequent message quoted Haidar Pasha as stating Israelis were then within 10 miles of El Arish and well over Egyptian frontier.

Brit FonOff desired substance these two messages be given Dept. FonOff stated no confirmation from other sources but RAF had been instructed to verify by reconnaissance. If Israelis had in fact crossed Egyptian frontier UK obligations under terms Anglo-Egyptian treaty would of course come into play.¹

LOVETT

¹ This telegram was repeated to Cairo.

501.BB Palestine/12-2948 : Telegram

*The Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald)
to the Acting Secretary of State*

SECRET US URGENT TEL AVIV, December 29, 1948—4 p. m.

349. Acceptance by S.C. of Beeley resolution¹ would, we believe, postpone peace in Negev by encouraging Egypt's continued refusal negotiate armistice. Moreover, PGI cannot surrender military gains in Negev especially since Egypt shows no willingness recognize Israel's existence, MG [*sic*] state or to deal with PGI.

MCDONALD

¹ See resolution of December 29, *infra*.

*Resolution 66 (1948) Adopted by the Security Council on
December 29, 1948*¹

The Security Council

Having considered the report of the Acting Mediator on the hostilities which broke out in southern Palestine on 22 December 1948,
Calls upon the Governments concerned:

- (i) To order an immediate cease-fire;
- (ii) To implement *without* further delay resolution 61 (1948) of 4 November 1948 and the instructions issued by the Acting Mediator in accordance with sub-paragraph (1) of the fifth paragraph of that resolution;
- (iii) To allow and facilitate the complete supervision of the truce by the United Nations observers;

Instructs the committee of the Council appointed on 4 November to meet at Lake Success on 7 January 1949 to consider the situation in southern Palestine and to report to the Council on the extent to which the Governments concerned have by that date complied with the present resolution and with resolutions 61 (1948) and 62 (1948) of 4 and 16 November 1948;

Invites Cuba and Norway to replace as from 1 January 1949 the two retiring members of the committee (Belgium and Colombia);

Expresses the hope that the members of the Conciliation Commission appointed by the General Assembly on 11 December 1948 will nominate their representatives and establish the Commission with as little delay as possible.

¹ Reprinted from SC, *3rd yr., Resolutions, 1948*, p. 30. The Council adopted the resolution by eight votes to none, with the United States, the Soviet Union, and the Ukraine abstaining. For the official record of the voting, see SC, *3rd yr., No. 137*, pp. 23-26. The Egyptian Representative, in a letter of December 24 to the President of the Security Council, had claimed that Zionist forces had launched heavy, new attacks on Egyptian positions in the Negeb and had requested an urgent meeting of the Council to deal with the situation; for text, see SC, *3rd yr., Supplement for December 1948*. The Council began its deliberations on the matter on December 28 and considered a British draft resolution; for text, see SC, *3rd yr., No. 136*, pp. 13-14.

867N.01/12-2948 : Telegram

Mr. Wells Stabler to the Acting Secretary of State

SECRET

AMMAN, December 29, 1948—8 p. m.

175. Following obtained from Kirkbride this morning:

1. At meeting December 28 in Jerusalem attended by Sassoon, Dayan and Abdullah el Tel, Israelis informed Transjordan representative

that Israel was no longer interested in armistice and insisted on immediate peace negotiations. Apparently Israelis took severe line indicating it must be either peace or war. This is believed to be in nature reply to Abdullah's message Sassoon (paragraph 3 mytel 172, December 28¹).

2. King is considerably worried by this situation as, with present Jewish attack in Negev, it is obvious Israel entirely prepared continue hostilities to achieve its ends. Kirkbride thought it likely that unless Abdullah agreed to peace negotiations almost at once Jews might well attack Iraqis thereby rendering Transjordan's position hopeless.

3. King is now following own line in respect Israelis and Prime Minister uninformed. Latter has reached stage where he is no longer particularly interested in developments. Only question of time before he resigns.

4. As Egyptian troops in Bethlehem area cannot be trusted (mytel 169, December 23²), Arab Legion has moved regiment from Akaba to Bethlehem leaving Akaba unprotected. In view unsatisfactory state of affairs in Bethlehem, Transjordan authorities are reconsidering attitude toward Egyptian units keeping in mind fact that punitive action would probably result in final break with Egypt.

5. Certain evidence now points to air raid on Jericho being carried out by Jewish plane with bombs captured from Egyptians.³ Raid may have been for psychological purposes as bombs were dropped in such a manner as to cause no damage. British Royal Air Force in Egypt have reported they satisfied it not Egyptian plane.

Sent Department 175; repeated Jerusalem 82.

STABLER

¹ Not printed; paragraph 3 stated in part: "King gave account [to Mr. Stabler] of steps he is now taking on political level to reach understanding with Jews. Several weeks ago Sassoon of Israeli Foreign Office sent message to King that he would like to confer with responsible Transjordan official (mytel 155, December 13). King sent reply through Abdullah el Tel and his private physician, Shawkat Pasha, suggesting certain action Jews might follow to indicate their sincerity of intentions. Apparently main points were return of Jaffa to Arabs and permission for Arab refugees to go back to Lydda and Ramle. King remarked that if Jews did accept his proposition, his position vis-à-vis Arab League would be much stronger in that he could point to this achievement as concrete evidence of his efforts in behalf of Palestine Arabs. Expected answer from Sassoon December 27 or 28. If reply is in negative it will not change his present policy toward Israel or his belief that two countries could cooperate." (867N.01/12-2848)

² Not printed.

³ Amman, in its telegram 172, gave the King's comment that the "air raid on Jericho and Shuneh night December 24 may have been carried out by Egyptians. Bomb fragment bore words 'Farouk to Shertok' in the Arabic letters."

501.BB Palestine/12-3048

*Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Secretary of State*¹

TOP SECRET

[WASHINGTON,] December 30, 1948.

Participants: The Acting Secretary, Mr. Lovett
The British Ambassador, Sir Oliver Franks
The British Minister, Mr. Hoyer Millar
Mr. Satterthwaite—NEA
Mr. McClintock—UNA

The British Ambassador called, under instructions to leave a *Note Verbale* with the Acting Secretary of State with reference to the existing hostilities in Palestine. A copy of this document is attached. Sir Oliver Franks read, from a telegram just received by his Embassy, reports from the British Ambassador in Cairo to the effect that an Israeli column had bifurcated in the vicinity of Beersheba and that attacks were being made by Israeli forces across the Egyptian frontier from the south and southeast on a line from Rafah extending fifteen kilometers in the direction of El Arish. One Egyptian airstrip on Egyptian territory had been taken by the Israeli forces. Egyptian Spitfires had landed out of gas on British airfields in the Canal zones, thus implying that advanced Egyptian airfields were no longer operable.

When asked whether, if the treaty of 1936 were invoked, it would be invoked by the British Government or by the Egyptian Government, particularly in light of the fact that the latter government had recently shown its dissatisfaction with that treaty, the British Ambassador said that he could give no straight answer. He emphasized that his information on the military situation was preliminary but that, according to the evidence now at hand, it seemed highly probable that Israeli forces had crossed the Egyptian frontier and that in consequence a most serious situation had arisen. He spoke of the strategic interests of the United States and the United Kingdom in this area and, from the broader political point of view, the troubles which could ensue to both governments if the present threatening situation were allowed to continue.

I said that we agreed that the situation, if the facts were as represented, was a serious one and that we were ready to do our best to compose it. I said the President had been informed yesterday of the most recent information and that I would discuss the Ambassador's *Note Verbale* with the President at 12:30 today.² I thought, offhand, that it might be useful for the President to instruct our Representative at Tel Aviv to make immediate representations to the Provisional Government of Israel.

¹ Drafted by Mr. McClintock.

² President Truman read this note at 12:45 p. m., December 30.

As for the final paragraph of the *Note Verbale*, I could not but say frankly that if the British Government decided to resume the shipment of arms to the Arab countries this would be regarded as a clear violation of the Security Council's arms embargo. It would inevitably result in a demand in this country for the lifting of our own arms embargo which, as the Ambassador knew, had been imposed by us unilaterally even before the Security Council took action. Such a development would, of course, be highly unfortunate.

Mr. McClintock suggested to the Ambassador that there was a seeming inconsistency between the first and final paragraphs of the *Note Verbale*. The concluding sentence of the first paragraph reads "If the Security Council is thus flouted the United Nations will cease to be an effective force", yet the final sentence of the fourth paragraph clearly indicates that the British Government intends to resume shipping arms to the Arab countries, thus itself flouting the United Nations.

Sir Oliver Franks at this point said that he had been given permission, but only in terms of "utmost discretion", to inform the Acting Secretary that a telegram had been received from the British Representative in Amman, stating that King Abdullah had received a message from the Jews (presumably the Provisional Government of Israel) that the time for negotiations for an armistice had passed. The Jews were interested now only in negotiating peace. If it was not to be peace, it would be war. Sir Oliver inferred that it was on the basis of this threatening information that his government had drafted the final paragraph of the *Note Verbale*. The British Ambassador was asked his opinion whether his Government would carry out the intended action described in Paragraph 4, if through the cooperation of the United States it proved possible to meet the suggestions made in Paragraph 3, with the result that the forces of Israel would withdraw from Egyptian territory immediately. Sir Oliver said that he was speaking only for himself but he thought it possible that his government would not proceed to arm the other Arab countries if indeed it was possible to restrain the Israelis from their present attack on Egypt and to get their forces back across the border.

Sir Oliver reverted to his telephone conversation with me³ in which he had requested an interview with the President. I said that the President was giving no outside appointments this week as he was engaged on the State of the Union Message. Sir Oliver asked if I would present his case to the President and I said I would at once give him the British *Note Verbale* and report our interview. At the Ambassador's request I promised to ask the President to accord him an interview at the earliest possible moment.

³ The editors have found no record of this conversation in the Department of State files.

[Annex]

Note Verbale by the British Embassy

All the evidence in possession of the British Government points to the fact that, notwithstanding the truce and the resolutions passed by the United Nations, Israeli forces are fighting on Egyptian territory, where they are in possession of airfields. They have declined the use of United Nations observers and officials and it seems that United Nations, upon which the United States and Britain had both pledged their action, are being deliberately and totally ignored. If the Security Council is thus flouted the United Nations will cease to be an effective force.

2. The British Government regard the situation with grave concern. Unless the Jews withdraw from Egyptian territory the British Government will be bound to take steps to fulfil their obligations under their treaty of 1936 with Egypt. There may arise out of this situation the gravest possible consequences, not only to Anglo-American strategic interests in the Near East, but also to American relations with Britain and Western Europe.

3. The British Government have no desire to get into conflict with the Jews provided the latter accept the decisions of the Security Council of the United Nations and act upon them. They still trust that wiser counsels among the Jews will prevail. They trust that it will be possible for the United States Government so to act upon the Jews as to make any military action by British forces on Egyptian territory unnecessary under our treaty with Egypt. This can only be ensured if the Jews immediately withdraw from Egyptian territory.

4. Meanwhile, the British Government feel bound to take the necessary steps to protect their own troops and installations in Transjordan. The British Government agreed not to supply any arms to the Arab countries provided the truce was observed, and they understood that the United States Government were agreeable that Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter should be applied to either party which did not observe the truce. On that basis, the British Government have carried out their obligations to the absolute letter. They have refrained from moving arms and equipment even to their own installations, thereby endangering their own troops in order to assist a settlement. In view of the very serious danger the British Government must now proceed to move equipment into Transjordan. Moreover, in view of the aggressive use to which the Jews have put arms obtained from Russian satellite countries, the British Government will find themselves in a position in which they are no longer able to refuse to carry out British contracts to the Arab countries.

WASHINGTON, 30th December, 1948.

501.BB Palestine/12-3048 : Telegram

*The Acting Secretary of State to the Special Representative of the
United States in Israel (McDonald)*

TOP SECRET US URGENT WASHINGTON, December 30, 1948—5 p. m.
NIACT

281. President directs that you make following immediate representation to Shertok and Ben Gurion. You are authorized in your discretion to make same representation to President Weizmann. Please telegraph immediate report of your interviews.

1. This Govt is most deeply disturbed on receipt of apparently authentic reports confirming that Egyptian territory has been invaded by armed forces of Israel. Reports indicate that this is not an accidental maneuver but a deliberately planned military operation.

2. British Govt has officially notified this Govt that it regards situation with grave concern and that unless Israeli forces withdraw from Egyptian territory British Govt will be bound to take steps to fulfill their obligations under Treaty of 1936 with Egypt. However, British Govt states it has no desire to get into conflict with Govt of Israel provided latter accept decisions of Security Council of UN and act upon them.

3. As first govt to recognize PGI and as a sponsor of Israel's application for admission to UN as a "peace-loving state" this Govt, with deep concern and as evidence of its consistent friendship for Israel, desires to draw attention of Israeli Govt to grave possibility that by ill-advised action PGI may not only jeopardize peace of Middle East but would also cause reconsideration of its application for membership in UN and of necessity a reconsideration by this Govt of its relations with Israel. As PGI knows, their assurances of peaceful intent have been basis upon which our policy toward Israel has rested.

4. Immediate withdrawal of Israeli forces from Egyptian territory appears to be minimum requirement giving proof of peaceful intent of PGI, if enlarged conflict is to be avoided.

5. This Govt has received reports from its representative in Transjordan indicating that PGI has informed Govt of Transjordan that time for negotiations for an armistice has passed. PGI is represented as stating that it is interested now only in negotiating peace, but indicated that it must be either peace or war. If this threatening attitude should be confirmed, again this Govt would have no other course than to undertake a substantial review of its attitude toward Israel.

6. You may conclude by stating that temporarily your Govt is withholding press comment pending a complete statement from PGI in answer to the foregoing representation.

Repeated to Amembassy, London as 4819.

LOVETT

Forrestal Papers

*Diary Entry for December 31, 1948, by the Secretary of Defense
(Forrestal)*

Cabinet—China—Palestine

Subject this morning at Cabinet was China.

[Here follow two paragraphs concerning China.]

Palestine:

Lovett said the Israeli troops had apparently invaded Egypt. Specifically, they were reported to have attacked an air field within the Egyptian border; that it was reported the British would notify us that the failure of the Israelis to withdraw promptly would automatically bring into operation the Anglo-Egyptian mutual defense pact.

501.BB Palestine/12-3148: Telegram

*The Special Representative of the United States in Israel (McDonald)
to the Acting Secretary of State*

TOP SECRET

URGENT

TEL AVIV, December 31, 1948—1 p. m.

NIACT

350. Redeptel 281, December 30, 5 p. m., received at 1 p. m. December 31. True copy typed at 1:45. At 2 p. m. called Shertok who came my house and I read him careful paraphrase. Knox present. Shertok informed me Ben-Gurion left Tel Aviv for Tiberias at 12 noon but would immediately attempt get in touch with him. I urged necessity my seeing BG here or Tiberias today. Owing distance Tel Aviv to Tiberias and gravity of question 10 or 12 hours may elapse before I am able send full reply.

Shertok's tentative and informal preliminary reply was as follows:

1. As for Israel incursion into Egypt he admitted such operations but stated uninformed as to details (Shertok returned Israel only last 24 hours). Shertok observed that his opinion such operations based on military logic of total operations and not any intentions seize Egyptian territory.

2. As regards Trans-Jordan Shertok was positive. He stated that our government's advices inaccurate. Israel has informed Trans-Jordan that negotiations must proceed further than present cease-fire arrangements toward an effective armistice looking toward peace. Last secret meeting of negotiators took place night December 30 in Arab part Jerusalem with Shiloah, Colonel Dayan and secretary on one side and Abdullah el-Tel on other. Next secret meeting is for January 5 in Jewish Jerusalem. Shertok stated that if any statement re-

garding "war or peace" was made at earlier meeting it was in course conversational exchange, was not an ultimatum, and used in an effort persuade Trans-Jordan proceed to definite armistice.¹

McDONALD

¹ Mr. McDonald, later the same day, reported that he and Mr. Knox were leaving immediately for Tiberias to see the Israeli Prime Minister, who was ill. He also advised of information from Mr. Shiloah that orders had already been issued for the immediate withdrawal of small Israeli units from the Egyptian side of the frontier (telegram 351 from Tel Aviv, 501.BB Palestine/12-3148).

867N.01/12-2848 : Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to Mr. Wells Stabler, at Amman

TOP SECRET

WASHINGTON, January 3, 1949—5 p. m.

2. Dept has given careful consideration Jerusalem tel No. 1550 Dec 23 rptd Amman 15 and to ur 173 Dec 28, 172 Dec 28¹ and 176 Dec. 29.² Dept's comment on points raised as follows:

Dept anxious see peace restored to Palestine and believes should be accomplished by negotiations, either directly between parties or through Conciliation Commission. Dept would naturally welcome any concrete steps by Israelis or Arabs to bring about such negotiations. In this connection Dept has found reasonable attitude shown by TJ re negotiations with Jews extremely hopeful sign.

US, however, naturally desires avoid becoming involved in inter-Arab jealousies and intrigues and Dept regards question TJ relations with Arab League as essentially one for determination by TJ. As you point out ur 176 Dec 29, determining factor seems to be mil one. Dept believes final attitude TJ re Israelis will be decided by mil situation, particularly position of Arab Legion, and by stand taken by UK. Not essential, therefore, and certainly undesirable that US become involved in question TJ attitude re Arab League and other Arab States.

Dept believes that most satisfactory solution disposition greater part Arab Palestine would be incorporation in Transjordan. Therefore Dept approves principle underlying Jericho resolutions.

To sum up, US would like to see TJ negotiate armistice and final peace with Israelis, and believes most Arab Palestine could be incorporated in Transjordan as outcome such negotiations. However, US can not become involved in inter-Arab politics. If King and TJ officials

¹ No. 172 not printed; but see footnotes 1 and 3, p. 1700.

² Not printed; it advised that British Minister Kirkbride had cabled the Foreign Office for instructions concerning an approach to King Abdullah. The Minister commented that the policy of the Foreign Office to "hold back until Conciliation Commission arrives" no longer corresponded with the facts and that the King was fearful that the Israelis would "continue war against him or Iraqis or both unless he agrees in immediate future to peace negotiations." The King was said to be aware that the Arab Legion and the Iraqi Army would be defeated easily, the former because of its lack of ammunition (867N.01/12-2948).

seek views US on question Palestine settlement, you are authorized state US approval reasonable attitude so far shown by TJ and to express US hope that TJ, as well as other Arab States, will find way of entering armistice and peace negotiations with Israelis. You are also authorized, if queried re US views on disposition Arab Palestine, to state that US believes logical outcome negotiations between TJ and Israelis would be incorporation greater part Arab Palestine in TJ. You will know best how to do this without giving impression US supporting TJ against Arab League and without involving US in Arab politics.³

LOVETT

³ This telegram was repeated to Jerusalem and London.

APPENDIX

RESOLUTION 181 (II) CONCERNING THE FUTURE GOVERNMENT OF PALESTINE, ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON NOVEMBER 29, 1947¹

A

The General Assembly,

Having met in special session at the request of the mandatory Power to constitute and instruct a special committee to prepare for the consideration of the question of the future government of Palestine at the second regular session;

Having constituted a Special Committee and instructed it to investigate all questions and issues relevant to the problem of Palestine, and to prepared proposals for the solution of the problem, and

Having received and examined the report of the Special Committee (document A/364)* including a number of unanimous recommendations and a plan of partition with economic union approved by the majority of the Special Committee,

Considers that the present situation in Palestine is one which is likely to impair the general welfare and friendly relations among nations;

Takes note of the declaration by the mandatory Power that it plans to complete its evacuation of Palestine by 1 August 1948;

Recommends to the United Kingdom, as the mandatory Power for Palestine, and to all other Members of the United Nations the adoption and implementation, with regard to the future government of Palestine, of the Plan of Partition with Economic Union set out below;

Requests that

(a) The Security Council take the necessary measures as provided for in the plan for its implementation;

(b) The Security Council consider, if circumstances during the transitional period require such consideration, whether the situation

¹ Reprinted from United Nations, *Official Records of the Second Session of the General Assembly, Resolutions, 16 September–29 November 1947*, pp. 131 ff. (U.N. document A/519, January 8, 1948) Two maps accompanying the source text as Annexes A and B are reproduced facing p. 1730. They are respectively entitled "Palestine—Plan of Partition with Economic Union" (United Nations Map No. 103(b), November 1947); and "City of Jerusalem—Boundaries Proposed" (United Nations Map No. 104, November 1947).

*See *Official Records of the second session of the General Assembly*, Supplement No. 11, Volumes I–IV. [Footnote in the source text.]

in Palestine constitutes a threat to the peace. If it decides that such a threat exists, and in order to maintain international peace and security, the Security Council should supplement the authorization of the General Assembly by taking measures, under Articles 39 and 41 of the Charter, to empower the United Nations Commission, as provided in this resolution, to exercise in Palestine the functions which are assigned to it by this resolution;

(c) The Security Council determine as a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, in accordance with Article 39 of the Charter, any attempt to alter by force the settlement envisaged by this resolution;

(d) The Trusteeship Council be informed of the responsibilities envisaged for it in this plan;

Calls upon the inhabitants of Palestine to take such steps as may be necessary on their part to put this plan into effect;

Appeals to all Governments and all peoples to refrain from taking any action which might hamper or delay the carrying out of these recommendations, and

Authorizes the Secretary-General to reimburse travel and subsistence expenses of the members of the Commission referred to in Part I, Section B, paragraph 1 below, on such basis and in such form as he may determine most appropriate in the circumstances, and to provide the Commission with the necessary staff to assist in carrying out the functions assigned to the Commission by the General Assembly.

B†

The General Assembly

Authorizes the Secretary-General to draw from the Working Capital Fund a sum not to exceed \$2,000,000 for the purposes set forth in the last paragraph of the resolution on the future government of Palestine.

Hundred and twenty-eighth plenary meeting, 29 November 1947.

At its hundred and twenty-eighth plenary meeting on 29 November 1947 the General Assembly, in accordance with the terms of the above resolution, elected the following members of the United Nations Commission on Palestine:

Bolivia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Panama and Philippines.

PLAN OF PARTITION WITH ECONOMIC UNION

PART I

Future constitution and government of Palestine

A. TERMINATION OF MANDATE, PARTITION AND INDEPENDENCE

1. The Mandate for Palestine shall terminate as soon as possible but in any case not later than 1 August 1948.

† This resolution was adopted without reference to a Committee [Footnote in the source text.]

2. The armed forces of the mandatory Power shall be progressively withdrawn from Palestine, the withdrawal to be completed as soon as possible but in any case not later than 1 August 1948.

The mandatory Power shall advise the Commission, as far in advance as possible, of its intention to terminate the Mandate and to evacuate each area.

The mandatory Power shall use its best endeavours to ensure that an area situated in the territory of the Jewish State, including a seaport and hinterland adequate to provide facilities for a substantial immigration, shall be evacuated at the earliest possible date and in any event not later than 1 February 1948.

3. Independent Arab and Jewish States and the Special International Regime for the City of Jerusalem, set forth in part III of this plan, shall come into existence in Palestine two months after the evacuation of the armed forces of the mandatory Power has been completed but in any case not later than 1 October 1948. The boundaries of the Arab State, the Jewish State, and the City of Jerusalem shall be as described in parts II and III below.

4. The period between the adoption by the General Assembly of its recommendation on the question of Palestine and the establishment of the independence of the Arab and Jewish States shall be a transitional period.

B. STEPS PREPARATORY TO INDEPENDENCE

1. A Commission shall be set up consisting of one representative of each of five Member States. The Members represented on the Commission shall be elected by the General Assembly on as broad a basis, geographically and otherwise, as possible.

2. The administration of Palestine shall, as the mandatory Power withdraws its armed forces, be progressively turned over to the Commission, which shall act in conformity with the recommendations of the General Assembly, under the guidance of the Security Council. The mandatory Power shall to the fullest possible extent co-ordinate its plans for withdrawal with the plans of the Commission to take over and administer areas which have been evacuated.

In the discharge of this administrative responsibility the Commission shall have authority to issue necessary regulations and take other measures as required.

The mandatory Power shall not take any action to prevent, obstruct or delay the implementation by the Commission of the measures recommended by the General Assembly.

3. On its arrival in Palestine the Commission shall proceed to carry out measures for the establishment of the frontiers of the Arab and Jewish States and the City of Jerusalem in accordance with the general lines of the recommendations of the General Assembly

on the partition of Palestine. Nevertheless, the boundaries as described in part II of this plan are to be modified in such a way that village areas as a rule will not be divided by state boundaries unless pressing reasons make that necessary.

4. The Commission, after consultation with the democratic parties and other public organizations of the Arab and Jewish States, shall select and establish in each State as rapidly as possible a Provisional Council of Government. The activities of both the Arab and Jewish Provisional Councils of Government shall be carried out under the general direction of the Commission.

If by 1 April 1948 a Provisional Council of Government cannot be selected for either of the States, or, if selected, cannot carry out its functions, the Commission shall communicate that fact to the Security Council for such action with respect to that State as the Security Council may deem proper, and to the Secretary-General for communication to the Members of the United Nations.

5. Subject to the provisions of these recommendations, during the transitional period the Provisional Councils of Government, acting under the Commission, shall have full authority in the areas under their control, including authority over matters of immigration and land regulation.

6. The Provisional Council of Government of each State, acting under the Commission, shall progressively receive from the Commission full responsibility for the administration of that State in the period between the termination of the Mandate and the establishment of the State's independence.

7. The Commission shall instruct the Provisional Councils of Government of both the Arab and Jewish States, after their formation, to proceed to the establishment of administrative organs of government, central and local.

8. The Provisional Council of Government of each State shall, within the shortest time possible, recruit an armed militia from the residents of that State, sufficient in number to maintain internal order and to prevent frontier clashes.

This armed militia in each State shall, for operational purposes, be under the command of Jewish or Arab officers resident in that State, but general political and military control, including the choice of the militia's High Command, shall be exercised by the Commission.

9. The Provisional Council of Government of each State shall, not later than two months after the withdrawal of the armed forces of the mandatory Power, hold elections to the Constituent Assembly which shall be conducted on democratic lines.

The election regulations in each State shall be drawn up by the Provisional Council of Government and approved by the Commission. Qualified voters for each State for this election shall be persons over

eighteen years of age who are: (a) Palestinian citizens residing in that State and (b) Arabs and Jews residing in the State, although not Palestinian citizens, who, before voting, have signed a notice of intention to become citizens of such State.

Arabs and Jews residing in the City of Jerusalem who have signed a notice of intention to become citizens, the Arabs of the Arab State and the Jews of the Jewish State, shall be entitled to vote in the Arab and Jewish States respectively.

Women may vote and be elected to the Constituent Assemblies.

During the transitional period no Jew shall be permitted to establish residence in the area of the proposed Arab State, and no Arab shall be permitted to establish residence in the area of the proposed Jewish State, except by special leave of the Commission.

10. The Constituent Assembly of each State shall draft a democratic constitution for its State and choose a provisional government to succeed the Provisional Council of Government appointed by the Commission. The constitutions of the States shall embody chapters 1 and 2 of the Declaration provided for in section C below and include *inter alia* provisions for:

(a) Establishing in each State a legislative body elected by universal suffrage and by secret ballot on the basis of proportional representation, and an executive body responsible to the legislature;

(b) Settling all international disputes in which the State may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered;

(c) Accepting the obligation of the State to refrain in its international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations;

(d) Guaranteeing to all persons equal and nondiscriminatory rights in civil, political, economic and religious matters and the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of religion, language, speech and publication, education, assembly and association;

(e) Preserving freedom of transit and visit for all residents and citizens of the other State in Palestine and the City of Jerusalem, subject to considerations of national security, provided that each State shall control residence within its borders.

11. The Commission shall appoint a preparatory economic commission of three members to make whatever arrangements are possible for economic co-operation, with a view to establishing, as soon as practicable, the Economic Union and the Joint Economic Board, as provided in section D below.

12. During the period between the adoption of the recommendations on the question of Palestine by the General Assembly and the termination of the Mandate, the mandatory Power in Palestine shall maintain full responsibility for administration in areas from which it has

not withdrawn its armed forces. The Commission shall assist the mandatory Power in the carrying out of these functions. Similarly the mandatory Power shall co-operate with the Commission in the execution of its functions.

13. With a view to ensuring that there shall be continuity in the functioning of administrative services and that, on the withdrawal of the armed forces of the mandatory Power, the whole administration shall be in the charge of the Provisional Councils and the Joint Economic Board, respectively, acting under the Commission, there shall be a progressive transfer, from the mandatory Power to the Commission, of responsibility for all the functions of government, including that of maintaining law and order in the areas from which the forces of the mandatory Power have been withdrawn.

14. The Commission shall be guided in its activities by the recommendations of the General Assembly and by such instructions as the Security Council may consider necessary to issue.

The measures taken by the Commission, within the recommendations of the General Assembly, shall become immediately effective unless the Commission has previously received contrary instructions from the Security Council.

The Commission shall render periodic monthly progress reports, or more frequently if desirable, to the Security Council.

15. The Commission shall make its final report to the next regular session of the General Assembly and to the Security Council simultaneously.

C. DECLARATION

A declaration shall be made to the United Nations by the provisional government of each proposed State before independence. It shall contain *inter alia* the following clauses :

GENERAL PROVISION

The stipulations contained in the declaration are recognized as fundamental laws of the State and no law, regulation or official action shall conflict or interfere with these stipulations, nor shall any law, regulation or official action prevail over them.

CHAPTER 1

Holy Places, religious buildings and sites

1. Existing rights in respect of Holy Places and religious buildings or sites shall not be denied or impaired.

2. In so far as Holy Places are concerned, the liberty of access, visit and transit shall be guaranteed, in conformity with existing rights, to all residents and citizens of the other State and of the City of Jerusa-

lem, as well as to aliens, without distinction as to nationality, subject to requirements of national security, public order and decorum.

Similarly, freedom of worship shall be guaranteed in conformity with existing rights, subject to the maintenance of public order and decorum.

3. Holy Places and religious buildings or sites shall be preserved. No act shall be permitted which may in any way impair their sacred character. If at any time it appears to the Government that any particular Holy Place, religious building or site is in need of urgent repair, the Government may call upon the community or communities concerned to carry out such repair. The Government may carry it out itself at the expense of the community or communities concerned if no action is taken within a reasonable time.

4. No taxation shall be levied in respect of any Holy Place, religious building or site which was exempt from taxation on the date of the creation of the State.

No change in the incidence of such taxation shall be made which would either discriminate between the owners or occupiers of Holy Places, religious buildings or sites, or would place such owners or occupiers in a position less favourable in relation to the general incidence of taxation than existed at the time of the adoption of the Assembly's recommendations.

5. The Governor of the City of Jerusalem shall have the right to determine whether the provisions of the Constitution of the State in relation to Holy Places, religious buildings and sites within the borders of the State and the religious rights appertaining thereto, are being properly applied and respected, and to make decisions on the basis of existing rights in cases of disputes which may arise between the different religious communities or the rites of a religious community with respect to such places, buildings and sites. He shall receive full cooperation and such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the exercise of his functions in the State.

CHAPTER 2

Religious and minority rights

1. Freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of worship, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals, shall be ensured to all.

2. No discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants on the ground of race, religion, language or sex.

3. All persons within the jurisdiction of the State shall be entitled to equal protection of the laws.

4. The family law and personal status of the various minorities and their religious interests, including endowments, shall be respected.

5. Except as may be required for the maintenance of public order and good government, no measure shall be taken to obstruct or interfere with the enterprise of religious or charitable bodies of all faiths or to discriminate against any representative or member of these bodies on the ground of his religion or nationality.

6. The State shall ensure adequate primary and secondary education for the Arab and Jewish minority, respectively, in its own language and its cultural traditions.

The right of each community to maintain its own schools for the education of its own members in its own language, while conforming to such educational requirements of a general nature as the State may impose, shall not be denied or impaired. Foreign educational establishments shall continue their activity on the basis of their existing rights.

7. No restriction shall be imposed on the free use by any citizen of the State of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, in religion, in the Press or in publications of any kind, or at public meetings.‡

8. No expropriation of land owned by an Arab in the Jewish State (by a Jew in the Arab State)§ shall be allowed except for public purposes. In all cases of expropriation full compensation as fixed by the Supreme Court shall be paid previous to dispossession.

CHAPTER 3

Citizenship, international conventions and financial obligations

1. *Citizenship.* Palestinian citizens residing in Palestine outside the City of Jerusalem, as well as Arabs and Jews who, not holding Palestinian citizenship, reside in Palestine outside the City of Jerusalem shall, upon the recognition of independence, become citizens of the State in which they are resident and enjoy full civil and political rights. Persons over the age of eighteen years may opt, within one year from the date of recognition of independence of the State in which they reside, for citizenship of the other State, providing that no Arab residing in the area of the proposed Arab State shall have the right to opt for citizenship in the proposed Jewish State and no Jew residing in the proposed Jewish State shall have the right to opt for citizenship in the proposed Arab State. The exercise of this right of option

‡ The following stipulation shall be added to the declaration concerning the Jewish State: "In the Jewish State adequate facilities shall be given to Arabic-speaking citizens for the use of their language, either orally or in writing, in the legislature, before the Courts and in the administration." [Footnote in the source text.]

§ In the declaration concerning the Arab State, the words "by an Arab in the Jewish State" should be replaced by the words "by a Jew in the Arab State". [Footnote in the source text.]

will be taken to include the wives and children under eighteen years of age of persons so opting.

Arabs residing in the area of the proposed Jewish State and Jews residing in the area of the proposed Arab State who have signed a notice of intention to opt for citizenship of the other State shall be eligible to vote in the elections to the Constituent Assembly of that State, but not in the elections to the Constituent Assembly of the State in which they reside.

2. *International conventions.* (a) The State shall be bound by all the international agreements and conventions, both general and special, to which Palestine has become a party. Subject to any right of denunciation provided for therein, such agreements and conventions shall be respected by the State throughout the period for which they were concluded.

(b) Any dispute about the applicability and continued validity of international conventions or treaties signed or adhered to by the mandatory Power on behalf of Palestine shall be referred to the International Court of Justice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the Court.

3. *Financial obligations.* (a) The State shall respect and fulfil all financial obligations of whatever nature assumed on behalf of Palestine by the mandatory Power during the exercise of the Mandate and recognized by the State. This provision includes the right of public servants to pensions, compensation or gratuities.

(b) These obligations shall be fulfilled through participation in the Joint Economic Board in respect of those obligations applicable to Palestine as a whole, and individually in respect of those applicable to, and fairly apportionable between, the States.

(c) A Court of Claims, affiliated with the Joint Economic Board, and composed of one member appointed by the United Nations, one representative of the United Kingdom and one representative of the State concerned, should be established. Any dispute between the United Kingdom and the State respecting claims not recognized by the latter should be referred to that Court.

(d) Commercial concessions granted in respect of any part of Palestine prior to the adoption of the resolution by the General Assembly shall continue to be valid according to their terms, unless modified by agreement between the concession-holder and the State.

CHAPTER 4

Miscellaneous provisions

1. The provisions of chapters 1 and 2 of the declaration shall be under the guarantee of the United Nations, and no modifications shall be made in them without the assent of the General Assembly of the

United Nations. Any Member of the United Nations shall have the right to bring to the attention of the General Assembly any infraction or danger of infraction of any of these stipulations, and the General Assembly may thereupon make such recommendations as it may deem proper in the circumstances.

2. Any dispute relating to the application or the interpretation of this declaration shall be referred, at the request of either party, to the International Court of Justice, unless the parties agree to another mode of settlement.

D. ECONOMIC UNION AND TRANSIT

1. The Provisional Council of Government of each State shall enter into an undertaking with respect to Economic Union and Transit. This undertaking shall be drafted by the Commission provided for in section B, paragraph 1, utilizing to the greatest possible extent the advice and co-operation of representative organizations and bodies from each of the proposed States. It shall contain provisions to establish the Economic Union of Palestine and provide for other matters of common interest. If by 1 April 1948 the Provisional Councils of Government have not entered into the undertaking, the undertaking shall be put into force by the Commission.

The Economic Union of Palestine

2. The objectives of the Economic Union of Palestine shall be :

- (a) A customs union;
- (b) A joint currency system providing for a single foreign exchange rate;
- (c) Operation in the common interest on a non-discriminatory basis of railways; inter-State highways; postal, telephone and telegraphic services, and ports and airports involved in international trade and commerce;
- (d) Joint economic development, especially in respect of irrigation, land reclamation and soil conservation;
- (e) Access for both States and for the City of Jerusalem on a non-discriminatory basis to water and power facilities.

3. There shall be established a Joint Economic Board, which shall consist of three representatives of each of the two States and three foreign members appointed by the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. The foreign members shall be appointed in the first instance for a term of three years; they shall serve as individuals and not as representatives of States.

4. The functions of the Joint Economic Board shall be to implement either directly or by delegation the measures necessary to realize the objectives of the Economic Union. It shall have all powers of organization and administration necessary to fulfil its functions.

5. The States shall bind themselves to put into effect the decisions of the Joint Economic Board. The Board's decisions shall be taken by a majority vote.

6. In the event of failure of a State to take the necessary action the Board may, by a vote of six members, decide to withhold an appropriate portion of that part of the customs revenue to which the State in question is entitled under the Economic Union. Should the State persist in its failure to co-operate, the Board may decide by a simple majority vote upon such further sanctions, including disposition of funds which it has withheld, as it may deem appropriate.

7. In relation to economic development, the functions of the Board shall be the planning, investigation and encouragement of joint development projects, but it shall not undertake such projects except with the assent of both States and the City of Jerusalem, in the event that Jerusalem is directly involved in the development project.

8. In regard to the joint currency system the currencies circulating in the two States and the City of Jerusalem shall be issued under the authority of the Joint Economic Board, which shall be the sole issuing authority and which shall determine the reserves to be held against such currencies.

9. So far as is consistent with paragraph 2 (*b*) above, each State may operate its own central bank, control its own fiscal and credit policy, its foreign exchange receipts and expenditures, the grant of import licenses, and may conduct international financial operations on its own faith and credit. During the first two years after the termination of the Mandate, the Joint Economic Board shall have the authority to take such measures as may be necessary to ensure that—to the extent that the total foreign exchange revenues of the two States from the export of goods and services permit, and provided that each State takes appropriate measures to conserve its own foreign exchange resources—each State shall have available, in any twelve months' period, foreign exchange sufficient to assure the supply of quantities of imported goods and services for consumption in its territory equivalent to the quantities of such goods and services consumed in that territory in the twelve months' period ending 31 December 1947.

10. All economic authority not specifically vested in the Joint Economic Board is reserved to each State.

11. There shall be a common customs tariff with complete freedom of trade between the States, and between the States and the City of Jerusalem.

12. The tariff schedules shall be drawn up by a Tariff Commission, consisting of representatives of each of the States in equal numbers, and shall be submitted to the Joint Economic Board for approval by a majority vote. In case of disagreement in the Tariff Commission, the Joint Economic Board shall arbitrate the points of difference. In the

event that the Tariff Commission fails to draw up any schedule by a date to be fixed, the Joint Economic Board shall determine the tariff schedule.

13. The following items shall be a first charge on the customs and other common revenue of the Joint Economic Board:

(a) The expenses of the customs service and of the operation of the joint services;

(b) The administrative expenses of the Joint Economic Board;

(c) The financial obligations of the Administration of Palestine consisting of:

(i) The service of the outstanding public debt;

(ii) The cost of superannuation benefits, now being paid or falling due in the future, in accordance with the rules and to the extent established by paragraph 3 of chapter 3 above.

14. After these obligations have been met in full, the surplus revenue from the customs and other common services shall be divided in the following manner: not less than 5 per cent and not more than 10 per cent to the City of Jerusalem; the residue shall be allocated to each State by the Joint Economic Board equitably, with the objective of maintaining a sufficient and suitable level of government and social services in each State, except that the share of either State shall not exceed the amount of that State's contribution to the revenues of the Economic Union by more than approximately four million pounds in any year. The amount granted may be adjusted by the Board according to the price level in relation to the prices prevailing at the time of the establishment of the Union. After five years, the principles of the distribution of the joint revenues may be revised by the Joint Economic Board on a basis of equity.

15. All international conventions and treaties affecting customs tariff rates, and those communications services under the jurisdiction of the Joint Economic Board, shall be entered into by both States. In these matters, the two States shall be bound to act in accordance with the majority vote of the Joint Economic Board.

16. The Joint Economic Board shall endeavour to secure for Palestine's exports fair and equal access to world markets.

17. All enterprises operated by the Joint Economic Board shall pay fair wages on a uniform basis.

Freedom of transit and visit

18. The undertaking shall contain provisions preserving freedom of transit and visit for all residents or citizens of both States and of the City of Jerusalem, subject to security considerations; provided that each State and the City shall control residence within its borders.

Termination, modification and interpretation of the undertaking

19. The undertaking and any treaty issuing therefrom shall remain in force for a period of ten years. It shall continue in force until notice

of termination, to take effect two years thereafter, is given by either of the parties.

20. During the initial ten-year period, the undertaking and any treaty issuing therefrom may not be modified except by consent of both parties and with the approval of the General Assembly.

21. Any dispute relating to the application or the interpretation of the undertaking and any treaty issuing therefrom shall be referred, at the request of either party, to the International Court of Justice, unless the parties agree to another mode of settlement.

E. ASSETS

1. The movable assets of the Administration of Palestine shall be allocated to the Arab and Jewish States and the City of Jerusalem on an equitable basis. Allocations should be made by the United Nations Commission referred to in section B, paragraph 1, above. Immovable assets shall become the property of the government of the territory in which they are situated.

2. During the period between the appointment of the United Nations Commission and the termination of the Mandate, the mandatory Power shall, except in respect of ordinary operations, consult with the Commission on any measure which it may contemplate involving the liquidation, disposal or encumbering of the assets of the Palestine Government, such as the accumulated treasury surplus, the proceeds of Government bond issues, State lands or any other asset.

F. ADMISSION TO MEMBERSHIP IN THE UNITED NATIONS

When the independence of either the Arab or the Jewish State as envisaged in this plan has become effective and the declaration and undertaking, as envisaged in this plan, have been signed by either of them, sympathetic consideration should be given to its application for admission to membership in the United Nations in accordance with Article 4 of the Charter of the United Nations.

PART II

Boundaries||

A. THE ARAB STATE

The area of the Arab State in Western Galilee is bounded on the west by the Mediterranean and on the north by the frontier of the Lebanon from Ras en Naqura to a point north of Saliha. From there the boundary proceeds southwards, leaving the built-up area of Saliha

|| The boundary lines described in part II are indicated in Annex A. The base map used in marking and describing this boundary is "Palestine 1:250,000" published by the Survey of Palestine, 1946. [Footnote in the source text.]

in the Arab State, to join the southernmost point of this village. Thence it follows the western boundary line of the villages of 'Alma, Rihaniya and Teitaba, thence following the northern boundary line of Meirun village to join the Acre-Safad sub-district boundary line. It follows this line to a point west of Es Sammu'i village and joins it again at the northernmost point of Farradiya. Thence it follows the sub-district boundary line to the Acre-Safad main road. From here it follows the western boundary of Kafr I'nān village until it reaches the Tiberias-Acre sub-district boundary line, passing to the west of the junction of the Acre-Safad and Lubiya-Kafr I'nān roads. From the south-west corner of Kafr I'nān village the boundary line follows the western boundary of the Tiberias sub-district to a point close to the boundary line between the villages of Maghar and Eilabun, thence bulging out to the west to include as much of the eastern part of the plain of Battuf as is necessary for the reservoir proposed by the Jewish Agency for the irrigation of lands to the south and east.

The boundary rejoins the Tiberias sub-district boundary at a point on the Nazareth-Tiberias road south-east of the built-up area of Tur'an; thence it runs southwards, at first following the sub-district boundary and then passing between the Kadoorie Agricultural School and Mount Tabor, to a point due south at the base of Mount Tabor. From here it runs due west, parallel to the horizontal grid line 230, to the north-east corner of the village lands of Tel Adashim. It then runs to the north-west corner of these lands, whence it turns south and west so as to include in the Arab State the sources of the Nazareth water supply in Yafa village. On reaching Ginneiger it follows the eastern, northern and western boundaries of the lands of this village to their south-west corner, whence it proceeds in a straight line to a point on the Haifa-Afula railway on the boundary between the villages of Sarid and El Mujeidil. This is the point of intersection.

The south-western boundary of the area of the Arab State in Galilee takes a line from this point, passing northwards along the eastern boundaries of Sarid and Gevat to the north-eastern corner of Nahalal, proceeding thence across the land of Kefar ha Horesh to a central point on the southern boundary of the village of 'Ilut, thence westwards along that village boundary to the eastern boundary of Beit Lahm, thence northwards and north-eastwards along its western boundary to the north-eastern corner of Waldheim and thence north-westwards across the village lands of Shafa 'Amr to the south-eastern corner of Ramat Yohanan. From here it runs due north-north-east to a point on the Shafa 'Amr-Haifa road, west of its junction with the road to I'Billin. From there it proceeds north-east to a point on the southern boundary of I'Billin situated to the west of the I'Billin-Birwa road. Thence along that boundary to its westernmost point, whence it turns to the north, follows across the village land of Tamra

to the north-westernmost corner and along the western boundary of Julis until it reaches the Acre-Safad road. It then runs westwards along the southern side of the Safad-Acre road to the Galilee-Haifa District boundary, from which point it follows that boundary to the sea.

The boundary of the hill country of Samaria and Judea starts on the Jordan River at the Wadi Malih south-east of Beisan and runs due west to meet the Beisan-Jericho road and then follows the western side of that road in a north-westerly direction to the junction of the boundaries of the sub-districts of Beisan, Nablus, and Jenin. From that point it follows the Nablus-Jenin sub-district boundary westwards for a distance of about three kilometres and then turns north-westwards, passing to the east of the built-up areas of the villages of Jalbun and Faqqu'a, to the boundary of the sub-districts of Jenin and Beisan at a point north-east of Nuris. Thence it proceeds first north-westwards to a point due north of the built-up area of Zir'in and then westwards to the Afula-Jenin railway, thence north-westwards along the district boundary line to the point of intersection on the Hejaz railway. From here the boundary runs south-westwards, including the built-up area and some of the land of the village of Kh.Lid in the Arab State to cross the Haifa-Jenin road at a point on the district boundary between Haifa and Samaria west of El Mansi. It follows this boundary to the southernmost point of the village of El Buteimat. From here it follows the northern and eastern boundaries of the village of Ar'ara, rejoining the Haifa-Samaria district boundary at Wadi'Ara, and thence proceeding south-south-westwards in an approximately straight line joining up with the western boundary of Qaqun to a point east of the railway line on the eastern boundary of Qaqun village. From here it runs along the railway line some distance to the east of it to a point just east of the Tulkarm railway station. Thence the boundary follows a line half-way between the railway and the Tulkarm-Qalqiliya-Jaljuliya and Ras el Ein road to a point just east of Ras el Ein station, whence it proceeds along the railway some distance to the east of it to the point on the railway line south of the junction of the Haifa-Lydd and Beit Nabala lines, whence it proceeds along the southern border of Lydda airport to its south-west corner, thence in a south-westerly direction to a point just west of the built-up area of Sarafand el' Amar, whence it turns south, passing just to the west of the built-up area of Abu el Fadil to the north-east corner of the lands of Beer Ya'-Aqov. (The boundary line should be so demarcated as to allow direct access from the Arab State to the airport.) Thence the boundary line follows the western and southern boundaries of Ramle village, to the north-east corner of El Na'ana village, thence in a straight line to the southernmost point of El Barriya, along the eastern boundary of that village and the southern boundary of 'Innaba village. Thence it turns

north to follow the southern side of the Jaffa-Jerusalem road until El Qubab, whence it follows the road to the boundary of Abu Shusha. It runs along the eastern boundaries of Abu Shusha, Seidun, Hulda to the southernmost point of Hulda, thence westwards in a straight line to the northeastern corner of Umm Kalkha, thence following the northern boundaries of Umm Kalkha, Qazaza and the northern and western boundaries of Mukhezin to the Gaza District boundary and thence runs across the village lands of El Mismiya, El Kabira, and Yasur to the southern point of intersection, which is midway between the built-up areas of Yasur and Batani Sharqi.

From the southern point of intersection the boundary lines run north-westwards between the villages of Gan Yavne and Barqa to the sea at a point half way between Nabi Yunis and Minat el Qila, and south-eastwards to a point west of Qastina, whence it turns in a south-westerly direction, passing to the east of the built-up areas of Es Sawafir, Esh Sharqiya and Ibdis. From the south-east corner of Ibdis village it runs to a point south-west of the built-up area of Beit'-Affa, crossing the Hebron-El Majdal road just to the west of the built-up area of Iraq Suweidan. Thence it proceeds southwards along the western village boundary of El Faluja to the Beersheba sub-district boundary. It then runs across the tribal lands of 'Arab el Jubarat to a point on the boundary between the sub-districts of Beersheba and Hebron north of Kh. Khuweilifa, whence it proceeds in a south-westerly direction to a point on the Beersheba-Gaza main road two kilometres to the north-west of the town. It then turns south-eastwards to reach Wadi Sab' at a point situated one kilometre to the west of it. From here it turns north-eastwards and proceeds along Wadi Sab' and along the Beersheba-Hebron road for a distance of one kilometre, whence it turns eastwards and runs in a straight line to Kh. Kuseifa to join the Beersheba-Hebron sub-district boundary. It then follows the Beersheba-Hebron boundary eastwards to a point north of Ras ez Zuweira, only departing from it so as to cut across the base of the indentation between vertical grid lines 150 and 160.

About five kilometres north-east of Ras ez Zuweira it turns north, excluding from the Arab State a strip along the coast of the Dead Sea not more than seven kilometres in depth, as far as Ein Geddi, whence it turns due east to join the Transjordan frontier in the Dead Sea.

The northern boundary of the Arab section of the coastal plain runs from a point between Minat el Qila and Nabi Yunis, passing between the built-up areas of Gan Yavne and Barqa to the point of intersection. From here it turns south-westwards, running across the lands of Batani Sharqi, along the eastern boundary of the lands of Beit Daras and across the lands of Julis, leaving the built-up areas of Batani Sharqi and Julis to the westwards, as far as the north-west corner of the lands of Beit Tima. Thence it runs east of El Jiya across

the village lands of El Barbara along the eastern boundaries of the villages of Beit Jirja, Deir Suneid and Dimra. From the south-east corner of Dimra the boundary passes across the lands of Beit Hanun, leaving the Jewish lands of Nir-Am to the eastwards. From the south-east corner of Beit Hanun the line runs south-west to a point south of the parallel grid line 100, then turns north-west for two kilometres, turning again in a south-westerly direction and continuing in an almost straight line to the north-west corner of the village lands of Kirbet Ikhza'a. From there it follows the boundary line of this village to its southernmost point. It then runs in a southerly direction along the vertical grid line 90 to its junction with the horizontal grid line 70. It then turns south-eastwards to Kh. el Ruheiba and then proceeds in a southerly direction to a point known as El Baha, beyond which it crosses the Beersheba-El 'Auja main road to the west of Kh. el Mush-rifa. From there it joins Wadi El Zaiyatin just to the west of El Subeita. From there it turns to the north-east and then to the south-east following this wadi and passes to the east of 'Abda to join Wadi Nafkh. It then bulges to the south-west along Wadi Nafkh, Wadi Ajrim and Wadi Lassan to the point where Wadi Lassan crosses the Egyptian frontier.

The area of the Arab enclave of Jaffa consists of that part of the town-planning area of Jaffa which lies to the west of the Jewish quarters lying south of Tel-Aviv, to the west of the continuation of Herzl street up to its junction with the Jaffa-Jerusalem road, to the south-west of the section of the Jaffa-Jerusalem road lying south-east of that junction, to the west of Mique Yisrael lands, to the north-west of Holon local council area, to the north of the line linking up the north-west corner of Holon with the north-east corner of Bat Yam local council area and to the north of Bat Yam local council area. The question of Karton quarter will be decided by the Boundary Commission, bearing in mind among other considerations the desirability of including the smallest possible number of its Arab inhabitants and the largest possible number of its Jewish inhabitants in the Jewish State.

B. THE JEWISH STATE

The north-eastern sector of the Jewish State (Eastern Galilee) is bounded on the north and west by the Lebanese frontier and on the east by the frontiers of Syria and Transjordan. It includes the whole of the Hula Basin, Lake Tiberias, the whole of the Beisan sub-district, the boundary line being extended to the crest of the Gilboa mountains and the Wadi Malih. From there the Jewish State extends north-west, following the boundary described in respect of the Arab State.

The Jewish section of the coastal plain extends from a point between Minat el Qila and Nabi Yunis in the Gaza sub-district and includes the towns of Haifa and Tel-Aviv, leaving Jaffa as an enclave

of the Arab State. The eastern frontier of the Jewish State follows the boundary described in respect of the Arab State.

The Beersheba area comprises the whole of the Beersheba sub-district, including the Negeb and the eastern part of the Gaza sub-district, but excluding the town of Beersheba and those areas described in respect of the Arab State. It includes also a strip of land along the Dead Sea stretching from the Beersheba-Hebron sub-district boundary line to Ein Geddi, as described in respect of the Arab State.

C. THE CITY OF JERUSALEM

The boundaries of the City of Jerusalem are as defined in the recommendations on the City of Jerusalem. (See Part III, Section B, below.)

PART III

City of Jerusalem

A. SPECIAL REGIME

The City of Jerusalem shall be established as a *corpus separatum* under a special international regime and shall be administered by the United Nations. The Trusteeship Council shall be designated to discharge the responsibilities of the Administering Authority on behalf of the United Nations.

B. BOUNDARIES OF THE CITY

The City of Jerusalem shall include the present municipality of Jerusalem plus the surrounding villages and towns, the most eastern of which shall be Abu Dis; the most southern, Bethlehem; the most western, Ein Karim (including also the built-up area of Motsa); and the most northern Shu'fat, as indicated on the attached sketch-map (annex B).

C. STATUTE OF THE CITY

The Trusteeship Council shall, within five months of the approval of the present plan, elaborate and approve a detailed Statute of the City which shall contain *inter alia* the substance of the following provisions:

1. *Government machinery; special objectives.* The Administering Authority in discharging its administrative obligations shall pursue the following special objectives:

(a) To protect and to preserve the unique spiritual and religious interests located in the city of the three great monotheistic faiths throughout the world, Christian, Jewish and Moslem; to this end to ensure that order and peace, and especially religious peace, reign in Jerusalem;

(b) To foster co-operation among all the inhabitants of the city in their own interests as well as in order to encourage and support the peaceful development of the mutual relations between the two Palestinian peoples throughout the Holy Land; to promote the security, well-being and any constructive measures of development of the residents, having regard to the special circumstances and customs of the various peoples and communities.

2. *Governor and administrative staff.* A Governor of the City of Jerusalem shall be appointed by the Trusteeship Council and shall be responsible to it. He shall be selected on the basis of special qualifications and without regard to nationality. He shall not, however, be a citizen of either State in Palestine.

The Governor shall represent the United Nations in the City and shall exercise on their behalf all powers of administration, including the conduct of external affairs. He shall be assisted by an administrative staff classed as international officers in the meaning of Article 100 of the Charter and chosen whenever practicable from the residents of the city and of the rest of Palestine on a non-discriminatory basis. A detailed plan for the organization of the administration of the city shall be submitted by the Governor to the Trusteeship Council and duly approved by it.

3. *Local autonomy.* (a) The existing local autonomous units in the territory of the city (villages, townships and municipalities) shall enjoy wide powers of local government and administration.

(b) The Governor shall study and submit for the consideration and decision of the Trusteeship Council a plan for the establishment of special town units consisting, respectively, of the Jewish and Arab sections of new Jerusalem. The new town units shall continue to form part of the present municipality of Jerusalem.

4. *Security measures.* (a) The City of Jerusalem shall be demilitarized; its neutrality shall be declared and preserved, and no paramilitary formations, exercises or activities shall be permitted within its borders.

(b) Should the administration of the City of Jerusalem be seriously obstructed or prevented by the non-co-operation or interference of one or more sections of the population, the Governor shall have authority to take such measures as may be necessary to restore the effective functioning of the administration.

(c) To assist in the maintenance of internal law and order and especially for the protection of the Holy Places and religious buildings and sites in the city, the Governor shall organize a special police force of adequate strength, the members of which shall be recruited outside of Palestine. The Governor shall be empowered to direct such budgetary provision as may be necessary for the maintenance of this force.

5. *Legislative organization.* A Legislative Council, elected by adult residents of the city irrespective of nationality on the basis of universal and secret suffrage and proportional representation, shall have powers of legislation and taxation. No legislative measures shall, however, conflict or interfere with the provisions which will be set forth in the Statute of the City, nor shall any law, regulation, or official action prevail over them. The Statute shall grant to the Governor a right of vetoing bills inconsistent with the provisions referred to in the preceding sentence. It shall also empower him to promulgate temporary ordinances in case the Council fails to adopt in time a bill deemed essential to the normal functioning of the administration.

6. *Administration of justice.* The Statute shall provide for the establishment of an independent judiciary system, including a court of appeal. All the inhabitants of the City shall be subject to it.

7. *Economic union and economic regime.* The City of Jerusalem shall be included in the Economic Union of Palestine and be bound by all stipulations of the undertaking and of any treaties issued therefrom, as well as by the decisions of the Joint Economic Board. The headquarters of the Economic Board shall be established in the territory of the City.

The Statute shall provide for the regulation of economic matters not falling within the regime of the Economic Union, on the basis of equal treatment and non-discrimination for all Members of the United Nations and their nationals.

8. *Freedom of transit and visit; control of residents.* Subject to considerations of security, and of economic welfare as determined by the Governor under the directions of the Trusteeship Council, freedom of entry into, and residence within, the borders of the City shall be guaranteed for the residents or citizens of the Arab and Jewish States. Immigration into, and residence within, the borders of the city for nationals of other States shall be controlled by the Governor under the directions of the Trusteeship Council.

9. *Relations with the Arab and Jewish States.* Representatives of the Arab and Jewish States shall be accredited to the Governor of the City and charged with the protection of the interests of their States and nationals in connexion with the international administration of the City.

10. *Official languages.* Arabic and Hebrew shall be the official languages of the city. This will not preclude the adoption of one or more additional working languages, as may be required.

11. *Citizenship.* All the residents shall become *ipso facto* citizens of the City of Jerusalem unless they opt for citizenship of the State of which they have been citizens or, if Arabs or Jews, have filed notice of intention to become citizens of the Arab or Jewish State respectively, according to part I, section B, paragraph 9, of this plan.

The Trusteeship Council shall make arrangements for consular protection of the citizens of the City outside its territory.

12. *Freedoms of citizens.*

(a) Subject only to the requirements of public order and morals, the inhabitants of the City shall be ensured the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of conscience, religion and worship, language, education, speech and Press, assembly and association, and petition.

(b) No discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants on the grounds of race, religion, language or sex.

(c) All persons within the City shall be entitled to equal protection of the laws.

(d) The family law and personal status of the various persons and communities and their religious interests, including endowments, shall be respected.

(e) Except as may be required for the maintenance of public order and good government, no measure shall be taken to obstruct or interfere with the enterprise of religious or charitable bodies of all faiths or to discriminate against any representative or member of these bodies on the ground of his religion or nationality.

(f) The City shall ensure adequate primary and secondary education for the Arab and Jewish communities respectively, in their own languages and in accordance with their cultural traditions.

The right of each community to maintain its own schools for the education of its own members in its own language, while conforming to such educational requirements of a general nature as the City may impose, shall not be denied or impaired. Foreign educational establishments shall continue their activity on the basis of their existing rights.

(g) No restriction shall be imposed on the free use by any inhabitant of the City of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, in religion, in the Press or in publications of any kind, or at public meetings.

13. *Holy Places.*

(a) Existing rights in respect of Holy Places and religious buildings or sites shall not be denied or impaired.

(b) Free access to the Holy Places and religious buildings or sites and the free exercise of worship shall be secured in conformity with existing rights and subject to the requirements of public order and decorum.

(c) Holy Places and religious buildings or sites shall be preserved. No act shall be permitted which may in any way impair their sacred character. If at any time it appears to the Governor that any particular Holy Place, religious building or site is in need of urgent repair, the Governor may call upon the community or communities concerned to carry out such repair. The Governor may carry it out himself at the expense of the community or communities concerned if no action is taken within a reasonable time.

(d) No taxation shall be levied in respect of any Holy Place, religious building or site which was exempt from taxation on the date of the creation of the City. No change in the incidence of such taxation shall be made which would either discriminate between the owners or

occupiers of Holy Places, religious buildings or sites, or would place such owners or occupiers in a position less favourable in relation to the general incidence of taxation than existed at the time of the adoption of the Assembly's recommendations.

14. *Special powers of the Governor in respect of the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites in the City and in any part of Palestine.*

(a) The protection of the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites located in the City of Jerusalem shall be a special concern of the Governor.

(b) With relation to such places, buildings and sites in Palestine outside the city, the Governor shall determine, on the ground of powers granted to him by the Constitutions of both States, whether the provisions of the Constitutions of the Arab and Jewish States in Palestine dealing therewith and the religious rights appertaining thereto are being properly applied and respected.

(c) The Governor shall also be empowered to make decisions on the basis of existing rights in cases of disputes which may arise between the different religious communities or the rites of a religious community in respect of the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites in any part of Palestine.

In this task he may be assisted by a consultative council of representatives of different denominations acting in an advisory capacity.

D. DURATION OF THE SPECIAL REGIME

The Statute elaborated by the Trusteeship Council on the aforementioned principles shall come into force not later than 1 October 1948. It shall remain in force in the first instance for a period of ten years, unless the Trusteeship Council finds it necessary to undertake a re-examination of these provisions at an earlier date. After the expiration of this period the whole scheme shall be subject to re-examination by the Trusteeship Council in the light of the experience acquired with its functioning. The residents of the City shall be then free to express by means of a referendum their wishes as to possible modifications of the regime of the City.

PART IV

Capitulations

States whose nationals have in the past enjoyed in Palestine the privileges and immunities of foreigners, including the benefits of consular jurisdiction and protection, as formerly enjoyed by capitulation or usage in the Ottoman Empire, are invited to renounce any right pertaining to them to the reestablishment of such privileges and immunities in the proposed Arab and Jewish States and the City of Jerusalem.

INDEX

INDEX

- Abaza, Ibrahim Dessuky, 1492*n*
 Abdullah, Prince of Yemen, 594*n*
 Abdullah ibn Hussein, King of Trans-jordan, 544, 719, 723, 725, 863*n*, 865, 869, 876, 895, 896*n*, 899-900, 925, 937, 939-941, 945-949, 952-953, 955, 967, 971, 973, 985, 992, 997*n*, 1016-1017, 1038, 1040*n*, 1044, 1050, 1089, 1100, 1105-1106, 1115, 1136-1137, 1150*n*, 1158-1159, 1164-1169, 1171, 1183, 1189, 1191, 1193, 1198*n*, 1199, 1203-1205, 1210, 1214, 1220, 1237-1238, 1289, 1359, 1374, 1376-1377, 1384, 1393, 1419-1420, 1423, 1427, 1429, 1447*n*, 1451, 1472-1473, 1476-1477, 1480, 1484, 1501-1502, 1505-1506, 1521, 1540, 1548, 1557-1558, 1564, 1602, 1611, 1617, 1629, 1638*n*, 1641-1642, 1644, 1646-1647, 1655-1656, 1659, 1667-1668, 1671, 1674*n*, 1685, 1688-1689, 1693-1694, 1700, 1702, 1706
 Advisory Committee on Voluntary Aid of the U.S. Department of State, 1311, 1365
 Afghanistan, 596*n*, 1169, 1185
 Africa, 692
 Aggression, 558-561, 567, 575, 577, 588-591, 598, 601, 617, 628, 632, 638-639, 648*n*, 653-654, 659, 661, 672, 682, 688, 697, 714-715, 766, 776, 779, 808-809, 814, 862, 879, 884, 890, 895-897, 911, 918-919, 940, 946, 953, 989, 998, 1000, 1003, 1020-1021, 1041-1042, 1045, 1061, 1063, 1066, 1075, 1129, 1169, 1182, 1201, 1205-1206, 1207*n*, 1211-1212, 1248, 1292, 1303, 1315, 1320, 1328, 1335, 1422, 1483, 1506*n*, 1517, 1615, 1659, 1692
 Air Force, U.S. Department of the, 632*n*, 666*n*, 1101, 1111*n*, 1240*n*, 1279*n*
 Albania, 558, 601, 1247, 1283
 Alexander, A. V., 1033, 1036, 1047, 1680-1684
 Alfange, Dean, 1507, 1511
 Ali, Mohamed, 1561
 Alireza, Sheikh, 847, 886
 Allen, Denis, 1099, 1178
 American Christian Palestine Committee of New York, 1507
 American Export Lines, 1419, 1462
 American Middle East Relief Incorporated, 1333*n*
 American Red Cross, 1325, 1333, 1351, 1478, 1491, 1507
 American University at Beirut, 550
 American University at Cairo, 550
 American Zionist Emergency Council, 1420, 1431, 1439
 Ammoun, Fuad, 1658
 Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, 1946. *See under* Palestine.
 Arab Higher Committee (*see also subheadings under individual subjects*), 540, 668-670, 1465, 1484*n*
 Arab League (*see also subheadings under individual subjects*), 596
 Arab Legion. *See under* Palestine: Intervention by Arab states.
 Arab refugee problem. *See subheadings under individual subjects*.
 Arab states. *See subheadings under individual subjects*.
 Arabian American Oil Company, 1147, 1325, 1333*n*
 Arce, José, 775, 821, 917*n*, 926-927
 Argentina, 775, 805, 911, 1214, 1223, 1224*n*, 1282, 1639-1640, 1643
 Armour, Norman, 583*n*, 637*n*, 742*n*, 754, 941
 Army, U.S. Department of the, 632*n*, 666*n*, 1101, 1104, 1149, 1240*n*, 1279*n*, 1477
 Asia, 692
 Asil, Naji al-, 1055-1056, 1058, 1161, 1163, 1182, 1272-1273
 Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal, 1371
 Attlee, Clement R., 593, 771, 847, 856-857, 865, 876, 892, 1033, 1036, 1046-1047, 1049, 1097, 1122, 1530, 1585-1591, 1610, 1613
 Austin, Warren R.:
 Arab invasion of Palestine, 1000
 Hostilities, alleged resumption of, 1491-1492
 Israel, U.S. recognition of, 1006-1008, 1013-1015
 Jerusalem, proposed international regime for, 584, 860, 871-873, 1484-1485
 Palestine status after British withdrawal, 682-685, 697, 700
 Protection of Americans in the Middle East, 1037
 Security Council cease-fire proposals, 1043, 1045*n*, 1054-1056, 1058, 1062, 1063*n*, 1064, 1067-1070, 1083, 1086, 1088, 1093-1094, 1098-1099, 1128, 1498
 Security Council Truce Commission, 1046*n*

Austin, Warren R.—Continued

Special General Assembly Session on Palestine, 796*n*, 829–830, 835, 843, 847–849, 905, 978, 993, 1170

Threats to the peace in Palestine, 1008–1010, 1014, 1016–1018, 1024–1027, 1029, 1498

Truce between Arabs and Jews in Palestine, 858–859, 864–865, 873–874, 880–881, 886–889, 895*n*, 897, 920–925, 941*n*, 946–948, 997–999

U.N. Commissioner for Palestine, proposed, 957–958

U.N. General Assembly resolution on partition of Palestine (1947), 542, 566, 586, 589, 604, 633

U.N. military observers, 1112, 1140*n*

U.N. Palestine Commission, 544–545, 599–600, 614–616

U.N. Palestine Truce Commission, 852–853

U.N. Security Council actions concerning Palestine, 554, 568*n*, 626, 637, 639, 645, 648–654, 657–663, 665, 666*n*, 675–679, 685, 693, 697, 700–702, 705–723, 725–738, 741–744, 747, 759, 765, 768, 769*n*, 770–771, 774–775, 776*n*, 777, 797, 801, 809–812, 813*n*, 817–824, 907, 1152, 1304, 1310, 1341, 1369, 1397, 1498

U.N. trusteeship for Palestine, proposed, 743–749, 750*n*, 752–754, 760, 768, 769*n*, 835, 842–844, 936–940, 942–944, 949–953, 970–971

U.S. arms embargo for Palestine and neighboring states, 1014, 1027, 1043

U.S. policy toward a Palestine settlement, 1490*n*, 1503, 1504*n*, 1543, 1594

Australia, 584*n*, 591, 805, 845, 913, 987, 1643, 1649, 1656–1657, 1661, 1663

Austria, 1149, 1348–1349, 1371, 1580

Azcarate, Pablo de, 971, 1076, 1240

Azer, Anis, 1349

Azerbaijan, 1530

Azzam Pasha, 550, 687*n*, 719, 725, 804*n*, 805, 812, 830–831, 832*n*, 863, 870–872, 915–916, 954*n*, 1004*n*, 1042*n*, 1114–1115, 1117, 1164, 1192, 1220, 1228*n*, 1229, 1289, 1295, 1308, 1399, 1422–1423

Balfour, Sir John, 767–769, 1019

Balfour Declaration, 1917, 690–691, 848, 963, 992

Bancroft, Harding, 1134*n*, 1172–1174

Barazi, 1421

Barkley, Alben, 1635

Beeley, Harold, 562*n*, 611, 758, 767*n*, 882–886, 897*n*, 912, 936–940, 946–949, 952, 970, 997–999, 1016, 1024, 1028*n*, 1040*n*, 1068, 1081, 1099–1101, 1161, 1164, 1166–1168, 1288, 1365,

Beeley, Harold—Continued

1396, 1440–1441, 1463, 1465, 1481, 1559, 1616, 1618*n*, 1619, 1622, 1627*n*, 1685, 1695, 1698

Begley, Frank, 1399, 1412, 1460, 1488

Beigin, Menachem (Menahem), 1142, 1292

Belgium (*see also* Belgian position under Palestine: U.N. Security Council), 805, 1159, 1260, 1264, 1278, 1282, 1294, 1308–1309, 1336, 1424, 1523*n*, 1555, 1597, 1614, 1643, 1645

Ben-Arzi, Col. Efraim, 1668–1669

Ben Gurion, David, 930, 973–974, 985, 1004–1005, 1141–1142, 1232, 1273, 1274*n*, 1286, 1334, 1336, 1338, 1368, 1371, 1377–1378, 1384–1386, 1398, 1413*n*, 1435, 1526, 1630, 1652–1653, 1690, 1704–1705, 1706*n*

Berger, Samuel D., 1033

Bergson, Peter, 1155

Berlin blockade, 1226, 1272, 1291–1292, 1314, 1323, 1388, 1409, 1518, 1530, 1532, 1535, 1585

Bernadotte, Count Folke. *See* U.N. Mediator (Bernadotte) under Palestine: U.N. mediation efforts.

Bevin, Ernest:

Anglo-American cooperation in the Middle East, 1034

Arab refugees from Palestine, 1249–1250, 1252

British policy regarding a Palestine settlement, 579, 593, 615, 1249, 1266–1271, 1291–1294, 1309–1310, 1314, 1352–1355, 1358, 1363, 1369, 1372–1373, 1383, 1388, 1409–1411, 1418, 1421, 1431, 1438, 1445, 1449–1450, 1464, 1469–1470, 1475, 1517, 1520, 1524, 1528*n*, 1529–1530, 1534, 1553–1554, 1565, 1571, 1590–1591, 1605–1606, 1622, 1624–1625, 1628–1629, 1670, 1680–1685

British relations with Arab states, 1254, 1520–1521

Haifa oil refinery problem, 1122–1123, 1132, 1157–1158, 1176

Israel, question of British recognition of, 990, 1019, 1360*n*, 1590, 1686*n*

Jerusalem, security and future status of, 868–869, 926–927, 1274, 1293–1294, 1309

Resumption of hostilities by Israel, 1695

Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly on Palestine, 837, 839, 842, 847, 850–851, 855–857

Threat to peace in Palestine, 1019–1020, 1031–1033, 1037

Transjordan attack on Palestine, 865, 869, 876, 1038–1039

Truce between Arabs and Jews in Palestine, 876–877, 892, 896–897, 906–907, 940–941, 955, 1033–1034

Bevin, Ernest—Continued

- U.N. General Assembly resolution on partition of Palestine (1947), 533, 559, 587
- U.N. Security Council actions and cease-fire proposals concerning Palestine, 738, 804–805, 826, 828–829, 1040, 1046–1047, 1049, 1064–1067, 1070–1072, 1078–1079, 1082, 1083*n*, 1092, 1097, 1113, 1121–1122, 1128, 1133–1134, 1143–1144, 1148–1149, 1161, 1164, 1177–1178, 1186–1187, 1192–1194, 1202–1205, 1210–1212, 1214–1215, 1220, 1239, 1319–1320, 1328, 1329*n*, 1340, 1345
- Bickerton, Ian J., 745
- Bidault, Georges, 807*n*, 1082
- Biffle, Leslie, 1635
- Bliss, Don C., 1394–1396
- Blockade, 1022–1024
- Bloom, Sol, 1635
- Bohlen, Charles E., 648*n*, 697*n*, 730–732, 742*n*, 746, 750*n*, 751–752, 754–755, 760*n*, 1236, 1449, 1470, 1522*n*, 1543
- Bolivia, 540, 668, 1639
- Bonde, Col. Thorde, 1116, 1178, 1193, 1196
- Bradley, Gen. Omar N., 1232
- Brazil, 805, 1639–1640, 1643
- Bréart de Boisanger, Claude, 1693
- British Commonwealth, 898, 938, 1353, 1475
- Bromley, T. E., 767–769, 882, 1099, 1178, 1238–1239, 1445–1446, 1692–1693
- Brunsson, Col. Nils, 1112, 1119, 1178
- Budget, U.S. Bureau of the, 1478
- Bulgaria, 558, 602, 1282, 1620
- Bunche, Ralph J. (*see also* U.N. Acting Mediator *under* Palestine: U.N. mediation efforts), 540, 544–545, 614–616, 1091, 1096, 1098–1099, 1115, 1117, 1156, 1202–1203, 1228, 1235, 1256, 1290, 1296, 1308–1309, 1310*n*, 1340, 1341*n*, 1387*n*, 1399–1400, 1408*n*, 1412–1413
- Burdett, William C., 1034*n*, 1039, 1046, 1053, 1062, 1075–1076, 1105–1106, 1112–1113, 1119–1120, 1141–1142, 1145, 1176, 1298, 1558–1559, 1619, 1634–1635, 1644, 1662–1663, 1665–1667, 1687–1689
- Burma, 1036
- Burrows, Bernard, 985*n*, 1092, 1293*n*, 1365, 1373, 1383, 1388, 1429*n*, 1432*n*, 1447*n*, 1463, 1602, 1650, 1685–1686, 1695–1696
- Butler, George H., 619, 625*n*, 632*n*, 637*n*, 1022*n*, 1087
- Byrnes, James F., 546
- Cabinet Committee on Palestine, 1946, 546
- Cadogan, Sir Alexander, 540, 544, 545*n*, 555, 599–600, 615, 635, 647, 707–710, 720–723, 736, 738*n*, 758, 765, 769,

Cadogan, Sir Alexander—Continued

- 822–823, 1016*n*, 1064–1066, 1067*n*, 1077, 1097, 1148, 1190, 1193, 1197*n*, 1204*n*, 1209–1212, 1214, 1220, 1225–1226, 1249, 1252, 1262, 1331, 1521, 1523, 1529
- Caffery, Jefferson, 1449
- Canada (*see also* Canadian position *under* Palestine: U.N. General Assembly Special Session *and under* Palestine: U.N. Security Council), 805, 1014, 1410, 1628, 1656
- Cargo, William I., 1198*n*, 1440–1442
- Carlson, Colonel, 1644
- Carter, Brig. Gen. Marshall S., 637*n*, 754, 904*n*, 973, 1013*n*, 1022*n*, 1037, 1045*n*, 1127*n*, 1134*n*, 1535
- Cattan, Henri, 1117
- Celler, Emanuel, 1105*n*
- Central Intelligence Agency, reports on Palestine by the, 666–675, 1200, 1240–1246, 1279–1286
- Chamoun, Camille, 643–644, 659, 724, 735, 744*n*
- Chapman-Andrews, E. A., 1471
- Childs, J. Rives, 540*n*, 571*n*, 603–604, 719, 995–996, 1042*n*, 1146–1147, 1150*n*, 1216
- Chile, 1639
- China (*see also* Chinese position *under* Palestine: U.N. Security Council), 584*n*, 833–834, 875*n*, 979, 994, 1014, 1351–1352, 1482, 1603, 1656, 1663, 1670, 1681–1682, 1705
- Christian Rural Overseas Program, 1333*n*
- Church World Service, 1311, 1325, 1351, 1457
- Churchill, Winston S., 837
- Cilento, Sir Raphael, 1455–1457, 1478, 1486, 1568
- Civil Aeronautics Administration, 1601
- Civil Aeronautics Board, 1219
- Clark, Lt. Gen. Mark, 903
- Clayton, Brig. I. N., 611, 1229, 1423
- Clifford, Clark M., 637*n*, 687–696, 745–746, 749–752, 754–755, 760*n*, 771*n*, 813*n*, 819*n*, 824–825, 830, 891*n*, 904*n*, 906, 925, 930, 935–936, 972, 974–978, 989*n*, 993, 1005–1007, 1036*n*, 1037, 1060*n*, 1080*n*, 1117–1119, 1131–1132, 1140, 1154, 1223*n*, 1232, 1320*n*, 1339, 1390–1391, 1415*n*, 1430–1431, 1432*n*, 1437–1438, 1459, 1466*n*, 1467, 1471*n*, 1490, 1501, 1509, 1527*n*, 1528, 1536, 1567*n*, 1584, 1585*n*, 1623*n*, 1628–1629, 1658, 1670*n*, 1689
- Cohen, Benjamin V., 1467, 1470, 1474–1475, 1535, 1540, 1543, 1663
- Colombia (*see also* Colombian position *under* Palestine: U.N. Security Council), 1663
- Colquitt, Adrian DeB., 1668
- Comay, Michael Saul, 1248–1249, 1518, 1562–1563, 1616, 1629

- Connally, Tom, 1635
 Connelly, Matthew J., 755, 972, 1013*n*, 1390
 Conolly, Adm. Richard L., 1530
 Conway, Rose A., 809*n*
 Coolidge, Calvin, 690
 Cordier, Andrew W., 1098-1099, 1308*n*
 Costa Rica, 1649
 Cox, William R., 1412
 Creech Jones, Sir Arthur, 615, 654, 676, 704, 710, 857, 895, 899, 919, 922-925, 936-937, 939-941, 950-951, 955-956, 970, 973, 1033, 1036, 1044, 1047, 1136
 Cuba, 1502*n*, 1699
 Cummings, Herbert J., 1375
 Cunningham, Sir Alan, 876*n*, 917*n*, 954, 956, 971, 972*n*, 990, 1011-1012, 1035
 Cyprus, 933, 945, 955, 1071, 1072*n*, 1079, 1092, 1100, 1684
 Cyrenaica, 1611
 Czechoslovakia, 540, 668, 991, 1177, 1247-1248, 1279, 1282-1283, 1292, 1315, 1361, 1517, 1521, 1522*n*, 1531, 1534, 1571, 1578-1579, 1585, 1603, 1652, 1669, 1675, 1685
- D'Arcy, Lt. Gen. John C., 1393
 Dayan, Col. Moshe, 1263, 1412, 1619, 1622, 1624, 1634, 1638, 1662, 1668, 1687-1688, 1699, 1705
 Defense, U.S. Department of (National Military Establishment), 633, 833, 991, 1101, 1260, 1309, 1478-1479, 1489, 1496, 1686
 Democratic Party Platform, 1948, 1135*n*, 1221, 1291, 1430, 1439, 1507-1509, 1513, 1516, 1533, 1565, 1573, 1633
 Denmark, 540, 668, 1643
 De Rose, François, 700
 Descoedres, 1567
 Dewey, Thomas E., 1446, 1449, 1463, 1471, 1503, 1507, 1509, 1511-1512, 1533, 1534*n*, 1541
 Dhahran air base in Saudi Arabia, 996, 1147, 1217
 Dill, Sir John, 901
 Displaced Persons Act, 1262, 1273
 Dodge, Bayard, 1365
 Dominican Republic, 1643
 Dorr, Goldthwaite H., 1523
 Douglas, Lewis W., 826, 828, 837, 845, 850-851, 855-856, 865, 869, 876-877, 891, 896-897, 906, 915, 925, 955-956, 990, 1031-1041, 1046-1050, 1064-1067, 1070, 1072, 1076-1081, 1083*n*, 1086, 1091-1093, 1097-1098, 1121-1125, 1128, 1143-1144, 1148, 1157, 1168, 1178, 1189-1190, 1192-1195, 1202-1205, 1210-1212, 1214-1215, 1220-1221, 1225-1226, 1239-1240, 1249-1250, 1252, 1254, 1262, 1266-1271, 1291-1294, 1308, 1314, 1319-1320, 1329*n*, 1340, 1342-1345, 1352-1359, 1365-1366, 1369, 1371-1375, 1383-1384, 1386, 1388-1390, 1392, Douglas, Lewis W.—Continued
 1409-1413, 1469-1470, 1471*n*, 1474-1476, 1508, 1516-1518, 1529-1534, 1536-1538, 1565, 1570-1574, 1577, 1584-1591, 1602-1603, 1610-1613, 1618*n*, 1625, 1636, 1642-1643, 1650, 1659-1660, 1670, 1681*n*, 1682-1684, 1685*n*
 Dow, Sir Hugh, 1239, 1319, 1390, 1440-1442
 Dulles, John Foster, 1446, 1448-1449, 1463, 1470, 1503, 1511, 1532-1533, 1534*n*, 1540-1541, 1543, 1619-1621, 1625-1632, 1635-1640, 1649, 1652-1661, 1663-1665
 Dundas, Cyril Alfred Flux, 1421
 Durbrow, Elbridge, 1011
- Eban, Aubrey S., 537-539, 566, 1160-1161, 1107*n*, 1163-1166, 1179, 1191-1192, 1209, 1256-1258, 1259*n*, 1392, 1452, 1492*n*, 1512, 1514-1515, 1518, 1543-1545, 1551, 1562, 1576-1577, 1581, 1616, 1619-1620, 1629-1631, 1632*n*, 1655, 1693
 Ecuador, 1639
 Edelston, Vice Adm. Sir J., 1047
 Eden, Anthony, 615, 1613
 Egypt (*see also Egyptian subheadings under individual subjects*), 534, 581, 778, 863, 1643
 Eichelberger, Clark M., 1165
 Elliott, John, 1173, 1177
 Elsey, George M., 637*n*, 760*n*, 830, 976, 977*n*, 989*n*, 1060*n*, 1527*n*
 Entezam, Nasrollah, 858
 Epstein, Eliahu, 537-539, 640, 761-764, 876*n*, 930, 940*n*, 973, 989, 992, 1001-1002, 1004*n*, 1012-1013, 1051, 1057*n*, 1059, 1060*n*, 1074, 1084-1085, 1117-1120, 1132*n*, 1198-1199, 1261-1262, 1299-1301, 1314-1317, 1331-1332, 1345-1348, 1371, 1394, 1513, 1544*n*, 1545*n*, 1551, 1562-1563, 1578, 1601, 1668-1669, 1671*n*, 1676-1679
 European Recovery Program, 550, 597, 623, 693, 749, 806, 938, 1034, 1124, 1133, 1171, 1181, 1217, 1246, 1323, 1352, 1391, 1532
 Evans, Harold, 917*n*, 1091, 1168
 Evatt, Herbert E., 564, 987
 Ewing, Oscar R., 755, 760*n*
 Export-Import Bank of Washington (*see also Export-Import Bank loan, etc. under Israel*), 636
 Eytan, Walter, 1326, 1653-1654
- Faisal, Amir, 594
 Faisal, King of Iraq, 1273
 Faisal, Prince, 540*n*, 550, 603, 812*n*, 847-849, 859, 873*n*, 886-889, 1159, 1416, 1568
 Falahi, Abdul Rahman al-, 1117
 Faour, Emir, 556
 Faqih, Asad al-, 859, 860
 Far East, 551

- Farouk, King of Egypt, 539, 621, 634, 863, 872, 1040*n*, 1164, 1210, 1560-1561, 1564, 1659, 1691, 1693*n*, 1694, 1700*n*
- Fawzi Bey, Mahmoud, 643-644, 724, 744*n*, 777, 836-837, 858, 864*n*, 886-889, 1055, 1182, 1349-1352, 1423-1425, 1491-1492, 1499-1500, 1568, 1625-1627, 1658
- Fawzi Pasha Mulki, 1010*n*, 1106
- Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1601
- Federal Council of Churches, 1333*n*
- Federspiel, Per, 614
- Feller, Abraham, 1175
- Fletcher-Cooke, John, 710
- Food and Agriculture Organization, 824, 1170, 1455, 1478, 1498
- Forrestal, James, 554*n*, 566*n*, 625*n*, 632-633, 637, 742*n*, 747, 751-752, 767, 774, 797-798, 829-830, 832-833, 851, 852*n*, 1094-1095, 1116, 1126*n*, 1140, 1196*n*, 1232, 1236, 1240, 1260, 1309, 1321-1324, 1330, 1335-1336, 1427-1428, 1444, 1449, 1462-1463, 1479, 1488, 1501, 1524, 1525*n*, 1547, 1591*n*, 1686, 1705
- France (*see also French subheadings under individual subjects*), 584*n*, 1282, 1349, 1364, 1578
- Francisco, 614
- Frangié, Hamid, 764, 1002-1004, 1030, 1039-1040, 1417, 1447*n*
- Franklin, William M., 687*n*, 690*n*, 746, 993, 1391
- Franks, Sir Oliver, 1695, 1701-1702
- Frazer, Adm. Lord, 1681
- French Indochina, 1681
- Fulbright program, 1561
- Gallad Bey, 1464
- Gallman, Waldemar J., 563*n*, 758-759
- Garnish, John H., 1645
- Garreau, Roger, 948
- Gass, Oscar, 1120, 1261*n*
- Gerig, O. Benjamin, 584-585
- Germany, 1091-1092, 1104, 1149, 1348-1349, 1371, 1385
- Ghory, Emile, 543-544
- Glubb Pasha, Brig. John Bagot, 890, 940, 1044, 1050, 1106, 1276
- Goldmann, Nahum, 826, 839, 878, 920-922, 930, 946, 1041, 1133, 1384
- Goldy, Colonel, 940, 973
- Gorlitz, Samuel J., 844*n*
- Gort, General, 1393
- Gowen, Franklin C., 1572-1573
- Grady, Henry F., 546, 593
- Granados, Jorge García, 1663
- Grand Mufti of Jerusalem. *See* Husseini, Haj Amin el-
- Greater Syria, 1169, 1238, 1419, 1471
- Greece (*see also Greek question under United Nations: General Assembly, etc.*), 551, 558, 602, 624, 628, 695, 806, 833, 901, 1030, 1182, 1185, 1217, 1362, 1364, 1416
- Griffis, Stanton, 1152, 1233, 1887, 1397-1401, 1418-1419, 1422-1423, 1447, 1471-1472, 1487*n*, 1507*n*, 1553, 1560-1561, 1568, 1635, 1643, 1693-1694
- Gromyko, Andrei Andreyevich, 676, 685, 699-701, 705-713, 718, 720-723, 725-728, 730, 732-735, 741*n*, 744*n*, 776*n*, 809, 817, 819-820, 822, 1103, 1112-1113, 1197
- Gross, Ernest A., 543, 637*n*, 747-748, 908*n*, 959-965, 976, 980-981, 1006*n*, 1022-1023, 1036*n*, 1051*n*, 1127, 1146, 1543
- Gruenther, Maj. Gen. Alfred M., 632-633, 797
- Guatemala, 892, 1640, 1649, 1663
- Gufier, Bernard, 1087
- Haffar, Lutfi, 1347*n*
- Haidar, Prince Abdel Majid, 1347*n*, 1376, 1502, 1506, 1557, 1564, 1568, 1617, 1647
- Haidar Pasha, 1691, 1698
- Hamilton, Minard, 1177
- Hamilton, Thomas J., 1485
- Harding, Warren G., 690
- Hare, Raymond, 936, 946, 1316-1317, 1330*n*, 1331*n*, 1345, 1349, 1657, 1672, 1685*n*
- Hashem Pasha, Ibrahim, 1106
- Hashimi, Taha, 555
- Haurani, Akram, 556
- Havlik, Hubert F., 1120-1121
- Hayter, William, 1681
- Henderson, Loy W., 536*n*, 537-538, 546, 566*n*, 583*n*, 592, 600-603, 613-614, 616-617, 637*n*, 643*n*, 648*n*, 660, 663-664, 677, 697*n*, 699*n*, 742*n*, 744*n*, 755, 756*n*, 764-765, 767-769, 771*n*, 805, 811-812, 813*n*, 833-835, 840-842, 846-847, 853-855, 859-860, 876*n*, 882-886, 941, 976, 981, 992, 1001-1002, 1018*n*, 1019, 1036*n*, 1037, 1044-1045, 1056, 1085, 1087, 1099-1101, 1109, 1117-1120, 1134*n*, 1217*n*
- Heyd, Uriel, 1316, 1601, 1668-1669
- Hickerson, John D., 697*n*, 1036*n*, 1037*n*, 1087
- Hilldring, John H., 879
- Hillenkoetter, R. H., 1200
- Hilmi Pasha, Ahmad, 1447
- Hiss, Alger, 542
- Hoda Pasha, Tewfik Abdul. *See* Huda, Tawfik al-
- Hollis, Major General, 1047, 1681
- Holmes, Julius C., 1463-1465, 1680-1686, 1695-1696
- Hoover, Herbert, 690, 1487
- Hope, Mary E., 1060*n*
- Hopkins, 936, 949, 970
- Horner, John E., 898-901
- Horowitz, David, 566
- Hoyer Millar, Sir Frederick Robert, 1624-1625, 1627, 1701
- Hsia, C. L., 809

- Huda, Tawfik al-, 1039, 1086, 1106, 1115, 1117, 1120, 1255, 1276*n*, 1295, 1427*n*, 1548*n*, 1557, 1564, 1617-1618, 1623, 1641-1642, 1646-1648, 1655, 1667, 1674, 1694, 1700
- Humelsine, Carlisle H., 632*n*, 634, 731, 746-747, 749-750, 752*n*, 1036*n*, 1037*n*, 1047*n*, 1087, 1428*n*, 1598, 1676*n*
- Hussain Bey, Hilmi, 872
- Husseini, Abdul Kader, 609, 817
- Husseini, Haj Amin el- (Grand Mufti of Jerusalem), 543, 550, 611, 642, 646, 725, 838, 899, 930, 1094, 1164, 1166, 1289, 1447*n*, 1448, 1531, 1620
- Husseini, Jamal, 893, 946, 1447*n*
- Ibn Saud, Abdul Aziz, King of Saudi Arabia, 540*n*, 550, 571*n*, 603-604, 621, 634*n*, 695-696, 725, 871, 895, 996, 1031, 1042*n*, 1146, 1150*n*, 1164, 1238, 1318
- Ignatieff, George, 661, 949
- Illah, Abdul, Regent of Iraq, 535, 594-596, 850, 862-863, 1040
- India, 1036, 1048, 1185, 1643
- Indonesia, 904, 1047, 1160*n*, 1689*n*, 1695
- International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 596, 824, 1073, 1170-1171, 1313
- International Bechtel Company, 1333*n*
- International Conference of American States (Ninth), Bogotá, Mar. 30-May 2, 1948, 774*n*, 841
- International Court of Justice, 543, 554, 558, 562, 588-589, 595, 605, 667, 675, 795, 911, 1146, 1215, 1222-1223, 1241, 1243, 1643
- International Monetary Fund, 1170
- International Red Cross, 907, 944, 951, 957, 979, 995, 1075, 1154, 1176, 1298, 1311, 1330, 1365, 1487, 1491, 1499, 1507, 1510-1511, 1542, 1568
- International Refugee Organization, 698, 788, 867, 1255, 1308, 1311-1312, 1364-1365, 1454-1458, 1478, 1498
- Inverchapel, Lord, 562-563, 581-584, 634, 868-869, 876*n*, 906-907, 1011
- Iran, 551, 596*n*, 806, 833, 1048-1049, 1169, 1182, 1185, 1217, 1222, 1292, 1314, 1362, 1511*n*, 1530
- Iraq (*see also* *Iraqi subheadings under individual subjects*), 534-535, 551, 581, 594-597, 850, 872, 900, 902, 1026, 1030, 1048, 1255, 1273, 1293, 1310, 1312, 1314, 1319, 1399, 1636, 1641, 1682, 1697
- Ireland, Philip W., 872, 915-916, 1114-1116, 1159, 1295, 1422-1423
- Israel (*see also* *Israeli and Jewish Agency subheadings under individual subjects*):
- Arab refugees, policy toward, 1137-1138, 1151, 1155, 1167, 1230*n*, 1248-1250, 1253, 1266, 1295, 1311-1312, 1314, 1324-1326, 1331-1332, 1334, 1346-1347, 1697
 - Arab residents, treatment of, 1137-1138, 1249
- Israel—Continued
- Armed forces (*see also* Haganah, Irgun Zvai Leumi, and Stern gang *under* Israel and *under* Palestine), 1192, 1245, 1273-1274, 1283, 1286, 1414, 1476-1477, 1536, 1652
 - Arms purchases abroad, 1216*n*, 1244, 1279-1284, 1286, 1300, 1314, 1361, 1499-1500, 1521, 1522*n*, 1534, 1682
 - British policy toward, 997-998, 1019, 1031, 1035, 1088, 1124-1125, 1144, 1163, 1194, 1210, 1215, 1266-1267, 1291, 1345, 1353, 1360, 1364, 1393, 1475, 1590, 1678, 1681, 1684, 1686
 - Diplomatic representatives, proposed exchange with the United States of, 1012-1013, 1051-1053, 1058-1059, 1074, 1117-1119, 1131-1132, 1140, 1151-1152, 1156, 1178-1179, 1188, 1578
 - Elections, plans for general, 1326-1327, 1359, 1379-1380, 1383-1384, 1391, 1393, 1408, 1468, 1513, 1531, 1533, 1562, 1634, 1660*n*, 1674-1676, 1678-1679
 - Establishment of state of, May 14, 1948, 989, 992-993, 1026, 1088, 1183, 1185, 1200, 1305, 1313
 - Export-Import Bank loan, request for, 1043, 1051, 1073, 1104-1105, 1120-1121, 1170, 1261-1262, 1300-1301, 1306, 1313-1314, 1345-1346, 1391, 1432, 1468-1469, 1514, 1579, 1633, 1674, 1676, 1678, 1679*n*, 1690
 - Haganah (*see also under* Palestine), 1113, 1141-1142, 1155, 1164, 1175, 1212, 1245, 1250, 1258, 1295, 1441, 1534
 - Haifa oil refinery problem, 1123, 1132-1133, 1143-1144, 1157-1158, 1168, 1176-1177, 1267, 1288
 - Immigration of Jewish displaced persons, 1043, 1046, 1049, 1051, 1071, 1104-1105, 1120, 1141, 1149, 1155, 1163-1164, 1253, 1266, 1300, 1304, 1307, 1311, 1332, 1371, 1549, 1595, 1619-1620
 - Irgun Zvai Leumi (*see also under* Palestine), 1113, 1141-1142, 1154-1156, 1162, 1175, 1177, 1182-1183, 1198, 1233, 1236, 1241, 1245, 1250, 1263, 1275, 1278, 1283, 1293, 1298, 1347, 1361, 1414-1415, 1440-1441, 1619
 - Jerusalem, policy regarding, 1035, 1212-1213, 1250-1251, 1256-1257, 1273-1274, 1278, 1286-1288, 1292, 1294, 1307, 1313-1314, 1316-1317, 1319-1321, 1327-1328
 - MAPAI, 1675-1676, 1678
 - MAPAM, 1675-1676
 - Military operations and situation, 1010, 1017, 1020, 1029, 1035, 1038-1039, 1044, 1049, 1062, 1067, 1100-1101, 1125, 1141-1142, 1158, 1183, 1200, 1203, 1206, 1242-1245, 1267,

Israel—Continued

Military operations and situation—Continued

1280-1281, 1286, 1292-1293, 1300, 1313, 1319-1320, 1328, 1351, 1476-1477, 1492, 1508, 1515-1518, 1536-1537, 1541-1542, 1544-1545, 1549-1550, 1558-1559, 1563, 1576, 1602, 1668-1671, 1673, 1680, 1688-1689, 1698, 1700-1706

Provisional government, 989-990, 992, 994, 1002, 1005*n*, 1010, 1012, 1014, 1017, 1033, 1036*n*, 1051-1053, 1059, 1072, 1074, 1083-1084, 1085*n*, 1102, 1104, 1107*n*, 1120, 1154, 1177, 1179, 1186, 1188, 1195*n*, 1199, 1242, 1256-1258, 1261*n*, 1280, 1282-1283, 1324-1327, 1331-1332, 1339-1340, 1346-1348, 1361, 1363, 1408

Recognition:

Arab position, 1014, 1030, 1169, 1184, 1243, 1268, 1270, 1280, 1284, 1290, 1295, 1308-1309, 1339, 1341*n*, 1396, 1400, 1417, 1425, 1434-1435, 1452, 1466, 1606, 1626, 1661, 1673

Egyptian position, 997, 1030-1031, 1061, 1561

Iraqi position, 1030

Other states, 911, 919, 921, 1014, 1364, 1391, 1393

Saudi Arabian position, 995-996, 1031, 1146-1147, 1416

Soviet recognition, 897, 911, 925, 937, 952, 974-976, 1011, 1075, 1081*n*, 1142, 1163, 1182-1183, 1206, 1361, 1532, 1578

Syrian position, 1030, 1061

Transjordan position, 1447*n*

United States:

Considerations regarding, 906, 909, 912, 959-965, 974-978, 983, 989

De facto recognition of provisional government, 990-994, 997-998, 1001-1002, 1004-1007, 1012-1014, 1019, 1030-1031, 1035, 1045*n*, 1052-1053, 1055, 1058, 1061, 1100, 1134-1135, 1147-1148, 1158, 1179, 1183, 1188, 1199, 1206, 1216, 1232, 1305, 1353, 1408, 1432, 1532, 1549, 1578, 1657, 1673, 1704

De jure recognition of provisional government, proposed, 1036-1037, 1051-1053, 1060*n*, 1119, 1199, 1215-1216, 1232-1233, 1306, 1314, 1317, 1359-1360, 1379-1380, 1383-1384, 1390, 1392-1394, 1408-1409, 1427, 1432, 1448, 1507, 1513, 1537, 1553, 1579, 1634, 1660*n*, 1674, 1676, 1679

Israel—Continued

Recognition—Continued

United States—Continued

De jure recognition of the State of Israel, 1215-1216, 1232, 1362, 1408, 1432, 1476*n*, 1595

Soviet and Soviet bloc arms shipments, 1247, 1280-1282, 1284-1285, 1292, 1361, 1517, 1531, 1534, 1571, 1576, 1578-1580, 1652, 1669, 1675, 1685, 1703

Soviet Union, relations with the, 1183-1184, 1284, 1370, 1381, 1531, 1554, 1563, 1578, 1607, 1620, 1652, 1675, 1682

Stern gang (*see also under* Palestine), 1113, 1141-1142, 1145, 1154-1156, 1162, 1175, 1177, 1182, 1212, 1233, 1236, 1241, 1245, 1263, 1275, 1278, 1283-1284, 1292-1293, 1348, 1361, 1413*n*, 1415, 1619

Territorial boundaries, 1002, 1005-1006, 1019, 1119, 1134-1137, 1144, 1165-1168, 1172, 1191, 1204, 1211, 1267, 1269, 1288, 1316

U.N. membership, application for, 995, 1019, 1164, 1179, 1186, 1259, 1299, 1306, 1314, 1317, 1345, 1359, 1391, 1448, 1513, 1537, 1549, 1553, 1577-1579, 1619-1620, 1629-1631, 1635-1636, 1657-1658, 1668, 1680, 1690, 1692, 1704

U.N. Security Council cease fire and truce, 1010, 1033-1034, 1040-1041, 1053, 1065, 1072, 1083-1085, 1093, 1102, 1107*n*, 1110, 1112, 1125, 1141, 1145, 1156, 1158, 1162, 1174, 1186-1187, 1189, 1192, 1201, 1240, 1243, 1298-1300

U.S. arms embargo, request for modification of, 1042, 1072, 1158, 1217-1218, 1285

U.S. military assistance, request for, 1042-1043, 1051

U.S. policy toward, 1222, 1230, 1337-1339

U.S. technical assistance, request for, 1601

Italian colonies, 1674

Italy, 624, 833, 1159, 1247, 1283, 1314, 1349, 1364

Jabr, Saleh, 535

Japan, 1272, 1352

Javits, Jacob K., 626

Jebb, Sir H. M. Gladwyn, 1394-1395

Jerusalem. *See subheadings under individual subjects.*

Jessup, Philip C., 823, 835, 847-848, 863, 871*n*, 873*n*, 897, 907-909, 923, 941, 965-969, 981, 984, 986-987, 993-994, 1028*n*, 1058, 1068, 1088-1090, 1112-1113, 1126, 1138, 1146, 1155, 1160-1171, 1180-1186, 1191-1192, 1197, 1205-1209, 1215-1216, 1223, 1227-1228, 1235-1237, 1248-1249, 1251-1260, 1262, 1271, 1286-1291, 1298-

- Jessup, Philip C.—Continued
 1300, 1320, 1335, 1394–1396, 1397*n*,
 1413–1414, 1511, 1543, 1559, 1574,
 1583*n*, 1616–1617, 1619–1623, 1625–
 1627, 1631–1632, 1659, 1676, 1690–
 1692, 1695, 1698
- Jewish Agency. *See subheadings under individual subjects.*
- Jinnah, Mohammad Ali, 569, 571, 621,
 634*n*
- Johnson, Herschel V., 555, 586*n*
- Johnson, Joseph, 542
- Joint Chiefs of Staff: Arab refugee
 problem, 1427–1428, 1444, 1479; U.N.
 military forces for Palestine, ques-
 tion of, 1322, 1360–1361, 1381–1382,
 1524–1525, 1547–1548, 1592; U.S.
 military forces for Palestine, ques-
 tion of, 797–800, 832, 932–933, 1322–
 1323, 1360, 1524–1525; U.S. ob-
 servers for U.N. Mediator, 1236,
 1363
- Jones, Lewis, 826, 1047, 1210, 1426, 1439,
 1585, 1602, 1650–1651, 1681, 1685*n*
- Joseph, Bernard, 1112*n*, 1113, 1141, 1154,
 1158, 1201, 1277, 1296, 1301–1302,
 1412
- Karmi, Abdel Ghani Bey, 1564, 1617
- Kashmir dispute, 599
- Kawukji, Fawzi. *See Qawnujji, Fawzi.*
- Keeley, James H., 1307–1308, 1421–1422,
 1542
- Keenan, Joseph B., 1693
- Kemman, George F., 545–546, 573–581,
 592, 601, 632*n*, 655*n*, 1020–1021,
 1022*n*, 1113–1114, 1172, 1213, 1221*n*,
 1222*n*, 1437
- Khalidi, Hussein, 687*n*, 705, 817
- Khashaba Pasha, Ahmed Mohammed,
 534, 677–678, 996–997, 1085, 1492,
 1500–1501, 1627
- Khayat, Victor, 1138
- Khourri, Faris el-, 572*n*, 643, 723–724,
 731, 744*n*, 818*n*, 820, 822, 1093–1094,
 1098–1099, 1164
- Khourri, Bishara al-, 1417, 1569–1570,
 1670–1671, 1677*n*
- Kirkbride, Sir Alec S., 863*n*, 990, 1050,
 1086, 1106, 1193, 1203, 1506, 1647,
 1699–1700, 1702, 1706*n*
- Klein, Julius, 1380–1381
- Knapp, John P., 1645
- Knapp, Joseph B., 1261, 1468*n*
- Knox, Charles Frederick, 1060*n*, 1178,
 1273–1274, 1375, 1451, 1679, 1705,
 1706*n*
- Knox, M. Gordon, 586–587, 817–819, 821–
 823
- Kohler, Foy D., 1432
- Kohn, Leo, 832*n*, 866*n*, 1053
- Kopper, Samuel K. C., 563–566, 643–645,
 659, 723–725, 744*n*, 847–849, 873*n*,
 886, 923, 1087, 1099, 1349, 1440,
 1499–1501, 1568–1569, 1625–1627,
 1635–1636, 1657–1658, 1660
- Korea, 616, 644, 1504
- Kourdagy, Jamal el-, 643
- Kuniholm, Bertel E., 1417
- Kurds, 1291–1292, 1362, 1682
- Kurzman, Dan, 542, 748
- Kuwatly (Quwatly), Shukri al-, 706,
 1342, 1421
- Lash, Brigadier, 1236, 1644
- Latin America, 898, 1014
- Langier, Henri, 1456
- League of Nations: Assembly, 683;
 Council, 778, 860, 961, 963; Coven-
 ant, 683, 747, 960–964, 1447; failure
 of, 1586; mandate system, 683, 848;
 Palestine mandate, 642, 682, 684,
 690, 747, 778, 860, 960–963, 998,
 1152; termination of, 683, 692;
 Upper Silesian plan, 1167
- Leahy, Fleet Adm. William D., 798–800,
 1427–1428, 1524–1525
- Lebanon (*see also Lebanese subheadings
 under individual subjects*), 778,
 850*n*, 1015–1018, 1039–1040, 1057,
 1113, 1146, 1246, 1531, 1643
- Lie, Trygve (*see also* United Nations:
 Secretary-General), 572*n*, 615, 630*n*,
 669, 676, 701, 707–708, 718–719, 725,
 732, 744*n*, 817, 821, 896*n*, 917*n*, 994*n*,
 995, 997*n*, 999–1001, 1004*n*, 1018,
 1045*n*, 1085, 1091*n*, 1099, 1111*n*,
 1126, 1134, 1138–1140, 1154*n*, 1155–
 1156, 1161–1162, 1168, 1175, 1190,
 1197, 1201–1202, 1227*n*, 1228*n*, 1229,
 1230*n*, 1235, 1295*n*, 1308*n*, 1325*n*,
 1329*n*, 1369, 1401*n*, 1492*n*
- Linton, I. J., 1686*n*
- Lippincott, Aubrey E., 838, 1137–1138,
 1201*n*
- Lisicky, Karel, 540, 572*n*, 599, 614–615,
 651*n*, 680, 684–685, 711*n*
- López, Alfonso, 654–655, 658, 664*n*, 809–
 812, 818, 821–822
- Lourie, Arthur, 566
- Lovett, Robert A.:
 Anglo-American cooperation in the
 Middle East, 578*n*
 Arab government in Palestine, estab-
 lishment of, 1447–1448
 Arab refugees, relief for, 1330–1331,
 1364*n*, 1427–1428, 1454*n*, 1477–
 1478, 1486*n*, 1491, 1498, 1506–1507,
 1509–1511, 1522–1523, 1554–1555,
 1567–1568, 1581, 1614, 1635, 1643,
 1648, 1696–1698
 Assassination of Count Bernadotte,
 1414
 Detention of American citizens by
 Lebanon, 1057*n*
 Egyptian and Syrian blockade of
 Palestinian waters, 1022, 1023*n*,
 1418, 1461–1462
 Egyptian invasion of Palestine, 1000
 Haifa oil refinery problem, 1122, 1157

Lovett, Robert A.—Continued

- Israel: *De facto* recognition, 959–960, 975–977, 989, 992*n*, 1001, 1005–1007, 1031; *de jure* recognition, proposed, 1036, 1051–1053, 1392*n*; exchange of diplomatic representatives with, 1051–1052, 1058–1060, 1074, 1118, 1131–1132, 1140, 1151–1152, 1232–1234; Export-Import Bank loan, Israeli request for, 1261, 1300–1301, 1313, 1468*n*, 1674–1676
- Jerusalem, security and future status of, 833, 853, 868–869, 1154–1155, 1484, 1488–1489, 1547–1548, 1572, 1591*n*, 1619, 1665
- Palestine partition plan, 543, 545*n*, 546*n*, 554–556, 562, 569–571, 573, 581–583, 587, 593, 595, 600, 604–605, 617, 619, 632*n*, 633, 637*n*, 640–643, 645, 648*n*, 655*n*, 659–661, 663–665, 676, 697, 699–702, 705, 707, 712, 744, 746–747, 749–752, 760*n*, 761–764, 767, 770–771, 774–776, 797, 799–807, 809*n*, 811–813, 819*n*, 824*n*
- Resumption of hostilities by Israel, 1689–1692, 1695, 1698–1699, 1701–1702, 1704–1705
- Threat to peace in Palestine, 1019–1022, 1032, 1036*n*
- Transjordan, question of U.S. recognition of, 1655, 1659
- Travel from the United States to Arab countries and Palestine, 1129
- U.N. Conciliation Commission, 1669, 1693
- U.N. General Assembly Special Session, 828–830, 835, 839–840, 843–844, 846*n*, 847, 850, 855–856, 905*n*, 968, 980–981, 984, 987*n*
- U.N. military observers in Palestine, 1079–1080, 1686–1687
- U.S. Palestine Truce Commission, 857–858
- U.N. Security Council truce and cease-fire efforts, 858, 864, 866*n*, 867*n*, 873, 877*n*, 881*n*, 886, 891–892, 894, 896, 920, 925, 940*n*, 941–942, 972–974, 1040, 1046, 1047*n*, 1062–1064, 1070–1072, 1076, 1078, 1082–1088, 1113, 1121, 1127*n*, 1134*n*, 1148–1149, 1172, 1174, 1198–1199, 1214, 1222, 1223*n*, 1315, 1320, 1345–1348, 1491
- U.N. trusteeship for Palestine, proposed, 831–832, 839–840, 845
- U.S. arms embargo to Palestine and neighboring states, 1027*n*, 1036–1037, 1217–1219, 1580
- U.S. Marine guards for the U.S. Consulate General at Jerusalem, 1462
- U.S. military forces for enforcement of truce in Palestine, proposed, 851–852

Lovett, Robert A.—Continued

- U.S. policy regarding a Palestine settlement, 1171*n*, 1172, 1234, 1353, 1389, 1397–1398, 1409, 1413*n*, 1415–1417, 1420–1422, 1426–1427, 1430–1432, 1433*n*, 1435*n*, 1437–1439, 1446, 1448, 1450, 1459–1461, 1466–1467, 1469–1474, 1476, 1480–1481, 1485–1486, 1489–1490, 1494–1497, 1499, 1501–1505, 1507–1509, 1511–1516, 1518, 1520, 1522–1525, 1526*n*, 1527–1530, 1533–1536, 1538–1543, 1544*n*, 1548, 1551, 1555, 1558–1560, 1562–1571, 1573–1574, 1578, 1582–1584, 1589*n*, 1594–1595, 1603, 1607–1610, 1612, 1614, 1616–1619, 1621–1625, 1627, 1629, 1639, 1641–1642, 1644–1647, 1649–1650, 1652, 1656, 1667–1668, 1670, 1671*n*, 1672–1674, 1676–1680, 1685, 1687, 1693–1694, 1706–1707
- Lowenthal, Max, 976, 977*n*, 1060*n*
- Lucas, Scott, 1635
- Lundstroem, Col. Aage, 1412
- Lutheran World Relief Incorporated, 1333*n*, 1457
- Macatee, Robert B., 543–544, 605–612, 687*n*, 753
- Macdonald, John J., 1150–1151, 1158–1159, 1176, 1212–1213, 1234, 1236–1237, 1250–1251, 1252*n*, 1263–1265, 1274, 1276–1279, 1287–1288, 1294, 1296–1298, 1301–1302, 1307, 1317–1318, 1327–1328, 1375, 1383, 1392, 1412–1413, 1415*n*, 1444, 1474, 1488
- Mack, Sir William, 1189*n*
- Magnes, Judah L., 805, 811, 859, 901–904, 1137, 1171, 1176
- Makin, Norman J. O., 987
- Malik, Charles, 643, 724, 764–765, 1660, 1664
- Mann, Morgan, 1440
- Manuilski, Dmitry Zakharovich, 1160, 1186
- Mardam Bey, Jamil, 534, 719, 1159
- Markos. *See* Vafiades.
- Marshall, George C.:
 Arab intervention in Palestine, 881–882, 983–984, 990–991, 996, 999–1000, 1002, 1041
 Arab refugees from Palestine, relief for the, 1137, 1151, 1155, 1248–1249, 1252, 1262–1263, 1307, 1310–1312, 1315, 1326*n*, 1330–1334, 1427, 1444, 1465, 1477–1478, 1498–1499, 1568*n*
 Assassination of Count Bernadotte, 1412, 1413*n*, 1414, 1416
 British arms shipments to Arab states, 626, 1328–1329
 China mission, 1351
 China situation, 875*n*
 Detention of American citizens by Lebanon, 1015, 1017–1018, 1039, 1057, 1146

Marshall, George C.—Continued

- Egyptian and Syrian blockade of Palestine waters, 1023-1024, 1108, 1146
- Haifa oil refinery problem, 1122, 1132-1133, 1157-1158
- Immigration of men of military age into Palestine or neighboring states, 1104, 1107, 1147-1148, 1371
- Iraq economic development plan, 1682
- Israel: *De facto* recognition of, 978, 989*n*, 990-993, 1001-1002, 1004*n*, 1005, 1011-1013, 1015*n*, 1030-1031, 1160, 1215, 1394; *de jure* recognition, proposed, 1036-1037, 1359-1360, 1379-1380, 1390-1391, 1392*n*, 1408-1409, 1427; exchange of diplomatic representatives with, 1051, 1059, 1074, 1118*n*, 1131*n*, 1140, 1234*n*, 1326; Export-Import Bank loan, proposed, 1105*n*, 1313, 1674; U.N. membership, proposed, 1259, 1635
- Jerusalem, security and future status of, 860-862, 871-872, 879, 912, 986, 1011-1012, 1138-1139, 1141, 1155-1156, 1212, 1231, 1235-1236, 1250-1252, 1256-1258, 1263-1264, 1273-1274, 1276-1277, 1287, 1296-1298, 1301, 1307, 1317, 1321, 1327, 1337, 1634
- Jewish displaced persons, 1252
- Palestine and the Middle East, 655*n*
- Palestine status after British withdrawal, 682-685
- Soviet Union, U.S. policy toward, 988-989
- Syrian relations with the Soviet Union, 1341-1342, 1370
- Threat to peace in Palestine, 1007-1008, 1018-1019, 1021, 1022*n*, 1024, 1033, 1036*n*
- Transjordan intervention in Palestine, 1038-1039
- U.S. General Assembly Palestine partition resolution (1947), 533, 539, 543, 546*n*, 548, 562-563, 593, 595, 605-612, 616-617, 620, 625-626, 629-630, 633-634, 667, 849
- U.N. General Assembly Special Session on Palestine, 847, 850, 855, 905, 936, 978-980, 982, 987-989
- U.N. mediation efforts, 1265, 1272-1273, 1295-1297
- U.N. military observers in Palestine, 1090, 1093-1097, 1101-1103, 1111, 1116, 1126, 1140-1141, 1227, 1230, 1260, 1275-1276, 1335-1336
- U.N. Palestine Commission, 544, 599, 614, 629-630
- U.N. Security Council truce and cease-fire efforts, 645, 648*n*, 649-651, 661-662, 665-666, 676-681, 686-687, 697, 701-707, 712, 719-720, 725, 728-729, 731-732, 736, 744-

Marshall, George C.—Continued

- U.N. Security Council truce and cease-fire efforts—Continued
 - 746, 755, 756*n*, 759-760, 765-767, 770-771, 774, 775*n*, 809, 817, 820-821, 823, 830, 858, 862, 864-865, 873-874, 875*n*, 876, 877*n*, 878, 880, 886, 889, 891-892, 896-897, 901-904, 906, 915-916, 920, 922-923, 927-928, 930, 940-941, 944-946, 948, 954-956, 969, 971-977, 984, 997, 999-1000, 1007-1008, 1033-1034, 1040, 1043-1044, 1045*n*, 1046-1047, 1053-1055, 1058, 1062, 1064-1065, 1067, 1069, 1075-1076, 1078, 1080-1081, 1088, 1090-1096, 1098, 1105, 1107, 1110-1114, 1116, 1119, 1121, 1124-1127, 1133-1134, 1143, 1145-1146, 1148-1150, 1156, 1158-1159, 1186-1189, 1191-1193, 1195-1197, 1201-1203, 1205, 1209-1210, 1214, 1216, 1220-1221, 1225, 1228, 1234, 1237, 1239, 1313-1315, 1317-1318, 1320-1321, 1334-1336, 1340-1341, 1349-1352, 1364, 1375, 1383, 1492, 1498
- U.N. trusteeship for Palestine, proposed, 745-746, 748, 753-754, 760, 841-842, 870, 942, 949, 970
- U.S. arms embargo for Palestine and neighboring states, 1008, 1011, 1036-1037, 1043-1044, 1126, 1179-1180, 1216, 1255-1256, 1271, 1406-1408
- U.S. military forces to implement truce, proposed, 832, 852*n*, 904, 1251-1252
- U.S. policy regarding Palestine settlement, 1161, 1172, 1180, 1222*n*, 1266, 1288, 1291, 1303-1306, 1308-1310, 1319, 1334, 1337*n*, 1339-1340, 1352-1354, 1358, 1360*n*, 1363, 1365-1369, 1373, 1380-1384, 1386, 1388-1389, 1392, 1394, 1396-1398, 1406-1409, 1413, 1415-1417, 1419-1420, 1430-1431, 1433-1434, 1437-1439, 1445-1446, 1448-1450, 1452-1453, 1459-1460, 1463, 1467, 1470-1476, 1481-1483, 1485, 1488-1490, 1494, 1497-1503, 1504*n*, 1505, 1507, 1509, 1512, 1514-1516, 1518-1523, 1525*n*, 1526-1529, 1533-1536, 1538-1540, 1543-1544, 1552, 1555-1556, 1559-1560, 1565-1566, 1568-1569, 1572, 1574-1583, 1585-1590, 1591*n*, 1594-1597, 1599, 1603-1608, 1610, 1612-1616, 1618-1619, 1622-1630, 1636, 1657, 1662, 1694
- U.S. technical assistance for Israel, request for, 1601
- Martin, William McChesney, 1261*n*, 1301, 1346
- Matthews, H. Freeman, 982, 1341*n*

- Mattison, Gordon, 1060*n*, 1099, 1103, 1151, 1198, 1238-1239, 1316
- Mayhew, Christopher, 1411, 1602
- McClintock, Robert M., 541-542, 617*n*, 627-628, 643*n*, 648*n*, 659-660, 663-665, 676, 697-701, 729-732, 736, 746-747, 749-752, 771*n*, 775*n*, 813*n*, 819*n*, 825, 835, 845-847, 852, 856*n*, 864*n*, 866*n*, 867*n*, 881*n*, 891*n*, 894*n*, 901, 903-905, 925-927, 944*n*, 958*n*, 972, 976, 977*n*, 981, 984, 1036*n*, 1047*n*, 1080*n*, 1085, 1087, 1099, 1102-1103, 1111*n*, 1120-1121, 1127*n*, 1134-1135, 1151, 1171-1179, 1221*n*, 1235*n*, 1308*n*, 1360*n*, 1371-1372, 1387, 1390, 1394-1401, 1413, 1426, 1430*n*, 1433*n*, 1435*n*, 1437-1439, 1445, 1457*n*, 1459-1460, 1461*n*, 1466*n*, 1485, 1495-1496, 1499, 1508, 1509*n*, 1551-1553, 1584-1585, 1598-1601, 1612*n*, 1623*n*, 1635, 1651, 1685*n*, 1692-1693, 1701-1702
- McDermott, Michael J., 625-626, 648*n*, 1011, 1379, 1476*n*
- McDonald, James Grover, 1131, 1132*n*, 1151-1152, 1178-1179, 1188*n*, 1232-1234, 1255*n*, 1286, 1315-1316, 1326-1327, 1334, 1336-1340, 1363-1364, 1366, 1369, 1373, 1375-1378, 1384-1386, 1392-1394, 1408, 1413-1415, 1428-1429, 1435, 1450-1451, 1459, 1472-1473, 1476-1477, 1486-1487, 1508, 1525-1526, 1536, 1553-1554, 1567-1568, 1580, 1598, 1606-1607, 1628-1630, 1658-1659, 1674-1676, 1679-1680, 1689-1690, 1698, 1704-1706
- McGrath, J. Howard, 755, 760*n*
- McKeever, Porter, 626
- McNaughton, Gen. Andrew G. L., 572*n*, 661, 1161, 1167, 1559
- McNeil, Hector, 839, 1204, 1529, 1543, 1551, 1553, 1559, 1562, 1576, 1581, 1589, 1591, 1622, 1681, 1683-1684, 1686
- McWilliams, William J., 678*n*, 1330*n*
- Medagba, Fellah Pasha, 1557
- Meeker, Leonard C., 747*n*, 1127-1129, 1134*n*, 1172, 1174, 1221*n*
- Memminger, Robert B., 556
- Merriam, Gordon P., 537, 764, 859, 1087, 1099, 1221-1222
- Mexico, 584*n*, 805, 1639
- Middle East :
 Anglo-American cooperation, discussions regarding, 1031-1032, 1034-1035, 1042*n*, 1047, 1050
 Anglo-American talks, *Oct. 1947*, 533*n*, 536, 578, 865
 British policy, 534, 536, 578, 602, 692, 898, 1270-1271, 1328-1329
 British strategic position, 655-656, 1035, 1291
 Petroleum pipeline, 1123, 1168
- Middle East—Continued
 Petroleum resources, importance of, 550-551, 597, 618, 623, 694-696, 753, 767, 806, 938, 1047-1048, 1181, 1208, 1217, 1229, 1270, 1285, 1530
 Protection of Americans and American interests, 1037, 1055, 1060-1061, 1161, 1217-1218, 1229
 Soviet policy, 1241, 1245-1248, 1280, 1291, 1293, 1314, 1322-1323, 1329, 1360, 1370, 1530-1532
 U.S. economic and financial assistance, question of, 1171-1172
 U.S. security interests in the, 546-547, 550-553, 565, 571, 577, 579, 597, 618, 623, 625, 655-657, 695-696, 756, 768, 772, 805-806, 840-841, 844, 865, 992, 1020-1021, 1035, 1042*n*, 1044, 1047-1048, 1060, 1161, 1181, 1217, 1244*n*, 1271, 1291, 1304, 1456, 1472, 1555
- Mohammed, Ahmed, 1272
- Mohn, Paul, 1202, 1567
- Molotov, V. M., 988, 1011
- Morocco, 834, 1399
- Mountbatten, Lord Louis, 903
- Mulki. *See* Fawzi Pasha Mulki.
- Murphy, Charles S., 745
- Murray, James E., 1105*n*
- Mussolini, Benito, 1048
- Mustafa, Abdul Moniem, 1117
- Myerson, Mrs. Golda, 608, 1307
- Nakhleh, Isa, 605*n*, 613-614, 686, 705, 718-719, 728, 744*n*
- Nashashibi, Azmi, 1383
- Nasser, Sherif Husein, 1105-1106
- National Catholic Relief Service, 1457
- National Catholic Welfare Conference, 1333
- National Security Council: Israel, U.S. policy concerning, 1222; Middle East, Anglo-American policies concerning, 578; Middle East, importance to U.S. security of the, 840; Palestine question, U.S. policy regarding, 545-546, 573-574, 592-593, 595, 619, 625*n*, 627*n*, 628*n*, 631-632, 841, 1021, 1022*n*, 1087-1088, 1114, 1172, 1321-1322, 1324*n*, 1360, 1501, 1524*n*, 1525*n*, 1547-1548; U.N. police force for Jerusalem, proposed, 1591-1594
- Navy, U.S. Department of the, 632*n*, 666*n*, 1101, 1111*n*, 1235, 1240*n*, 1279*n*
- Near East Foundation, 1325, 1333
- Ness, Norman T., 634-636
- Netherlands, 805, 1523*n*, 1555, 1614, 1643, 1681, 1689*n*
- Neuville, René, 1558-1559, 1619
- New Zealand, 805, 1400, 1656
- Nicaragua, 1639-1640

- Nieuwenhuys, Jean, 1376-1377, 1505-1506
- Niles, David K., 755, 760*n*, 972, 1501, 1551*n*
- Nisot, Joseph, 661-662, 664*n*, 922-923, 925, 947-948
- Nokrashy, Mahmud Fahmy el-, 725, 804*n*, 844*n*, 863, 1096-1097, 1101*n*, 1110*n*, 1116, 1125, 1229, 1295, 1472, 1653-1654, 1667
- Norstad, Maj. Gen. Lauris, 797
- Norton, Garrison, 1468*n*
- Norway, 1643, 1649, 1663, 1699
- Noyes, Charles P., 909-912
- Nuweihid, Aja, 1646
- O'Connell, Joseph J., Jr., 1218
- O'Connor, Basil, 1487
- Ohly, John H., 829-830, 1236, 1428*n*
- O'Keefe, Colonel, 996
- Oxnam, Bromley, 903
- Padilla Nervo, Luis, 858
- Pakistan, 560, 569, 571, 596*n*, 621, 692, 847, 1031, 1047-1048, 1053, 1185
- Palestine:
- Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, 1946, 593, 642, 808, 1105, 1131, 1156, 1554
 - Arab intervention. *See* Intervention by Arab states, *infra*.
 - Arab refugees (*see also subheadings under individual subjects*), 1137-1138
 - Arms and equipment for Jewish forces, request for, 538
 - Balfour Declaration, Nov. 2, 1917, 690-691, 848, 963, 992
 - Communist infiltration and influence, 849, 1125, 1162, 1169, 1182, 1184
 - Detention by Lebanon of American citizens destined for Palestine, 1015-1018, 1039-1040, 1057, 1146
 - Displaced Jews in American zones of occupation in Germany and Austria, questions regarding emigration of, 1091-1092, 1104, 1149, 1348-1349, 1371, 1385
 - Displaced Jews on Cyprus, questions regarding disposition of, 933, 945, 955, 1042, 1071, 1072*n*, 1079, 1092, 1100, 1684
 - Federal state or federation of states, proposals for establishment of a, 548, 554, 561, 563, 565, 624-625, 724, 726, 1136-1137, 1144, 1153, 1164
 - Government, 641, 643, 832, 945-946, 954
 - Haganah, activities of (*see also under* Israel), 538, 549, 567, 607-608, 614-615, 667, 671-672, 688, 762, 817, 882, 890-891, 894, 900, 902, 937, 940, 955-956, 984-985, 1034*n*, 1038, 1062
- Palestine—Continued
- Haifa oil refinery problem (*see also* Haifa, future status of *under* Palestine: U.N. mediation efforts), 1122-1124, 1132-1133, 1143-1144, 1157-1158, 1168, 1176-1177
 - Intervention by Arab states:
 - Arab League, 1002-1003, 1039, 1064, 1105-1106, 1115-1117, 1119, 1125, 1144, 1147, 1156, 1164, 1169, 1187, 1189, 1218, 1223, 1227-1229, 1238, 1359, 1400, 1418, 1419*n*, 1447*n*, 1477, 1557, 1564, 1656, 1670, 1700*n*, 1707
 - Arab Legion, 889-890, 900, 940, 956, 973, 985, 990, 992, 1038-1039, 1044, 1049-1050, 1062, 1064, 1066, 1071, 1076, 1106, 1114, 1158, 1175, 1193, 1203, 1204*n*, 1236-1238, 1263, 1277, 1292-1293, 1296, 1302, 1315, 1319, 1343, 1375, 1383, 1420, 1465, 1477, 1480, 1501-1502, 1521, 1534, 1537, 1548, 1556*n*, 1557-1558, 1564, 1571, 1587, 1591, 1618*n*, 1619, 1624, 1644-1645, 1666, 1688, 1700, 1706
 - Arab Palestine (*see also* Arab state, etc., *under* Palestine: U.N. General Assembly resolution recommending partition, etc. (1947) and *under* Palestine: U.N. mediation efforts): Establishment of provisional government, 1447-1448, 1464, 1471, 1476, 1477*n*, 1642; proposed annexation of Transjordan of, 1646-1648, 1667-1669, 1689, 1706-1707
 - Arms shortages, 1244, 1247-1248, 1282, 1292, 1342*n*, 1520-1521, 1536-1537, 1550, 1669, 1682
 - Egyptian actions, 881*n*, 882*n*, 983, 990-991, 996-997, 999, 1001, 1009, 1010*n*, 1049, 1061-1062, 1064, 1070, 1077-1079, 1086, 1102-1103, 1110*n*, 1111*n*, 1115, 1125, 1136-1137, 1145, 1157, 1187-1188, 1198, 1200, 1205, 1216*n*, 1218-1219, 1244-1245, 1447*n*, 1462, 1472, 1476-1477, 1491-1492, 1521, 1526-1527, 1544-1545, 1548, 1554, 1558, 1560-1561, 1564, 1586, 1631-1632, 1680-1681, 1689, 1698, 1700-1705
 - Egyptian and Syrian blockade of Palestinian waters, 1022-1024, 1108, 1146, 1418-1419, 1461-1462
 - Haifa oil refinery problem, 1122-1124, 1132-1133, 1143-1144, 1157-1158, 1168, 1176-1177

Palestine—Continued

Intervention by Arab states—Con.

Iraqi position, 983, 990-991, 1009, 1010*n*, 1048-1049, 1064, 1070, 1077-1078, 1086, 1102-1103, 1110*n*, 1111*n*, 1115, 1123, 1163, 1168, 1200, 1205, 1218-1219, 1244-1245, 1255, 1292-1293, 1342, 1472, 1476, 1541, 1554, 1558, 1618*n*, 1679-1680, 1700, 1706*n*

Lebanese position, 881*n*, 983, 990-991, 1002-1004, 1009, 1010*n*, 1061, 1070, 1077-1078, 1086, 1102-1103, 1106, 1110*n*, 1115, 1121-1122, 1169, 1218-1219, 1245, 1248, 1462*n*, 1476, 1548, 1569-1570, 1586-1587, 1670-1671, 1677, 1679

Military activities and situation, 884-885, 887, 889, 895-896, 908-909, 915, 953, 983-985, 990, 996, 998-1001, 1009-1010, 1016-1017, 1025, 1029-1030, 1041, 1042*n*, 1049, 1061-1062, 1067, 1075-1076, 1106, 1114-1115, 1145, 1161-1163, 1173, 1183, 1194, 1200, 1205-1208, 1215, 1217, 1224, 1240-1241, 1244-1245, 1247-1248, 1280-1281, 1286, 1292, 1476-1477, 1492, 1515-1516, 1521, 1526, 1537, 1542, 1544-1545, 1548, 1550, 1558, 1668-1669, 1673, 1677, 1679, 1689, 1698, 1700-1705

Palestine Arab Conference at Jericho, 1642, 1645-1646, 1647*n*, 1667, 1688, 1695, 1706

Saudi Arabian position, 983, 991, 1009, 1010*n*, 1070, 1077-1078, 1086, 1102-1103, 1106, 1110*n*, 1115, 1146-1147, 1150*n*, 1218-1219, 1245, 1477*n*

Security Council cease-fire proposals, 1040, 1042, 1046, 1049, 1054-1056, 1064-1065, 1070, 1078-1079, 1081-1083, 1085-1086, 1092, 1100, 1102, 1105-1106, 1107*n*, 1110, 1114-1117, 1121, 1125, 1144, 1147, 1150*n*, 1156, 1158-1159, 1162-1163, 1173, 1187-1189, 1194, 1198, 1201, 1236-1237

Soviet bloc arms shipments, 1247-1248, 1280-1282, 1285, 1342, 1370-1371

Syrian position, 881*n*, 983, 990-991, 1009, 1010*n*, 1030, 1049, 1061, 1064, 1070, 1077-1078, 1086, 1102-1103, 1106, 1110*n*, 1115, 1156*n*, 1164, 1169, 1188*n*, 1200, 1205, 1218-1219, 1245-1248, 1255, 1341-1342, 1476, 1548, 1677

Palestine—Continued

Intervention by Arab states—Con.

Transjordanian position, 881*n*, 939-941, 945-947, 952, 955-956, 967, 971, 973, 983, 985, 990-992, 997*n*, 1009, 1010*n*, 1016-1017, 1038-1039, 1049, 1061-1062, 1070, 1077-1078, 1086, 1100-1103, 1105-1106, 1110*n*, 1115, 1119, 1134, 1136-1137, 1150*n*, 1158, 1163-1166, 1168, 1170, 1183, 1186, 1189, 1193, 1195*n*, 1199-1200, 1219, 1245, 1255, 1292-1293, 1447*n*, 1476-1477, 1501-1502, 1520-1522, 1524, 1537, 1540-1541, 1545, 1548, 1557-1558, 1564, 1586-1587, 1613, 1667-1669, 1681, 1687, 1699-1700, 1704-1707

Yemeni position, 1009, 1010*n*, 1070, 1077-1078, 1102-1103, 1110*n*, 1115, 1218-1219, 1667*n*

Irgun Zvai Leumi (*see also under* Israel), 547, 608, 615, 667, 669, 672, 817, 890-891, 894, 937, 985, 1034*n*, 1046, 1049

Jewish military activities, 889-891, 894-896, 902, 908-909, 918, 956-957, 971-973, 984-985

National Council of the Jews in Palestine, the Vaad Leumi, 753*n*

Partition plan. *See* U.N. General Assembly resolution recommending partition, etc.

Peel Commission, 1106, 1136

Revisionists, 547

Round Table Conference, 1939, 1273

Soviet espionage activities, 1113

Soviet influence, 1142, 1181-1184, 1221, 1244, 1247, 1285, 1361-1362, 1370

Special Municipal Commission for Jerusalem, 917, 926-927, 943-944, 951

Sterling balances, proposed British utilization of, 634-636

Stern gang (*see also under* Israel), 547, 608, 615, 667, 669, 672, 817, 890-891, 894, 1034*n*, 1046, 1049

Strategic importance of, 546-547

Terrorist activities, 538, 630, 667, 672

Travel from the United States to Palestine and neighboring states, 1129-1131, 1147-1148, 1178

Trusteeship proposals:

General, 628

United Nations. *See* U.N. trusteeship for Palestine, proposed *under* Palestine: U.N. General Assembly Special Session *and under* Palestine: U.N. Security Council.

United States-United Kingdom, 625-626

United States-United Kingdom-France, 625, 697, 754, 769, 774

Palestine—Continued

Unitary state, proposed, 1145, 1192, 1200

U.N. Conciliation Commission on Palestine (United States, United Kingdom, Turkey), 1662-1664, 1669-1670, 1671*n*, 1674*n*, 1678-1680, 1682-1687, 1690, 1692-1693, 1696-1697, 1706

U.N. General Assembly Regular Session at Paris:

Arab provisional government, 1464-1465, 1471

Arab Higher Committee representation, 1465, 1484*n*

Arab League position, 1420, 1473, 1641-1642, 1661, 1667, 1670, 1686

Arab refugee problem, 1364-1366, 1369, 1401*n*, 1404-1406, 1425, 1439*n*, 1454-1459, 1477-1478, 1480, 1483, 1485-1487, 1490, 1497-1500, 1506-1507, 1509-1512, 1522-1523, 1532, 1534, 1554-1555, 1567-1568, 1581, 1614, 1617, 1620, 1638, 1643, 1648, 1662, 1673, 1696-1698

Arab states, position of, 1416, 1424, 1446, 1450-1451, 1459-1460, 1464, 1466, 1471-1473, 1479, 1487, 1496, 1505-1506, 1510, 1515, 1520, 1532, 1548, 1568-1569, 1584*n*, 1600, 1602, 1611, 1625-1627, 1635-1636, 1638*n*, 1639-1642, 1644, 1646, 1648-1651, 1656-1661, 1664-1665, 1667, 1669, 1671-1673, 1681, 1684

Australian position, 1656-1657, 1661, 1663

Belgian position, 1424, 1523*n*, 1555, 1597, 1614, 1643, 1645

British position, 1445, 1449-1450, 1460, 1463-1465, 1469-1473, 1475, 1482, 1485, 1505, 1510-1511, 1514-1515, 1517, 1520-1523, 1555, 1560, 1565, 1570-1572, 1574, 1587-1588, 1591, 1602-1614, 1617, 1618*n*, 1619-1626, 1628-1629, 1637-1638, 1640, 1643, 1645, 1647-1651, 1656, 1663, 1670-1671, 1680-1686

Canadian position, 1400, 1628, 1656
Chinese position, 1482, 1603, 1656, 1663

Committee I deliberations, 1400, 1424, 1439, 1464, 1470, 1471*n*, 1480*n*, 1485, 1490*n*, 1495, 1502-1503, 1508, 1510-1511, 1515, 1551, 1566, 1576, 1584, 1594, 1598, 1603, 1606, 1608, 1609*n*, 1612-1613, 1617-1619, 1623-1624, 1628-1629, 1631, 1637, 1638*n*, 1640, 1643-1647, 1656-1657, 1661

Palestine—Continued

U.N. General Assembly Regular Session at Paris—Continued

Committee III deliberations, 1400, 1439*n*, 1478, 1522-1523, 1568, 1643

Conciliation Commission, proposed, 1482-1483, 1485, 1496, 1510, 1512, 1514, 1595-1602, 1604-1605, 1609, 1612, 1617-1618, 1620, 1621*n*, 1622-1623, 1625, 1637, 1639, 1641-1642, 1645-1647, 1649, 1651, 1656-1657, 1662, 1668

Cuban position, 1502*n*

Egyptian position, 1423-1425, 1450, 1471-1472, 1499-1500, 1505, 1515, 1565-1567, 1611, 1622, 1625-1627, 1639, 1641, 1647-1648, 1660*n*, 1667, 1670-1674, 1684-1686, 1697

French position, 1400, 1464, 1482, 1597, 1643, 1645, 1649, 1657, 1663-1664, 1671

Iranian position, 1511*n*

Iraqi position, 1641, 1697

Israeli position, 1420, 1428-1429, 1446, 1450-1453, 1459, 1463-1464, 1466, 1473, 1484-1485, 1487, 1496, 1508, 1512, 1514-1515, 1547-1548, 1566-1567, 1573, 1584-1585, 1591, 1598-1600, 1603, 1611-1612, 1619-1623, 1630, 1640-1642, 1647, 1649, 1651, 1657, 1659-1660, 1663, 1665, 1668-1669, 1673, 1676

Jerusalem question, 1428-1429, 1440-1442, 1460-1461, 1482-1485, 1488-1489, 1495-1497, 1512-1513, 1524-1525, 1534, 1547-1548, 1591-1594, 1596, 1598-1600, 1603, 1617, 1620-1621, 1644, 1662, 1665-1667

Lebanese position, 1641, 1658, 1660-1661, 1670-1671

Netherlands position, 1523*n*, 1555, 1614

New Zealand position, 1400, 1656

Peace negotiations, proposals regarding, 1599

Resolution on Arab Refugees, *Nov. 19, 1948*, 1614, 1635, 1648

Resolution on Palestine, *Dec. 11, 1948*, 1661-1662, 1664, 1686, 1690, 1696

Saudi Arabian position, 1416, 1423, 1667*n*, 1671, 1697

Soviet position, 1425, 1432, 1465, 1480, 1482, 1516, 1518, 1531, 1547, 1628, 1643, 1661, 1663

Syrian position, 1628, 1641, 1643, 1667*n*

Territorial questions, 1403-1404, 1428-1429, 1433, 1451-1453,

Palestine—Continued

U.N. General Assembly Regular Session at Paris—Continued

Territorial questions—Continued

1459, 1463-1464, 1466, 1472-1473, 1482-1483, 1496-1497, 1504, 1507-1509, 1512, 1514-1518, 1520, 1531, 1534, 1545, 1552, 1565-1567, 1571, 1573-1574, 1581, 1584*n*, 1595-1596, 1598-1599, 1601-1602, 1604-1605, 1607, 1609-1613, 1616-1618, 1620, 1621*n*, 1622, 1625-1627, 1633, 1636-1637, 1639, 1642-1643, 1651, 1656, 1661, 1669-1670, 1672-1673, 1680-1681, 1683-1685, 1694

Transjordanian position, 1464-1465, 1480, 1484-1485, 1501-1502, 1504-1506, 1508, 1518, 1565, 1567, 1571-1572, 1611, 1622, 1624, 1626, 1627*n*, 1638*n*, 1639, 1641-1642, 1644, 1646-1649, 1659-1660, 1665, 1667-1669, 1671, 1684-1686

U.N. Mediator's proposals and report, 1372, 1382, 1388, 1392, 1395-1397, 1399-1406, 1409, 1420, 1426, 1439, 1445-1447, 1451-1455, 1459-1461, 1463-1464, 1466, 1468-1470, 1472-1475, 1481-1482, 1484-1485, 1488-1490, 1495-1498, 1501, 1505, 1537, 1545, 1547, 1551-1552, 1560, 1565-1566, 1569-1571, 1574, 1581, 1584*n*, 1587-1588, 1591-1592, 1596, 1599-1602, 1604-1612, 1617, 1621-1627, 1637-1638, 1656, 1661, 1681-1682, 1688

U.S. position, 1426, 1445-1446, 1449-1450, 1452-1461, 1470-1476, 1481-1483, 1488-1490, 1494-1499, 1502-1518, 1520, 1522-1523, 1547-1548, 1554-1555, 1565-1567, 1570-1571, 1573-1574, 1581, 1591-1600, 1608-1610, 1614, 1617-1619, 1621-1623, 1626-1628, 1630-1631, 1633-1634, 1636-1640, 1642-1643, 1645, 1648-1651, 1656-1657, 1660-1661, 1663, 1668-1669, 1672, 1685*n*, 1696-1698

U.N. General Assembly resolution recommending partition of Palestine into Arab and Jewish states, Nov. 29, 1947 (text, 1709) :

Arab Higher Committee, position of, 543, 561, 565, 607, 642, 645-646, 654, 671, 715, 724, 727, 838, 960

Arab League position, 535, 564, 587, 645-646, 666*n*, 670-671, 678, 696, 714-715, 725, 727, 763-764, 836, 841, 898-900

Palestine—Continued

U.N. General Assembly resolution recommending partition, etc.—Con.

Arab militia, proposed, 541, 589, 618, 628, 688, 696, 711

Arab state: Annexation by Transjordan, proposed, 895, 899-901, 925, 1089, 1100, 1134, 1136-1137, 1165, 1172, 1211, 1238, 1305, 1419; boundaries, proposed, 547, 668, 1631; establishment of, proposed, 547, 549, 558, 577, 584*n*, 585, 605, 615, 619, 623, 646, 652, 666, 668, 672, 703-704, 751, 776*n*, 880, 897, 908-909, 928, 961, 963-964, 965*n*, 978, 1089, 1135-1136, 1165, 1296, 1357, 1480, 1596

Arab states, reaction of, 533-536, 538-540, 547-550, 552-553, 558, 560-561, 563, 565, 567, 569-571, 573, 576-579, 588, 595, 601-602, 604, 617-618, 620-622, 625, 628, 630, 632, 640, 642-645, 650, 661, 666-671, 675, 677, 678*n*, 686-688, 694-697, 715, 717, 719, 722, 724-728, 730-736, 776-777, 808-809, 838, 841-842, 844*n*, 846-849, 859, 1118, 1626

Arabs in Palestine, 547, 552-554, 558-559, 564, 574, 576, 600-602, 617, 620, 622, 630, 639-640, 670-672, 676, 686, 704-706, 714, 720, 729, 739, 742-743, 753, 757, 759, 769*n*, 770, 772, 776, 779, 784, 789, 796, 801-803, 808, 843, 848, 1405-1406

British arms shipments to Arab states, questions regarding, 562-563, 578, 581-584, 626, 695, 1019, 1031-1032

British position, 534, 536, 544, 553, 558-561, 567, 575, 577-580, 588, 592-593, 602, 609, 611-612, 620, 628, 630, 637, 639-642, 647, 664-666, 668-670, 672, 683-684, 688, 695-696, 698-699, 724-725, 748, 756-757, 763, 961-962

British withdrawal from Palestine, 534, 539, 544, 548, 560-561, 568, 570, 581, 587-588, 599, 608, 612, 614, 620, 624, 630, 655, 665, 668, 670-671, 681-682, 687, 689, 694, 696, 698-699, 721-722, 740, 756, 762, 768, 772, 838-839, 851, 872, 889, 894, 961-962, 1185

Economic union, proposed, 547, 553, 596, 665-666, 672, 679, 684, 701-705, 708, 716, 729, 738, 751, 759, 807, 814, 825, 843, 905, 961, 977, 1002, 1089, 1135-1136, 1170, 1306, 1357, 1401, 1595

Egyptian position, 534, 539-540, 548, 555, 621, 644, 671, 720, 723, 846

Palestine—Continued

U.N. General Assembly resolution recommending partition, etc.—Con.

Immigration of Jews, questions regarding continuation of, 537–539, 565, 604, 612, 624, 641, 644, 654, 669–670, 672, 677, 698, 717–718, 724, 734, 753*n*, 757, 760*n*, 763–764, 767*n*, 769*n*, 788, 803, 808–810, 818, 822, 824, 846, 848–849, 859, 864, 867–868, 873, 875, 877–878, 884, 887–888, 915–916, 918, 921, 923–926, 928, 937–943, 945–946, 955, 972, 1055, 1089, 1096, 1098, 1100, 1125

Implementation and enforcement, problems concerning, 541–542, 545, 548–551, 553–554, 557–559, 563, 573–578, 586–587, 590, 622–623, 629, 642, 644, 646, 657, 684–685, 742, 748, 813–817, 825, 870, 898, 944, 977, 1266

Iraqi position, 534–536, 548, 555–556, 596–597, 609, 616–617, 641, 671, 720, 753*n*, 761, 767

Jerusalem, proposed international regime for, 547, 558, 560, 579, 584–585, 589, 599, 607, 618, 666, 670, 672–674, 684, 689, 716, 750–751, 758, 763, 765–766, 814, 833–833–835, 838, 961, 1002, 1089–1090, 1278, 1378, 1404, 1436, 1482, 1484, 1488, 1525, 1547, 1592, 1594, 1596, 1666

Jewish Agency position, 536–538, 547, 561, 565–569, 608, 636, 640–643, 645–648, 654, 667, 669, 671, 753, 918, 960, 963*n*, 985

Jewish militia, 538, 541, 567, 589, 608, 618, 628, 644, 648, 654, 672, 688, 696, 709, 711, 715

Jewish state: Proposed boundaries of, 547, 668–669, 672–673, 989, 1002, 1019, 1135, 1144, 1165, 1204, 1288, 1303, 1367–1368, 1399, 1403–1404, 1430*n*, 1439, 1452–1453, 1466, 1473, 1507–1508, 1513, 1531, 1550, 1554, 1563, 1565–1567, 1574, 1586, 1595–1596, 1599, 1601, 1604–1610, 1612, 1617–1618, 1625, 1633, 1637, 1639, 1681–1682; proposed establishment of, 547, 549, 553, 558–559, 566, 569, 577, 584*n*, 585, 588, 597–598, 603, 605, 607, 609, 614–615, 617, 619–620, 622–623, 642, 644, 648, 652, 656, 666–669, 671–674, 677, 703–704, 709, 715–716, 751, 753, 758, 765, 776*n*, 808–809, 823, 832*n*, 842–843, 846, 848, 876*n*, 880, 883–884, 888–889, 891, 894, 897, 899, 901, 906, 908–911, 918–921, 923–924, 928–932, 935–938, 940, 953, 960–961, 963–964, 965*n*, 967,

Palestine—Continued

U.N. General Assembly resolution recommending partition, etc.—Con.

Jewish state: Proposed boundaries of—Continued
972–974, 978, 1041, 1042*n*, 1089, 1100, 1513

Jews in Palestine, 554, 566, 576, 601–602, 639–640, 646, 667, 676, 704–706, 720, 729, 742–743, 753, 757, 759, 769*n*, 770, 772, 776, 779, 784, 789, 796, 801–803, 808, 843

Joint Economic Board, proposed, 635, 668

Lebanese position, 534, 561, 616–617, 643–644, 671, 846

Mandate: Proposals for continuation or extension of, 604, 632, 640, 647, 655, 681, 698–699, 717, 767, 804*n*, 810, 891–893, 897*n*, 906–908, 917–918, 966, 969; termination of, *May 15, 1948*, 535, 543, 547, 558, 581, 612, 618, 620, 624, 630–631, 641, 666, 668, 670, 676, 680–682, 684, 701, 710–711, 717, 723, 734, 736, 740–742, 751, 758–759, 762, 764, 768, 772–773, 790–792, 806, 810, 828, 831, 834, 840, 842–844, 853, 862, 883, 886, 889–890, 892, 896, 897*n*, 898, 906–908, 910, 912–913, 919, 935–936, 939, 942, 945–946, 956, 961–962, 974, 977, 980–981, 983–985, 990*n*, 998, 1002–1003, 1032, 1038, 1076, 1185, 1200, 1215, 1249, 1313, 1447, 1643

Pakistani position, 569, 571, 621

Provisional governments, proposed establishment of, 545*n*

Saudi Arabian position, 534, 540*n*, 548, 550, 603–604, 621, 694–696, 753*n*, 767

Soviet position, 548–549, 551–553, 566, 631, 644–645, 667, 672–673, 696, 722, 1075, 1081–1082, 1246, 1432, 1480, 1531

Suspension of, proposed, 944, 949–950, 952, 962

Syrian position, 534, 548, 555–556, 572*n*, 609, 616–617, 641, 644, 671, 720, 767, 846

Transjordanian position, 534–535, 544, 548, 615, 641, 671, 723, 761, 846, 895

U.N. armed forces for implementation, question of, 554, 622–623, 625, 632, 642–643, 648, 665, 667, 670, 672–674, 688–689, 698, 763

U.S. arms for Jewish state, question of, 549, 553, 566, 622–623, 643, 673, 688

U.S. economic and financial assistance to Jewish state, question of, 541, 553, 622–623, 643

Palestine—Continued

- U.N. General Assembly resolution recommending partition, etc.—Con.
- U.S. military forces to enforce partition, proposals regarding possible utilization of, 542, 549, 552–554, 565, 579, 586–587, 592, 595, 597, 622–623, 628, 632, 656, 673, 689–691, 699*n*, 756, 760, 774
- U.S. position, 534, 537–540, 542, 545–554, 556–566, 569–571, 573–581, 587–589, 616–625, 627–632, 634, 645, 647, 656, 687–696, 977, 1259, 1303, 1305, 1430*n*, 1451, 1513, 1531, 1563
- U.N. General Assembly Special Session, *Apr.–May 1948*:
- Arab Higher Committee, position of, 797, 799, 865, 891, 893, 913, 915, 966
- Arab states, position of, 859–860, 862–863, 865, 871–872, 873*n*, 875, 887–889, 891, 894, 911, 915, 920–921, 983–984
- Argentine position, 805
- Australian position, 805, 845, 987
- Belgian position, 805
- Brazilian position, 805
- British position, 804, 806, 826, 837, 839–840, 845, 847, 850–851, 855–856, 877, 882–886, 896–897, 899, 906–907, 912–913, 919–920, 926–927, 935–940, 949–951, 953, 956, 966, 968–971, 974, 979, 981, 994
- British Commonwealth position, 898, 938
- Canadian position, 805, 936–939, 950–951, 953, 970, 981
- Chinese position, 979, 994
- Committee I hearings and recommendations, 835, 843, 845, 857, 863–864, 871*n*, 880–881, 892–893, 905, 909, 939, 949–951, 956, 958–959, 968, 979, 986–987, 994, 1170
- Committee IV hearings, 835, 863
- Draft trusteeship agreement for Palestine, 778–796, 802–805
- Egyptian position, 805, 836–837, 844*n*, 862–863, 872, 900
- French position, 845, 857, 871, 958, 968, 979, 994, 1321
- Guatemalan position, 892
- Iraqi position, 872, 900, 902
- Jerusalem, proposals regarding future status of, 845–846, 853–855, 857, 860–862, 868–869, 871, 879, 901–903, 912, 917, 926, 943–944, 946, 950–951, 958, 966, 968–969, 979–980, 1321
- Jewish Agency position, 797, 799, 864–865, 880, 890–891, 893–894, 900, 913, 915, 918–922, 947, 966, 971*n*, 973–974
- Latin American position, 898

Palestine—Continued

- U.N. General Assembly resolution recommending partition, etc.—Con.
- Lebanese position, 871, 900
- Mexican position, 805
- Netherlands position, 805
- New Zealand position, 805
- Resolution on Jerusalem, *May 6, 1948*, 917, 943–944, 951
- Resolution on Palestine, *May 14, 1948*, 994–995, 1001, 1029, 1054, 1126, 1134–1135, 1139, 1158, 1160, 1176, 1185, 1225, 1254–1255, 1266, 1318, 1355, 1363, 1387, 1396, 1409, 1481, 1604, 1662
- Saudi Arabian position, 847–849, 859–860, 871, 888, 900
- Soviet position, 829, 900–901, 936, 939, 952–953, 965, 979, 994, 1246
- Swedish position, 805, 871*n*
- Syrian position, 872, 900, 902
- Transjordanian position, 836, 863*n*, 865, 869, 872, 876, 896*n*, 899–901, 931, 937, 939–940
- U.N. Commissioner for Palestine, proposed, 957–958, 979–982
- U.N. Mediator for Palestine, establishment of, 994–995
- U.N. Security Council truce efforts, support for, 978–979, 981, 987, 994, 1013
- U.N. security forces, proposals regarding, 802–803, 805–806, 825, 829–830, 836–837, 842, 851, 949–951, 987
- U.N. trusteeship for Palestine, proposed, 813–814, 816, 829–832, 834–835, 839–840, 845–849, 851, 853, 855–860, 863, 865, 870, 876*n*, 878, 880, 883, 888, 898–899, 902, 904, 910, 919, 925, 935–940, 942–944, 948–953, 965–966, 968–971, 978, 980, 986–987, 1013, 1246
- U.S. military forces required for U.N. trusteeship, considerations regarding, 797–800, 802*n*, 803, 829–830, 832–833, 842, 845, 851–852, 899, 904, 953, 987
- U.S. position, 813–817, 825, 828–835, 839–840, 843–853, 856–857, 860–861, 870, 880–881, 885–888, 891–892, 898–901, 905, 935–936, 942, 949–953, 957–958, 965, 978–981, 984, 986–988, 994, 1013, 1246, 1321
- Western European position, 898
- U.N. mediation efforts:
- Arab position, 1135, 1159, 1192–1194, 1196, 1198–1209, 1211–1212, 1214–1215, 1224, 1226, 1228–1229, 1230*n*, 1234, 1237–1242, 1251, 1253–1254, 1257, 1268–1270, 1276–1277, 1281, 1289–1290, 1295–1297, 1300–

Palestine—Continued

U.N. mediation efforts—Continued

Arab position—Continued

1301, 1303, 1307-1309, 1313, 1315, 1337, 1341*n*, 1343, 1349-1352, 1355, 1357-1359, 1363, 1367, 1370, 1373-1374, 1382-1383, 1388-1389, 1396, 1399-1401, 1404, 1406, 1408, 1411, 1417-1420, 1422-1426, 1433-1435, 1442, 1479, 1541, 1586, 1682, 1687

Arab refugee problem, 1250, 1253, 1255, 1267, 1270, 1276*n*, 1283, 1295, 1304, 1307-1308, 1310-1312, 1314, 1324-1326, 1330-1333, 1338, 1344, 1349-1351, 1357, 1364, 1366-1367, 1374, 1378, 1381-1383, 1385, 1387, 1393, 1397-1398, 1400, 1401*n*, 1403-1406, 1425, 1434, 1444, 1454-1459, 1465-1466, 1477-1480, 1485-1486, 1542

Arab state under Transjordan, proposed, 1153, 1159, 1191, 1211, 1238, 1305, 1344, 1353, 1357, 1445-1446, 1471

Arms embargo to Palestine and neighboring states, 1255-1256, 1271, 1279-1286, 1292, 1362, 1368, 1371, 1406-1408

Belgian role, 1260, 1264, 1278, 1294, 1306, 1308-1309, 1336

British policy toward, 1192-1194, 1199, 1202-1205, 1209-1210, 1216, 1238-1240, 1260, 1267-1268, 1271, 1274, 1283, 1285, 1288-1294, 1303, 1305, 1314-1315, 1319-1320, 1342-1345, 1352-1360, 1365-1366, 1368-1369, 1371-1375, 1383-1384, 1388-1390, 1394-1396, 1398-1400, 1407, 1409-1412, 1418, 1429, 1438, 1441, 1449-1450

Conciliation Commission, proposed, 1404-1405, 1425, 1450, 1454*n*, 1458, 1482-1483

Egyptian position, 1230*n*, 1238, 1287*n*, 1324, 1344, 1357, 1385, 1387, 1405, 1419, 1423-1425, 1472

Federation or union proposals, 1153, 1159, 1191, 1210, 1267

French role, 1260, 1264, 1275, 1278, 1286, 1294, 1306, 1308-1309, 1314, 1336, 1399

Haifa, future status of, 1154, 1168, 1176-1177, 1196, 1267, 1288, 1303, 1343, 1355-1357, 1374, 1382, 1386, 1395, 1399, 1404, 1422-1423, 1425, 1512, 1532, 1638

Palestine—Continued

U.N. mediation efforts—Continued

Immigration proposals, 1153, 1159, 1177-1178, 1191, 1201, 1230*n*, 1239, 1253-1255, 1281, 1304-1305, 1307, 1348-1349, 1370-1371, 1385, 1434, 1452-1453

Iraqi position, 1230*n*, 1238, 1272-1273, 1289, 1312, 1405, 1419*n*, 1687

Israeli position, 1135, 1191-1192, 1196, 1198, 1200, 1202, 1205-1206, 1208, 1215, 1224, 1226, 1230*n*, 1234, 1237, 1239, 1241-1242, 1250-1251, 1254, 1256-1258, 1263, 1275, 1277, 1287-1288, 1290, 1292-1304, 1306-1307, 1309-1315, 1317-1319, 1321, 1328, 1334-1340, 1344, 1347-1348, 1353, 1355, 1357-1358, 1364, 1366-1369, 1376, 1382, 1384-1386, 1389, 1392-1393, 1395, 1400-1402, 1406, 1411, 1415, 1428-1429, 1435-1436, 1442, 1444, 1451, 1541

Jaffa, future status of, 1153, 1159, 1166-1167, 1267, 1303, 1420, 1422-1423, 1425

Jerusalem, security and future status of, 1153, 1162, 1175, 1186-1187, 1191-1193, 1195-1196, 1203-1204, 1211, 1224-1225, 1228, 1231, 1233-1234, 1238-1240, 1242-1243, 1250-1252, 1256-1258, 1263, 1267, 1274, 1276-1279, 1286*n*, 1287-1288, 1293-1294, 1296-1299, 1303, 1305, 1307-1309, 1313-1314, 1316, 1320, 1328, 1329*n*, 1337-1338, 1343-1344, 1347-1348, 1353, 1355-1357, 1359, 1363, 1366-1368, 1374-1376, 1378, 1382, 1385-1386, 1392-1393, 1395, 1399, 1403-1404, 1420, 1423, 1425-1426, 1428-1429, 1436, 1440-1441

Lebanese position, 1230*n*, 1295, 1405, 1417, 1419*n*, 1472, 1505

Peace settlement, proposals for direct negotiations concerning, 1336-1340, 1347, 1366-1367, 1374, 1376-1378, 1385-1386, 1393-1394, 1436-1437, 1526, 1544-1545, 1548-1550, 1552-1553, 1556-1557, 1560-1561, 1564-1565

Saudi Arabian position, 1159, 1216, 1230*n*, 1238, 1318, 1424

Syrian position, 1159, 1216, 1230*n*, 1289, 1324, 1370-1371, 1405, 1419*n*, 1421-1422, 1472, 1505

Territorial boundaries, 1153, 1159, 1191, 1204, 1238, 1242, 1268-1270, 1288-1289, 1296, 1303, 1305-1306, 1309-1310, 1316,

Palestine—Continued

U.N. mediation efforts—Continued

Territorial boundaries—Continued

1340, 1343-1345, 1350-1351, 1353, 1355-1357, 1363, 1367-1370, 1372, 1374, 1376, 1378, 1381-1382, 1385-1387, 1393, 1395-1399, 1402-1404, 1422-1423, 1425, 1428-1429, 1430*n*, 1431, 1433-1435, 1437, 1439, 1445-1446, 1451-1453, 1472

Transjordanian position, 1203, 1205, 1211, 1230*n*, 1237-1238, 1276, 1280, 1283, 1289, 1295, 1303-1306, 1309-1310, 1314-1315, 1319, 1324, 1343-1344, 1357-1359, 1367-1368, 1374, 1376-1378, 1382-1385, 1387, 1395, 1404-1405, 1419-1420, 1429, 1445-1446, 1451, 1465-1466, 1471-1473

Truce extension, efforts to obtain, 1186-1187, 1189-1198, 1200-1203, 1205-1207, 1209-1213, 1216, 1224

U.N. Acting Mediator (Bunche), 1442-1444, 1454-1456, 1464, 1477-1479, 1486-1487, 1492-1495, 1497, 1508, 1512, 1516, 1527, 1538, 1543, 1545-1547, 1555-1556, 1568-1569, 1575-1576, 1579, 1581, 1583, 1587-1588, 1589*n*, 1597, 1600-1601, 1604, 1609, 1614-1616, 1621-1623, 1626, 1652-1655, 1689-1691, 1695, 1699

U.N. Mediator (Bernadotte) :

Activities and proposals, 982, 994-995, 1001, 1026, 1029, 1032, 1054, 1063, 1066, 1069-1070, 1078-1080, 1083, 1085-1090, 1091*n*, 1093-1095, 1097, 1098*n*, 1101-1103, 1104*n*, 1107, 1110*n*, 1111-1117, 1120-1126, 1129-1135, 1138-1141, 1143-1144, 1146-1150, 1152-1155, 1159, 1161-1163, 1167, 1170, 1172*n*, 1174, 1176-1178, 1180, 1182, 1185-1187, 1189-1191, 1193-1194, 1197-1198, 1201-1211, 1213-1216, 1224-1226, 1228-1229, 1233, 1237, 1239-1242, 1253-1258, 1261-1263, 1265-1269, 1271-1272, 1274-1277, 1282, 1286*n*, 1287-1290, 1292-1296, 1298-1306, 1308-1316, 1318, 1320-1321, 1325, 1328-1329, 1331-1333, 1335-1336, 1340-1345, 1347-1353, 1355-1359, 1361, 1363, 1365-1366, 1368-1375, 1378, 1382-1384, 1386-1390, 1392, 1394-1409, 1411-1413, 1416, 1420, 1430, 1433-1437, 1439-1443, 1446, 1456-1457, 1459, 1473-

Palestine—Continued

U.N. Mediator (Bernadotte)—Con.

Activities and proposals—Con.

1474, 1486, 1550, 1662, 1686-1687, 1694

Assassination of, 1412-1414, 1433, 1442, 1457, 1474, 1482, 1493-1494, 1536*n*

Report, *Sept. 16, 1948*, 1401-1406, 1409-1411, 1413, 1415-1426, 1427*n*, 1428, 1430-1441, 1445-1446, 1448-1456, 1458-1461, 1463-1464, 1466, 1468-1475, 1480-1482, 1484-1485, 1488-1490, 1495-1499, 1501, 1505, 1507-1508, 1512, 1514-1517, 1519-1520, 1525, 1545, 1547, 1551-1552, 1560, 1565-1566, 1569-1571, 1574, 1581, 1584*n*, 1587-1588, 1591-1592, 1596, 1599, 1601-1602, 1604-1612, 1617, 1621-1627, 1637-1638, 1656, 1661, 1681-1682, 1688.

U.S. military forces, request for, 1235-1236, 1251-1252, 1274, 1322

U.S. policy toward, 1186-1187, 1194, 1199, 1209-1210, 1237, 1239, 1258-1263, 1275-1279, 1286, 1288-1291, 1303-1306, 1308-1310, 1313-1315, 1318-1319, 1321, 1328-1329, 1334-1335, 1338-1341, 1348, 1351, 1362-1363, 1365-1369, 1371-1372, 1375-1378, 1381-1382, 1386-1387, 1392, 1396-1400, 1406-1408, 1413, 1415-1417, 1426, 1433-1439, 1443*n*, 1445-1448, 1452-1453

U.N. military observers (United States, Belgium, France), 1078-1080, 1090-1091, 1093-1099, 1101-1104, 1112-1113, 1116, 1126, 1140-1141, 1157, 1178, 1193, 1205, 1208, 1225-1228, 1230, 1234, 1236-1237, 1239, 1241-1243, 1251, 1263-1265, 1271, 1275-1276, 1278, 1296, 1302, 1308-1309, 1313, 1317, 1328, 1335-1336, 1355, 1361, 1363, 1375, 1384, 1412, 1443, 1468, 1488, 1493-1494, 1541-1542, 1634, 1638, 1644, 1686-1688, 1699, 1703

U.N. Palestine Commission :

Activities of, 539-540, 547, 549, 558, 564, 590, 599-600, 608, 623, 628, 649, 654-655, 665-668, 670, 675, 684, 688-689, 750-751, 814, 905, 941, 958, 961, 995*n*, 1649

Arab Higher Committee, position of the, 540, 668-670

Arabs in Palestine, positions of, 547, 549, 606, 666

Jewish Agency position, 540, 566-569, 608, 667-670, 711

Palestine—Continued

U.N. Palestine Commission—Con.

Jews in Palestine, position of, 606
Mandatory Power (United Kingdom), attitude of, 540, 544-545, 554-555, 557, 568, 587, 599-600, 604-606, 612, 615, 631, 641, 647, 654, 666, 668-670, 672, 688, 695, 711, 723

Members (Bolivia, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Panama, Philippines), 540, 668-670

Palestine sterling balances, utilization of, 634-636

Reports, 544-545, 554, 568, 572, 587, 589-590, 599, 601, 604-605, 614-617, 624, 629-631, 638, 651, 657-658, 686, 711, 720, 738, 771, 815, 825

Suspension of, 968, 979, 984, 986-987, 995, 1266

U.N. Security Council:

Arab Higher Committee position, 568*n*, 605, 613-614, 618, 651*n*, 686-687, 699-705, 707, 718-719, 727-728, 738-739, 759*n*, 761, 770, 801, 805, 809-810, 820, 827, 830-832, 866-869, 872, 874, 905, 923-924, 926-929, 945, 969, 1010, 1164, 1166

Arab League Military Commission, 863

Arab League position, 804*n*, 830-831, 858, 864*n*, 875, 879, 915-916, 945, 947, 954*n*, 969, 1000, 1026, 1040-1041, 1056*n*, 1058, 1063-1065, 1069, 1078, 1085-1086, 1206, 1223, 1253, 1654, 1662*n*, 1677, 1694-1695, 1706

Arab refugee problem, 1249-1250, 1252-1255, 1262-1263, 1295, 1311-1312, 1331, 1344

Argentine position, 775, 911, 1214, 1223, 1224*n*

Armistice proposals, 1555-1556, 1560, 1573, 1576-1578, 1580, 1582-1584, 1588-1589, 1597, 1601, 1603, 1614, 1616, 1621*n*, 1631-1632, 1638*n*, 1653, 1655, 1660*n*, 1662, 1674, 1679-1680, 1687-1689, 1691, 1695, 1698, 1700, 1702, 1704-1707

Assassination of U.N. Mediator, 1474, 1493-1494

Belgian position, 661-664, 675-676, 678-680, 685, 923, 947, 1079, 1090-1091, 1095-1096, 1214, 1220-1221, 1231, 1528, 1539, 1543, 1546, 1575, 1583*n*, 1597, 1677*n*, 1699

British arms embargo to Palestine and neighboring states, 1019, 1031-1032, 1064, 1067-1069, 1071, 1073, 1077, 1111*n*, 1145, 1157, 1177, 1194, 1216-1217,

Palestine—Continued

U.N. Security Council—Continued

British arms embargo to Palestine and neighboring states—Con.
1256, 1271, 1280, 1285, 1293, 1329, 1499-1500, 1517, 1520-1522, 1524, 1530, 1534, 1537, 1540, 1565, 1571, 1579, 1585, 1587-1588, 1590, 1629, 1669, 1681-1682, 1702-1703

British position, 618, 654, 658, 673, 676, 678-679, 682, 686, 688, 699-702, 704, 706-707, 709-710, 720-723, 727, 737-739, 741-742, 758-759, 761, 765, 767*n*, 769*n*, 775, 797-800, 812, 819, 821-822, 826, 877, 923-925, 935, 941, 946-948, 955-956, 997-999, 1016, 1019-1020, 1024-1027, 1032, 1034-1035, 1040-1041, 1044, 1046-1050, 1063-1072, 1076-1077, 1080-1082, 1086, 1090-1093, 1097-1101, 1109, 1115-1116, 1121-1125, 1143-1144, 1157-1158, 1164, 1166-1168, 1181-1182, 1185, 1189-1190, 1192-1195, 1198*n*, 1199, 1203-1206, 1208-1212, 1214-1216, 1223, 1225-1226, 1249-1250, 1252-1255, 1262-1263, 1268-1269, 1288-1291, 1329*n*, 1474, 1493, 1519-1523, 1525, 1528-1530, 1533, 1537, 1539-1540, 1543, 1550, 1553-1554, 1559-1560, 1562-1563, 1565, 1575-1576, 1579, 1581, 1582*n*, 1583*n*, 1585-1591, 1655, 1658-1659, 1677*n*, 1688-1689, 1691-1692, 1695-1696, 1698, 1699*n*, 1701-1704, 1706

Canadian position, 812, 819, 821-822, 1185, 1214, 1223, 1306, 1329*n*, 1528, 1559, 1575-1576, 1582*n*, 1583*n*, 1597*n*, 1677, 1679

Cease-fire efforts, 1009, 1027-1029, 1032-1034, 1039-1041, 1043-1045, 1054-1056, 1058, 1062-1072, 1075-1076, 1078, 1080-1087, 1090-1107, 1110-1114, 1116-1117, 1126, 1150, 1162-1163, 1267, 1298-1299, 1302, 1320, 1328, 1372, 1382, 1389, 1491-1494, 1498, 1516-1518, 1534, 1688

Chinese position, 673, 680, 699-702, 707-708, 712-713, 731, 737, 741, 746-747, 757, 819, 821-822, 911, 1185, 1222, 1225-1226, 1306, 1474, 1493, 1519*n*, 1521, 1523, 1528-1529, 1533, 1539, 1554, 1575, 1677*n*

Colombian position, 654-655, 658, 664, 680, 775, 809-811, 819, 821, 853, 911, 1029, 1128, 1222, 1539, 1543, 1546, 1699

Palestine—Continued

U.N. Security Council—Continued

Committee of Permanent Members,
654, 658, 660, 662, 664*n*, 676,
678, 685, 687, 699-723, 725-740,
741*n*, 749-750, 771-772, 801

Committee on the Palestine ques-
tion (United States, United
Kingdom, Soviet Union, China,
France, Belgium, Colombia),
1546-1547, 1575, 1583, 1630,
1654-1655, 1692, 1695, 1699

Conciliation efforts, 676-677, 679-
680

Considerations, 537-538, 554, 557-
558, 561, 565, 615, 667, 779

Cuban position, 1699

Egyptian position, 568, 651*n*, 677-
678, 728, 753*n*, 777, 804*n*, 1210,
1491-1492, 1499-1501, 1518,
1526, 1538, 1546, 1580, 1653-
1655, 1662, 1679, 1691, 1699*n*

Enforcement of U.N. General As-
sembly resolution recommend-
ing partition, 541, 543, 559-560,
566-568, 572, 579, 587-591, 595,
613, 618, 622-624, 629-630, 638-
640, 648*n*, 651-654, 657-661,
667, 673-676, 678-680, 682, 686,
687*n*, 688, 696, 699, 702, 704-
706, 708-710, 712-714, 717, 719,
725-727, 729, 733-735, 738-739,
742-743, 745, 748-749, 772, 777,
801, 814-815, 843, 1289

French position, 618, 661-664, 673,
685, 699-702, 707-708, 713, 717,
731, 737, 741, 746-747, 757, 799-
800, 804, 806, 812, 819, 821, 826,
923, 946-948, 1029, 1041*n*, 1077,
1079, 1081, 1090-1091, 1095-
1096, 1128, 1175, 1185, 1223,
1231, 1329*n*, 1519, 1538-1539,
1560, 1575-1576, 1583*n*, 1597,
1677, 1679, 1692

Immigration of men of military age
into Palestine or neighboring
states, 1077-1083, 1085*n*, 1086-
1087, 1091-1092, 1096, 1098-
1100, 1102-1103, 1107, 1126,
1129-1131, 1142*n*, 1145, 1147-
1149, 1177-1178, 1419

International refugee problem,
1249, 1252-1254, 1262-1263, 1267

Iraqi position, 1009, 1010*n*, 1041*n*,
1055-1056, 1679, 1687, 1689

Israeli position, 1160, 1474, 1492*n*,
1493, 1518, 1521, 1526-1529,
1533, 1537-1538, 1542, 1544-
1546, 1550-1551, 1554, 1559,
1562-1563, 1574, 1576-1582,
1585-1587, 1589-1591, 1606-
1607, 1614-1616, 1619, 1626,
1630-1632, 1634, 1652-1655,
1659, 1662-1663, 1676-1677,

Palestine—Continued

U.N. Security Council—Continued

Israeli position—Continued

1679-1680, 1682, 1687-1689,
1693-1696, 1699-1700, 1702-
1703, 1706

Jerusalem:

Cease-fire arrangements for, 954,
956, 971-972, 986, 1010, 1012,
1029, 1035, 1038-1039, 1043,
1045*n*, 1049, 1058, 1062-1063,
1066, 1069, 1075-1078, 1223,
1225-1226, 1228, 1231, 1234,
1239*n*, 1258-1259, 1263, 1276,
1493, 1619, 1622-1623, 1634-
1635, 1638, 1641, 1644, 1647,
1654, 1660*n*, 1662, 1688

Condominium, proposed, 1305,
1343, 1441

Demilitarization, proposed, 1138-
1139, 1175-1176, 1185-1187,
1192-1193, 1195-1196, 1203,
1211, 1225, 1231, 1238-1240,
1243, 1250-1251, 1257-1259,
1264-1265, 1276-1279, 1287-
1288, 1294, 1296-1297, 1299,
1305, 1313-1314, 1320-1321,
1329*n*, 1337-1338, 1359, 1361,
1366-1367, 1392, 1426, 1558,
1638*n*, 1665-1666

International regime, proposed,
1124, 1134, 1137, 1141, 1144,
1154, 1160, 1166-1168, 1172,
1174-1176, 1204, 1212, 1233,
1242-1243, 1250, 1267, 1277-
1279, 1286*n*, 1288, 1292, 1294,
1302, 1307, 1309, 1316, 1353,
1362-1363, 1368, 1378, 1392,
1399, 1404, 1429, 1512-1513,
1531, 1561, 1572-1573, 1590,
1592, 1663, 1667

Protection and security of, 862,
868, 928, 933, 948, 1138-1139,
1155-1156

U.N. armed guard, proposed,
1138-1139, 1155-1156, 1162,
1175-1176, 1231, 1235-1236,
1240, 1251-1252, 1264-1265,
1274, 1294, 1296-1297, 1308,
1328, 1337, 1361, 1392, 1395,
1399, 1484

Jewish Agency position, 537-538,
568, 605, 618, 640, 686, 699-703,
707-709, 712-718, 727, 732, 734-
735, 738-739, 741, 753*n*, 761-
764, 770, 776-777, 801, 805, 809-
810, 819-820, 827, 831-832, 866-
869, 872, 874-876, 878, 905, 917-
924, 926-930, 940, 945, 953, 969,
971-973, 1069, 1071, 1076, 1082,
1160, 1179

Lebanese position, 568, 651*n*, 659,
728, 753*n*, 761, 764, 1009, 1010*n*,
1041*n*, 1518, 1569-1570

Palestine—Continued

U.N. Security Council—Continued

Norwegian position, 1699

Peace negotiations, proposals concerning, 1582-1584, 1602-1604, 1606, 1614-1616, 1622, 1634, 1644, 1647, 1653, 1655, 1658-1659, 1663, 1667-1668, 1686-1687, 1689, 1693, 1695, 1700, 1702, 1704-1707

Polish position, 538

Resolution calling for Special Session of the General Assembly on Palestine, *Apr. 1, 1948*, 777, 801, 815, 843

Resolutions calling for armistice, cease fire, or truce:

Mar. 1, 881, 905

Mar. 5, 685-688, 699-700, 702, 705-707, 712-713, 725, 727, 730, 733, 738, 801, 881, 978

Apr. 1, 777, 801, 819-820, 827, 849, 881, 905, 926, 975, 978

Apr. 17, 827-828, 852, 858, 881, 897, 905, 926, 931*n*, 943, 947, 959, 963-964, 970, 975, 978, 981, 1008, 1013-1014, 1027, 1055, 1065, 1070

Apr. 23, 853, 857, 881, 905, 957, 975, 978-979, 995, 1009, 1029, 1185

May 22, 1029, 1033-1034, 1041*n*, 1054, 1058, 1065-1067, 1128, 1225

May 29, 1077-1087, 1091-1094, 1097-1100, 1102-1103, 1106-1107, 1109-1111, 1126, 1128, 1130, 1135, 1139-1140, 1158, 1173-1174, 1177-1179, 1189-1195, 1197-1198, 1207, 1209-1211, 1216, 1218, 1224-1225, 1234, 1256, 1271, 1300, 1349, 1356, 1361, 1407, 1442, 1474, 1481, 1538, 1540-1541, 1545*n*, 1546, 1555, 1580

July 7, 1197, 1202, 1224, 1246-1247

July 15, 1224-1228, 1230*n*, 1237, 1239, 1246, 1251, 1253-1254, 1257-1258, 1277, 1294, 1296, 1301, 1313, 1320, 1322, 1324, 1329, 1356, 1361, 1367, 1402, 1407, 1442-1443, 1474, 1481-1482, 1492, 1494, 1498, 1519, 1522, 1538, 1540-1541, 1545*n*, 1546, 1555-1556, 1580

Aug. 19, 1329-1330, 1443, 1474, 1494, 1538, 1540-1541, 1545*n*, 1546

Oct. 19, 1493-1494, 1498, 1503, 1515, 1518, 1538, 1545*n*, 1546

Nov. 4, 1546-1547, 1550-1554, 1559-1560, 1562-1563, 1575-1577, 1579-1585, 1588-1589, 1600, 1614-1616, 1630-1632, 1653-1655, 1691-1692, 1695, 1699

Palestine—Continued

U.N. Security Council—Continued

Resolutions calling for armistice, cease fire, or truce—Continued
Nov. 16, 1597, 1604, 1614, 1616, 1626, 1637, 1646, 1653-1654, 1662, 1674, 1679, 1688-1692, 1695, 1699

Dec. 29, 1699

Resumption of hostilities by Israel, 1689-1692, 1695-1696, 1698-1706

Sanctions against violations of truce, proposals regarding, 937-938, 1014, 1017, 1025, 1027, 1032, 1048-1049, 1054-1055, 1066, 1068, 1121-1122, 1127, 1134, 1147, 1159, 1173, 1189, 1205, 1210-1211, 1216, 1228-1229, 1243, 1334-1335, 1338-1339, 1353, 1368-1369, 1372, 1378, 1381-1382, 1399, 1403, 1519, 1523, 1525-1526, 1528*n*, 1536, 1538, 1540, 1551, 1553-1554, 1559, 1563, 1573-1576, 1582*n*, 1584, 1586, 1591, 1598, 1603, 1629, 1658-1659, 1694

Saudi Arabian position, 1009, 1010*n*

Soviet position, 616, 618, 624, 667, 674, 676, 678*n*, 685, 689, 699-702, 705-712, 720, 730-735, 741, 767, 776, 797, 801, 803*n*, 806, 819, 822-823, 827*n*, 853, 865, 911, 948, 953, 970, 1026, 1029, 1032, 1035, 1049, 1067-1068, 1070-1071, 1075-1076, 1077*n*, 1084, 1091*n*, 1097, 1099, 1103, 1112-1113, 1128, 1139, 1145, 1160, 1182-1183, 1197, 1207, 1215, 1223, 1224*n*, 1225-1226, 1246, 1254, 1260*n*, 1263, 1289-1290, 1322-1324, 1345, 1360-1362, 1372, 1382, 1460, 1493, 1526, 1528-1529, 1531, 1535, 1537, 1540, 1546*n*, 1554, 1575-1576, 1584, 1593-1594, 1597, 1620, 1677*n*, 1699*n*

Special Session of the General Assembly on Palestine, 542, 554, 559-560, 562, 564, 565*n*, 588, 616, 618, 622, 624, 632, 640, 655, 660, 664, 667, 675, 679, 681, 697, 699, 724-725, 730, 738, 740-741, 743, 747, 752, 754, 770-771, 774-775, 801, 812, 818, 843

Status of Palestine after British withdrawal and end of mandate, 682-685, 697, 700, 728, 907-912, 1215, 1249, 1643

Subcommittee on Palestine (United Kingdom, China, France, Belgium, Ukraine), 1528, 1535-1536, 1538-1541, 1543, 1544*n*

Syrian position, 538, 568, 572*n*, 706-707, 728, 753*n*, 761, 818-819, 822, 852, 911, 1009, 1010*n*, 1041*n*,

Palestine—Continued

U.N. Security Council—Continued

Syrian position—Continued

1093, 1113*n*, 1197, 1215, 1222-1223, 1224*n*, 1493, 1518, 1575, 1597, 1677*n*

Threats to international peace and security, considerations concerning, 638-639, 649-650, 652-653, 658-659, 661-662, 665, 678, 682, 688, 706, 719, 721-722, 725-727, 729-735, 740, 742, 814, 865, 895, 907, 937, 948, 998, 1007-1010, 1014, 1016-1017, 1019-1022, 1024-1027, 1029, 1035-1036, 1045*n*, 1063, 1067, 1127-1129, 1134, 1172-1173, 1197, 1198*n*, 1202-1203, 1205-1210, 1215, 1219, 1223-1225, 1289, 1321-1322, 1357, 1362, 1368, 1396-1397, 1405, 1434, 1436, 1492, 1498, 1503-1504, 1509, 1543, 1546-1547, 1556, 1583, 1584*n*, 1703

Transjordanian position, 1009, 1010*n*, 1210, 1520-1521, 1654, 1662, 1674, 1687-1689, 1693-1695, 1699-1700, 1706-1707

Truce proposals, 726-728, 732-733, 736, 738, 740, 742-743, 755, 757, 759-763, 765, 768, 770-772, 774-775, 797-799, 801, 804-805, 809-813, 817-825, 827-828, 830-832, 833*n*, 835-836, 839-840, 843, 845, 847, 849, 851, 853, 856-859, 864-870, 872-881, 883-885, 888-889, 891-892, 896-898, 902, 904-905, 910-912, 915-936, 940-941, 944-948, 953, 956-957, 965-969, 972, 974-975, 978-979, 981, 986, 994, 997-999, 1007, 1010, 1013-1014, 1026, 1044, 1055

Ukrainian position, 685, 777, 801, 810, 827*n*, 853, 1029, 1091*n*, 1113*n*, 1128, 1197, 1223, 1224*n*, 1254, 1263, 1361, 1493, 1528, 1535, 1537, 1539-1540, 1546*n*, 1620, 1699*n*

U.N. Mediator, reports of, 1213-1215, 1366, 1372-1373, 1388, 1392, 1395-1396, 1464

U.N. military forces, proposals regarding, 1321-1324, 1360-1363

U.N. Palestine Commission, reports from and guidance to, 651-652, 654, 657-658, 660, 668, 673, 675-676, 678, 681, 684-686, 699-711, 720, 733, 738-739, 741, 743, 771, 814-815, 818, 825

U.N. trusteeship for Palestine, proposed, 554, 561, 565, 580, 588, 599, 618, 624, 632, 640, 644, 664, 681, 697-699, 724, 730, 736-738, 740-745, 747-749, 751-754, 756-757, 759-760, 763-764, 766-769, 771-774, 776-777, 797, 801-804,

Palestine—Continued

U.N. Security Council—Continued

U.N. trusteeship for Palestine, proposed—Continued
806-808, 810, 820, 823-824, 831-832, 843, 870

U.S. arms embargo for Palestine and neighboring states, 541, 549, 554, 562-563, 565, 581-583, 593, 618, 622-623, 628-629, 688, 695, 698, 755, 921-922, 1008, 1011, 1014, 1019, 1027-1028, 1031-1033, 1036, 1042-1044, 1045*n*, 1055*n*, 1060-1061, 1070-1074, 1100, 1109-1111, 1126, 1158-1161, 1177, 1179-1180, 1187, 1208, 1216-1219, 1221-1222, 1233, 1255-1256, 1260, 1271, 1280-1281, 1285, 1310, 1315, 1371, 1406-1408, 1499-1500, 1513, 1520, 1524, 1531, 1537, 1580, 1586, 1702

U.S. position, 538-539, 541, 543, 545, 565, 575, 577, 579, 589-592, 599, 604-605, 622, 624, 625-629, 632, 637-640, 643, 645, 648-654, 657-666, 675-676, 678-685, 687-697, 699-708, 712-713, 726-733, 736-751, 756-757, 759-760, 765-767, 770-777, 800-807, 811-813, 815, 818-825, 840, 843, 852-853, 857-858, 865, 870, 923-936, 944-945, 965-967, 977-987, 1007-1011, 1013, 1016-1018, 1020-1022, 1027-1029, 1034, 1041*n*, 1054-1055, 1058, 1062-1063, 1067-1072, 1079-1083, 1086-1091, 1093-1096, 1101-1104, 1107, 1110-1111, 1113-1114, 1116, 1127-1129, 1133-1139, 1147-1150, 1155-1156, 1172-1175, 1179-1188, 1195, 1197-1198, 1205-1210, 1214-1215, 1220-1223, 1262-1263, 1269, 1288-1291, 1320-1321, 1329*n*, 1361, 1378, 1381-1382, 1435-1436, 1443*n*, 1498, 1509, 1522-1524, 1527-1530, 1533-1534, 1537, 1539-1541, 1543-1544, 1550-1553, 1555-1556, 1573, 1575-1576, 1583-1584, 1659, 1677*n*, 1689-1694, 1699*n*, 1704, 1706-1707

Yemeni position, 1009, 1010*n*

U.N. Security Council Truce Commission for Palestine (Belgium, France, United States), 852, 857-858, 866-868, 873-874, 877-878, 880-882, 887, 891, 893, 921, 923, 927-929, 931-935, 941-945, 947-949, 951, 954*n*, 957, 969-972, 975, 979, 982, 994-995, 1001, 1009-1010, 1029, 1046, 1054, 1058, 1063, 1066, 1068-1069, 1075*n*, 1078-1080, 1083, 1085-1086, 1089-1090, 1093-1095, 1097, 1099, 1101, 1112-1113, 1119,

Palestine—Continued

- U.N. Security Council Truce Commission for Palestine (Belgium, France, United States)—Con.
1120*n*, 1126, 1141, 1149–1150, 1154–1156, 1175–1176, 1187, 1195, 1207, 1225, 1231, 1234, 1237, 1239*n*, 1251, 1257*n*, 1259, 1260*n*, 1263, 1276–1278, 1287, 1294, 1296–1299, 1336, 1361, 1368, 1412, 1442–1444, 1450, 1460, 1464, 1493–1494, 1500, 1516, 1558, 1597, 1604, 1634, 1638, 1644, 1649, 1662, 1687–1688
- U.N. Special Commission on Palestine, 537, 547–548, 552, 557, 559–561, 564, 568–570, 574–575, 579, 601, 619–620, 642, 645, 668, 675, 684, 715–716, 759, 977, 1303, 1393
- U.N. Trusteeship Council:
Administering authority for Jerusalem, proposed, 861–862, 871, 913, 958, 966, 968–969, 1441, 1484, 1489, 1525, 1592–1593
- Administering authority for Palestine, proposed, 625, 632, 740, 742, 766, 773, 779, 781–783, 785–788, 790–791, 793–795, 802–803, 848–849, 877, 942–944, 950, 952
- Arab Higher Committee, position of, 913–914
- Australian position, 913
- British position, 913–914, 917
- Jerusalem: Draft statute for city of, 584–585, 716, 750, 766, 802, 804, 814–815, 837–838, 905, 913, 1168, 1368, 1378, 1572; truce arrangements, 872–873, 912–914, 917
- Jewish Agency position, 913–914
- U.S. Presidential elections, considerations relating to, 690, 757, 975, 1006, 1035, 1438–1439, 1448–1449, 1470–1471, 1475, 1490, 1501, 1503, 1505, 1507–1509, 1511–1514, 1516, 1533–1534, 1540, 1570
- Palestine Conference in London, 1946, 579
- Panama, 540, 668, 1639
- Parodi, Alexandre, 661–662, 705, 707, 710, 712–713, 717, 720, 726–728, 734–737, 817–818, 821, 845, 881–882, 895, 909, 922–926, 946–948, 1043, 1063, 1099, 1161, 1538, 1560
- Pasvolsky, Leo, 542
- Patterson, Jefferson, 1090–1091, 1096, 1101*n*, 1114–1117, 1125, 1144–1145, 1155–1157, 1159, 1196, 1202–1203, 1228–1230, 1295–1296, 1693–1694
- Pearson, Lester, 661, 1559
- Peel Commission, 1106, 1136
- Penfield, James K., 1652
- Perry, Colonel, 1315
- Peru, 1639

- Philippines, 540, 614, 668
- Pinkerton, Lowell C., 1002–1004, 1015–1016, 1030, 1039–1040, 1462*n*, 1569*n*, 1570*n*, 1670–1671
- Poland, 538, 1142, 1247, 1282, 1620, 1649, 1663
- Policy Planning Staff of the U.S. Department of State: Israel, U.S. policy toward, 1222; Palestine, U.S. policy regarding, 546–554, 556–557, 559, 573–580, 592*n*, 600–601, 619–625, 628, 655–657, 964, 1020–1022, 1087–1088, 1127*n*, 1172, 1213, 1221–1222
- Potsdam Conference, 1945, 988
- Proskauer, Joseph M., 858, 864, 917
- Protitch, Dragoslav, 809
- Pyman, Lancelot, 1111*n*
- Qadri, Tahsin, 535–536
- Qawuqji (Kawukji, Quawuqji), Fawzi, 555, 609, 707, 722, 753, 1542
- Quwatly. *See* Kuwatly.
- Radius, Walter A., 1109
- Rahim, Mohamed Abdul, 1672–1674
- Rawi, Ahmed al., 1144–1145, 1568–1569
- Raynor, G. Hayden, 1174
- Recognition of Israel. *See under* Israel.
- Recognition of Transjordan by U.S., question of. *See under* Transjordan.
- Reed, Harry C., 1248
- Reedman, 1096
- Renborg, Bertil A., 615
- Republican Party Platform, 1948, 1135*n*, 1291, 1507, 1511, 1516, 1533
- Reston, James, 629*n*
- Reza, Ali. *See* Alireza.
- Rifai, Abdel Moneim, 1106, 1564
- Rifai, Samir al-, 534
- Riley, Brig. Gen. W.E., 1275, 1302, 1335–1336, 1408*n*, 1412, 1462, 1518–1519, 1541–1542, 1551–1552, 1575, 1630–1631, 1644, 1679, 1689, 1691, 1695
- Roberts, Frank K., 1047, 1449, 1534, 1681
- Rockwell, Stuart W., 1437, 1445, 1562, 1601, 1668–1669, 1676*n*, 1685*n*
- Rogers, John, 730
- Romania, 1248, 1532, 1620, 1675
- Roosevelt, Eleanor, 629, 677, 1015*n*, 1467, 1503, 1535, 1540, 1543
- Roosevelt, Franklin D., 539–540, 690–691, 930*n*
- Rosenman, Samuel I, 930*n*
- Ross, Charles G., 634, 755
- Ross, John C., 566–569, 586*n*, 626–627, 730, 769*n*, 819–821, 823–824, 864, 881*n*, 894*n*, 905*n*, 912–914, 917–920, 923–925, 936–942, 946–948, 965–971, 981, 984, 993, 997–999, 1007, 1016–1017, 1024–1027, 1040*n*, 1043–1044, 1055–1056, 1087, 1091*n*, 1112–1113, 1163, 1171*n*, 1191–1192, 1223, 1256–

- Ross, John C.—Continued
 1257, 1259*n*, 1286, 1394–1396, 1397*n*,
 1440, 1484–1485, 1514, 1559, 1623,
 1630–1631, 1650, 1654–1655, 1659
- Routt, Garland C., 1380*n*
- Royall, Kenneth C., 1232, 1236
- Ruegger, Paul J. A., 1176
- Rusk, Dean, 537–539, 541–543, 546, 556–
 562, 566*n*, 573–580, 586*n*, 587–589,
 600–603, 605, 617–618, 625*n*, 626–627,
 637*n*, 643*n*, 648*n*, 651, 659–664, 676,
 699–701, 729–732, 736–737, 746–747,
 750–751, 754–755, 760*n*, 769*n*, 771*n*,
 775*n*, 797–798, 813*n*, 817, 819*n*, 820–
 821, 823–825, 829–830, 833*n*, 835–
 837, 845, 858–860, 864–865, 866*n*,
 873–874, 877–879, 886–889, 891*n*,
 893–895, 897, 905, 920–923, 925–927,
 930–936, 941–942, 947–948, 965–969,
 974, 981, 993, 999, 1007–1008, 1016,
 1019, 1021, 1036*n*, 1037, 1045*n*, 1058,
 1068, 1171, 1197*n*, 1198*n*, 1209–1210,
 1222–1223, 1227, 1236, 1286*n*, 1320,
 1326*n*, 1330*n*, 1331–1332, 1360*n*,
 1364*n*, 1371, 1397–1398, 1413*n*, 1439–
 1441, 1448–1449, 1463, 1470,
 1471*n*, 1474, 1484–1485, 1489, 1491,
 1495, 1498–1499, 1502*n*, 1503, 1504*n*,
 1505–1506, 1511–1512, 1514–1516,
 1528–1529, 1535, 1543–1545, 1594,
 1598, 1607–1608, 1629–1630, 1635–
 1636, 1638*n*, 1663–1664, 1685*n*, 1689
- Sabur, Brigadier, 991–992
- Safwat, Ismail, 535, 609, 863*n*
- Said, Nuri as-, 535
- Sanders, William, 1171*n*
- Sandifer, Durward V., 1085, 1087, 1134*n*,
 1146, 1175
- Sargent, Sir Orme G., 563*n*, 1047, 1373,
 1375, 1388, 1591, 1602–1603, 1617,
 1625, 1681
- Sassoon, August Elias, 1347*n*, 1473*n*,
 1502, 1506, 1548, 1618, 1623–1624,
 1647, 1667–1668, 1699–1700
- Satterthwaite, Joseph C., 581–584, 1099,
 1129–1131, 1132*n*, 1151, 1171*n*,
 1198*n*, 1217–1218, 1261–1262, 1272,
 1360*n*, 1396*n*, 1431, 1437–1438, 1445–
 1446, 1462*n*, 1468*n*, 1499, 1551*n*,
 1568, 1584, 1601, 1636, 1650, 1657,
 1668–1669, 1671*n*, 1679*n*, 1680,
 1685*n*, 1692–1693, 1701
- Saudi Arabia (*see also Saudi Arabian
 subheadings under individual sub-
 jects*), 888, 996, 1217
- Saugstad, Jesse E., 1102
- Savage, Carlton, 632*n*, 976, 1087, 1222*n*
- Sawfat, Ismail. *See* Safwat, Ismail.
- Sayre, Francis B., 993, 1008, 1015*n*
- Scheib, Israel, 1142
- Schukraft, Gladys E., 760*n*
- Selective Service system, 798, 800, 833,
 852, 1323
- Senator, Werner, 1321, 1328
- Serot, Col. Andre P., 1412, 1442, 1493
- Servoise, Rene, 1542
- Shaltiel, David, 1141, 1158, 1201, 1263
- Sharabati, Ahmad, 556, 707*n*
- Shawkat Pasha, 1700*n*
- Sherman, Vice Adm. Forrest P., 632*n*,
 1236, 1251, 1275
- Sherringham, 1377
- Shertok, Moshe, 539–540, 566–569, 608,
 640–643, 645–648, 712, 714–717, 732,
 761–763, 776–777, 810, 864, 866*n*,
 874–876, 878, 881, 893–894, 917–920,
 922, 926, 929–932, 934, 939–942, 945–
 946, 948, 955, 973–974, 995, 1004*n*,
 1005*n*, 1011–1013, 1051, 1058–1059,
 1074, 1082, 1084–1085, 1096, 1104–
 1105, 1107*n*, 1118*n*, 1136, 1142, 1151,
 1164, 1187, 1191–1192, 1198*n*, 1199,
 1224*n*, 1249*n*, 1256–1258, 1277*n*,
 1286*n*, 1287, 1295–1296, 1313–1314,
 1324–1327, 1331–1332, 1334, 1336–
 1338, 1345, 1368, 1375*n*, 1376–1378,
 1384–1386, 1398, 1414–1415, 1428–
 1429, 1435, 1437, 1452–1492, 1502*n*,
 1506, 1514–1515, 1526–1527, 1544–
 1545, 1562, 1576–1579, 1581–1582,
 1584, 1598–1600, 1603, 1607*n*, 1619–
 1621, 1630–1632, 1635*n*, 1680, 1690,
 1700*n*, 1704–1706
- Shiloah, Reuven, 1615, 1679–1680, 1705,
 1706*n*
- Shipley, Ruth B., 1129
- Shukeri (Shukairy), Ahmad al-, 1117,
 1584*n*
- Siam. *See* Thailand.
- Silver, Abba Hillel, 609, 620–621, 707,
 709–713, 717–718, 878, 900, 917–920,
 922, 930, 1165, 1420
- Slim, William, 1680–1681, 1683
- Smith, Trafford, 737, 936, 949
- Smith, Walter Bedell, 767, 988, 1075,
 1081, 1370–1371, 1480
- Snetsinger, John, 745
- Sobolev, Arkady Alexandrovitch, 616,
 809, 817, 821, 1237, 1260, 1413*n*
- Solh, Riad Bey. *See* Sulh.
- Solh, Takhiddin, 1117
- Solod, Daniel, 1342, 1370
- Souers, Sidney W., 592–593, 797, 1324*n*,
 1594*n*
- Southeast Asia, 1681
- Sovereignty, 910–911, 918–921, 923–924,
 928–929, 932, 973–974, 998, 1052,
 1135, 1137, 1144, 1151, 1163, 1165–
 1166, 1169, 1184–1185, 1189*n*, 1191,
 1253, 1267, 1281, 1288, 1309, 1343,
 1356, 1363, 1386, 1440*n*, 1441, 1552,
 1686
- Soviet satellites, 616, 645, 656, 667, 673,
 900, 953, 1139, 1142, 1163, 1285,
 1322–1324, 1360–1362, 1460, 1531,
 1547, 1578, 1593–1594, 1652, 1661,
 1675, 1703

- Soviet Union (*see also Soviet subheadings under individual subjects*): Political and military activities and pressures, 692, 695, 1056, 1169, 1182, 1293; United Nations, policy toward, 616; U.S. recognition of, 1053; U.S. relations with, 965, 988-989, 1021
- Spain, 992, 1049, 1282
- Stabler, Wells, 1039, 1086, 1188*n*, 1195*n*, 1202-1203, 1237-1238, 1419-1420, 1426-1427, 1447*n*, 1465-1466, 1501-1502, 1505-1506, 1548, 1556-1557, 1564-1565, 1617-1618, 1623-1624, 1641-1642, 1646-1648, 1660*n*, 1667-1668, 1674, 1688, 1694-1695, 1699-1700, 1706
- Steinhardt, Laurence A., 1177
- Sudan, 1157
- Suez Canal: Defense of, 1683; U.S. position regarding right of transit through, 1023*n*, 1108
- Sulh (Solh), Riad al-, 534, 536, 863*n*, 1116-1117, 1121-1122, 1245, 1347*n*, 1417, 1465, 1568-1569, 1658, 1660-1661, 1664-1665
- Sweden, 805, 871*n*, 1282, 1643
- Switzerland, 1282, 1578
- Symington, W. Stuart, 797, 1232, 1236
- Syria (*see also Syrian subheadings under individual subjects*), 778, 1026, 1030, 1061, 1246, 1341-1342, 1350-1351, 1370-1371
- Taft, Charles, 903
- Taft, Robert A., 1533
- Tarasenko, Vasilii Arkady, 810, 820
- Tardini, Msgr. Domenico, 1572-1573
- Tedder, Lord, 1047-1050, 1585, 1587-1589, 1680, 1683-1684
- Teheran Conference, 1943, 988
- Tel, Maj. Abdullah el-, 1076, 1234*n*, 1558, 1619, 1634, 1638, 1662*n*, 1668, 1687, 1699, 1700*n*, 1705
- Templer, Lieutenant General, 1047, 1530-1532
- Tennessee Valley Authority, 1048
- Thailand, 1259
- Thompson, Llewellyn E., 868
- Thorp, Willard L., 737-742, 1087
- Tomlinson, John D., 1364*n*, 1454*n*
- Trans-Arabian pipeline, suspension of work on, 564
- Trans-Arabian Pipeline Company, 1333*n*
- Transjordan (*see also Transjordanian subheadings under individual subjects*):
- British air force installations in, 1293, 1310, 1319, 1684, 1703
 - Greater Syria, policy toward, 1169, 1238, 1419, 1471
 - Jewish claims to, 669, 672
 - Palestine mandate, part of original, 1152-1153, 1655
- Transjordan—Continued
- Recognition by U.S., question of, 1120*n*, 1165, 1255, 1291, 1306, 1359-1360, 1379, 1383-1384, 1420, 1426-1427, 1655-1656, 1659-1660
 - Separation from Palestine, 1922, 646, 778, 963
 - U.N. membership, application for, 1165, 1186, 1306, 1345, 1359, 1620, 1656
 - U.S. diplomatic establishment, question of, 1119-1120, 1165
- Treaties, conventions, agreements, etc.:
- Anglo-American financial agreement, 1945, 635
 - Anglo-American Palestine Mandate Convention, 1924, 690-691, 963*n*
 - Anglo-Egyptian treaty, 1936, 534, 581, 1064, 1066-1067, 1071, 1157, 1396-1397, 1499-1500, 1611, 1698, 1701, 1703-1705
 - Anglo-Iraqi treaty, 534-535, 581, 597, 1064, 1066-1067, 1071
 - Anglo-Transjordanian treaty of alliance, 581, 1020, 1038, 1064, 1066-1067, 1071, 1101, 1168, 1292, 1315, 1345, 1396-1397, 1429*n*, 1521, 1537, 1540, 1571-1572, 1586, 1602, 1647-1648, 1667, 1669, 1689
 - Brussels treaty, 1034
 - Egyptian-American treaty of 1929, 1561
 - Italian peace treaty, 591
 - Saadabad pact, 1937, 596
 - Suez Canal Convention of 1888, 1108
 - Treaty of friendship, neutrality, conciliation, and arbitration between Greece and Turkey, 1930, 1371
 - Treaty of Lausanne, 998
 - United Nations Charter, 1945, 556, 558, 562*n*, 569, 571, 575, 577, 584-586, 588, 590-591, 602, 617-618, 621-622, 628, 638-639, 648*n*, 649-650, 652-653, 658-659, 661-662, 675, 678, 681-684, 689, 696, 706, 714, 717, 727-728, 731, 734-735, 738, 740, 742-743, 748, 751, 759, 771-773, 778-780, 791, 793-796, 802, 806, 814-815, 829*n*, 831, 848, 855, 861-862, 865, 885, 888, 897, 911, 922, 936-937, 942, 949-950, 962*n*, 987, 998-1001, 1003-1004, 1008-1009, 1011, 1016-1017, 1019, 1024-1025, 1027-1028, 1032-1033, 1036, 1044-1045, 1058, 1067, 1070-1071, 1078, 1110, 1127-1128, 1169, 1172-1174, 1197, 1198*n*, 1202-1203, 1206-1208, 1212, 1215, 1218, 1224, 1228, 1259, 1289, 1303, 1321-1322, 1357, 1359, 1362, 1368, 1372, 1381, 1399, 1422, 1433-1434, 1436, 1481, 1504, 1519*n*, 1525, 1538-1539, 1543, 1546-1547, 1556, 1583, 1614, 1620, 1690, 1703

- Trieste, Free Territory of, 591, 1343, 1356
- Trott, Alan C., 1216
- Troutbeck, Sir John M., 1193-1194, 1229, 1390, 1394-1396, 1398-1400, 1423, 1485
- Truman, Harry S.:
- Anglo-American cooperation in the Middle East, 578*n*
 - Arab refugees from Palestine, 1324, 1326*n*, 1331-1332, 1428*n*, 1444, 1478, 1486, 1491, 1507, 1511*n*, 1554-1555, 1567-1568, 1581, 1635, 1648
 - Conversations with: Ambassador Wadsworth, 592-595; Amir Faisal of Iraq, 594; Chaim Weizmann, President of Israel 737, 807, 1036-1037, 1042*n*, 1050-1052; Judah L. Magnes of Hebrew University of Jerusalem, 904*n*; Julius Klein of Jewish War Veterans, 1380-1381
 - Correspondence with: Ben Gurion, 1004-1005; Epstein, 989; Evatt, 987-988; Farouk, 621, 634*n*; Ibn Saud, 621, 634*n*; Iman of Yemen, 571*n*; Jinnah, 569, 621, 634*n*; Weizmann, 807-809, 982-983, 1042-1043, 1050-1051, 1549-1551, 1633-1634
 - Displaced persons, request for legislation concerning, 1252, 1255
 - Egyptian blockade, 1462
 - Export-Import Bank loan for Israel, proposed, 1300, 1313, 1346, 1391, 1432, 1514, 1633, 1676*n*
 - Israel: *De facto* recognition of, 746, 974-975, 977*n*, 983, 989, 992-994, 1002, 1004-1007, 1013*n*, 1030, 1051-1052, 1055, 1059, 1394, 1432, 1513, 1549; *de jure* recognition, proposed, 1036-1037, 1233, 1359, 1360*n*, 1379-1380, 1391-1392, 1408, 1432, 1513, 1634, 1676*n*; exchange of diplomatic representatives with, 1051, 1058, 1060*n*, 1074, 1118, 1131-1132, 1140, 1151, 1178, 1232-1233; U.N. membership for, proposed, 1391
 - Middle East, importance to U.S. security of, 840*n*
 - Palestine Conference in London, 1946, 579
 - Palestine partition plan, 557, 569, 571*n*, 592-598, 621, 626*n*, 633-634, 637, 640, 645, 648-649, 651, 666*n*, 677-678, 690-691, 693, 697, 728, 730, 744-747, 755, 759-760, 771-773, 813*n*, 888, 967, 974, 982
 - Press conference on Palestine, May 27, 1948, 1072-1074
 - Proclamation on arms embargo, 1110
 - Protection of Americans in the Middle East, 1037
- Truman, Harry S.—Continued
- Resumption of hostilities by Israel, 1690, 1701-1702, 1704
 - Soviet Union, U.S. policy toward, 987*n*, 988-989
 - Statement of June 5, 1947, 562
 - Statement of U.S. policy regarding Palestine, Mar. 25, 1948, 759-760, 764-765, 767*n*, 770-773, 801, 807
 - Threat to peace in Palestine, 1007-1008, 1021, 1036*n*
 - Tigris-Euphrates valley development, proposed, 1636
 - Transjordanian attack on Palestine, threat of, 865*n*
 - Truce between Arabs and Jews in Palestine, 877-879, 887, 891-893, 904, 915, 922, 925, 927, 930, 967, 972, 974, 976
 - U.N. Commissioner for Palestine, proposed, 957-958
 - U.N. General Assembly Special Session on Palestine, 972-974, 976, 978, 984
 - U.N. military observers in Palestine, 1080*n*, 1094-1095, 1155-1156
 - U.N. Palestine Truce Commission, 852-853, 866*n*
 - U.N. Security Council cease-fire proposals, 1064, 1070-1071, 1084, 1127, 1155, 1172, 1200, 1207-1208, 1221, 1313, 1320, 1364
 - U.N. trusteeship for Palestine, proposed, 744-752, 759, 764, 774, 824*n*, 829-830, 841, 966
 - U.S. arms embargo, 1008, 1027-1028, 1055*n*, 1233
 - U.S. Marine guards for U.S. Consulate General at Jerusalem, 1462
 - U.S. military forces for Palestine, proposed, 542, 673, 760*n*, 774, 798, 842
 - U.S. policy regarding a Palestine settlement, 1337-1340, 1363-1364, 1366, 1369*n*, 1372, 1387, 1413-1414, 1420, 1430-1432, 1437-1439, 1446, 1459, 1463, 1466*n*, 1467, 1470-1473, 1475-1476, 1489-1490, 1494, 1496, 1502-1504, 1507, 1509, 1512-1514, 1523, 1527-1529, 1533, 1535-1536, 1539-1541, 1549-1554, 1565-1567, 1570-1572, 1583-1585, 1594*n*, 1595, 1598-1602, 1606-1610, 1624-1625, 1628-1630, 1658-1659, 1664, 1685*n*, 1694
 - U.S. representative on the U.N. Conciliation Commission for Palestine, 1693
- Truman, Margaret, 744
- Truman Doctrine, 695
- Tsarapkin, Semyon Konstantinovich, 1221*n*
- Tsiang, Tingfu F., 700, 705, 707, 710, 712-713, 717-718, 720, 725, 727-728, 732-733, 735-737, 809, 1089

- Tuck, S. Pinkney, 539-540, 677-678, 804*n*, 812, 830, 832*n*, 844*n*, 862-863, 870-872, 879, 915-916, 991-992, 996, 1042*n*, 1152
- Turkey, 551, 560, 579, 596, 695, 806, 833, 901, 960, 1030, 1048-1049, 1169, 1182, 1185, 1217, 1222, 1362, 1429, 1530, 1649, 1657, 1663-1664, 1692
- Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. *See* Ukrainian position *under* Palestine : U.N. Security Council.
- Union of South Africa, 636
- Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. *See* Soviet Union.
- United Kingdom (*see also* *British subheadings under individual subjects*), 691-692
- United Nations (*see also* *U.N. subheadings under* Palestine) :
- Economic and Social Council, 1153, 1170, 1249, 1255, 1312
- General Assembly Regular Session at Paris :
- Atomic energy, 1439, 1470, 1471*n*
- Committees: *Ad Hoc* Committee on Palestine, 568, 586*n*. 620-621, 684; Committee I, 716, 796*n*; Committee IV, 835, 863; Committee V, 1478; Contributions, 1478; Interim, 644, 1013
- Conventional armaments, 1471*n*
- Greek question, 616, 644, 1470, 1502-1504
- Korean situation, 616, 644
- Membership questions, 644, 1259, 1299, 1631, 1659, 1677
- Soviet disarmament proposals, 1439, 1470
- Soviet position, 644
- Trusteeship agreements, 683
- League of Nations functions, transfer to the United Nations of certain, 683
- Secretary-General (*see also* Lie, Trygve, 540, 565*n*, 572*n*, 591, 605*n*, 613, 655, 675, 681, 683-684, 725, 727, 740, 743, 770-771, 779, 809, 814-815, 905, 943, 957, 979, 995, 999-1000, 1098-1099, 1116, 1129-1130, 1139, 1156, 1158, 1174-1175, 1180, 1192, 1225, 1227, 1251, 1253, 1308, 1331, 1335, 1361, 1388-1389, 1395, 1397, 1400, 1408, 1411-1412, 1442, 1454*n*, 1458, 1460-1461, 1483-1484, 1488-1489, 1497-1499, 1510-1511, 1524-1525, 1547, 1572, 1592-1593, 1635
- Security Council :
- Anglo-Egyptian case, 1351
- Armed forces for the Security Council *under Article 43* of the Charter, lack of, 618, 639, 653
- Azerbaijan question, 1530
- Berlin question, 1530
- United Nations—Continued
- Security Council—Continued
- Egyptian candidacy for Security Council seat, 1350-1351
- Kashmir dispute, 599, 728
- Maintenance of international peace and security, 543, 558, 575, 590-591, 638-639, 648*n*, 653, 659, 661-662, 665, 681, 697, 728-729, 731, 735, 742, 747, 770, 814, 942, 1000-1001, 1022, 1180-1181, 1289, 1362
- Membership questions, 644, 1259, 1299, 1631, 1658, 1676-1677, 1679, 1690, 1692
- Trieste question, 591
- Trusteeship agreements, 683
- Veto question, 543, 664, 673, 680, 685, 689, 865, 911, 921-922, 936, 1175, 1182, 1223*n*, 1345, 1372, 1535, 1537, 1540, 1554, 1575, 1620
- Withdrawal of French and British troops from Syria and Lebanon, 1946, 706
- Specialized agencies, 1171, 1406, 1454-1455, 1457, 1478, 1498-1499, 1553
- Trusteeship Council, 1221*n*
- United Nations guard, 1139, 1156, 1175, 1460
- U.S. policy toward, 692-694
- U.N. Balkan Commission, 1079, 1093-1094, 1504
- U.N. Consular Commission in Indonesia, 904
- U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 1170-1171
- U.N. Good Offices Committee in Indonesia, 904, 1079, 1093-1094
- U.N. International Children's Emergency Fund, 1333, 1351, 1365, 1454-1458, 1478, 1498, 1510-1511
- U.N. Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, 1454
- U.N. Relief for Palestine Refugees, 1008, 1465-1466, 1635
- U.S. Congress :
- Arab refugee problem, 1252-1253, 1255, 1262-1263, 1273, 1333*n*, 1365, 1454, 1456, 1458, 1478, 1491, 1511, 1522-1523, 1555, 1581, 1635, 1648
- Displaced persons, proposed legislation for, 849
- Egyptian blockade, 1462
- House Foreign Affairs Committee, 988
- Palestine question, 548, 553, 557, 562-563, 565, 569, 581-582, 620-621, 626, 666*n*, 690-691, 757, 829, 841, 1073, 1461, 1533-1534
- Selective Service, 852
- Senate, 633, 867*n*
- Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 755*n*

- U.S. economic and military assistance to Greece and Turkey (Truman Doctrine), 695
- U.S. Maritime Commission, 1023, 1126, 1462*n*
- U.S. Tariff Commission, 1561
- Universal military training, proposed, 852
- Uruguay, 1639, 1643
- Vafiades, Markos, 1416
- Vandenberg, Arthur H., 1532, 1534, 1635
- Vatican, 1572-1573
- Venezuela, 550, 1639, 1643
- Venizelos, Eleutherios, 1371
- Vigier, Henri, 1689
- Villard, Henry S., 628-629, 1087, 1099, 1172, 1221*n*, 1416
- Vyshinsky, Andrey Yanuaryevich, 1081, 1370, 1663
- Wadsworth, George, 592-599, 850*n*, 1041-1042, 1152
- War Council (U.S.), 1236
- Warren, George L., 1364*n*
- Wasson, Thomas C., 811, 817, 832*n*, 842-843, 864, 866*n*, 889-891, 894, 945-947, 954, 956-957, 971-972, 984-986, 990*n*, 1030, 1046, 1150*n*
- Wedemeyer, Lt. Gen. Albert C., 632*n*
- Wehba, Sheikh Hafiz, 847
- Weizmann, Chaim, 737, 807-809, 823-824, 982-983, 1036-1037, 1042-1043, 1046-1047, 1049-1052, 1072-1073, 1301, 1326-1327, 1398, 1549-1551, 1606-1607, 1633-1634, 1704
- Welles, Sumner, 677, 1165
- Western Europe, 898, 938, 1391
- Western European Union, 833, 1169
- Weyland, Otto P., 632*n*
- Whitman, Roswell H., 1468*n*
- Wilkins, Fraser, 537-539, 613, 640, 724, 771*n*, 813-817, 824*n*, 882, 926, 936, 972, 1060*n*, 1084-1085, 1087, 1099, 1232-1233, 1308*n*, 1345, 1348, 1440, 1452, 1484-1485, 1577, 1676, 1679
- Wilson, Woodrow, 690, 1053
- Wise, Stephen S., 1431-1432, 1438
- World Health Organization, 824, 944, 951, 957, 979, 995, 1170, 1312, 1455, 1478, 1498
- World Zionist Congress, 737
- Wright, Michael R., 738*n*, 1032, 1080-1081, 1097, 1121, 1143-1144, 1148, 1189-1190, 1192-1194, 1239-1240, 1249-1250, 1266, 1274, 1293*n*, 1373-1375, 1383, 1388, 1394, 1396, 1426, 1432*n*, 1439, 1463-1464, 1475, 1517, 1534, 1536-1538, 1585, 1588-1591, 1602, 1681, 1684
- Wyman, Lt. Col. Leslie H., 1090-1091
- Yadin, Col. Yigal, 1615
- Yalcin, Hüseyin, 1693
- Yalta Conference, 1945, 988
- Yasin, Sheikh Yusef (Yusuf), 534, 1146-1147, 1150*n*
- Yellin, Nathan Friedman, 1142
- Yemen (*see also* Yemeni position under Palestine: Intervention by Arab states), 571*n*, 718, 1009, 1010*n*
- Yugoslavia, 558, 602, 695, 1247, 1282-1283
- Zeineddine, 1342, 1370-1371
- Zia, M. S., 1419
- Zionism, 550, 553, 753, 757, 887, 1056, 1081, 1308, 1675
- Zionist references, 547, 549, 564, 570, 595, 597, 634, 646, 757, 842-843, 848-849, 886, 899, 901, 992, 997, 1045, 1056, 1125, 1131, 1179, 1206, 1230, 1246, 1279, 1282-1283, 1381, 1411, 1421-1422, 1464, 1538*n*, 1698*n*
- Zionists, 549-550, 583-584, 624-625, 758, 841, 888, 901, 992, 997*n*, 1031, 1035, 1045, 1100, 1155, 1281, 1285, 1349, 1410, 1423, 1655*n*, 1675
- Zorin, Valerian Aleksandrovich, 1432

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